MATHEW THOMAS v. THE STATE
(2014)LCN/7205(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 16th day of May, 2014
CA/AK/159CA/2012
RATIO
WHETHER A JUDGE CAN INFER FROM THE FACTS PROVED TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE OR GUILT
It is settled that a Judge, is permitted, to infer from the facts proved and other facts necessary, to complete the element of guilt or establish innocence. Such evidence, must however, be closely examined. The Judge has to be certain that there are no other co-existing circumstances which may weaken or destroy the inference.
See the cases of Teper V R/Queen (1952) AC 480 at 489, Anekwe V The State (1976) 9 – 10 SC 255, 264. (1976) 9 – 10 SC (Reprint) 158, Nasiru V The State (1999) 1 SC 1 (1999) 1 SCNJ 83 at 101, Ijioffor V The State (2001) 4 SC (Pt.11) 1, (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.718) 371 at 384, 390 – 391, (2001) 4 SCNJ 230. per MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.
WHETHER THERE IS A DUTY ON THE PROSECUTION TO DISPROVE AN ALIBI
It is now settled that even though it is the duty of the prosecution, to check on a statement of alibi by an accused person and disprove the alibi or attempt to do so, there is no inflexible and or invariable way of doing this. If the prosecution, adduces sufficient and accepted evidence to fix a person at the scene of crime at the material time, his alibi is thereby logically and physically demolished and that would be enough to render such plea, ineffective as a defence.
See the cases of Patrick Njovens & Ors V The State (1973) 5 SC (Reprint) 12 (1973) NMLR 331, Gachi v The State (1965) NMLR 333, (1965) NNLR 233, Yanor & Anor V The State (1965) NMLR 337 (1965) 1 ANLR 199, Nwabueze & Ors V The State (1988) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 157, (1988) 7 SCNJ (Pt. 11) 248 at 260, Ndukwe V The State (2009) 2 – 3 SC (Pt. 11) 35 at 72. per MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.
WORDS AND PHRASES: CONTRADICTION
Now, the word “contradiction” comes from two Latin words “contra” which means “opposite” and “dicere” which means “to say”. Therefore to contradict is to speak or affirm the contrary. A piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other asserts, and not necessarily when there are some minor discrepancies, in say details between them. In other words, contradiction between two pieces of evidence goes rather to the essentiality of some being or not being at the same time. Whereas minor discrepancies depend on the person’s status and capacity for observing meticulous details”.
See Dagayya V State (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt.980) 637. Also in Ayo Gabriel V The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 457 at 468. Nnaemeka -Agu JSC had this to say:
“A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what the other evidence has stated, not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradict one another when they are by themselves inconsistent. On the other hand, ‘a discrepancy’ may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of, or contains a little more than, what the other piece of evidence says or contains some minor differences in details. per MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A
JUSTICES
SOTONYE DENTON WEST Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
CORDELIA IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MATHEW THOMAS Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal from the judgment of his lordship. I. A. Adegbenro J. of the High Court of Ondo State sitting at Ondo, delivered on the 16th day of August, 2012. The appellant and two others were arraigned before the Ondo State High Court sitting at Ondo on a two count charge of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery contrary to and punishable under Section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Fire Arms (special provisions) Act Cap. R11 Vol. 14 of the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004. The appellant and the other accused persons pleaded not guilty to the two count charge and the case proceeded to hearing. The prosecution called four witnesses and tendered various Exhibits. PW1 is one of the victims of the alleged armed robbery incident that took place at his residence on 1/2/2008. He was at the material time a serving judge at the Ondo State High Court of Justice. PW2 is the son of PW1 and also a victim of the armed robbery incident. PW3 and PW4 are police officers who were involved in the investigation of the case at various stages. Exhibits tendered by the prosecution include one stick – Exhibit A, one toy gun – Exhibit B, one army trouser – Exhibit C.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the appellant testified in his defence and denied his involvement in the armed robbery. He maintained that he was never at the scene of the armed robbery incident, but that he was with the 1st accused person in his residence at the material time. The defense contends further that the wife of the PW1 who saw the appellant during the robbery was not called as a witness and that PW2 who knew the appellant very well did not mention his name to the police at the earliest opportunity. It is also the case of the appellant that there are material contradictions not only in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses but also between the particulars of the charge and the evidence led.
At the close of evidence and addresses from both sides, the learned trial Judge delivered Judgment and found the appellant and the two other accused persons guilty of conspiracy and armed robbery and sentenced each of the accused persons to death accordingly.
Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, the appellant who was the 2nd accused at the trial in the court below filed a Notice of Appeal containing six (6) grounds of appeal before this court on 8/10/2012. Appellant’s brief of argument dated 11/1/2013 was filed on 14/1/2013. Respondent’s brief of argument filed on 30/4/2013 was deemed filed on 7/5/2013.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant nominated two (2) issues for determination which were adopted by the Respondent’s Counsel. They are:
(i) Whether the Learned trial judge was right to have relied on the evidence of identification/recognition of the appellant by PW1 and PW2 to hold that the prosecution proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
(ii) Whether from the totality of the evidence on the record, the lower court was right in convicting the appellant for the offences of conspiracy to rob and armed robbery.
On issue 1, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have relied on the evidence of identification/recognition of the appellant by PW1 and PW2 to hold that the prosecution proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. That, it is trite law that one of the major factors that a court must take into consideration in a criminal trial where the evidence against the accused person is based primarily on recognition by one of the victims who claimed to have known the accused person is whether he mentioned the name of the accused person to the police at the earliest opportunity. That the court is also enjoined to take into consideration the following factors:
(a) Circumstances in which the eye witness saw the suspect – Whether it was difficult condition (b) The length of time the witness saw the suspect or defendant, whether in a glance or longer observation; (c) The opportunity of close observation; (d) Previous contact between the two parties; (e) The lightning conditions.
He referred to the cases of Wakala V State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 211) 552, Bozin V State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 465 and Ochiba V State (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 608) 849 at 871.
He submitted that in the instant case and having regard to the above authorities, the PW1 and PW2 could not be said to have positively identified the appellant as one of the armed robbers having regard to the circumstances of the case and evidence on record. That both PW1 and PW2 said they knew him very well as he had previously worked with them as gateman and left the service before the armed robbery incident. But, that it was in evidence that the person that was identified as the appellant did not enter the house with the other four armed robbers. In other words, there was no close contact between the person that was identified as the appellant and the victims. However, said Counsel, both PW1, and PW2 gave evidence in an attempt to link the appellant with the commission of the offence charged. The evidence, according to counsel, fell short of the requirement of the law relating to the guidelines a court must take into consideration before ascribing probative value to the evidence of identification or recognition of a person said to have committed an offence.
He submitted that in the course of his evidence in chief, PW1 was very categorical that he could only recognize the 1st accused person (not the appellant who is the 2nd accused person) during the armed robbery incident and that he did not personally see the appellant during the armed robbery incident. That, PW1 stated further that it was the wife that saw the appellant.
He argued that in the light of the testimony of PW1, the following facts are not in dispute.
(i) PW1 did not see the appellant during the armed robbery incident.
(ii) The wife of PW1 who claimed saw the appellant as one of the armed robbers was not called by the prosecution to give evidence during the trial. Therefore, the evidence of PW1 that the wife told him she saw the appellant as one of the armed robbers amount to hearsay and inadmissible in law, in the absence of the wife. See Ekpo v State (2001) FWLR (Pt. 55) 454 at 464- 465.
(iii) The evidence of PW1 that he mentioned the name of the appellant to the police at the earliest opportunity time does not meet the requirement of the law that says that where an eye witness saw a person whom he or she knows very well committing an offence, he or she must mention the person by name or description to the police at the earliest opportunity. The simple reason is because it was not PW1 that saw the appellant. Rather from his evidence, it was the wife that saw the appellant. The information supplied by PW1 to the police was not based on his personal information, but rather based on what she was told by the wife. Clearly, such evidence is simply hearsay and inadmissible.
(iv) The house girl whom PW1 said identified the appellant during an identification parade conducted by the police at Akure was not called by the prosecution to give evidence. PW1’s evidence on the identification of the appellant by the house girl amounted to hearsay. It is only the house girl that can give evidence of what she did during the alleged identification parade. See the case of Ogudu v. State (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 629) Pg. 1111 at 1131.
Learned Counsel added that more importantly, there was evidence from the prosecution especially PW1 and PW2 that the person they suspected to be the appellant (2nd accused person) did not enter the house, but was outside. There was also evidence from PW1 that the house girl did not know the appellant and that the appellant was not one of the robbers that allegedly attacked and raped the house girl. The questions, said Counsel are how can the house girl identify somebody she had never met or had contact with in her life? How can one identify a complete stranger? That such evidence coming from PW1 is simply incredible.
Learned Counsel then quoted the evidence of PW2 and PW1 at page 30, 18 and 28 of the record. He submitted that from the evidence of PW1 and PW2 thereby quoted, there are material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the vital issue of the recognition of the appellant and whether the appellant was actually one of the robbers that robbed PW1 and PW2. That from their evidence, the following contradictions and inconsistencies are glaring:
(i) Whilst PW1 said that when he noticed that the dogs were barking and he peeped through the glass door, he did not see anything, but PW2 said that himself and PW1 peeped and they saw the appellant.
(ii) Whilst PW1 positively stated that he did not see the appellant (2nd accused person) during the armed robbery incident and that it was his wife that saw the appellant, PW2 claimed that himself and PW1 saw the appellant (2nd accused) when they both peeped through the glass door.
(iii) It was the evidence of PW1 that PW2 was in his study room when the armed robbers gained entry into the house and that the armed robbers went to meet the PW2 inside the study room. The PW2 on the other hand gave evidence that he was with the PW1 before the armed robbers gained entry into the house and they both peeped through the glass door where they both recognized the appellant.
Moreover, said Counsel, from the prosecution’s evidence, there was no close contact between the person identified as the appellant and PW2. In fact, by PW2’s evidence” – I notice that the dogs were attracted to a particular object near the gate area. It was at this stage we saw Matthew Thomas (2nd accused) (the appellant)…………..”
Learned Counsel therefore submitted that the conclusion of the Learned trial Judge at page 130 that “PW2 also saw the 1st and 3rd accused persons during the same operation. He also saw the 2nd accused as he peeped through the glass door when the armed robbers arrived the house” is perverse and should be set aside.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the learned trial Judge was right to have relied on the evidence of identification/recognition of the appellant by PW1 and PW2 to hold that the prosecution proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Learned Counsel referred to the case of Ikemson V State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 455 at 479 and submitted that identification evidence is evidence tending to show that the person charged with an offence is the same person who was seen committing the offence. That, where faced with identification evidence, the trial court should be satisfied that the evidence of identification proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused before the court was the person who actually committed the offence charged.
He conceded the guiding principles as to the ascription of any value to the evidence of an eye witness’s identification of an accused person as laid down in the case of Ochiba V State (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 608) 849 at 871 but submitted that the conditions in the case were taken into consideration and well evaluated by the trial judge in the conviction of the appellant.
That for example, the learned trial judge held not only that “he (that is PW2) also saw the 2nd accused as he peeped through the glass door when the armed robbers arrived in the house” but further that:
“There was generator light illuminating the entire premises including the rooms in the house. These armed robbers were not masked, so all the victims saw their faces as they unleashed terror and horror on their defenceless victims. All these pieces of evidence put together will no doubt prove the participation of the three accused persons in the robbery attack at PW1’s house and on his person and members of his family. Again, talking about circumstantial evidence, it has been established by PW3 (CPL. Amao) that a toy gun was found in the bag kept in the 1st accused’s room within 24 hours after the robbery incident at PW1’s house. Before this discovery of the toy gun, PW1 had made a statement to the police in which he mentioned the toy gun taken away from his house during the robbery operation is a strong evidence of participation of the people found in the room in the robbery attack. Therefore, taking these two sets of facts together, I make bold to say that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused persons took part in the robbery attack at PW1’s house on the night of 1st February 2008.”
Learned Counsel further referred to the evidence of PW2 at page 34 lines 8 – 18 and said it depicts that the circumstances in which the eye witness, that is PW2 saw the appellant was not a difficult situation. That, in the course of cross-examination, PW2 stated thus: “I have not suspected the 2nd accused, but I actually saw him on our premises on the night of the robbery attack.” (page 35 of the records).
Learned Counsel then quoted the evidence of PW1 when he saw the 2nd accused on the morning of the armed robbery operation as he was about coming out of Road 7 in Funbi Fagun Estate as follows:
“As we were about coming out of road 7 in Funbi Fagun Estate. That morning on our way to Akure, I saw the 2nd accused, Matthew Thomas, just adjacent to the main crescent. He was backing us at Road 7 and discussing with an Hausa man selling provisions. There, I moved quietly towards him and tried to grab him from the rear. But turned round and saw me and attempted to run. I however succeeded in grabbing him and he struggled with me, though he could not escape because I held on to his throat seeing that he could not escape, he finally succumbed to arrest by me”.
Also, that it is the uncontroverted evidence of PW1 that when we came back from Akure later that same afternoon, the 2nd accused had led the police to their house where they arrested the 1st and 3rd accused. That, this piece of evidence was corroborated by PW2, the son of PW1 who followed the police to where the arrest of 1st and 3rd accused took place. It was the 2nd accused (appellant) that acted as the pointer to co-accused. Reacting to the contention of the Appellant that PW2 did not describe the features of the appellant or mention his name to the police. Respondent Counsel referred to the case of Henry Otti V State (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 207) 103 at 106 and submitted that there is no law which required a witness to describe the peculiar features of an accused before the accused could be said to have been properly identified by the witness. It is sufficient if the suspect is properly identified by the witness. It is sufficient if the witness properly identified the accused. Counsel reiterated that it was the evidence of PW2 that when the appellant was arrested that he took them to the house of the 1st and 3rd accused persons where they were arrested. That PW3’s evidence confirmed the identification of the appellant when he said at page 49 that “It was the 2nd accused who upon his arrest took us to the house of the 1st and 3rd accused person where we arrested both men. The 2nd accused told us he passed just a night in the house where the 1st and 3rd accused persons were arrested”.
In deciding Appellant’s issue 1, if the question were limited to the unchallenged and direct evidence of PW2 that he saw the appellant on the night of the armed robbery incident, there would be enough room to argue as the Learned Counsel for the Appellant did that in this important respect, the evidence of PW1 contradicted that of PW2. To that extent, little or no weight would be given to the evidence of identification of the appellant offered by PW2.
However, the circumstances presented by the facts of the case become totally different if we are to proffer an answer to the wider question of whether the learned trial Judge was right to have relied on the evidence of identification/recognition of the appellant by PW1 and PW2 to hold that the prosecution proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This is because in the words of Section 9(b) of the Evidence Act 2011 there are other facts which by themselves or in connection with the fact of identification of the appellant by PW2 which make the identification of the appellant by PW2 probable in the circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the following facts and circumstances do work together to support or buttress the reliance of the learned trial Judge on the evidence of identification/recognition of the appellant by PW1 and PW2.
(i) PW1 and PW2 knew the appellant before the armed robbery incident as their gateman.
(ii) PW2 gave evidence that he saw the appellant as the person who was outside with the dogs on the night of the armed robbery incident.
(iii) On the morning of the armed robbery incident PW1 (who earlier mentioned the name of the appellant to the police as a member of the gang) spotted the appellant on the road.
(iv) The appellant on sighting PW1 took to his heels but was held on to and arrested by PW1 with the assistance of PW3 and one other policeman.
(v) In the company of PW2 the appellant took the police to their house where the police met the 1st and 3rd accused persons.
(vi) In the presence of the appellant and the two accused persons the police executed a search warrant in the house of the appellant and the other two accused person and recovered a bag which amongst other things contained a toy gun which PW1 claimed was one of the items carted away from his house on the day of the robbery incident.
(vii) The defence of the appellant was that at the time of the incident he was in the house in company of the 1st accused.
(viii) Meanwhile, the evidence of PW1 and PW2 show clearly that the 1st and 3rd accused were amongst those vividly seen as those that came in to attack them on the night of the robbery.
In all of the above circumstances I do not think the learned trial judge was wrong to have held at page 131 of the records that:
“I accept all evidence – direct and circumstantial backing up the involvement of the three accused persons in the armed robbery attack on PW1 and his household on 1st February 2008. I therefore find all the three guilty of the second count of the charge alleging armed robbery———–”
It is settled that a Judge, is permitted, to infer from the facts proved and other facts necessary, to complete the element of guilt or establish innocence. Such evidence, must however, be closely examined. The Judge has to be certain that there are no other co-existing circumstances which may weaken or destroy the inference.
See the cases of Teper V R/Queen (1952) AC 480 at 489, Anekwe V The State (1976) 9 – 10 SC 255, 264. (1976) 9 – 10 SC (Reprint) 158, Nasiru V The State (1999) 1 SC 1 (1999) 1 SCNJ 83 at 101, Ijioffor V The State (2001) 4 SC (Pt.11) 1, (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.718) 371 at 384, 390 – 391, (2001) 4 SCNJ 230.
Finally, having found as a fact that the evidence of the prosecution positively leads to the identification/recognition of the appellant, the defence of alibi becomes of no moment.
Issue 1 is resolved against the appellant.
On issue 2, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that for the prosecution to succeed in a charge or offence of conspiracy to rob and armed robbery, it must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following ingredients:
(a) That there was an agreement or confederacy between the convict and others to commit the offence of robbery.
(b) That in furtherance of the agreement or confederacy, the accused took part in the commission of the offence of robbery or series of robberies.
(c) That the robberies or each of the robbery was an armed robbery.
He referred to the case of Usufu V State (2008) All FWLR (Pt.405) 1731.
Counsel submitted that from the evidence led, the prosecution failed to establish any of the above ingredients against the appellant as required by law. That the issue at the trial was as to whether the appellant was one of the armed robbers, and whether the robbers were actually armed. He submitted that having regard to the totality of the evidence led, the lower court was wrong to have convicted the appellant for the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery.
Learned Counsel for the appellant proceeded to divide his submissions on issue 2 into (5) five legs as follows:
(a) The Evidence led by the prosecution is at variance with the charge laid.
(b) Material contradictions in the Evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
(c) The lower court wrong in relying on Exhibit B to convict the Appellant.
(d) Failure to properly evaluate the Defence put up by the Appellant.
(e) Offence of conspiracy not proved against the Appellant.
On (a) above, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the evidence adduced by the prosecution at the trial court is at variance with the particulars of the charge laid on vital issues. Counsel reproduced count 11 of the charge in pages 1 and 2 of the record of appeal.
He submitted that in an attempt to lead evidence in support of the charge, the prosecution called PW1 and PW2 who were victims of the armed robbery incident. That, the prosecution also called two investigating police officers as PW3 and PW4. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses was at variance with the charge as laid in two fundamental respects. First, that whilst the particulars of the charge in court quoted above did not contain the toy gun tendered and admitted as Exhibit B, as one of the items robbed from PW1, the PW1 in his oral evidence testified that the toy gun, Exhibit B, was one of the items robbed from him on 1/2/2008. The oral evidence of PW1 that the toy gun Exhibit B, was one of the items robbed from him, said Counsel, greatly influenced the mind of the learned trial judge in convicting the appellant for the offence of conspiracy and armed robbery. On this, Learned Counsel referred to the concluding part of the judgment of the trial court at page 131 of the records.
He furthered that the second fundamental area where the evidence led is at variance with the charge laid in this case is that whereas the particulars of the charge in court 11 on the substantive offence stated that the appellant and others were armed with “guns, cutlasses, etc,” the evidence led by the prosecution through PW1 was that the robbers that robbed PW1 used a wooden stick to hit him in the course of the robbery operation. That in fact, under cross-examination, the PW1 was very emphatic that no gun was used during the operation. He argued that it is important to mention that the issue here is not whether a stick can be categorized or regarded as an offensive weapon under Section 15 of the Act. But, rather that in view of the variance between the evidence led by the prosecution and the particulars of the offence charged, the prosecution can be said to have proved the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011.
On this, Counsel referred to the cases of Raymond Nwokedi V C.O.P. (1977) All NLR Pg. 11 and Aruna V State (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 125 at 135 where it was held that the purpose of a charge is to give to the defence (i.e. accused persons) due notice of the case they are to meet in court.
The learned trial Judge, said Counsel misconceived the issue when he held at pages 131 to 132 that under Section 13 (Sic) Section 15 of the robbery and fire arms Act “Offensive weapon” has been defined as any article (apart from a firearm) made or adapted for use, for causing injury to the person or intended by the person having it for such use by him and it includes “…………..any piece of wood capable of being used as an offensive weapon” He submitted that the learned trial Judge should have been concerned with the issue of the variance between the evidence led and the charge as laid and the effect on the burden and standard of proof on the prosecution.
On (b) above, Appellant’s counsel submitted that having regard to the material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in this case, the prosecution cannot be said to have proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He concedes that an appellate court will only set aside the judgment of a lower court on the ground that there are contradictions when such contradictions are material. He referred to the case of Awosika V State (2011) All FWLR (Pt.560) 1237. Learned Counsel proceeded to highlight the material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as follows:
(i) Whereas PW1 testified that when he noticed that the dogs were barking and he peeped through the glass door, he did not see anything but PW2 said that himself and PW1 peeped and they both saw the appellant. This contradiction touches on the credibility of the evidence of identification of the appellant and other accused persons given by PW1 and PW2.
(ii) It was the evidence of PW1 that PW2 was in his study room when the armed robbers gained entry into the house and that the armed robbers went to meet the PW2 inside the study room, but the PW2 on the other hand gave evidence that he was with the PW1 before the armed robbers gained entry into the house and they both peeped through the glass door and saw the appellant.
(iii) Another material contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is that whereas PW1 was emphatic that Exhibit ‘B’ the toy gun recovered from the room where the appellant slept, was one of the items robbed from him by the armed robbers; PW2 and PW3 on the other hand confirmed in their oral testimony that none of the items stolen from the house of PW1 was recovered from the room. All these contradictions were not explained by the prosecution.
Learned Counsel referred to the cases of Sunday V State (2010) All FWLR (Pt.548) 874 at 924 – 925 and Aruna V State (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 125 at 136 and submitted that where the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly conflict as in this case, it is not open to the prosecution to pick and choose between the testimonies. Similarly, that it is not to the court to credit and discredit the other unless a proper foundation is laid for such a course. Also, that where conflicting testimonies of prosecution witnesses raises a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the complainant, the doubt should be resolved in favour of the accused.
He referred again to the case of Aruna V State (Supra) at 127.
On (c) above, Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have relied on Exhibit ‘B’ to hold that the prosecution proved the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Learned Counsel quoted portions of the evidence of PW1 and PW3 at pages 40 and 29 of the record and submitted that the learned trial Judge findings at page 131 of the records are not supported by the totality of the evidence on record and are therefore findings in perversity. That, the learned trial Judge was misled by the evidence of PW1 without looking at the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses (PW2 and PW3) which sharply contradicted the evidence of PW1.
According to Counsel, it was wrong for the learned trial Judge to make reference to and rely on the extra judicial statement of PW1 where the learned trial Judge said that PW1 mentioned the toy gun (Exhibit B) as one of the items stolen from him. This, he said, is because PW1’s extra judicial statement was never tendered as an exhibit throughout the proceedings. Therefore, the learned trial Judge cannot even look at it talk less of relying on it in its judgment.
He referred to the case of State v Ogbubunjo (2001) FWLR (Pt. 37) 1097 at 1115 – 1116.
Counsel submitted that under cross-examination, both PW2 and PW3 were emphatic that none of the items stolen from the house was recovered from the appellant. If PW1 told PW3 that Exhibit B was part of the items robbed from him, PW3 would have included the item (toy gun) in the particulars of the charge in count 11. But, that the prosecution for this obvious reason did not include the toy gun as one of the items robbed from PW1 in the information filed. Learned Counsel referred to the case of Ekaidem V State (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 531) 1587 at 1614 and submitted that where as in the instant case, the findings of the trial court has been found to be perverse and not supported by evidence on record, an appellant court is justified to intervene and set aside the decision of the trial court based on such erroneous findings.
On (d) above, Learned Counsel submitted that the lower court failed to properly evaluate the totality of the evidence especially the defence raised by the appellant and the defence available to the appellant having regard to the evidence on record.
That the appellant denied the charges against him both in his extra judicial statements and the oral evidence in court. His evidence was not contradicted by the prosecution under cross-examination. ln such a situation, said Counsel, the lower court ought to have believed same.
He submitted further that in the present case, there was evidence from the prosecution supported by the defence that the toy gun (Exhibit B) relied on by the trial court as an evidence of recent possession of stolen items to convict the appellant was not part of the items stolen from PW1 during the armed robbery incident in the house of PW1. There was also evidence that the identification evidence adduced by the prosecution against the appellant are based on mere suspicion and incredible evidence. That it was also in evidence that the prosecution witnesses gave contradictory evidence on material facts as to whether Exhibit ‘B’ recovered from the room was part of the items stolen from PW1 And, that it is also evident from the record that the evidence led by the prosecution is at variance with the particulars of the charge laid on a vital issue as to the weapon used during the armed robbery incident.
Learned Counsel submitted that looking at the totality of the evidence led by the prosecution in this case, there is strong evidence that the arrest and prosecution of the appellant and others are based on suspicion and subsequent fabrication of stories by the prosecution to convict the appellant at all cost.
It is however trite law, said Counsel, that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of concrete proof. He referred to the case of Sunday V State (2010) All FWLR (Pt.548) 874 at 924 to say that a case can be fabricated if it has no foundation in fact or if the evidence connecting the accused person with the offence was manufactured, invented or fabricated.
On the conviction for the offence of conspiracy learned Counsel submitted that the conclusion of the learned trial Judge at page 130 of the record was wrong as it was not borne out by the evidence on record. That it is also wrong for the learned trial Judge to have considered and decided the issue of conspiracy before the substantive offence. He referred to the case of Awosika V State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 560) 1237 at 1256. Again, said Counsel, it is erroneous for the learned trial judge to hold as he did that simply because the appellant and the other accused persons slept in the same room or were together on 1st February 2008, they must have been together for illegal purpose. He argued that the appellant and the other accused persons gave unchallenged evidence as to how they came together and the fact that the appellant and 1st accused person are friends. The appellant, he said, was not arrested at the scene of crime and none of the items said to have been stolen from the PW1 was recovered from the appellant. That the evidence of identification/recognition led by the prosecution has been shown to be unreliable. Therefore, there is no credible evidence from the prosecution to support the findings of the trial court on the issue. Learned Counsel added that the evidence upon which the learned trial Judge found the appellant guilty of the offence of conspiracy is the same with that upon which the appellant was convicted of the substantive offence. And, that in the circumstances of the case, the Appellant ought not to have been charged separately for the offence of conspiracy.
On issue 2, Learned Counsel for the Respondent reiterated the necessary ingredients of the offence of conspiracy to rob and armed robbery by reference to the case of Usufu V State (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 405) 1731. He said from the totality of evidence led, the learned trial Judge was right to have convicted the Appellant for the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery. He also divided his submissions on the issue into four legs or segments as follows:
(i) The evidence led by the prosecution is not at variance with the charge laid.
(ii) There are no material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
(iii) on failure to properly evaluate the defence put up by the Appellant.
(iv) Offence of conspiracy was proved against the Appellant.
On (i) above, Learned Counsel for the Respondent reproduced count II of the charge and submitted in respect of the Appellant’s contention that the toy gun was not listed as item robbed in the charge, that the toy gun, was admitted as Exhibit ‘B’ in the course of trial. That, PW1 stated that the toy gun, Exhibit “B” was one of the items robbed from him on 1/2/2008. He submitted that failure to mention the toy gun in the particulars of the charge before the court is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. That, what the law requires is that sufficient notice of the charge must be given to an accused and this the prosecution has done.
He submitted that the learned trial Judge evaluated Exhibit ‘B’ properly before placing much weight on it and that this is evident from the evidence of PW1, PW3 and PW4. That, in the instant case, the learned trial Judge evaluated the oral testimony of all the prosecution witnesses before arriving at his conclusion that he accepts both direct and circumstantial evidence.
Learned Counsel submitted that it is the law that for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the evidence must be cogent and compelling and that there must be no aspect of the case which weakens or destroys any inference as to the guilt of the accused person.
After referring to the case of Atano V State (2005) 4 ACLR 25 at 30, he submitted that in the instant case, Exhibit B, the toy gun recovered from the Appellant points to the irresistible conclusion that it was the Appellant and others that robbed PW1 and his household on the night of 1st February, 2008.
Learned Counsel again submitted in response to the Appellant’s submission that the charge is not at variance with the evidence led for the failure of the prosecution to itemize ‘stick’ on the charge. He submitted that the assertion of the Appellant is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. This, he said, is because the prosecution used the word “etc” at the end of “cutlasses” in the charge. The meaning of “etc” is that what had earlier been listed is not foreclosed.
He referred to Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Edition page 573 that, the word “etc” means etcetera. Which means “And other things and indicates additional unspecified items in a series.” That “Stick” is in the series of dangerous weapons as envisaged by Section 15 of the Robbery and Firearms Special Provisions Act. He submitted that the evidence of prosecution witnesses with respect to the stick (Exhibit A) was not discredited under cross-examination.
In a situation like this, said Counsel, the law allows the court to make inference from facts proved and other facts necessary to complete the element of guilt or innocence of the accused person.
He referred to the case of Samson Ebenechi V The State (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt.1138) 431 at 447. He submitted that in the instant case, it has been established by evidence that the armed robbers used a stick to hit the head of PW1, and the ear/side of the head of his wife; that the effect of the stick was much to the extent that it cracked the skull of PW1 and also cut the cartilage of the ear of his wife, that the stick was found the following morning at the scene of crime, that a toy gun (Exhibit B) belonging to one of the children of PW1 was also found with the appellant and the other accused persons.
On (ii) above, Learned Counsel submitted that there is no contradiction at all on the credibility of the evidence of identification of the appellant and other accused persons given by PW1 and PW2. The appellant, said Counsel, was positively identified by PW2 as one of the armed robbers who attacked on the night of the robbery, the appellant was the gatekeeper in the house of PW1 up to December 2007. The evidence of PW2 that he saw the appellant is direct evidence and admissible within the provision of Section 126(a) of the Evidence Act 2011.
Learned Counsel submitted that it is not all contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that are fatal to the case. That, for any conflict or contradiction to be fatal, it must be substantial and fundamental to the main issue in question before the court. That what is material depends on the facts of each case and that in the instant case the discrepancies of the evidence of PW1 and PW2 cannot be tagged serious contradiction capable of rendering their evidence unreliable.
He referred to the case of Khaleel V State (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 156) 237 at 240.
He submitted that there are no material contradictions as to whether PW1 was in the study room or the sitting room when the armed robbers gained entry into the house as the issue is that he was in the house of his father when the armed robbery incident took place on the night of 1/2/2008. Also, that there is no contradiction between the evidence of PW3 and PW4 as to whether Exhibit B the toy gun recovered from the Appellant was one of the items robbed from PW1. It is the unchallenged evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 that Exhibit B, the toy gun was among the items robbed from the house of PW1.
The appellant said the bag containing the toy gun Exhibit B belonged to one Enete. Enete was never called by the Appellant to clear the issue of ownership and hence this weakens his defence. The toy gun (Exhibit B) said Counsel, was properly identified as one of the items recovered from the armed robbers.
Learned Counsel noted that what PW2 said in the course of his testimony was that none of the items removed from his room i.e. laptop computer, two wristwatches and two mobile phones was recovered from them. (page 34 of the record)
He submitted that where a contradiction does not raise doubt as to the guilt of an accused person, a trial Judge is entitled to discountenance such contradictory evidence.
He referred to the cases of Henrv Otti V State. (1991) 8 NWLR 103 at 108 and Atano V State (2005) 4 ACLR 25 at 30 and submitted that the material elements of the charge against the appellant have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
On (iii) above, Learned Counsel submitted that the trial judge properly evaluated the evidence on record in relation to the identification of the appellant by PW1 and PW2 and that the denial of the charge by the appellant in the presence of overwhelming positive and convincing evidence cannot avail him.
Learned Counsel referred to the case of State V Usman (2007) 5 ACLR 34 at 44 and submitted that it is not the duty of the court to speculate on a possible defence for an accused person where there is no evidence before the court suggesting such a defence. The learned trial Judge considered the Appellant’s defence though rejected in the face of both direct and circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the Appellant.
The Appellant, said Counsel, never called any witness to buttress the evidence that the toy gun belong to one Enete. Enete was never called as a witness. He submitted relying on the case of Offemette V The State (2000) FWLR (Pt. 12) 2081 at 2112 – 2113. That the only cause open to the learned trial Judge was to believe the evidence of PW1 in relation to Exhibit B.
On (iv) above, Learned Counsel referred to the finding and conclusion of the Learned trial Judge on the offence of conspiracy at page 130 of the record. He submitted that it is trite that the offence of conspiracy is hardly provable by direct evidence. It is usually proved by inference drawn from the agreement on the meeting of the minds of the accused persons which tend to show that they acted in tandem in relation to the principal offence charged.
He referred to the cases of Adejobi V The State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 585) page 850, Nkemson V The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 110) page 455 and Abacha V State (2003) 3 ACLR page 333. Where the courts said there is no statutory definition of the offence of conspiracy, that the meeting of the minds is inferred even where the accused person have no physical contact.
He submitted that though the appellant was not arrested at the scene of crime, evidence of his reliable identification by PW2 who had seen and known him before the robbery incident is sacrosanct. Also, the evidence upon which the learned trial Judge found the Appellant guilty of offence of conspiracy is in tandem with that upon which the Appellant was convicted of the substantive offence.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant raised two points as to the issue of the evidence led by the prosecution being at variance with the charge. The first is that the stick used was not included in the items mentioned in the particulars of the charge and the second is that the toy gun Exhibit B was not one of the items listed in the charge as part of the items stolen in the house of PW1.
I do not think that any of the above mentioned points is significant for the viability and/or sustainability of the charge against the appellant and the other two accused persons in the instant case. In the first place, there is no law which says the charge laid by the prosecution must necessarily exhaust all the items that were stolen in any such offence(s) relating to property as in the present one. Secondly, the learned Counsel for the Respondent has rightly pointed out that count II of the charge was equally not exhaustive as to the offensive weapons used at the time of the robbery, thus the use of the word “etc” after the mention of “guns, cutlasses” shows or perhaps gives notice that the prosecution intended to rely on other forms of offensive weapons used apart from guns and cutlasses or outside of guns and cutlasses. Therefore, the question in relation to that issue as rightly pointed out by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent turned to be whether “sticks” qualify as offensive weapons under the provision of Section 15 of the Robbery and fire arms (special provisions) Act and not whether the word “stick” was specially mentioned in the charge as suggested by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Again, the more important question in both of the enquiries raised by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant concerns the conformity or non-conformity of the charge with the provision of Section 152(1) and (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Ondo State.
The charge against the Appellant with the particulars in respect of count II as contained in pages 1 and 2 of the record are as follows.
COUNT II
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Armed Robbery, contrary to and punishable under Section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act Cap R 11 Vol. 14 the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
Benjamin Friday, Matthew Thomas and Nelson Friday on or about the 1st day of February 2008 at Ondo Judicial Division robbed Hon. Justice Williams Akin Akintoroye of a sum of N14,000.00 two sets of laptop computers, a suit a wrist watch, a pen, a double-barreled gun and jewelries and at the time of the robbery you were armed with offensive weapons, viz: guns, cutlasses etc.
There is no gainsaying that the above charge together with its particulars gave sufficient notice to the accused of the matter with which he is charged in accordance with the provision of Section 152(1) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Ondo State. Section 152(1) and (4) of the CPL read thus:
(1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the offence and the person, if any, against whom or the thing, if any, in respect of which it was committed as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.
(4) Where the nature of the offence is such that the particulars required by Section 151 of this Law and subsections (1) to (3) of this section do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall contain such particulars of the manner in which the offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose.
Also, it does not lie well in the situation of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant to argue that “Stick” was not included in the items of the particulars of the offence and that it was eventually a stick that was admitted in evidence as the offensive weapon used as Exhibit A. This is for the additional reason that the prosecution having used the words “armed with offensive weapons, viz: guns, cutlasses etc” the defense could have exercised an option of requesting for further particulars in relation to the charge on behalf of the defendant. In the absence of such a request, the burden is on the appellant to prove that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned.
See Enahoro V The State (1965) 4 N.S.C.C. 98.
This was not done in the instant case.
Clearly, therefore the Learned Counsel for the Appellant was wrong on his view that the evidence led by the prosecution is at variance with the charge either on account of the failure of the prosecution to include the toy gun Exhibit B as one of the items stolen or on account of the no-inclusion of stick Exhibit A specifically as the offensive weapon used in the attack of 1/2/2008. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also believe that there are contradictions in the case of the prosecution as to the identification/recognition of the Appellant by PW1 and PW2 and also contradictions as to the recovery and/or ownership of the toy gun Exhibit B in between the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. There could of course be discrepancies in matters of detail in between the prosecution witnesses on these vital points, but I do not share the view of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on these two points. For example, in relation to the recovery and identification of Exhibit B, the evidence of PW3 and PW4 show that the toy gun was recovered in the bag kept in the room where the Appellant and the two other accused persons slept soon after the robbery incident. The evidence of PW1 which identified Exhibit B as belonging to one of his children and as one of the items carted away in the course of the robbery incident remained unchallenged and uncontradicted. None of the prosecution witnesses, that is PW2 or PW3 said anything hearing the opposite of the testimony of PW1 that the toy gun belongs to one of his children or that it was not one of the items taken away by the robbers. In such a situation one cannot as a matter of law say there was a material contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as regards the recovery and identification of Exhibit B.
Now, the word “contradiction” comes from two Latin words “contra” which means “opposite” and “dicere” which means “to say”. Therefore to contradict is to speak or affirm the contrary. A piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other asserts, and not necessarily when there are some minor discrepancies, in say details between them. In other words, contradiction between two pieces of evidence goes rather to the essentiality of some being or not being at the same time. Whereas minor discrepancies depend on the person’s status and capacity for observing meticulous details”.
See Dagayya V State (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt.980) 637. Also in Ayo Gabriel V The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 457 at 468. Nnaemeka -Agu JSC had this to say:
“A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what the other evidence has stated, not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradict one another when they are by themselves inconsistent. On the other hand, ‘a discrepancy’ may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of, or contains a little more than, what the other piece of evidence says or contains some minor differences in details.”
In the instant case, I do not think there are material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses either on account of the identification/recognition of the Appellant or on account of the recovery and identification of Exhibit B.
Again, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant could not be right to have suggested that the trial court did not consider the defences put forward or open to the Appellant. The Appellant did put forward a defence of alibi. That defence becomes of no moment and pales into insignificance in the face of credible evidence of identification/recognition which fixes the Appellant to the scene of crime.
It is now settled that even though it is the duty of the prosecution, to check on a statement of alibi by an accused person and disprove the alibi or attempt to do so, there is no inflexible and or invariable way of doing this. If the prosecution, adduces sufficient and accepted evidence to fix a person at the scene of crime at the material time, his alibi is thereby logically and physically demolished and that would be enough to render such plea, ineffective as a defence.
See the cases of Patrick Njovens & Ors V The State (1973) 5 SC (Reprint) 12 (1973) NMLR 331, Gachi v The State (1965) NMLR 333, (1965) NNLR 233, Yanor & Anor V The State (1965) NMLR 337 (1965) 1 ANLR 199, Nwabueze & Ors V The State (1988) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 157, (1988) 7 SCNJ (Pt. 11) 248 at 260, Ndukwe V The State (2009) 2 – 3 SC (Pt. 11) 35 at 72.
Finally, on the issue of conspiracy, I agree with the Learned Counsel for the Respondent that the evidence upon which the learned trial Judge found the Appellant guilty of offence of conspiracy is in tandem with that upon which the Appellant was convicted of the substantive offence.
The learned trial Judge was thus right to have held at page 130 of the record inter alia that:
“………the fact that all the three who were together in the evening of 1st February 2008 were also identified by the victims of the robbery at PW1’s house is a conclusive proof of the offence of conspiracy. I therefore hold that the 1st count of the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt against all the three accused persons. I found them guilty of the offence of conspiracy accordingly”.
This is because the offence of conspiracy has clearly over the centuries been committed by being a member of what in the old books is referred to as a “confederacy” – that is to say, being one of two or more persons acting or planning to act in concert under some agreement – be it express or implied – in pursuit of a criminal design.
See. R. V Simmonds (1969) 1 QB 685, David Omotola & 4 Ors V The State (2009) 2 – 3 SC (Pt. 11) 196 at 243.
In order to get conviction on a count of conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the element of an agreement to do something which is unlawful or to do something which is lawful by unlawful means. Conspiracy is an offence which is difficult to prove because it is often hatched in secrecy. And, because of the nature of the offence of conspiracy, it is rarely or seldom proved by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence and inference from certain proved acts.
In the instant case the evidence of identification/recognition which fixes the appellant and other accused persons as participants in the armed robbery in the house of PW1 proved that the Appellant and others acted in pursuance of a criminal purpose held in common between them and that each of the conspirator know that there was in existence or coming into existence a scheme which went beyond the illegal act which he agreed to do.
See: R. V Griffiths (1966) 1 QB 589, 49 Cr. App. R.279.
Having considered the various legs of Appellant’s issue 2, the issue is resolved against the Appellant.
The two (2) issues in this appeal are resolved against the Appellant. The appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
The conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the Hon. Justice I.A. Adegbenro on 16th August 2012 is hereby affirmed.
SOTONYE DENTON WEST, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, JCA. I do agree with the reasonings and conclusions reached therein, but differ with him on the sentencing.
I am inclined to further remark that the appellant did not disprove the fact that PW1 and PW2 know him before the robbery incident since he was their former gate keeper up to December, 2007.
At page 32 of the record of appeal, PW2 testified as follows:
“The 2nd accused was our gatekeeper in the house up to December, 2007. He was in charge of the dogs. He fed them, apart from his normal gate-keeping duties. The dogs stopped barking when they were attracted to the gate.”
Also at page 34, PW2 further testified as follows:
“The scene was well lit. And as soon as the accused persons came into our living room, they started dishing out orders.”
Upon cross examination, PW2 confirmed as follows:
“I have not suspected the 2nd accused but I actually saw him on our premises on the night of the robbery attack.”
Given this uncontracdicted evidence of PW2, one is left in no difficulty in agreeing that PW2 had no problem recognizing and identifying the appellant as one of those that attacked and robbed them on 1/2/2008.
For this and the more detailed reasonings marshaled out in the lead judgment by my learned brother, I concur with the conviction of the appellant but disagree with the death sentence handed down and confirmed by my learned brother in the lead judgment. I took this position because of the sanctity of life and the indisputable fact that as mere mortals, our reasoning are not infallible. No one has the right to take the life of another. On the strength of this, I hereby affirm the conviction but commute the sentence of death handed down on the appellant by the Hon. Justice I. A. Adegbenro on 16th August, 2012 to life imprisonment.
CORDELIA IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A.: I read in draft before now the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, OWOADE, JCA. I adopt every reasoning and conclusion reached therein by him as mine.
The learned trial Judge was indeed right when he attached weight and value to the evidence of identification of the appellant by the PW1 and PW2, notwithstanding that the PW1 did not personally identify the appellant as one of the armed robbers that robbed his residence. PW1’s evidence was in no way directed or aimed at establishing the fact that he identified the appellant, rather it was aimed at establishing that the said appellant was identified as one of the armed robbers which on its own is a fact relevant to the fact in issue. PW1 testified thus:
“…… At the SARS office Akure, an identification parade was conducted with the three accused persons forming part of the 9 men paraded. My housemaid who was a victim of their indecent assault easily identified these three accused persons while claiming that the fourth person who also assaulted her sexually was not on the parade.”
PW1’s message in the foregoing is very clear and that is that he was present when his house girl positively identified the appellant as one of the robbers who robbed the PW1’s residence. Though the said house girl was for obvious reasons not called as a witness, yet the prosecution who was not obliged to call every material witness at its disposal was still able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.
As for the PW2, though he never saw or knew the appellant before the armed robbery, yet he was emphatic about the fact that he saw with his eyes and heard the appellant ordering them about in the course of the robbery. PW2 in his evidence said that the appellant and his group were not masked at the time of the robbery operation. It was therefore easy for him to take in the features of the appellant consequent upon which he was able to promptly identify him. After all it is trite that the best identification is the prompt one by the victim or people who saw the crime committed. See Adamu vs. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.187) 530.
For this and the fuller and more in-depth reasons marshaled out in the lead judgment by my learned brother, I too shall dismiss the appeal and it is so dismissed.
Appearances
Ayo AsalaFor Appellant
AND
Miss S.A. Adegoke DDLR/PSL Ministry of Justice Ondo StateFor Respondent
