OKEZIE VICTORY IKPEAZU v. ALEX OTTI & ORS
(2015)LCN/7997(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 3rd day of September, 2015
CA/OW/EPT/GOV/2/2015
RATIO
APPEAL: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION; WHEN MUST A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION BE RAISED
It is now settled law that though a Respondent can validly raise and embed a preliminary objection in the Respondents brief of argument. It is however germane that because such objection is preliminary as the word connotes, it must be raised at the introductory stage of the brief or hearing of the Appeal before the parties formally adopt their briefs of argument. See the case of NSIRIM VS NSIRIM 1990 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 285; ACB V SAPUGO (1995) 6 NWLR (P7339) 65; UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC VS NWANAJUO (2012) LPELR (7914) CA. See also OFORKIRE VS MADUIKE (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 166 where the Supreme Court held that, where the notice of preliminary objection is embedded in a respondent?s brief, the Respondent must seek to obtain the leave of court to move the objection before the oral hearing of the Appeal commences. Failure to do so is fatal to the objection as it will be deemed to have been waived and therefore abandoned. See also BEN VS STATE (2006)16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 582; ODJEGBA VS ODJEGBA (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt. 858)589. It follows therefore that a preliminary objection must of necessity be moved and argued before the hearing of an Appeal given that a preliminary objection if upheld has the effect of terminating an Appeal. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
APPEAL: ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION; WHETHER EVERY ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION MUST BE FORMULATED OR BASED UPON OR RELATED TO A GROUND OF APPEAL
It has been restated over and over by the Supreme Court and it is a firmly established principle that every issue for determination must be formulated, or based upon or relate to a ground of Appeal. This is so whether or not the said issue or issues were formulated by the Appellants or the Respondents. It does not however preclude the respondent from couching an issue in a manner favourable to his case provided it is distilled or relates to a ground of Appeal. Thus, an issue for determination not derived from a ground of Appeal or relate to it is incompetent and liable to be struck out with the argument in support. See MAGIT VS UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, MAKURDI (2005)19 NWLR (PT959) 211; MOMODU VS MOMOH (1991)2 SC 1; CBN VS DINNEH (2010) LPELR (8983) CA; EFFIONG BOB VS AKPAN (2009) ALL FWLR (PT491)894 AND TRIANA LTD VS U.T.B. PLC (2009)12 NWLR (PT1155)313. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION: THE EFFICACY OF THE PARAGRAPH 12(5) OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE TO CURE CERTAIN MISCHIEF IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ELECTION PETITIONS
Given the chequered history of election Petitions in this country and the use and abuse of preliminary objections to scuttle or frustrate the hearing of Petitions on the merit and leading to some Petitions outliving the four year term of an elected candidate, it became not only desirable but imperative for the legislature to intervene and restore sanity to our judicial process as it relates to Election Petitions. Hence, the mischief paragraph 12(5) seeks to cure to ensure that objections raised to a Petition do not delay, impede, derail or frustrate the determination of an election Petition on the merit, by undue and unwarranted delay occasioned by a preliminary objection. See OKE VS MIMIKO (2013)9 SCM 155. Also in BELGORE VS AHMED Supra, the Supreme Court per Tabai JSC emphasized on the efficacy of paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to cure certain mischief in the jurisprudence of Election Petitions. This court had also in a number of cases towed the same line and this includes AREGBESOLA VS OMISORE (2014) LPELR (24237) CA where at page 18-21 of the report it held per ABIRIYI JCA that:- Paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 provides as follows:
5. A Respondent who has an objection to the hearing of the Petition shall file his reply and state the objection therein and the objection shall be heard along with the substantive Petition. Paragraph 53 (5) of the same schedule to the Electoral Act on other hand provides thus:
(5) An objection challenging the irregularity or competence of an election Petition shall be heard and determined after the close of pleadings.? It is now trite law that election Petitions are sui generis that is, that they are in class of their own and governed by different rules. An election Petition is by nature a very peculiar proceeding which distinguishes it from an ordinary civil proceeding. See ABUBAKAR VS YAR?ADUA (2008) 19 NWLR (PT 1120) 1. IN NWOLE V. IWUAGWU (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 895) 61 the Court held thus: The courts have often harped on the need to do substantial justice in most cases without dwelling too much on technicalities in all election matters, the use of technicalities merely help to shut issues in controversy. Once it is agreed that election Petitions are in a class of their own, the handling of the matter too must take a form devoid of legal technicalities that tend to leave the litigants more confused. Boldness of a high degree is required of the electoral Tribunal, which must never be seen to shy away from obvious grave allegations. When paragraph 53(5) was in being paragraph 12 (5) came in on the 29th October, 2010 like a Trojan Horse. Paragraph 53 (5) itself came into effect on 20th August, 2010. Paragraph 12(5) was undoubtedly enacted for a purpose. That purpose was to enable election Petition Tribunals to handle election Petitions without undue reliance on technicalities. Although paragraph 53 (5) was not repealed, the law is that the provisions of the later enactment amend the earlier so far as necessary to remove the inconsistency between them. See AKINTOKUN V LPDC (2014) 5 SCM 1, OGBUINYA V. OKUDO (1979) 6-9 SC 32 AND DPP V INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (PT 626) 200. Paragraph (5). By paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act an objection to the hearing of a Petition. Learned counsel for the Appellant thinks the position is rather fluid when the challenge to the competence or regularity of the election Petition is not contained in the reply but is brought by way of motion on notice. I see no difficulty here. If it is a challenge to the Tribunal hearing the Petition whether the objection is stated in the reply or is brought by motion on notice, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear it along with the substantive Petition. Paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act is intended to reflect the sui generis nature of election Petitions. The mischief it intends to cure is to ensure that objections raised do not derail the determination of the merit of a case by undue and unwarranted delay occasioned by the preliminary objection. See OKE & ORS V. MIMIKO & ORS (2013) 9 SCM 155 AND PDP V. INEC (2012) 7 NWLR (PT 1130) 538. I am of the view that although the Appellant filed two motions on notice apart from the objections incorporated in his reply the Tribunal rightly invoked the provision of paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral 2010 when it decided to take the preliminary objections along with the substantive Petition. I believe and strongly too that by the above decision, this court has expounded and also provided greater illumination in the administration of ?Electoral Justice? and equally established an enduring threshold for the sustenance and facilitation of an efficient, speedy and less frustrating process of hearing and determination of Election Petitions. To further fortify this point, the Court of Appeal Benin Division in the very recent case of SENATOR DR. ARTHUR OKOWA VS GREAT OVEDJE OGBORU. (Unreported judgment delivered on 12th August 2015 in Appeal No CA/B/EPT/181/2015) held per SAULAWA JCA at page 10 thereof as follows:- As aptly held in the said sister appeal, paragraph 12(5) of the first schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), was introduced by the Electoral Amendment Act (No. 10) 2010, to the following effect:-
38. The First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 is amended-
(c) In paragraph 12, by inserting electi on a new subsection
(5)
(5) A respondent who has an objection to the hearing of the petition shall file his reply and state the objection therein, and the objection shall be heard along with the substantive petition. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EJEMBI EKO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HAMMA AKAWU BARKA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
OKEZIE VICTORY IKPEAZU Appellant(s)
AND
1. ALEX OTTI
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES GRAND ALLIANCE (APGA)
3. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)
4. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Election into the office of the Governor of Abia State was conducted on the 11th and 25th April 2015 by the Independent National Electoral Commission. At the conclusion thereof, the Appellant herein (OKEZIE VICTOR IKPEAZU) was declared winner and returned as elected.
The 2nd Respondent herein All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) was one of the political parties which participated in the said election and the 2nd Respondent was its candidate.
Dissatisfied with the declaration and return of the Appellant as the winner of the Election, the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a Petition dated 14th May, 2015. There are three Respondents to the said Petition. They are the Appellant, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 3rd Respondent herein and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which is the 4th Respondent in this Appeal.
Each of the Respondents to the Petition filed a separate reply to the Petition wherein they joined issues with the Petitioners and also raised sundry objections to the Petition.
?The Petitioners in turn filed replies in response to all three Respondents replies to the said
Petition.
This was subsequently followed by a number of motions by the parties in the Petition seeking one relief or the other and this includes the Appellant?s motion on notice dated 23-6-2015 seeking an order of the Tribunal to strike out the Petition. The Appellants second motion dated 29-6-2015 also sought for an order striking out the Petitioners (now 1st and 2nd Respondents) reply for non compliance of with Paragraph 16(1) (a) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as recommended) having raised fresh issues. The 1st and 2nd Respondents also reacted by filing counter affidavits and written addresses in opposition to the said motion. They in addition filed another motion on notice dated 16-7-2015 wherein they sought for the direction of the tribunal to defer the various preliminary objections till the end of trial of the Petition along with the final addresses.
?At the prehearing session held on 24-7-2015 the Tribunal ordered that all the pending motions be moved one by one by the relevant Applicants and same was done with necessary arguments canvassed in support. A few other motions were however on the application of counsel ordered to be heard
outside the pre-trial session.
At the resumed pre-trial session later on the same 24-7-2015 the Tribunal after granting one of the 1st&2nd Respondents application for an order to bring all Electoral materials used in the Governorship elections held on 11-4-2015 and 25-4-2015 Ruled as follows:-
TRIBUNAL:- The Tribunal in respect of these motions moved today by:-
?The Petition (sic) filed 16-07-2015; 29-6-2015,The 1st Respondents motions moved on 24-7-2015. The motions were filed 18-07-2015, 20-06-2015 and 30-06-2015 In respect of Motions of the 2nd Respondent moved (sic)24-07-2015. These motions were filed 01-07-2015, 01-07-2015 and 09-07-2015. In Respect of 3rd Respondent motions moved on 24-7-2015, the ones filed on 01-07-2015, 01-07-2015 and 02-07-2015. All these motions will be taken together with our judgement. Some of the motions are word for word with the preliminary objections raised in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents replies to the Petition and the Petitioners replies to the Respondents replies served on him.
?The above motion (sic) will be part of our judgment, Petitioners motion dated 16-7-2015 has been impliedly granted. Matter is adjourned to 31-7-2015 for
issuance of pre-trial Reports.
The Appellant felt aggrieved with the outcome of the Ruling and consequently filed a notice of Appeal dated 28/7/2015 and filed on 29-07-2015. It has six grounds of the Appeal.
This 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of argument is dated and filed on 14-8-2015.
The 3rd and 4th Respondents did not file any brief of argument.
The Appellant however filed a reply to the 1st and 2nd Respondents? brief and it is dated 18-8-2015 and filed on 19-8-2015.
At the hearing of the Appeal on 21-08-2015 the parties concerned duly adopted and relied on their respective briefs of argument.However, a perusal of the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of argument revealed that a Notice of Preliminary objection and the argument in support were embedded therein, particularly at pages 7 to 9.
?Unfortunately, the said preliminary objection was not referred to or moved before, during or even after the hearing of the Appeal. It is now settled law that though a Respondent can validly raise and embed a preliminary objection in the Respondents brief of argument. It is however germane that because such objection is preliminary as the word connotes, it must be raised at the
introductory stage of the brief or hearing of the Appeal before the parties formally adopt their briefs of argument. See the case of NSIRIM VS NSIRIM 1990 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 285; ACB V SAPUGO (1995) 6 NWLR (P7339) 65; UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC VS NWANAJUO (2012) LPELR (7914) CA. See also OFORKIRE VS MADUIKE (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 166 where the Supreme Court held that, where the notice of preliminary objection is embedded in a respondent?s brief, the Respondent must seek to obtain the leave of court to move the objection before the oral hearing of the Appeal commences. Failure to do so is fatal to the objection as it will be deemed to have been waived and therefore abandoned. See also BEN VS STATE (2006)16 NWLR (Pt. 1006) 582; ODJEGBA VS ODJEGBA (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt. 858)589.
It follows therefore that a preliminary objection must of necessity be moved and argued before the hearing of an Appeal given that a preliminary objection if upheld has the effect of terminating an Appeal. Consequently, where the preliminary objection is not moved immediately before the hearing of the Appeal, the end result is that it is deemed waived and abandoned. In the instant case, the 1st
and 2nd Respondent?s counsel, having not moved or argued the preliminary objection as embedded in their brief argument, it is hereby deemed abandoned. See OFORKIRE VS MADUIKE (Supra).
On the main Appeal, the Appellant formulated two issues for determination from the six grounds of Appeal. To wit:
1. Considering the fact that the Appellant?s motions filed on 25th June, 2015 and 30th June 2015, respectively were duly heard during the pre-hearing session, whether the lower Tribunal was not wrong when it refused to deliver its ruling on the Applications (Grounds 1,2,3, and 5 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the lower Tribunal was not wrong to have impliedly granted the 1st and 2nd Respondents application dated 15th July, 2015 (Grounds 4 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal).
?In the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of Argument the sole issue formulated for determination is:-
?Whether having regard to paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) the trial Tribunal came to the right decision in granting the Petitioners motion dated 16th July, 2015 praying their lordships to defer their decision until final addresses on the
Appellants motion challenging the Petition and averments therein on matters which parties had joined issues.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents? sole issue seem to fit in properly with the Appellants issue No2 but for a purposeful determination of this Appeal I will adopt the issues as raised in the Appellant?s brief of argument.
ISSUE ONE
Dwelling on this issue learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that pre-hearing sessions and scheduling are regulated by paragraph 18 of the 1st schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).
He made particular reference to paragraphs 18(1), 18(2) and 18(3) with emphasis on paragraphs 18(7)(d) which, if constructed alongside paragraph 18(6)(c) makes it clear that not only should all interlocutory applications be entertained at the pre-hearing but also that objections on points of law should be heard and determined during pre-hearing. Further reference was also made to paragraphs 47(1) and (2) of the said First Schedule.
It was further submitted that when paragraphs 18(6)(c); 18(7)(d) and 47(1) and (2) are cumulatively considered with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, the logical conclusion
would be to the effect that where motions are moved during pre-hearing, justice and fair play demands that rulings must be delivered thereon in the course of pre-hearing and not any other time.
On the authorities that interpretation of statues must be done in such a way as to arrive at a logical meaning and conclusion that aligns with common sense in arriving at the true intention of the legislature, Learned Senior Counsel citied the following cases:- AMAECHI VS INEC(2001) 12 NWLR (PT1048) 222 at 259; CHARLES OKIKE VS LPDC (2005) 3-4 SC 49; CPC VS INEC (2012)1 NWLR (PT1280) 106; ELOBANJO VS DAWODU (2006)15 NWLR (PT1001) 76 AT 138.
It was also submitted that when Section 140 (4) of the First Schedule is conjunctively interpreted with paragraph 47(1) of the First Schedule , it becomes obvious that the motion referred to in the said Section 140(4) of the Act relates to paragraph 47(1) which demands that the said motion must come up during pre-hearing which paragraphs 18(6)(c) and 18(7)(d) of the First Schedule mandates that it should be heard and determined during pre-hearing session which is fundamental to the hearing and determination of an election Petition and
during which objections can be properly taken vide NWANKWO VS YAR?DUA (2010) ALL FWLR (PT534)1 at 24-25.
Learned Senior Counsel referred to the prehearing session of the Tribunal held on 24-7-2015 where after hearing the Appellants applications filed on 25-6-2015 and 30-6-2015 the Tribunal reserved its ruling to be taken together with the judgment and submitted that the Tribunal did not determine the Appellants applications argued before it but instead opted to take the motions together with the judgement and closed the pre-hearing session. He added that such failure by the Tribunal to determine the said applications means that it acted without jurisdiction and as such breached the appellant?s right to fair hearing. He cited the following authorities:-MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLTD VS MONOKPO (2003) 18 NWLR (PT852) 346 at 412; ERIOBUNA VS OKORO (1988) 8 NWLR (PT616) 622; OKORO VS OKORO (1988) 3 NWLR (PT540) 65 at 74; OKEKE-OBA VS OKOYE (1994) 9 NWLR (PT364) 685 at 616.
?It was further contended that by the above cited authorities, the lower Tribunal has judicial duty not only to hear the Appellants applications filed on 25-06-2015 and 30-06-2015 but also to
determine same by delivering its ruling on each application one way or the other during the pre-hearing session which is meant to hold within a period of 14 days subject to extension by the Tribunal.
Learned Senior Counsel also argued that by the express mention of the 4th Respondent?s motion filed on 01-07-2015 as the ones to be taken together with the judgment, the Latin maxim (?expressio unis est exclusion alterius?) comes to play in which case it will apply to the statement of the Tribunal and in that regard the Appellant?s two motions are not included. Vide OBI VS INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (PT1046) 436 AT 485; MAJOR & CO. LTD VS SCHROEDER (1992) 2 NWLR (PT101)1 and AZUBUIKE VS GOVT OF ENUGU STATE (2014)5 NWLR (PT4100) 364.
?It was Learned Senior Counsel?s further contention that by failing or refusing to deliver the Ruling on the Appellants applications which have been duly argued before it, the Tribunal has breached the Appellants right to fair hearing. He relied on BAMGBOJE VS UNIVERSITY OF UNIILORIN (1999)10 NWLR (PT622) 290 AT 335; NTUKIDEM VS OKO (1896)5 NWLR (PT45) 909 AT 933; UNTHUMB VS NNOLI (1994)15 NWLR (PT363) 376 AT 402;
NJIOKWUEMENI VS OCHA (2004) 15 NWLR (PT895)196; NDUKAUBA VS KLOMA (2005)4 NWLR (PT915) 411; AND ZIIDEEH VS RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007)3 NWLR (PT1022) 554 AT 568.
Also citing the cases of OKONWO VS OKONWO (1998)10 NWLR (PT571)554 and IDAKWO V EJIGA (2002) 13 NWLR (PT783)783 he submitted that it is now settled law that a denial of the right to fair hearing completely vitiates the whole proceedings before the court or Tribunal whose decision is complained of making same liable to be set aside on Appeal.
It was also submitted that the innovation of the Tribunal, in ordering that motions be taken with its final judgment is not only impossible impracticable but also contrary to all known applicable rules of procedure and should therefore be rejected.
He also added that in failing to deliver its decision one way or the other in respect of the appellant?s application the Tribunal?s has acted outside its jurisdiction which is the life wire of an Action and determine the power of a court or Tribunal to entertain a case before it.
This court was then urged to allow the Appeal. Responding on the Appellants issue No(1) Learned Senior Counsel for
the 1st and 2nd Respondents inter alia, referred to paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended); Section 285 of the 1999 constitution (as amended) and Section 134 (2) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to posit that the 2010 amendments were effected by the Legislature to both the Constitution and the First Schedule whereby litigations from elections are to be disposed off within 180 days at the Tribunals and 60 days for Appeals to the court of Appeal. He added that the mischief sought to be cured is manifested in paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) which aim is to reduce the length of time spent on preliminary/ interlocutory objections in Election Petitions and for the Petitions to be determined on the merit.
It was therefore submitted that the Tribunal came to the right decision having found the Respondents in their respective replies had taken advantage of the first arm of p by raising their points of objection in those replies.
?On the object and intendment of paragraph 12(5) he referred to the position of the supreme court as held in BELGORE VS AHMED (2013) 8 NWLR (PT
1355) 60 and followed by this court in AREGBESOLA VS OMISORE. APPEAL NO CA/AK/EPT/GOV/237/2014 delivered by the court of Appeal on 9th December 2014 or (2014) LPELR (24237) CA.
It was further submitted that the authorities citied by the appellant in his brief of argument predates the constructions placed on paragraph 12(5) by the Supreme court and this court and therefore renders those authorities inapplicable.
Learned Senior Counsel added that the Appellants right to fair hearing must accommodate the exigencies of time limitation for disposal of the business of the Tribunal and in this case there is no such infraction by the method adopted by the Tribunal. He cited in support INAKOJU VS ADELEKE (2007)7 NWLR (PT1025) 423 AND ANSAMBE VS BON LTD (2005)8 NWLR (PT928) 650.
?He added that in the instant case the parties moved and argued their motions and the Tribunal availed them the opportunity to adopt and adumbrate their written addresses before adjournment for the Tribunal to give its decision on them one way or the other and time to give such decision by law has not lapsed, so no serious issue can be raised on the approach adopted even if it includes making a
decision on a jurisdictional point.
It was further submitted that it would have been a different matter if the decision of the Tribunal was such as to terminate the case but herein, some live issues were left hanging and unresolved. Therefore, if all the materials to reach a just decision were before the court of Appeal and the Tribunal?s decision to determine the case is faulted, then the Court of Appeal should have no hesitation in invoking its power of rehearing under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004. Vide AGAGU VS MIMIKO (2009) 7 NWLR (PT1140) 342 at 430; IHABE VS ZAKARI (2012) 12 NWLR (PT1315) 517and ADAMS VS UMAR (2009) 5 NWLR (PT1133) 41. This court was then urged to resolve the issue against the appellant and dismiss the Appeal.
?The Appellant filed a reply brief dated 18/8/2015 and filed on 19-8-2015. The arguments in response thereof are contained in pages 6 to16 of the said Appellants reply brief and in pages 6 to 9 the Appellant raised and argued the point that the 1st and 2nd Respondents sole issue for determination is incompetent because it did not arise from any of the grounds of Appeal and as such should be discountenanced. The
following authorities were cited in support: GARUBA VS OMOKHODION (2011) 15 NWLR (PT108) 177; AKERE VS GOV. OYO STATE (2012) 12 NWLR (PT1314) 240; SOUTH TRUST BANK 812 ORS VS PHERANZY GAS LTD. 813 ORS (2014) 6 NWLR (PT1266) 1 at 1920.
It has been restated over and over by the Supreme Court and it is a firmly established principle that every issue for determination must be formulated, or based upon or relate to a ground of Appeal. This is so whether or not the said issue or issues were formulated by the Appellants or the Respondents. It does not however preclude the respondent from couching an issue in a manner favourable to his case provided it is distilled or relates to a ground of Appeal. Thus, an issue for determination not derived from a ground of Appeal or relate to it is incompetent and liable to be struck out with the argument in support. See MAGIT VS UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, MAKURDI (2005)19 NWLR (PT959) 211; MOMODU VS MOMOH (1991)2 SC 1; CBN VS DINNEH (2010) LPELR (8983) CA; EFFIONG BOB VS AKPAN (2009) ALL FWLR (PT491)894 AND TRIANA LTD VS U.T.B. PLC (2009)12 NWLR (PT1155)313.
?In the instant case the sole issue for determination as contained in page 9
of the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief reads thus:-
?Whether having regard to paragraph 12(15) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act (2010) (as amended) the trial Tribunal came to the right decision in granting Petitioners motion dated 16th July, 2015 praying their lordships to defer their decision until final addresses on the appellant?s motion challenging the Petition and averments therein on matters which parties had joined issues?.
I have carefully compared the said issue for determination with all the six grounds of Appeal filed by the appellant and I find it to be in tandem or to have derived from or relate to grounds 4 and 5 which are herein below set out.
?GROUND FOUR?
?The lower Tribunal erred in law and came to a perverse decision by impliedly granting Petitioners? motion dated 16/07/2015?.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. No reason was /is advanced by the lower Tribunal before impliedly granting Petitioners motion dated 16/07/2015.
2. Appellant joined issues with the Petitioners and opposed the motion dated 16-7-2015 on diverse grounds, including abuse of court processes.
?3. Lower Tribunal did not consider Appellants
counter affidavit written address and submissions before impliedly granting Petitioner?s motion dated 16-7-2015 thus breaching Appellants right to fair hearing.
GROUND SIX.
?The Learned Justices (sic) of the lower Tribunal erred in law and also came to perverse decision by impliedly granting Petitioners motion dated 16-07-2015.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. By the said motion dated 16-7-2015 Petitioners prayed thus:
?An order directing that all preliminary objections filed by the Respondents now pending before this Tribunal on that may be subsequently filed directed either against the hearing of the Petition challenging the competence of the Petition or any part thereof on any ground whatsoever, be taken along with the final addresses of parties at the conclusion of the hearing of the Petition.
2. The lower Tribunal had already taken arguments in respect of appellants? motions.
3. The Tribunal held thus: ?All these motions will be taken together with our judgment?.
4. Petitioners did not pay the Tribunal to take motions together with its judgment.
?5. The lower Tribunal is without jurisdiction to impliedly grant what the Petitioner did not
pay for.?
From the above set out grounds of appeal, it is to my mind, not in doubt that the sole issue as formulated by the 1st and 2nd Respondents are related to or derived therefrom. The fact that they made reference or emphasized on paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010(as amended) does not coat the said issue with incompetence given that a Respondent is allowed to couch a issue with a slant favourable to his case but within the ambit of the ground or grounds of appeal. Vide C.B.N VS DINNEH (Supra). In this regard I hold that the sole issue formulated in the 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of argument is properly derived and relates to grounds 4 and 5 of the Notice of Appeal filed on 29-7-2015 and contained in pages 1529 to 1536 of the Record of Appeal.
?As earlier stated, the Appellant?s response to the 1st and 2nd Respondents issue for determination is contained in pages 6 to 16 of their Reply and the points raised therein will be addressed in the course of this judgment as the need arises.
Now a perusal of the Record of appeal show that at the pre-hearing session of the Tribunal held on 24-7-2015 all the pending motions filed
by the parties where duly moved and argued except for those requested for and were ordered to be heard during the trial. The said proceedings are found at pages 1512 to 1528 of the Record. As regards the hearing of the pending motions the Tribunal directed as follows at page 1516 of the record.
?We now come to the issue of motions pending before us. Each party will take his motion one by one. A movant (sic) (mover) of a motion has 6 minutes, replies from other parties 3 minutes each. Starting with the Petitioners moving their motion…?
This was then followed with each counsel for the parties moving and arguing their motion as necessary, beginning with that of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
?For the Appellant, Learned Senior Counsel thereof, Wole, Olanipekun S.A.N. moved a total of three motions dated 15-7-2015, 23-6-2015 and 30-6-2015 as shown in pages 1518 to 1520 of the record.
?While the motion dated 15-7-2015 was granted on the said 24-7-2015 having not been opposed by any of the parties. The motions dated 23-6-2015 and 30-6-2015 had counter affidavits filed in opposition and supported by written addresses which were also adopted
thereat.
It was at the conclusion of hearing of the motions move by the relevant applicants that the Tribunal rose for one hour lunch break, and upon resumption of sitting delivered a ruling with respect to the 1st and 2nd Respondents? motion filed on 29-6-2015. Thereafter the proceedings went as follows:-
TRIBUNAL:- The Tribunal in respect of these motions moved today by:-
The Petition (sic) filed 16-7-2015, 29-06-2015,The 1st Respondent?s motions moved on 24-7-2015. The motions filed 18-07-2015, 25-06-2015 and 30-06-2015. In respect of the 2nd Respondent?s motion moved 24-7-2015. These 01-07-2015 and 01-07-2015 and 09-7-2015.In respect of 3rd Respondent motions moved on 24-07-2015 the ones filed 01-07-2015, 01-07-2015 and 02-07-2015. All these motions will be taken together with our judgment. Some of the motions are word for word with the preliminary objection raised in 1st, 2nd & 3rd Respondents replies to the Petition and Petitioners replies to the Respondents replies served on him. Since the above motion will be part of our judgement Petitioners motion dated 16-7-2015 has been impliedly granted. Matter is adjourned to 31-07-2015 for
issuance of pre-trial report.The Appellant?s grouse is that his motions dated 25-6-2015 and 30-06-2015 respectively, having been heard by the Tribunal during the pre-hearing session on 24-07-2015, it was wrong for the said Tribunal not to have delivered its ruling on them within the pre-hearing session but ordered that they will be taken together with the judgment. Reliance was placed on paragraph 18(6)(c) 18(7)(d) and 47(1) &(2) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) with emphasis on paragraphs 18(6)(c), 18(7)(d) and 47(1)& (2) which I now herein below reproduce:-
18(6) ?At the pre-hearing session, the Tribunal or court shall enter a scheduling order for:-
(c)filing and adoption of written addresses on all interlocutory applications.
18(7) At the pre-hearing session, the Tribunal or court shall consider and take appropriate action in respect of the following as may be necessary or desirable.
(d) Hearing and determination of objections on points of law.
47(1) ?No motion shall be moved and all motions shall come up at the pre-hearing session except in extreme circumstances with the leave of the Tribunal or court.
?(2)
Whereby these rules any application is authorised to be made to the Tribunal or court, such application shall be made by motion which may be supported by affidavit and shall state under what rules or law the application is brought and shall be served on the Respondent.?
The Respondents on the other hand relied on paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) supported with the case of BELGORE V AHMED and AREGBESOLA VS OMISORE (Supra) to contend that the Tribunal took the right path in reaching its decision to rule on the argued motions together with the judgment. The said paragraph is as follows:-
12(5) ?A Respondent who has an objection to the hearing of the Petition shall file his reply and state the objection therein, and the objection shall be heard along with the substantive Petition?.
?
?The above set out paragraph is very clear and unambiguous and it is directed at any objection challenging the competence of a Petition as in the instant case where Respondents at the Tribunal raised series of objection to the hearing of the 1st and 2nd Respondents? Petition, hence the Tribunal noted in its ruling at page
1528 of the Record that ?Some of the motions are word for word with the preliminary objection raised in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents? replies to the Petition?.
?As much as I agree with Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the provisions of paragraph 18 and 47 of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) must of necessity be complied with as they provide guide to the parties as well as the Tribunal on the proper procedure to be followed in the hearing of an election Petition. I however, with due respect fail to see how the Tribunal derailed in following the dictates of the aforementioned paragraphs given the clear and glaring provisions of paragraph 12(5) which wholesomely used the word ?shall? to input mandatoriness for such objection to be heard along with the substantive Petition. Given the chequered history of election Petitions in this country and the use and abuse of preliminary objections to scuttle or frustrate the hearing of Petitions on the merit and leading to some Petitions outliving the four year term of an elected candidate, it became not only desirable but imperative for the legislature to
intervene and restore sanity to our judicial process as it relates to Election Petitions.
Hence, the mischief paragraph 12(5) seeks to cure to ensure that objections raised to a Petition do not delay, impede, derail or frustrate the determination of an election Petition on the merit, by undue and unwarranted delay occasioned by a preliminary objection. See OKE VS MIMIKO (2013)9 SCM 155.
Also in BELGORE VS AHMED Supra, the Supreme Court per Tabai JSC emphasized on the efficacy of paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to cure certain mischief in the jurisprudence of Election Petitions. This court had also in a number of cases towed the same line and this includes AREGBESOLA VS OMISORE (2014) LPELR (24237) CA where at page 18-21 of the report it held per ABIRIYI JCA that:-
?Paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 provides as follows:
?5. A Respondent who has an objection to the hearing of the Petition shall file his reply and state the objection therein and the objection shall be heard along with the substantive Petition?. Paragraph 53 (5) of the same schedule to the Electoral Act on other hand provides thus:
(5) An
objection challenging the irregularity or competence of an election Petition shall be heard and determined after the close of pleadings.? It is now trite law that election Petitions are sui generis that is, that they are in class of their own and governed by different rules. An election Petition is by nature a very peculiar proceeding which distinguishes it from an ordinary civil proceeding. See ABUBAKAR VS YAR?ADUA (2008) 19 NWLR (PT 1120) 1. IN NWOLE V. IWUAGWU (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 895) 61 the Court held thus: ?The courts have often harped on the need to do substantial justice in most cases without dwelling too much on technicalities in all election matters, the use of technicalities merely help to shut issues in controversy. Once it is agreed that election Petitions are in a class of their own, the handling of the matter too must take a form devoid of legal technicalities that tend to leave the litigants more confused. Boldness of a high degree is required of the electoral Tribunal, which must never be seen to shy away from obvious grave allegations. When paragraph 53(5) was in being paragraph 12 (5) came in on the 29th October, 2010 like a
Trojan Horse. Paragraph 53 (5) itself came into effect on 20th August, 2010. Paragraph 12(5) was undoubtedly enacted for a purpose. That purpose was to enable election Petition Tribunals to handle election Petitions without undue reliance on technicalities. Although paragraph 53 (5) was not repealed, the law is that the provisions of the later enactment amend the earlier so far as necessary to remove the inconsistency between them. See AKINTOKUN V LPDC (2014) 5 SCM 1, OGBUINYA V. OKUDO (1979) 6-9 SC 32 AND DPP V INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (PT 626) 200. Paragraph (5). By paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act an objection to the hearing of a Petition. Learned counsel for the Appellant thinks the position is rather fluid when the challenge to the competence or regularity of the election Petition is not contained in the reply but is brought by way of motion on notice. I see no difficulty here. If it is a challenge to the Tribunal hearing the Petition whether the objection is stated in the reply or is brought by motion on notice, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear it along with the substantive Petition. Paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the
Electoral Act is intended to reflect the sui generis nature of election Petitions. The mischief it intends to cure is to ensure that objections raised do not derail the determination of the merit of a case by undue and unwarranted delay occasioned by the preliminary objection. See OKE & ORS V. MIMIKO & ORS (2013) 9 SCM 155 AND PDP V. INEC (2012) 7 NWLR (PT 1130) 538. I am of the view that although the Appellant filed two motions on notice apart from the objections incorporated in his reply the Tribunal rightly invoked the provision of paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral 2010 when it decided to take the preliminary objections along with the substantive Petition.?
?I believe and strongly too that by the above decision, this court has expounded and also provided greater illumination in the administration of ?Electoral Justice? and equally established an enduring threshold for the sustenance and facilitation of an efficient, speedy and less frustrating process of hearing and determination of Election Petitions.
?To further fortify this point, the Court of Appeal Benin Division in the very recent case of SENATOR DR. ARTHUR
OKOWA VS GREAT OVEDJE OGBORU. (Unreported judgment delivered on 12th August 2015 in Appeal No CA/B/EPT/181/2015) held per SAULAWA JCA at page 10 thereof as follows:-
?As aptly held in the said sister appeal, paragraph 12(5) of the first schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), was introduced by the Electoral Amendment Act (No. 10) 2010, to the following effect:-
38. The First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 is amended-
(c) In paragraph 12, by inserting election a new subsection
(5)
(5) A respondent who has an objection to the hearing of the petition shall file his reply and state the objection therein, and the objection shall be heard along with the substantive petition.
Interestingly, prior to the amendment of the Electoral Act, 2010 in question, there was no definite time limit for the disposal of petitions. Consequently, election petitions suffered inordinate delays. In most cases, election petitions outlived the four terms of the elective office that was litigated upon. Thus, with a view to curing or suppressing the mischief, the 1999 Constitution was amended vide Section 285(6) thereof:
?And for the purpose of meeting the clear candidates of
the Constitution, the legislature introduced paragraph 12(5) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act..
Going by the guiding principles of interpretation of statues, the amendment has to be construed liberally and beneficially so as to promote the suppression of the mischief clearly sought to be remedied. Thus, the provisions of paragraph 53(2) and (5) of the 1st Schedule notwithstanding, full effort must be given to paragraph 12(5) of the 1st Schedule.
On this question of whether by virtue of paragraph 12(5) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, the respondent rightly raised the objection to contain paragraphs of the petition at the time they did, I hold that the decision of Tribunal and affirmed by the court below is unassailable. See BELGORE VS. AHMED (Supra) per Tabai, JSC@ 92-93 paragraphs C-E. See also SA?EED VS. YAKOWA (Supra).
?In the instant case, it?s obvious from the record that the decision of the lower Tribunal, to the effect that all preliminary objections irrespective of whether or not they raised question of jurisdiction or competency of petition, must be heard along with the petition, is unassailable, and duly supported by the law
and authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and this court. And so I hold.?
In the instant case, the Tribunal took the pains to take all the motions before making an order that they will all be taken along with the judgment which means nothing more than, that the Rulings there from shall be delivered together with the judgment.
This brings me to an apparent misconception or wrong interpretation of the Ruling of the Tribunal on the issue. I observe that both the Appellant and the 1st and 2ndRespondents laboured under the erroneous impression that the 1st and 2ndRespondents? motion dated 16-7-2015 was specifically or expressly granted on 24-7-2015, and thus resulted in the order of the Tribunal deferring its ruling till final judgement. It is definitely not so. From my own understanding and appreciation of the said ruling part of which I am constrained to again reproduce. It reads:-
?All the motions will be taken together with our judgement. Some of the motions are word for word with the preliminary objection raised in 1st, 2nd, 3rd Respondents replies to the Petition and Petitioners replies to the Respondents replies served by him?.
?It
should be observed here that the Tribunal on its own and in apparent compliance with paragraph 12(5) of the first schedule ordered that all the motions will be taken with the judgement.
It was after having so ruled that it now followed with what I may term ?as an unwarranted and irritating surplusage? wherein the Tribunal added further follows:-
?Since the above motion (sic) will be part of our judgement, Petitioners motion dated 16-7-2015 has been impliedly granted.
This portion of the Tribunals ruling is no doubt unnecessary having decided on the fate of the argued motions in accordance with the First Schedule. What it would have at best done if at all is to have stated that the Petitioners motion dated 10-7-2015 has been overtaken by events.
Nevertheless, the said error of excess grammatical baggage does not alter the fact that the Tribunal acted rightly and within the ambit of paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010(as amended) and there is no modicum of miscarriage of justice or breach of right of fair hearing.
This issue is accordingly resolved against the Appellants.
ISSUE NO. 2
?Herein, Learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant submitted that at the proceedings of 24-7-2015, the Tribunal heard arguments on the 1st and 2nd Respondents application date 15-7-2015 and counsel to the Appellant made copious oral adumbrations in opposition thereto but in the ruling appealed against the Tribunal merely stated that the application was [impliedly granted] without considering the processes filed by the appellant as well as the arguments canvassed in opposition to the said application contrary to laid down principles of law. He cited the case of UZUDA VS EBIGAH (2009) ALL FWLR (PT493)1224 AND G&T. INVESTMENT LTD VS WITT & BUSH LTD (2011)8 NWLR (PT1250) 500 AT 535.
He added that the Tribunal has a constitutional duty under Section 294 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to deliver its decision in writing after the conclusion of adoption of addresses. This is not only to ensure that all the parties are heard and that the court or Tribunal had the benefit of arguments on both opposing sides in reaching a well informed and express decision on any given issue, but also to ensure that the party against whom the decision is given is well informed and is given full knowledge of the
reasoning of the court as well as the basis /rationale of the decision. Vide ABUBAKAR VS NASAMU (2012) AIL FWLR (PT.630)1207 AT 1233; ANYANKPELE VS NIGERIAN ARMY (2000)13 NWLR (PT.684) 209. OKPAH VS URO (Supra); UDENGWU VS UZUEGBU (2003) 13 NWLR (PT836) 136 AT 152.
It was further submitted that reliefs sought by the 1st and 2nd Respondents in the said motion is at variance with the terms of what was actually impliedly granted by the Tribunal and it is settled law that a Tribunal has no power to grant a relief not claimed by a party.
He relied on the following authorities:-
VEEPEE INDUSTRIES LTD VS COCOA IND. LTD (2003) 13 NWLR (PT1105) 486 at 512; OJAH VS OGBONI (1996) NWLR (PT528) 268; EMEGOKWE VS OKADIGBO (1973) 4SC; ATOYEBI VS BELLO (1997) 11 NWLR (PT528) 268; ADEFULU VS OKULAJA (1996) 9 NWLR (PT475) 688, OBIAJAKU VS OFFIAH (1995) 7 NWLR (PT409)510 and ODOFIN VS AGU (1992) 3 NWLR (PT229) 350 AT 369.
?Further submission was made to the effect that having made its decision that all pending motions will be taken at the pre-hearing session, the Tribunal had issued a positive order pursuant to paragraph 47(1) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act. As such it lacks
jurisdiction to impliedly grant the 1st and 2nd Respondents? application having become functus officio on the issue of when to hear applications. Therefore, by impliedly granting the application, the Tribunal in effect has reversed and overturned the operative part of its earlier decision which was affirmed by it on three occasions vide the proceedings of 10th, 13th and 24th July 2015 respectively contrary to the laid down principle of law. He added that the Tribunal in the circumstance acted without jurisdiction in impliedly granting the said application. This court was then urged to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant.
The 1st and 2ndRespondents did not adduce any argument in response to this issue raised by the Appellant. They are therefore taken to have no answer to it and I will so consider same subject to the applicable principles of law.
?I had earlier in this judgment, while addressing issue one harped on the excess baggage inherent in the ruling of the Tribunal on the 24-7-2015. It was however made clear that the decision of the Tribunal that ?all these motions shall be taken together with our judgment? was not a product of the
1st and 2nd Respondents motion dated 16-7-2015 and moved and argued on the 24-7-2015. From the available record of appeal particularly at pages 1527 to 1528 the Tribunal after delivering a ruling on an application brought by the Petitioners proceeded to order as follows:-TRIBUNAL:- The Tribunal in respect of these motions moved today by:
The Petition (SIC) filed 16-7-2015, 29-6-2015. The 1st Respondents motions moved on 24-7-2015. The motions were filed 18-7-2015, 25-6-2015 and 30-6-2015. In respect of the motions of the 2nd Respondent moved 24-7-2015. These motions were filed 01-07-2015, 01-07-2015 and 09-07-2015.
In respect of 3rd respondent?s motions moved on 24-7-2015, the ones filed on 01-07-2015, 01-07-2015 and 02-07-2015. All these motions will be taken together with our judgment. Some of these motions are word for word with preliminary objection raised in 1st, 2nd, 3rd, Respondents replies to the Petition and Petitioners replies to the Respondents? replies served on him.
Since the above motion will be part of our judgment, Petitioner?s motion dated 16-7-2015 has been impliedly granted.
?Matter is adjourned to 31-7-2015 for issuance of
pre-trial report.
As earlier pointed out, the decision of the Tribunal to take all the argued motions referred to in the order, together with the judgment was done suo motu and as such cannot be rightly held to be a decision flowing from the 1st and 2nd Respondents motion dated 16-7-2015. The issue of the Tribunal granting a relief not sought in the aforesaid motion as strongly contended by the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant does not arise, given that from the records, the order to have all the motions taken together with the judgement was made before even the issue of the implied grant of the 1st and 2nd Respondents motion arose. In order words, it is my humble view that the order of the Tribunal to take all the motions together with the judgment is not a product of or a ruling derived from or connected with the 1st and 2nd Respondents? motion dated 16-7-2015. The statement subsequently made by the Tribunal to the effect that.. ?Petitioners motion dated 16-7-2015 has been ?impliedly granted? was to my mind another way of stating that it has been overtaken by events given that the prayers sought therein are in a nutshell similar
to the preceding order of the Tribunal that all the relevant motions under reference shall be taken together with the judgment and which procedure I had earlier held in this judgment is in consonance with paragraph 12(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act (2010)(as amended). See also AREGBESOLA VS OMISORE (Supra) and OKOWA VS OGBORU (Supra).
?It must however be pointed out that the part of the rule of the Tribunal that ?Petitioners motion dated 16-7-2015 is impliedly granted? (notwithstanding its separation from the preceding order of the Tribunal) is totally unwarranted if not perverse. Records show that the 1st and 2ndRespondents motion dated 16-7-2015 was duly argued on 24-7-2015 with supporting affidavits, counter affidavits and written addresses. It therefore behoves the Tribunal to deliver a considered ruling thereafter taking into account the processes and submissions made by the counsel before it can eventually reach a decision one way or the other including a conclusion that the application had been overtaken by events. I therefore agree entirely with the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the ruling of
the Tribunal that the said motion has been impliedly granted without considering the processes filed as well as the arguments canvassed in opposition is contrary to established principle of law. It does not constitute the decision of a court in the real sense of it. The cases of UZUDA VS EBIGAH AND G&T INVESTMENT VS WITT & BUSH LTD Supra cited by the Learned Senior Counsel are quite apposite on the principle that once an issue is raised before the court in pleading or application, the court has a duty to determine and pronounce on it one way or the other.
The pronouncement made by the Tribunal on the motion dated 16-7-2015 to the effect that it has been impliedly granted is not only inchoate but perverse and cannot stand.
Consequently, this issue is partly resolved in favour of the Appellant but without prejudice to the order of the Tribunal that all motions shall be taken together with the judgment which this court had earlier upheld.
In the final result, this appeal succeeds in part to the extent that the part of the ruling of the Tribunal that ?the Petitioners motion dated 16-7-2015 has been impliedly granted is hereby set aside. While the
order that all the motions referred to will be taken together with the judgment is hereby affirmed.
Parties are to bear their costs.
JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA, J.C.A.: I agree.
EJEMBI EKO, J.C.A.: I agree.
JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.: I agree.
HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A.: I agree.
APPEARANCES
CHIEF WOLE OLANIPEKUN
SAN WITH C.O.C. EMEKA-IZIMA
Esq; ADEMOLA ADESINA Esq;
BOLARINWA AWUJOOLA Esq;
F.C IBEBUIKE Esq AND MAZI
JUDE NWAOKORO For the Appellants
?NWALA ORACLE Esq.
WITH EMEKA OPARA
FOR THE 1ST AND 2ND RESPONDENTS.
DR. SAM ERUGO WITH EMEKA
EZE Esq; PRINCE E. OKPANKU
AND AKOBUNDU EHIEMERE Esq;
FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
LIVY UZOUKWU SAN. WITH
MIKE ONYEKACHI AND S.O For the Respondents
HAGLER FOR THE 4TH RESPONDENT
Appearances
CHIEF WOLE OLANIPEKUN SAN WITH C.O.C, EMEKA-IZIMA ESQ;
ADEMOLA ADESINA ESQ; BOLARINWA AWUJOOLA ESQ; F.C
IBEBUIKE ESQ AND MAZI JUDE NWAOKORO FOR THE APPELLANT.For Appellant
AND
NWALA ORACLE ESQ WITH EMEKA OPARA FOR THE 1ST AND 2ND RESPONDENTS.
DR. SAM ERUGO WITH EMEKA EZE ESQ; PRINCE E. OKPANKU AND AKOBUNDU EHIEMERE ESQ; FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
LIVY UZOUKWU SAN. WITH MIKE ONYEKACHI AND S.O HAGLER FOR THE 4TH RESPONDENTFor Respondent
