DR. JEREMIAH ABALAKA V. MINISTER OF HEALTH & ORS
(2015)LCN/7900(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 13th day of June, 2005
CA/A/121/2003
RATIO
COURT: INTERFERENCE; WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT THAT ARE NOT PERVERSE
It is trite law that once the findings of trial court are not perverse, an appeal court has no business interfering with such findings. See Egbaran & Ors. v. Akpotor & Ors. (1997) 7 SCNJ 392, (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 514) 559; Ahmed v. State (1998) 7 SCNJ 60, (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 389; Nkado & Ors. v. Obiano & Anor. (1997) 5 SCNJ, 33, (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 31.
COURT: ALLEGATION OF BIAS; WHAT THE COURT LOOKS AT BEFORE AN ALLEGATION OF BIAS TO BE GROUNDED AGAINST THE PERSON OF A JUDGE
The pronouncements of our superior courts of record are always consistent that for an allegation of bias to be grounded against the person of a Judge, it must be made on solid and unshaken grounds not on mere figments of imagination. In the case of Onigbede v. Balogun (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 762) p. 1 at p. 22 the Supreme Court per Ogundare, JSC reiterating the principles of law stated by Lord Denning, M.R.; held among other things that: ” … considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand:
See Reg. v. Huggins (1895) 1 Q.B. 563 and Rex v. Sunderland Justices (1901) 2 K.B. 357, CA per Vaughan Williams, L.J. Ibid 373.
Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise of conjecture is not enough; see Reg v. Cambome Justices. Ex-parte Pearce (1955) 1 Q.B. 41,48-51; (1954) 3 WLR 415; 2 All ER 850 DC and Reg. v. Nailsworth Licencing Justices, Ex parte Bird (1953) 1WLR 1046; (1953) 2 All ER 652, DC. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side fairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking: The Judge was biased.” Also, in Orugbo & Anr. v. Bulara Una & Ors. (2002) 9-12 SCNJ 12 at 32, (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) 175 at p. 209, the same court reiterated “The constitutional provision of fair hearing has no tribal insinuation of the composition of the bench vis-a-vis the tribes of the parties. A party should not be heard to complain that because he is not of the same tribe with members of the bench, he cannot have a fair hearing. That in my humble view, is the most invidious and incongruous approach to this very important legal principle. If the contention is correct, then most, if not all trials in our judicial system, must be faulted because the composition of most courts may not agree with the tribes of the litigants. Perhaps an example will make the point clearer. No Asian, American, German or any other foreigner would submit to the jurisdiction of any Nigerian court because virtually all courts in Nigeria are constituted by Nigerians. Was section 33 of the 1979 Constitution, which is now section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, designed to cure such a crude situation. No not at all. Tribal composition at the bench per se cannot be basis for the charge of bias or likelihood of bias, unless the aggrieved party shows by the conduct of the bench such bias or likelihood of bias. The constitutional provision of fair hearing is already large and omnibus and I am not prepared to expand the frontiers beyond its onerous content or ambit.”
The learned counsel for the appellant failed to show what pecuniary benefits or any benefit at all, the learned trial Judge stood to gain by his above pronouncements. Generally, bias or likelihood of bias should not be built upon chase of a wild goose in an unlimited thick forest. The case of Yabugbe v. C. O. P. (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 234) 152 at 177 clarifies the issue more where it was stated that a man is said to be a Judge in his own cause when he is likely to be biased in favour or against either for reason of interest or favour. In other words, if he has either pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter in litigation, or, because of his relationship with either of the parties, he is likely to be biased in favour of or against him, then he ought not to be the Judge. “If courts are to go by spurious allegation of bias as in this case, then no legal practitioner can be tried by any court because he belongs to same profession as the Magistrate or High Court Judge that might try him. Similarly, judicial officers with shares in public companies or coming from a particular State of Nigeria cannot try or hear any case involving such companies or any of the arms of the Government of that State. I think there is a limit to which the chase of such wild goose can go. Concrete evidence of bias must be shown before the allegation can succeed. In the present case I see no such evidence and I, therefore consider the allegation to be frivolous and unfair to the learned trial Magistrate.” per. I. T. MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.
COURT: DUTY OF A COURT; THE DUTY OF A COURT TO PRONOUNCE ON ISSUES RAISED BEFORE IT BY PARTIES
The position of the law is that a court is duty bound to pronounce on issues raised before it by parties. See: NBC Plc. v. Borgundu (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 588) 605 WR. & P.C Ltd. v. Onwo (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 630) 312; Fawehinmi v. Abacha (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 475) 710. Where the trial court fails to consider such issues, the appeal court is in as much a position as the trial court to determine such issue particularly where no further evidence will be required or where the issues are purely questions of law. See: Imonikhe v. A-G., Bendel State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 296. per. I. T. MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ZAINAB ADAMU BULKACHUWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MARY PETER ODILI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
DR. JEREMIAH ABALAKA – Appellant(s)
AND
1. MINISTER OF HEALTH
2. MEDICAL & DENTAL COUNCIL OF NIGERIA
3. MEDICAL AND DENTAL PRACTITIONERS INVESTIGATING PANEL – Respondent(s)
I. T. MUHAMMAD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): In a motion on notice dated 5th day of July, 2000, and filed at the Federal High Court, Abuja (lower court) on 7th July, 2000, the appellant herein, as applicant, prayed for the following reliefs –
“1. A declaration that the respondents are under the complete control and authority of the Minister of Health and that they are bound to carry out any directive he gives them.
2. A declaration that the Minister of Health by his public utterances and actions is in open hostility to the efforts of the applicant and his discovery or effect preventive and curative vaccines against HIV infection.
3. A declaration that such open hostility and implacable opposition of the Minister to the applicant and his discoveries have impugned the independence and impartiality of all organs and public offices and persons under his control to carry out any judicial or quasi-judicial duties.
4. A declaration that the 2nd & 3rd respondents’ independence and impartiality to carry out any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings against the applicant is compromised by the powers of the Minister to appoint their members and give them directions which they must obey and by virtue of their membership of the Nigerian Medical Association.
5. A declaration that it will be unconstitutional and therefore null and void for the 2nd respondent to accuse the applicant, set up the 3rd respondent to investigate him and also set up a tribunal of its members to try the applicant.
6. A declaration that it is unconstitutional for the 2nd respondent to set up tribunal to try the applicant for an action he did not know was an offence at the time of its occurrence.
7. A declaration that it is ultra-vires for the 2nd respondent to investigate or try the applicant for announcing the discovery of vaccines against HIV infection.
8. An order of mandatory injunction restraining the respondents, their officers, agents, servants and privies from investigating the appllicant or setting up a tribunal to try him.
9. Such further or other orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.”
Written addresses were filed by the respective parties to support their submissions on the motion. After considering the affidavit evidence adduced by the respective parties and their various written submissions, the learned trial Judge found the motion to be unmeritorious and dismissed it. It is against the dismissal order that the appellant filed his appeal before this court. Five original grounds of appeal were initially filed contained in the notice of appeal. On the 29th of January, 2004, this court granted leave to the appellant to amend his original notice and grounds of appeal. The amended notice of appeal now contains 7 grounds of appeal.
Parties to this appeal with the exception of the 1st respondent, filed and exchanged briefs of arguments. Learned counsel for the appellant formulated the following issues for determination; viz:
“1. Whether the lower court came to the right decision to dismiss the appellant’s application when it ignored the bulk of the affidavit evidence before it.
2. Whether the lower court did not err when it failed to hold as unconstitutional the 3rd respondent’s clear attempt to be the accuser, the prosecutor and Judge in its own case.
3. Whether the lower court was right when it held that the 2nd and 3rd respondents were statutory bodies carrying out statutory functions when by their own admission they were not constituted according to law.
4. Whether the lower court was not completely in error when it held that the appellant’s claims are outside the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution.
5. Whether the lower court was not in error when it subsumed the issues raised by the appellant under the issues raised by the 1st respondent and completely failed to consider the bulk of the appellant’s case.
6. Whether the lower court was not in error when it failed to hold that the bias of the 3rd respondent against the appellant vitiates any claim it has to impartiality in the trial of the appellant.
7. Whether the judgment of the lower court was not tainted by the bias of the learned trial Judge against the appellant and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”
Learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents formulated 5 Issues –
1. Whether the learned trial Judge considered the entire case, including affidavit evidence by the parties and counsel’s submissions, before arriving at his conclusion that the applicant’s case is unmeritorious and lacks merit? (Grounds 1 and 5).
2. Whether from the totality of the materials placed before the lower court, it could be said that the 3rd respondent breached the principles of fair hearing as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution and the rules of natural justice when it invited the applicant for investigation (Grounds 2 & 6).
3. Whether the materials placed before the lower court justified the assertion of the appellant that the 2nd and 3rd respondents were not properly constituted to perform their statutory functions in relation to the appellant (Ground 3).
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in his conclusion that all the reliefs claimed by the appellant as applicant showed that they were outside the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution (Ground 4).
5. Whether the learned trial Judge exhibited bias against the appellant as applicant in the lower court in his consideration of the case (Ground 7).”
Before I consider the submissions of the respective learned counsel for the parties, it is pertinent to state the salient facts giving rise to this appeal. The appellant had been invited by a letter dated 22nd May, 2000, signed by the secretary to the 3rd respondent, to appear before the 3rd respondent’s panel sitting at Abuja on Monday, 26th June, 2000.
Upon receipt of the aforesaid letter of invitation, the appellant applied to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory for leave to enforce his fundamental rights. That court granted him ex parte an order of interim injunction restraining the respondents from carrying out the proposed investigation. An objection was taken by the respondents to the jurisdiction of the FCT High Court to entertain the matter. That court upheld the objection, and the suit at the FCT High Court was accordingly struck out on 3rd July, 2000.
Following the striking out of the suit at the FCT High Court and the consequential discharge of the earlier order of interim injunction, the 3rd respondent once again by letter dated 14th July, 2000 invited the appellant to appear before it on Monday 31st July, 2000, in respect of the proposed investigation. To this letter was attached a letter dated February 17, 2000 addressed to the 2nd respondent by one Dr. Seyi Roberts, Consultant physician and Neurologist, complaining about the professional conduct of the applicant concerning his alleged discovery.
Following the said invitation, the appellant applied to the Court of Appeal for an order to restrain the 3rd respondent from carrying out its investigation. With the consent of all the parties, the Court of Appeal on 21st of September, 2000 granted an order restraining the respondents from conducting the investigation of appellant in any way whatsoever, pending the determination of the substantive motion on notice now pending before the lower court. The Court of Appeal further directed that the lower court should dispose of the substantive motion on notice as expeditiously as possible.
There had been series of publications in the news media concerning the alleged therapeutic breakthrough by the appellant for the cure of HIV-AIDS. The 3rd respondent in its letter drew the attention of the applicant to rules 32 and 33 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Medical and Dental Practitioners in Nigeria which deal respectively with self advertisement or procurement of advertisement and medical publication of pending treatment and new discoveries.
The appellant alleged that the 1st respondent had hitherto been hostile to him and his alleged discovery and that the invitation that he should appear before the 3rd respondent must have been a consequence of the 1st respondent’s hostility. He also alleged that the 2nd and 3rd respondents are under the control and supervision of the 1st respondent and that as all the respondents are likely to be biased against him, he would have no chance of fair hearing before the 3rd respondent. He in fact alleged that the 2nd and 3rd respondents are under the directives of the 1st respondent to remove his name from the Medical Register at all costs.’
The applicant also alleged that the Nigerian Medical Association, which is the umbrella professional body for all medical practitioners, had criticized him and his discovery, and that because of this; no member of the Association is qualified to sit in judgment over him in respect of the subject matter. That was why the appellant had to resort to the lower court for the grant of the reliefs sought.
While making submissions on the issues he formulated, learned counsel for the appellant, argued on issue No.1 that because of the statutory nature of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, the number of their members and the manner of their appointment, their decision could be influenced by the 1st respondent, the Minister of Health in charge of the Ministry under which the 1st and 2nd respondents are parastatal and panel. He submitted further that statutory bodies that are larger in number whose members are not even appointed but elected have been manipulated, are being manipulated in Nigeria everyday. Learned counsel urged this court to take judicial notice under section 74(1)(c) of the Evidence Act of the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly of the States. He cited the case of National Assembly v. President (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 824) 104 at 131 C-D. Learned counsel cited an examine with the Senate which regularly suffered continuously for 4 years mainly due to influence from outside it. He cited the case of Yakubu v. Governor of Kogi State (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 511) 66. He also cited the episode in Anambra State with the purported resignation of the Dr. Chris Ngige where learned counsel said, the entire House of Assembly was manipulated. Olaye v. Chairman, Medical and Dental Practitioners Investigating Panel & Anor: (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.506) 550 was cited.
Learned counsel argued that facts, not in issue but so closely connected with a fact in issue were completely ignored by the trial court against the provision of section 7 of the Evidence Act. The 1st respondent carried out between March and July 2000 a series of actions and pronouncements against the appellant which culminated in his announcing the ban of the appellant’s vaccines on 20th of July, 2000. It is also clear that the move of the 2nd and 3rd respondents against the appellant since 22nd May, 2000 is so closely connected in time and place with the other acts and pronouncements of the 1st respondent to form part of the same set of actions or those other actions and utterances of the 1st respondent to form the motive for the action of the 2nd and 3rd respondents against the appellant, namely inviting him to come for an investigation of a spurious offence. Learned counsel stated that the judgment of the lower court was against the weight of evidence as it completely neglected the evidence of the 2nd and 3rd respondents and showed bias against the appellant attempting to try him while the matter was already sub-judice. Another reason why the judgment of the lower court was against weight of evidence is that the lower court chose to believe the evidence of a party that engaged in deliberate falsehood. The lower court ignored the evidence presented before it in discovering vaccines against HIV. Another important evidence glossed over by the lower court is the fact that none of the newspaper publications exhibits p6a to p6g was an advertisement or an article written by the appellant. None of them was an interview. They were articles written by others. Case of LPDC v. Fawehinmi (1985) 2 NSCC 998., (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 300 The learned trial Judge’s raising of the issue of scientific proof of the appellant’s vaccine, suo motu in his judgment is another proof of the fact that the judgment was against weight of evidence, as he imported into the case a foreign issue obviously from a personal position held by him in respect of the appellant’s vaccine for which lapse, his judgment ought not to be allowed to stand. Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 1 All NLR (Pt.1 35; Romaine v. Romaine (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 238) 650.
Issue No.1 from the issues formulated by learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents coresponds with appellant’s first issue.
Learned SAN for the 2nd and 3rd respondents submitted on that issue that the submission of each of the counsel highlighted the affidavit evidence offered by each party in support of his case.
The learned trial Judge adopted the correct approach to the case and gave adequate consideration to the evidence offered by the parties as far as they are necessary to determine the reliefs sought by the appellant. On the allegation of manipulation of 2nd and 3rd respondents by the 1st respondent, learned SAN submitted that what the appellant is required to establish is clear evidence of the manipulation of the 2nd and 3rd respondents by the 1st respondent. It is incorrect for the appellant to speculate. Learned SAN submitted that all the examples cited by the appellant in support of his argument are inappropriate and irrelevant and should be discountenanced.
Learned SAN cited and relied on section 15(3) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act, Cap. 221, LFN which invests 3rd respondent with the duty of conducting preliminary investigation into any case where it is alleged that a registered person has misbehaved in his capacity as a Medical Practitioner or Dental Surgeon, or should for any other reason be the subject of proceedings before the disciplinary tribunal. He cited the case of LPDC v. Fawehinmi (supra). On the issue of allegation of motive on the part of the 2nd and 3rd respondents for inviting the appellant for investigation, learned SAN submitted that there is no evidence of such motive and the law is clear that motive is irrelevant to the consideration of this type of matter. Agbo v. C.B.N (1996) 10NWLR (Pt.478) 370 at 377 E-F. On the allegation that 3rd respondent had manufactured the letter from one Dr. Seyi Roberts, dated 17/2/2000 and told a blatant lie; learned SAN submitted that this is objectionable and is an unprofessional use of language by counsel. The allegation appears fraudulent which as a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. There was no pleading and no evidence from the appellant to establish that allegation. The lower court was right in discountenancing the allegation. Learned SAN argued that on the matters of Investigating whether there was advertisement as defined in the Medical Code of Ethics, these were issues for the panel and not for the court as the court cannot usurp such function. Ajakaiye v. Idehai (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 364) 504 at 525-526 referred. Failure of the court to decide the issue is not the same thing as saying that the lower court failed to attach weight to the evidence.
On issues not pronounced upon by the lower court, learned SAN argued that failure of the court to pronounce on them would not vitiate the proceedings as they were questions of law requiring no further evidence and the failure to decide on them did not lead to a miscarriage of justice. He urged this court to assume the position of the lower court to pronounce on them where necessary.
Appellant’s Issue No.2: The submission of learned counsel for the appellant on this issue is condensed as follows. The 3rd respondent accused the appellant and was going to play the roles of his prosecutor and Judge before he went to court against it. The 3rd respondent’s letter of 22nd May, 2000 carried along with it 7 newspaper cuttings attached to it which clearly showed that the 3rd respondent procured the evidence it was going to use to prosecute and judge the appellant whereas Dr. Seyi Robert’s letter did not refer to those seven newspaper cuttings. Reference was made to Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee v. Fawehinmi (1985) 2 NSCC 998 at 1018-1019, (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 300. When on the 15th May, 2000, the 3rd respondent decided to accuse the appellant, its Chairman presided over that meeting, and the letter of 22nd May, 2000 was signed by its Secretary plainly on Chairman’s instruction.
The same Chairman was going to sit in judgment over the appellant on 26th June, 2000 he was stopped by the order of the court.
In response, learned SAN for the 2nd and 3rd respondents in his issue No.2, stated that Dr. Seyi Robert’s complaint against the appellant in the letter of 17th February, 2000, if read together, it could not reasonably be said that the 3rd respondent was the accuser, the prosecutor and the Judge all at once. As for the newspaper publications attached to exhibits p6, they were made to the world at large. So also were the electronic news items that were published on the subject. So, if any member of the 2nd respondent council came to the knowledge of the publication and drew the attention of the 3rd respondent’s panel to it, it would not be wrong for the 3rd respondent to conduct an investigation based on such information. section 15(3) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act (supra) referred to. Learned SAN submits that the role of the 3rd respondent is only to conduct preliminary investigation into allegations of misbehavior by a registered person which role the appellant confused with that of adjudication. Learned SAN tried to draw distinctions between the case of Legal Practitioner’s Disciplinary Committee v. Fawehinmi (supra) and the appeal on hand.
Appellant’s issue three is on the membership/constitution of the 2nd and 3rd respondents. Learned counsel cited the provisions of section 2(1)(a), (e), (f) and 15(3) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act to debunk the assertion that the 1st respondent had nothing to do with the appointment of members of 2nd respondent, which, if not properly constituted, could not properly constitute the 3rd respondent. The case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) NSCC 374 at 379, (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 was referred to. Learned counsel urged this court to declare the attempt by the 3rd respondent to arraign the appellant a nullity being itself incompetent and lacking in jurisdiction.
Learned SAN for the 2nd and 3rd respondents on the issue of constitution of the 2nd and 3rd respondents made the following submissions: that membership of the 2nd respondent is statutory. It is trite law that parties need not join issues on a statutory provision which once found applicable by the court would be readily applied.
Section 2 of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act referred to. Any deposition to the contrary ought to be ignored. Authorities cited by appellant are inapplicable.
Appellant’s issues 4 and 5 were argued together. The learned trial Judge ignored the case of the appellant, treated his application only as a complaint against the actions and utterances of the 1st respondent, subsumed almost the entire application under the issues raised by the 1st respondent and came to the wrong conclusion that the applicant’s claim was not covered by Chapter IV of the Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution and dismissed it. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that 3rd respondent’s issues coincided with the appellant’s issues 2, 3, 5 and 6 which were treated by the lower court. Issues 7, 8 and 9 were not subsumable into to the 3rd respondent’s issues as they raised different questions altogether. He cited and relied on: Ugbodume v. Abiegbe (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.209) 261 at p. 274 E-F. Learned counsel urged this court to set aside the learned trial Judge’s judgment as he failed to critically consider all the issues raised by the appellant in his application.
On these issues which correspond to the 2nd and 3rd respondent’s issue 4, the learned SAN adopted his earlier submissions. He submitted further that even if it is conceded that the lower court was wrong to have held that the action was outside the purview of the fundamental rights enforcement procedure, that had not occasioned any miscarriage of justice as the lower court had considered the case on its merit and come to a conclusion which in the circumstances of the case is fair.
The appellant’s 6th issue is on the lack of independence and impartiality of the 3rd respondent which was lost on the learned trial Judge for reasons proffered earlier.
On issue 7, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the judgment of the lower court was tainted with open bias against the appellant in favour of the 1st respondent. He made some citations of instances such as where the learned trial Judge found that the applicant/appellant distorted the method of appointment of 2nd respondent’s members. He stated that none of the respondents at any point ever accused the appellant of distorting any figures. How the learned trial Judge come by that accusation remains mysterious.
The second instance is about the Judge’s idea of scientific approval of the appellant’s vaccines. This shows the learned trial Judge had taken a stand that the appellant had refused to assure Nigerians that his vaccines were scientifically approved and he must go before the 3rd respondent to do so. The learned trial Judge, learned counsel submitted, was clearly biased against the appellant in the application before him. Cases of Ude v. Chimbo (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 169 at 183; Ogunlowo v. Ogundare (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 610 at 624 were cited in support.
Learned SAN for the 2nd and 3rd respondents submitted on the issue of bias that the statements in the above statements cited from the learned trial Judge’s judgment were no more than the findings of the court. It is a mistake to take them as evidence of bias. He submitted further that bias on the part of a Judge or a tribunal can only be perceived during the hearing or trial of a case by the outward conduct of the Judge or tribunal towards a party or the parties while conducting the case. The case of Deduwa v. Okorodudu (1976) 9-10 SC 329 at 353-354 was cited. The complaint of the appellant and the facts adduced do not support the accusation of bias against the learned trial Judge. The submissions and authorities cited in support of the issue of bias in the appellant’s brief are irrelevant and ought to be discountenanced.
In a reply brief filed by learned counsel for the appellant certain points were sought to be clarified. For instance, in respect to Dr. Seyi’s letter as the basis for the appellant’s application before the lower court, the respondent neglected to say that a fresh application was filed before the lower court on 4th of July, 2000 and the applicant was granted leave to appeal to enforce his fundamental human rights on 7th July, 2000 and that the 2nd and 3rd respondents were served on same date with the motion notice i.e. one week before the 3rd respondent wrote its letter of 14th July, 2000 to which the letter of Dr. Seyi was attached. Appellant stood by his submission that Dr. Seyi’s letter was manufactured and a forgery. The letter is inadmissible in evidence per section 91(3) of the Evidence Act and as a suit was pending in court. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the basis of the appellants application before the lower court is the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ letter of 22nd May, 2000 and not Dr. Seyi Robert’s letter.
On the issue of the trial Judge’s review of evidence, learned counsel argued that the learned trial Judge said nothing about the question of a party being a Judge in his own cause. He did not deal with issues 7, 8 and 9 raised by the appellant. From the issues he formulated himself; he only addressed one of them. The issue of whether the appellant as a medical practitioner could develop a vaccine and apply it to human beings before going through the normal process was never raised before the lower court, it is wrong for the respondents to urge this line of argument upon the court. Finally, it did not emanate from the appellant that the 1st respondent had nothing to do with the appointments of the members of the 2nd respondent.
I will now consider the issues raised by the appellant have learned counsel one by one. Issue No.1 is on ignoring of the bulk of the affidavit evidence before the trial court. In his judgment, the learned trial Judge reviewed the affidavit evidence placed before him by the parties. He considered the written addresses by the parties along with the affidavit evidence. See pages 267 – 276 of the record. The learned trial Judge has shown that he evaluated the affidavit evidence.
This is what the trial Judge said:
“Most importantly, the applicant has not placed before this court any convincing evidence to show that any of the members of the councilor panel is biased or shared the views with the then Minister of Health … The above as my premises, I hold that the case before court is unmeritorious and lacks merit.”
This, to my mind, indicates that the learned trial Judge reached his conclusion to dismiss the case after he had considered the totality of the affidavit evidence placed before him. If it was otherwise, then the learned trial Judge would not have been able to consider the “merit” or otherwise of the case. A case is decided on its merit when every evidence proffered by the parties has been considered along with the prevailing laws. I think it is just a matter of style how a Judge considers the evidence laid before him and the prevailing law in arriving at his findings and conclusions. I think whichever method a Judge adopts in reaching his conclusion, so long as he does not under-evaluate or over-evaluate the evidence placed before him or misapplies the prevailing law, which is capable to cause a approach in his consideration or evaluation of evidence. See: Nneji v. Chukwu (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt.478) 265. I resolve issue No.1 against the appellant.
I will consider appellant’s issues 2, 3, 6 and 7 together and at once as they appear related. An umbrella holding of the learned trial Judge in respect of the above issues reads as follows:
“I do agree with the learned SAN for the 2nd and 3rd respondents Mr. Akinlonu for the 1st respondent that 2nd respondent, a statutory body known as Medial and Dental Council of Nigeria hereinafter referred to as “the Council” is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue or be sued in its corporate name, is a creature of statute. See section 1(1) of Medical & Dental Practitioners Act, Cap. 221 LFN 1990. Similarly the 3rd respondent is created by section 15(3) of Medical and Dental Act, Cap. 221 LFN 1990 and is charged with the duty of conducting a preliminary investigation into any case where it is alleged that a registered person has misbehaved in his capacity as a medical practitioner or dental surgeon, or should for any other reason. Be subject of proceedings before the disciplinary tribunal. It is worthy to note that this Investigating Panel is appointed by the Council and shall consists of 15 members, at least three of whom shall be dental surgeons. The Council shall consist of a Chairman to be appointed by the President- section 2(1) and other fifty-seven members which 1st respondent as the Minister of Health has the prerogative to appoint only seven of them.
The above method of appointment, which the applicant distorted, is statutory and leaves no room for the 1st respondent to manipulate for his advantage. Beside 2nd respondent is a body corporate and its Chairman and a majority of its members are appointed by the President of this country independent of any advice from the 1st respondent. I am not persuaded to hold that in the circumstance, it is possible for those 48 appointees to be influenced and controlled by the 7 appointees of 1st respondent. Those members are experienced medical practitioners who are paid by the Government and their sole aim is to sanitize the medical professional, their chosen profession. Not even reliance on section 4 of the Act which the 1st respondent is enjoined to give directions of general character or relating generally to particular matters will affect the view of this court that the Council is not controlled and manipulated by the 1st respondent.
I cannot agree with the applicant that the Minister of Health has controlling authority over the Council as constituted by section 2(1) of the Act especially when they are removed only by the President of this country.
Furthermore, the appointment of the 3rd respondent under section 15(2) of the Act which is ad hoc leaves no room for manipulation. That is to say no member of the medical profession is sure of such appointment, and in order to instill sanity into the medical profession, such body is sure of such appointment, and in order to instill sanity into the medical profession such body is very necessary. Being ad hoc in nature it is not possible for the unknown members to be influenced by the 1st respondent. In this particular case, the applicant in all his affidavits filed did not specifically point out which member of the panel was/is ineligible. The mere fact that all the parties are nominal members of the Medical Association which holds an opinion against applicant is not enough to impute to any of them the views of the Association or infer that the member is likely to be biased.”
(Italics for emphasis)
Thus, the fundamental points raised in the above issues are that 3rd respondent’s attempt to be accuser, prosecutor and Judge in its own case should have been held unconstitutional by the trial court; 2nd and 3rd respondents were not constituted according to law and that there were bias from the 3rd respondent and the learned trial Judge against the appellant.
In resolving issue No.2, it is my finding that the learned trial Judge did not make any pronouncement on the issue of attempt by the 3rd respondent to be the accuser, the prosecutor and the Judge in its own case. This was largely so because from the affidavit evidence, there was no averment to match that allegation.
I think a court of law is a court of facts and law. It is not a court of speculation. Where there is no evidence upon which to base its decision, a court has no alternative to dismiss the case placed before it. It is clear that even the learned counsel for the appellant formulating his issue NO.2 used this expression “attempt to be.” This shows that the intended action has not been consummated into real/actual action. It remains speculative which is as good as non-starter. See: Animashaun v. U.C.H. (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) 65; Okereke v. State (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 540) 75; Orhue v. NEPA (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 557) 187. Thus, appellant had no right to speculate what would happen at the Medical Panel or the court unless he has subjected himself to their jurisdictions.
On the 3rd issue, it has been seen above that the court below found that both 2nd and 3rd respondents were created by statutes and were conducting statutory functions. Learned counsel quoted paragraph 3(d) of the 1st respondent’s counter affidavit of 18th October, 2000 and paragraph 4 of the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ counter-affidavit of 20th July, 2000 to argue that all the respondents were in agreement that the 1st respondent had nothing to do with the appointment of the members of the 2nd and 3rd respondents which according to him, amounted to admission that they were not constituted according to law. But the interpretation given by the learned trial Judge is that the above statutory method of appointment leaves no room for the 1st respondent to manipulate for his advantage. He stated further:
“Beside 2nd respondent is a body corporate and its chairman and a majority of its members are appointed by the President of this country independent of any advice from the 1st respondent. I am not persuaded to hold that in the circumstance, it is possible for those 48 appointees to be influenced and controlled by the 7 appointees of the 1st respondent.”
I think the trite law is that parties need not join issues on a statutory provision which once found applicable; the court would readily apply it. See: Guinness (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agoma (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 256) 728 at 741 A-B. Thus, section 2 and 15 of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act have stipulated the manner of appointment of members of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, it is not open for a party to dispute without clear evidence to the contrary, the stipulations of those provisions. The learned trial Judge concluded that the appellant in all his affidavits filed did not specifically point out which member of the panel was ineligible. I am of the view too, that the 2nd and 3rd respondents were statutory bodies carrying out statutory functions assigned to them by the Act. Issues 6 and 7 are on bias. ‘Bias’ legally defined is a precondition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way which does not leave the mind perfectly open to the adjudicator’s conviction. It sways judgment and renders a Judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in particular case. Where it is established by evidence or acknowledgment it disqualifies a Judge from participating on the matter placed before him. See: Eriobuna v. Obiorah (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 616) 622; Okeke v. Nwokoye (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 635) 495.
Two separate and distinct allegations of bias were made by the appellant-
(i) bias against the appellant by the 3rd respondent; and
(ii) bias against the appellant by the learned trial Judge.
In the 1st set of allegation of bias, one needs to look at the functions of the 3rd respondent as provided by the Act. Section 15(3) provides, the panel shall be charged with the duty of –
“(a) conducting a preliminary investigation into any case where it is alleged that a registered person has misbehaved in his capacity as a Medical Practitioner or Dental Surgeon, or should for any other reason be the subject of proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal;
(b) compelling any person by subpoena to give evidence before it;
(c) deciding, if satisfied that to do so is necessary for the protection of members of the public; to make an order for interim suspension from the medical or dental profession in respect of the person whose case they have decided to refer for inquiry; and for the case to be given accelerated hearing by the Disciplinary Tribunal within three months; or
(d) deciding, if satisfied that to do so is necessary for the protection of members of the public or is in his interest, to make an order for interim conditional registration in respect of that person, that is to say, an order that his registration shall be conditional on his compliance, during such period not exceeding two months as is specified, as the panel may think fit to impose for the protection of members of the public or in his interest.”
I think there is need for clarification on the episode as chronicled in the record of appeal. The first invitation to the appellant to appear before the panel sitting at Abuja for investigation was through a letter dated 22nd May, 2000 and signed by the secretary to the 3rd respondent. The applicant then (appellant) applied to the FCT High Court which granted him ex-parte order of interim injunction restraining the respondents from carrying out the purported investigation. This was later struck out on 3/7/2000. The appellant then filed an application to enforce his fundamental rights by a motion dated 5/7/2000 but filed on 7/7/2000. As the order of 7/7/2000 granting leave to the appellant to enforce his fundamental rights did not include an order for interim injunction for the investigation, the 3rd respondent once again invited the appellant vide its letter dated 14/7/2000 to appear before it on 31/7/2000 in respect of the proposed investigation. Following this invitation the appellant obtained an interim order on 21/9/2002 from this court against the proposed investigation. Thus, as there was no order prevailing which prevented the 3rd respondent to conduct its statutory functions as at the time the second letter of invitation to the appellant was sent to him, the 3rd respondent had every right to validly invite the appellant for investigation as per the stipulation of section 15(3) of the Act. That cannot in my view, amount to bias. It only amounted to attempt to comply with statutory provisions confened on the 3rd respondent. Secondly, 3rd respondent’s attempt to “manufacture” evidence against the appellant through the letter of one Dr. Seyi Roberts. That the letter was not authentic. I agree with the learned SAN’s submission that such an allegation amounted to commission of forgery. Telling “blatant lie” on oath also tantamounts to perjury. Both allegations are criminal in nature which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as per section 138 of the Evidence Act. No such proof was established before the lower court. The lower court was right in its conclusion that the case before the panel was a report made by Dr. Seyi Roberts against the applicant. It is trite law that once the findings of trial court are not perverse, an appeal court has no business interfering with such findings. See Egbaran & Ors. v. Akpotor & Ors. (1997) 7 SCNJ 392, (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 514) 559; Ahmed v. State (1998) 7 SCNJ 60, (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 389; Nkado & Ors. v. Obiano & Anor. (1997) 5 SCNJ, 33, (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 503) 31. I find no elements of bias here too.
The second set of allegations of bias leveled against the learned trial Judge is that he was tainted with open bias against the appellant in favour of the 1st respondent. Several instances were cited from the learned trial Judge’s judgment. It is apt to reproduce an instance, i.e. page 279 of the record.
“In the above method of appointment which the applicant distorted is statutory and leaves no room for the 1st respondent to manipulate for his advantage.”
The quarrel of learned counsel for the appellant here is with the use of the word “distorted” which is underlined. To “distort” means to change the shape, appearance or sound of something so that it looks strange or not clear. It amounts to act of twisting or changing of facts, ideas, etc so that they are no longer correct or true.
The learned trial Judge made that observation after he had chronicled the methods of appointment of members to the 2nd and 3rd respondents. But prior to that, learned counsel for the appellant made submissions before the trial court, which the trial court reviewed, as follows-
“As pointed out above under the provisions of section 2(1) of the MDPA the 1st respondent appoints 7 members of the 2nd respondent. Under section 4(1), the 2nd respondent is bound to carry out the directives of 1st respondent. Under section 5, the 1st respondent maintains total financial control over the 2nd and 3rd respondents. The independence of the 3rd respondent in a case which the 1st respondent has personalized issues as he has done in his controversy with the applicant can only be very tenacious indeed. Referred to paragraphs 4(b) of their own further and better counter affidavit where 2nd and 3rd respondents averred that they are under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Health where the 1st respondent hold sway. It was he that inaugurated the 2nd respondent on the 13/12/99 and relied on Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee v. Fawehinmi (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 7) 300, (1985) 2 NSCC 998. Learned counsel concluded that in the present case, 1st respondent who maintains personal hostility towards the applicant is in a position akin to that of an employer to the 2nd and 3rd respondents. In his view, the 2nd and 3rd respondents are bound to take sides with the 1st respondent in a dispute with the applicant. He urged the court to hold that there is a likelihood of bias.”
The learned trial Judge found out that 2nd respondent as a statutory council shall consist of a chairman to be appointed by the president and other fifty-seven members which the 1st respondent as the Minister of Health has the prerogative to appoint only seven of them. It is the colour added to the provisions, by learned counsel for the appellant, in my view, such as the issue of personalization of issues by the 1st respondent; personal hostility of the 1st respondent towards the appellant and the relationship of 1st respondent and 2nd and 3rd respondents as that of employer and employee where the latter is bound to take sides with the former (i.e. 1st respondent) as employer. Except where one takes a hard look at the provisions in question, one may be bound to believe the scenario set out by learned counsel for the appellant. That cannot be weighty enough in my view to levy allegation of bias against a trial Judge. The pronouncements of our superior courts of record are always consistent that for an allegation of bias to be grounded against the person of a Judge, it must be made on solid and unshaken grounds not on mere figments of imagination. In the case of Onigbede v. Balogun (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 762) p. 1 at p. 22 the Supreme Court per Ogundare, JSC reiterating the principles of law stated by Lord Denning, M.R.; held among other things that:
” … considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand:
See Reg. v. Huggins (1895) 1 Q.B. 563 and Rex v. Sunderland Justices (1901) 2 K.B. 357, CA per Vaughan Williams, L.J. Ibid 373.
Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise of conjecture is not enough; see Reg v. Cambome Justices. Ex-parte Pearce (1955) 1 Q.B. 41,48-51; (1954) 3 WLR 415; 2 All ER 850 DC and Reg. v. Nailsworth Licencing Justices, Ex parte Bird (1953) 1WLR 1046; (1953) 2 All ER 652, DC. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side fairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking: The Judge was biased.”
Also, in Orugbo & Anr. v. Bulara Una & Ors. (2002) 9-12 SCNJ 12 at 32, (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) 175 at p. 209, the same court reiterated
“The constitutional provision of fair hearing has no tribal insinuation of the composition of the bench vis-a-vis the tribes of the parties. A party should not be heard to complain that because he is not of the same tribe with members of the bench, he cannot have a fair hearing. That in my humble view, is the most invidious and incongruous approach to this very important legal principle. If the contention is correct, then most, if not all trials in our judicial system, must be faulted because the composition of most courts may not agree with the tribes of the litigants. Perhaps an example will make the point clearer. No Asian, American, German or any other foreigner would submit to the jurisdiction of any Nigerian court because virtually all courts in Nigeria are constituted by Nigerians. Was section 33 of the 1979 Constitution, which is now section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, designed to cure such a crude situation.
No, not at all. Tribal composition at the bench per se cannot be basis for the charge of bias or likelihood of bias, unless the aggrieved party shows by the conduct of the bench such bias or likelihood of bias. The constitutional provision of fair hearing is already large and omnibus and I am not prepared to expand the frontiers beyond its onerous content or ambit.”
The learned counsel for the appellant failed to show what pecuniary benefits or any benefit at all, the learned trial Judge stood to gain by his above pronouncements. Generally, bias or likelihood of bias should not be built upon chase of a wild goose in an unlimited thick forest. The case of Yabugbe v. C. O. P. (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 234) 152 at 177 clarifies the issue more where it was stated that a man is said to be a Judge in his own cause when he is likely to be biased in favour or against either for reason of interest or favour. In other words, if he has either pecuniary or proprietary interest in the subject matter in litigation, or, because of his relationship with either of the parties, he is likely to be biased in favour of or against him, then he ought not to be the Judge.
“If courts are to go by spurious allegation of bias as in this case, then no legal practitioner can be tried by any court because he belongs to same profession as the Magistrate or High Court Judge that might try him. Similarly, judicial officers with shares in public companies or coming from a particular State of Nigeria cannot try or hear any case involving such companies or any of the arms of the Government of that State. I think there is a limit to which the chase of such wild goose can go. Concrete evidence of bias must be shown before the allegation can succeed. In the present case I see no such evidence and I, therefore consider the allegation to be frivolous and unfair to the learned trial Magistrate.”
Accordingly, none of the allegations of bias leveled in this appeal can succeed as they lack merit. I decided issues 2,3,6 and 7 against the appellant.
Appellant’s issues 4 and 5 were argued together. The main grouse of the appellant is that issues 7, 8 and 9 formulated by the appellant could not be subsumed under 1st respondent’s issues and were not deliberated upon by the learned trial Judge as he ignored the clear differences. Now, what are these issues?
“Issue No.7: What is the effect where the prosecutor in a case is both the complainant and the Judge rolled into one? Does the Nigeria law allow a party to be a Judge in his own case?
Issue No.8: Whether or not the allegation in exhibit P6 are not spurious and a calculated attempt to victimize the appellant having regard to paragraph 34a, b, d, e, f and h of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Rules of Professional Conduct.
Issues No.9: Whether or not the 2nd respondent is not acting ultra vires in setting up the 3rd respondent to investigate the appellant whose activities have moved beyond the boundaries of traditional medical practice.”
Let me observe that the issues above raised have not featured in the judgment of the learned trial Judge. This is because the learned trial Judge preferred to adopt the issues formulated by the 1st respondent. The issues formulated by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents did not subsume the above issues. But is it necessary that these issues must be considered? The position of the law is that a court is duty bound to pronounce on issues raised before it by parties. See: NBC Plc. v. Borgundu (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 588) 605 WR. & P.C Ltd. v. Onwo (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 630) 312; Fawehinmi v. Abacha (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 475) 710. Where the trial court fails to consider such issues, the appeal court is in as much a position as the trial court to determine such issue particularly where no further evidence will be required or where the issues are purely questions of law. See: Imonikhe v. A-G., Bendel State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 296.
Learned SAN for the 2nd and 3rd respondents invited this court to determine the above issues raised by the appellant before the lower court. Under section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act, this court has power to determine such issues. I shall, accordingly, proceed to consider issues 7, 8 and 9 raised before the lower court.
It is clear that this case was decided by the lower court on affidavit evidence. Issue 7 alleges that the complainant rolled into one as prosecutor and Judge. I find no averment from the supporting affidavit in respect thereof. Where no evidence covers an issue, such issue, however brilliantly argued goes to no issue as it is deemed abandoned and a court has no business to pronounce upon it. It is akin to pleadings. See: Bello v. Fayose & Ors. (1999) 7 SCNJ 286.
Issue No.8 is whether or not the allegations in exhibit p.6 are not spurious and calculated to victimize the applicant having regard to paragraph 34(a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (h) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Rules of professional conduct. Applicant/appellant submitted that there was no proof in exhibit P6 and any of the attachments to it that the applicant published or sponsored any newspaper article. Learned counsel for the applicant concluded that the respondents’ mission was to nail the applicant by all means fair or foul and this is another reason why the court must restrain and prohibit the respondents from trying the applicant. In paragraph 33 of the affidavit in support, the applicant/appellant averred as follows “That in furtherance of this campaign of the Minister against me and my vaccines, I received a letter from the 2nd respondent on the 22nd of May, 2000 inviting me to appear before the 3rd respondent for an investigation pursuant to S.15 (2) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act Cap. 221 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. This letter had eight attachments which are eight newspaper articles the Council is accusing me of publishing. A copy of the said letter is attached as exhibit p6a, p6b, p6c, p6d, p6e, p6f, p6g, p6h and p6i.”
I think the essence of exhibit p6 and all the annexures thereto is to convince the court to grant the relief sought by the applicant and not to determine their merits. It is for the panel to first determine their merits or otherwise. It will appear anticipatory for the trial court to treat exhibit p6 and its annexures on their merit. I do not see how this issue will affect the decision already arrived at by the trial court. It is an issue whose merit must be reserved to the time when merit of the allegations levied against the applicant/appellant will be considered by the right authority.
Issue No.9. 2nd respondent is the Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria which has been established by section 1(1) of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act, Cap. 221, LFN, 1990, now contained in Cap. MS, LFN, 2004. 3rd respondent is the Medical and Dental Practitioners Investigating Panel established by section 15(1) of the Act. It is true that the powers of the Council have been spelt out by section 1(2) of the Act. But section 3(1) of the Act empowers the Council to do anything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying out of its activities under the Act. One of the most important responsibilities of the 3rd respondent as per the provisions of section 15(3)(a) is conducting a preliminary investigation into any case where it is alleged that a registered person has misbehaved in his capacity as a medical practitioner or dental surgeon or should for any other reason be the subject of proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal. It has not been shown that the applicant/appellant’s name no longer exists in the register of such professionals as required by section 12 of the Act. It is a fallacy for learned counsel for the applicant/appellant to argue that what the applicant has done in discovering anti HIV vaccines is outside the purview of traditional medical practice and that he has moved into the realms of pharmacy or laboratory science. Does that remove him from being a medical practitioner or dental surgeon? It is my view that the 2nd respondent acted within the limits of powers confected on it by the Act. It did not act ultra vires by setting up the 3rd respondent to investigate the applicant/appellant. I resolve issues 4 and 5 against the appellant.
In the final result, I find no merit in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed I affirm the judgment of the lower court which dismissed the case before it. The 2nd and 3rd respondents are entitled to N10,000.00 costs from the appellant.
ODILI, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading the draft of the judgment of my learned brother, 1. T. Muhammed, JCA. I agree with the decision therein. I too dismiss the appeal which lacks merit and the appellant is to pay N10,000.00 costs to the 2nd and 3rd respondents.
BULKACHUWA, J.C.A.: I have read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Muhammad, JCA. He had admirably dealt with all the issues set out in this appeal. I have nothing useful to add. I adopt his reasoning as mine in dismissing the appeal which lacks merit.
I abide with the consequential order including orders as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
Isaac Okpanachi For Appellant
AND
1st respondent absent and unrepresented
G. A. Adetola-Kaseem, SAN, (with him, C. Ibe, Esq.) For Respondent
