BAUCHI STATE GOVERNMENT (FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF THE 20 LOCAL GOVT. AREAS OF THE STATE) v. NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION (NPC) & ANOR (2014)

BAUCHI STATE GOVERNMENT (FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF THE 20 LOCAL GOVT. AREAS OF THE STATE) v. NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION (NPC) & ANOR

(2014)LCN/7421(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 17th day of July, 2014

CA/A/33/2011

RATIO

APPEAL: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN AN APPEAL; WHETHER A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION NOT MOVED IS TAKEN TO HAVE BEEN ABANDONED

APPEAL: ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION; WHETHER ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION MUST BE LIMITED TO AND FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL FILE SINCE THEY MUST ARISE FROM THEM, WHAT AMOUNTS TO PROLIFERATION OF ISSUES AND WHETHER PROLIFERATION OF ISSUES IS NOT A BAR TO THE HEARING OF AN APPEAL ON THE MERIT
It is now well settled that issues for determination must be limited to and fall within the scope of the grounds of appeal filed since they must arise from them. Proliferation of issues is therefore not permissible. It follows therefore that while the number of issues formulated may tally with the number of the grounds of appeal filed or less, it is not permissible that they may be more than the grounds filed. Where there are more issues than the number of grounds of appeal filed, such a situation is regarded as undue proliferation of issues and quite unacceptable. See Oduntan vs. General Oil Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.387) 1; Adelaja vs. Fanoiki (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.131) 137; Chinweze vs. Masi (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.97) 254; and Adehi vs. Atega (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt.398) 388. In the instant case, the appellant filed only two grounds of appeal but three issues were formulated in the appellant’s brief. There is therefore a clear breach of the rule against proliferation of issues.
However, proliferation of issues is not a bar to the hearing of an appeal on the merit as an appellate court is free to either adopt the issues so formulated by learned counsel or formulate such issues that are consistent with the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. See Labiyi v. Anretiola (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.258) 139. per. ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDULKADIR, J.C.A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: HOW TO INTERPRET THE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE

STATUTE OF LIMITATION: TIME LIMITATION OF ACTIONS; WHEN DOES TIME STARTS TO RUN IN LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Time starts to run in limitation of actions when all the facts which constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action have happened. See NPA. vs. Abu Airadion Ajobi (2006) 7 SCNJ 168: (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt.998) 477 per. ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDULKADIR, J.C.A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION: THE DOCTRINE OF STATUTE BAR; WHETHER PERSON WITH REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD PURSUE THEM WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE
The jurisprudence of the doctrine of statute bar as encapsulated in the various limitation laws is that no matter how creditable or good a claim is, when it is not brought timeously, it abates and no relief can validly be sought to enforce a stale claim.
As this court held in Nwadiaro vs. Shell Petroleum (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 322, persons with reasonable cause of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. See Also Oba Aremo II vs. S.F. Adekanye (2004) 7 SCNJ 218; (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.891) 572. per. ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDULKADIR, J.C.A.

COURT: RULE OF COURT: WHETHER A RULE OF COURT CANNOT SUPERSEDE A STATUTORY ENACTMENT
It is trite and cannot be overemphasized that a Rule of Court cannot supersede a statutory enactment. See the case of Nasir vs. C.S.C. Kano State (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt.1100) 253. per. ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDULKADIR, J.C.A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATION: LIMITATION OF ACTION LAW; THE PURPOSE OF A LIMITATION PROVISION OR LAW

JUSTICES

ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDULKADIR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TANI YUSUF HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

BAUCHI STATE COVERNMENT
(FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF THE
20 LOCAL GOVT. AREAS OF THE STATE) Appellant(s)

AND

1. NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION (NPC)
2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION Respondent(s)

ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDULKADIR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein, was the Petitioner/Applicant in a petition brought before the Census Tribunal, sitting at Abuja, wherein the Appellant, by way of a Motion on Notice filed on the 30th of October 2009, prayed the Honourable Tribunal for the following orders:
1) AN ORDER extending time within which the Applicant/Petitioner may present its petition against the conduct of the 2006 census exercise.
2) AND FOR SUCH ORDERS or such further or other orders as this Honourable Tribunal may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
The petition was supported by a four paragraphed affidavit, deposed to by one Maureen Odezugo, a litigation secretary in the law firm of M.M. Nuruddeen & Co., Counsel to the Petitioner/Applicant. A written Address in support of the motion was also filed on the 9th of December 2009 wherein it was contended for the Appellant that in an application of this nature, the Applicant is required to show good reasons for the delay. The pertinent paragraph of the Affidavit is Paragraph 3, wherein it was deposed as follows:
“3.That I was informed by Barrister Y.B. Kirfi, Honourable Attorney General and Commissioner of Justice, Bauchi State, at our chambers on 17-10-2009 at around 5:30 pm and I verily believe him as follows:
A) That the Applicant/Petitioner could not file its petition within time because it could not complete its investigation into the conduct of the census exercise.
B) That the Applicant/Petitioner had to send investigation teams into every nook and cranny of the State and these are largely inaccessible.
C) That from the investigation carried out, most of the rural areas were not even visited by the census officials.
D) That the investigation also revealed that there was a dire shortage of FORM NPC1 throughout the State.
E) That accordingly the census result declared for the State and its local governments was not and could not have been correct.
F) That the Applicant/Petitioner is ready to present good and arguable petition before this Honourable Tribunal on its own behalf and on behalf of the 20 local government areas of the State.
G) That the Respondent will not be prejudiced if this application is granted.
H) That it will be in the interest of justice to grant this application.
The 1st Respondent filed no counter affidavit but by a Written Address filed on the 11th of January 2010, opposed the motion on points of law under the following grounds.
(1) The Tribunal is not empowered by the Rules to extend the time within which to present a complaint.
(2) The Applicant failed to place before the Honourable Tribunal all the materials required for the exercise of the Tribunals discretion in its favour.
(3) The Applicant lacks the competence to present/file a complaint, is not maintainable as the cause of action is now statute barred.
The 2nd Respondent filed no processes and was unrepresented at the Tribunal despite repeated service of hearing notices on him.
In a considered Ruling delivered on the 3rd of February 2010, the Census Tribunal Coram Hon. Habibu M. Ma’arlif, Hon. Kunle Ojo, and Hon. Dr. (Mrs.) Rhoda Mundi (Chairman and members respectively); held inter alia at page 38 of the Records thus:
“Based on the foregoing, it will be an exercise in futility if we start considering the reasons why the applicant didn’t file its complaint within time. The law has not given us the power to extend time for filing a complaint out of time and we cannot arrogate to ourselves a power we do not have. The application must therefore fail and we so hold.
The originating application brought by a Motion dated 19/10/2009 filed on the 30/10/2009 lacks substance and is accordingly dismissed.”
It is against this decision that the Appellant has appealed to this Honourable Court. The Notice of Appeal filed on the 16th of March 2010 is upon two grounds. The said grounds are reproduced here under, without their particulars.

GROUND ONE
The Learned members of the Census Tribunal erred in taw when they held that they had no power to extend time, within which to file a census petition.

GROUND TWO
The learned members of the Census Tribunal erred in taw when they held that the provisions of Order 20 Rule 3 (1 & 2 of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2004 do not apply.
In line with the Rules and practice of this Court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument.
The appeal came up for hearing on the 4th of June 2014. Learned Counsel for the Appellant, in urging his Court to allow the appeal adopted and relied on the Appellant’s brief of argument dated the 7th of February, 2011 and filed on the 9th of February 2011, as well as the Reply Brief to the 1st Respondent’s brief, dated the 29th of November 2013 but filed on the 11th of December 2013, both of which were settled by M.M. Nuruddeen Esq.Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, in urging this Court to dismiss the appeal adopted and relied on the undated 1st Respondent’s brief of Argument, filed on the 25th of November, 2013 and settled by Abubakar Malami SAN.Similarly, Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent, in urging this Court to dismiss the appeal adopted and relied on the 2nd Respondent’s brief of Argument dated the 26th of May, 2011, filed on the 1st of June, 2011 and settled by Peter N. Eze Esq.
Three issues were formulated in the Appellant’s brief from the two grounds of appeal for the determination of this appeal. They are:
1. Whether there is any conflict between the provisions of paragraph 2 and paragraph 39 of the 3rd schedule to the National Population Commission Act, 2004.
ii. Whether in view of paragraph 39 of the 3rd Schedule to the National Population Commission Act, 2004 and the provisions of Order 30 Rule 3 (1 & 2) of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2004, which are the only rules of the Tribunal, the tribunal has the power to extend time or not.
iii. Whether the tribunal has the power to exclude the application of any part of the Rules of the FCT High Court, which are by virtue of paragraph 45 of the 3rd Schedule of the National Population Commission Act, 2004, the only rules to be applied by the Tribunal
The 1st Respondent in its brief formulated a sole issue for the determination of this appeal, to wit:
“Whether the trial Tribunal was right when it dismissed the Appellant’s application for extension of time to present petition regard being had to the provisions of Paragraph 2, 39 and 45 of the 3rd Schedule of the National Population Commission Act 2004 N67 LFN and without recourse to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 3(1) and (2) of the FCT High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2004”
For the 2nd Respondent, a sole issue was also formulated for determination, that is:
“Whether the Tribunal was right when it held that it does not have power to enlarge the time granted to the Petitioner by the National Population Commission Act to file a petition complaining about the census results”
Both the 1st and 2nd Respondents have in their various briefs deprecated the proliferation of issues as done by the appellant when it formulated three issues from the two grounds of appeal. The 1st Respondent went further to file a notice of preliminary objection to that effect.
At the hearing of the appeal however, the said preliminary objection was not moved. The consequence of this is that the said objection is deemed abandoned.
This is because a notice of objection in a brief of argument does not dispense with the need for the respondent to move the court at the hearing for the reliefs prayed for.

Where a preliminary objection is not moved, it is taken to have been abandoned -see UPS Ltd. v. Ufot (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt.963) 1; Oshiomole vs. F.G.N. (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt.907) 414; Nsirim vs. Nsirim (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.138) 285. In fact, not only is it mandatorv that the objection be argued before the main appeal but the objector must, before moving his objection obtain prior leave of court so to do – see Onochie vs. Odogwu (2006) 2 SC (Pt.LL) 153 at 155; (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.975) 65; Nsirim vs. Nsirim supra.
In the instant case, the 1st Respondents never obtained the leave of this court to argue its preliminary objection nor did it in fact argue the objection before arguing the main appeal.
Consequently, the preliminary objection is struck out.
Be that as it may however, I too, have observed that the Appellant has distilled three issues from the two grounds of appeal. Clearly there is proliferation of issues herein.
The apex court and indeed this court have taken a disfavourable view of proliferation of issues for determination formulated from grounds of appeal.
It is now well settled that issues for determination must be limited to and fall within the scope of the grounds of appeal filed since they must arise from them. Proliferation of issues is therefore not permissible. It follows therefore that while the number of issues formulated may tally with the number of the grounds of appeal filed or less, it is not permissible that they may be more than the grounds filed. Where there are more issues than the number of grounds of appeal filed, such a situation is regarded as undue proliferation of issues and quite unacceptable. See Oduntan vs. General Oil Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.387) 1; Adelaja vs. Fanoiki (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.131) 137; Chinweze vs. Masi (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.97) 254; and Adehi vs. Atega (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt.398) 388.
In the instant case, the appellant filed only two grounds of appeal but three issues were formulated in the appellant’s brief. There is therefore a clear breach of the rule against proliferation of issues.
However, proliferation of issues is not a bar to the hearing of an appeal on the merit as an appellate court is free to either adopt the issues so formulated by learned counsel or formulate such issues that are consistent with the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant. See Labiyi v. Anretiola (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.258) 139.
I have also observed that the Appellant in its reply brief has withdrawn its 3rd issue, leaving behind issues one and two, from the two grounds of appeal. The said ISSUE THREE is accordingly struck out.
I hold the view therefore that any of the sole issues formulated by the 1st and 2nd Respondents is sufficient ex debito justiciae, for the determination of this appeal.
Accordingly I adopt the sole issue as formulated by the 1st Respondent in the consideration of this appeal.
For avoidance of doubt, the issue states thus:
“Whether the trial tribunal was right when it dismissed the Appellant’s application for extension of time to present the petition regard being had to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 39 and 45 of the 3rd Schedule of the National Population Commission Act, 2004 N67 LFN and without recourse to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 3(1) and (2) of the FCT High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2004.”
In the Appellant’s brief of argument, it is submitted that there is no conflict between the provisions of paragraph 2 and 39 of the 3rd Schedule. It is also submitted that even if there is conflict between the two provisions, the learned tribunal should have interpreted the law in such a wav that the right to be heard will be preserved. Reliance was placed on the case of DIN vs. Attorney General of the Federation (1988) NSCC VOL. 19 PART II 449.
The Appellant also contends that by virtue of Paragraph 45 of the 3rd Schedule of the National Population Commission Act 2004, the Rules of the High Court of the FCT are the applicable Rules of the Census Tribunal. It therefore follows that the Census Tribunal can extend time just like time can be extended in any civil matter before the High Court of the FCT. These authorities are relied on: Savannah Bank vs. Ajilo 91987) 2 NWLR (Pt.57) 421; Okpala vs. D.G. National Commission for Museum & Monuments & 2 Ors (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.4440) 585.
It is submitted that by virtue of Order 20 Rule 3 (1 & 2) of the FCT High Court Rules, the tribunal clearly was in error when it failed or refused to extend time for the Appellant, more so in the absence of a counter affidavit. The case of Azeez vs. The State (1986) NWLR (Pt.23) 541, was cited and relied on in furtherance to this point.
In conclusion, it is submitted that Order 20 Rule 3 (&A of the High Court of the FCT Rules confers unfettered jurisdiction on the Tribunal and this Court is urged to so hold.
This Court is therefore urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and allow the appeal.
Conversely, it is submitted for the 1st Respondent that a court can only act or have recourse to any particular matter when it is so empowered by a statute or the rules of court to do so. Where a statute does not provide for taking any step or doing any act, the parties and the court cannot validly take any step or do that act. The authorities of Riruwai vs. Shekarau (2008) NWLR (Pt.1100) 142 and New Ltd. vs. Asiogu (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt.1108) 582 were relied on.
It is submitted that in the instant case, the prayer to extend time for a party who failed to present a complaint within the time allowed by law, cannot be legally/validly granted by the Tribunal.
It is submitted that the power to extend time as provided under paragraph 39 of the 3rd Schedule is made subject to paragraphs 2 and 15 of the 3rd Schedule.
It is the further submission of learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent that where an enactment makes an issue subject to a particular provision, it is the 0rovision of that enactment on the limitation that will be taken into account. Reliance was placed on these cases: Ayantola vs. Action Congress & Anor (2009) FWLR (Pt.4750) 1795; and Olusemo vs. COP (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.575) 547.
In the instant case, it is submitted that by reason of paragraph 2 of the 3rd Schedule, any complaint in respect of the 2006 census result must be presented within six months after the date the census result was released.
Thus, it is submitted that once time limited for presenting a case has elapsed or expired, it becomes incurable and nothing can be done to give life to it. These authorities were relied on: SPDC vs. Farah (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.592) 533; Ogbebor vs. Danjuma (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.843) 403; Owners of the MV”Arabella” vs. N.A.I.C. (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1097) 182; Waziri vs. Damboyi (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt.598) 239; ACB PLC vs. NTS (MA) LTD (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt.1016) 596.
It is submitted that in the instant case, failure of the Appellant to file or present the complaint within the time allowed by paragraph 2 extinguished by operation of law the cause of action and the right of complaint is extinguished forever. Reliance was placed on these authorities: Adeosun vs. Jibesikin (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.724) 290; Aina vs. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWL (Pt.233) 91; Egbe vs. Adefarasin NO.2 (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.47) 1
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Tribunal was right to have declined the jurisdiction to hear and entertain the application and this court is urged to so hold.
This Court is also urged to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st Respondent and dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit.
For the 2nd Respondent, it is submitted that the powers of the Tribunal to extend time is subject to paragraphs 2 and 15 of the 3rd Schedule.
Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent in defining the phrase “subject to”, placed reliance on the following authorities: Yesufu vs. Obasanjo (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt.847) 554; Ibrahim vs. Fulani (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt.1222) 241: Ebhota vs. K.S.I.E.C. (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt.948) 266, N.D.I.C. vs. Okem Ent Ltd (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.880) 107; and submitted that the FCT High Court Rules, are subordinate to the National Population Act and in the event of conflict, the Act will prevail.
It is also submitted for the 2nd Respondent that the case of DIN vs. Attorney-General of the Federation supra cited and relied on by the Appellant is inapplicable in the instant case because the case cited above applies only when there is ambiguity in the language of the statute.
It is submitted that in the instant case, there is no ambiguity in the language of Paragraphs 2, 39 and 45 of the 3rd Schedule and so the case is irrelevant and does not apply.
It is further submitted that when any law prescribes a fixed period within which an action may be instituted, the effect of this limitation is that any action brought outside this fixed period is statute barred. These authorities were relied on: Ujoatuonu vs. Anambra State Government (20101 15 NWLR Pt.1217) 421; Emiator vs. Nigerian Army (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt.631) 362; S.P.D.C vs. Farah supra.
It is submitted also that limitation provisions are construed strictly so that failure to file an originating process within time is fatal to the case of the party and completely deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain the matter. A.C.B PLC vs. MTS (MA) LTD (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt.1016) 596 and Adeosun vs. Jibesikin (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.724) 290 were relied on. It is submitted also that there are no compelling reasons in the affidavit in support of the Appellant’s originating motion to warrant the discretion of the Tribunal in his favour. The case of Etim vs. Obot (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt.1207) 108 is relied on.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Tribunal upon satisfying itself that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s application rightly declined to consider the merit of the affidavit and this Court is urged to so hold.
This Court is also urged to resolve this issue against the Appellant and dismiss the appeal.
Before proceeding any further in the determination of this appeal, I think it would be expedient to set out the relevant provisions of the law applicable hereto. These provisions are Paragraphs 2, 39 and 45 of the 3rd Schedule to the National Population Commission Act, 2004, and Order 20 Rules 3(1) & (2) of the High Court of the FCT Civil Procedure Rules, 2004.

PARAGRAPH 2
“A complaint to a census result shall be presented within six months after the date which the result is released”

PARAGRAPH 39(1)
“The Tribunal shall have power, subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 15 of this Schedule, to enlarge or abridge the time appointed by this Act or Rules of Court mentioned in Paragraph 44 of this Schedule or fixed by any order enlarging time for doing any act or taking any proceeding upon such terms (if any as the justice of the case may require.”

PARAGRAPH 39(2)
“Enlargement may be ordered although the application for same is not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed.”

PARAGRAPH 39(3)
‘When the time for delivering any pleadings or filing any affidavit, answer, or document, or doing any act is or has been fixed or limited by any of the paragraphs or rules aforesaid or by direction or order of the tribunal, costs of any application to extend such time and any order made thereon, shall be borne by the party making such application, unless the Tribunal shall otherwise order.”

PARAGRAPH 45
“‘Subject to the express provisions of this Schedule, the practice and procedure of the Tribunal in relation to a complaint shall be assimilated as nearly as may be to the practice and procedure of the High Court in the civil exercise of its civil jurisdiction and the Civil Procedure Rules or the Civil Procedure Code shall apply with such modifications as may be necessary to render them conveniently applicable, as if the petitioner and the Respondent were respectively the plaintiff and the defendant in a civil action.”

ORDER 20 RULE 3 (1) & (2)
“A court may, on such term as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is requires or authorized by these provisions, to do any act, or take any proceedings.”
“A court may extend any period referred to in sub rule (1), although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period. Except for compelling reasons, the court shall not grant more than one extension prior to trial.”

It is trite that in the interpretation of statutes the court is concerned with the intendment of the statute. In this regard, a provision in an enactment must be examined as a whole with a view to determining the object it was intended to serve. It should not be interpreted piecemeal. Such a piecemeal approach is bound to lead to absurd conclusions. And more importantly it must be interpreted broadly in order not to defeat the intention of its framers.
Looking at above reproduced provisions of the law, I hold the view that Paragraph 2 provides the limitation time within which to present a complaint before the census tribunal. By the said paragraph, the intendment of the framers of the National Population Commission Act is that any complaint in respect of the 2006 census result must be presented within 6 months after the date on which the census result is released.
Time starts to run in limitation of actions when all the facts which constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action have happened. See NPA. vs. Abu Airadion Ajobi (2006) 7 SCNJ 168: (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt.998) 477

I have no hesitation in making the finding that the cause of action in the instant appeal arose sometime in 2006, a fact which has not been controverted by any of the parties.
It is also on record that the originating motion at the Tribunal was filed by the Appellant on the 30th of October, 2009; a period of about three years from the time the 2006 census was conducted and the result announced.
The Appellant has argued strenuously that the Tribunal had the power to extend time for the fillng of the petition, by virtue of Order 20 Rule 3 (1&2) of the High court of the FCT Rules 2004 and that the said Order 20 Rule 3 is applicable to the Census Tribunal by virtue of Paragraph 45 of the 3rd Schedule of the Act.
I have meticulously gone through the relevant provisions of the law regarding this case. I am inclined to agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the Respondents that the said Rule of the High Court of the FCT is subject to the provisions of the 3rd Schedule to the Act.
It is trite and cannot be overemphasized that a Rule of Court cannot supersede a statutory enactment. See the case of Nasir vs. C.S.C. Kano State (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt.1100) 253.

It is also settled law that a limitation provision or law is made based on public policy so as to put an end to litigation. This is because the limitation of actions law is the pivot upon which the wheel of litigation rotates and the ruthless watchman that guards the gates to the sanctuary of justice. The statute of limitation is therefore regarded as an act of peace based on the principle that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, as the defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. The reasoning of the statute of limitation is that greater injustice is likely to be done by allowing stale claims than by refusing them a hearing on the merit.
In the case of S.P.D.C. vs. Farah (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt.382) 148 at 185, the court held as follows:
“The legislature has prescribed certain periods of limitation for instituting certain action. This is based on public policy that there should be an end to litigation and that stale demands should be suppressed for it would be unfair to a person to allow claims to be made upon him after a long period during which time he may have lost the evidence formerly available and necessary to rebut the claim”
In the instant case, the Appellant failed to file its complaint within the six months prescribed by Paragraph 2 to the 3rd Schedule. The consequence of this failure is that the Appellant’s application is statute barred.
The jurisprudence of the doctrine of statute bar as encapsulated in the various limitation laws is that no matter how creditable or good a claim is, when it is not brought timeously, it abates and no relief can validly be sought to enforce a stale claim.
As this court held in Nwadiaro vs. Shell Petroleum (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 322, persons with reasonable cause of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. See Also Oba Aremo II vs. S.F. Adekanye (2004) 7 SCNJ 218; (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.891) 572.
I have no difficulty therefore in arriving at the conclusion that the application of the Appellant is caught up by the limitation clause in Paragraph 2 of the 3rd schedule to the National Population commission Act 2004 and the Tribunal rightly declined to consider the merit of the facts deposed in the Appellant’s affidavit.
The sole issue is resolved against the Appellant in favour of the Respondents.
This appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
I make no order as to costs.

MOORE A.A. ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Abubakar Jega Abdulkadir, JCA. My learned brother has comprehensively dealt with the issues in this appeal.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusions of my learned brother. For the reasons given by my learned brother, I also dismiss this appeal as it lacks merit.
There is no order for costs.

TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I have read in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother Abubakar Jega Abdulkadir PJCA just delivered. I agree with the entire reasoning and conclusions.
I abide by the order made as to cost.

Appearances

Mr. M. Ikyau with K. Usoro and Miss O.F. JegedeFor Appellant

AND

Mr. B.S. Ahmed and Miss D. David for the 1st Respondent
Mrs. M. Onyiuke for the 2nd RespondentFor Respondent