OKON ANTIGHA ESSIEN v. CROSS RIVER STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR (2014)

OKON ANTIGHA ESSIEN v. CROSS RIVER STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR

(2014)LCN/7732(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 30th day of June, 2014

CA/C/232/2012

RATIO

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION; PUBLIC OFFICERS PROTECTION LAW; WHETHER THE PUBLIC OFFICER PROTECTION LAW APPLIES TO INSTITUTIONS

We find it, somewhat, amazing that, in the year 2014, of the Gregorian Calendar, reliance could still be placed on the above two decisions of this court on the definition of term, public officer. We say so because the apex court had, way back in 2001, settled this question. Let us elaborate. In the same year [1998], the question whether the Public Officers Protection Law applied to institutions [such as the respondents in the instant appeal came before the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (pt.584) 1.
At page 36, Iguh JSC held that “‘any person’ in section 2 (a) [the equivalent of section 1A of the above Cross River Law] admits and include artificial persons.” In the esteemed view of the eminent jurist:
…it seems to me plain that the definition of the word ‘person, in the legal sense under the Nigerian law is not limited to natural persons or human beings only as the appellant now vigorously appears to contend. It clearly admits and includes artificial persons such as a corporation sole, company or anybody of persons, corporate or incorporate.
Wali JSC gave further insight into the tenor of the said provision. At 49, His Lordship opined that:
The provision did not use the word ‘officer,’ but instead the word ‘person.’ In my view, the purpose of using the word ‘person, is obviously to widen the scope of the law to cover both human being and legal or artificial person such as corporate and un-incorporate. Without referring to any foreign decision, the intention of the legislature is to provide protection for public officers, corporate and un-incorporate bodies in the discharge of their public assignments Used in the wide sense, the term ‘any person’ will cover both human being and other bodies, corporate and un-incorporate …
Both Kutigi and Onu JJSC agreed with the expansive interpretation of the definition of “any person” used in the said enactment. It was only Ogundare JSC who dissented. According to His Lordship, the word “person” in section 2 (a) must be read in its plain ordinary meaning as ‘a human being as an individual.’
Just three years after Ibrahim v Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (supra), the apex court had another opportunity of considering the same question. That was in 2001 in the case of Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government and Anor (2001) LPELR -2265 (SC); [2001] 16 NWLR (pt.739) 458; [2001] 7 SC (pt.111) 107. Instructively, this case, Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government and Anor (supra) commenced its journey from the lower Court, that is, the High Court of Cross River State. It wound its way to the apex court. Ayoola JSC, who read the leading judgment of the court, was emphatic that:
Ibrahim v Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (supra) is a clear pronouncement on the point raised by counsel to the appellant on the applicability of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law to the 1st respondent, [the Judicial Service committee of Kaduna State]. Notwithstanding the powerful dissent of Ogundare, JSC, in that case, it remains authority which this court is enjoined to follow…. This court will not depart from its previous decision merely on the basis of a powerful dissent.
[italics supplied for emphasis]
Interestingly, Iguh JSC, who read the leading judgment in Ibrahim v Judicial Service committee, Kaduna state (supra) was, also, on the Panel of the eminent Supreme Court Justices who decided the latter case of Offoboche v. Ogoja Local Government and Anor (supra). We note, in passing, that the decision in Ibrahim v Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (supra) has been criticised for its expansive interpretation of “person” to accommodate artificial persons, E. A. Taiwo, “The Supreme Court and the true Ambit of Public Officers Protection Act: A Critique,” in Nigerian Bar Journal 2003 Vol 1 No 4, pages 553-574. The learned author placed reliance on the earlier case of Momoh v. Okewale and Ors (1977) NSCC 365.
With respect, it would appear that the learned author lost sight of the narrow issue which was the thrust of the reasoning in the judgment of Udoma JSC in that case. Somewhat, more propitiously, Ayoola JSC would appear to have anticipated this sort of critique. In Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government and Anor (supra), percipiently, observed that:
There was an earlier decision of this court in Momoh v Okewale and Anor [1977] NSCC 365, sometimes claimed to have decided the contrary to the majority view in Ibrahim’s case. However, the ratio in Momoh’s case was limited to whether or not a Lagos City Council bus driver was a ‘public officer’ in the con of the Public Officer’s Protection Act, Cap 108. Udo Udoma JSC, who delivered the leading judgment of the court in that case, after referring to the English cases of T. Tilling, Limited v. Dick Kery and Co. Ltd. (1905) 1 KB 562; Attorney-General v. Company of Proprietors of Margate Pier and Harbour (1990) KB 749 and Parker v. London County Council (1904) 2 KB 501 did not actually come to the conclusion urged by the appellant in this case. [italics supplied for emphasis] per. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

COURT: THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS; WHETHER ALL SUBORDINATE COURTS ARE BOUND BY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE APEX COURT

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all subordinate courts are bound by the pronouncements of the apex court. This court is subordinate to the apex court and is, therefore, bound by all its the Supreme Court’s decisions, Mohammed v. Olawunmi [1993] 4 NWLR (pt.287) 254; 7up Bottling Co Ltd v Abiola and Sons (Nig) Ltd [1995] 3 NWLR (pt.883) 257; Osho v Foreign Finance Corporation [1991] 4 NWLR (pt.184) L57; Dalhatu v Turaki [2003] 15 NWLR (Pt.843) 310; University of Lagos v. Olaniyan [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 156; Clement and Anor v. Iwuanyanwu and Anor [1989] 3 NWLR (pt 107) 39, 54. per. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION: THE EFFECT OF ANY ACTION TAKEN OUTSIDE THE LIMITATION PERIOD OF THE RELEVANT LAWS
With respect to the appellant’s counsel, the point canvassed here has long been settled in a long line of cases from the apex court. Whether it is negotiation or appeal, the fact is that such factors do not impinge on the limitation period ordained in the law, Eboigbe v NNPC (supra); Odubeko v Fowler (supra); Sanda v Kukawa v Local Government (supra) and of this court, NBN Ltd v A. T. Eng Co. Ltd (2006) 16 NWLR (pt 1005) 210; Ibeto Cement Co Ltd v. A-G, Fed (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt.1069) 470. By the clear averments in the Statement of Claim, the appellant 2 chose to first pursue and exhaust the internal administrative remedies, paragraph 4-09 of the appellant’s brief, before taking out his Writ against the respondents. We invite Adio JSC to advise the appellant on the proper cause he should have embarked upon:
The best cause for a person to whom a right has accrued is to institute an action against the other party so as to protect his interest or right in case the negotiation fails. If, as in this case, the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in admission of liability, the law will not allow the time devoted to negotiation to be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration for the determination of the question whether a claim has been statute-barred,
Eboigbe v. NNPC (supra) 659, per Adio JSC. The answer to the question, therefore, is that, since the appellant’s action was taken outside the limitation period in the above laws of the Cross River State, the lower Court was right in its view that the action was statute-barred, Adekoya v FHA (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1099) 539; Amusan v. Obideyi (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) 322; Asaboro v Pan Ocean Oil (Nig) Ltd (2006) 4 NWLR (pt 971) 595; Seleba v Mobil Prod (Nig) Unltd (2006) 12 NWLR (pt 995) 634; Military Administrator, Ekiti State v. Aladeyelu (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt.1055) 619; generally, O. F. Ogbuinya, Understanding the Concept of Jurisdiction in the Nigerian Legal System (Enugu: SNAAP Ltd, 2008) 177. per. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

DALHATU ADAMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ONYEKACHI A. OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

OKON ANTIGHA ESSIEN Appellant(s)

AND

1. CROSS RIVER STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
2. GOVERNMENT OF CROSS RIVER STATE Respondent(s)

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant in this appeal [as claimant] took out a writ of Summons against the respondents herein [as defendants] at the High Court of Cross River State, Calabar Judicial Division (hereinafter, simply, referred to as “the lower Court”). He claimed declaratory and injunctive reliefs. He filed the Writ of Summons together with His Statement of Claim.

Upon service of the processes on them, the respondents [as defendants] reacted, swiftly, through their twenty two paragraph Statement of Defence. Subsequently, they filed a preliminary objection entreating the lower Court to strike out the suit for want of jurisdiction.

In the said objection, they canvassed the ground that the suit was statute-barred since it was instituted over five years after the accrual of the cause of action, citing section 1 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap P17, Laws of cross River state of Nigeria as amended by Law No.1 and also section 16 of the Limitation Law, Cap L14, Laws of Cross River State, 2004.

After hearing the submissions of counsel on the said objection, the lower Court, in its ruling of May 24, 2012, found in favour of the objectors, holding that “the claimant’s instant action as presently constituted is belated, statute-barred and a complete waste of judicial time,” page 155 of the record. The court, accordingly, dismissed the claim.

Aggrieved by the order dismissing his action, the appellant appealed to this court. He formulated two issues for the determination of his appeal. We shall revert to them anon. Before then, however, we take liberty to sketch the factual background to the suit that prompted this appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant was employed in the Cross River State Civil Service. He rose to the rank of Director in the Internal Revenue Service of the said state. By letter, dated March 1, 2005, his said appointment in the State Civil Service was terminated. He was, expectedly, dissatisfied with the termination of his appointment.

However, instead of seeking remedy in court, he opted to exhaust the internal administrative remedies. Accordingly, he appealed against his termination of appointment by his letter of appeal March 23, 2005 through the Head of Service of the State.

In response to his said appeal, a committee was set up to review his case. It was headed by a Permanent Secretary in the office of the Head of Service. Following the committee’s recommendation in his favour, the appellant, expectantly, waited for a letter of his reinstatement in the Service. None came. He, then, after five years of the termination of his appointment, turned over this complaint to the lower Court for adjudication.

As indicated above, the respondents [as defendants], swiftly, greeted the suit with a preliminary objection on the ground that it was statute-barred. The lower Court’s order dismissing the action precipitated this appeal.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
1. Whether the claimant’s action offended and violated the public Officers’ Protection Law and the Statute of Limitation of Cross River State?
2. Whether from the surrounding circumstances of this right for case, it was the learned trial Judge to hold that the claimant’s action was belated and statute-barred?
The respondents adopted the above two issues.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
Just as they challenged the competence of the suit at the lower Court, they, equally, raised a preliminary objection to the competence of the appellant’s appeal. They looked askance at the appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal filed outside the fourteen days which this court, graciously, granted him. Following this court’s further indulgence to the appellant on May 5, 2014, as per the order of court deeming the said Amended Notice of Appeal as, properly filed and served, the appellant’s counsel abandoned the said objection. It was, accordingly, struck out.

ARGUMENTS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE APPEAL
ISSUE ONE
Whether the claimant’s action offended and violated the public Officers’ Protection Law and the Statute of Limitation of Cross River State?
At the hearing of this appeal on May 5, 2014, appellant’s counsel, Agbor P. Nandi, adopted the brief of argument filed on July 17, 2013 and the Reply brief filed on January 15, 2014, although, deemed properly filed on May 5, 2014. On this issue, counsel explained that no civil or public officer was involved in the suit but only the Cross River State Civil Service Commission and the Government of Cross River State. He noted that in the proviso to the Public Officers’ Protection Law, Cap P17, Laws of Cross River State, 2004, (as amended), a public officer was, clearly, defined.

He explained that the attention of the lower Court was drawn to the above provision however, it did not consider it. He, further, explained that the said court found in favour of the respondents’ submission that the suit was against a public officer. He submitted that the lower Court erred in so doing as the section 1A of the said law is very clear and ought to be given its ordinary meaning, citing Alhaji Ganity Martins v. Commissioner of Police (2012) 12 MJSC (Pt.11) 73, 92; Nyame v FRN [2010] 7 NWLR (Pt.1193) 344. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
On his part, Anthony Effiong, counsel for the respondents, adopted the respondents’ brief filed on August 22, 2013. In the said brief, he submitted that, by virtue of section 1A of the above law as amended by section 1B of the Law No 1 of 2007, subparagraph (a) and the proviso thereof, the Permanent Secretary, Lady Dr. Anne Eyo-Enebong, who signed the claimant’s letter of termination of appointment, was a Public Officer. He cited section 318 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, for the definition of “public Service of State.”

He pointed out that the Civil Service Commission is one of the Commissions which the Constitution established, section 197 (1) (a) thereof. He contended that, by section 207 of the said Constitution, the State Civil Service Commission can delegate any of its constitutionally conferred powers to any of its members or to any officer in the Civil Service of the State.

He maintained that such powers include the power to appoint persons to offices in the State Civil Service and the power to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding such offices. In his submission, the drivers of these processes are the Civil/Public servants. He contended that, in addition to the limitation period of six months stipulated in the Public Officers Law, the action was also caught by section 16 of the State’s Limitation Law which consecrates five years within which an action could be commenced.

In his view, the dispute between the appellant and the respondents related to contact, namely, contract of employment whose terms were, allegedly, breached. He argued that, as the appellant did not file his suit within five years, his claim was caught by the Limitation Law. Thus, the lower Court was right in favour of the objector’s contention.
APPELLANT’S REPLY
In his reply brief, appellant’s counsel pointed out that the issue was the correct interpretation of the proviso to section 1A of the 2004 law (supra) as it concerns the correct definition of a public officer and not Public Service. He maintained that section 318 (1) of the Constitution was inapplicable. In his submission, a public office is not a corporation, Eze v. Okechukwu (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.548) 53 where Tobi JCA (as he then was) defined a public officer as a holder of a public office. He, equally, prayed in aid U.B.R.B.D.A. V Aik (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt.637) 332. He urged the court to give the words of the above law their clear, unambiguous and literal meaning, Duru v F.R.N. [2013] 2-3 MJSC (Pt IV) 92, 113.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
From the arguments of the appellant’s counsel [paragraphs 4.02-4.04, page 3 of the appellant’s brief; paragraph 1.01 of the Reply brief], it is not in doubt that the question which the appellant wants this court to resolve is a very narrow one. It comes to this: whether, on a correct rendition of the above Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law, the respondents to this appeal [Cross River State Civil Service Commission and Government of Cross River State] could, rightly, canvass the limitation period in the above law made for the protection of “public officers.” [He cited the proviso to section 1A thereof]. Counsel prayed in aid two decisions of the Court of Appeal handed down in 1998, namely, Eze v Okechukwu (supra) and U. B.R.B.D.A. v. Aik (supra).

In all, therefore, having regard to the majority decision of the apex court in Ibrahim v Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State (supra): a majority decision, approvingly, adopted in the 2001 decision in Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government and Anor (supra), we hold the view that section 1A of the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River State (as amended) applies to the respondents in this appeal. In view of the latter judgment [Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government and Anor], the scholastic critique of the former decision [Ibrahim v Judicial Service Committee, Kaduna State], E. Apeh, Nigerian Law of Limitation of Actions (Benin: Elaigwu Apeh Law Publications, 2001); S. Azubuike and E. Akpeme, “Protection of Public Officers in Nigeria: Revisiting the Limitation Law,” in 2014 Vol 15, No 1 [Jan – June] UBLJ 143, will not delay us here.

We find no merit in the appellant’s complaint. Indeed, counsel had no justification for canvassing this argument in this court. As shown above, thirteen years earlier, the apex court, in a matter that emanated from the same High Court of Cross River State [Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government and Anor (supra)] had answered the question affirmatively; also, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works etc Kwara State v Balogun (1975) NSCC 292. We, therefore, resolve this issue against the appellant.

ISSUE TWO
Whether from the surrounding circumstances of this case, it was right for the learned trial Judge to hold that the claimant’s action was belated and statute-barred?
On this issue, counsel pointed out that, in considering the question canvassed in this appeal which relates to a Limitation Law, both the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim have to be considered. He referred to the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim, both, dated April 15, 2010 and the Reply dated November 19, 2010, pages 1-2; 3-8; 66-79 of the record. He submitted that the lower Court did not fully appraise the circumstances of the appellant’s case.

Citing the appellant’s letter of appointment, page 11 of the record, he contended that the appellant was subject to the conditions of service in the Civil Service, including the Civil Service Rules. He explained that it was in strict deference to the said Rules that the appellant chose to exhaust the administrative remedies prior to litigation, citing Rules 05102, 05201, 05202, 05203 and 05209, Chapter Five of the Cross River State Public Service Rules, 2004, pages 80-130 of the record, in particular, pages 128-130, [paragraphs 4.09 – 4.12, pages 4-5 of the appellant’s brief]. He observed that, notwithstanding that all the above facts were brought to the notice of the lower Court, it concerned itself with the arguments in support of the preliminary objection.

He contended that the Civil Service Rules were made pursuant to powers conferred by the Constitution, Derima v Rivers State CSC [2005] 16 NWLR (pt.951) 378, 382. In his view, every civil servant was under obligation to exhaust remedies under the Service Rules before resorting to litigation, Adigun and Anor v. Osaka (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt.812) 95, 130-131; Lawal v. Oke (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.711) 88.

He contended that every case ought to be considered on its peculiar facts, Magit v. University of Agriculture Makurdi [2005] 19 NWLR (Pt.959) 211. He explained that, if the appellant waited to exhaust an administrative remedy, which remedy forbade from litigating the matter, this should be factored into the computation of time for the purposes of the above Limitation Laws. He urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.

RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS
On his part, counsel for the respondents contended that, for the purpose of considering whether an action was statute-barred, only the writ and statement of claim are relevant, Elabanjo v Dawodu [2006] 27 NSCQR 318. He maintained that the above-cited Rules only apply to the extent of their consistency with the constitution and any Law in force in Cross River. One of such Laws is the Public officers protection (supra) and the Limitation Law (supra). He maintained that the civil service Rules, being a subsidiary legislation, could not rank equipollently with the above substantive laws, citing page 155 of the record for the findings of the lower Court in this regard.

He cited Eboigbe v NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (pt 347) 649,660-661 as authority for the view that legal proceedings cannot be validly commenced after the expiration laid down in the limitation law; also , Odubeko v Fowler [1993] 7 NWLR (pt 308) 637; Sanda v. Kukawa Local Government [1991] 3 NWLR (pt.179) 258. He urged the court to discountenance the allusion which the appellant made to the committee’s recommendation of his re-instatement since there was no such exhibit before the lower Court. He canvassed the view that time does not cease to run merely because parties were engaged in negotiation, Eboigbe v NNPC (supra). He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.

APPELLANT’S REPLY
Counsel for the appellant, in reply, contended that the respondent did not raise the issue of estoppels at the lower Court and, as such, cannot raise it in this court without leave, Vassile v PAAS Ind Ltd (2000) FWLR (Pt.19) 418, 428; Uzo v Nnalimo (2000) FWLR (pt.3) 414, 424-425. He took the view that Egboigbe v NNPC (supra) was inapplicable as the appellant was not involved in any negotiation with the respondents. Rather, he appealed to them for the reversal of his termination pursuant to Chapter Five (supra).

RESOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS
With respect to the appellant’s counsel, the point canvassed here has long been settled in a long line of cases from the apex court. Whether it is negotiation or appeal, the fact is that such factors do not impinge on the limitation period ordained in the law, Eboigbe v NNPC (supra); Odubeko v Fowler (supra); Sanda v Kukawa v Local Government (supra) and of this court, NBN Ltd v A. T. Eng Co. Ltd (2006) 16 NWLR (pt 1005) 210; Ibeto Cement Co Ltd v. A-G, Fed (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt.1069) 470. By the clear averments in the Statement of Claim, the appellant 2 chose to first pursue and exhaust the internal administrative remedies, paragraph 4-09 of the appellant’s brief, before taking out his Writ against the respondents. We invite Adio JSC to advise the appellant on the proper cause he should have embarked upon:
The best cause for a person to whom a right has accrued is to institute an action against the other party so as to protect his interest or right in case the negotiation fails. If, as in this case, the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in admission of liability, the law will not allow the time devoted to negotiation to be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration for the determination of the question whether a claim has been statute-barred,
Eboigbe v. NNPC (supra) 659, per Adio JSC.

The answer to the question, therefore, is that, since the appellant’s action was taken outside the limitation period in the above laws of the Cross River State, the lower Court was right in its view that the action was statute-barred, Adekoya v FHA (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1099) 539; Amusan v. Obideyi (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) 322; Asaboro v Pan Ocean Oil (Nig) Ltd (2006) 4 NWLR (pt 971) 595; Seleba v Mobil Prod (Nig) Unltd (2006) 12 NWLR (pt 995) 634; Military Administrator, Ekiti State v. Aladeyelu (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt.1055) 619; generally, O. F. Ogbuinya, Understanding the Concept of Jurisdiction in the Nigerian Legal System (Enugu: SNAAP Ltd, 2008) 177. We find no merit in the appellant’s complaint against the conclusion of the lower Court. In the circumstance, we find no merit in this appeal. We, hereby, enter an order dismissing it. Appeal dismissed.

DALHATU ADAMU, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to have gone through the draft of the judgment of my learned brother, Centus Chima Nweze, JCA, in this appeal. He has comprehensively set out the facts of the case and the applicable law. I only need to agree with his reasons and the conclusion he arrived at that the two(2) issues set by the appellant are both resolved against him. The action taken by the appellant is statute barred and the lower Court was right in so holding. See Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil (Nig) Ltd. (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt.971) 595. The appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed by me also.

ONYEKACHI A. OTISI, J.C.A.: My learned Brother, Chima Centus Nweze, JCA, advanced a draft copy of the Judgment just delivered, dismissing this appeal. The issues raised in this appeal have been comprehensively addressed. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and the conclusions reached; which I adopt as mine.

The period of limitation begins to run from the date on which the cause of action accrued, Eboigbe V. N.N.P.C. (1994) 5 NWLR (Part 347) 649 at 663; Aremo 11 Vs Adekanye (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt.224) 2113 at 2132 – 2133. An action commenced after expiration of the period, within which an action must be brought, as stipulated in a statute of limitation, is not maintainable. The court would have no jurisdiction to entertain a statute barred claim. Therefore legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed limitation period, Ekeogu vs. Aliri (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.179) 258.

My lord in the lead Judgment has rightly stated that negotiation by the parties would not stop the time from running once it had started running from the time that the cause of action accrued, Eboigbe v. N.N.P.C. (supra).
I therefore also dismiss this appeal.

Appearances

Agbor P. NandiFor Appellant

AND

Anthony Effiong, A. D.; MOJ, CalabarFor Respondent