ANTHONY EGON EBUKA v. THE STATE
(2014)LCN/7303(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 23rd day of June, 2014
CA/C/168C/2012
RATIO
EVIDENCE: CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT; WHETHER AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN BE CONVICTED SOLELY ON HIS CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
A free and voluntary confession of guilt whether judicial or extra-judicial, if it is direct and positive and properly established is sufficient proof of guilt and is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as the Court is satisfied with the truth of such a confession. Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLP (Pt. 937) p. 460: Edhigere v. State (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) pg. 1; Ihuebeka v. The State (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) pg. 203; Idowu v. The State (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 2) pg. 50 and Alarape v. State (2001) 14 WRN Pg. 1. Per. UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: CONFESSION; THE MEANING OF CONFESSION
A confession is “an admission made at any time by a man charged with a crime stating or suggesting that he committed the crime”, Ubierho vs. The State (2005) 2 S.C. (pt 1) 18.It is the position of the law that a man can be convicted on his own confession alone, that is made freely and voluntarily; and if it is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained. See: Emeka vs. State (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 734) 666; Akpan vs. State (2008) 4-5 S. C. (PT. II) 1; Dawa vs. State (1980) 8-11 SC 236; Osung vs. State (2012) 6-7 MJSC (PT 11) 1; Galadinma vs. State (2012) 12 MJSC (PT 111) 190. Per. ONYEKACHI A. OTISI, J.C.A.
Before Their Lordships
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWUJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZEJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ONYEKACHI A. OTISIJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ANTHONY EGON EBUKAAppellant(s)
AND
THE STATERespondent(s)
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A(Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant in this appeal and one other person were arraigned before the Cross River State High Court, Ogoja Judicial Division, on information that alleged their commission of offences punishable under sections 516 and 390 (9) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C16 Vol 3, Laws of Cross River State. Specifically, they were alleged to have conspired to steal and, in fact, did steal the sum of N29, 927, 300, property of the Royal Fishing Company Limited.
At the conclusion of the case, the court (hereinafter referred to as “the lower court”) found that the charge was not proved. It, accordingly, discharged and acquitted the accused persons. However, acting under Part 29, section 259 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap C17, Laws of Cross River State, 2004, it held that the houses, which the appellant confessed he ploughed the PW1’s funds into, should be transferred to the said PW1. Aggrieved by that order, he appealed to this court. He submitted four issues for the determination of his appeal. We shall return to them anon. Before then, we think a recapitulation of the factual background to this appeal would be appropriate.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant was the Manager of the Royal Fishing Company Limited. As at 2003, he was on a monthly salary of N8,000. The PW1 was the Managing Director of the said company: a company, which, in addition to the fish business under the direct management of the appellant, had interests in other business concerns. They include Oil and Gas and Telecommunications.
The said PW1 testified on behalf of the Prosecution. While in the witness box, he testified that, between 2005 and 2009, there were remarkable shortages in the fish business. According to him, that arm of the business incurred substantial debt to its supplier. This prompted the impoundment of a truck load of the company’s fish in Port Harcourt, Rivers state. Pw1’s case was that, convinced that the appellant was a devout member of the Deeper Life Church, he [the PW1] committed the business to his [appellant’s] care. On his part, the appellant disclaimed any knowledge of the said shortages.
PW1, further, deposed that, in the course of their investigation, One Uche, the company’s customer who had stolen ten cartons of the company’s fish, confessed to the Police that the appellant’s houses were built with proceeds from the company’s business. Expectedly, the Police effected the arrest of the appellant. He admitted the allegation that his three blocks of two bedroom flats in Ogoja were built with money he diverted from the appellant’s fish business. He volunteered to surrender the said houses to the PW1, exhibit 5. He, further, admitted these facts in the presence of the pastors of his Deeper Life Church. The said pastors, PW2 and PW3; the appellant’s wife and one Omejesi, a friend of the PW1, appealed to him [PW1] to accept the appellant’s offer of return of the said houses. The said order of the lower court was, thus, anchored on the above facts, particularly, the said confessions of the appellant.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
As shown above, the appellant formulated four issues for the determination of his appeal. They were framed thus:
1. Whether Part 29, section 259 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap C17, laws of Cross River State, 2004, can be applied when the conviction of the accused person is not secured?
2. Whether all that the learned trial Judge said and held after a finding of not guilty on both counts 1 and 11, discharging and acquitting the appellant does not amount to obiter dictum?
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the four houses in the name of a non party to the suit before him [Emmanuel Egon] to be transferred to another non party to the suit, Wilfred Izeugbunam (sic)?
4. Whether the jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge ended with a finding of not guilty of the appellant on both counts 1 and 11 and the order discharging and acquitting him?
The respondent adopted the above issues. We shall, equally, adopt them as the issues for the determination of this appeal.
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL ON THE ISSUES
ISSUE ONE
Whether Part 29, section 259 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap C17, Laws of Cross River State, 2004, can be applied when the conviction of the accused person is not secured?
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
When this appeal came up for hearing on March 26, 2014, S. E. Adie, counsel for the appellant, adopted the brief filed on October 30, 2012 and the reply brief filed on November 7, 2013. In the said brief, it was contended that section 259 (supra) could not be invoked without a conviction of the accused person of the offence where with he was charged.
In his view, it would have been different if the court had found him guilty of stealing the funds of the above company and, equally, found that he utilised the said funds in building the said four houses.
He drew attention to the lower court’s findings that the appellant neither conspired nor stole the alleged sum. He contended that the lower court erred in making the said orders of transfer. He devoted paragraphs 4.5-4.6 (pages 3-6) of the brief to an analysis of his understanding of the import of the above provision. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
On his part, counsel for the respondent, J. U. Ogban, Deputy Director, MOJ, Calabar, adopted the brief filed on April 10, 2013 and deemed, properly, filed on October 30, 2013. He drew attention to the finding of the lower court on page 13 of the judgment. He observed that the order directing the transfer of the houses, which the appellant built with the PW1’s money, was consequent on the above finding. He noted that the appellant did not appeal against the said finding; hence it was binding on him, Adekanmbi v. Jangbon (2007) All FWLR (pt 383) 152, 160; Abubakar v. B. O. and A. P. Ltd (2007) 18 NWLR (pt 1066) 319, 318.
He submitted that, having accepted the above finding of the lower court, the appellant no longer had the liberty to question in this appeal.
In the alternative, he contended that the appellant’s interpretation of the above section is unsupportable. He pointed out that the items of property in issue were immovable, that is, houses. He noted that eight photographs of the buildings were tendered as exhibits 6A-6H and their negatives as exhibit 7, citing page 104 of the record. He, further, noted that the title documents of the said items of property were deposited with the lower court in fulfillment of the bail conditions, page 14 of the record. In his view, there was no other better way of producing the landed property to court than that.
He proceeded to the interpretation of the above section. He submitted that where it appeared to the court that any offence might have been committed or that the accused person himself owned up, (as in the present case), that he committed any offence, section 259 (supra) could be called in aid to deny him the benefit of the proceeds of the crime he confessed to even if he was not convicted for any particular offence. He re-iterated the submission that the findings of the lower court at page 13 of the judgment, which showed that an offence had been committed, were not appealed against. As such, it remained binding on the parties, Alakija v Abdulai [1998] 6 NWLR (pt 552) 1, 24.
He pointed out that there were three separate confessions of the appellant on diverse dates and before different persons, all to the same effect. They were: the confessions before the police, exhibit 5; before PW2, PW3 and one Okereke, all pastors and spiritual fathers of the appellant and before a senior pastor of his church. He observed that the evidence of these facts was given by PW2, PW3 and PW4, who tendered exhibit 5. Again, he re-iterated the fact the findings on these facts were not appealed against.
He maintained that these confessions fell, squarely, within the definition of stealing in section 383 of the Criminal Code. He canvassed the view that, though the appellant was not convicted of the particular charge for which he stood trial, from his confessions, an offence appeared to have been committed within the meaning of section 259 (supra). He took the view that that was the only requirement for invoking section 259 (supra). He proceeded to dismantle the appellant’s construction of the subsection of the said provision of section 259, [paragraphs 3. 9-13 of the respondent’s brief. He turned to the interpretation of the phrase “during or at the conclusion of any trial or inquiry.” In his view, the word “during” means that proceedings need not even get to the conviction stage for the court to exercise the power to make the order in question.
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
What prompted this appeal was the lower court’s order under Part 29 of the Criminal Procedure Law (supra) (hereinafter, simply, referred to as “the CPL”). After discharging and acquitting the accused persons, it proceeded thus at page 8 of the judgment:
Part 29 of the CPL of Cross River State, comprising sections 259 – 270, makes provision for seizure, restitution, forfeiture and disposition of property regarding which an offence was committed.
It cited section 259 (1) [of the CPL] which provides thus:
During or at the conclusion of any trial or inquiry the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal whether by way of forfeiture, confiscation or otherwise of any property produced before it regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence.
(Italics supplied by the lower court)
It, then, proceeded to deconstruct the constitutive phrases in the above provision of the CPL. It took the view that:
‘During or at a trial or inquiry’ means [ ] the order can be made without conviction. Conviction is therefore not a condition precedent to making the order envisaged here. ‘Regarding which any offence appears to have been committed’ means [that] the court does not have to find that an offence had actually been committed.
Next, the lower court turned to the ambit of section 259 (3) of the CPL. It noted that “subsection 3 of the Section 259 provides that the power conferred on the court by subsection 1 of section 259 shall include the power to make an order for the delivery to any person of such property….” In the court’s view:
Section 260 of (the CPL) defines property as used in the law to include, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to be committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession or under the control of a party, but also any property into or for which the same has been converted or exchanged, whether immediately or otherwise…
[Italics supplied by the lower court]
It is, perhaps, more appropriate now to situate the above orders of the lower court in the con of what transpired thereat. In the course of the trial of the appellant at the lower court, his extra-judicial statement to the police; PW2, PW3 and PW4, in the form of confessions, was tendered and admitted without any objection from him. In particular, his confession dated October 26, 2009, was tendered and admitted as exhibit 5 before the lower court. In it, he deposed thus:
I am the one that built the three flats buildings (sic) along (sic) Ministry of works Road, Ogaja. It was my Managing Director’s money that I used in building them without his consent.
I (sic) now handing over the three buildings to him with all the documents involved in the project… I am very sorry about the incident for there is nothing that I can give in exchange of my soul. Hence, my restitution to my Director. I therefore plead (sic) for Christ’s sake to accept my restitution and settle me as the Lord who has been prospering…lead (sic). Please forgive me for I want to return back (sic) to the Lord who is my Saviour. I have worked for him for about seven years now.
In its judgment, the lower court sought corroborative evidence of his admission outside the said exhibit 5. The court found it and made the following instructive findings: “Evidence of PWs 2 and 3 make the content of exhibit 5 most probable. I believe them. Exhibit 5 apart, I can and do act on the confessions made by the first accused person to PWs 2 and 3 to find and hold that the first accused (person) used PW1’s money in the name of the first accused [person’s] son, Emmanuel Egon,” page 13 of the judgment. At pages 13 – 14 of the judgment, the court advanced further reasons why the buildings in question could not pass for the appellant’s property. It rounded off its findings with the following telling conclusion at page 14 of the judgment:
From the above, it becomes clear that the first accused (sic) buildings at Ogoja were financed from PW1’s money converted by the first accused person without the consent of PW1…The first accused person himself told PWs 2 and 3, and stated on exhibit 5, that he will transfer the properties (sic) to PW1 to release himself as a Christian. To help first accused [person] do so I hereby order that title in the four buildings on Ministry of works Road, Ogoja, in the name of the son of the first accused person, Emmanuel Egon, be transferred to pw1, Wilfred Izuegbunam, pursuant to section 259 of the Criminal Procedure Law Cap C 17, Laws of Cross River State, 2004.
As the learned counsel for the respondent, correctly, contended, the implication of the appellant’s non-interrogation of the above findings on appeal is that he was bound by them. The authorities on this point are many. Suffice to refer only to the few cases which the respondent’s counsel cited, Adekanmbi v. Jangbon (supra); Abubakar v B. O and A. P. Ltd (supra); Alakija v Abdulai (supra).
Now, section 259 (supra) is, similarly, worded like section 263 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Lagos State. The latter provision fell for construction in Adetokunbo Ogunlana v State (1995) LPELR -2341 (SC). Instructively, in that case, the lower court made an order for the forfeiture of items procured with the proceeds of crime. On appeal to the Lagos Division of this Court, the order of the lower court was set aside. On further appeal, the apex court restored the order of the lower court. Iguh JSC, who read the leading judgment of the Supreme Court, explained that:
Section 263 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State confers the court with wide discretionary powers to deal with the issue of orders for the disposal of properly regarding which an offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence.
[Italics supplied]
The eminent jurist referred to section 263 (A) of the same Law which defined the term “property” under Part 30 of that Law in this elastic manner:
In this Part of this law the term ‘property’ includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession or under the control of any party, but also any property into or for which the same has been converted or exchanged and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.
Section 260 of the CPL of Cross River State (supra), equally, defines the term “property” in a strikingly, analogous phraseology. The apex court found that, on a combined reading of the provisions of sections 263 (supra) and 263 A (supra) (in pari materia with sections 259 and 260 of the CPL of Cross River State), the term “property” encompasses both the property the subject of the charge, and property which the proceeds of crime had been ploughed into. Listen to Iguh JSC:
The term ‘property’ under part 30 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State therefore includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed, not only the original property in specie but also such other property into which the same has been converted or exchanged and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange.
[Italics supplied]
The distinguished jurist saw no justification for this court’s disturbance of the order of the lower court since, in His Lordship’s esteemed view, the lower court had, rightly, found that the items of property covered by the court’s order were acquired with the proceeds of the complainant’s stolen property. Hear His Lordship:
In my opinion, the forfeiture or restitution orders of the trial court in the present case are amply covered by the combined effect of sections 263 and 263A of the Criminal Procedure Law, Lagos State in view of the finding of the trial court that the properties covered by the restitution orders were acquired with the proceeds of sale of the complainant’s stolen champion sparkling plugs in issue.
Interestingly, in the above case, the lower court’s order was predicated on certain circumstantial inferences which it made having regard to the divergence between the accused person’s humble station in life and the humongous wealth he had accumulated within the same period when the complainant’s goods were stolen. Although, the Lagos Division of this court disagreed with the approach of the High court, the apex court was unimpressed with this court’s reasoning and conclusion in this regard. Again, we, humbly, invite Iguh JSC to rationalise the logic that yielded the Supreme Court’s unanswerable espousal of the High Court’s order. His Lordship, first, hinted that it was:
…important to observe that the 1st appellant admitted in his examination in chief that he was only a clerk at the Government Coastal Agency on a salary of N180.00 per month. Similarly, the 2nd appellant admitted that he was on a salary of only N220.50 per month. It is also worthy of note that the appellants by some strange coincidence acquired their respective properties in issue contemporaneously with the burglary and stealing for which they were tried and convicted.
True, indeed, these were the proximate factors that impelled the High Court’s forfeiture order in question. The apex court concluded that the said High Court’s inferences from these facts were justifiable. Iguh JSC throws further light in the following passage dripping with profound jurisprudential wisdom shaped by a keen sense of justice:
It was in the face of the above sudden metamorphosis of the appellant from the humble rank of low working class, with some of them jobless to nouveaux riches of posh saloon cars owning class contemporaneously with the theft in question that the trial court, in the absence of any reasonable explanation, came to the irresistible conclusion that the appellants’ properties in issue were properties into which the complainant’s plugs had been converted. I think that the learned trial Judge was entitled to infer circumstantially that these properties were bought, all about the same time as it were, with the proceeds of the crime. I agree entirely with the learned counsel for the respondent that to insist, as the Court of Appeal appeared to have done, on direct evidence of the fact of acquisition of these properties with the proceeds of the theft will tantamount to placing less premium on the practice of proof by circumstantial evidence.
As could be seen, the High Court’s inferences were, merely, circumstantial. Now, in the instant appeal, the appellant, perhaps, piqued by his Christian conscience, owned up, first, to the police and, subsequently, to the pastors of his church that he had tampered with the PW1’s funds. These men of God testified before the lower court.
Emboldened by the appellant’s admissions and the viva voce testimonies of PW2; PW3 and PW4, the lower court found as a fact, based on the appellant’s own admission of his malfeasance, that he acquired the houses in question with the proceeds of his conversion of the PW1’s funds.
The above admissions in exhibit 5 may now be juxtaposed with the trenchant provisions of section 259 (supra). It provides this:
1. During or at the conclusion of any trial or inquiry the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal whether by way of forfeiture, confiscation or otherwise of any property produced before it regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence;
2. …;
3. The powers conferred by subsections (1) and (2) upon the court shall include the power to make an order for the forfeiture or confiscation or destruction or delivery to any person of such property, but shall be exercised subject to any special provisions regarding forfeiture, confiscation, destruction, detention or delivery contained in any written law under which the conviction was had or applicable to the case.
(italics supplied)
Having regard to the italicised portions of the above provisions, we, entirely, agree with the submissions of the counsel for the respondent. As shown above, the lower court found that that the appellant “used PW1’s money in the name of the first accused [person’s] son, Emmanuel Egon.” This finding was, amply, borne out by his admission in exhibit 5. What is more, in the words of the lower court “evidence of PWs 2 and 3 make the content of exhibit 5 most probable.”
We concede that, under section 259 (supra), the prosecution had the onus of proving that the houses, subject of the lower court’s order, were built or bought from the PW1’s funds which the appellant converted or stole, Adetokunbo Ogunlana v. State (supra). We are, however, quick to observe that the prosecution’s onus under the said provision, as in civil cases, was supposed to be discharged on the preponderance or balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt as prescribed in criminal cases, R. v. Ferguson (1970) 2 All E.R.820, approvingly, endorsed in Adetokunbo Ogunlana v State (supra).
In our view, against the background of the appellant’s admission and the testimonies of PW2 and PW3, the lower court was right in its order in question. We agree with the respondent’s submission that though the appellant was not convicted, by his admission, an offence appeared to have been committed against the PW1’s property by a combined reading of sections 259 and 260 of the Criminal Procedure Law (supra). We, therefore, take the humble view that the lower court, rightly, invoked section 259 (supra) in the circumstance, see, per Iguh JSC in Adetokunbo Ogunlana v State (supra). As noted above, having not appealed against the lower court’s findings on this crucial question, he was bound by them, Adekanmbi v Jangbon (supra); Abubakar v B. O and A. P. Ltd (supra); Alakija v Abdulai (supra). We find no merit in his complaint in this issue. We, therefore, resolve it against him.
ISSUES TWO; THREE AND FOUR
As shown above, these issues were framed thus:
1. Whether all that the learned trial Judge said and held after a finding of not guilty on both counts 1 and 11, discharging and acquitting the appellant does not amount to obiter dictum?
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the four houses in the name of a non party to the suit before him [Emmanuel Egon] to be transferred to another non party to the suit, Wilfred Izeugbunam (sic)?
3. Whether the jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge ended with a finding of not guilty of the appellant on both counts 1 and 11 and the order discharging and acquitting him?
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The appellant devoted paragraphs 4.9-4.17 [pages 6-8] of the brief to the elucidation of his agitation on issue two. In a nutshell, his main contention was that the lower court’s findings and decision after the appellant’s discharge and acquittal amounted to obiter dicta. He cited Abacha v Fawehinmi [2000] FWLR (pt 4) as authority for this proposition.
With regard to issue three, he contended (paragraphs 4.19-4.25, pages 8-9 of the brief) that the case before the lower court was not for the alleged stealing of money of PW1 but that of the Royal Fishing Company Ltd. It was argued that any purported stealing of PW1’s money was never in issue before the lower court.
On the question of the lower court’s jurisdiction [issue four], the view was canvassed that the court had no jurisdiction to go outside the complaint and evidence in support of the charge of stealing money belonging to the Royal Fishing Company Limited.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
With regard to the second issue, counsel for the respondent referred to section 259 of the CPL. He drew attention to exhibit 5 (supra) where the appellant admitted that he used PW1’s money to build those houses, subject of the order made pursuant to section 259 (supra). In his view, Abacha v Fawehinmi (supra) was inapposite apropos the peculiar facts of the instant case.
On issue three, he re-iterated the submission that, since the appellant did not appeal against the lower court’s findings that eventuated from his admission in exhibit 5, they were binding on him.
He drew attention to the phrase “any person” as the operative expression in section 259 (supra). He contended that the right of the PW1 to the property was established by the appellant himself when he, repeatedly, owned up to utilising PW1’s funds in erecting the said houses.
On issue four, counsel argued that section 259 of the CPL conferred on the lower court the power to make the order appealed against during or at the conclusion of a trial or inquiry. In this case, the lower court made the said order at the conclusion of the trial.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
With profound respect to the appellant’s counsel, the totality of his submissions on issue two betrayed his misconception of the import of section 259 of the CPL in pari materia with section 263 of the defunct CPL of Lagos State. As noted above, Iguh JSC in Adetokunbo Ogunlana v State (supra), interpreted 263 of the CPL, then applicable in Lagos State, as conferring a trial court with wide discretionary powers to deal with the issue of orders for the disposal of property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed. True, indeed, having regard to the uncontested findings of the lower court on exhibit 5 that the appellant owned up to using the PW1’s funds in building the said houses, we entertain no doubt that the lower court’s order found ample anchorage on the combined effect of sections 259 and 260 of the CPL (supra). We find no merit in the complaint on this issue.
On issue three, we, entirely, agree with the lower court’s interpretation of the ambit of section 259 (3) of the CPL. In our view, that court was right when it noted that “subsection 3 of the Section 259 provides that the power conferred on the court by subsection 1 of section 259 shall include the power to make an order for the delivery to any person of such property….”
The inescapable conclusion, from what we have said above, is that the answer to the last issue is that the lower court’s jurisdiction did not end with the findings; discharge and acquittal of the appellant. The court, rightly, acted under section 259 of the CPL (supra) which empowered it to make the orders in question “during or at the conclusion of the trial…”
We, therefore, answer the question posed in this issue in the negative. In other words, the lower court was on firm grounds when in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 259 (supra), it made the said orders. We find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, we enter an order dismissing it. Appeal is, hereby, dismissed.
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A: I had the privilege of reading in draft form, the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother C. C. Nweze, JCA.I agree with his reasoning and final conclusions in the lead Judgment.
Suffice it to say that the order of the lower Court was hinged on the provisions of S.259 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap C17 Laws of Cross River State, 2004. An accused who confesses to his crime may be convicted based solely on that confession.
A free and voluntary confession of guilt whether judicial or extra-judicial, if it is direct and positive and properly established is sufficient proof of guilt and is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as the Court is satisfied with the truth of such a confession. Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLP (Pt. 937) p. 460: Edhigere v. State (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) pg. 1; Ihuebeka v. The State (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) pg. 203; Idowu v. The State (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 2) pg. 50 and Alarape v. State (2001) 14 WRN Pg. 1.
In the instant case, the Appellant was not found guilty of the offence charged even though he had confessed using money diverted from the crime to build the houses the orders of the Court were directed at. In Law, no-one is allowed to keep the proceeds of crime.
The Appellant did not retract his confessional statements to the police and the pastors in his Church. He confessed to the proceeds of his crime and stated in his confession that he wished to forfeit the houses built with the proceeds of his crime.
The trial Judge was not in error when he made his orders concerning the houses. For this and the more robust reasoning contained in the lead Judgment, I also dismiss this appeal and abide by the other orders contained therein.
ONYEKACHI A. OTISI, J.C.A: I had the privilege of reading, in advance, the Judgment just delivered by my learned Brother, Chima Centus Nweze, JCA, dismissing this appeal. All issues raised have been comprehensively addressed, and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions, which I adopt as mine. I will only make these few comments in support.
A confession is “an admission made at any time by a man charged with a crime stating or suggesting that he committed the crime”, Ubierho vs. The State (2005) 2 S.C. (pt 1) 18.It is the position of the law that a man can be convicted on his own confession alone, that is made freely and voluntarily; and if it is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained. See: Emeka vs. State (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 734) 666; Akpan vs. State (2008) 4-5 S. C. (PT. II) 1; Dawa vs. State (1980) 8-11 SC 236; Osung vs. State (2012) 6-7 MJSC (PT 11) 1; Galadinma vs. State (2012) 12 MJSC (PT 111) 190.
Although the charge against the Appellant was found not proved by the trial court, the Appellant had made his confessions of stealing from the PW1 in the presence of pastors from his Church, among other persons.
I agree that the learned trial Judge, in making the orders that the houses which the Appellant had confessed were built from funds pilfered from PW1 be transferred to PW1, found firm footing in Section 259 CPL. See also: Ogunlana vs. State (1995) 5 NWLR (pt 395) 266.
Indeed such orders are in line with current global practice in the effort to discourage criminal activities. In Dangabar vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) LPELR-19732 (CA), this court, per Bada, JCA, said:
The trend all over the world is to prevent the accused person from retaining the proceeds of his crime and to deprive him of whatever benefit he may have derived from his criminal conduct.
For these reasons and for the fuller reasons given in the lead Judgment, I also dismiss the appeal and abide by the orders made in the lead Judgment.
Appearances
S. E. AdieFor Appellant
AND
John U. Ogbar, D. D. MOJ, CalabarFor Respondent
