GURAMA JAURO & ANOR v. BUBA DANMARAYA (2016)

GURAMA JAURO & ANOR v. BUBA DANMARAYA

(2016)LCN/8123(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 25th day of January, 2016

CA/J/139/2010

RATIO

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: WRIT OF SUMMONS; WHETHER A STATEMENT OF CLAIM SUPERSEDES A WRIT OF SUMMONS

It is a cardinal principle of law that a statement of claim supersedes a writ of summons; hence if some special form of relief be claimed on the writ and not in the statement of claim, it will be taken that so much of the claim is abandoned. So also, where in the statement of claim a consequential relief is added to the claim in the writ, such additional claim will be deemed as claimed before the Court. Thus, the statement of claim is more authoritative. See Oyu V ACB International Insurance Co. (Nig.) Ltd (2008) LPELR-2827(SC); Omnia (Nig.) Ltd V Dyktrade (2007) LPELR-2641(SC); Arabambi V Advance Beverages Industries Ltd (2005) LPELR-529(SC); Gbadamosi V Dairo (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 137; & Lahan V Lajotan (1972) LPELR-1748(SC). per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.

TORT: TORT OF TRESPASS; WHETHER A TRESPASSER CAN CLAIM POSSESSION BY HIS OWN ACT OF TRESPASS

This issue of adverse possession further weakens the arguments of the Appellants with regard to the application of the Limitation Law against the claim of the Respondent since a trespasser cannot claim possession by his own act of trespass. See Onanubi V Ogunfolu (2009) LPELR-3730(CA); Aromire V Awoyemi (1972) 1 ALL NLR 101 at 103. per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: TITLE TO LAND; WAYS TO PROVE TITLE TO LAND

In law, a party claiming declaration of title to land in dispute is under a duty to prove by any or all of the five ways his title to the land in dispute. These five ways, namely: evidence of traditional history; production of title documents; acts of ownership; acts of long possession and acts of possession of adjacent or adjoining land, which have crystallized over the years in a long line of decided cases as are replete in the law reports, are each if proved by credible and cogent evidence capable of and sufficient to ground a claim of title to land in dispute. See IdundunV. Okumagba (1976) 6-10 SC 48. See also Morenikeji V. Adebugun (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 825) 612; Ojah V. Eviaware (FWLR (Pt. 57) 163; OkorIe V. Onyejuwa (2001) FWLR (Pt. 41) 1820. Per. BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. GURAMA JAURO
2. YARIMA DAN ALI Appellant(s)

AND

BUBA DANMARAYA Respondent(s)

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an Appeal against the decision of the High Court of Justice Gombe State in Suit No. GM/93/2000 delivered on the 22nd October, 2007 in which Judgment was entered in favour of the Respondent in a claim in respect of title to land filed by the Respondent.

The Respondent in his claim before the Lower Court stated that he had hired out a part of the farmland he inherited from his father to the Appellants. That subsequently after paying rents on the land for two years, the Appellants failed to pay further rents for periods ranging for between 16 to 20 years. On the part of the Appellants, they contended that the Respondents father was granted the farmland as a traditional tenant who did not pay any rent. That the land was supposed to revert to the Appellants parents after the Respondents father vacated same, which never happened as the Respondents father lived and died on the farmland, as did his wife and some of his children. The issue as to the land had been taken variously before two Area Courts, Upper Area Courts and the Sharia Court

of Appeal, and the proceedings from these Courts were all tendered in evidence before the Lower Court.

At the close of trial, the Appellants in their final address to the Lower Court contended that the Respondent, in his claim did not seek title to the farmland in dispute, but only claimed for rent for thereon which was outstanding. The Appellants also contended that the suit was an abuse of Court process since there was a pending Order by the Sharia Court of Appeal (in the Exhibit BD6) transferring the suit to the High Court of Justice Gombe for hearing on the basis that the Sharia Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to decide the issues involving non-Moslems. The Appellants contend that the Respondent disregarded that suit and filed another suit before the Lower Court. However, in his Judgment, the learned trial Judge discountenanced this submission and, on the 22nd day of October, 2007, entered Judgment in favour of the Respondent. It is against this decision that the Appellants are appealing. Dissatisfied, they filed a Notice of Appeal on 05-11-07 wherein they complained on seven grounds.

?On 27th October, 2015, when the Appeal was called up for

hearing, learned Counsel for the Respondent was not in Court even though there was proof of service of a hearing notice duly served on him through his Counsel, C. D. Kadala & Co, received by its Secretary, Nade Sale. It was also on Record that the Respondent, having been duly served the Appellants? Brief of argument, had also not filed a Respondent?s Brief of argument, and so this Court had granted leave for the Appeal to be heard on the Appellants? Brief alone. Consequently, learned Counsel for the Appellants, Jonathan Mshelizah Esq., duly argued the Appeal by adopting the Appellants? Brief of argument filed on 07-07-15 as their submissions in the Appeal. He urged the Court to allow the Appeal and to set aside the Judgment of the Lower Court.

?In the said Brief of argument, the Appellants distilled three issues for determination from the seven grounds of Appeal as follows:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in assuming jurisdiction, proceeding to try this matter and ultimately entering Judgment in same? (Grounds 1, 5, and 6)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge, based on the pleadings

and the totality of the evidence before him, was right to have granted all the reliefs sought by the Respondent? (Grounds 2, 3, and 4)
3. Whether the entire proceeding is not caught by limitation of time such as to deprive the trial Court of Jurisdiction to try the same? (Ground 7)

I adopt the issues as formulated in the determination of the Appeal, except for some minor corrections in grammar to make them more comprehensible. However, I must observe that the arguments marshaled under the issues were quite disjointed and jumbled as Counsel mixed up arguments under one issue for the other, and in many cases, was repetitive. Much as the Brief of argument tendered to be quite incoherent, in line with the authorities on the issue, I will try and make some sense of the submissions of Counsel as he attempted to set them out in his arguments under the three issues.

Issue one:
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in assuming jurisdiction, proceeding to try this matter and ultimately entering judgment in same?

?Learned Counsel for

the Appellants submits that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction when it heard and determined this matter. He contends that the act complained of occurred in 1984 when, according to the Respondent?s witnesses, he was chased out of the farmland which he let on hire to the Appellants. Consequently, he submits that the trial Court should have given effect to the provisions of the Bauchi State Limitation Law 1989, applicable to Gombe State.

?Counsel submits that the Appellants were, according to the testimony of the Respondents? witnesses, in possession of this farmland for periods ranging from between 16 to 18 years. He contends that the Respondent throughout that length of time, neither sought a declaration of title to the said farmland nor did he seek to evict the Appellants from the said farmland. That all he did, from the various exhibits, particularly Exhibits BD1, BD2 and B3, was to sue for rents for hiring out the land, and not for ownership. He argues that, assuming but not conceding that the farmland belonged to the Respondent, he has slept over his right as time had lapsed by the provision of Section 5(1) of the Bauchi State Limitation

Law applicable to Gombe State, CAP 84. He submits that by virtue of this provision, the Respondent was out of time in pursuing his right to the farmland and the trial Court?s only recourse was to declare the action as being statute-barred. Counsel therefore submits that the cause of action arose in 1984 when the ownership of the Respondent was challenged by the action of the Appellants in driving him out of the land, and yet he did nothing towards seeking a declaration in respect of the disputed farmland. He therefore contends that the Respondent had acquiesced to the Appellants? ownership of the land.

?Counsel submits that the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental that it should be determined first by the Court before the commencement of proceedings. Where a Court proceeds without jurisdiction, all proceedings however well conducted, amount to a nullity. He submits further that the trial Court, being without jurisdiction by reason of effluxion of time, the matter should have ended there with the Court striking out the same. He relies on AG Lagos State V Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552 SC; & Okadigbo V Emeka (2012) AFWLR (Pt. 623)

Page 1869 at 1881 paras E-F.

Furthermore, Counsel submits that what the trial Court in determining the suit only summarized the evidence of the witnesses without evaluating same. He argues that a traditional tenant, in proof of his title, must testify as to how he came about his title and must also show by credible evidence how the person through whom he is claiming his root of title, acquired the land in the first place. He relies on Aigbobahi V Aifuwa (2006) AFWLR (Pt. 303) 202 at 213 paras A-E for the ways of proving title to land.

He contends that the only evidence of title adduced by the Respondent is that he inherited the farmland from his father who was given some bush to clear by the Paramount Chief of Billiri, Maiyamba; that there is no evidence provided by the Respondent as to how Maiyamba came by his title. Instead, it is his contention that evidence was supplied by the Appellants through DW1 that the Galadima gave land belonging to the parents of the Appellants to the Respondents father, Mallam Bello, on loan but he never vacated the land as was envisaged. Instead, he died on the land and never returned the same to the

Appellants. Counsel submits that DW2, the Galadima of Kalmai, also testified in the same vein and under cross examination, he stated that the Respondent was given the land on condition that when he leaves, the land will revert to the owners. He therefore submits that the learned trial Judge did not evaluate the evidence of these witnesses alongside those of the Plaintiff?s witnesses, in reaching its decision.

Counsel further submits that that there is evidence before the Lower Court that this matter was transferred from the Sharia Court to the High of Justice as the Court lacked jurisdiction, and that this is borne out by Exhibit BD6. He submits that the Court did not also properly resolve this issue. He argues that since the Respondents did not proffer any explanation for instituting this suit while another was pending, the Lower Court ought to have dismissed this action as being an abuse of its process.

?It is further submitted by Counsel that there were material contradictions in the evidence of the Respondent?s witnesses which were never resolved by the Lower Court and yet, all the reliefs sought were granted the Respondent. He submits

that the Respondent variously testified that the arrears of rent claimed were for 12 and 18 years respectively, and yet he did not explain the discrepancy. Counsel submits that where a trial Court fails to evaluate the evidence placed before him, even though it had the opportunity of seeing the witness, this Court is in as good a position to step in and do so. He relies on Cash Affairs Finance Limited V Inland Bank (Nig) Plc (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 658) 568 at 580. He therefore urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent as the learned trial Judge erroneously assumed jurisdiction in the suit and proceeded to enter Judgment for the Respondent even though time for bringing the action had lapsed. In the alternative, Counsel submits that there were material contradictions in the evidence of the Respondent which were not resolved before Judgment was entered in his favour.

?Findings:
Under this issue, the Appellants challenge of the Judgment of the Lower Court is two-pronged as follows:
(a) That by virtue of Section 5(a) of the Bauchi State Limitation Act applicable to Gombe State, the suit was statute-barred; and<br< p=””

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(b) That the suit was an abuse of Court process as there was already pending before another High Court another suit in respect of the same claim.

Section 5(a) relied upon provides as follows:
?5. Accrual of right of action in case of present interests in land.
(1) Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he claims, has been in possession thereof, and has while entitled thereto been dispossessed or discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.”

?This same issue was raised by the Appellants before the trial Court unsuccessfully. It was the considered view of the Lower Court that having regard to the facts of the case as disclosed in the evidence, the wrong was a continuing one and so the relevant provision applicable was Section 8 of the Law, and thus the suit was not statute-barred. Section 8 of the said Law also provides thus:
?8. Accrual of right of action in case of forfeiture or breach of condition.
A right of action to recover

land by virtue of a forfeiture or breach of condition shall be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken:
Provided that, if such a right has accrued to a person entitled to an interest reversion or remainder and the land was not recovered by virtue thereof, the right of action to recover the land shall not be deemed to have accrued to that person until his interest fell into possession, as if no such forfeiture or breach of condition had occurred.?

?Now the question to be answered is: was the suit of the Respondent filed before the Lower Court in excess of 10 years after the cause of action accrued to make it statute-barred? I have carefully scrutinized the pleadings and evidence before the Lower Court in this regard. Clearly, the dispute over the farmland started a long time ago. Indeed, from the evidence of the Respondent himself, he approached the first Area Court sometime in 1981 where he sued the Appellants and two other persons for refusing to pay him the agreed rent in respect of the farmland. The Area Court Billilri apparently found in favour of the

Appellants. However, the proceedings of this Court were not tendered before the Lower Court. The Respondent felt aggrieved and appealed to the Upper Area Court, Kaltungo. The said Upper Area Court delivered its Judgment on 08-09-82 (as in the Exhibit BD1) setting aside the Judgment of the Billiri Area Court and making an order of re-trial before the Tangale Waje Civil Area Court. The suit before that Court was promptly commenced on 25-10-82 and Judgment was delivered on 30-12-82 (Exhibits CD1 and CD2 at pages 1 and 5 thereof). The Respondent, as Plaintiff before that Area Court, had stated his claim and the Appellants had responded as follows (at pages 1 to 2 of the proceedings):
?That I Buba Maraya, I am suing the Defendant claiming for the amount of money in respect of my farmland which they are hiring it which my old father died and left to me. They are hiring the said farmland since for the past 7 years, they only paid for two years terms, remaining the balance for five years terms unpaid. The balance with them are as follows:
Damji ? N500
Gurama ? N400
Dan Ali

? N400
I made an appeal to UAC Kaltungo whereby I was transferred to this Court i.e. T/Waje A/Court Billiri.
Court to Gurama: Do you hear the statement made by the Plaintiff, do you agree or have you any explanation to made.
Ans. Gurama: I heard him, the farmland in dispute was given on hire to me by Dan-Ali, and I have already paid him his money. And I only farm the farmland for one year?
Court to Dan-Ali: Do you hear the statement made against you by Buba, and what have you got to say in regard to that. Buba is saying that he is claiming the sum of N4000 for the farmling (sic) he gave you on hire is that correct.
?
Ans. Jauro Dan Ali: What I know is that realy (sic) I know Damji gave me money the sum of N30.00 for the period of two years while I was hiring on Buba?s farmland. But I was just an immediator (sic) between them? And how Gurama came about the farmland in dispute is that there was a year Buba?s wife delivered and Buba has nothing to offer for the naming ceremony, and when I asked

him how he is going to do, he told me he has a farmland and he want to lease it or give it on hire to someone, that if I should get him who will give him a sheep for the naming ceremony or if I myself should give him the sheep, that he will give me the farmland in dispute. And when we finish that discussion, then we went to Gurama and Gurama gave us the sheep, then in my present he gave the farmland to Gurama, but he did not show us the intention whether he is going to sell it, or give it on hire? About myself, where I am now farming, we have never had any agreement with Buba that I am going to pay hire, because of the relationship between me and him Buba, upto the time Buba left, there is nothing like payment of hire between me and Buba.? (Emphasis supplied)

?At the close of trial, the Area Court found for the Respondent/Plaintiff inter alia as follows (at page 7 of the Record):
?The Court do make an order that Danji is to pay the sum of N60.00. Then he Gurama, since he accepted occupying the farmland on hire for the

period of three years on the sum of N30 per year. The Court do hereby ordered him to pay Buba his money for the farmland which he spend farming it, which money is N90 for 3 years.
Dan?Ali on his own part, since the Court did not receive or collect any evidence, no evidence was adduced to prove that there was such a transaction between him and Buba for hiring the farmland at the sum of N80.00 per month? The Court hereby ruled that from today the 30/12/2002 (sic), you Dan?Ali, Gurama, Danji you are all hereby ordered to hand over the farmland in your possession to the owner that is Buba. Court to Danji and Gurama:- The Court hereby ordered you to bring the sum of N60 and N90 respectively to Buba for the hiring of the farmland on or before 6/1/82 (sic) at around 8:am.?

?The Respondent was dissatisfied with the monetary awards made and so filed an Appeal to the Upper Area Court Kaltungo on 01-03-84. On 26-03-84, the UAC rendered its decision (as in the Exhibit BD2) wherein it dismissed the Appeal and confirmed the decision of the Area Court, Tangale Waje. In addition, the 1st Appellant herein, Dan Ali,

also lodged an Appeal to the same Upper Area Court, Kaltungo against the decision of the Area Court Tangale Waje on 25-01-84. This Appeal was similarly dismissed on 26-03-84 (as disclosed in Exhibit BD3) as the 1st Appellant was advised to file a separate action for title instead of an Appeal, if he intended to challenge the title of the Respondent.

?Thereafter, on 30-01-95, the Respondent again sued the Appellants for trespass into his farmland and for failing to pay rent on the farmland for 12 more years. In its Judgment delivered on 13-02-95 (as disclosed in Exhibit BD4), the Area Court Sabon Layi convicted the Appellants for trespass under Sections 348 and 152 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to a fine of N800.00 each, while also ordering them to pay the Respondent rent on the farmland covering the period of 12 years, plus the sums of N12, 000.00 each, and to also vacate the farmland. From Exhibit BD5, this latter Judgment was reported to the Upper Area Court Kaltungo on 29-06-95 by the Director of Area Courts, Bauchi in view of some irregularities in the proceedings, and the conviction and sentence of the Appellants was set aside on 05-07-95,

with an order that the fines paid by the Appellants be refunded to them.

Yet again dissatisfied, the Respondent filed an Appeal to the Sharia Court of Appeal, Gombe State on 06-08-96 vide his Notice of Appeal in the Exhibit BD7. The Sharia Court of Appeal however, on 27-10-98, declined jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal under Section 242(1) of the 1979 Constitution on the ground that the parties to the Appeal involved non-Moslem persons. It therefore transferred the Appeal to the High Court of Justice, Gombe State vide Exhibit BD6.

?I have taken time and space to examine and set out the chequered history of the dispute over this farmland since the first suit was filed sometime in 1981, in order to determine the issue of whether or not it is caught by the Limitation of Actions Law of Bauchi State, as canvassed by the Appellants. From all the narration, it is self evident that at no time did the Respondent sleep over his right or can he be described as being indolent. Instead, the evidence discloses that he has doggedly and resolutely fought his case at so many levels and before so many Courts before finally arriving at the Lower Court. The learned

trial Judge was therefore quite correct when he found that, on the evidence before him, the proper provision to be applied is Section 8, and not Section 5(a) of the Limitation of Actions Law of Bauchi State applicable to Gombe State.

?Finally, in respect of the claim that the suit before the Lower Court was an abuse of Court process, Exhibit BD6 reveals that the Sharia Court of Appeal declined jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal of the Respondent and transferred the case to the High Court. Contrary to the submission of learned Counsel for the Appellant, the mere pronouncement by the Sharia Court transferring the Appeal to the High Court is not, without more, sufficient to initiate proceedings before that Court. If the Respondent was still interested in pursuing that Appeal, then with that order, it was incumbent upon him to initiate proceedings before the appropriate Court by filing Court processes in that regard. Having not done so, and the Appellants having failed to adduce evidence of another suit in that regard, there is no evidence of any Appeal pending before the High Court on the same issue that could have constituted an abuse of Court process, as

alleged by the Appellants. The Lower Court was therefore right when it held as it did that there was no evidence of any other pending suit on the same matter before the High Court of Justice, Gombe State. Based on all the findings above, I resolve this issue against the Appellants.

Issue two:
Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have granted all the reliefs sought by the Respondent based on the Statement of defence and the totality of the evidence placed before him?

Learned Counsel argued that, in reaching its decision, the trial Court did not take into consideration the pleadings as well as the evidence adduced and the exhibits tendered on both sides. That it went further to grant a relief not sought by the Respondent. He submits that Exhibits CD1 and CD2 did not order that the Respondents vacate the farmland in dispute. Instead, it only ordered that the Appellants pay outstanding rents.

?Furthermore, it is argued that the Respondent failed to prove his root of title. He submits that PW1 and PW2 testified as to the knowledge of the grant to the

father of the Respondent, but during cross-examination they testified that they were not present when the grant was made, but were only told about same. He submits that it is not sufficient for the Respondent to say that he inherited the title from his late father who got the same from the Maiyamba. He needed to have gone further to supply evidence of how the Maiyamba himself came by the land, which he failed to supply. Reliance is placed on Awoyoolu V Aro (2006) AFWLR (Pt. 308) 1319. He however contends that the evidence on the root of title of the Maiyamba was supplied by the Appellants through DW1 and DW2, the latter who testified that he was present when the disputed land was given to Bello, the father of the Respondent temporarily, and that the DW3 affirmed this testimony. Counsel submits that since this evidence was not contradicted by the Respondent, he failed to prove his root of title to entitle him to Judgment.

?Counsel further submits that the doctrine of resulting trust can be pleaded on behalf of the Appellants. From the evidence of DW3, the farmland was given to the father of the Respondent on the understanding that he would vacate same as he

was a Fulani cattle rearer who would normally not settle permanently. He submits that since this was the understanding, it is proper to infer that the disputed farmland reverted to the Appellants. He relies on Ezennah V Atta (2004) ALL FWLR 1858 at 1885, paras E-F; & Madu V Madu (2008) FWLR 1604 at 1630, paras E-F.

Counsel further submits that the Appellants, by their pleadings in paragraphs 1, 2, and 5, pleaded that the property, the subject matter of the dispute, belonged to their forefathers who, upon the instruction of the village head, loaned same to the father of the Respondent as a non-paying customary tenant with an understanding that the land would revert to the Appellants. He argues that the Appellants adduced evidence in proof of these averments. He therefore urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.

?Thus, Counsel also submits that the failure of the Respondent to prove his root of title by credible evidence disentitles him to the disputed farmland. He relies on Otanma V Youdubagha (2006) FWLR (Pt. 300) 1574. He contends that there are conflicting pieces of evidence as to how he came about the disputed

farmland and these conflicts were not clarified by evidence to warrant their being resolved in his favour. In addition, Counsel submits that the Respondent, in his Statement of Claim had abandoned his claim in the Writ of summons for hiring the farmland, and instead went ahead to establish title to the disputed farmland, which evidence he submits, still fell short of that needed to prove traditional title. He therefore urged the Court to disregard the finding of the trial Court that the Appellants did not prove their title to the farmland in dispute. The burden of proof was on the Respondent who claimed title to the disputed farmland and he did not discharge that burden.

?Findings:
Before going into the evidence, the Appellants have argued that the Lower Court was wrong to have awarded the Respondent title to the farmland in dispute when he did not claim for same. However, an examination of the Record of proceedings of the Lower Court quickly dispels this mistaken notion. While it is true that by the Writ of Summons issued on 25th May, 2000 (at pages 1-2 of the Record), the claim was

limited to ejecting the Appellants from the land, perpetual injunction, recovery of the outstanding rents on the farmland as well as general damages for trespass; it was superseded by the Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff dated 15-01-2001 and filed on 18-01-2001 (at pages 5-7 of the Record). The claim was therefore articulated as follows:
25. WHEREOF the Plaintiff claims from the Defendants as follows:
(a) DECLARATION that the farmland situate as (sic) Lakelengu in Billiri LGA of Gombe State is the inherited property of the Plaintiff.
(b) An order of Court ejecting the Defendants from the Plaintiffs land.
(c) Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants by themselves, their privies, servants and relations howsoever called from entering into or tempering (sic) with the Plaintiffs farmland.
(d) The sum of N500.000.00 as general damages for trespass when the Defendants entered the farmland and continued to stay on it without the consent of the Plaintiff and destroyed the Plaintiffs house and economic trees.

(e) The cost of this action and other incidental expenses.

?By his pleadings before the Lower Court, it is evident that the Respondent pleaded as his root of title inheritance of the farmland from his father Jauro Mallam Bello, who, after he was given the land by the Paramount

Chief, Maiyamba, cleared the bush and cultivated it. To prove his claim, he adduced evidence through six witnesses and also testified in person as PW5. PW1, PW2 PW3 and PW4, all elderly men in their seventies, consistently testified that the farmland in dispute was given to Jauro Mallam Bello, (the Respondent?s father) by the said Chief and that the Respondent subsequently inherited the farmland from his father after the latter?s demise. PW6, the Registrar of the Tangale Waje Area Court, Billiri, tendered the Record of proceedings in Suit No. 398/82 between Buba Dan Maraya V Dan Ali, Danji & Gurama, and same was admitted in evidence as Exhibit CD1 and CD2. Therein, as has already been reproduced in the body of this Judgment, the 2nd Appellant admitted that the land was hired out to him while the 1st Appellant agreed he was given land by the Respondent but not on hire.

?The Appellants on their part in paragraph 18 of their Amended Statement of Defence (at pages 16-20 of the Record), while not counter-claiming for title, denied the claim of the Respondent and stated that the farmland in dispute belonged to their parents and was only loaned

to the Respondent?s father. However, no further details were given as to names of these parents and the details of their alleged ownership, in addition to the parents? root of title. While it is true that the Appellants? witnesses, DW1, DW2, DW3, DW4 and DW5 testified that the farmland was only given on loan to the Respondent, they did not give any cogent evidence on the purported ownership of the land by the Appellants? parents. As was rightly pointed out by the Lower Court, the evidence of the DW7 (1st Appellant herein) on his root of title when he stated that it was his father who cleared the land, was contradicted by the evidence of DW4 who stated that the Appellants inherited the land from their grandfather, Maitodo, and not from their father. Through DW6, the Registrar of the Area Court, Kaltungo, Exhibits BD1, BD2, BD3, BD4, BD5, BD6 and BD7, being Records of proceedings of various Courts, were tendered in evidence by the Appellants themselves.

?From the Exhibits CD1 and CD2, the record of proceedings of the Tangale Waje Area Court (as already reproduced in my findings under issue one above), both Appellants made statements

in Court variously admitting that whereas the 2nd Appellant hired the land, the 1st Appellant was given the land to farm by the Respondent. This was their viva voce evidence. The futile attempt by the 1st Appellant to appeal against the decision of that Court was unsuccessful as the Upper Area Court Kaltungo advised the 1st Appellant to sue for title before another Court. This is clearly reflected in the Record of proceedings of that Court tendered by the Appellants in Exhibit BD3. These pieces of evidence directly from the Appellants therefore contradicted the evidence adduced through the DW1 to DW5 to the contrary that the land belonged to them. The evidence of the Appellants was therefore rightly rejected by the Lower Court as fabricated since they had earlier themselves given evidence to the contrary in the Court proceedings of 25-10-82 (Exhibits CD1 and CD2). Consequently, I am satisfied that in view of the evidence adduced by the Respondent through PW1 to PW5, in conjunction with Exhibits CD1 and CD2, the learned trial Judge was right when he found that the Respondent proved his title to the farmland in dispute, as well as the claim of hiring out the

land to the Appellants.

Furthermore, in view of the appalling action of the Appellants in chasing their landlord, the Respondent, away from the farmland after their Appeal had failed before the Upper Area Court, Kaltungo on 26-03-84 (Exhibit BD3), the Appellants were rightly described by the Lower Court to have resorted to self-help, an action which is consistently deprecated by the Courts. This resort to self-help is even more grievous when it is an action taken by tenants against their overlord/landlord. The Appellants were therefore in adverse possession of the land. The law is settled that long and adverse possession can never ripen to an absolute ownership. See Bello V Birma (2014) LPELR-23969(CA); Ngene V Igbo (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 133 at 148; & Aturase V Sunmola (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 105.

?This issue of adverse possession further weakens the arguments of the Appellants with regard to the application of the Limitation Law against the claim of the Respondent since a trespasser cannot claim possession by his own act of trespass. See Onanubi V Ogunfolu (2009) LPELR-3730(CA); Aromire V Awoyemi (1972) 1 ALL NLR 101 at 103. Issue two is therefore

equally resolved against the Appellants.

Issue three:
Whether the entire proceeding is not caught by time as to deprive the trial Court of jurisdiction to try same?

Under this issue, learned Counsel for the Appellants essentially repeated his arguments and submissions already canvassed under issue one. It therefore serves no useful purpose to rehash them here. Consequently, this issue having been extensively and comprehensively dealt with under issue one, the findings therein are also adopted. Issue three is therefore similarly resolved against the Appellants.

In the result, having resolved all three issues against the Appellants, I find the Appeal totally lacking in merit. It fails and is accordingly dismissed.

SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading in draft the lead Judgment delivered by my Lord, Sankey, JCA. I agree entirely with the Judgment.
My Lord in the lead Judgment has fully and comprehensively dealt with all the issues raised in this Appeal. I also dismiss this Appeal as lacking

merit.

?BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.:?This appeal, which raises three pertinent issues for consideration and determination, is one with a chequered history dating back to the year of our Lord 1981, when the Respondent as Plaintiff sued the Appellants and two others before the Area Court Billiri. It would appear that the struggle between the parties as to who owns the land in dispute is yet to abate despite several decisions of the various Courts before which the parties had litigated upon this issue. It is this chequered history which perhaps, in my view, formed the basis for the orchestrated allegation of abuse of Court processes by the Appellants against the claims of the Respondent and also the issue of the claims of the Respondent being statute barred as raised by the Appellants both before the Court below and this Court in this appeal.?

In the lead judgment, a copy of which draft I have been privileged to read in advance, just delivered by my learned law lord, JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA; all these apparently crucial but truly and factually baseless allegations and contentions of the Appellants have been most

exhaustively and brilliantly considered and resolved in the negative against the Appellants. I am in complete agreement with both the reasoning and conclusions reached therein, which I hereby adopt as mine. I shall, however, for the purpose of emphasis add a few words of mine to the scintillating lead judgment.

By the clear reliefs sought by the Respondent as Plaintiff vide paragraph 25 of the statement of claim filed on 18/1/2001 as could be found at pages 5-7 of the Record of Appeal, the claim of the Respondent was rooted in an action for declaration of title to the land in dispute situate at Lakelengu in Billiri LGA of Gombe State. On the joinder of issues on the pleadings of the parties, it would appear that while the Respondent as Plaintiff before the Court below relied on evidence of traditional history of title by way of devolution of the land on him from his father one Jauro Mallam Bello, the Appellants also relied on evidence of traditional history of title as by devolution on them from their unnamed parents. Each of the parties called a horde of witnesses if proof of their respective averments in their pleadings as to the ownership of

the land in dispute. At the conclusion of trial, in its considered judgment, the Court below found for the Respondent as against the Appellants. In addition to the viva voce evidence of traditional history as led by the parties, they also tendered in evidence some documentary evidence.

Now, while on the one hand the Respondent averred to and led credible, cogent and consistent evidence in proof of

the allocation of the land in dispute to his father, one Jauro Mallam Bello by the Paramount Chief Maiyamba and the consequent clearing of the bush and subsequent cultivation thereon, the Appellants on the other hand failed to lead any credible and consistent evidence of who their parents are and how they came to be owners of the land in dispute which they claimed devolved upon them. As if that was not enough, it could also be seen readily in Exhibits CD1 and CD2, that while the 1st Appellant admitted that the land was merely given to him by the Respondent though insisting that it was not on hire, the 2nd Appellant admitted clearly that the land was hired out to him by the Respondent.

In law, admission of facts against self interest is not only admissible but is also perhaps the strongest form of evidence available to the adverse party in any suit between the parties and the adverse party is perfectly entitled to rely upon and make use of such admission in support of his claim. See Ezemba V. Ibeneme (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 617 @ p. 661-662. See also FCE V. Anyanwu (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 533.

On the printed record, considering the evidence

led by the parties through their witnesses and the documentary evidence coupled with the clear admission of the Appellants in Exhibits CD1 and CD2, an admission which was contrary to their averments that the land belonged originally to their parents, though even unnamed, and was loaned to the Respondents father, it is clear and I so hold that the Court below was perfectly right when it found for the Respondent as having proved his title to the land in dispute and such a finding of fact being correct and impeccable cannot be disturbed in any way by this Court in this appeal as in law it is not the business of an appellate Court to interfere with the correct findings of the trial Court and this is so even where the reason leading to such correct findings turns out to be wrong. See Alhaji Ndayoko & Ors. V. Alhaji Dantoro & Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 187 @ p. 198.

It is thus the law, and I think it is worth reiterating here, that a party shown to be in trespass on land in dispute, no matter the duration of his occupation in trespass or use of the land remains a trespasser ab initio and thus the length of his occupation or user of the land, no

matter how long, cannot translate into ownership of the land since in law no trespasser is allowed to derive a possessory title from his trespass.

?It is also the law that where an entry into possession of land is originally permitted as under a transaction, once such a transaction is declared void or found to be void ab initio or ceased to have any legal effect, such a lawful entry losses its lawfulness and thus acquires an illegal or unlawful character entitling the person with a better title to the ownership and right to possession of the land.

?It is for this germane reason that in law the proof of ownership is prima facie proof of right to possession and thus where there is a dispute as to which of two persons is in possession the presumption is that the person having a title to the land is also entitled to and in lawful possession. See Solomon V. Mogaji (1982) 11 SC 1. See also Jegede V. Gbajumo (1974) 10 SC 183.

It follows therefore that the Respondent having proved by credible and cogent and consistent evidence his root of title to the land in dispute and the fact of the hiring it out to the Appellants’ father- in-law the fact of a permitted use

of land of one by another cannot, no matter how long, ripen into ownership of such a land and so it is on the proved evidence in this case as between the Respondent and the Appellants, whose fathers original entry into the land in dispute was with the permission or leave of the Respondent. See Sanya & Anor. V. Sauman & Ors. (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 618) 917.

It is with the above few words of mine and for the more elaborate reasons so brilliantly marshalled out in the lead judgment that I too hereby hold that this appeal is devoid of any iota or modicum of merit and thus liable to be dismissed in its entirety and I hereby so dismiss it. Consequently, the judgment of the Court below in Suit No: GM/93/2000 delivered on 22/10/2007 is hereby affirmed.

Appearances

Jonathan Mshelizah, Esq.For Appellant

AND

No appearanceFor Respondent