HON. EFE GODFREY OFOBRUKU v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY & ANOR (2015)

HON. EFE GODFREY OFOBRUKU v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY & ANOR

(2015)LCN/7930(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 2nd day of July, 2015

CA/B/306/2014

RATIO

COURT: JURISDICTION; WHETHER THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SEAT OF A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY HAS BECOME VACANT

Section 272(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) stipulates:
“(3) Subject to the provisions of Section 251 and other provisions of this Constitution, the Federal High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether the term of office of a member of the House of Assembly of a State, a Governor or Deputy Governor has ceased or become vacant.”
So, clearly, the Constitution vests jurisdiction in the Lower Court to hear and determine whether the seat of the Appellant in the Delta State House of Assembly has become vacant. In INEC vs. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY (2014) LPELR (22809) 1 at 23-24, this court per Ogunwumiju, JCA, held that it is only the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the term of office of a member of the House of Assembly has ceased or become vacant. per. UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

COURT: THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE COURT; THE SCOPE OF THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE COURT ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION

JUSTICES

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

HON. EFE GODFREY OFOBRUKU Appellant(s)

AND

1. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY
2. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the Ruling of the Federal High Court, sitting at Warri, Delta State, Coram Judice: Hon. Justice M. Shitu Abubakar, J., in Suit No. FHC/WR/CS/102/2013 delivered on 27th May, 2014.

The facts leading to the appeal as can be gleaned from the cold printed records are as follows:
The Appellant on record, who was the 1st Defendant at the Lower Court is a member of the Delta State House of Assembly representing Uvwie State Constituency. He was elected on the platform of the Democratic Peoples Party, the 1st Respondent herein, which was the Plaintiff at the Lower Court. At the proceedings of the Delta State House of Assembly on 6th March 2012, the fact of the Appellant having decamped from the Democratic Peoples Party to the Peoples Democratic Party was announced on the floor of the House of Assembly. Subsequently, the 1st Respondent filed an Originating Summons at the Lower Court for the determination of the following question:
“Whether or not the 1st Defendant herein has not LOST HIS LEGISLATIVE SEAT IN THE DELTA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY under and by virtue of the provisions of Section 109 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as a result of the fact that the Record of Proceedings of that State House of Assembly (Hansard) for Tuesday 6th March, 2012 established beyond doubt that the 1st Defendant decamped from the Political Party on whose platform he was elected i.e. the Democratic Peoples Party (D.P.P.) to another political party (the Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P) on whose platform he was not elected.”

Upon the determination of this question, the following reliefs were sought:
“1. A declaration that the 1st Defendant Efe Godfrey Ofobruku elected to the Delta State House of Assembly to represent Uvwie State Constituency lost his seat in the House (Delta State House of Assembly) on Tuesday 6th March, 2012 having decamped from the Political Party under whose platform he was elected to another political party contrary to Section 109 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.
2. A declaration that the legislative seat of the Uvwie State House of Assembly representative is now vacant, Efe Godfrey Ofobruku having lost the right to sit therein under and by virtue of the provision of Section 109 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended.
3. An order that fresh election be conducted by the 2nd Defendant to fill the vacant seat of the member representing Uvwie State Constituency of the Delta State House of Assembly for the un-expired term of the 1st Defendant.
4. Any other order or orders or further or other order or orders as this Honourable Court may make, having regard to the circumstances and justice of this case.”

The Appellant could not see his way clear on the competence of the action filed by the 1st Respondent, he filed a preliminary objection seeking for an order striking out and/or dismissing the suit on the following grounds:
“i. This Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to enter and determine this suit.
ii. Condition(s) precedent to the filing of this Suit have not been complied with.
iii. The Suit is not properly constituted as all parties who are necessary for the effective and effectual determination of this Suit have not been joined in this Suit.
iv. The Plaintiff has no locus standi to initiate this suit.”

It is the Ruling of the Lower Court dismissing the said preliminary objection that has necessitated this appeal. The Ruling is at pages 162-180 of the Records while the Notice of Appeal which was filed on 9th June, 2014 is at pages 181-184 of the Records. The Records of Appeal were transmitted to this court on 24th June, 2014. Thereafter the parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument.

The Appellant’s Brief of Argument is dated 23rd June, 2014 but filed on 24th June, 2014. The 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument is dated 2nd December, 2014, filed on 3rd December, 2014 and deemed as properly filed and served on 12th March, 2015. The 2nd Respondent did not file any brief in respect of this appeal as it was content to pursue its own appeal in Appeal No. CA/B/306A/2014 which also emanated from the excoriated Ruling of the Lower Court delivered on the said 27th day of May, 2014. In consequence, the 2nd Respondent conceded this appeal.

The Appellant distilled a sole issue for determination in his brief of argument, namely:
“Whether having regards to the very clear provisions of Section 109(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) the suit for the Plaintiff/Respondent before the Lower Court was competent and maintainable?”

The 1st Respondent equally formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:
“Whether or not the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on the Lower Court in Section 272 is subject to any preliminary or precedent acts of the Speaker or any member of the House by virtue of Section 109(2) of the same Constitution, notwithstanding the provisions in the Order 9 Rule 14 of the Federal High Court Rules 2009.”

At the hearing of the appeal, Ikhide Ehighelua, Esq., learned Counsel for the Appellant adopted and relied on the Appellant’s brief of argument and he urged the court to allow the appeal and strike out the action at the Lower Court. He maintained that the action at the Lower Court was not properly constituted as the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly and the Delta State House of Assembly were not made parties to the action as required by Section 109 of the 1999 Constitution.

The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, S.O. Oluku, Esq., adopted and relied on the 1st Respondent’s brief which was settled by H.A. Aboloje, Esq., and he urged the court to dismiss the appeal. The 2nd Respondent was represented by J.H. Igbikiberesima, Esq., and he informed the court that he did not file a Respondent’s Brief and that he was conceding the appeal.

Though the 1st Respondent flayed the issue for determination as distilled by the Appellant, the issue for determination as formulated by the 1st Respondent is not radically different in its true essence from the issue distilled by the Appellant. The crux of the issues as distilled by the parties in their own words and language hinge on the competence of the action and whether it was maintainable on the state of the law. This being so, it is on the basis of the issue as formulated by the Appellant that I will consider and resolve this appeal.

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
“Whether having regards to the very clear provisions of Section 109(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) the suit for the Plaintiff/Respondent before the Lower Court was competent and maintainable?”

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
The Appellant submits that the action before the Lower Court rests squarely on the application and enforcement of Section 109 of the 1999 Constitution. It was contended that the germane provisions are Section 109(1)(g) and Section 109(2) which make it clear that it is the Speaker of a House of Assembly that has the power and authority to give effect to Section (109)(1) after having seen evidence satisfactory to the House of Assembly that the provision of Section 109(1) of the Constitution was applicable. It was argued that the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly and the Delta State House of Assembly were not made parties to the action as a result of which the action was not properly constituted; such that the court could not proceed to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of necessary, statutory and indispensible parties. It was posited that the court cannot arrogate to itself any jurisdiction which it does not have and that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court, nor can the court proceed to exercise jurisdiction because the parties did not raise the jurisdiction of the court. The cases of ARJAY NIG LTD vs. AIRLINE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT LTD (2003) 17 NWLR (PT 820) 577 at 634, OKOLO vs. UNION BANK (2004) 2 NWLR (PT 859) 87 at 108, IJEBU-ODE LOCAL GOVT. vs. BALOGUN & CO. LTD (1991) 1 NWLR (PT 166) 136, ADESOLA vs. ABIDOYE (1994) 14 NWLR (PT 637) 28 and JADESIMI vs. OKOTIE-EBOH (1986) 1 NWLR (PT 16) 264 were referred to.

It is the further submission of the Appellant that it is the Speaker of the House of Assembly that gives effect to Section 109(1) of the 1999 Constitution and that where therefore in any proceedings to enforce Section 109(1) of the Constitution, the Speaker is not made a party; the court cannot proceed. The decision of this court, per Ogunwumiju, JCA in DELTA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY vs. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY Appeal No. CA/B/181/2010 (unreported) delivered on 29th April 2014 was cited in support. It was opined that failure to join an indispensable necessary party spells doom for the action. The cases of OTUYA vs. ONYEKWELI (2010) LPELR (8961), NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS vs. ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION (2012) 10 NWLR (PT 1307) 170, BUHARI vs. YUSUF (2003) 14 NWLR (PT 841) 448, YAHAYA vs. AMINU (2004) 7 NWLR (PT 871) 185 and TAFIDA vs. BAFARAWA (1999) 4 NWLR (PT 597) 70 were referred to. The Appellant asserted that it is only when proper parties are before the court that makes the court competent. The cases of OKONTA vs. PHILLIP (2010) 18 NWLR (PT 1225) 320 at 326 was relied upon. The conditions precedent to the competence of a Court as laid down in MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587 were referred to and it was posited that the case was not initiated at the Lower Court by due process and upon the fulfilment of all conditions precedent. It was therefore contended that the Lower Court was wrong when it held that the absence of the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly cannot defeat the action and did not rob the court of its jurisdiction.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST RESPONDENTS COUNSEL
The 1st Respondent submits that a parallel should be drawn between Section 109 of the Constitution and Section 137 of the Constitution [sic] which spells out the compulsory parties to an election petition. It was posited that by the stipulation of Sections 6(6) and 272 of the Constitution, the High Courts have the jurisdiction to interpret Section 109 of the Constitution. It was submitted that based on the stipulation of Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 9 Rule 14 of the Federal High Court Rules, the action is competent as the stipulation of Section 109(2) of the 1999 Constitution was merely to avoid the necessity of the courts intervention at all times by conferring powers on the Speaker to administratively or non-judicially declare a seat of a legislator vacant. It was therefore contended that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be challenged on non-joinder because an order of mandamus can still lie to compel the Speaker to comply with a declaration made by the court. It was posited that the action was squarely between the Appellant who was sponsored by the 1st Respondent and the 1st Respondent, being the political party that was voted for and the winner of the election. The cases of AMAECHI vs. INEC (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 407) 1 at 97G-H and 204H – 205C and OTUAYA vs. ONYEKWELI Appeal No. CA/B/EPT/334/2007 (unreported) were referred to. It was finally submitted that Rules of Court must be obeyed and that it was therefore open to the Speaker of the Delta House of Assembly if he feels that he would be adversely affected by the outcome of the case to apply to be joined as a party. The cases of WILLIAMS vs. HOPE RISING VOLUNTARY FUNDS SOCIETY (1982) 2 SC 145, CHRISLIEB PLC vs. OLAGBAJU (2004) 4 NWLR (PT 863) 342 at 360F-G and KALIEL vs. ALIERO (1999) 4 NWLR (PT 597) 139 at 153E-F were cited in support.

RESOLUTION
The disceptation in this appeal falls within a very narrow compass. When properly streamlined and put in perspective, the contention is that the Lower Court was divested of jurisdiction to entertain the action because the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly and the Delta State House of Assembly were not made parties to the action. I have already redacted the background to the action. It is all about whether the seat of the Appellant should be declared vacant as a result of his defecting from the 1st Respondent, the political party that sponsored him and on whose platform he was elected as a member of the Delta State House of Assembly, to the Peoples Democratic Party. In succinct terms, the action is all about whether the seat of the Appellant in the Delta State House of Assembly has become vacant.

The necessary starting point will be to set out the provisions of Section 109(1)(g) and 109(2) of the Constitution. They provide:
“109(1) A member of a House of Assembly shall vacate his seat if: –
(g) Being a person whose election to the House of Assembly was sponsored by a political party, he becomes a member of another political party before the expiration of the period for which that House was elected; provided that his membership of the latter political party is not as a result of a division in the political party of which he was previously a member or of a merger of two or more political parties or factions by one of which he was previously sponsored.”
“(2) The Speaker of the House of Assembly shall give effect to subsection (1) of this section, so however that the speaker or a member shall first present evidence satisfactory to the House that any of the provisions of that subsection has become applicable in respect of that member.”

By Section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, the judicial powers of the court extends to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person. See RANSOME-KUTI vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (1985) 7 NWLR (PT 6) 211 and BAKARE vs. A-G FEDERATION (1990) LPELR (707) 1 at 15.
Therefore, the Lower Court in the exercise of its judicial powers pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it by Section 272(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) can adjudicate and determine the question of the civil rights and obligations of the parties before it.

The Appellant placed reliance on the dictum of My Lady, Ogunwumiju, JCA in DELTA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY vs. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY (2014) LPELR (22808) 1 at 41-42 to the effect that it is the Speaker of the House of Assembly that gives effect to Section 109(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution. That no doubt remains the legal position. But then facts are the fountainhead of the law and without knowing the facts that induced a dictum, the dictum would invariably be quoted out of con. The rationes decidendi or obiter dictum in a case must be intricately and intimately related to the facts that induced the dictum. See ADEGOKE MOTORS vs. ADESANYA (1989) 3 NWLR (PT 109) 250 at 265H-266A.

In DELTA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY vs. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY (supra) the Respondent therein, not being the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly wrote a letter for the seat of a legislator to be declared vacant. See pages 21, 41-42 and 47 of the LPELR. So on the peculiar facts of the matter, the Democratic Peoples Party sought to usurp the Constitutional responsibility of the Speaker of the House of Assembly under Section 109(2) of the 1999 Constitution and it was these set of facts that induced the dictum of my Lady, Ogunwumiju, JCA. The Appellant seeks to pull this ratio out of con and give it a general application since on the peculiar facts of the instant action, the 1st Respondent approached the Court to activate the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 272(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). I ask again, does the fact that the Speaker of the House of Assembly was not made a party affect the jurisdiction of the Court?

I doubt if that is the legal position. While it is for the Speaker to give effect to Section 109(2) of the 1999 Constitution, Section 287 of the Constitution provides that the decisions of a court shall be enforced in any part of the country by all authorities and persons. See DINGYADI vs. INEC (2011) LPELR (950) 1 at 56, 57. The necessary corollary of this Constitutional provision is that the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly is obligated, authorised and mandated to give effect to any decision of the Lower Court in exercise of the jurisdiction vested by Section 272(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Therefore it cannot be argued that Section 109(2) of the 1999 Constitution cannot be activated unless the Speaker is made a party to the action. It can definitely be activated based on the provisions of Section 287 of the Constitution.

It is pertinent to add that the cases of OTUYA vs. ONYEKWELI (supra), AWUSE vs. ODILI (supra), BUHARI vs. YUSUF (supra), YAHAYA vs. AMINU (supra) and TAFIDA vs. BAFARAWA (supra) relied upon by the Appellant are inapplicable. They are all decisions on election petitions based on the express stipulations of the Electoral Act on the statutory parties to an Election Petition.

There is nothing in Section 109 of the Constitution which stipulates that the Speaker of a House of Assembly or the House of Assembly itself must be made a party in an action to determine if the seat of a member of the House has become vacant.
Be that as it may, it seems settled that the non-joinder of a person who would have been made a party would not defeat the cause of action. See CROSS RIVER STATE NEWSPAPER CORPORATION vs. ONI (1995) LPELR (898) 1 at 31 and IFEANYI CHUKWU (OSONDU) LTD vs. SOLEH BONEH LTD (2000) LPELR 1 at 64. In NWANNA vs. A-G FEDERATION (2010) LPELR (9047) 1 at 13-14, this Court per Hussein Mukhtar, JCA stated:
“However, the non-joinder of a necessary party will not ground a dismissal of the action as the Lower Court did in this case nor does it derobe the court of jurisdiction to hear the case as held by the learned trial Judge … In this case, however, the mere failure to join the Inspector General of Police does not render the action incompetent as erroneously held by the court below. This position of the law is aptly provided under Order 12 rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2000 (supra). In the case of DAPIALONG vs. LALONG (2007) 5 NWLR (PT. 1026) 199 at 212 E-F this court per Akaahs, JCA held thus:
‘An action cannot be rendered incompetent simply because all the necessary parties have not been joined in the suit. It suffices if the parties before the court are competent parties and the cause of action, if substantiated by the plaintiff entitles him to a remedy against the defendant. In the instant case, the reliefs sought by the respondents could be determined between the parties to the suit without joinder of other parties. In the circumstance, the trial court was right when it held that the parties to the suit were the necessary parties, and assumed jurisdiction to determine the suit.’
The Supreme Court had similarly held in the case of BABA YEJU vs. ASHAMU (1998) 9 NWLR (PT 567) 546 at 557E-F per Ogundare, JSC (of blessed memory) as follows:
‘By virtue of order 3 rule 19 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 1973 (applicable to this case) non-joinder of necessary parties would not defeat an action, otherwise properly constituted.'”
I agree entirely with the legal position as eloquently stated by my learned brother. The non-joinder of the Speaker of the Delta State House of Assembly does not make the action incompetent. The reliefs sought by the 1st Respondent at the Lower Court could be determined to finality between the parties on record without the joinder of the Speaker since by Section 287 of the 1999 Constitution, the Speaker is enjoined to give effect to the decisions of the court. Furthermore, Order 9 Rule 14 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules expressly stipulates that no proceedings shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.

In arriving at the decision appealed against, the Lower Court conclusively stated as follows at pages 178-180 of the Records:
“By the lucid and plain provision of this Section, it is beyond doubt that of all the Courts in Nigeria it is only Federal High Court that has original jurisdiction to hear cases on whether the terms of the offence [sic] of a member of the State House of Assembly has ceased or become vacant by whatever reason.
The argument of the Learned Counsel for the Applicant that the absence of the Speaker of Delta State House of Assembly being a necessary party has robbed this Court of its jurisdiction is not correct, to say the least.
In my view that argument can only go to the proof and not competence of the Suit. This is because the absence of a necessary party by itself cannot defeat the action. It can only limit the reliefs the court can grant based on the age long settled principles of Law which says a Court cannot grant a relief against a party not before it. It is also the Law that a Plaintiff cannot be compelled to proceed against a party he has no desire to sue. See ALHAJI IBRAHIM ATANYI & ORS vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 89) 1168 C.A.
In the final analysis I am of the respectful view that there is no merit whatsoever in the Preliminary Objections filed by the Defendants/Applicant. The 2 Preliminary Objections are accordingly dismissed for lack of merit.”

Bull’s-eye! The decision of the Lower Court in this regard is unassailable.

In a summation, I will answer the issue for determination in the affirmative and resolve the same against the Appellant. The 1st Respondent’s action is competent and maintainable. Accordingly, this appeal is devoid of merit, the same fails and it is hereby dismissed with N50,000.00 costs in favour of the 1st Respondent. The matter is remitted to the Lower Court for hearing and determination of the originating summons on the merits.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu JCA. I agree with my learned brother that the suit is maintainable against the defendant as constituted and that non-joinder of the Speaker of the House of Assembly would not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to grant the declaratory order sought by the Appellant at the trial court.

I must add however that I am of the strong view that the Speaker in this type of situation is a desirable party to the proceedings. Whether the Speaker is a necessary party would depend on the declarations sought and the reliefs prayed for. In this case under review, the declaration sought for is that the 1st Defendant, Eze Godfrey Ofobuike having decamped to another party, his seat is now vacant since there is no division within his own party by virtue of Section 109 of the 1999 Constitution.

Nothing is asked of the Speaker and the declaration if granted would be made to the whole world including the Speaker. My learned brother is very optimistic and I suppose we have to be, that in this our nascent democracy whereby till now all sorts of gymnastics and contortions are performed to avoid the enforcement of court judgments, a Speaker who has something to gain by the decamping of a member of the house to his own party would be quick to obey a court order where he is not specifically named. If the Speaker decides to ignore the order, a writ of mandamus must then lie to force him to activate the process only the Speaker is mandated to perform pursuant to Section 109(2) of the Constitution.

A clear look at Section 109(1)(g) shows that it is mandatory for the elected member to vacate his seat immediately on decamping to another party where there is no division within his own party. It should be a voluntary honourable action on his part. It is when this is not done, that the Speaker is then called upon by Section 109(2) to give effect to the provision of Section 109(1)(g) by presenting evidence to the House that the member has fallen foul of S.109(1)(g) and then after deliberation, the member is given the decision of the house.

Suffice it to say that the current wisdom of the superior courts is that even non-joinder of a necessary party would not vitiate an action or rob the court of jurisdiction so long as the issues before the court can be justly and fairly resolve between the very parties before the court. In the circumstances of this case, the issues before the court can be fairly and justly resolved between the parties before the court. The appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit. I abide by all consequential orders in the lead judgment.

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: This Appeal is against the Ruling of the Federal High Court sitting at Warri, Delta State, Coram M. Shittu Abubakar, J., in Suit No.FHC/WR/CS/102/2013 delivered on 27th May, 2014.

My learned brother U.A. OGAKWU, JCA has admirably dealt with all the issues in this appeal and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions therein. The decision of the Lower Court cannot be faulted in this regard. Accordingly, I too am of the firm view that this Appeal lacks merit, it fails and is hereby also dismissed by me.

I abide by the order of costs of N50,000 in favour of the 1st Respondent whose action is deemed competent and maintainable.

The matter is hereby remitted to the Lower Court to hear and determine the Originating Summons on the merit.

Appearances

Ikhide Ehighelua, Esq. (with A. E. Alagun, Esq.)For Appellant

AND

S. O. Oluku, Esq. for the 1st Respondent
J. H. Igbikiberesima, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent.For Respondent