HYUNDAI MOTORS NIGERIA LIMITED v. STEVE IBANGA & PARTNERS (2014)

HYUNDAI MOTORS NIGERIA LIMITED v. STEVE IBANGA & PARTNERS

(2014)LCN/7385(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 10th day of July, 2014

CA/C/59/2013

RATIO

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION TO A PROCEEDINGS AND WHEN IT CAN BE RAISED

It has been stated in a plethora of cases that issue of jurisdiction of a court is a threshold issue which goes to the root of adjudication. It is a radical and crucial question of competence. If a court has no jurisdiction to hear a case the proceedings are and remain a nullity however well conducted. So judgment obtained from a court without jurisdiction is worthless and ineffective. See INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT.1025) 423; BARSOUN VS. CLEMESSY INTERNATIONAL (1999) 12 NWLR (PT.632) 516.

That is why anytime issue of jurisdiction is raised by a party, a court is duty bound to stay action in the matter unless the issue of jurisdiction is first determined. In other words, the court should not take any further step in the matter, for if a court lacks it jurisdiction however brilliantly it decides a case it is a nullity. It is trite that because of the importance of jurisdiction it may be raised at a trial even on Appeal. See WOKOPRAISE INTERMARIC COY LTD VS. DOBEST TRADING CORPORATION (1992) 9 NWLR (PT.520) 334 so also issue of jurisdiction can also be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court See RIVER STATE GOVERNMENT VS. SPECIALIST VS. SPECIALIST CONSULT (2005) 7 NWLR (PT.923) 145. For this purpose also no sympathy should be accorded to any party in the determination of jurisdiction. See INAKOJU vs. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR PT (1025) 423. per. JOSEPH JUDE JELLA, J.C.A.

CONTRACT: TERM OF CONTRACT OF WARRANTY; THE MEANING OF THE TERM OF CONTRACT OF WARRANTY

Although the term of contract of warranty means a situation where a person undertakes to pay, or guarantees the liabilities of another in case of any breach. per. JOSEPH JUDE JELLA, J.C.A.

COURT: JURISDICTION; THE WORLD OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AS IT RELATES TO THE TERRITORIAL, GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION OF A COURT AND JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO THE JUDICIAL DIVISION WITHIN WHICH TO COMMENCE AN ACTION AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF ANY MATTER CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE NECESSARY VIRES
Jurisdiction, whether subject matter or territorial, is always a threshold issue. In Dairo v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. (2007) 7 S. C. (PT. II) 97, the Supreme Court, per I.T. Muhammad, JSC said:
In the case of International Nigerbuild Construction Co. v. Giwa (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.836) 69 at 74 -76, the Court of Appeal stated in that respect as follows:
“there is a world of distinction between jurisdiction as it relates to the territorial, geographical jurisdiction of a court and jurisdiction in relation to the judicial division within which to commence an action. The distinction between venue as an aspect of jurisdiction which could be heard, is often provided in the rules of court of various states of the Federation. But when it comes to territorial jurisdiction, which is whether a suit ought to have been brought in another, the criteria is different. In such a case, the court has no jurisdiction and it cannot be conferred by agreement or consent of the parties.”
I am in complete agreement with that holding.
It is well settled that any matter conducted without the necessary vires on the part of the court amounts to a nullity, and it is liable to be set aside, no matter how well conducted the proceedings. It is irrelevant that the court with the necessary vires would have come to the same decision. A matter submitted to a court for adjudication must come before that court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction, Madukolu & Ors v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 (1962) 1 All NLR 587; (2001) 3 SCM, 185. per. JOSEPH JUDE JELLA, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

ONYEKACHI A. OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PAUL O. ELECHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH JUDE JELLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

HYUNDAI MOTORS NIGERIA LIMITED Appellant(s)

AND

STEVE IBANGA & PARTNERS Respondent(s)

JOSEPH JUDE JELLA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, Uyo delivered on the 27th June, 2012 in Suit No. HU/350/2008, by which Judgment was entered in favour of the Respondent as Plaintiff, against the Appellant.

A resume of the facts leading to this case will serve a better understanding of the case.

The Respondents sued the Appellant for a declaration that the engine failure developed by the bus supplied to the Plaintiff/Respondent by the Defendant Appellant amounts to a breach of condition and warranty as to merchantable quality as advertised by the Defendant/Appellant and this entitles the plaintiff/Respondent to repudiate the contract and for an order directing the Defendant/Appellant to refund to the Plaintiff/Respondent the sum of six million eight hundred and ninety five thousand naira (N6,895,000.00) being the purchase price for the bus or to replace the bus with another in good condition.

In the judgment delivered on the 27th of June, 2012 by learned trial Judge Philomena Etim J. ordered the Defendant/Appellant to replace to the Plaintiff/Respondent a brand new Nyundai 29 Sector Super delux bus or its current financial equivalent in place of the one in custody of the defendants within one month from the date of the judgment. The defendants were also ordered to pay five million naira damages to the Plaintiffs.

Dissatisfied with the above judgment, the Defendant henceforth referred as the Appellant appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal filed on the 23rd July, 2012 containing four Grounds of Appeal. An Amended Notice of Appeal of four grounds was filed on the 24th September, 2013 and deemed on the 22nd October, 2013. In his written brief, the Appellant distilled four issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the Lower Court has jurisdiction to enter the Respondent’s case (Ground 1).
2. Whether the Respondent is entitled to declaration sought and a replacement of a brand new Hyundai 29 sector Super Delux Counter Bus or its financial equivalent (Ground 2).
3. Whether the Respondent is entitled to general damages in the sum of N5 million as award by the Learned trial Judge (Ground 3).
4. Whether the judgment of the learned trial Judge is against the weight of evidence (Ground 4).

In the Respondent’s brief filed on the 10th January, 2014 he adopted all the issues raised by the Appellant.
An Appellants reply was filed on the 21st February, 2014. All the briefs of argument were adopted by the various parties.

The 1st issue raised by learned counsel for the Appellant which borders on jurisdiction is that the learned trial Judge lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate in this matter because the Respondent purchased the 29 Sector Super Delux Hyundai country bus in Calabar at the Appellants branch office where he carries on business and that all necessary documentation were issued in Calabar. it is contended that the Respondent chose to commence action to enforce the warranty contract against the Appellant in Uyo. In the Appellant’s view learned trial Judge lacks jurisdiction since the course of action arose in Calabar Cross River State and not Uyo. Reliance was place on section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and Order 2 Rule 5 of High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Akwa Ibom State.

It is further submitted by Learned Counsel to the Appellant that the case before the learned trial Judge had nothing to do with delivery and non delivery of the bus, but that it relates to breach of contract of warranty entered into at the Appellants office and that performance can only take place in Calabar Cross River State. He called in aid ANO LODGE HOTELS LTD VS. MERCANTILE BANK NIG. LTD (1993) 3 NWLR (PT 284) 721 @ 731 PARA E – F. It is then argued that there is nowhere in the writ of summons and statement of claim that states that the contract was contracted in Uyo, and so the Court cannot confer jurisdiction or vest itself with jurisdiction not conferred to it by the Constitution and the enabling statute. Reliance was placed on NAIGE VS. CAPITAL BANKORP LTD (1999) 7 NWLR (PT 609) 71 @8 0. It is submitted that in WEMA BANK PLC VS. CHRISTOPHER LAB INT LTD (2002) 8 NWLR (PT 770) 614 @ 633 the court held that:
Where however a dispute arises as to which State High Court has jurisdiction in the matter, a reference to the Constitution is made to resolve the dispute”
Further that in NBC PLC VS. NWANERA (2000) 14 NWLR (PT686) 30 @ 39 PARA C the Court held that:
The primary rule is that causes of action arising within a State are justifiable by the State High Court of the same State.

Counsel to the appellant concluded that it is settled law that judgment entered in the absence of jurisdiction is a nullity. Reference was made to AGBITI VS. NIGERIA NAVY (2011) 4 NWLR (PT.1236) 175 @ 2008 PARA F – G.

In somewhat swift reaction to the submission of the Appellant on this issue, stated that the lower court had jurisdiction in the suit, on the basis that in cases of breach of contract, geographical jurisdiction of a court is determined by:
1. Where the contract was performed or intended to be performed.
2. Where the contract was signed or entered into, in cases where exist (sic) written contractual document.

That proposition that jurisdiction should be determined by a place where the defendant does his business or resides is not a general principles or law of contract but that it is a provision in Order 2 Rule 3 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 which states:
“All Suits for specific performance or upon the breach of any contract may be commenced and determined in the judicial Division in which such contract was made or in which the Defendant resides or carries on business”

Learned counsel for the Respondent drew the attention of the court to the fact that in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff/Respondent’s Statement of Claim and paragraph 7 of Pw1’s Deposition the bus was delivered to the Respondent at Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. It is suggested that contract of the sale of the bus was concluded on the delivery of the goods in this case the bus to the Purchaser.

It is further contended that the contract between the Respondent and the appellant was a geographical jurisdiction and not territorial jurisdiction, counsel referred to pages 87 – 89 of the Record of Appeal and we were urged upon to disregard the appellant’s argument that the contract between the appellant and the respondent relate to territorial jurisdiction. We are urged to resolve issue No. 1 in favour of the Respondent and uphold the judgment of the lower Court, that High Court in Uyo had jurisdiction to entertain this case.

It is trite that because of the importance of jurisdiction it may be raised at a trial even on Appeal. See WOKOPRAISE INTERMARIC COY LTD VS. DOBEST TRADING CORPORATION (1992) 9 NWLR (PT.520) 334 so also issue of jurisdiction can also be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court See RIVER STATE GOVERNMENT VS. SPECIALIST VS. SPECIALIST CONSULT (2005) 7 NWLR (PT.923) 145. For this purpose also no sympathy should be accorded to any party in the determination of jurisdiction. See INAKOJU vs. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR PT (1025) 423.

I am content to state that issue of jurisdiction in all Suits is vital and must be resolved by the court when raised. In the present case, it is the submission of the appellant that since the contract of warranty was entered by the parties in Calabar, Cross River State, all necessary documents signed and issues there, where the Defendant/Appellant resides and carries on business one should have thought that the High Court of Cross River State and not Akwa Ibom State High Court should have jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter and it is vehemently submitted that Akwa Ibom State High Court had no jurisdiction over the matter.

Whereas the Respondent is of the view that jurisdiction of contract of sale is determined by where the goods were delivered in this case that since the bus which is the subject matter of the appeal was delivered to the Respondent in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, it is there the action should commence.

There is no gain saying that this case was predicated on a supposed breach of terms of contract which was entered and concluded in Calabar, Cross River State where the appellant resides and carries on business. I have no hesitation stating that the High Court of Cross River State have jurisdiction to determine the case and not the Akwa Ilbom State High Court as in the instant case. This is clearly an issue of territorial jurisdiction. In AFRIBANK NIGERIA PLC VS. BONIK INDUSTRIES LTD supra at page 302. The Supreme Court held:
“That on territorial jurisdiction all suits for specific performance, upon a breach of contract, shall be commenced and determine in the judicial Division in which such contract ought to have been performed or in which the Defendant resides and carries on business”.

More so, that the contract in question does not have on record any document showing that this contract was to be performed in Uyo, the Akwa Ibom State Capital, in any case the absence of such, implied that contract was performed in Calabar, the Cross River State Capital.

As I stated earlier that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time before judgment or after judgment on appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court for the first and any proceedings which neglects this will be null and void.

Although the term of contract of warranty means a situation where a person undertakes to pay, or guarantees the liabilities of another in case of any breach. However, in an action of this nature, party must comply with the requirements of law by instituting his action in a proper Court, before he is met with the issue of lack of jurisdiction. I therefore, find merit in the argument of the Appellant and resolve this issue in favour of Appellant, against the Respondent. The trial Akwa Ibom High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain this matter.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued issues 2, 3 and 4 together. On his general submission, he argued that Respondent is not entitled to the reliefs sought, as awarded by the lower Court as he has not satisfied that requirement of SECTION 131(1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT, 2011 which provides:
“Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.”
It is submitted by the Counsel that Respondent is not entitle to a declaration repudiating the contract for sale of bus under the Contract of Warranty as granted by the lower Court, but would only be entitle to damages for the breach of condition of Warranty, Counsel relied on HALSBURY’S LAW OR ENGLAND (4TH EDITION) 2005 REISSUE, PAGE 58 PARAGRAPH 63.

It is submitted that the Respondent purchased the said bus in March, 2007 and returned same in March, 2008 on the ground that the bus developed fault in the engine. That when the Appellant examined the bus he discovered it was having low compression and that piston, valve and the oil seals of the Bus have been affected by the bad fuel, being used by the Respondent and it was not serviced in line with the service Manual. Appellant said in order to maintain customer relation, proceeded to repair the bus, at no cost to the Respondent and invited the Respondent to pick same. It is stated that the Respondent conceded to this assertion as shown on page 23 of the Record of Appeal by his reply to the statement of Defence.

Furthermore, in paragraph 23 of witness’ statement on oath of Pw1 on page 28 of the records of appeal, agreed that Respondent was invited to take delivery of the repaired bus. The learned Counsel to the Appellant submitted that the lower Court erred when it refused to act on the admitted facts in the Respondent’s pleading. Appellant’s counsel submitted that the purpose of pleading is to avoid surprises on the opponent so that issues can be properly joined on facts. He relied on AGALA VS. OKUSIN (2010) 10 NWLR (PT 1202) 412 AT 436 PARAGRAPH B TO D.

It is the Appellant’s submission that trial Judge made a case outside the pleadings and evidence adduced before him and held that repairs was not communicated to the Respondent until the period of evidence in Court in 2010. But the time within which this was communicated was never indicated by the Respondent either in evidence or pleading, but it is strange that trial Court made a case for the Respondent. He called in aid PASCUTTO VS. ADECENTRO (NIG) LTD supra.

The Appellant’s Counsel argued further that Respondent having failed to deny the fact that the bus was not serviced as and when due in line with the Service Manual was an admission by conduct, but the Court below refused to believe this fact on the ground that it was not tendered in evidence. Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011 states that where relevant, admissible and credible evidence stands unchallenged, uncontroverted, the Court has no alternative but to accept it. See ADEPOJU ODUNSI VS. AZEEZ BAMGBALA & ORS (1995) 1 NWLR (PT. 374) 641 AT 646.

It is further submitted that trial Judge failed to consider the content of Exhibit 8, in reply to the Respondent’s letter Exhibit 2 and 3, showing the reason for the delay in responding to the said letters. Reference was made to ADEBAYO VS. ADUSEI (2004) 4 NWLR (PT 862) 44 AT 76 PARAGRAPH D TO E where the Court held:
That totality of the evidence must be evaluated and assessed together, the Judge cannot pick and choose the evidence to be assessed.

It is also the submission of the Appellant that Respondent is not entitled to the award of N5 Million as damages against the Appellant as ordered by the trial Judge, on the ground that no evidence was placed before the Court to justify the loss by the respondent or substantiate the allegation of engine failure and breach of warranty.

Learned counsel for the Plaintiff concluded that Respondent did not satisfy the conditions necessary for the award of damages for breach of contract which are as follows:
. That damages must be reasonably foreseeable;
. That loses must be shown by credible evidence to have been incurred.
. That amount of loss was ascertained and proved by evidence.
See SHELL B.P VS. JAMMAL ENGINEERING LTD (1974) 4 SC 25 AT 66 TO 67. That if the Respondent had yielded to the call to pick the repaired bus, the losses suffered would have been avoided or minimized. Relied on UDEAGA VS. BENUE CEMENT CO. PLC (2006) 2 NWLR (PT.596) 600 AT 62 PARAGRAPH C – E and urged the Court to resolve the issue in his favour.

Respondent’s Counsel in reaction stated that he is entitle to the declaration sought, on what constitute breach of fundamental terms of contract or condition. He cited PHOTO PRODUCTIONS LIMITED VS. SECURICOR TRANSPORT LTD (1980) AC PAGE 827.

He argued that the benefit that would have been conferred on the Plaintiff/Respondent would have been the movement of the bus from one location to the other, with or without passengers on board. But with the engine failure it was not possible and so he was deprived of the benefits therefrom. He referred to KARSALES (HARROW) LTD VS. WALLIS (1956) 1 WLR PAGE 936 OR (1956) 2 ALL ER PAGE 866.

In reaction to the definition of Warranty by the Appellant from Halbury’s Laws of England. Counsel’s submission was that Respondent claim is for fundamental breach of a condition of the contract, and that the Court must consider whether the term of contract is a condition or warranty the object therein. Whatever name the Appellant gives it, said Respondent Counsel breach of it constitutes fundamental breach and entitles the affected party to repudiate the contract. He submitted that the trial Judge did not misapplied the principles as argued by the Appellant on paragraph 5.06 of his brief of argument. Trial Court accepted the fact that failure of the engine is fundamental breach, which entitles the Respondent to repudiate the contract. He referred to CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT BANK PLC VS. EKANEM (SUPRA) where the Court held thus:
It is incumbent on a recipient of a business letter to reply as its defaults to reply can be presumed that it has no objections to the proposals contained therein.

Appellant’s action and failure to reply exhibit 2, 3 and 4 which are the letters by the Respondent, amount to admission. He also reacted to the argument of the Appellant that, the Appellant never proved that the bus was affected by the bad fuel or on-service in line with the Service Manual.

In the evidence of Dw1, it is stated that the bus was examined by auto-mechanics at Calabar, but Appellant could not call any auto-mechanic to give direct evidence to that effect. But Dw1 said in cross-examination that the auto mechanics who examined the bus told him what he said and in law his evidence is hearsay and not admissible in law.

It is undisputable that Appellant invited the Respondent to pick the vehicle after repairs the facts which the Respondent conceded, but state it was until the claim of the losses by the Respondent. The argument in paragraph 5.15 of the appellant’s Brief, where he said the trial Judge acted in error in refusing to consider the Appellant’s argument that Respondent’s was already repaired but Respondent refused to take delivery, was because the facts were not pleaded. It is true from the records the facts were not pleaded and such facts are not admissible by the court.

Undoubtedly, Respondent’s case was that the bus developed engine failure within the period it was supposed to continue performance, and its failure was due to manufacturer’s defect, in absence of contrary evidence, and that was the only proper conclusion for the court to reach.

Learned counsel submits that Respondent was entitled to the reliefs sought, as same have been established and pleaded. More so, that the money used in buying the bus was borrowed from the Intercontinental Bank Plc., which was payable from the proceeds of the bus, with interest, which had attracted penalty and accumulated charges.
To my mind, the Appellant is liable for the breach of condition of warranty as to the merchantable quality or fitness of the bus and the breach entitled the Respondent to repudiate the contract. See PHOTO PRODUCTION LTD VS. SECURICOR TRANSPORT LTD (1980) AC P.827.

Failure of the engine of the bus constitute a fundamental breach as a result of a manufacturer’s fault, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 are letters from the Respondent dated 25th March, 2008, 9th July, 2008, 24th July, 2008 respectively to the Appellant, all in respect to the failure of the said engine of the bus in question. Appellant neither replied to these letters until 14th August, 2008, wherein reasons for the Appellant’s failure were given that it was based on the move to resolve the matter amicably. This attitude of the Appellant shows no seriousness on his part to attend to the complaint of the Respondent. It is undisputable that Appellant agreed to repair the bus at no cost, that which the Respondent conceded. However, since March, 2008 when the bus developed the engine failure, Appellant did not show any act of seriousness in repairing the bus, since it is clear that until 2010 after the Respondent had filed the action in Court that Appellant put the said bus in order, and so there was a clear undue delay by the appellant, which entitled the Respondent to repudiate. The engine failure occurred during the subsistence of the condition of warranty. The engine failure developed by the said bus, supplied by the Appellant amounts to a breach of the condition of warranty and thus entitled the Respondent to repudiate the contract and the replacement of a new brand 29 Seater Hyundai Delux bus to the Respondent. This issue is resolved in favour of the Respondent, against the Appellant.

Appellant further made a heavy weather on the issue of damages claimed by the Respondent, that Respondent is not entitled to the damages on the ground that no satisfactory conditions necessary for the award of same in the case of breach of contract was proved. Appellant in his evidence told the lower Court that the failure of the engine was caused by the bad fuel used by the Respondent, and could not proof to the Court how he came about that conclusion. But Respondent went further to tender receipts of the fuel he used in the bus. The time within which the Appellant put the said bus in its normal condition was lengthy enough to have caused serious damages to the day to day activities of the Respondent. With all these delay, it is enough evidence to entitle the Respondent of his claims.
Counsel also submits that lower Court made case outside the pleading of the parties. It is true that Court had no power to make a case for a party but will only adjudicate on the issues before it. See OGUNSOLA VS. IBIYEMI (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 400) 731 AT 735.

However, this issue is of no moment since it would not affect the decision of the court in any way. It is the position of the law that Plaintiff will succeed on the strength of its case not on the weakness of the defence. Trial court was right in holding that Appellant did not prove his case convincingly to exonerate him from the alleged facts against him, more importantly; he made no facts to prove that the fault of the engine failure was caused by the bad fuel.

Learned counsel submits that lower Court made heavy weather on the issue that Appellant did not led evidence, despite the admission by the Respondent that the said bus had been repaired and awaits collection, thereby ruling against the evidence. In LUCUS PHARMACEUTICAL CHEMIST LIMITED VS. ROCHE (NIGERIA) LIMITED (1995) 1 NWLR (PT 369) 28 AT 30. Court held that when evidence adducted by the Appellant is weighed against that adduced by the Respondent, the judgment given in favour of the Respondent is against the totality of the evidence adduced before the trial Court. But this was however not the case in the instant case, it is clear that Appellant could not proof his case satisfactorily before the trial court. More so, it is the evidence of the Dw1 that an auto-mechanic examined the bus and came to conclusion that it was not serviced in compliance with the Service Manual, bad fuel was used, but the auto-mechanic was never called as witness to prove same before the trial Court. In its result, I find merit in the brief of argument of the Respondent and I hereby resolved issues 2, 3 and 4 in his favour against the Appellant.
Therefore, the reliefs sought by the Appellant in issues 2, 3 and 4 are hereby refused. The Judgment of the lower court on these issues is upheld.
However, since the trial Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case of the Respondent, the proceedings conducted is null and void.

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading, in draft, the Judgment just delivered by my learned Brother, Joseph Jude Jella, JCA, allowing this appeal. I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. I will only comment, for emphasis.
Jurisdiction, whether subject matter or territorial, is always a threshold issue. In Dairo v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. (2007) 7 S. C. (PT. II) 97, the Supreme Court, per I.T. Muhammad, JSC said:
In the case of International Nigerbuild Construction Co. v. Giwa (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.836) 69 at 74 -76, the Court of Appeal stated in that respect as follows:
“there is a world of distinction between jurisdiction as it relates to the territorial, geographical jurisdiction of a court and jurisdiction in relation to the judicial division within which to commence an action. The distinction between venue as an aspect of jurisdiction which could be heard, is often provided in the rules of court of various states of the Federation. But when it comes to territorial jurisdiction, which is whether a suit ought to have been brought in another, the criteria is different. In such a case, the court has no jurisdiction and it cannot be conferred by agreement or consent of the parties.”
I am in complete agreement with that holding.
It is well settled that any matter conducted without the necessary vires on the part of the court amounts to a nullity, and it is liable to be set aside, no matter how well conducted the proceedings. It is irrelevant that the court with the necessary vires would have come to the same decision. A matter submitted to a court for adjudication must come before that court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction, Madukolu & Ors v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 (1962) 1 All NLR 587; (2001) 3 SCM, 185.I agree that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter submitted to it for adjudication.
For this reason and for the fuller reasons in the lead Judgment, I also allow this appeal. The judgment of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State delivered by Hon Justice Philomena Etim J. in HU/350/2008 on June 27, 2012 is hereby set aside.

PAUL OBI ELECHI, J.C.A.: I have read the draft judgment just delivered by my learned brother Joseph Jude Jella and I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
For the reasons ably set out in the lead judgment which I adopt as mine, I too agree that the appeal is unmeritorious and should be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.

Appearances

B.A. Ayeni Esq.For Appellant

AND

Emmanuel Udo Esq.For Respondent