STEPHEN OGBEBOR & SONS SAWMILL LIMITED v. CHIEF JOHN OSAMEDE ADUN (2014)

STEPHEN OGBEBOR & SONS SAWMILL LIMITED v. CHIEF JOHN OSAMEDE ADUN

(2014)LCN/7135(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 15th day of April, 2014

CA/B/20/2009

JUSTICES

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

STEPHEN OGBEBOR & SONS SAWMILL LIMITED Appellant(s)

AND

CHIEF JOHN OSAMEDE ADUN Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ARISE FROM THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

It is a well settled principle of law, that issues must correspondingly be distilled from competent grounds of appeal. Where issues raised in an appeal are not distilled from, or covered by the grounds of appeal, they are liable to be discountenanced and struck out. See HOUSE OF REPS VS. SPDCN (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 213 @ 244; CEAKAY TRADERS LTD V. GEN MOTORS LTD. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 132. PER SAULAWA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT WHERE THE COMPETENCE OF A PARTY TO INSTITUTE AN ACTIO IN A COURT OF LAW IS IN ISSUE, THE PLAINTIFF HAS TEH BURDEN OF PROVING THE SAME

As a trite law, that issue is not a new issue, but rather a continuation of the case fought at the court below by the respective parties. See ADEGOKE MOTORS LTD V. ADESANYA (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 @ 256 paragraphs G – H; AKPA V. ILODO (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 506) 589 @ 604 paragraphs C – D; AJAO V. SONOLA (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 533. The principle upon which the aforementioned authorities are predicated is to the combined effect that where the competence of a party to institute an action in a court of law is in issue, the plaintiff has the burden of proving same when called upon to do so, otherwise the matter is deemed incompetent and liable to be struck out. Instructively, in the case of EYEKAM V. DENEN INDUSTRIES LTD (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 417, this court had had the unique opportunity of once more reiterating the trite principle in the most unequivocal terms, to the effect that only a Board of Company in a general meeting thereof may institute an action in a court of law on behalf of the company. PER SAULAWA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A MANAGING DIRECTOR HAS THE POWER TO AUTHORISE THE INSTITUTION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE COMPANY’S NAME

Most particularly, in the case of TASA LTD VS. DENTRAS NIG. LTD (Supra), this court was reported to have aptly reiterated the well settled principle, to the effect thus:
“A Managing Director has got no power to authorise the institution of legal proceeding in the company’s name without the requisite authority from the Board of Directors or the shareholders.” Per Muhammad, JCA (as he then was) @ 358 paragraph G. See also Sections 63, 65, & 66 of the Companies & Allied Matters Act (Supra). PER SAULAWA, J.C.A.

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The present appeal is a fallout of the Judgment of the High Court of Edo State, Benin Judicial Division which was delivered on July 30, 2007 in Suit No. B/194/2003. By the Judgment in question, the court below, coram A.N. Erhabor, J; dismissed the Appellant’s suit for lack of competence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

It is evident from the record of appeal, that the said suit was instituted at the court below vide a writ of summons dated April 4, 2003 seeking some declaratory and injunctive reliefs. By the Amended Statement of Claim, dated April 19, 2005, the reliefs sought by the Appellant against the Respondent are as follows:
(a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of and in possession of a piece of land marked as “A”, “B” and “C”, each containing an area of about 3, 675 acres, 3115.84 square yards and 3318.84 Square Yards respectively, lying, being and situate at Evbuoriaria Village Benin/Sapele Road. Benin City and more particularly delineated in Survey Plan No. OM/839.
(b) A declaration that the Plaintiff is the person entitled to apply for and be granted a Certificate of Occupancy in respect of the land marked as “A”, “B” and “C” containing an area of about 3,675 acres, 3115.84 square yards and 3318.84 square yards, lying, being and situate at Evboriaria Village, Benin/Sapele Road Benin City and more particularly delineated in Survey Plan No. OM1839 bounded by Beacon Numbers MA671, MA672, MA4213, MA673, MA4214, MA4212, MA4211, MA4210, MA1087, MA1088 and MA4211.
(c) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant by himself, his servants, agents and or privies from further trespassing or doing anything/act which is adverse to the Plaintiffs right to the said piece or Parcel of land.
(d) N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) being general damages against the Defendant for his unlawful claim and trespass on the said land.

Contrariwise, by the statement of defence thereof, dated May 27, 2004, the Respondent denied the Appellant’s claim. Pleadings having been exchanged by the respective parties, the Suit eventually proceeded to trial. Two witnesses testified for the Appellant. Various documents were tendered by the Appellant, which were accordingly admitted as Exhibits A, B, C, D & E, respectively. On the part thereof, the Respondent called two witnesses and tendered Exhibits F, G, H, J, K, L, M and N, respectively. At the end of the trial of the Suit, the lower court delivered the vexed Judgment on the said date, to the conclusive effect thus:
In conclusion, I hold that the plaintiff has not been able to establish its competence to institute this suit… Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for all the reasons afore-stated.

Not unnaturally, dissatisfied with the Judgment in question, the Appellant filed the instant appeal. The Appellant’s amended brief of argument was filed on 07/8/12, but deemed properly filed on 28/3/13. The Respondent’s amended brief was filed on 19/6/3. On the 06/02/14, when the appeal lastly came up for hearing, the learned counsel argued the appeal, thus resulting in reserving Judgment for delivery.

At page 2 of the said amended brief thereof, the Appellant’s learned counsel, Mrs. Stafan Ezomo, formulated three issues for determination, viz:
(i) Whether the plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to show that in the land in dispute vested in it on the preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities.
(ii) Whether PW1 has authority to institute this action which is the bedrock of Defendant’s defence.
(iii) Whether it is possible to share a company’s property as port of the Estate of the deceased.

From the outset, it was submitted on Issue No. 1 that the Appellant had proffered sufficient evidence to show that the title on the land in dispute vested in the Appellant on the preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities.
See DAOUDU V. NNPC (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 538) (SC); OMORHERI VS. ENATEVWER (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 746 @ 766 – 767 (SC).

Reference was made to the trite procedure for determining on which side of the imaginary scale the evidence adduced would tilt, and the five ways of proving title to land, as laid down in various cases including ODOFIN V. MOGAJI (1978) 4 SC 91, 94; IDUNDUN VS. OKUMAGAGBA (1976) 10 NSCC 445, 453 – 454; (1975) 9 – 10 SC 77, etc.

It was further submitted, that by the evidence of PW1 and Exhibits A, B, C & D, the Appellant showed that it has been in actual possession of the land in dispute. That, the PW1 testified that the Appellant took one G.N. Eribo to court in 1986 in respect of the land in dispute. Exhibit E is the CTC of the court processes in respect of the said Suit, which allegedly was neither challenged nor controverted. The court must deem same as true and admitted. Thus, the Appellant has proved his title to the land in dispute.

Contrariwise, the Respondent’s title was allegedly based on Exhibit K. The DW2, under cross-examination said the Appellant had a lot of property which was shared. He claimed that in conjunction with his junior brother, Patrick Ogbebor, he sold their portions to the Respondent. From Exhibits K (Memo of Sharing) and N (Deed of Transfer), what was given to DW2 was 100ft by 100ft, thereby making a total of three plots. While what was transferred to the Respondent were 200ft by 200ft i.e. four plots. Thus, raising the question of “where did they get the extra one plot?”

Regarding issue No. 2, it was submitted without any much ado, that the PW1 can sue as agent of the Appellant. And that the DW1 cannot challenge the PW1’s authority to sue for the Appellant. See SOTOMUNU VS. OCEAN STEAMSHIP NIG. LTD (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 66) 697, 692 – 693; OROTO COMPANY LAW AND PRACTICE @ 82 – 83.
Referring to page 53 of the Record, the learned counsel contended that the DW2 had admitted under cross-examination to the existence of a ruling in Suit No. FHC/B/1/M3: EFOSA OGBEBOR & S. 4. OGBEBOR & SONS V. ROLAND OGBEBOR. That in the said Suit, the challenge to his authority (to sue) was thrown out.

Further submitted, that the ruling in question is binding on the Respondent.
He is estopped from raising the issue. Substantial justice must be done in individual cases, as the courts frown at technical justice. See SECTION 37 CAMA; FALOBI V. FALOBI (1976) 7 – 10 SC; FAGUNWA V. ADIBI (2004) 12 MJSC; FOSS v. HARBOTTLE (1843) 2 HARE 461; 67 ER; UDOH V. OKITIPUPA OIL PALM PLC & ANOR (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 58.

On the issue No. 3, it was submitted that upon incorporation, the Appellant became distinct from its founder, S.U. Ogbebor. See Exhibits L & M; SALOMON V. SALOMON & CO (1879) AC @ 22, et al.

Further submitted, that a company’s solicitor may institute an action in the name of the company without being authorised to do so, if the latter’s interests and rights are in jeopardy. See LADEJOBI VS. ODUTOLA HOLDINGS LTD (2002) 3 NWLR (Pt. 753) 130; ASABORO vs. WN FINANCE CORP. (1978) 1 NCLR 266; OROJO: COMPANY LAW & PRACTICE, 3rd Edition @ 307.

Conclusively, the court is urged upon to resolve the (three) issues in favour of the Appellant; and accordingly enter Judgment thereof.

On the part thereof, the Respondent’s learned counsel, Olayiwola Esq, raised some preliminary points at pages 4 – 6 of the brief thereof. Allegedly, there are only two grounds of appeal as borne from the Amended Notice of Appeal. That, there cannot be more issues than the grounds of appeal. And that any issue not covered by grounds of appeal is liable to be struck out. HOUSE OF REPS VS. SPDCN (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 213 @ 244; CEAKAY TRADERS LTD v. GEN. MOTORS CO. LTD (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 132.

Equally submitted, that none of the said three issues has in fact been tied down to any ground of the grounds of appeal.

Regarding issue No. 1, it was submitted, that issue goes to no issue in view of the fact that there is still in existence a suit challenging the power of the family to share the various companies’ properties, including the land in dispute. See paragraphs 4, 6, 7 & 8 of the Statement of Defence (Page 11, Record), and Exhibit G.

Furthermore, it was submitted, that the argument raised under issue No. 1 goes to specific issue, thus cannot come under omnibus ground of appeal. The court is urged to discountenance same. See OSOLU VS. OSOLU (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 32) 608, per Musdapher, JSC (as he then was).

On issue No. 2, it was submitted that the Appellant never joined issue in relation to this critical issue at the trial, having not filed a reply thereto. He cannot do so now. See ADEGOKE MOTORS LTD VS. ADESANYA (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 @ 259 H; LONGE VS. FBN PLC (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 313) 46 @ 53; AJAO vs. SONOLA (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 533 @ 534; EYEKAM V. DENEM IND. LTD (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 417.

That, the Appellant’s submission regarding the number of directors is false, as Exhibit L (Memorandum of Association) shows that the Appellant has four and not two directors.

In conclusion, the court is urged to dismiss this appeal, as same is lacking in merits.

I have amply considered the submissions of the learned counsel, contained in the respective briefs of argument thereof vis-Ã -vis the Record of appeal, as a whole.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION

It is evident, that the original Notice of Appeal, dated and filed on 18/10/07 is contained at pages 80 – 81 of the Record. The original notice of appeal in question is predicated upon a sole ground (Omnibus Ground), to the effect thus:
“3. GROUND(S) OF APPEAL
(i) The Judgment of the court below is against the weight of evidence.

With the leave duly granted by this court, the Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal on 28/3/13, which is predicated upon the following two grounds:
(a) The Judgment of the court below is against the weight of evidence.
(b) The learned trial judge below erred in law when he held that since there was specific authority to sue by the company’s Directors, the plaintiff in the case at the lower court, the company itself, had no locus to institute the action.

PARTICULARS OF ERROR
(a) The learned trial judge in the court below pegging all his decision when he held that because the Appellant did not obtain the company’s authority to sue, he lacked locus standi. By so holding, he ignored the rule in Foss V. Harbottle (1843) 2 HARE 461 or 67 ER, 189 which identified certain exceptions to the general rule.
(b) Besides, the cause of action was title to land in Benin and there was abundant evidence that the Defendant’s acquisition of the land in dispute was a nullity since his transferor did not have requisite title to transfer the land in dispute.
(c) Learned judge completely ignored the evidence of PW2 at page 26 of the Record of Proceeding to the effect that the Law Firm of Chief Osaheni Uzamere ore legal advisers to the plaintiffs company.

By the said amended notice of appeal thereof, the Appellant has urged upon the court to set aside the vexed Judgment of the court below, and in its stead enter Judgment in favour of the Appellant. Most unfortunately, however, the Appellant has not deemed it appropriate, or even expedient, to file a reply brief to address the preliminary points raised in the Respondent’s brief in question. Firstly, I would want to appreciate the very fact that there are only two grounds of appeal upon which the appeal is predicated. It is, therefore, a misnomer for the Appellant to raise and argue three issues for determination in the brief thereof. It’s against the rules of the court for the Appellant, or any party for that matter, to formulate more issues more than the grounds upon which the appeal is predicated, what is notoriously known as proliferation of issues. It is a well settled principle of law, that issues must correspondingly be distilled from competent grounds of appeal. Where issues raised in an appeal are not distilled from, or covered by the grounds of appeal, they are liable to be discountenanced and struck out. See HOUSE OF REPS VS. SPDCN (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 213 @ 244; CEAKAY TRADERS LTD V. GEN MOTORS LTD. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 132.

Secondly, it’s also obvious, that none of the two issues raised in the Appellant’s brief has been specifically tied down, or related, to any of the two grounds of appeal in question.

Thirdly, I equally appreciate and do agree with the Respondent’s learned counsel, that the omnibus ground of appeal is not proper where (as in the instant case) weight is being attached to any particular piece of evidence. In the case of OSOLU vs. OSOLU (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 32) 508, the Apex court was recorded to have aptly held, inter alia, that –
When a complaint is against the weight of evidence, the complaint must be against the totality of the evidence adduced before the trial court not against any specific issue. The complaint only concerned with the appraisal and evaluation of all the evidence and not the weight to be attached to any particular piece of evidence.
That being the case, any argument canvassed under the said issue No. 1 goes to no specific issue, and cannot therefore be argued under an omnibus ground such as the ground 1. And I so hold.

Most instructively, at pages 56 to 57 of the Record of Appeal, the lower court referred to the four issues identified by the Appellant in the written address thereof, viz:
(B) Whether the land in dispute which is a company property can be shared as part of the personal estate of the founder of the company.
(A) Whether the plaintiff has proved his case on a balance of probabilities.
(C) Whether the defendant who is a privy if PW2 is not caught by the doctrine of estoppels in raising the issue of authority to institute the action.
(D) Whether the court has jurisdiction to make any pronouncement on the internal management of a company.

Consequent upon reviewing the submissions of the respective learned counsel, the lower court observed at pages 72 -73 of the Record, thus:
In paragraph 6 of the statement of defence as earlier stated, it was averred that the defendant states that the company has not authorised anybody to sue in respect of the subject matter of this suit and it is Mr. Roland Ogbebor who personally initiated this suit have failed in the motion he filed for interlocutory injunction in Suit No. B/609/98.
One has to necessarily consider this issue first, as the entire case depends and rests on the court’s decision on the issue…
This issue is undoubtedly crucial in the determination of the entire suit and the plaintiff was put on notice when the defendant raised it in the statement of defence. No reply was filed to controvert or rebut the averment of lack of competence to file the suit. The court can assume that this was admitted by plaintiff.

Conclusively, on this issue, the lower court held, inter alia, thus –
In conclusion, I hold that the plaintiff had not been able to establish its competence to institute this suit. The authority to institute this legal proceeding having not been shown or proved in court, this court is incompetent … and to adjudicate over and the matter…
Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for all the reasons aforesaid. See pages 78 -79 of the Record.

Thus, against the back-drop of the foregoing highlight, I have deemed it expedient to appreciate and hold, that there is only one fundamental issue which calls for determination in the instant appeal, viz:
1. Whether the court below was right in holding as it did in the vexed Judgment that the court was incompetent … to adjudicate over the matter and thereby dismissing same.

Undoubtedly, the above sole issue essentially relates to Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal, deemed properly filed on 28/3/13, with the leave of this court.

Interestingly, the Appellant, for reasons best known thereto, failed to join issue regarding the very crucial issue of non-filing of reply to the Respondent’s Address alluded to above. As a trite law, that issue is not a new issue, but rather a continuation of the case fought at the court below by the respective parties. See ADEGOKE MOTORS LTD V. ADESANYA (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 @ 256 paragraphs G – H; AKPA V. ILODO (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 506) 589 @ 604 paragraphs C – D; AJAO V. SONOLA (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 533. The principle upon which the aforementioned authorities are predicated is to the combined effect that where the competence of a party to institute an action in a court of law is in issue, the plaintiff has the burden of proving same when called upon to do so, otherwise the matter is deemed incompetent and liable to be struck out.

Instructively, in the case of EYEKAM V. DENEN INDUSTRIES LTD (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 534) 417, this court had had the unique opportunity of once more reiterating the trite principle in the most unequivocal terms, to the effect that only a Board of Company in a general meeting thereof may institute an action in a court of law on behalf of the company.

In the instant case, the PW1, Roland Ogbebor, had testified under cross-examination, inter alia, thus:
“I was authorized by the company to sue. The authority by the company will be in the office, I have list of directors, it is in my office… I have document in the office appointing me as Chief Executive Officer.”

Ironically, however, throughout the period the trial of the matter lasted at the court below, the DW1 did not deem it expedient to tender the purported document evidencing that he was actually authorised by the Appellant to institute the instant action on behalf thereof. The purported letter appointing him as the Chief Executive of the Appellant equally remains a mystery, exclusively known only to the PW1. See UDOH VS. OKITIPUPA OIL PALM PLC (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 88 @ 64; TASA LTD V. DENTRAS NIG. LTD (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 478) 360 @ 368.

I would want to agree with the Respondent’s postulation, to the effect that the case of SOTIMINU VS. OCEAN STEAMSHIP NIG. LTD (Supra), cited and relied upon by the Appellant, is not directly applicable to the instant case. And the reason being that in the instant case, it’s not been established that the legal practitioner, Edito E. Amen Obi-Ojo (Mrs.) of UZAMERE & CO, that instituted the action was truly the Legal Adviser of the Appellant.

This particular crucial issue has been extensively dealt with by the lower court, at pages 74 -76 of the Record. Not surprisingly, the above findings of the lower court have not been challenged by the Appellant by way of an appeal. Yet, it’s well settled principle, that where no specific grouse or complaint is made against findings of a trial court, as in the instant case, the effect is that such findings stand to subsist. Thus, an appellate court is devoid of competence or power to delve therein. See OGENI VS. BAJULU (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 164 @ 183 to 184.

In the light of the foregoing postulations, I am of the paramount view, that the lower court was right in holding, as it did, in the vexed Judgment to the effect that the authority to institute the instant action has not been proved by the Appellant. Thus, the said sole issue is resolved against the Appellant.

Before putting the last dot to this Judgment, I have deemed it expedient to allude to the fact (as rightly noted by the learned counsel at paragraph 4.05, page 8 of Respondent’s brief), that the matter regarding whether or not the Appellant’s properties could be shared by the family members is still the crux of the subject matter in Suit No. 8/609/98: ROLAND OGBEBOR VS. MR. R.I.I. OGBEBOR & 11 ORS. See paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Respondent’s Statement of Defence, contained at page 11 of the Record, thus:
6. The Defendant states that the company has not authorized anybody to sue in respect of the subject matter of this suit and it is Mr. Roland Ogbebor who personally initiated this suit having failed in the motion he filed for Interlocutory Injunction in Suit No/B/609/98.
7. The Defendant states that the said Mr. Roland Ogbebor once filed a suit in Suit No. B/609/98 and the name of parties are Roland Ogbebor V. R.I.I. Ogbebor and eleven others. The Defendant will rely on a Certified True Copy of the ruling dismissing the motion for Interlocutory Injunction filed by Roland Ogbebor and the Statement of Claim filed by Mr. Roland Ogbebor therein.
8. The Defendant will at the trial of this suit raise the issue that this suit is an abuse of court process and should be dismissed.
9. The Defendant states that the said Roland Ogbebor sued in respect of this property when the distribution was made by the family and the matter is still pending in Court.

The said Suit No. B/609/98 was instituted by no other person than the PW1 himself. Thus, there is every cogent reason for this court to hold, that the filing of the present action was orchestrated by the PW1 to deliberately pre-empt and render nugatory the determination of the Suit No. 8/609/98 in question. Thus, I am of the paramount view, that the instant action has amounted to a gross abuse of court process. And I so hold.
Hence, having effectively resolved the sole issue against the Appellant, there is every cogent reason for me to hold that the instant appeal is grossly unmeritorious, and it’s accordingly hereby dismissed by me.

CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER
As regards the proper order that ought to have been made, I am of the considered view that the court below erred when it dismissed the suit instead of striking it out. At pages 34 to 35 of the Record, the court below held thus:
In conclusion, I hold that the Plaintiff has not been able to establish its competence to institute this suit. The authority to institute this legal proceeding, having not been shown or proved in court, this court is incompetent and to adjudicate over and (sic) the matter
…
Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for all the reasons aforesaid.

With due deference to the court below, the Suit ought to have been struck out. The reason simply being that where a court comes to the conclusion that it lacks the vires or jurisdictional competence to hear and determine an action, or that the action is rendered incompetent for whatever reason, it shall make an order striking out (and not dismissing) the suit. See HALILCO (NIG) LTD V. EQUITY BANK (NIG) LTD (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 1 @ 10 paragraph D & 11 paragraph A; 12 Paragraph C thus:
If the court had followed proper procedure in declaring the judgment of the trial court a nullity, it should have struck out the incompetent Suit pursuant to Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act. Therefore, pursuant to Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, I strike out the Suit No. K/750/2000 as incompetent and the Kaduna State High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. …
Appeal is allowed. Judgment of the Court of Appeal which nullified the Judgment of the trial court is, itself declared null and void, and Suit No. K/750/2000 in the High Court Kaduna State is struck out for being incompetent and for want of jurisdiction in the High Court to hear and determine it. Per Ngwuta, JSC @ 12 paragraphs C – E. See also MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.

In the circumstance, having dismissed the appeal, I have no hesitation in holding that the Suit No. B/194/2003 in question ought to be, and same is hereby, struck out for being incompetent.
Parties to bear their respective costs of litigation.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA JCA. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is wholly unmeritorious and ought to be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed by me.
No order as to costs.

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead judgment prepared by my learned brother, Saulawa, JCA; and I agree that the appeal is unmeritorious. Therefore, I too dismiss the appeal.

Appearances

MRS STEFAN EZOMOFor Appellant

AND

MISS E.E. OISAMOJEFor Respondent