DR. N.S. NWAWKA v. MR. ALLOY OHAZURIKE
(2014)LCN/6886(CA)
RATIO
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: HOW THE COURTS CONSIDERS ACTION IN CONTEMPT OF COURT
Now, the essence of contempt is action or inaction amounting to an interference with, or obstruction of, or having a tendency to interfere with, or obstruct, due administration of justice and it consists of any act which is calculated to hinder or embarrass the court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity – Awobokun Vs Adeyemi (1968) NMLR 289 and, Ezeji Vs Ike (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt 486) 206. Contempt of court occurs when a person to whom an order of the court of competent jurisdiction is directed to do or to refrain from doing an act defies the order or seeks one subterfuge or the other to refuse to comply with the order. “The term also embraces such invidious acts as insults or unsavoury comments with very sinister motives against a court with a view to denigrating the court and swear besmirch its nobility, its majesty, its aura, its responsibility or indulging in expressive sinister and offensive acts or words that would lower the esteem of the court in the eyes of the public” – Odu Vs Jolaoso (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt 950) 178.
The power of the court to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of superior original jurisdiction and they are expressly preserved under our law because section 6 of the Criminal Code Act states that nothing in the Act or in the Code shall affect the authority of courts of record to punish for contempt. In Onagoruwa Vs Adeniji (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.293) 317, Tobi JCA (as he then was) put it thus: “I wish to add that the most cherished ‘property’ of the court is its judgment (and this includes its orders) and therefore where there is a move to deprive the court of that most cherished ‘property’, the court will definitely resist that move with all its judicial powers conferred by Section 6(6) of the Constitution as well as those which inhere in it. This is because once a court is denied or deprived of its judgment; it is not only reduced to the level of a toothless dog: it is no more a court.”
Similarly, in Ebhodagbe Vs Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt 905) 472, the Supreme Court stated that the power of the court to punish for contempt is derived from the Constitution and it is vested in the court so that it may preserve its dignity; and the power is completely independent of the jurisdiction to hear the substantive matter in the case. Also in Odu Vs Jolaoso (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt 950) 178 Pats-Acholonu JSC
(now of blessed memory) put the point thus: “By its nature, punishment for contempt is the exercise of the powers of the court to punish an offender for an act that somehow affects the dignity of the court in the administration of justice. It is an inherent power in that it is innate to the court once it is established. Essentially, it is invoked by the court to protect its dignity and majesty so its orders cannot be trivialized or treated with levity. In other words, a court exercises the power which is cognately vested in it as a judicial body.”
It can therefore be concluded that whenever the circumstances of proceedings dictate the necessary invocation by the court of its inherent powers to punish for contempt and impose the desired punishment, it shall be to preserve the magisterium of the court’s greatness in demonstrating that it is the bulwark against any invidious act or behavior that strikes at the root of the Rule of Law – Odu Vs Jolaoso supra.
Contempt is, generally, of two kinds, direct and constructive. Direct contempt is that committed in the immediate view and presence of the court such as insulting language or acts of violence or somewher near the presence of the court as to obstruct or interrupt the due and orderly course of proceedings. Constructive contempt is that which arise from matters not occurring in or near the presence of the court, but which tend to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice. Direct contempt is usually referred to as contempt in facie curia while constructive contempt is referred to as contempt ex facie curia. Contempt is also classed as civil or criminal. The former consists of the failure to do something which the party is ordered by the court to do for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding before the court, while criminal contempt is an act done in disrespect of the court or its process or which obstruct the administration of justice or tend to bring the court into disrepute. Contempt of court is an offence purely sui generis and its punishment involves, in most cases, an exceptional interference with the liberty of the citizen by a method or process which would in no other case be permissible or tolerated.
The acts which will constitute contempt of Court vary and they include acts which interfere with persons having duties to discharge in a court of justice. The general principle on this point was explained by Bowen, L.J. in R Vs Johnson (1887) 20 QBD 68 thus:
“The law has armed the High Court of Justice with the power and imposed on it a duty of preventing brevi manu and by summary proceedings an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. It is on that ground, and not on any exaggerated notions of dignity of individuals that insults to Judges are not allowed. It is on the same ground that insults to witnesses or to jurymen are not allowed. The principle is that those who have duties to discharge in a court of justice are protected by law, and shielded on their way to the discharge of such duties, while discharging them, and on their return therefrom, in order that such persons may safely have resort to courts of justice.”
The phrase “person having duties to discharge in a court of justice” has been interpreted widely and it includes Judges, witnesses and court officers such as process servers, sheriffs, bailiffs, liquidators, receivers, etc. It is thus contempt to assault a witness, whether or not the witness is prevented from giving evidence – Purdin Vs Roberts (1910) 74 J.P. Jo. 88. It is contempt to threaten a witness – Re B (J.A.) (An Infant) (1965) Ch. 1112. Threat or victimization of a witness is contempt of court whether it was done during the proceedings in which the witness testified or after it had been concluded – Attorney General Vs Butterworth (1963) 1 QB 696. Acts which prevent or which are intended to prevent officers of Court from carrying out their duties constitute contempt of court. Thus to refuse to allow persons to be served with court process will amount to contempt of Court – Danson Vs Le Capelain Steele 155 ER 116. To frustrate or attempt to frustrate a writ of execution or of possession is contempt – Ejembi Vs Attorney General, Benue State (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt 846) 337. In Alliance Building Society Vs Austen (1951) 2 All ER 1068 in which a Sheriffs Officer of Court in executing a writ of possession evicted a defendant from a flat and gave vacant possession to the plaintiffs and the defendant went back into the flat without the authority of the plaintiffs, it was held that the action of the defendant amounted to contempt. This same point had earlier been made by Pollock, B in Lacon Vs De Groat (1893) 10 TLR 24 at page 25 in the following words:
“In a case like this, where judgment had been given that the plaintiff shall recover possession of premises and a writ has been issued to the sheriff to deliver possession: if the officer has been apparently put in possession and the defendant chooses at some later time to change his mind and came back to the premises and by craft or force to again obtain possession, it was right that an attachment should be issued against him on the ground that he had not really given up possession. Whenever, the writ being put in force, the defendant or anybody who assists him, does not fully and honestly give up possession, but only colourably does so, the judge applied to may and ought to find that the process of the court had not been obeyed, and that there had been a contempt of the court.” Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.
