OZONMA (BARR) CHIDI NOBIS ELENDU v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2014)

OZONMA (BARR) CHIDI NOBIS ELENDU v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS

(2014)LCN/7663(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 3rd day of February, 2014

CA/E/201/2011

RATIO

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO ENTERTAIN A SUIT COMPLAINING ABOUT THE NOMINATION OF A CANDIDATE BY A POLITICAL PARTY FO AN ELECTION

Let me now consider the issue of whether a court has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit complaining about the nomination of a candidate by a political party for an election or whether the issue of nomination by a political party of a person as its candidate for an election is justiciable. This Court in UGWU & ORS V. PDP (unreported Judgment in Appeal No.CA/E/259/2012 delivered on 8-3-2013) sufficiently answered this questions by its holding that. “It is settled by a long line of judicial decisions including ONUOHA VS. OKAFOR (1983) 2 SCNLR 244. (SC) DALHATU VS. TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR (PT 843) 310 (SC), EMENIKE VS. OKADIGBO & ORS (2012) LPELR 9338 (SC) and EMENIKE VS. PDP & ORS (supra) (SC) that the decision as to who should be nominated or sponsored to represent a political party as its candidate in a general election is the domestic affair of the political party and the courts have no jurisdiction to decide for a political party who should be its candidate for election, that is an internal matter within the exclusive province of a political party. However, the exercise of this power is now regulated in certain respects by the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). S.87 (9) of this Act now gives an aspirant in any primary election of his political party who feels the party did not comply with the Electoral Act and the guideline of the political party in the nomination of a rival aspirant as its candidate for an election, the right to seek redress in the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or FCT. S.87 has not taken away or reduced the exclusive power of the party to nominate or sponsor persons as its candidates for elections. It merely regulates the process and procedure of nominating such persons. It places a responsibility on the party to avoid arbitrariness and follow the procedure prescribed therein. This is to ensure that the decision to nominate a person as the party’s candidate is the democratic decision of the party and not the dictation of a minority.

The jurisdiction of the Court here is very narrow and strictly limited only to the extent prescribed in S.87 (9) of the Electoral Act. The Court has no jurisdiction to deal with any question or complain that does not fall within this narrow compass. So the only question or complain the Court can entertain is that the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of the party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate.” The Supreme Court decisions in DINGYADI & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2011) LPELR – 950; PDP & ANOR V. SYLVA & ORS (2012) LPELR -7814, EMEKA V. OKADIGBO & ORS (2012) LPELR 9338 (SC) support this decision.

ACTION: PARTIES TO AN ACTION; THE REASONS WHICH MAKES IT NECESSARY TO MAKE A PERSON PARTY TO AN ACTION AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PARTY WHO IS MERELY INTERESTED IN THE OUTCOME OF THE SUIT AND A NECESSARY PARTY TO A SUIT

What is relevant here is that its action in accepting and recognizing the name of the 3rd Respondent is challenged and certain reliefs have been sought against it. Therefore it is necessary that it be a party so that it can be heard concerning the complain and the claim for the reliefs and be bound by the result of the determination of the suit. As the Supreme Court held per Oputa, J.S.C in GREEN V. GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT.61) 481, “under our laws one reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action.” In A.G. OF THE FEDERATION V. A.G. ABIA STATE & ORS (2001) 11 NWLR (PT.725) 689 the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC held that “A distinction should be made between a party who is merely interested in the outcome of the suit against who there can be no claim or relief sought. See GUDA v. KITTA (1999) 12 NWLR (PT.629) 21; AROMIRE V. AWOYEMI (1972) 2 SC 1 and a necessary party, against who there can be a claim or relief, and who would be irreparably prejudiced if he is not joined in the action. That is one of the tests in determining whether to join a person as a party to an action. See ODUOLA V. COKER (1931) 5 SC 197. Whereas the former cannot be joined as a Defendant, the latter who is a necessary party is entitled to be joined. In BABAYEJU & ANOR v. ASHAMU & ANOR (1998) 7 SC (PT.1) 156. the Supreme Court per Ogwuegbu, J.S.C held that “the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party.” per. EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

OZONMA (BARR) CHIDI NOBIS ELENDU Appellant(s)

AND

1. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)
3. HON. MRS EUCHARIA AZODO Respondent(s)

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): On the 8th of April 2011, the Appellant herein, as Plaintiff filed Suit No.FHC/AWK/CS/167/2011 against the Respondents herein as Defendants for:-
a. A Declaration that the Plaintiff is the duly nominated candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party for the Federal House of Representatives, Aguata Federal Constituency, Anambra State of Nigeria having polled the highest number of votes at the repeat primaries of the Peoples Democratic Party held on Monday, the 10th day of January, 2011.
b. A Declaration that the Plaintiff is the lawful candidate of the 2nd Defendant (PDP) for the House of Representatives, Aguata Federal Constituency whose name shall ought to be placed or published on the ballot for the 2011 National Assembly election by the 1st Defendant.
c. A Declaration that the purported submission of the name of the 3rd Defendant to the 1st Defendant (INEC) as a candidate of the 2nd Defendant (PDP) for the Federal House of Representatives Aguata Federal Constituency and acceptance and publication of some by the 1st Defendant is unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional null and void and of no effect.
d. A Declaration that the 3rd Defendant is not the winner of the 2nd Defendant primaries election for the Federal House of Representatives, Aguata Federal Constituency held on the 10th January, 2011.
e. An ORDER of Perpetual Injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner whatsoever recognizing, transacting, doing anything, or dealing with the 3rd Defendant as the candidate of the 2nd Defendant for the 2011 Federal House of Representatives Election, Aguata Federal Constituency.
f. An Order substituting or replacing the name of the Plaintiff for the 3rd Defendant’s name as the candidate of the 2nd Defendant (PDP) for the Federal House of Representatives, Aguata Federal Constituency.
g. And any general or other reliefs which may be given as the judge may think just as if same had been asked for.

The Writ of Summons commencing this Suit was filed along with a Statement of Claim, List of Witnesses, Witness Statements on Oath and other documents. The 1st Defendant did not file a Statement of Defence. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed a joint Statement of Defence and a Motion on Notice praying for an Order dismissing/striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that:-
(i) The suit is an abuse of the processes of the Court.
(ii) The suit was initiated after the period for the submission or substitution or change of candidates of political parties had elapsed.
(iii) Courts do not make Orders in vain.
(iv) As at 8/4/2011, when the above suit was filed, the issue of nomination of candidates, substitution of candidates and sponsorship of candidates by political parties had come to an end and time bared.
(v) The Plaintiff had no cause of action as at 8/4/2011, as the request/claim of the Plaintiff is time bared and unenforceable in law, the suit having been filed after the time provided for submission of names of candidates or substitutes of names of candidates.
(vi) The suit was filed after the latest time for delivery of nomination papers and the withdrawal of candidates for an election under the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).
(vii) A poll had taken place on the 9th of April 2011 without the Plaintiff s delivery of nomination paper before the commencement of the poll and without the Defendants being aware of the pendency of the above suit.
(viii) The 3rd Defendant having delivered her nomination paper and the 2nd Defendant having submitted the name of the 3rd Defendant before the last date for the submission of names of candidates, the Plaintiffs claim has become a legal impossibility and at best leaves the Plaintiff with the remedy of suing the 2nd Defendant for damages as the case falls within the domain of internal and domestic affair of the 2nd Defendant in the matter of nomination of candidates.
(ix) Once the 3rd Defendant have been screened and cleared within the period stipulated by law any suit filed after the said period, does not ensure any cause of action to the Plaintiff.
(x) The suit of the Plaintiff is within the realm of internal affairs of PDP and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain same, particularly for a suit filed after the close of nomination and a day to the polls which took place on 9th April 2011.
(xi) The above suit is founded on hearsay documentary evidence.
(xii) The Plaintiff did not join a necessary and important party to the suit-the chief Returning Officer in the PDP primaries.

The 2nd and 3rd Defendants argued the Objection. The Plaintiff replied to same. In its Ruling delivered on 21-7-2011 and contained in 2 1/2 typewritten pages, the trial court upheld the objection and struck out the suit. The trial court reproduced the Grounds for the Objection and recapped the arguments of Counsel to both sides in 1-1/2pages of the ruling. It then proceeded to decide the objection in the following words-
“The supreme court in this case of MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) ALL NLR (PT.2) 580 held that in order to determine jurisdiction, court should look at the statement of claim. I have looked at the Statement of Claim here, I could see that the averments of the Respondent herein centres on the primary election of the party to elect a candidate for the election proper, that the Plaintiff was screened and cleared to contest the election, that on the Friday the 7th January 2011 the party conducted the primary, that the Plaintiff was on the verge of winning the election when some party top shots manipulated the process and called for a repeat election which was held on the 10th January, that the party top people changed the system of voting adopted by the party for all the primary elections in the state. That the returning officer refused to count the votes, that in spite of the hurdles placed on his path, he the Plaintiff won the repeat primary, that the party bias wigs still refused to recognize him as the winner of the election, consequent upon when he filed this action. In my opinion this scenario only borders on the domestic affairs of the party. In spite of the averments of the Plaintiff that the 1st Defendant’s officers monitored the primary election and witnessed the counting of votes and that the Plaintiff shall rely on the 1st Defendant’s report on the repeat election and allusion to 1st Defendant’s making it clear in several correspondences that the Plaintiff won the election. It is evidently clear, in my opinion that the suit is about the internal politics of the party. The cancellation of the 1st voting exercise, the abandonment of the option A4 in the repeat primary, the role of the Chief Returning Officer and the top shots of the party and the party’s acceptance of the 3rd Defendant as the winner of the election instead of the Plaintiff. In my opinion those are the issues that would be decided in this suit and I do not see how the Independent National Electoral Commission could be a necessary party. Learned counsel to the Plaintiff referred to Section 87 of the Electoral Act which provides that an aggrieved party in the primary election could approach the High Court in the state. In my view, this would not enable the Plaintiff come to the Federal High Court as the High court in the state could only mean a court that has original jurisdiction. In respect of the subject-matter there is nothing in the Statement of Claim that could invoke Section 251(1) p, q, r, s of the 1999 Constitution. There is nothing that touches the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies since there is nothing touching Section 251 (p, q, r). I agree that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction in respect of this subject matter. In view of the above I’m of the view that the Federal High Court is not the proper venue for the Plaintiff to ventilate his grievances in respect of the said primary election. This suit is therefore hereby struck out.”

Dissatisfied with this Ruling, the Plaintiff on the 27 July 2011, commenced this Appeal No. CA/E/201/2011. The Grounds of this Appeal are as contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 9th December 2013. All the parties to this Appeal have filed exchanged and adopted their respective Briefs of Argument.

During the hearing of this Appeal, this Court invited the parties to address it on whether the Appellants suit at the trial court still had practical value and had not been rendered a mere academic exercise in view of the fact that the General Election to the House of Representatives had long held on 9th April 2011 and was contested by the 3rd Respondent, and considering the decisions of the Supreme court in several cases like IMEGWU V. OKOLOCHA (2013) 9 NWLR (PT.1359) 347 and the provisions of the Electoral Act 2010, particularly S.141.

On 16-12-2013, Learned Counsel for the Appellant while adopting Appellant’s Brief orally argued that S.141/2010 Electoral Act is not applicable to the instant case as the questions before this Court are as stated in the issues for determination in the Briefs of Argument and that it is premature to consider if this case is an academic exercise. He cited in support the authority of UZODINMA V. IZUNASO (2011) 17 NWLR (PT.1275) 30 AT 60 AND 61 and urged that this Court should not apply S.141 of the 2010 Electoral Act as it will be premature to do so.

Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondent while adopting their Brief orally argued in addition that S.141 of the 2010 Electoral Act applied to this case and that it will be wrong to transfer the matter to a court that lacks jurisdiction.

The Appellant in his Brief of Argument raised the following issues for determination:-
1. Whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain pre-election matter bothering on the validity of the nomination and/or submission of the name of a person alleged to have lost the party primary election by a political party instead of the winner of the primary election to INEC as the party’s candidate for election into the House of Representatives (formulated from Ground 1)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to make a case quite distinct from the case presented by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the said Respondents and resolve same without inviting the parties to address him on the issue raised by him (formulated from Ground 2)
3. Whether the 1st Respondent is a necessary party in this Suit (formulated from Ground 3)
4. Whether the learned trial Judge properly exercised his discretion in the matter by striking out the Suit instead of transferring it to the State High Court for hearing and determination (formulated from Ground 4)

The Respondents adopted the Issues as framed by the Appellant, except the 1st Respondent who reframed Appellant’s Issue No.1. Even then the 1st Respondent’s issue No. 1 is in substance the same with the Appellants Issue No.1. I will therefore adopt the Appellant’s issues for determination as reframed by Respondents and decide this Appeal on the basis of those Issues.
Arising from the question suo moto raised by the court and on which the Learned Counsel for the Appellant and the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents addressed the Court, is the issue of whether the suit at the trial court is not an academic and vain exercise since the general election held on 9th April 2011 and the 3rd Respondent contested same. This will constitute the fifth Issue for determination in this Appeal.

Let me consider the first Issue. On this Issue, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that –
(i) by virtue of S.87 (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act, the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit before it because the central complain of the Plaintiff in that suit is that the 2nd Respondent did not comply with S.87 (4)(ii) of the 2010 Electoral Act, and its electoral guidelines in the nomination of its candidate on 10th January 2011 for the 9th April 2011 general election to the seat of member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency.
(ii) the trial court was wrong to have held that the subject matter of the Suit before it, not being one of the subject matters listed in S.251(1) p, q, r and s of the 1999 Constitution as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
(iii) by virtue of S.251(i) itself, the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court is not limited to the matters listed therein and extends to other matters over which jurisdiction is conferred on it by an Act of the National Assembly like S. 87(a)(c) (ii) of the 2010 Electoral Act.
(iv) contrary to the Ruling of the trial court, the suit is not about the internal affairs or politics of the 2nd Respondent and that it complains about the breach of S.87(a)(c)(ii) of the Electoral Act and the 2nd Respondent’s guidelines for the conduct of National Assembly primary elections. Learned Counsel referred to the Supreme Court decision in AMAECHI V. INEC (2008) 10 WRN 1 AT 110 that the internal affairs of a Political party is subject to the Constitution and other laws of Nigeria and argued that this authority was cited to the trial court and that it did not follow it and did not give any reason for not following it. According to learned counsel the 2nd Respondent is not an outlaw organization as it is bound by the Laws of Nigeria. It must uphold the law.
(v) The 1st Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria and one of the issues in the suit is its administrative actions in respect of the nomination, acceptance and publication of the name of the 3rd Respondent instead of the Appellant as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for 9th April 2011 election to the Seat of Member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency. This issue and the reliefs concerning the 1st Respondent are part of the subject matters over which the trial Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction by S.251 (1) of the Constitution.
(vi) The decision of the trial Court that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit is therefore wrong.

Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent, and the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents made the same submissions on this Issue in their respective Briefs. They argued that-
(1) There is nothing in the Statement of Claim touching on the management and control of the 1st Respondent or its administrative or executive Officers. A Claim that the staff of the 1st Respondent monitored the primary election of the 2nd Respondent is not a matter arising from administration, management and control of the 1st Respondent as it is the prerogative of political parties.
(2) The jurisdictions conferred on the Federal High Court by S. 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 is not independent of s. 251(i) of the Constitution, it is an addition to the jurisdiction conferred on it by S.251 (i) of the Constitution.
(3) An action under S.87 (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act can brought to the Federal High Court only if the subject matter and parties therein are within its jurisdiction.
(4) The facts of the case of AMAECHI V INEC are different from the instant case. In Amaechi’s case there was a complain that after accepting the nomination of the Appellant and publishing same, INEC later without any reason removed the name and substituted it with another name. In this case INEC did not change the name submitted to it by the 2nd Respondent. It played no role whatsoever in the nomination of the 3rd Respondent apart from observing the primaries. This Court is therefore not bound to follow Amaechi’s case.
(5) Nomination of a candidate by a political party is within the absolute jurisdiction of the Political Party.

Let me now consider the above arguments of both sides on this Issue. The scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is prescribed by S. 251 (i) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (The Constitution). Before listing the items of subject matters in civil causes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, it stated thus – “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters.”

All sides herein agree, and it is correct, that by virtue of this provision, an Act of the National Assembly may confer on the Federal High Court Jurisdiction in addition to that conferred on it therein. It is also agreed by all sides herein, and it is correct, that the 2010 Electoral Act is an Act of the National Assembly and that the jurisdiction conferred by S.87 (9) of the said Electoral Act to entertain the application of an aspirant who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of a Political Party has not been complied with in the election or nomination of a candidate of a Political Party for election, is additional to the jurisdiction conferred on it by S.251 (i) of the Constitution.

The point of divergence between the Appellant and the Respondents is whether the jurisdiction conferred on the Trial Court by S.87 (9) of the Electoral Act is independent or dependent on that conferred on it by S.251 (i) of the Constitution. S.87 (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act Provides that:-
“Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.”

The subject matter of the jurisdiction to be exercised under this provision is non-compliance with the Electoral Act and Political Party guidelines in the election or nomination of a candidate of a political party for an election. It is obvious that this subject matter is completely different and unrelated to any of the subject matters listed in S. 251 (i) of the 1999 Constitution. Furthermore, the provisions of S.87 (9) of the Electoral Act does not reduce or curtail or affect the jurisdiction vested on the trial court by S.251 (i) of the Constitution. Rather it created a subject matter jurisdiction that is not provided for in S.251 (i) of the Constitution. The vesting of this additional subject matter jurisdiction by S. 87 (9) of the Electoral Act has not in any way reduced or curtailed the jurisdiction vested on it by S.251 (i) of the Constitution. There is nothing in S.87 (9) of the Electoral Act suggesting that the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by it is dependent on the existence of the jurisdiction conferred by S.251 (i) of the 1999 Constitution. It is therefore clear from the express words of S.87 (9) of the Electoral Act that the jurisdiction conferred thereunder on the Federal High Court is a separate and special jurisdiction, distinct from, independent and not related to its other jurisdiction:

S.251 (i) of the Constitution that allowed for additional jurisdiction to be conferred on the Federal High Court by an Act of the National Assembly clearly and deliberately defined the relationship between the jurisdiction conferred by it on the Federal High Court and the one conferred on it by an Act of the National Assembly in the following words, “and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by an Act of the National Assembly.” It is clear from this provision that the constitution intends that the Federal High Court can in addition to the Jurisdiction conferred on it by the constitution itself exercise other jurisdiction that is conferred on it by an Act of the National Assembly. The Constitution by the use of the words “Other” intends that the jurisdiction conferred by the National Assembly is distinct and therefore unrelated to the one it already has. The word “other” or the phrase “other jurisdiction” is not defined by the Constitution and does not have any technical or special meaning. Therefore the word “other” as used in S.251 (i) of the Constitution must be given its ordinary or grammatical meaning. It is defined in the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary (1983 Edition at page 895) as follows:- “One of two, alternate, different from or not the same, remaining, additional”. From this definition, it is clear that the word is an adjective used to refer to a person or thing that is different or distinct from the one already mentioned or known about.

There is nothing is S.251 (i) of the Constitution placing any limitation on the “other Jurisdiction” that an Act of the National Assembly can confer on the Federal High Court. There is nothing in S.251(1) of the Constitution requiring that the other jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by an Act of the National Assembly must relate to any of the subject matters over which exclusive jurisdiction is vested on it by S.251(1) of the Constitution. The phrase “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution” does not subject or subordinate other parts of the Constitution to S.251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. It means that any provision in the Constitution that is contrary to S.251 (1) will not limit its effect or application. It emphasizes that the jurisdiction vested on the Federal High Court therein is not subject to any contrary provision in the constitution. The phrase defines the relation between S. 251(1) and other parts of the Constitution. It emphasizes that S.251 (1) and other provisions to the contrary in the Constitution shall co-exist in spite of each other and therefore not affect each other. So non is subject to the other. The word “notwithstanding” is defined in the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, (supra at page 865) as a participial phrase in nominative absolute and that as a preposition it means “in spite of the fact,” and as an adverb it means “nevertheless, however, yet.” As a conjunction it means “although” and in spite of the fact.” Therefore the said phrase “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution also shows that the following phrase “and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly” is not subordinate to the remaining part of S.251(1) of the Constitution.

For the above reasons I do not agree with the submission of Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent and the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by S.87 (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act can only be invoked to admit a case in which the subject matter and party are within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Court by S.251 (1) of the Constitution. The trial court was therefore wrong when it held that “Learned Counsel to the Plaintiff referred to Section 87 of the Electoral Act which provides that an aggrieved party in the primary election could approach the High Court in the State. In my view, this would not enable the Plaintiff come to the Federal High Court as the High Court in the State could only mean a court that has original jurisdiction. In respect of the subject-matter there is nothing in the Statement of Claim that could invoke Section 251(1) p, q, r, s of the 1999 Constitution. There is nothing that touches the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies since there is nothing touching Section 251 (p, q, r).”
By virtue of S.87 (9) of the 2010 Electoral Act, the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit at the instance of an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, whether the Independent National Electoral Commission or any agency of the Federal government is a party to the suit or not.

The cause for the suit at the trial court is that the Appellant herein alleges that he was the aspirant with the highest number of votes in the 2nd Respondent’s 10th January 2011 National Assembly primary election to nominate the party’s candidate for the 9th April 2011 Election to the seat of Member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency and that contrary to S.87(4)(c)(ii) of the Electoral Act 2010 he was not declared the winner, rather the 2nd Respondent declared the 3rd Respondent who was next to him in number of votes winner and forwarded her name to the 1st Respondent.

In the light of the foregoing, I hold that the trial court has the jurisdiction to entertain the complain that the declaration of the 3rd Respondent by the 2nd Respondent as the winner of the said primary election and the forwarding of her name by the 2nd Respondent to the 1st Respondent, is in breach of S.87(4)(c)(ii) of the 2010 Electoral Act. I therefore resolve issue No. 1 in favour of the Appellant.

Let me consider the issue of whether the 1st Respondent is a necessary party to the suit at the trial court. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued that-
(i) The 1st Respondent is a necessary party to the suit because its presence is required for the just determination of the issues in controversy between the Parties.
(ii) The Appellant in his Statement of Claim showed that he has a cause of action against the 1st Respondent for its failure to uphold the provisions of S.87 (a)(c)(ii) of the 2010 Electoral Act.
(iii) The Issues relating to the claims contained in paragraph 28 (b), (c), (e) and (f) of the Statement of Claim cannot be resolved in the absence of the 1st Respondent.
(iv) The 1st Respondent is entitled to fair hearing as its rights and obligations are in issue and will ultimately be determined in the suit. It is trite that the court cannot grant injunction against a person who is not a party in a proceeding before it.
(v) The trial court held that the 1st Respondent is not a necessary party to the suit because of its view that the subject matter of the suit was purely the internal affair of the 2nd Respondent. The Electoral Act is very clear on the powers and position of INEC. The duties cannot be performed by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent and the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents argued that-
(i) The 1st Respondent is not a necessary party to the suit as the cause of action could not be defeated by the non-joinder of the 1st Respondent.
(ii) The Appellant has no complaint against the 1st Respondent in his claims in the Court below.
(ii) It is the cause of action as stated in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim that determine the proper parties before the Court. There are no averments in the pleadings disclosing any cause of action against the 1st Respondent as the Constitution and S.87 of the Electoral Act did not confer on the 1st Respondent the power of nomination and sponsoring of a candidate for election. The power lies with political parties.
(iv) Under Order 9 rule 5 of the Federal High Court Rules, 2009 a Plaintiff is required to allege the existence of a right to relief against all the persons joined so that judgment may be given against them jointly or severally or in the alternative without amendment.
(v) The presence of the 1st Respondent is not necessary in this Suit as it cannot be bound by any decision reached in the suit.
(vi) The 1st Respondent has no direct or legal interest in the proceedings.
(vii) The courts have laid down some principle as a guide in determining whether or not to join a party in a suit. They are-
(a) The purpose of joinder provided for by the Rules of Court is to allow a Plaintiff to proceed in the same action against all Defendants against whom he alleges to be entitled to relief.
(b) The person to be joined must be someone whose presence is necessary, so that he may be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled.
(c) It is improper to join as co-Defendant, a person against whom the Plaintiff has no cause of action or whose interest is adverse to that of the existing Defendant.
(d) It is not sufficient if all a party has is a mere interest in the result of the action. There must be a dispute between the parties giving rise to the right of action.
(e) The Defendant so joined must have a direct or legal interest in the matter in order to take advantage of the rule. It is not enough that he has an indirect interest.

I will start with the determination of the merit of the above arguments of Counsel for all the parties by calling to mind the contents of the Statement of Claim concerning the 1st Respondent. Paragraph 2 therein states that “The 1st Defendant is the body statutorily charged with the function, duty and responsibility of overseeing and superintending the affairs and conduct of activities of political parties, among others, having its headquarters in Abuja.” Paragraph 17 of the said Statement of Claim states that “Officers of the 1st Defendant, INEC, who monitored the repeat primary election aforesaid as required by law witnessed the counting of the votes and recorded the event and what transpired at the repeat primary election.” In paragraph 25 it states that “Notwithstanding the fact that the 1st Defendant by and in several correspondences made it clear to the 2nd Defendant that the Plaintiff is the validly nominated candidate of the party and the person whose name ought to appear on the ballot as the 2nd Defendant’s candidate for the said election, the 1st Defendant for some inexplicable reasons has published the name of the 3rd Defendant as the candidate of the 2nd Defendant for the Federal House of Representatives, Aguata Federal Constituency for the 2011 National Assembly Election and would continue to recognize the 3rd Defendant as such unless restrained by the Honourable Court. In paragraph 26 it states that- “The recognition of the 3rd Defendant as the candidate of the 2nd Defendant for the Federal House of Representatives, Aguata Federal Constituency for the 2011 National Assembly Election by the 1st Defendant is unlawful illegal, ultra vires the 1st Defendant and accordingly null and void and of no effect.”
Paragraph 28(c) and (e) claimed for reliefs against the 1st Respondent as follows – (c)”A declaration that the purported submission of the name of the 3rd Defendant to the 1st Defendant (INEC) as a candidate of the 2nd Defendant (PDP) for the Federal House of Representatives Aguata Federal constituency and acceptance and publication of same by the 1st Defendant is unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional null and void and of no effect.”
(e) “An Order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner whatsoever recognizing, transacting, doing anything, or dealing with the 3rd Defendant as the candidate of the 2nd Defendant for the 2011 Federal House of Representatives Election, Aguata Federal Constituency.”

It is clear from the contents of the Statement of Claim referred to and reproduced above that the Appellant complained that the 1st Respondent had the duty and obligation to ensure that S. 87(4)(c)(ii) of the Electoral Act was complied with by the 2nd Respondent in declaring the winner of the primary election and in forwarding the name of the winner to it and that it was unlawful for the 1st Respondent to have accepted and recognized the 3rd Respondent as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the 9th April 2011 election to the seat of Member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency when it knew fully well that she did not have the highest number of votes in the primary. The issues raised by this complain constitute the issues in controversy in the suit and therefore render the 1st Respondent a necessary party to the suit. I agree with Learned counsel for the Appellant that it is natural and in accord with common sense that persons against whom complaints are made in an action be made parties to the action. This is because disputes involving them should not be determined without hearing them and if reliefs are claimed against them, they have to be made parties to be bound by any order or declaration of the court against them. The legality or otherwise of the actions of the 1st Respondent cannot be determined without making it a party or hearing it in the suit challenging its action. To do so will violate its right to fair hearing and it will not be bound by the result of the suit. The merit of the complain or challenge is not relevant in determining if 1st Respondent is a necessary party to the action. Whether the 1st Respondent has a statutory duty or obligation to ensure that political parties comply with the Electoral Act and their internal primary election guidelines and whether the 1st Respondent in keeping with that duty and obligation had the right, power and duty to refuse to accept and recognize the name of the 3rd Respondent as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the said election since she was not the aspirant with the highest number of votes at the said primary election is not relevant in determining if the 1st Respondent is a necessary party in a suit complaining that it has such duty and obligation and failed to discharge it. That question touches on the merit of the suit. What is relevant here is that its action in accepting and recognizing the name of the 3rd Respondent is challenged and certain reliefs have been sought against it. Therefore it is necessary that it be a party so that it can be heard concerning the complain and the claim for the reliefs and be bound by the result of the determination of the suit. As the Supreme Court held per Oputa, J.S.C in GREEN V. GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT.61) 481, “under our laws one reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action.” In A.G. OF THE FEDERATION V. A.G. ABIA STATE & ORS (2001) 11 NWLR (PT.725) 689 the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC held that “A distinction should be made between a party who is merely interested in the outcome of the suit against who there can be no claim or relief sought. See GUDA v. KITTA (1999) 12 NWLR (PT.629) 21; AROMIRE V. AWOYEMI (1972) 2 SC 1 and a necessary party, against who there can be a claim or relief, and who would be irreparably prejudiced if he is not joined in the action. That is one of the tests in determining whether to join a person as a party to an action. See ODUOLA V. COKER (1931) 5 SC 197. Whereas the former cannot be joined as a Defendant, the latter who is a necessary party is entitled to be joined. In BABAYEJU & ANOR v. ASHAMU & ANOR (1998) 7 SC (PT.1) 156. the Supreme Court per Ogwuegbu, J.S.C held that “the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party.” For the above reason, I do not agree with the submissions of Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent and the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents that the 1st Respondent is not a necessary party to the suit and I hold that the opinion of the trial court that it did not see how the 2nd Respondent could be a necessary party to the suit is wrong. Issue No. 3 is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant.

Having resolved Issues Nos. 1 and 3 in favour of the Appellant it becomes unnecessary and useless to consider and determine Issues Nos. 2 and 4 of the Appellant’s Brief. Having held under Issue No 1 herein that the trial court was wrong to have held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because it has jurisdiction, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether it was right to have suo motu raised the issue of whether the suit touched on the administration, management and control of a Federal Government Agency or challenged the administrative action of such agency and suo motu determined same and on the basis of that determination held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Clearly the basis for holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit is its decision that the suit did not touch on the administration, management and control of a Federal Government Agency or/and that it is not challenging the administrative action of such Agency. I have already held under Issue No. 1 that the suit pursuant to S.87 (9) Electoral Act need not touch on the above subject matters before it can be validly brought to and entertained by the trial court, since it is a complain that the 2nd Respondent did not comply with S.87 (a)(c)(ii) of the Electoral Act in the nomination of the 3rd Respondent as its candidate for the election.

I had held under Issue No 3 herein that the 1st Respondent is a necessary party to the suit. It therefore becomes idle to find out if the trial court was right to have suo moto raised the issue of whether the 1st Respondent was a necessary party to the suit and suo moto determine same.

I will now deal with the issue of whether the suit at the trial court was an academic exercise, and if so whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain such suit. As I had stated herein, this issue was raised suo moto by this Court. No Ground of this Appeal raised this issue and it was not part of the issues for determination raised by the Appellant in his Brief of Argument. The judgment of the trial court did not decide this issue even though it was raised by the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in the Motion on Notice dated 31st May 2011 and filed on 1-6-2011 (see pages 102-103 of the Record of this Appeal) and argued by the said Learned Senior Advocate in his written argument dated 31st May 2011 and filed on 1-6-2011 (see pages 155-156 of the record of this appeal). Generally, an appeal is heard and determined on the basis of the ground upon which the Appellant brought the appeal and the jurisdiction of the appellate court to determine the appeal is limited to the grounds for the Appeal. See Order 6 Rules 2 and 4 of the 2011 Court of Appeal Rules. Rule 4 therein, expressly state that the Appellant shall not be heard on any ground not mentioned in the notice of appeal. However Rules 5 of Order 6 of the said Rules enable this Court to decide the appeal on grounds not stated in the notice of appeal after allowing the Respondent the opportunity to address the Court on that ground. For ease of reference I will reproduce the exact words of Rule 5. It states that-.
“Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the Court in deciding the appeal shall not be confined to the grounds set forth by the Appellant; provided that the Court shall not if it allows the appeal, rest its decision on any ground not set forth by the Appellant unless the Respondent has had sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground.”

So it is in keeping with this provision of Rule 5 that this Court raised this issue suo motu and invited all the parties to address on it. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents had at the trial court filed a motion on notice praying for an order dismissing/striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit on the grounds inter alia that-
(iv) As at 8/4/2011, when the above suit was filed, the issue of nomination of candidates, substitution of candidates and sponsorship of candidates by political parties had come to an end and time barred.
(v) The Plaintiff had no cause of action as at 8/4/2011, as the request/claim of the Plaintiff is time barred and unenforceable in law, the suit having been filed after the time provided for submission of names of candidates or substitutes of names of candidates.
(vi) The suit was filed after the latest time for delivery of nomination papers and the withdrawal of candidates for an election under the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).
(vii) A poll had taken place on the 9th of April 2011 without the Plaintiff’s delivery of nomination paper before the commencement of the poll and without the Defendants being aware of the pendency of the above suit.
(viii) The 3rd Defendant having delivered her nomination paper and the 2nd Defendant having submitted the name of the 3rd Defendant before the last date for the submission of names of candidates, the Plaintiffs claim has become a legal impossibility and at best leaves the Plaintiff with the remedy of suing the 2nd Defendant for damages as the case falls within the domain of internal and domestic affair of the 2nd Defendant in the matter of nomination of candidates.
(ix) Once the 3rd Defendant have been screened and cleared within the period stipulated by law any suit filed after the said period, does not ensure any cause of action to the Plaintiff.

In the written argument of this ground of the objection, the Learned Senior Advocate for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants submitted that – (Everything about nominations, submission of names of candidates and substitution of names of candidates by political parties ended in January 2011. The 3rd Defendant’s nomination papers were submitted, and the 2nd Defendant forwarded the name of the 3rd Defendant after winning the PDP primaries to the 1st Defendant. The polls held on 9th April 2011. It has been held that when the issue of a cause of action being statute barred is raised, it bothers on the jurisdiction of the court. See DAWODU V. ELABANJO (2006) ALL FWLR (PT.323) 604 AT 620-621. The action of the Plaintiff filed on 8th April 2011 is statute barred, in that, in the most unlikely event that the Plaintiff succeeds in this action, the Plaintiff’s name cannot be submitted at this stage to the 1st Defendant as nominations, submission of names of candidates and substitution of names of candidates as provided by the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) has long expired. We therefore submit that the Plaintiff’s cause of action is stale, time barred and unenforceable in law and consequently the court has no jurisdiction to entertain same. We urge the court to so hold.”

In ruling on this Motion, the trial court for inexplicable reasons did not decide these grounds of the objection. It was silent on them. The trial court may have considered it unnecessary to consider other grounds of the objection, having sustained the objection to its jurisdiction on the ground that the subject matter of the suit does not touch on the management, administration and control of a Federal Government Agency or its administrative action. The Supreme Court in FCDA V. SULE (1994) 3 SCNJ 71 per Olatawura, J.S.C. supports this approach as correct where an issue of jurisdiction is raised with other issues. In that situation once the court determines the issue of jurisdiction, which it is by law bound to deal with first, and holds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, then it becomes unnecessary and academic to consider other issues. According to the Supreme Court, this is an exception to the general rule that all issues submitted for the consideration of the court must be considered and that failure to consider any may lead to a miscarriage of justice. In FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH V. CSA LTD (2009) 9 NWLR (PT 1145) 193 AT 221 the same Court per Chukwumah-Eneh, JSC held that as a general rule all issues properly raised before a court for its determination must be considered “in order, apart from the issue of fair hearing, not to risk the possibility that the only issue or issues decided by them could be faulted on appeal”. But where the competence of a suit or the jurisdiction to entertain it is questioned on several grounds as in this case, I do not think that this kind of a situation is the same as one where several issues including a jurisdictional issue or issues are raised. I think that all the grounds for the objection should be determined to avoid the occurrence of the situation. His Lordship Chukwumah-Eneh, JSC warned against in FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH V. CSA LTD, as follows- “not to risk the possibility that the only issue or issues decided by them could be faulted on appeal” and the undesirable consequence of a piece meal litigation of the objection. The risk warned against has occurred here. I have held herein that the decision of the trial court upholding the objection on that ground is wrong. This has now resulted in the violation of the right of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to be heard on other grounds of their objection. Their arguments of the other grounds of the objection have remained without a decision. This is a complete negation of the principle of fair hearing and abdication of judicial responsibility complicating and protracting the process of access to justice. All the grounds of the objection should have been considered to avoid this situation.

The record of this appeal show that the Appellant filed his suit at the trial court on 8th January 2011, the eve of the 9th January 2011 general election and that the 3rd Respondent contested the said election as the candidate of the 2nd Respondent for the seat of Member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency. The 2nd Respondent’s primary election of 10th January 2011 was to nominate its candidate for the above mentioned election. Now that the election held a day after the suit was filed with the 3rd Respondent contesting as the 2nd Respondents’ candidate, has the suit not been overtaken by events, drained of any utilitarian value and rendered an academic and vain exercise. With the holding of the general election, is the question of who should represent the 2nd Respondent any longer relevant? Is it still possible for the Appellant’s name to be submitted by the 2nd Respondent to the 3rd Respondent as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the 9th April 2011 election? Is it possible for the 9th April 2011 election to the seat of member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency to be nullified and another election held to enable the Appellant contest as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate? These are the questions that arise as a result of the holding of the election of 9th April 2011.

It is obvious that with the holding of the election of 9th April 2011, the question of who should be or should have been the candidate of the 2nd Respondent in that election is no longer relevant. The holding of that election presupposes that the matter of nomination of a political party’s candidate for the election, the submission of the name by the party to the 1st Respondent, publication of the particulars of such candidate in the relevant constituency and any issue connected therewith, publication of the list of candidates standing for the election and all matters connected with the nomination of candidates of political parties for the election have been fully and finally settled and come to a close in accordance with Sections 31 to 41 of the Electoral Act 2010. Therefore, after the holding of the election, it is no longer practicable and possible for a person to ask to be nominated as or be declared the nominated candidate of a political party for an election that has held. The right to be the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the said election expired or became unenforceable upon the holding of that election. It is no longer possible for the 2nd Respondent to submit the name of the Appellant to the 1st Respondent as its candidate for the election that has already held.

S.31(1) of the Electoral Act 2010 provides that every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election, submit to the 1st Respondent in the prescribed forms, the list of the candidates it proposes to sponsor at the elections. The 2nd Respondent’s said primary election held on 10th January 2011. The Appellant stated in his Statement of Claim that the 2nd Respondent forwarded the name of the 3rd Respondent to the 1st Respondent as its candidate for the 9th April 2011 election and that the 1st Respondent published the name of the 3rd Respondent as the 2nd Respondent’s candidate for the election to the seat of member, House of Representatives for Aguata Federal Constituency. The Appellant instead of timeously bringing an action in court pursuant to S. 87(9) of the 2010 Electoral Act to complain that S.87 (4)(c)(ii) of the Electoral Act has not been complied with in the nomination of the 3rd Respondent, so as to enable the complain be judicially determined in time before the election, resorted to writing the 1st Respondent requesting it to refuse to accept or recognize the nomination of the 3rd Respondent and writing to the 2nd Respondent to substitute the name of the 3rd Respondent with his, as the winner of the primary election. The said written requests were ab initio bound to yield nothing because the proviso to S.31(1) of the 2010 Electoral Act states that the 1st Respondent shall not reject or disqualify candidates for any reason whatsoever, and S. 33 of the Electoral Act provides that a political party shall not be allowed to withdraw or substitute its candidate whose name has been submitted pursuant to S.31 of the Electoral Act, except in the case of death or withdrawal by the candidate. Furthermore, upon a political party submitting the name of a person to the 1st Respondent as its candidate for an election pursuant to S.31(1) of the 2010 Electoral Act, only the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State or Federal Capital Territory can disqualify such candidate from contesting the election. A High Court can do so under the provisions of S.31(4), (5) and (6) of the 2010 Electoral Act or under the provisions of S.S7(9) of the same Act. To allow for an early judicial determination of the complain about the nomination of a person as candidate before an election, it is necessary that the person complaining under S.31 (4), (5) and (6) of the Electoral Act or an aspirant complaining under S.87 (9) of the said Act, timeously, immediately after the said nomination, files a suit in the High Court challenging the nomination on the appropriate grounds. This is because time is of essence in the determination of issues relating to such nominations before the election. It is clear from the tenor of the provisions of the Electoral Act on the nomination of persons as political party candidates for an election, that the Act intend that issues concerning such nomination should be finally settled well before the election. The Appellant waited until the eve of the election before filing the suit at the trial court complaining that S. 87(4)(c)(ii) was not complied with in the nomination of the 3rd Respondent. This made it impossible for his complain to be determined before the election. The filing of the suit on the eve of the election could not have stopped the holding of the election. It is clear from the tenor of the Act that it intends that pending court actions should not be allowed or used to truncate the holding of primaries or general elections or other electoral processes. This is clear from the provisions of S.87 (10) of the Electoral Act which provides that nothing in S.87 shall empower the courts to stop the holding of primaries or general election or the processes thereof under the Act pending the determination of a suit.

Now that the election had been held, the suit is rendered academic or hypothetical. A court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. The jurisdiction of courts is limited to the determination of live questions or questions that are useful and relevant in the sense that their determination will change the circumstances of the parties. In IMEGWU V. OKOLOCHA (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1359) 347 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to Appeal against the decision substituting him as the candidate of a political party for the election for the sole reason that the appeal had become academic, hypothetical, irrelevant and useless since the said election had been held and the winner had been sworn in as Member, House of Representatives. The Supreme Court held that a court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain academic questions or questions that have no practical value. The Supreme Court further held that even if a nomination was wrongful, once the election has been held, the wrongful nature of the nomination can no longer affect the nomination and the election. This was also the decision of this court in OBIECHINA V. INEC & ORS (unreported decision of this court in CA/A/358/2012 delivered on 13-12-2013). It is clear from these decisions that even if the suit of the Appellant at the trial court succeeds and the reliefs claimed therein are granted, the circumstances of the parties will not change.

In the light of the foregoing, I hold that the suit having been overtaken by events and rendered useless, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to continue to entertain and determine it. Therefore I resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent and for this reason uphold the decision of the trial court that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
On the whole this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs.

ADZIRA GANA MSHELIA, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of a preview in draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Agim JCA. I entirely agree with his reasoning and conclusions. For the reasons so clearly set out in the lead judgment, I too would dismiss the Appeal. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I abide by the order for costs made in the lead judgment.

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the lead judgment of my Learned brother, E. A. Agim, JCA and I agree completely with his reasoning and conclusion that the Appeal fails and should be dismissed as the substantive Suit that gave rise to it had been overtaken by events in that same had become otiose, academic and spent by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in Imegwu V. Okolocha (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1359) 347.

I also agree with my Lord that even if the Court below decides in favour of the Appellant, he cannot step into the shoes of Hon. Mrs. Eucharia Azodo who is now occupying the position of the elected member of the House of Representatives for the Aguata Federal Constituency of Anambra State of Nigeria; the General Elections which threw up the said Mrs. Azodo having been since held on the 9th April, 2011 notwithstanding that the Appellant filed the Suit on the 8th April, 2011.
Accordingly, I shall also make no Order as to costs.

Appearances

Chief G. Oseloka Osuigwe Esq. with C. E. Nwosu (Miss) and C.S.G. Anozie Esq.For Appellant

AND

Ben Osaka Esq. with C. E. Anyigbo Esq, for the 1st respondent
O. J. Nnadi SAN with L. E. Egwu Esq, for the 2nd and 3rd respondents.For Respondent