TOTAL UPSTREAM NIGERIA LIMITED v. A.I.C LIMITED & ORS
(2015)LCN/7975(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 22nd day of July, 2015
CA/L/831/2011
RATIO
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: HEARING NOTICE; THE EFFECT OF THE FAILURE TO ISSUE A HEARING TO A PARTY THAT OUGHT TO BE ISSUED ONE AND THE FAILURE TO DO SO MAKES HIM ABSENT IN COURT
It is a settled law that where a party ought to be issued with a hearing notice but none was so done to the effect that such failure to serve makes him absent in court, he has to all intents and purposes been effectively denied justice which borders on fair hearing and a judgment, ruling or decision given, against him will be rendered null and void. See OKAFOR VS A.G. ANAMBRA STATE (1991)6 NWLR (PT 33) 104. Any failure or neglect to serve hearing notice on a party is an infringement of his right to an opportunity to be heard in his defence. O. O. OBU VS ARCHIBONG (2009) LPELR (8897) (CA).) OGUNDOYIN VS ADEYEMI (2001) 13 NWLR (PT 730) 403. In S.B.N. PLC VS CROWN STAR CO. LTD. (2003) 6 NWLR (PT 815) 1 AT 16 this court held that:-
“It is a well settled law and practice that a court of law must not give judgment against a person who has not had the opportunity to defend the suit in the sense that hearing notice which will bring to his notice the date, time and place of the trial has not been served on him. It would amount to a grave error on the part of the judex to proceed to enter judgment or make an order against a party who is shown not to have been given an opportunity to appear in court.” See also SKENCONSULT VS UKEY (1981) 1 SC. 6. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: HEARING NOTICE; WHETHER IT IS THE PARTY THAT WAS NOT SERVED WITH THE HEARING NOTICE THAT CAN APPLY TO SET ASIDE WHATEVER ORDER THAT WAS MADE AGAINST HIM AND THAT THE PROCEEDINGS IS A NULLITY
The position of the law is quite clear that it is the party that was not served with the hearing notice that can apply to set aside whatever order that was made against him and that the proceedings is a nullity. See INEC VS APP (2014) LPELR (22804) CA., TENO ENGINEERING LTD VS ADISA (2005)10 NWLR (PT 933) 346.
In CHIME VS CHIME (2001) LPELR (2001) 3 NWLR (PT 701) 527 also cited by the Appellant’s counsel, the Supreme Court per Wali JSC which affirming the stance of this court on this principle of law noted at page 542-543 of the NWLR that:-
“It is not in dispute that neither 1st Respondent nor the 3rd defendant complained against non service of the Court Processes referred to above or any other Order made. It does not therefore lie in the mouth of the Appellants to complain on their behalf. It is abundantly clear from the printed record that neither the 3rd defendant nor the 1st and 2nd Respondents complained against non service of any court process on him, in fact throughout the proceedings in this case the 3rd defendant did not put up any appearance.” per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
APPEAL: STRIKING OUT A PARTICULAR; WHETHER STRIKING OUT A PARTICULAR WILL THE THE GROUND OF APPEAL
The recent Supreme Court case of EGBIRIKA VS STATE (Supra) provides a good precedence that striking out a particular does not kill the ground of Appeal. See page 14 of the report where it was held thus:-
“there is no doubt that particular (b) constitutes an independent complaint which ought to be the subject of separate ground of appeal, as it does not relate to the ground of appeal under which it is formulated, which complains of failure of the court below to consider the defence of accident.
The court continued at page 14 as follows:-
The law is settled that the particulars of a ground of appeal must not be an independent complaint from the ground of appeal itself but should be ancillary to it. Where the particulars of a ground are inconsistent with the main complaint in the ground, the particulars must be discountenanced. See GLOBE FISHING LTD VS COKER (1990) 7 NWLR (PT 162) 265; HONIKA SAWMILL (NIG) LTD VS HOFF (1994) 2 NWLR (PT 326) 252; BRIGGS VS C.L.O.R.S.N (2005) 12 NWLR (PT 938) 59. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: DUTY OF A GARNISHEE; WHETHER IT IS THE DUTY OF A GARNISHEE TO DEFEND THE JUDGEMENT SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT DEBTOR
In OCEANIC BANK PLC VS OLADEPO (2012) LPELR (19670) CA this court held inter alia that it is not the business of a Garnishee to undertake to play the role of an advocate for a judgment debtor by trying to shield and protect the money of the judgment debtor. In SKYE BANK PLC VS DAVID & ORS (2014) LPELR (23731) CA this court reaffirmed its decision in Oceanic Bank’s case. In the circumstance it needs be emphasized that it is not the duty of a garnishee to defend the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the judgment debtor. The duty of a garnishee upon receipt of Garnishee order nisi is to file before the relevant court an affidavit to show cause why the judgment debtor’s money in his custody should not be attached to satisfy the judgment debt. It then behoves a garnishee to present the true state of affairs regarding the monies before the court. Either there is no or insufficient fund in his custody or that the available fund is under lien or assigned to a third party in which case the court instead of proceeding to make an order for Garnishee absolute may order that any issue or question necessary for determining his liability be tried or determined as provided for in Section 87 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
APPEAL: WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT IS UNDER THE OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER ISSUES FORMULATED BY THE PARTIES WHERE IT IS OF THE VIEW THAT THE CONSIDERATION ON AN ISSUE IS ENOUGH TO DISPOSE OF AN APPEAL
Where an appellate court is of the view that the consideration on an issue is enough to dispose of an appeal, it is under no obligation to consider all other issues formulated by the parties. See OKONJI VS NJOKANMA (1991)7 NWLR (PT 202) 131; EBBA VS OGODO (1984) 1 SCNLR 372; OKOTIE-EBOH VS MANAGER (2004) 18 NWLR (PT 905) 242. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
TOTAL UPSTREAM NIGERIA LIMITED Appellant(s)
AND
1. A.I.C LIMITED
2. MANNES MANN ANLAGENBAU AG
3. MANNESMANN DEMAG AG
4. TECHNIP
5. STAR DEEPWATER PETROLEUM LIMITED
6. TEXACO NIGERIA OUTER SHELF INC
7. PETROLEO BRASILEIRO NIGERIA LIMITED
8. STATOIL NIGERIA LIMITED
9. FAMFA OIL LIMITED Respondent(s)
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of the High Court of Lagos State delivered by A.A ALABI CJ on the 4th day of November, 2005 wherein an earlier Garnishee Order nisi was made Absolute against the Appellant and others.
The Genesis of this Appeal flows from the judgment of the Lower Court delivered by C.O. Segun CJ. on the 25th January, 2000. The said judgment was in favour of the 1st Respondent (AIC LTD) and against the two original defendants (MANNESMANN ANLAGENBAU AG and NNPC) in the following terms:-
I will give judgment in favour of the Plaintiff against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly and severally as follows as contained in schedule B of their statement of claim:
(1) $1, 222,185,40 (US Dollars)
(2) ?547,105.00 (Sterling)
(3) DM 22,270,922,00 (Dutch marks sic).
(4) N2,764,785,40 (Naira)
(5) $750,000.00 being 50%.Commissions of Contract D.
The first and 2nd Defendants shall pay interest on the above sums at the rate of 13% per annum from 10th April, 1987 until payment thereof of all the sums.
Again an injunction is granted against the 2nd defendant Restraining them from paying over to the 1st defendant. The amount claimed herein until the plaintiff is fully paid, the 5% enumerated above.”
A Garnishee proceedings was commenced thereafter by the 1st Respondent to enforce the said judgment via a motion Exparte filed on 26-8-2005 wherein the following orders were sought against the Appellant and other companies.
“1. An Order granting leave to enforce judgment dated 25th January, 2000 in this case.
2. An Order granting leave to issue the enforcement process (Order) against Mannesmann Anlangebau A.G, Mannesmann Demag A.G and TECHNIP of France in the said Judgment of 25th January, 2000.
3. An Order of garnishee of this Court against Total Upstream Nigeria Limited in the sums of:
(1) $1, 220,185,40 40 (US Dollars)
(2) ? 547,185.00 (Sterling)
(3) DM 22,270,922,00 (Dutch marks)
(4) N 2,764,785,40 (Naira)
(5) $750,00.00 or the equivalent of which sums in Naira are as follows:
(1) N1,545,56,484.70
(2) N1,228273771.42
(3) N14,922,828,342.55
(4) N26,349,753.61
(5) N949,808,417.25
================
Total N18,672,516,769.53
================
4. An Order of garnishee of this Court against (1) Star Deep Water Petroleum Limited, (an affiliate of the Chevron Corporation) also (2) Texaco Nigeria Outer Shelf Inc. (an affiliate of Chevron Corporation) (3) Petroleo Brasileiro Nigeria Limited Statoil Nigeria Limited and (5) Famfa Oil Limited in the sums stated in paragraph 3 supra.
AND
5. For such further order or other order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
Pursuant thereto Garnishee Order Nisi was made against the Appellant and others to show cause why they should not pay to the Judgment Creditor the judgment debt owed by the judgment debtor and so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
The Appellant consequently filed an affidavit to show cause as a well as a motion on notice and a written argument dated 13-10-2005. In the said motion the Appellant prayed the court to discharge the Garnishee Order nisi issued by the court on 1st day of September, 2005 or in the alternative, direct a trial of the liability of the first named Garnishee (now Appellant).
In a ruling delivered on 4-11-2005 the Lower Court held thus at page 688 of the Record:-
“For the reasons that I have stated above in connection with the application of the second subrogating party, the application of the first garnishee lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
I hold that the Garnishee Order Nisi, the leave granted to the judgment debtor to enforce judgment by service of Processes and the order for joinder made by this court on 1st September, 2005 were properly and regularly made. I Hold that no arguable ground has been established before me to justify setting aside those orders.”
And at page 696 of the Record held thus:-
Accordingly the Garnishee Order Nisi made on 1st September, 2005 is hereby made Absolute.”
Aggrieved with said decision of the Lower Court the Appellant herein filed a Notice of Appeal on the 22-11-2011 and contains for grounds of appeal.
The Appellant subsequently filed a brief of argument dated 24-8-2011 and filed on 25-8-2011 but deemed properly filed on 12-2-2015.
Three issues were formulated therein for determination as follows:-
(1) Was there any judgment in existence, or in Existence against a party with which TUPNI had any relationship that could properly be the subject of a garnishee order Nisi?
(2) Was the learned Chief Judge correct in holding, upon the material evidence that had been placed before him, that TUPNI was “indebted to the Technip entities for the contract awarded to them and ….. whatever amount is accruable to the Technip entities from the contract is attachable by Garnishee Order.”
(3) Was the Garnishee Order absolute, as made valid, given that it failed to specify the sum that was payable by the garnishees to the 1st Respondent, and merely reference to a computation of the sum alleged to be due, which sum was computed with interest compounded. (The interest awarded on the judgment was not compounded).
In the 1st Respondent’s brief dated and filed on 25-4-2014 but deemed properly filed on 12-2-2015 two issues were formulated for determination as follows:-
(1) Whether the Garnishee Order Absolute was wrongly made by the trial court against the Appellant.
(2) whether the Garnishee Order Absolute as clarified by supplementary order of the trial court on payment of only simple interest on the judgment debt as adjudged in the substantive suit by Segun C.J (As he then was) is ambiguous as to be unenforceable.”
The 1st Respondent also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 31-12-2012 which argument in support is embedded in pages 7 to 16 of the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument. The said preliminary objection and the submissions in support as well as the Appellant’s reply thereto were moved and adopted before the hearing of the substantive appeal on 29-4-2015.
The 2nd, 3rd and 5th to 9th Respondents did not file any brief of argument.
The 4th Respondent on the other hand filed a brief of argument wherein he urged this court to allow the appeal.
In other words, rather than support the judgment as a Respondent, he supported the case of the Appellant. The law is however settled that the role of a Respondent in an appeal is to defend the judgment appealed against or in the alternative remain nominal and keep his fingers crossed but not to file a brief of argument urging that the appeal be allowed. See NBC VS INTERGRATED GAS (NIG) LTD (2005) ALL FWLR (PT 250) Page 1; FEDERAL MORTGAGE FINANCE LTD VS EKPO (2005) ALL FWLR (PT 248) 1667; EMEKA VS OKADIGBO (2012) 18 NWLR (PT 1331) 55 at 97.
The end result therefore is that the 3rd Respondent’s brief be and is hereby discountenanced.
As regards the Preliminary Objection vis-‘a-vis the substantive appeal. Authorities have it that where a preliminary objection is raised against the hearing of a matter, it must be taken first. See JAIYEOLA VS ABIOYE (2003) 4 NWLR (PT 810) 397; OSUN STATE GOVERNMENT VS DALAMI (NIG) LTD (2003) 7 NWLR (PT 818) 72.
In the 1st Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection three prayers were sought as follows:-
1. An Order setting aside the Ruling and Enrolled Order of this Honourable Court made on 13th June, 2011, the condition precedent to conferring the Honourable Court jurisdiction to grant same having been fulfilled.
2. An Order striking out the Appellant/Respondent’s Notice of Appeal for being incompetent, including all other processes filled in furtherance of this appeal.
3. An order striking out the record of Appeal compiled and transmitted by the Appellant/Respondent for failure to contain material relevant process.”
The application is premised on 13 grounds and supported by a 5 paragraph affidavit with Exhibit AIC (1) and AIC (2) attached.
The 1st Respondent’s submissions in support of the preliminary objection as embedded in pages 8 to 16 of the brief of argument is firstly that the Appellant’s application for extension of time for leave to appeal against the decision of the Lower Court delivered on 4-11-2005 was not served on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents who are reportedly located in Germany. He added that the trinity prayer was not preceded by a separate leave of this Court to serve the motion on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This means in effect that the said Appellant’s motion on notice was not served on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents including the hearing notice for the hearing of the said motion on notice, nor were they given adequate time to appear.
He added that lack of valid filing and service of originating process is a matter of jurisdiction and affects the competence of the court to adjudicate. Vide AGIP (NIG) VS AGIP PETROLI INTER (2010)5NWLR (PT 1187) 348; OTOBAIMERE VS AKPOREHE (2004) 14 NWLR (PT 894) 591 at 614; MARK VS EKE (2004) 5 NWLR (PT 865) 54; UBA PLC VS OKONKWO (2004) 5 NWLR (PT 867) 445; F.B.N PLC VS T.S.A IND. LTD (2010) 15 NWLR (PT 1216) 247; OKOGI VS OKOH (2010) 9 NWLR (PT 1199) 311 at 324.
On the effect of an act which is a nullity he cited, LABOUR PARTY V INEC (2009) 6 NWLR (PT 1137) 315, OLORUNYELOMI VS AKHABGE (2011) 8 NWLR (PT 1195) 48. He therefore urged this Court to set aside the ruling of this Court for lack of valid service of the motion on notice and hearing notice on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
Learned senior counsel also made submission on the failure to annex the order granting leave to appeal to the Notice of Appeal before or simultaneously with filing same on 22nd June, 2011 and cited authorities in support.
He also argued on the incompetence flowing from the incomplete record of appeal transmitted to this court by the Appellant. He argued that the Record of Appeal transmitted to this Court does not contain relevant documents filed in connection with the Appeal such as the motion on notice by which the Appellant sought and obtained leave of this Honourable Court to appeal and the Order of Court granting such leave. Vide Order 8 Rule 7 of the Court of Appeal Rules and NWANA VS FCDA (2007) 11 NWLR (PT 1044) 59 at 78.
On the need for a valid record of appeal to contain every material fact, evidence or document in the proceedings at the trial and relevant to the determination of the issues in controversy between the parties at the Appellate court he cited, OLORUNLEYIMI VS AKHAGBE (2010) 8 NWLR (PT 1195) 48; AULT & WIBORG (NIG) LTD VS NIBEL INDUSTRIES LTD (2010) 11NWLR (PT 1220) 486 at 496.
On the second point of objection, the Learned Senior Counsel attacked all the four grounds of Appeal filed by the Appellants and the arguments and authorities in support are detailed in pages 11 to 16 of the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument.
He then submitted that since all the grounds are incompetent, the appeal has no valid grounds from which arguable issue could be distilled and canvassed in court. Vide KOREDE VS ADEDOKUN (2001) 15 NWLR (PT 736) 483; MACFOY VS UAC (1962) AC 152, SKENCONSULT VS UKEY (1981) 1 SC 6.
He then urged this court to uphold the Preliminary Objection. The Appellant’s response to the Preliminary Objection is as contained in pages 3 to 6 of the Appellant’s reply brief dated 20-3-2015.
In addressing the 1st point of objection Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the contention that the Appeal is incompetent for being filed without a copy of the enrolled order attached thereto is no longer tenable because the perceived errors regarding same have been cured without opposition as a result of remedial steps taken by the Appellant by filing a fresh application to remedy the defect via a motion dated 28-10-2014. The said motion was heard and granted by this court on 12-2-2015 wherein the Notice of Appeal was validated as well as the records already compiled and transmitted. He added that the said application was not opposed by the 1st Respondent in which case the Objection on that ground should be discountenanced.
On the complaint regarding the exclusion of a substituted party in the Notice of Appeal, it was argued that the error in the continued exclusion of Mannesmann Demag Kraus-Maffei GmbH was an error committed by all the parties including even the 1st Respondent who applied for the substitution. He referred for example, to the process filed by the 1st Respondent as contained in pages 770, 776, and 781 of the Record of Appeal and this error was continued by the said 1st Respondent in its brief of argument.
Furthermore counsel submitted that the issue of joinder or non-joinder and non-service of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents is a matter to be raised by the party concerned.
Therefore, it is not within the competence of the 1st Respondent to raise such issue. Vide CHIME VS CHIME (2001) 3 NWLR (PT 707) 527, MOBIL VS LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (PT 795) 1 at 34. Therefore, the only party to complain about non-joinder and non-service is the party affected.
Learned Counsel added that by the motion on notice filed on 28-10-2014 and granted by the court on 12-2-15, the Notice of Appeal and Record of Appeal already filed were deemed properly filed and served on that 12-2-15 in which case the objection is deemed to have been overtaken by events given that the 1st Respondent did not object to the application.
It was also noted that the original Notice of Appeal contained in the Record was found to be defective and a fresh one filed subsequent to the leave granted by this Court, hence the fresh order granting same could not form part of the record already transmitted to this Court.
On the second point of objection which relates to the competence of the four grounds of appeal, it was submitted that the objection was without merit and should be dismissed, after an exhaustive submission made in defence of all the grounds of appeal spanning pages 5 to 7 of the Appellant’s reply brief.
Now on the first point of objection which borders on non-service of Notice of Appeal and Hearing Notice or leave to serve the 2nd and 3rd Respondents Outside jurisdiction.
This court need to address the issue regarding the propriety and competence of the 1st Respondent to raise it as an objection.
It is a settled law that where a party ought to be issued with a hearing notice but none was so done to the effect that such failure to serve makes him absent in court, he has to all intents and purposes been effectively denied justice which borders on fair hearing and a judgment, ruling or decision given, against him will be rendered null and void. See OKAFOR VS A.G. ANAMBRA STATE (1991)6 NWLR (PT 33) 104. Any failure or neglect to serve hearing notice on a party is an infringement of his right to an opportunity to be heard in his defence. O. O. OBU VS ARCHIBONG (2009) LPELR (8897) (CA).) OGUNDOYIN VS ADEYEMI (2001) 13 NWLR (PT 730) 403. In S.B.N. PLC VS CROWN STAR CO. LTD. (2003) 6 NWLR (PT 815) 1 AT 16 this court held that:-
“It is a well settled law and practice that a court of law must not give judgment against a person who has not had the opportunity to defend the suit in the sense that hearing notice which will bring to his notice the date, time and place of the trial has not been served on him. It would amount to a grave error on the part of the judex to proceed to enter judgment or make an order against a party who is shown not to have been given an opportunity to appear in court.”
See also SKENCONSULT VS UKEY (1981) 1 SC. 6. However, in the instant case, the party complaining is the 1st Respondent who is on the opposite side of the divide in the dispute. The 2nd and 3rd Respondent in question who incidentally are on the side of the Appellant have not in anyway complained about any none receipt of hearing notice or that they have been denied any opportunity of being heard in their defence before any adverse order was made against them. It therefore sound strange and unusual to my humble self that the 1st Respondent has opted to make an issue without any proof or evidence that it is acting on behalf of the said 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
The position of the law is quite clear that it is the party that was not served with the hearing notice that can apply to set aside whatever order that was made against him and that the proceedings is a nullity. See INEC VS APP (2014) LPELR (22804) CA., TENO ENGINEERING LTD VS ADISA (2005)10 NWLR (PT 933) 346.
In CHIME VS CHIME (2001) LPELR (2001) 3 NWLR (PT 701) 527 also cited by the Appellant’s counsel, the Supreme Court per Wali JSC which affirming the stance of this court on this principle of law noted at page 542-543 of the NWLR that:-
“It is not in dispute that neither 1st Respondent nor the 3rd defendant complained against non service of the Court Processes referred to above or any other Order made. It does not therefore lie in the mouth of the Appellants to complain on their behalf. It is abundantly clear from the printed record that neither the 3rd defendant nor the 1st and 2nd Respondents complained against non service of any court process on him, in fact throughout the proceedings in this case the 3rd defendant did not put up any appearance.”
I believe that the above set out view of the Supreme Court puts paid to this issue in the sense that it does not lie with the 1st Respondent to complain of non service of any process on the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
That notwithstanding the Appellant made it clear in its reply brief and it is so evident on record that whatever defect in the Notice of Appeal and Record of Appeal was rectified via a Motion on Notice filed by the Appellant and dated 28-10-2014 and which was granted by the Court on the 12-2-2015 without any objection by the 1st Respondent. Thus granting of the said application validated the late filing of the Notice of Appeal as well as the Record of Appeal already complied and transmitted.
This also includes the complaint about non attachment of the enrolled order granting leave for the Notice of Appeal filed in the Lower Court. This is so given that by the said application, the prayer deeming the Notice of Appeal and the record of Appeal already filed as having been properly filed and served was granted that same day on 12-2-2015. The objections seems therefore to have been over taken by events.
On the complaint about exclusion of a substituted party, that is to say that Mannesmann Demag Krauss-Maffei GmbH ought to be the correct 3rd Respondent and not Mennesmann Demag AG. I agree with the Appellant that such error of exclusion had its origin from the Lower Court and from a perusal of the record, the 1st Respondent was much more guilty and worse for it because all process subsequently filed by it continued to bear Mannesmann Demag AG as the 3rd Respondent. Even the Ruling of the Lower Court delivered on 4-11-2005 culminating in this Appeal is not exonerated as it also bears Mannesmann Demag AG as the 3rd Respondent. In the circumstance, it will be most irrational to blame the appellant for such exclusion given that the Notice of Appeal must bear the correct the names as reflected in the judgment of the Lower Court appealed against except in cases of death where an application for substitution will be made and granted to remove the name of the original deceased party at the Lower Court.
The 1st Respondent did not fare any better in this comedy of errors and as such cannot benefit from their own omission given that after their own application to make the substitution they still continued to file processes bearing the name of Mannessmann Demag AG. Such examples are found at pages 778, 781, 786, 788, 793 and 799 of the Record.
Equity, it is said helps the vigilant and not the indolent and he who seeks equity must do equity. The 1st Respondent did not also come to equity with clean hands and as such will not receive succour from the temple of justice without much do. The error is generic and the Appellant will not be allowed to face the injustice of bearing the burden at this stage when even the Ruling appealed against bore the names of the parties as reflected in the Notice of Appeal subsequently filed by the Appellant. If anything, the said Ruling delivered on 4-11-15 from which the 1st Respondent benefited from a Garnishee Order Absolute lacks competence at least against a nonexistent 3rd Respondent subrogating party. I however say no more because it is not an issue before this court.
On the competence of the four grounds of Appeal filed by the Appellant. The said four grounds without particulars reads thus:-
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
1. The Learned Chief Judge erred in Law in ordering that garnishee order nisi issued on the 1st day of September, 2005 be made absolute against the first named garnishee.
2. The Learned Chief Judge erred in law and in fact when he held that the second named “Subrogating Party” had acquired the liabilities of the defendant/judgment debtor under the judgment delivered herein on the 25th day of January, 2000.
3. the Learned Chief Judge erred in law and in fact when he concluded that the first garnishee was indebted to the second named “subrogating Party.”
4. The Learned trial Judge erred in law when having held that “in the result, it is herby ordered that execution shall issue to levy the amount due from the first and second Garnishee or from any of them or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment of this court delivered on Tuesday, 25th January, 2000 as calculated in the table/document attached to the original affidavit in support of the motion for garnishee order nisi which table or document is marked Exhibit WK2-26 (costs assessed at N20,000.00 is awarded in favour of the judgment Creditor, he went on to hold, in the same Rling, that “this Court agrees that the interest can only be calculated in simple interest as that is the judgment delivered on 25th January by this court. If the judgment is calculated in compound interest, it is wrong.”
A careful perusal of the four grounds above reproduced show that ground 2 thereof do not fit into the part of the decision of the lower court appealed against which is that part of the decision ordering that the garnishee order nisi issued on the 1st day of September, 2005 be made absolute against the 1st named garnishee.”
In the circumstance, I agree with the 1st Respondent that it is incompetent and it is accordingly struck out.
As regards grounds 1, 3 and 4. I am of the view that they are properly derived from the portion of the decision appealed against which borders on the Garnishee Order Absolute against the Appellant. I am also satisfied with the particulars provided except particulars (a) and (b) of ground 1 which incidentally the Appellant conceded that they have been abandoned. Particular (c) suffices to sustain ground (1) having provided enough explanation in support of the ground of appeal aforementioned and the 1st Respondent cannot claim to have been misled or confused. The recent Supreme Court case of EGBIRIKA VS STATE (Supra) provides a good precedence that striking out a particular does not kill the ground of Appeal. See page 14 of the report where it was held thus:-
“there is no doubt that particular (b) constitutes an independent complaint which ought to be the subject of separate ground of appeal, as it does not relate to the ground of appeal under which it is formulated, which complains of failure of the court below to consider the defence of accident.
The court continued at page 14 as follows:-
The law is settled that the particulars of a ground of appeal must not be an independent complaint from the ground of appeal itself but should be ancillary to it. Where the particulars of a ground are inconsistent with the main complaint in the ground, the particulars must be discountenanced. See GLOBE FISHING LTD VS COKER (1990) 7 NWLR (PT 162) 265; HONIKA SAWMILL (NIG) LTD VS HOFF (1994) 2 NWLR (PT 326) 252; BRIGGS VS C.L.O.R.S.N (2005) 12 NWLR (PT 938) 59.
Particularly (b) underground I of the Notice of Appeal is hereby struck out for being incompetent.”
Underline for emphasis.
This decision of the Supreme Court which is later in time is to my mind in consonance with substantial justice given that it amounts to Justice on the platform of technicality to strike out a whole ground of appeal simply because one of two or more particulars stated therein is found to be incompetent. In my humble view, one competent particular is enough to sustain a ground of appeal just like one competent ground of Appeal can adequately sustain an appeal.
Therefore while I duly recognize the authorities cited by the 1st Respondent in support of his position that once a particular amongst others is found to be incompetent it affects the competence of the ground of Appeal from which it is derived. I am inclined to go with the more recent 2014 decision of the Supreme Court where one incompetent particular was discountenanced and the competent ones allowed to sustain the ground of appeal.
On the whole, except as affecting ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal, this preliminary objection is hereby overruled.
On the substantive appeal, I had earlier stated that the Appellant formulated three issues for determination while the 1st Respondent distilled two issues for determination.
I observe however that the two issues raised by the 1st Respondent are similar in con with the Appellant issues 2 and 3. In the circumstance, I will adopt the three issues as formulated by the Appellant in the Resolution of this appeal.
ISSUE ONE:
Dwelling on this issue learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that there was no valid judgment debt in existence or in existence against a party with which TOTAL UPSTREAM NIGERIA LTD (TUPNI) had any relationship that was capable of being the subject of garnishee proceedings. He referred to the judgment of the Lower Court with respect to NNPC at page 40 of the Record where the learned trial Judge made an order of injunction restraining NNPC from paying over the judgment sum to Mannesmann Anlagenbau AG. He added that the said injunction has the effect of limiting the party against whom the judgment will be enforced to NNPC in which case the 1st Respondent is not entitled to seek further enforcement of the judgment against any other party than NNPC. In the alternative, it was submitted that Technip (4th Respondent) is not liable to satisfy the judgment debt because it is not a successor, either in fact or in law, to the liabilities of Manessman Anlageubau AG. (MAAG), one of the original judgment debtors. He added that there is no evidence to support the Lower Courts holding that the 4th Respondent had acquired liabilities of either MANNESMANN Anlagenbau AG (MAAG) or Mannesmann Demag AG (MADG) but on the contrary the evidence before the court showed clearly that what the 4th Respondent acquired from the 3rd Respondent were specifically indentified assets which does not include the judgment debt sought to be enforced.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the agreement under which the judgment debtor sold its MDEU and KTI divisions is clearly between the judgment debtor and “Technip certain Affiliate Companies” and the said two divisions were later acquired by FMS Abacus Asset Management GMBH, which later changed its name to Technip Germany GMBH. Thus even if the (MAAG) TRANSFERRED liabilities created by the judgment to any Technip entity, it could have been to a German Technip entity and not to either Technip France or Technip Offshore Nigeria Limited with which the Appellant had contractual relationship.
It was then contended that from the foregoing, it is clear that Technip France does have a contractual relationship with the Appellant but to which it was not indebted at the time of the Garnishee proceedings because it did not acquire any liabilities from the judgment debtor. Therefore there is no basis for the issuance of any Garnishee Order against the Appellant in respect of any judgment debt liability on the part of Techip France.
ISSUE TWO
Learned Counsel herein submitted that the law is clear as provided in Section 85 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act that the only debts due
to a third party from a garnishee and capable of being attached, are debts due at the time when the order nisi is served. He added that the stance of the Appellant is that as at the date of the purported service of the Order Nisi, it was not indebted to any Technip entity including Technip of France, therefore, even if the order to amend the name was valid it could not after the service validly attach any funds in the hands of the Appellant because the order nisi ought to be sought and served a fresh because in the absence of proper service of an order nisi no debt will be attached. He referred to the finding of the Lower Court at page 494 of the record to submit that in coming to a conclusion the learned trial Judge ignored the clear and unequivocal provisions of Section 85 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, which made it clear that it is only a debt due or accruing to the judgment debtor that can be attached and not “whatever amount accruable” as held by the learned trial Judge.
It was further submitted that whether or not a debt is due under a contract is dependent upon the terms of the contract. Vide DUNLOP & RANKEN LTD VS HENDALL STEEL STRUCTURES LTD, PITCHERS LTD (Garnishee ) (1957) 3 All E.R 344 at 347 (cited with approval in the judgment of Uwaifo JCA as he then was) in UBA LTD VS SOCIETE GENETRALE BANK LTD VS INTERNATIONAL HENSEN (NIG) LTD & ANOR VS IBWA (1996) 10 NWLR (PT 478) 381 AT 389-390 where it was held that in the case of a building contract where the builder was paid on the certificate of the architect, money in the hands of the building owner could not be attached until a certificate was issued. The rationale being that there is a distinction between existing debts in which payment is deferred and cases where debts rests in the future or are dependent upon some contingency. Thus existing debts, the payment of which is deferred can be attached but where debts and the obligation to pay them are yet to be incurred, then there is nothing that can be attached by way of garnishee order.
It was further submitted that based on the decision in DUNLOP VS RANKEN the learned Chief Judge was wrong to have concluded without any evidence on the terms of the contract that since the Appellants contract with Technip entities was alleged to be $1.08 billion attachable debts had to be due. He added that even if there had been a dispute between the garnishee and the judgment creditor as to whether or not a debt was due or had accrued in favour of the judgment debtor the proper approach was for the Learned Trial Chief Judge to direct that the issue be tried rather than jump to conclusions not supported by evidence and in the face of conflicting affidavits. He cited FALOBI VS FALOBI (1976) 10 NSCC 576 at 581.This court was then urged to discharge the Lower Courts order.
On issue THREE, it was submitted that the Learned Chief Judge erred when he held that the sum to be garnished was “as calculated in the table/document attached to the original affidavit in support of the motion for Garnishee order nisi which table or document is marked Exhibit wk 2-26”. It was however pointed out by Learned Counsel that there is no exhibit on record marked WK2-26 but wk2-2c which exhibits is a purported computation of the judgment debt as at 31-8-2005 and was calculated on a compound interest basis instead of 13% interest per annum as per the original judgment sought to be enforced, therefore, the sum in which the garnishee order was made was incorrect.
He added that an order absolute having been made to include compound interest of simple interest, it becomes unclear, uncertain and imprecise and as such not capable of being complied with in which case it should be set aside on the authority of NITEL V OGUNBIYI (1992) 7 NWLR (PT 255) 543.
He then urged this court to allow the appeal and set aside the Garnishee order absolute.
Responding in their own issue No 1 Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that it is not open for the Appellant to challenge the finding of liability of the Lower Court as against the subrogated judgment debtor parties, that is the 3rd and 4th Respondents. He added that as garnishee the Appellants obligation at the Lower Court is limited simply to show cause why the court should not hold that monies were due from it to the credit of the subrogating judgment debtor party which were liable to attachment.
He cited the case of DENTON WEST VS MUOMA (2006) 6 NWLR (PT 1083) 418 at 442 to support the stance that Appellant has not right to challenge the validity of the judgment of the Lower Court, per Segun CJ.
On the issue of non resolution of conflicting affidavits as contended by the Appellant’s counsel, he referred to the ruling of the Lower Court at page 695 of the Record where the learned Chief Judge in reviewing the parties affidavits noted that the affidavit evidence of the judgment creditor to the effect that Technip France is in a position to pay and discharge the judgment sum because it has entered into valuable and large contracts including the Akpo field project has remained unchallenged, uncontradicted and uncontroverted and this part of the Ruling was not appealed against by the Appellant. Vide MADUABUM VS NWOSU (2010) 13 NWLR (PT 1212) 623 and C.B.N VS IGWILO (Supra).
It was then submitted that the finding of the Lower Court as to the liability of the Appellant as a garnishee is borne out of the documentary evidence as presented to the court by the 1st Respondent and the 2nd subrogating party and they show the basis of liability of Technip as a subrogating party and the basis of liability of the Appellant to Technip for attachable debt. Thus after a review of Article 2.3.1 and 4.1 of the PSA (Exhibit SO2) the Learned Chief Judge concluded that Technip is a subrogee of Mannessmann Demag A.G.
He added that in view of Article 15.3 in the PSA, the Technip as the parent and principal contracting party in the PSA was rightly found subrogating to all DEMAG liabilities and obligations it assumed. Therefore (MAAG) which the Appellant held as answerable party dropped out of the picture in 1995 ever before the execution of the PSA in 1998 and before the judgment of the Lower Court of year, 2000 which culminated in the garnishee proceedings against the Appellant.
It was further submitted that the assumption of liability by 4th Respondent (Technip) by the finding of the Lower Court is not open to be questioned by a Garnishee like the Appellant. Thus only the 4th Respondent or a third party claiming to be entitled to the money garnished has a right to challenge same by virtue of Section 88-90 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
Justifying the Garnishee Order Absolute made by the Lower Court, it was submitted that the order Absolute is only directed at the Garnishee and not a judgment debtor, who is thus debarred from being heard on the garnishee order absolute. Vide NITEL PLC VS I.C.I.C (DIRECTORY PUBLISHERS) LTD (2009) 16 NWLR (PT 1167) 356 and P.P.M.C LTD VS DELPHI PET. INC. (2005) 8 NWLR (PT 928) 458 at 484.
It was also submitted that the Akpo contract referred to by the Appellant was not attached as an exhibit to the affidavit and was produced in court and having suppressed such material fact, there was not nothing left for the Court to order any trial as contended by the Appellant.
On issue No 2, Learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that it is open to a Judge seised of post judgment or enforcement proceedings to revisit and review its decision for enforcement from time to time the debt is fully liquidated except where the substantive judgment is on appeal. Vide Order 5 Rule 8 of the Judgment (enforcement) Rule.
He added that in the instant case, the supplemental order made after delivery of the Ruling was within the powers of the Lower Court to clarify its decision. Therefore the Learned Trial Judge acted properly when at the invitation of the parties’ counsel he pronounced on the applicable rate of interest chargeable on the judgment debt by the garnishee order absolute. It was also submitted that where an order of Court is varied at the request of parties, there can be no legitimate objection there to and even if parties cannot agree as to the variation, all that is required is that the Court should proceed unless a party files a formal motion to so pray. Vide BOLA VS LATUNDE (1963) 3 NSCC 127 at 130.
It was also argued that there is a distinction between the substantive judgment delivered in the year 2000 and sought to be enforced vis-‘a-vis the garnishee order made in the instant case. While the former is final and conclusive, the later was corrected to fit into the substantive judgment as to the proper rate of interest payable.
On the consent order, it was submitted that it was upon enquiry generated after the Ruling on garnishee that the trial court made an order now being complained of and which order was with the consent of the parties and therefore binding. He added that once parties consent to an order of Court in a matter requiring its discretion, non of this parties can later rely on his legal rights to have the order set aside because by giving their consent, they are deemed to have forfeited their right to complain. See UBA LTD VS TAAN (1993) 4 NWLR (PT 287) 368.
It was further submitted that even if there was any irregularity, in the procedure adopted the ultimate decision reached is still correct and has occasioned no miscarriage of justice and ought not to be disturbed on appeal. He cited the following case:- A. G. LEVENTIS (NIG) PLC VS AKPU (2007) 17 NWLR (PT 1063) 416, DIAMOND BANK LTD VS P.L.C LTD (2009) 18 NWLR (PT 1172) 67; AGAGU VS MIMIKO (2009) 7 NWLR (PT 114)) 342.
The Appellant’s reply to the 1st Respondent’s brief is contained in pages 7 to 10 of the Appellant’s reply brief filed on 20-3-2015. I have perused same and find that it mainly consist of reargument of the issues already canvassed in the Appellant brief. However, for whatever it is worth I will pick the wheat from the chaff as the need arises in this judgment.
I will deal with issues 1 and 2 together and they are in tandem with the 1st Respondents issue No 1.
The Appellants complain in the main is that there is no valid judgment debt in existence against any party with which the Appellant had any contractual relationship that was capable of being the subject of garnishee proceedings. But if any it should be the NNPC which was the 2nd Defendant in the Judgment sought to be enforced and against who an order of injunction was made to retain the money belonging to 1st Defendant in its possession until the judgment sum is satisfied.
In the alternative, that the 4th Respondent Technip is not liable to satisfy the judgment debt because it is not a successor to the liabilities of (MAAG) the original 1st judgment debtor.
On the other, the 1st Respondent drew attention to the fact that the judgment obtained against NNPC as 2nd Defendant and the order of injunction that followed was set aside on appeal by the Supreme Court in which case NNPC has totally dropped out of the scene. This is evidenced in the law report AIC LTD VS NNPC (2008) NWLR (PT 937) 563.
Given the clear cut explanation as done above by the 1st Respondent’s counsel and which proof is manifested in the law report above cited, this no doubt puts paid to the Appellants stance on the issue.
I also agree with the submission by the 1st Respondent’s counsel that it does not lie with the Appellant to contest the liability of the 3rd and 4th Respondent as held by the Lower Court that they are subrogated judgment debtors because the Appellant being just a garnishee has only the simple duty to show cause why the Court should order that an Order Nisi against it should not be made Absolute as held in DENTON WEST VS MUOMA Supra at page 442.
My support for the stance of the 1st Respondent is borne out of series of authorities on the issue.
In OCEANIC BANK PLC VS OLADEPO (2012) LPELR (19670) CA this court held inter alia that it is not the business of a Garnishee to undertake to play the role of an advocate for a judgment debtor by trying to shield and protect the money of the judgment debtor. In SKYE BANK PLC VS DAVID & ORS (2014) LPELR (23731) CA this court reaffirmed its decision in Oceanic Bank’s case. In the circumstance it needs be emphasized that it is not the duty of a garnishee to defend the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the judgment debtor. The duty of a garnishee upon receipt of Garnishee order nisi is to file before the relevant court an affidavit to show cause why the judgment debtor’s money in his custody should not be attached to satisfy the judgment debt. It then behoves a garnishee to present the true state of affairs regarding the monies before the court. Either there is no or insufficient fund in his custody or that the available fund is under lien or assigned to a third party in which case the court instead of proceeding to make an order for Garnishee absolute may order that any issue or question necessary for determining his liability be tried or determined as provided for in Section 87 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act.
The Appellant in the instant case went beyond the scope of its responsibilities as a garnishee in raising the issue whether there was a valid judgment debt owed by the 3rd and 4th Respondents.
As regards issue No. 2, the Appellant had contended that by virtue of Section 85 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act only debts due to a third party from a garnishee and capable of being attached, are debts due at the time when the order nisi is served. He further argued that there was absolutely no evidence before the Lower Court that the Appellant was indebted to the 4th Respondent subrogating party.
The 1st Respondent’s counsel however posited that the Appellant was not able to adduce enough evidence to show that it is not indebted to it. He also relied on the Ruling of the Lower Court to that effect wherein at page 695 of the Record the Learned trial Judge held inter alia that:-
“All the first Garnishee was able to say is that it is not indebted to Technip or Technip France. I have no respect for such feeble and flimsy denial. After admitting that you entered into a contract for the purpose of carrying out works on its behalf and you say you are not owing them, it is like hiding one finger. You are certainly kidding yourself.
I hold that the first Garnishee is indebted to the Technip entities for the contract awarded to them and I hold that whatever amount accruable to the Technip entities from that contract is attachable by Garnishee order”…”
The Learned Trial Chief Judge had premised his view on the fact that the 1st Respondent’s affidavit was not challenged or controverted on the issue of the fact that the Appellant entered a contract with Technip in the sum of $1.08 billion.
The Learned Trial Chief Judge seem to have ignored the deposition in paragraph 6 and 7 of the Appellant’s affidavit to show cause wherein it was deposed as following:-
(6) The first Garnishee has entered into a contract with a consortium of companies for the purpose of carrying out works on its behalf in respect of a project known as the Akpo project. Amongst the consortium of Companies are two Technip entities, called Technip France and Technip Offshore Nigeria Limited.
(7) As at September 5, 2005, the first named Garnishee was not indebted to either of the subrogating parties named herein or to Technip France. As at the date thereof, the first named Garnishee is not indebted to either of the subrogating parties named herein or to Technip France.”
From the two paragraphs above set out, I wonder askance at what other facts or evidence are required from the Appellant to justify the fact that there is uncertainty over its indebtedness to the 4th Respondent given the nature of the transaction. This is not a question of indebtedness in terms of fixed sum of money but a project contract which is executed in stages and payments made accordingly. There is no proof as to how much of the contract price that has been paid or the outstanding balance or even whether the whole agreed sum have been paid. In a situation of this nature therefore there is need for concrete evidence of the actual sum outstanding with the debtor from the contract. Fortunately the Sheriff and Civil Process Act in an apparent anticipation of such situations provided in Section 87 as follows:-
“If the Garnishee appears and disputes his liability, the court, instead of making an order that execution shall issue, may order that any issue or question necessary for determining in any manner in which any issue or question in any proceedings may be tried or determined or may refer the matter to a referee.”
To my mind, the Appellant’s case strongly fell into this category where there is need for further enquiry as to the actual or possible indebtedness of the Appellant to the 4th Respondent, moreso given the huge sum of money involved running into millions of foreign hard currencies and infact given the very technical nature of the alleged Akpo contract involving a consortium of Companies reference or involvement of a referee will not be out of place.
The bottom line here is that the Learned Trial Judge acted in a haste to make an order absolute when there was every good reason for the issue of the Appellant’s liability to the 4th Respondent to be tried or determined.
Although Section 87 used the word ‘MAY’ to impute the element of discretion on the part of the Trial Judge, it is however imperative that such exercise of discretion must be done judiciously and judicially. A discretion irrationally or perversely exercised will definitely engender injustice and lacks the fairness inherent in the powers of a Judge.
In the instant case, the Appellant to my mind had disputed his liability to the 4th Respondent as shown in paragraph 7 for the affidavit to show cause.
In GENERAL AVIATION VS THAHAL (2004) 6 MJSC 120 at 144, the Supreme Court per UWAIFO JSC in emphaising on the need for proper exercise of a court’s discretion held thus:-
“It is the rule of equity that where the exercise of discretion plays a part, it is expected that the court will act in conformity with the ordinary principles upon which judicial discretion is exercised otherwise an appellate court will interfere with the decision.”
see also the case of MAINSTREET BANK LTD VS UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC (2014) LPELR (24118) CA where this court held clearly at pages 26-27 “that the provisions of Section 87 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, which stipulates what procedure to be adopted by the trial court, where liability for the judgment debt is disputed by the Garnishee, indeed limits the exercise of the courts discretion to either, to call for trial of the case, or to refer the matter to a referee.”
On the whole it is my humble view that the failure of the Trial Chief Judge to apply the provisions of Section 87 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is a fundamental flaw that cannot be ignored given the nature of the transaction leading to the involvement of the Appellant as a garnishee and the clear necessity for the determination of the Appellant’s liability to the 4th Respondent. There is need for the ends of justice to be properly served and this case deserves it.
The Garnishee Order absolute made against the Appellant cannot therefore stand.
This issue is accordingly resolved on favour of the Appellant.
The resolution of this issue in this manner weakens the need to consider the Appellant’s issue No 3 or 1st Respondent’s issue No. 1. It will amount to an unnecessary academic exercise.
Where an appellate court is of the view that the consideration on an issue is enough to dispose of an appeal, it is under no obligation to consider all other issues formulated by the parties. See OKONJI VS NJOKANMA (1991)7 NWLR (PT 202) 131; EBBA VS OGODO (1984) 1 SCNLR 372; OKOTIE-EBOH VS MANAGER (2004) 18 NWLR (PT 905) 242.
In the final result, I hold that notwithstanding the resolution of Appellant’s issue No 1 partly in favour of the 1st Respondent, this appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed.
The Garnishee Order Absolute made by the Lower Court against the Appellant on the 4-11-2005 is hereby set aside.
Parties to bear their costs.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEII, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein and have nothing extra to add.
Accordingly, I too join my learned brother in holding that this appeal is meritorious and is also allowed by me.
The Garnishee Order Absolute made by the Lower Court against the Appellant on the 4-11-2005 is hereby set aside.
Parties to bear their costs.
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: I read before today the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Samuel Chukwumebi Oseji JCA. I agree with reasoning and conclusion arrived with nothing useful to add.
Appearances
O. Omolodun with C. EzediaroFor Appellant
AND
Prof. A.B. Kasumu SAN with A.J Owonikoko SAN, Dotun Abolade, T.P Olatunde (Mrs.) and V.C Mbaeze for the 1st Respondent.
Paul Usoro SAN with Sixtus Onuka, C. Eze, Yetunde Oluyayo (Miss) and Temitope Kuti for the 4th Respondent.
Ladipo Soetan with A.A. Afadameh. Suzie Momoh (Miss) and D.Emesiobum for the 5th- 9th Respondents.For Respondent
