GEORGE IKPEKHIA v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS (2014)

GEORGE IKPEKHIA v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS

(2014)LCN/7562(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 27th day of November, 2014

CA/L/111D/2013

RATIO

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; CHARGE SHEET; CONTENT OF A CHARGE SHEET
The names of the accused persons, the date of the alleged offence, the place the alleged offence was committed, the particulars of the alleged offence and the statute and particular section of the statute allegedly violated are contained on the charge sheet. The charge in my view is in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. See ANKWA VS. STATE (1969) 1 ALL NLR 133; BAMAIYI VS. A.G. FED (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 551) 35; COP Vs AGI (1980) 1 NCR 234; ASUQUO VS. STATE (1967) 1 ALL NLR 123; MGBEMENE VS. IGP (1963) 2 SCNLR 261; ENAHORO VS. STATE (1965) NLR 265. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

APPEAL: ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION; ISSUE FORMULATED FOR DETERMINATION
It is trite law and enshrouded by a plethora of authorities that any issue formulated for determination must be derived from a ground of appeal.
An issue therefore becomes incompetent unless it is predicated on a ground of appeal, because the court lacks the powers to embark on the consideration of issues which are not connected with or arise from a ground of appeal. In other words, it is now settled that issues for determination cannot be formulated outside the grounds of appeal, an issue not so distilled from any of the grounds of appeal is incompetent and must be discountenanced together with the argument or arguments canvassed therefrom. See CO-OPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK PLC VS EKPERI (2007) 1 S.C. (PT. 11) 130 OR (2007) 3 NWLR (PT.1022) 493; ODEH vs FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1103) 1; CALABAR EAST CO-OPERATIVE THRIFT & CREDIT SOCIETY LIMITED vs. IKOT (1999) 14 NWLR (PT. 638) 225 or (1999) 12 S.C. (PT.11) 133 and AGALA vs OKUSIN (2010) 10 NWLR (PT.1202) 412; OKPALA vs IBENE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.102) 208 and ALLI VS ALESINLOYE (2000) 4 SCNJ 264. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

COURT; DUTY OF COURTS; THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO CONSIDER AND DECIDE ON ALL ISSUE PROPERLY RAISED
A court of law or tribunal has a duty to consider and decide on all issue properly raised and submitted to it for determination of their dispute because failure to so do will tantamount to a denial of fair hearing as guaranteed under Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. See STATE VS AJIE (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 679) 434; AGBO VS STATE (2006) 1 SC (PT.4) 73; CHIEF OKOTIE EBOH VS MANAGER (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 242. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

COURT: ABUSE OF COURT; THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT ABUSE OF COURT
The concept of abuse of court process has been variously defined, described and analysed in a plethora of cases.
In Blacks Law Dictionary 9th Edition at page 11, Abuse of process is defined as:-
“The Improper and tortuous use of legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope”.
Abuse of process has been held to lie in both proper and improper use of the judicial process in litigation such as when a party use the issue of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient administration of justice. This includes instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues. See SARAKI VS KOTOYE Supra and OKAFOR VS A.G. ANAMBRA STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 659.
The term abuse of process also applies to a proceeding which is wanting in bonafide and is frivolous, vexatious and oppressive. See SEVEN UP BOTTLING COMPANY LIMITED VS ABIOLA & SONS BOTTLING COMPANY LIMITED (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 453) 714; AMAEFUNA VS STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 775) 156, IKINE VS EDJERODE (2001) 12 SC (PT. 11) 94, C.B.N VS AHMED (2001) 5 SC (PT.11) 146; ODE VS BALOGUN (1999) 10 NWLR (PT. 622) 214.
The term “Abuse of Court Process” was also defined by the Supreme Court in DINGYADI VS INEC (2010) 44 NSC QR 301 at page 340 as follows:-
“The term “abuse of court Process” connotes simply the misuse of courts process and it includes acts which otherwise interfers with the course of justice. Clearly the acts includes where without reasonable ground, a party institute frivolous. Vexatious and oppressive actions and also by instituting multiplicity of actions or is on a frolic acts of forum shopping i.e. seeking for a favorable court to entertain a matter. It also includes depriving a court of jurisdiction.”
The concept of abuse of process was also held not to be precise but also denote a perversion of the system by the use of a lawful procedure for the attainment of unlawful results. See OGOEJOFO VS OGOEJOFO (2002) 12 NWIR (PT. 780) 171; ETTE VS EDOHO (2009) 1 NWLR (PT. 1144) 601. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

EVIDENCE: BURDEN OF PROOF; THE BURDEN ON THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED PERSON BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND WHEN IS THIS BURDEN DISCHARGED
However I know for sure, at least till this very moment that the law has not charged, neither has the constitution been amended to alter the provisions of Section 36(5) which guarantees that any person charged with the commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. This presumption of innocence correlates with the burden placed on the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reason doubt. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act 2004.
The burden on the prosecution is only discharged when the essential ingredients of the offence charged have been established and the accused person is unable to bring himself within the defences or exceptions allowed by the law generally on the statutes creating the offence. See OTEKI VS A.G. BENDEL STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (PT. 24) 648 and OKORO VS STATE (1988) 12 SC (PT.11) 88. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A CHARGE; THE INFORMATION THAT MUST BE CONTAINED IN A CHARGE
A charge is intended to inform an accused person in clear terms the offence for which he is tried. Consequently, a charge that is filed in the Federal High Court must contain and disclose the following: (a) heading; (b) reference number; (c) parties (d) counts and (e) date and Signature of the drafting authority. The charge before the Court contains these information. The names of the accused persons, the date of the alleged offence, the place the alleged offence was committed, the particulars of the alleged offence and the statute and particular section of the statute allegedly violated are contained on the charge sheet. The charge in my view is in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. See ANKWA VS. STATE (1969) 1 ALL 661) 35; COP Vs. AGI (1930) 1 NCR 234; ASUQUO VS. STATE (1967) 1 ALL NLR 123; MGBEMENE VS. IGP (1963) 2 SCNLR 261; ENAHORO VS. STATE (1955) NMLR 265. per. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: SUMMARY TRIAL; THE DEFINITION, NATURE, SCOPE AND PROCEDURE FOR SUMMARY TRIAL

JUSTICES

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

GEORGE IKPEKHIA Appellant(s)

AND

1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
2. PATHFINDER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
3. NIGERIA AVIATION HANDLING CO. PLC
4. AWONUBI ABAYOMI
5. OBINNA ONYEUKWU ONYENSO Respondent(s)

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein together with some other persons were arraigned before the Federal High Court, Lagos Division, and Presided over by IDRIS J. on the 1st day of March 2012 on a three count charge which read as follows:-
CHARGE NO. FHC/L/386C/2009
BETWEEN:
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA – Complainant
AND
1. Emirates Airlines – Accused Persons
2. Pathfinder International Ltd
3. Nigerian Aviation Handing Company Plc
4. Abayomi Adekanbi Abiola
5. Isiaka Adegoke Adedji
5. Awonnubi Abayomi
7. Jennifer Abayomi
8. Obinnna Onyeukwu Onyenso
9. Mohammed Yousouf
10. George Ikpekhia
11. Haffeez Azeem

COUNT 1
That you Emirates Airlines Pathfinder International Ltd, Nigerian Aviation Handling Company Plc, Abayomi Adekanbi Abiola ‘m’, lsiaka Adegoke Adedji ‘m’, Awonubi Abayomi ‘m’, Jennifer Eze ‘f’ Obinna Onyeukwu Onyenso ‘m’, Mohammed yousouf ‘m’, George Ikpekhia ‘m’ and Hafeez Azeem ‘m’ on or about the 19th December 2007 at Murtala Mohammed International Airport Ikeja, Lagos within the jurisdiction of this Honourable court conspired among yourselves to commit felony to wit: stealing four bags with tag numbers EK 429682, EK 428683 E650152 and EK 650101 tagged by you upon collection from one prince Chu Ikem Orji (one of which contains the sum of $1,630,000.00 (One Million six Hundred and Thirty US Dollars) and thereby committed an offence punishable under s.516 of the Criminal Code Cap C38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

COUNT 2
That you Emirates Airlines, Pathfinder International Ltd, Nigeria Aviation Handling Company Plc, Abayomi Adekanbi Abiola ‘m’, Isiaka Adegoke Adedji ‘m’, Awonubi Abayomi ‘m’, Jennifer Eze ‘f’ Obinna Onyeukwu Onyenso ‘m’, Mohammed Yousouf ‘m’, George Ikpekhia ‘m’ and Hafeez Azeem ‘m’ on or about the 19th December 2007 at Murtala Mohammed International Airport Ikeja Lagos within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court stole 4 bags with tag numbers EK 428582, EK 428689, EK 650162 AND EK 650151 (one of which contains the sum of 51,530,000.00 (One Million Six Hundred and Thirty US Dollars) property of one Prince Chu Ikem Orji which you tagged and collected from him and you thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 390(9) of the Criminal Code Cap C38 laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
COUNT 3
That you Emirate Airlines, Pathfinder International Ltd, Nigerian Aviation Handling Company Plc, Abayomi Adekanbi Abiola ‘m’, Isiaka Adegoke ‘m’, Awonubi Abayomi ‘m’, Jennifer Eze ‘f’ Obinna Onyeukwu Onyenso ‘m’, Mohammed Yousouf ‘m’, George Ikpekhia ‘m’, and Hafeez Azeem ‘m’ on or about the 19th December 2007 at Murtala Mohammed International Airport Ikeja Lagos within the jurisdiction of this Honourable court conspired to defraud one Prince Chu Ikem Orji of his bags, which you tagged as No EK428682, EK428683, EK 650152 and EK 650162 (one of which contains the sum of $1,530,000.00) and which you collected for onward delivery to him at Guangzhou China and you thereby committed an offences punishable under S.422 of the Criminal Code Cap C38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.”
Attached to the charge sheet are the list of witnesses for the prosecution and the proof of evidence. Upon receipt of the said charge sheet together with the proof of evidence, the Appellant herein, filed a motion on notice dated 21-6-2012 praying the lower court for the following reliefs:-
(1) An order quashing the charges herein for not disclosing a prima facie case against the 1st, 4th, 5th,9th and 11th Accused persons and for constituting on abuse of court process.
The grounds for the application are as follows:-
(a) The proof of evidence does not disclose the offence of conspiracy, stealing or fraud for which the accused persons are charged.
(b) The proof of evidence does not show the evidence of the amount of money allegedly stolen.
(c) The proof of evidence shows contrary evidence as to the ownership of the money allegedly stolen.
(d) The proof of evidence clearly shows that the court process in that the allegedly stolen funds are proceeds of an offence in law under the money Laundering Act and/or that the complainant is in violation of the provision of the money Laundering Act for which he should be prosecuted and for which two superior the money Laundering Act for which he should be prosecuted and for which two superior courts of records have ordered that he should be investigated but which order has been ignored by the prosecution.”
The said application was supported by an 11 paragraph affidavit to which was attached some documents including the charge sheet and proof of evidence as exhibit as well as a written address.
The prosecution opposed the application and also filed a written address. The Appellant also reacted by filing a reply on points of law.
The parties written addresses were adopted on the 10-12-12.
In a ruling delivered on the 21-1-2013, the lower court in dismissing the Appellant’s motion on the notice held inter alia as follows:-
“I am of the firm view that this Court is obliged to conduct summary trial of the Accused without proof of evidence as it is not a requirement for summary trial as provided under section 33(2) of the Federal High court Act. I am of the view therefore that attaching a proof of evidence to a charge sheet in criminal proceedings instituted before the Federal High Court is an anomaly which should not be allowed to detract from the aim and objective of the summary trial procedure.
Arising from the above, I am of the view that the issue whether or not the charge discloses a prima facie case is premature and completely irrelevant. There are no materials before the court to enable it conclude that the charge constitutes an abuse of the process of this Court.
A charge is intended to inform an accused person in clear terms the offence for which he is tried. Consequently, a charge that is filed in the Federal High Court must contain and disclose the following: (a) heading; (b) reference number; (c) parties (d) counts and (e) date and Signature of the drafting authority. The charge before the Court contains these information.
The names of the accused persons, the date of the alleged offence, the place the alleged offence was committed, the particulars of the alleged offence and the statute and particular section of the statute allegedly violated are contained on the charge sheet. The charge in my view is in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. See ANKWA VS. STATE (1969) 1 ALL NLR 133; BAMAIYI VS. A.G. FED (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 551) 35; COP Vs AGI (1980) 1 NCR 234; ASUQUO VS. STATE (1967) 1 ALL NLR 123; MGBEMENE VS. IGP (1963) 2 SCNLR 261; ENAHORO VS. STATE (1965) NLR 265.
In view of all that I have stated above, I am of the view that this application is premature and lacks merit. It is dismissed.”
The Appellant was not satisfied with the said Ruling and consequently filed a Notice of appeal dated 1-2-2013 and it contains two grounds of appeal which shorn of their particulars reads thus:-
GROUND 1
(1) The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when he failed to consider the grounds of objection which alleged that subject matter of the charge was the proceeds of a crime under the Money Laundering Act which ground of objection ipso facto essentially questions the jurisdiction of the court to try the case.
GROUND 2
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law where he failed to consider the issues raised in the Notice of preliminary objection brought by the Appellant and some co-accused persons on the grounds that the said issues were premature because the proceedings were in the form of a summary trial and the prosecution did not have to file the proof of evidence relied upon by the Accused persons for their preliminary objection.
Briefs of Argument were subsequently filed and served as per the Rules of this court. The Appellant’s Brief of Argument is dated 8-11-2013 and filed on 13-11-2013. The Appellant’s Reply Brief is dated 28-4-2014 and filed on 29-4-2014.
The 1st Respondent’s Briefs of Argument is dated 6-2-2014 and filed on 10-2-2014 but deemed properly filed and served on the 15-4-2014. The other Respondents did not filed any Brief of Argument.
At the hearing of the Appeal on 16-10-2014 the parties duly adopted and relied on their Briefs of Argument.
In the Appellant’s Brief, two issues were formulated for determination.
To wit:-
(a) Is the lower court vested with jurisdiction to try the Appellants on the counts of a charge which primo facie disclose acts of criminality and illegality on the part of the complainant are which in essence constitute an abuse of the court processes (Ground one).
(b) Was the lower court in order when it failed to consider and rule on the objection of the Appellant on the grounds that the objections on complaint of the Appellant were premature because they were based on a proof of evidence supplied by the prosecution when the prosecution was not expected under the law to have filed or supplied the proof of evidence in the first place? (Ground two.)
Two issues were also formulated for determination in the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument. To wit:-
(1) Whether this appeal as constituted is competent. (Ground 1)
(2) Whether the objection giving rise to this appeal is premature. (Ground 2).
Except for the Respondent’s issues No 1, the issues raised for the determination by the parties are virtually similar. I will therefore address them accordingly, with particularly reference to the two issues in the Appellant’s Brief.

ISSUE NO 1
Herein the Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted inter alia that the facts of the case as shown on the exhibits annexed to the Appellant’s application before the lower court clearly indicates that the charges were brought in bad faith against the Appellant and that the court has no jurisdiction to preside over the charge as constituted.
He added that the Learned Trial Judge omitted to consider Appellant’s prayer in the motion on notice that the charge as constituted amounts to an abuse of process but formulated his own issue and dwelt extensively on it.
Learned Counsel also referred to page 134-136 of the Record to show that the complainant, PRINCE ORJI was actually charge to court under the money Laundering Act 2004 with respect to the same money for which the Appellant is being charged. Further he asserted that the Federal High court Lagos Division, CORAM SHAKARHO J. had once ordered that PRINCE ORJI should be referred to the EFCC for investigation on the movement of such huge sum of money without being declared, contrary to the Money Laundering Act 2004. The same order was also made by ALUTA J. of the same court. The said PRINCE ORJI was charged to court accordingly but that the charge was strangely withdrawn on the 15-1-2009. He added that sometime in November 2009, the Federal Director of Public Prosecution forwarded a legal opinion to the office of the Inspector General of police on the matter, wherein the Appellant and others were exonerated of any offence while the said PRINCE ORJI was recommended for prosecution under the Money Laundering Act 2004.
It was submitted that in the face of the documents relating thereto, especially the report of the DPP, the proceeds of the charge against the Appellant, i.e. (1.6 million Dollars) are prima facie, proceeds of a crime or an illegality. He added that it was therefore wrong for the lower court to close its eyes to these facts even in the face of compelling documents before the court because it is the law that once an Act of illegality is brought to the attention of the court, it should not close its eyes to it. He referred to the following authorities:- AGIP NIGERIA LTD vs AGIP PETROL INTERNATIONAL & ORS. (2010) 5 NWLR 9PT187) 248, AT 412; CO-OPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK (NIG.) LTD VS ONWUCHEKWA (1998) 8 NWIR (PT 62) 375 AT 393; FMBN Vs DESIRE GALAXY LTD (2005) 1 WRN 177 AT 193; FAWEHIMI vs A G LAGOS STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT 112) 707 AND OHOWOVORIOLE SAN VS FRN (2003) 1 SC (PT.1) AT 9. SEVEN UP BOTTLING CO. LTD VS ABIOLA & SON. BOTTLING CO. LTD (1996) NWLR (PT 463) 714; ARUBO Vs AILERU (1993) 3 NWLR (PT 280) 131; SARAKI vs KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (PT 264) 926 AND OKAFOR VS AG ANAMBRA STATE. (1999) 6 NWLR (PT.210) 659.
On the issue No 2, it was submitted that the Learned Trial Judge was wrong to have held that he could not look at the complaints of the Appellant because they were based on the proof of evidence which the law did not require the prosecution to provide in a summary trial in the Federal High Court.
He contended that a court of law must of necessity hear all applications properly brought before it and give a decision on all issues before it.
And failure to do so amounts to a breach of fair hearing. Vide AERO CONTINENTAL (NIG) LTD VS CO-OPERATIVE ASSN OF PROF. INC. (2003) 5 NWLR (PT 813) 303; OKONJO VS NJOKANMA (1991) NWLR (PT 202) 131 AT 146; UKA VS UROLO (1996) 4 NWLR (PT 441) 218 AND 146; ATANDA VS AJANI (1989) 3 NWLR (PT 111) 511.
It was further argued that the Learned Trial Judge ought not to have ignored the said issues given the fact they touch on the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on the matter. Vide DINGYADI VS INEC (2011) 40 WRN 1 AT 41.
He added that since the Appellant raised the issue of abuse of process on their motion paper before the lower court, ipso facto, the jurisdiction of the court has been called into question, more so that the issues of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceeds and a court of summary jurisdiction should not shut its eyes to such issue of jurisdiction because technical rules cannot defeat a claim challenging it.
A number of authorities were also referred to in support of the contention.
Learned Counsel also submitted that if the Attorney General of the Federation being fully aware of the procedure for instituting summary trial at the Federal High Court, opts to file charges with a comprehensive proof of evidence, he will be deemed to have opted to vary or modify the procedure and thus waive his right to jettison it. He added that the prosecution having decided to file the proof of evidence, the lower court could not pretend not to have seen the grave issues of illegality and crime contained in them. Vide ANDY UBA VS ETIABA & ORS (Supra).
Learned Counsel further referred to Section 35(5) (a) & (b) of the 1999 constitution to contend that the provision of the proof of evidence was in conformity with and is covered by the constitutional requirement to provide an accuse person, the detailed of the nature of the offence and be given adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence in which case it would have been correct for the trial court to consider the proof of evidence in determining the application of the Appellant that no prima facie case has been established against him. This court was then urged to allow the appeal.
For the Respondent, it was submitted firstly, in their issue No 1 that the law is that Grounds of Appeal must attack the Ratio Decidendi of the judgment appealed against. See AG ANAMBRA STATE vs OKEKE (2002) 10 MJSC (?). He added that the Ratio Decidendi of the decision of the lower court is that the Federal High Court is a court of summary jurisdiction and that the charge sheet before the court established enough material that the Appellant is required to answer to.
It was therefore submitted that this appeal is incompetent since the grounds of appeal are not founded on the Ratio Decidendi and should accordingly be struck out. The following cases were cited in support:-
MERE VS OBI (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 426) 1956 AT 1967; IGBINOVIA Vs UBTH (2000) 8 NWLR (PT 667) 53; AKIBU vs ODUNTAN (2000) 13 NWLR (PT 685) 446; NATIONAL ASSEMBLY vs PRESIDENT (2003) 9 NWLR (PT 824) 104 AND BASSEY ADAM III VS OKOHO (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 415) 1732 AT 1746.
Responding to the Appellant’s issue No 1 Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent contended that for the Appellant to assert that the charge before the Federal High Court is an abuse of process is a misconception and that the principle of abuse of process has received judicial pronouncement variously, including, ROZEN INVESTMENT LTD VS NDIC (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 348) 823 AT 848; SARAKI vs KOTOYE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 200) 559; OLUTIRIN VS AGAKA (1998) 6 NWLR (PT 554) 366; UBA V MODE (2000) ALL FWLR (PT 209) 1126.
It was further submitted that, for an action to constitute an abuse of court process there would have been a previous or pending action between the parties or their privies the action would have been of same substance or based on the same facts or subject matter. The subsequent action would have been instituted to annoy, harass, irritate and/or intimidate the other party and all these requirements are lacking in the charge before the lower court. He added that what the Appellant termed abuse of process is predicted on the fact that a victim of crime was listed as a witness in a charge of stealing, because the complainant in the charge is Federal Republic of Nigeria and not PRINCE ORJI as alluded to by the Appellant.
He then submitted that the authorities cited by the Appellant do not apply to the instant case. More so, he argues that there is nothing before the lower court to show that the victim PRINCE ORJI committed an offence as a alleged by the Appellant and the money Laundering Act referred to by the Appellant only has a grip on a person, who when indicted, fails to prove the source of his money and not necessarily the quantum of money in his possession.
Added to that is the fact that no court of law has declared the alleged stolen sum of money as a proceed of crime and the victim PRINCE ORJI has not been convicted for the crime of money Laundering.
Therefore it does not lie with the Appellant’s Counsel to hold PRINCE ORJI out as a convict or the missing money to be the proceeds of crime which even if it were so, a charge of stealing could still stand, if the alleged sum is stolen by another person.
On issue No 2, Learned counsel submitted that the Learned Trial Judge duly considered, the Appellant’s motion on notice together with the proof of evidence before coming to the conclusion that the objection to the charge against the Appellant was premature.
He also referred to Section 33(1) &(2) of the Federal High Court act to submit that in summary trial at the Federal High Court as in Magistrate Court, the proof of evidence is not required, neither is the prosecution required to produce all the exhibits needed to prove the case at the stage of arraignment.
It was further submitted that where there is a challenge to the competence or jurisdiction of a court to try a case, it is the charge sheet before the court that it will examine and not the probable defence that the accused wants to raise and having reviewed the relevant laws and judicial precedents, the Learned Trial Judge duly made a finding that the proof of evidence is not a requirement to be met before the commencement of criminal trial before the Federal High Court. This court was then urged to dismiss the appeal.
In the Appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument it was first contended that issues No.1 in the 1st Respondent’s Brief did not derive from the ground 1 of the Notice of appeal as claimed and as such should be discountenanced and struck out because it was not formulated from any of the grounds of appeal neither did the 1st Respondent cross-appeal or file a Respondent’s Notice. Vide MOMODU VS MOMOH (199) NSCC (PT 1) 212.
On the issue that the appeal is not based on the Ratio Decidendi of the lower court, it was submitted that the Grounds of appeal are against the entire Ratio Decidendi in that they challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain the matter at all and the Appellant also complained in Grounds 2 that the lower court failed to make findings on the issues raised in the application brought before it.
On the issue of abuse of process, it was submitted that the 1st Respondent’s Counsel trivialized the definition of the concept of “abuse of process” as it relates to the case.
He referred to SARAKI vs KOTOYE (Supra) and CBN vs AHMED (2001) 11 NWLR (PT 274) 369 AT 409 in support of his contention that there was an abuse of process in bringing the charge against the Appellant having been brought mala fides.
I will first deal with the issues 1 as raised in the 1st Respondent’s brief that is “whether this appeal as constituted is competent.” The argument herein by the 1st Respondent is that the Grounds of appeal are not derived from the Ratio Decidendi in the judgment of the lower court and this renders the said Grounds of appeal incompetent. The Appellant however in the Reply Brief contended that the said issue 1 as formulated by the 1st Respondent does not relate to any of the two grounds of appeal as contained in the Notice of appeal in which case the said issue 1 should be discountenanced and struck out. It was also observed that the proper way the 1st Respondent would have challenged the competence of the Notice of appeal is by preliminary objection and not by way of an issue for determination.
It is trite law and enshrouded by a plethora of authorities that any issue formulated for determination must be derived from a ground of appeal.
An issue therefore becomes incompetent unless it is predicated on a ground of appeal, because the court lacks the powers to embark on the consideration of issues which are not connected with or arise from a ground of appeal. In other words, it is now settled that issues for determination cannot be formulated outside the grounds of appeal, an issue not so distilled from any of the grounds of appeal is incompetent and must be discountenanced together with the argument or arguments canvassed therefrom. See CO-OPERATIVE & COMMERCE BANK PLC VS EKPERI (2007) 1 S.C. (PT. 11) 130 OR (2007) 3 NWLR (PT.1022) 493; ODEH vs FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1103) 1; CALABAR EAST CO-OPERATIVE THRIFT & CREDIT SOCIETY LIMITED vs. IKOT (1999) 14 NWLR (PT. 638) 225 or (1999) 12 S.C. (PT.11) 133 and AGALA vs OKUSIN (2010) 10 NWLR (PT.1202) 412; OKPALA vs IBENE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.102) 208 and ALLI VS ALESINLOYE (2000) 4 SCNJ 264.
In the instant case, I have carefully compared the issue I as formulated in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument with the two grounds of appeal as contained in page 313 to 314 of the Record of Appeal and I clearly cannot connect them to the said issue 1.
A party or a respondent who desires to formulate an issue for determination outside the grounds of appeal filed by an appeal has the option to, either cross appeal or file a respondent’s notice.
But going by the nature of the 1st Respondent’s issue 1, which seeks to challenge the competence of the appeal because the two grounds of appeal are alleged not to have been derived from the judgment of the lower court, the proper procedure to have been followed is by way of a Notice of Preliminary Objection even if it is embedded in the brief of argument.
I therefore agree with the appellant that there is a fundamental flaw in the 1st respondent’s issue 1. It is incompetent and it is accordingly struck out.
I must however add by the way that the two grounds of appeal sought to be attached by the 1st respondent cannot be said not to flow from the ratio decidendi in the judgment of the lower court. The two grounds are for purposes of clarity, herein be law set out.
“(1) The learned trial judge erred in law when he failed to consider the ground of objection which alleged that the subject-matter of the charge was the proceeds of a crime under the money Laundering Act which ground of objection ipso facto essentially questions the jurisdiction of the court to try the case.
(2)The learned trial judge erred in law when he failed to consider the issues raised in the Notice of Preliminary Objection brought by the Appellant and some, co-accused persons on the grounds that the said issues were premature because the proceedings were in form a summary trial and the prosecution did not have file the proof of evidence relied upon by the Accused persons for their preliminary objection.”
The summary of the appellant’s complaint in the two grounds of appeal is that the lower court failed to consider and decide on the issues brought before it by way of the motion on notice filed on 21-6-2012. A clearer picture of the complaint is presented in the particulars of error.
In the circumstance, it will be out of place, to contend as the 1st Respondent did, that the grounds of appeal are not related to the relevant decision of the lower court. This is based on the premise that a ground of appeal is the totality of the reasons why the decision complained of is considered wrong by the aggrieved party. See EHINLANWO VS OKE (2008) 6-7 SC (PT. 11) 123. The appellant herein was aggrieved with the Ruling of the lower court delivered on 21-1-2013 on the ground that it was not based on the reliefs sought in the motion on notice and canvassed in the parties written addresses. In this regard, the attack is against the whole decision of the lower court which was found not to have effectively addressed the issues brought before it by the appellant.
A court of law or tribunal has a duty to consider and decide on all issue properly raised and submitted to it for determination of their dispute because failure to so do will tantamount to a denial of fair hearing as guaranteed under Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. See STATE VS AJIE (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 679) 434; AGBO VS STATE (2006) 1 SC (PT.4) 73; CHIEF OKOTIE EBOH VS MANAGER (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 242.
It therefore suffices as a ground of appeal as in the instant case, it is therefore left with the appellate court to consider and decide on the genuineness of the complaint.
On issue I as raised in the appellant’s brief of argument the contention is that the charge against the appellant in the lower court constitutes an abuse of court process given the fact that the proof of evidence annexed therewith prima facie discloses acts of criminality and illegality on the part of the complaint.
The concept of abuse of court process has been variously defined, described and analysed in a plethora of cases.
In Blacks Law Dictionary 9th Edition at page 11, Abuse of process is defined as:-
“The Improper and tortuous use of legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope”.
Abuse of process has been held to lie in both proper and improper use of the judicial process in litigation such as when a party use the issue of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient administration of justice. This includes instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues. See SARAKI VS KOTOYE Supra and OKAFOR VS A.G. ANAMBRA STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 659.
The term abuse of process also applies to a proceeding which is wanting in bonafide and is frivolous, vexatious and oppressive. See SEVEN UP BOTTLING COMPANY LIMITED VS ABIOLA & SONS BOTTLING COMPANY LIMITED (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 453) 714; AMAEFUNA VS STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 775) 156, IKINE VS EDJERODE (2001) 12 SC (PT. 11) 94, C.B.N VS AHMED (2001) 5 SC (PT.11) 146; ODE VS BALOGUN (1999) 10 NWLR (PT. 622) 214.
The term “Abuse of Court Process” was also defined by the Supreme Court in DINGYADI VS INEC (2010) 44 NSC QR 301 at page 340 as follows:-
“The term “abuse of court Process” connotes simply the misuse of courts process and it includes acts which otherwise interfers with the course of justice. Clearly the acts includes where without reasonable ground, a party institute frivolous. Vexatious and oppressive actions and also by instituting multiplicity of actions or is on a frolic acts of forum shopping i.e. seeking for a favorable court to entertain a matter. It also includes depriving a court of jurisdiction.”
The concept of abuse of process was also held not to be precise but also denote a perversion of the system by the use of a lawful procedure for the attainment of unlawful results. See OGOEJOFO VS OGOEJOFO (2002) 12 NWIR (PT. 780) 171; ETTE VS EDOHO (2009) 1 NWLR (PT. 1144) 601.
In the instant case, the charge for which the appellant was arranged in the lower court was earlier reproduced in this judgment and it relates to the theft of four bags belonging to Prince Orji and one of the bags contain the sum of $1,630,000 (One Million, Six Hundred and Thirty Thousand us Dollars).
The stance of the appellant is that going by the facts of the case leading to the loss of the bags there is no proof that the said Prince Orji declared the said sum of $1,630,000 at the Airport during the process of his security check in as required by law and this contravenes the money laundering act 2004, and thus constitutes act of criminality and illegality which renders the charge of stealing the said sum of $1,630,000 brought against the appellant an abuse of court process. I have carefully perused the record of appeal, and I failed to see therein any evidence or document showing that Prince Orji the owner of the missing money was tried and convicted for money laundering. It is also not disputed anywhere that the said sum of money is missing and it belongs Prince Orji. Learned counsel for the appellant had also relied heavily on the legal opinion of the Federal DPP, to support his argument that Prince Orji having been recommended for prosecution under the Money Laundering Act, no charge based on the missing sum should be brought against the appellant because it is the proceed of a crime.
However I know for sure, at least till this very moment that the law has not charged, neither has the constitution been amended to alter the provisions of Section 36(5) which guarantees that any person charged with the commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. This presumption of innocence correlates with the burden placed on the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reason doubt. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act 2004.
The burden on the prosecution is only discharged when the essential ingredients of the offence charged have been established and the accused person is unable to bring himself within the defences or exceptions allowed by the law generally on the statutes creating the offence. See OTEKI VS A.G. BENDEL STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (PT. 24) 648 and OKORO VS STATE (1988) 12 SC (PT.11) 88.
In the instant case there is nowhere shown in the record of appeal that the said Prince Orji the owner of the allegedly stolen money has been tried, convicted and sentenced for any offence relating to the money or even the much taunted money Laundering (Prohibition) Act which has become a sing-song for the appellants counsel who by his arguments and assertions has tried, convicted and sentenced the said Prince Orji and in fact got him to forfeit the said sum of $1,630,000 hence his strong stance that the charge against the appellant cannot stand ab initio because it is based on the proceeds of criminality and illegality.
Unfortunately also it is nowhere shown on the records that the owner of the stolen money is presently facing trial in any court for the offence of money laundering or even any other offences associated with the ownership of the said sum of $1,630,000. The appellant’s counsel has also relied heavily on the legal Advice of the Federal DPP which is at page 141-154 of the Record. It was addressed to the office of the Inspector General of Police. It definitely cannot have more force than what it is, a “legal Advice” which the addressee is not bound to adopt or follow to the letter. The learned counsel for the Appellant perhaps forgot to also refer to the Police Investigation report at page 251 to 259 of the record. It is dated 5-5-2009 and signed by a Deputy Commissioner of Police on behalf of the Commissioner of Police in charge of special Fraud Unit. The said Police Investigation Report addressed to the Deputy Inspector General of Police ‘D’ Department Force Headquarters made Recommendations for the prosecution of a number of persons including the Appellant. The Federal DPP substantially agreed with it in addition to recommending that Prince Orji is also liable to be prosecuted for Non-Declaration of the sum of $1.630 Million US Dollars while attempting to Board an Emirate Airline on the 19/12/2007. Meanwhile, as earlier stated, the said Prince Orji is at present not facing any trial for any offence relating to the said sum of money. The issue of Criminality or illegality being associated with the charge against the appellant does not therefore arise. Reference was also made to the order made by Shekarho J. and Auta J (as he then was) when the appellant and others were arraigned in court on the charge of stealing the said money. Their lordships directed the EFCC to further investigate Prince Orji and look into the circumstances under which he received “such huge sum of money at the “Airport in Dubai”.
Whether the said Prince Orji received any such money at the “Airport in Dubai” is another issue entirely because going by the facts available on record, the whole transaction surrounding the loss of the sum of $1,630,000 took place at the Muritala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos.
Be that as it may there is nothing on record to show that the E.F.C.C. carried out the said investigation or that Prince Oji was found to have laundered the aforementioned sum of money.
I need therefore to emphasize once again that until a person is tried and proved guilty of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, it will amount to injustice and malafide to smear him with the stinking mud of criminality or illegality. I must add here that I agree with the submission of learned counsel for the Respondent that even if the said Prince Orji is convicted of any offence under the Money Laundering Act or any other law, it does not lie with anybody to divert or convert the sum of money involved to his own personal use because it will definitely fall under the scope of the offence of stealing. There is certainly no immunity from prosecution for the offence of stealing the proceeds of a crime all in the guise or anticipated defence that it is a product of criminality or illegality. The issue of abuse of process does not therefore arise in the instant case and I so hold. In this regard, I resolve this issue against the appellant.
On the appellant’s issue 2. This is similar in con with the 1st Respondent’s issue 2 and I will accordingly consider them together.
The appellant’s contention here is that the learned trial judge was wrong to have held that he could not consider the prayer as sought in the motion on notice filed on 21-12-2009 because it was based on the proof of evidence which the law did not require the prosecution to provide in a summary trial in the Federal High Court. On the other hand, it was the stance of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that the learned trial judge duly considered the prayers in the appellant’s motion on notice together with the proof of evidence before coming to the conclusion that the objection to the charge against the Appellant was premature.
In the said Ruling delivered on 21-12-2009, the learned trial judge after an exhaustive review of the submissions of both parties as well as authorities cited in support held inter alia as follows at page 305 to 305 of the Record.
“I am of the firm view that this Court is obliged to conduct summary trial of the Accused without proof of evidence as it is not a requirement for summary trial as provided under Section 33 (2) of the Federal High Court Act. I am of the view therefore that attaching a proof of evidence to a charge sheet in criminal proceedings instituted before the Federal High Court is an anomaly which should not be allowed to detract from the aim and objective of the summary trial procedure.
Arising from the above, I am of the view that the issue whether or not the charge discloses a prima facie case is premature and completely irrelevant. There are no materials before the Court to enable it conclude that the charge constitutes an abuse of the process of this Court.
A charge is intended to inform an accused person in clear terms the offence for which he is tried. Consequently, a charge that is filed in the Federal High Court must contain and disclose the following: (a) heading; (b) reference number; (c) parties (d) counts and (e) date and Signature of the drafting authority. The charge before the Court contains these information. The names of the accused persons, the date of the alleged offence, the place the alleged offence was committed, the particulars of the alleged offence and the statute and particular section of the statute allegedly violated are contained on the charge sheet. The charge in my view is in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. See ANKWA VS. STATE (1969) 1 ALL 661) 35; COP Vs. AGI (1930) 1 NCR 234; ASUQUO VS. STATE (1967) 1 ALL NLR 123; MGBEMENE VS. IGP (1963) 2 SCNLR 261; ENAHORO VS. STATE (1955) NMLR 265.
In view of all that I have stated above, I am of the view that this application is premature and lacks merit. It is dismissed.”
From the above set out portion of the Ruling, particularly the underlined paragraph, it is not in doubt that the learned trial judge duly addressed the issues in contention, as to whether the charge disclosed a prima facie case and whether it constitute an abuse of process. This was done after a review of the relevant statutes, with particular reference to Section 33(2) of the Federal High Court Act which provides that criminal charges in the Federal High Court shall be tried summarily.
He therefore held the view that given the position of the law on summary trials, the process of attaching a proof of evidence to a charge sheet in a criminal proceedings before the court as in the instant case was an anomaly which should not be allowed to detract from the aim and objective of the summary trial procedure.
A proof of evidence was annexed to the charge sheet in the lower court and that is what the appellant had hinged the contention that the charge discloses no Prime Facie case against the appellant and that the said charge is also an abuse of court process. I had earlier on in this judgment dealt with the issue of abuse of court and came to the conclusion that there was no such abuse in the instant case and I am also of the view that the issue was addressed by the lower court as earlier highlighted. On whether it was premature at that stage of the trial to decide whether or not a prime facie case was made out against the appellant.
It is not in doubt that criminal trials are by law conducted summarily in the Federal High Court. In this regard Section 33(1) and (2) of the Federal High Court Act provides that:-
“33(1). Subject to the provisions of this section, criminal proceedings before the court shall be conducted substantially in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal procedure Act, and the provisions of that Act shall, with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Act, have effect in respect of all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the court.
(2). Notwithstanding the generality of subsection (1) of this section, all criminal causes or matters before the court shall be tried summarily”.

Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act defined summary trial as follows:-
“Summary trial” means any trial by a magistrate and a trial by a Judge in which the accused has not been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry”.
The nature, extent scope and procedure for summary trial was exhaustively analysed by this court in the case of ALAMIEYESEIGHA VS FRN (2006) 16 NWLR (PT. 1004) at 93 – 95 per Ogunbiyi JSC (as she then was). As follows:-
“The concept or nature of summary trial proceeding has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (sixth edition) at page 1204 as:
“any proceeding by which a controversy is settled, case disposed of or trial conducted in a prompt and simple manner, without the aid of a jury without presentment or indictment, or in other respects out of the regular course of the common law. In procedure, proceedings are said to be summary when they are short and simple in comparison with regular proceedings.”
The 8th Edition of the Blacks Law Dictionary at page 1242 in the same spirit defines summary proceeding as:-
“A non-jury proceedings that settles a controversy or dispose of a case in a relatively and simple manner.”
Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act also defines summary trial as follows:-
“Summary trial means any trial by a Magistrate and trial by a Judge in which the accused has not been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.”
From all indications, it is obvious that the definition by Section 2 of the CPA excludes the initiation of criminal proceedings in the High Court under section 77 (b) (ii) and (iii) which have been reproduced supra. The relevant and apt question to pose is:-
The provision of Section 277 of the CPA would appear to provide the answer and its reproduction is as follows:-
“The provisions of this part of this Act shall apply to offences triable summary that is to say;
(a) To all trials in the High Court other than on information; and
(b) To all trials in the High Court in respect of offence for which it is provided that a trial can be had in the High Court otherwise than on information and for which no special procedure is provided and;
(c) To all trials in any Magistrate’s court to the extent of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate adjudicating; and
(d) For all offences declared by any written law to be triable summarily or on summary conviction or in a summary manner or by a Magistrate”
Consequent to Section 277 especially subsection (a) of the CPA read along with Section 77 (b) (ii) and (iii) of same, trial by information is generally excluded from summary trial proceedings. In the light of the foregoing deductions and with due consideration to Section 33(2) of the Federal High Court Act, wherein all criminal causes or matters before the court shall be tried summary, it follows and as rightly submitted by the learned Respondents counsel that criminal proceedings cannot by initiated or instituted at the Federal High Court by way an information under Section 77 (b) (i, ii & iii) therefore. As a consequential effect, criminal proceedings, can only be commenced at the Federal High Court in the same manner or initiating criminal proceedings in the Magistrate Court under the summary trial proceedings. The conclusion arrived at would in my opinion hold reasonable especially with due regard to the definition of summary trial by Section 2 of the CPA supra.”
See also FRN VS IBORI (2014) 13 NWLR (PT. 1423) 168 at 201 – 202) where this court per Saulawa JCA held that:-
“Under Section 2 of the Criminal procedure Act, the term Summary trial denotes –
“Any trial by a Magistrate and trial by a Judge in which the accused has not been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.”
As alluded to above, by virtue of the combined provisions of Section 25(1) of the 1999 Constitution, Section 33(2) of the Federal High Court Act and Section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Supra), the Federal High Court in undoubtedly conferred with an unfettered jurisdictional competence to conduct all criminal trials summarily. As authoritatively reiterate, and too long ago by the Supreme Court:
“Section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for summary trials. Summary trials are short and fast. Cases tried summarily, are disposed in a prompt and simple manner.
Attached to a charge to be tried summarily are scanty summary of the evidence the prosecution would rely on. Put in another way it is not all the evidence relied on by the prosecution that is made available to the accused person before trial. On the other hand, trials can also be on information. Section 334 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for trial on information.
See Ralph Uwazuruike Ors Vs. A.G. Federation (2013) LPELR – 20392(SC) at 17 paragraphs C-F (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1361) 105 AT P. 125 Per Rhodes-Vivour JSC”.
From the above set out decisions which I duly endorse, it is glaring that the annexure of proof of evidence, to a charge sheet is not part of a summary trial as it pertains to the Federal High Court going by the clear provisions of Section 33 of the Federal High Court Act. Such proof of evidence is only relevant, if not imperative where criminal proceedings are initiated or instituted by way of information as obtainable in the High Court of most states of the federation. It follows therefore that criminal proceedings can only be commenced at the Federal High Court in the same manner as applicable to magistrates courts under the summary trial procedure by virtue of the combined provisions of Section 277(a) and Section 77 (b) (iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
The learned trial judge duly considered the issue vis a vis the relevant laws before coming to the conclusion that attaching proof of evidence to charge sheet in criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court is an anomaly.
The appellant’s counsel however felt otherwise and argued strenuously that having been attached to the charge brought against the appellant in the lower court, it ought to be used and applied by the learned trial judge in the consideration of the merit of the motion on notice and was therefore wrong in holding that it was premature and irrelevant to consider at that stage whether a prima facie case was disclosed.
To my mind however, the procedure for summary trial is well established by law and it is not in dispute that attachment of a proof of evidence to a charge sheet is not part of summary trial proceedings.
See UWAZURIKE vs A.G FEDERATION (2013) 10 NWLR (PT.1361) 105 and FRN VS IBORI (Supra).
An isolated case of such occurrence should not therefore be capitalized upon to insist that having been so done in the instant case, it must be considered and relied on by the lower court in reaching it’s decision.
Where a statute has prescribed the mode of performing a duty or taking a particular action, it will be an anomaly to condone or adopt any other method to the contrary whether done deliberately or by inadvertence. It will be improper to insist that such anomalous situation should be acted upon by a court in reaching it’s decision.
In a summary trial proceedings, an accused person has the option either to challenge the competence of the charge sheet which of necessity the court is obliged to look into in determining whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the case; or wait for the prosecution to present it’s case before raising the issue whether or not a prima facie was established by the available evidence.
I am therefore in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that the learned trial judge was right in his finding that proof of evidence is not a requirement in a summary trial before the lower court in which case it cannot be resorted to in deciding whether there is a prima facie case against the appellant.
I am therefore inclined to resolve this issue against the appellant.
In the final result, I hold that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
The Ruling of the Federal High Court, Lagos Division delivered by M. B. IDRIS J. on the 21st day of January 2013 is hereby affirmed.
Given the fact that the charge against the appellant was filed since 2009, it is hereby ordered that the said charge be given accelerated trial.

AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A.: I have read the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Oseji, JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. He dealt comprehensively with all the issues canvassed in the appeal, and there is really nothing I can add that would make any difference, but I will say a few words about summary trials.
There is a definite difference between summary trial and trial by information –
See Alamieseigha V. FRN (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1004)1, where this Court held –
“…A summary trial is and remains so in both its manner of initiation, institution and conduct and is distinct from the full trial (on information), which also has its peculiar characteristics and different pre-requisites in both its manner of initiation, institution and conduct. It will therefore be wrong and contrary to the letter and spirit of the law (i.e. the CPA) to differentiate between the manner of initiating a summary trial and the way it is conducted. Similarly, we cannot differentiate on how a full trial on information can be commenced or initiated from how it will be conducted. Thus, a summary trial is or remains as such from its inception to its conduct and conclusion in the same way as a full trial on information also remains with its full characteristics from its inception, conduct and conclusion as recommended by the law and it would be a double standard to mix them up or to expect such a full trial to (on information) be commenced or be initiated summarily and be conducted fully (or as a full trial). In the same manner, a summary trial cannot be expected to commence fully and be conducted summarily.”
Stated simply, a summary trial is a SUMMARY TRIAL, and a trial on information is a TRIAL ON INFORMATION; each method has its peculiar characteristics from inception, conduct and conclusion. A trial by information is a different set-up because “proof of evidence” must be prepared before the ball starts rolling, while “proofs of evidence” are not required to kick-start a summary trial.
At the end of the day, I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead Judgment.

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I have read the lead judgment just delivered today by my brother JUDGE – CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI JCA and I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusions therein. He has covered the field and I have nothing extra to add.

Appearances

Adekunle Ogesanya SAN with O. Giwa-Osagie, Ike Nwachukwu and T. KotunFor Appellant

AND

E. K. Ugwu Asset. Director (FMJ) for 1st Respondent.For Respondent