SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED v. CHIEF GOODLUCK C.R. MEBURU (2013)

SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED v. CHIEF GOODLUCK C.R. MEBURU

(2013)LCN/6386(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 5th day of July, 2013

CA/OW/136/2012

RATIO

WORDS AND PHRASES: CAUSE OF ACTION

JUSTICES

JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

SHELL PETROLEUM DEV. CO. LIMITED Appellant(s)

AND

CHIEF GOODLUCK C.R. MEBURU (For himself and representing the entire Robinson Family of Abacheke Egbema) Respondent(s)

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By a specially endorsed Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated the 02/7/2010 and filed the 19/07/2010 at the Imo State High Court of Justice, Oguta Judicial Division, the Respondent in a representative capacity, as Plaintiff claimed as follows:
(i) A DECLARATION that the entry of the Defendant into claimant’s parcels of land in Abacheke since 1958 without payment of lease, rent, acquisition or any form of compensation money is unlawful.
(ii) A DECLARATION that the defendant has no right or authority to compulsorily acquire Claimant’s lands at Abacheke in Ohaji/Egbema Local Government Area which land houses defendant’s oil wells designated as EGBEMA WEST EVBP LOC/ARD WELL 15, EGBEMA WEST EIBV LOC/ARD WELL 13, EGBEMA WEST EIBN LOC/ARD WELL 10, EGBEMA WEST EIBS LOC/ARD WELL 11, EGBEMA WEST ERNO LOC/ARD WELLS 17 & 20 and UGADA EGBEMA WEST ADHCF LOC/ARD WELL 1 IYIOKA without payment of compensation.
(iii) A DECLARATION that Claimant is entitled to (as landlord) payments for acquisition of his lands, rents, claims payment for the excavations and any other acceptable benefit as a host landlord to the defendant company for their blockading his fish ponds, ridges, streams, swamps and farmlands.
(iv) A MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the defendant company to recognize the claimant as the bonafide landlord to the defendant’s company in respect of defendant’s oil wells designated as EGBEMA WEST EVBP LOC/ARD WELL 15, EGBEMA WEST EIBV LOC/ARD WELL 13, EGBEMA WEST AIBN LOC/ARD WELL 10, EGBEMA WEST EIBS LOC/ARD WELL 11, EGBEMA WEST ERNO LOC/ARD WELLS 17 & 20 and UGADA EGBEMA WEST ADCHCF LOC/ARD WELL 1 IYIOKA lying and situate on claimant’s personal land at Abacheke-Egbema in Ohaji Egbema Local Government Area of Imo State.
(v) A MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the defendant’s company to honour and implement the agreement reached on 27/11/89 between the Claimant and defendant without further delay.
(vi) The sum of Six Hundred and fifty Million, five Hundred thousand Naira only (N650,500,000,00) representing special and general damages follows:-
Special damages
(a) N100,500,00 being the approved 335 merit claims by defendant’s company, :
(b) N250,000,000.00 for the acquisition of hectares of land belonging to claimant.
(c) N200,000,000.00 being accumulated rent for 52 years of operation on claimant’s land.
General damages:
(d) N100,000,000.00 for general damages.
TOTAL = N650,500,000.00
The said statement of claim was accompanied by the written deposition of the Plaintiff/Respondent (Chief Goodluck C.R. Meburu) and several documents annexed to the written deposition,
Upon being served, the Defendant/Appellant entered a conditional Appearance by filing a Memorandum of Conditional Appearance dated 09/11/2010 and filed 12/11/2010. The Defendant/Appellant also filed a statement of Defence also dated 09/11/2010 and filed 12/11/2010 wherein it averred at paragraph 10 of the Statement of Defence that:
“10. The Defendant denies paragraph 24(i-v) of the Claimant’s statement of claim and contends that the claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought, in this matter or any relief whatsoever in that:
(i) The claimant is not one of the Defendant’s landlords and the Robinson’s family he is claiming to represent in this suit is not one of the Defendant’s landlords in respect of the subject matter of this Suit.
(ii) The claimant’s case is statute barred.
(iii) The entire Suit is incompetent and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it.
Consequent upon the above pleadings of the Appellant, she filed a Notice of Preliminary objection praying the lower court to strike out the Suit for being incompetent on the following grounds:-
1. That as this Suit relates to or connects with mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining etc) it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and this Court lack jurisdiction to entertain it.
2. That the Claimant’s action is statute barred and as such the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.
The said Notice of Preliminary objection was dated the 09/11/2010 and filed the 12/11/2010. It was supported by an affidavit of 12 paragraphs deposed to by Nonso F. Udekweleze, a legal practitioner in the Law Firm of T.O Ahize & Co, who are Counsel to the Defendant/Appellant. It was also accompanied by a written Address also filed the 12/11/2010. The Plaintiff (now Respondent) filed a Counter – Affidavit of 10 paragraphs in opposition to the Preliminary Objection, After Counsel had addressed the Court, the learned trial judge in a considered Ruling on the 06/3/2012, dismissed the Preliminary Objection entirely and held that the matter should be heard on its merit. The Defendant now Appellant is aggrieved by that Ruling of the Court below and has therefore filed this appeal.
The Notice of Appeal dated the 20/3/2012 was filed on the same day. Therein, the Appellant appealed only in respect of the issue that the Suit is statute barred on only one ground of appeal. It is reproduced, without its particulars as follows:
“GROUND 1: The learned trial Court erred in law by dismissing the Appellant’s preliminary objection without due consideration of the relevant limitation laws governing limitation of actions.”
In compliance with the Rules of this Court, the parties filed and exchanged Briefs of Arguments. The Appellants Brief of Arguments was dated 22/6/2012 and filed the same day. Therein the Appellant formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:
“Whether the learned trial judge was right in law in dismissing the Appellant’s preliminary objection as it concerns the case being statute barred without considering the relevant laws governing limitation of actions.”
Upon being served the Respondent’s brief of arguments, the Appellant filed a Reply on point of law. It was dated the 03/8/2012 and filed the 06/8/2012.
As pointed out earlier, the Respondent also filed a Brief of Argument. It was dated the 19/7/2012 and filed the 20/7/2012. Therein, the Respondent nominated four (4) issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether payment of compensation for land lease/acquisition as provided by the constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) can be subjected to Limitation Law of a State, vis-a-vis Imo State of Nigeria?
2. Whether native land held under customary right of inheritance is subject to Limitation Law or Statute?
3. Whether a party guilty of inequitable conduct can successfully plead and rely on an equitable defence?
4. Whether the subject matter is caught up with limitation law, assuming without conceding, that the Honourable Court is minded to reason along the line of the Appellant’s argument.
Now, as can be seen here, the Appellant filed only one Ground of Appeal and formulated only one issue therefrom for determination. The Respondent on the other hand formulated four (4) issues out of the one ground of appeal filed by the Appellant. While it is conceded that a respondent is at liberty to formulate his own issues which he considers as the issues arising for determination, he is not at liberty to formulate more issues for determination than the number of grounds of appeal.
Furthermore, a Respondent who has neither filed a cross-appeal nor a Respondent’s Notice can only adopt the issue or issues formulated by the Appellant or recast the Appellant’s issues in a manner favourable to his arguments in the appeal, but without deviating or departing from the complaint as stated in the grounds of appeal. In other words, a Respondent who did not cross appeal nor filed a respondent’s Notice cannot formulate an issue at variance with the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. See SEAGULL OIL LTD v MONI PULO LTD (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt.1271) p.525 and C.P.C v LADO (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt.1266) p.40.That being so, a party and indeed a Respondent is not permitted to formulate more issues from the grounds of appeal for whereas a party may formulate a single issue to encompass several grounds of appeal, he has no liberty to formulate more than one issue from a ground of appeal. Accordingly, a Respondent who did not file either a cross appeal or a Respondent’s Notice, cannot formulate more issues than the ground of appeal filed by the Appellant. Where such is done, all the issues will become illegitimate and should be ignored or discountenanced. See SOWUNMI v. AYINDE (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt.1227) P.122; AROWOLO v. ADESINA (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt.1231) P.315; PHARMA DEKO PLC v. N.S.I.T.F.M.B. (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt.1241) P.431 and DURBAR HOTEL PLC. v. ITYOUGH (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt.12510- P.41.
In the instant case, only one ground of appeal was raised in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal. The Respondent neither filed a cross-appeal nor a Respondent’s notice. The Appellant however nominated four (4) issues from the lone ground of appeal filed by the Appellant. This is against the recognized principle for formulation of issues and thus should not be countenanced. Accordingly, the four issues formulated by the Respondent are discountenanced. That being so, this appeal shall be determined on the sole issue nominated for determination by the Appellant. However, in the determination of the appeal, I will have recourse to the arguments presented by the Respondent as are germane to the determination of this appeal
Now, learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that, the Limitation Law of Imo State of Nigeria, L994 in Section 10 provides that no action founded on contract, tort or any other, action not specifically provided for in parts II and III of the Law shall be brought after the expiration of five (5) years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, That the concept of limitation of action is based on the principle of equity that a person who is aware of his right but allows them to go stale, should not be allowed to revive the said stale action to the detriment of an adversary because equity aids the vigilant, acts in personam and prevents a party from acting unconscionably. The case of S.P.D.N. LTD v AMADI (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1210) p.82 at 121 paras C-D was cited in support.
Learned Appellant’s Counsel submitted that, to determine the period of limitation, the trial Court would look at the Writ of Summons and the statement of claim, which alleges when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action, and by comparing such date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. That, if the date on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Law, then the action is statute barred; and the trial court would be bound to strike out the action in limine. It was then contended by the Appellants that, the claim in this case was filed on the 19/7/2010, while the cause of action as stated in paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the statement of claim, arose either in 1958 or 1989. That in either case, it is a period of over twenty (20) years when the cause of action rose.
The cases of EGBE v ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NSCC p.1 at p.2 ELEBANJO v DAWODU (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1001) p.76; OMOTOSHO v. B.O.N. LTD (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt.986) p.573 AND SAVANNAH BANK LTD v ATLANTIC SHIPPING & TRANSPORT AGENCY LTD (1987) 1 N.S.C.C. p.67 at 73, were cited to further submit that it is a fundamental principle of law that, it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the claim. That where an action is statute barred, it removes the right of action, the right to enforcement or judicial relief, and leaves the claimant with a bare and empty cause of action. That where an action has become statute barred, the effect is that, the cause of action becomes extinguished by operation of law and can no longer be maintained in the Court. That in the instant case, the learned trial judge of the Court below, did not give any consideration to the submissions of the Appellant in its address before it in support of the Preliminary Objection, before holding that the cause of action and right of action in this case are still extant.
It is further contended by learned Appellant’s Counsel that, none of the documents filed by the Respondents supports the decision of the trial Court. That the latest document which is the letter written by the Appellant to the Respondent is that dated 10/12/2003; and that if that letter is taken to be an acknowledgment made in 2003, the said acknowledgment being a new contract has also become statute barred, as the suit was instituted on the 19/7/2010. That the three documents each dated in 2009, did not emanate from the Appellant and so are not relevant in determining the issue of limitation time or the period in this suit. The cases of S.P.D.C.N LTD v EJEBU (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) p.324 and EBOIGBE v N.N.P.C (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.347) p.649 were then cited to submit that, it is the law that when a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. That even where there is an acknowledgment, such acknowledgement of or promise to pay debt after a limitation period must be very clear in order to raise an inference of acknowledgment or enforceable promise to pay the debt. That in any case, acknowledgment of or promise to pay the debt does not extend the period of limitation. It was further contended that the fact that the acknowledgment or promise to pay came upon negotiation during or post negotiation does not extend the limitation period statutorily prescribed but only leaves or establishes a fresh contractual relationship. Learned Appellant’s Counsel then submitted that, the trial Court was therefore in error by relying on those documents to dismiss the Preliminary objection.
It is also the submission of the Appellants that, although the Law does not prohibit parties to a dispute from negotiating on the issue for the purpose of settling same such negotiation by the parties does not prevent or stop the period of limitation from running. That the best a person to whom a right of action has accrued can do is to institute an action so as to protect his interest or right in case the negotiation fails. Accordingly, learned Counsel submitted that the Respondent’s action is statute barred and ought to have been struck out. The cases of EBOIGBE v N.N.P.C (supra) and S.P.D.C.N LTD v AMADI (supra) were further cited in support.
I have carefully perused the arguments of the Respondent as presented in his Brief of Argument. I had also stated earlier that, a party is not permitted to raise and argue issues not raised and canvassed in the Grounds of Appeal. Consequently, a Respondent who wishes to raise any issue not covered in the ground of appeal, must file a cross-appeal or a Respondent’s notice. That is not the case in the instant appeal, as the Respondent neither filed a cross-appeal or a Respondent’s notice. I have carefully reflected on the issues canvassed in the Respondent’s Brief of Argument; and I am of the view that the main argument in the said brief relevant to this appeal are as contained in the issue 4 raised and canvassed by the Respondent see pages 12-16 of the Respondent’s Brief of Argument. It is therefore to those arguments that I shall rely on as the argument of the Respondent, as the other arguments as contained as pages 2-12 of the said Brief do not arise from the ground of appeal and therefore not germane to the determination of this appeal.
Having found as above, it was therefore argued by learned Counsel for the Respondent that the argument of the Appellant with respect to the provision of the Imo State Limitation Law, 1994 is misconceived because, the Law is inapplicable to the subject matter in issue. He then referred to Section 18 of the said Law to contend that, it is clear that the provisions of the said Law does not make mention of compensation. He also referred to Section 19 of the same Law to further contend that, the Limitation Law of Imo State (supra) refers to damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty and therefore inapplicable to compensation for land or lease or acquisition of land by a statutory licence holder. That by the legal expression of expressio unuis est exclusio alterius, the Limitation Law, as stated in Section 19, show that the subject issues covered are damages for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty. That in the construction of statutes therefore, where the statute expressly mentions a specific thing or person, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. He referred to the cases of A.G.; BENDEL STATE v AIDEYAN (1989) 9 S.C. p.127 and EHUWA v ONDO STATE (2006) 11-12 S.C p.102 in support. It was therefore submitted that, the legal authority or statutory licence by which the Appellant entered the Respondent’s land was derived from a Federal Enactment, and therefore cannot be subject to a state Law, and thus, the reliance by the Appellant on Section 18 of the Limitation law of Imo State is a complete misconception. That in any case the subject of Respondent’s claim is compensation and not premised on contract or tort as erroneously asserted by the Appellant.
Assuming, but not conceded, that the Limitation Law (supra) applies learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that, the Appellant stated in its statement of defence filed on the 09/11/2010, at paragraph 6(iv) thereof that, it did not neglect its landlords as claimed by the Respondent, but made acquisition payments and has continued to pay the rent due and other tributes, even up to 2009. That this impliedly means, the Appellant has acknowledged the interest of the Respondent. That such acknowledgment by the Respondent has created a fresh actual date of the right of action in favour of the Respondent. He relied on Section 30(2) of the Limitation Law (supra). That the Appellant has filed its defence, thereby joining issues with the Respondent wherein it acknowledged the interest of the Respondent.
It was further contended by the Respondent that, learned Counsel for the Appellant failed to draw a distinction between when a cause of action arose and when cause of action accrued. He cited Section 18 of the Limitation Law (supra) to submit that, the provision is not meant to check-mate when a cause of action arose, but, when it accrued. The case of FADARE & ORS v A.G.; OYO STATE (1982) 13 N.S.C.C. p.62 AT 80, was relied on to further submit that, time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. That in the instant case, the parties were having good relationship and deliberation whereof some payments were already made to Respondent with undertaking by the Appellant to pay which were communicated to the Respondent. He referred to pages 71-75 of the record, wherein documents evidencing ancillary payment to the ‘Respondent were made and contended that all this while, the Appellant gave the impression of his willingness to make good the transaction and the Respondent waited patiently, with occasional reminders to the Appellant. It was therefore submitted by the Respondent that, for the purpose of this Suit the cause of action accrued in 2008 when the chambers of S. Eze Kpanuku & Co wrote to the Appellant on 18/9/2008 on the instruction of the Respondent, to make good her undertaking, with a further reminder on the 07/10/2008 through D.A. Eremie & Associates. That it was failure of the Appellant to reply to the two letters that sent the warning signal to Respondent that the Appellant had reneged from her obligation. It was therefore submitted that, the cause of action accrued in 2008 when the Appellant reneged on his promise to pay.
Based on the above postulation learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that, between 2008 and 2010 when the action was filed, the cause of action is still extant and cannot be checkmated by the Limitation Law of Imo State. We were accordingly urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.
In its reply on points of law, it was submitted by the Appellant that to determine the period of limitation, it is the writ of summons and statement of claim that the Court would look at. That from paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the statement of claim, the cause of action arose both in 1958 when the Appellant allegedly entered the land without payment of compensation and also 1989, by virtue of the alleged agreement with the Appellant to pay the compensation. That in any case, it is over twenty (20) years that the cause of action arose. That in that case the jurisdiction of the trial Court is removed by virtue of Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Imo State, 1994. The cases of AJAYI v MILAD ONDO STATE (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt.504) p.237 at 235; TEXACO PANAMA INC v SHELL P.D.C.N. LTD (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt.759) p.209 at 235; OWIE v IGHIWI (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.917) p.184 were cited in support. That at those times, both the Respondent who can sue and the Appellant who can be sued were in existence and all the facts that would be material for the Respondent to prove his case had happened. We were then urged to allow the appeal dismiss the Ruling of the lower Court and to strike out the Respondent’s case, same having been statute barred.
Now the law permits every citizen who perceives that any of his proprietary rights has been violated to approach the Courts for the ventilation of his grievance, either against the government or a private citizen. However, in certain cases, the legislature has prescribed certain periods, called periods of limitation, within which certain actions may be instituted. This is based on a consideration of public policy that, there should be an end to litigation and therefore persons should be vigilant and ensure that their claims are not left to loom in perpetuity. Accordingly demands or claims which have became “Stale”, are deliberately suppressed by law, as the law considers it unfair to a person to allow claims against them to be made after a long period has expired, and during which period he may have lost the evidence that might have been available to him to enable him rebut the claim against him. The issue of limitation of action therefore is one of clear law, which a litigant or even the Court can not wish way in the light of the available facts. See SHELL PET DEV. CO. v. FARAH (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.382) p.148 at 145.
From the above stated principle, it means that, where a statute has specifically and clearly prescribed the period within which an action must be commenced, no proceeding can be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Thus, where an action is statute barred a Plaintiff who might otherwise have had a valid cause of action, loses that right to enforce the cause of action by judicial intervention, because the period allowed him to seek judicial remedy or redress as laid down by the Limitation law has elapsed. Accordingly, an action instituted or commenced after the expiration of the period within which such action must be brought as stipulated in the Limitation statute, cannot be sustained. See ODUBEKO v FOWLER (1993) 7 NWLR (p.308) p.637, YARE v NUNKU (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 394) p.129 at 148.

The general principle of law therefore is that, where a Law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. see TAFIDA v ABUBAKAR (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.230) p.511 at 520-521. It is the defendant who raised the defence that the Plaintiff’s claim or action is statute barred that has the onus to establish that, the Plaintiff’s claim is indeed statute barred. See ADEJUMO v OLAWAIYE (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt.425) P.436 at 445 and ODUBEKO v FOWLER (supra).In the instant case, the Limitation Statute relied on in the Appellant’s Preliminary Objection is the Limitation Edict (now Law), 1994 of Imo State. Specifically he relied on Section 18 of the said Law. Section 18 of the Limitation Law, 1994 of Imo state of Nigeria provides that:
“No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in parts II and III of this Edict shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”
To determine this issue, it is necessary or incumbent on me to determine whether the Plaintiff/Respondent’s claim before the trial Court falls within the category mentioned in the said Section 18 of the Limitation Law. I must however point out that the type of actions caught by Section 18 of the Limitation Law (supra) are those pertaining to or founded “on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in Parts II and III of the Law.” Part II of the Law deals with Limitation period in respect of land, such as action for recovery of land, forfeiture for breach of condition, tenancy agreement, actions for redemption under mortgages and actions to recover money secured by mortgages or to recover proceeds of sale of land. Part III on the other hand, deal with period of Limitation in respect of judgments, trust property and estate of deceased persons. It therefore means that the Limitation period provided by Section 18 covers actions in contract, tort or an) other cause of action which has not been covered by parts 2 and 3 of the said Law. My duty now is to determine the nature of the Respondent’s claim, so as to see whether it is one on contract, tort, or other matter not covered by Parts 2 and 3 of the Limitation Law (supra). This is because, it is the law that, to determine whether an action is caught by the limitation period, it is necessary to first find out the nature of the cause of action and when it arose. See OCHOGA v. MIL ADMIN, BENUE STATE (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 759) p.209 at 241. The principle here is akin to that in the determination of a cause of action.
The settled law is that in the determination of the cause of action, it is the statement of claim only that must be looked at. In other words, to determine what the cause of action is in a particular: suit, the Court is required to examine only the averments in the pleadings of the Plaintiff as disclosed in the writ of summons and statement of claim. See IKEJA HOTELS LTD v L.S.B.I.R (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt.954) P.343, BAKARE v N.R.C. (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt.1064) P.606; ABUBAKAR v B.O & A.P. LTD (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt.1066) P.319, NICON INS. CORP v. OLOWOFOYEKU (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt.973) P.244 and AREMO II v ADEKANYE (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt.644) P.259, In the instant case I am of the view that the relevant pleadings of the Respondent to the determination of the cause of action are as stated in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the statement of claim. I endeavour to reproduce them i below:
“4. The subject matter of this suit is all that piece or parcel of land lying and situate at Abacheke-Egbema wherein lies the defendant’s oil well locations…. within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.
5. Claimant avers that he is an indigene of Abacheke Town in Ohaji Egbema Local Government Area of Imo State and the piece or parcel of land wherein lies defendant’s oil wells…. is an (sic) customary inheritance from his fore-fathers under the Egbema Native Law and Custom as applicable in Abacheke Egbema.
6. Claimant avers that the ownership of the piece or parcels of land wherein lies defendant’s oil wells…. are not in dispute and have never been subject of any dispute with regards to its ownership as same belongs exclusively to Claimant’s family.
7. Claimant avers that defendant discovered crude oil in this land far back in 1958;
8. Claimant shall by leave of Court survey the said piece or parcels of land in order to determine the hectarage occupied by defendant and shall rely on the said survey plan in proof of his case.
9. Claimant avers that since 1958 when defendant entered his Land, defendant have (sic) never paid him any lease, rent or acquisition compensation up till date of occupying the said hectares of land belonging to the claimant s family.
10. Claimant avers that defendant have (sic) refused or neglected to recognize him as landlord and to grant him his entitlements as a host to the defendants who have been drilling a total of nine (9) oil wells on claimants land since 1958 without any employment opportunity to his family or contract award.”
It seems to me therefore that the substance of the Respondent’s claim against the Appellant, is centred on paragraph 9 of the statement of claim. That paragraph, if read along with the reliefs sought at paragraphs
24(i), (ii) and (iii) reveal clearly to me that the crux of the Respondent’s claim is on payment of lease, rent or compensation in respect of his land acquired by the Appellant for oil prospecting, Surely, those claims cannot be said to qualify the Respondent’s claims as founded on contract or tort. That being so, I have to consider whether it qualifies as claims founded on any of the items mentioned in Parts II or III of the Limitation Law (supra). The action cannot come under Part II as his claim is not an action for the recovery of land as to bring his action under any of the provisions of part II of this Limitation Law, nor is it one based on any judgment or trust property and estate of a deceased person. Furthermore the relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent does not arise from contract or ‘tort. Rather, it is one imposed by statute, by virtue of Section 11 of the Oil Pipe line Act, 1956, which places an obligation on the holder of a licence to pay compensation to the person whose land or interest in land has been affected by the operations of the licencee. In that respect, I am of the view that the action of the Respondent can conveniently covered under “any other action not specifically mentioned in Part II and III” of the Limitation Law (supra). Consequently, I hold that Section 18 of the Limitation Law (supra) is applicable in the instant case.
Having thus resolved, the next thing for me to determine is whether indeed, the Respondent’s suit is caught by the Limitation Law as stipulated by Section 18 thereof. Generally to determine the period of limitation in any statute, it is the writ of summons and statement of claim that will be looked at. The Court will then ascertain from the statement of claim the date on which the wrong complained of as giving rise to the Plaintiff’s claim was committed or when the right sought to be enforced accrued, and to compare the date with the date the writ of summons was taken or filed. If it is found that the date pleaded as to when the right to sue accrued is beyond the limitation period as stipulated by the statute, then the action would be statute barred. See AREMO II v ADEKANYE (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.391) P.572; WOHEREM v ENENWA (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.890) p.398, AYOWRONMI v. N.N.P.C. (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt.1197) p.616 at 639; USMAN DAN FODIO UNIVERSITY, SOKOTO v BALOGUN (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt.325) p.116 and SANI v PRESTDENT; FRN (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt.1198) p.153 at 171.

A Court called upon to determine whether or not an action is statute barred, should always have it in mind that, Limitation Laws are generally construed liberally, but not in such a way as to read into them words that are not intended by the law makers. Thus, in, construing such Limitation Laws, the Court called upon to apply it, should also bear it in mind that Limitation Laws are intended to prevent the continuance of stale actions. See AINA v JINDU (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) p.91 at 111 and AJIBONA v KOLAWOLE (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt.476) p.22 at 36. Accordingly, to determine the issue, it is necessary to look at the pleading of the Respondent in the statement of claim. Those pleadings I find Germaine are paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the statement of claim. A summary of the Respondent’s case as pleaded is that, the Appellant discovered oil in the Respondent’s land in 1958, but has since refused or neglected to recognize him or grant him his entitlements as a host landlord. That it resulted into the Respondent blocking access to the oil wells of the Appellant on the land, since peaceful approach by the Respondent had failed. That was in 1989, and this led to the Respondent being charged to Court for conduct likely to cause breach of peace. That due to this development, the Appellant invited the Respondent to a meeting on the 27/11/1989, where an agreement was reached to the effect that all the Respondent’s entitlement and other perquisites would be paid him by the Appellant. The Appellant was however, not able to pay which culminated into several communications between the parties, the last being the one dated 07/10/2008.
Now, for the purposes of determining the limitation of action, time begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose or accrued. Time begins to run where there is in existence a person who can be sued and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the Plaintiff to succeed. See HASSAN v ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) p.547; SANDA v KUKAWA LOCAL GOVT. (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.174) p.379, ABUBAKAR v B.O & A.P. LTD (supra) at 319; U.B.N v UMEODUAGU (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt.890) p.352 and LABODE v OTUBU (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.712) p.256.

A cause of action may therefore be defined as a combination of facts and circumstances giving rise to the right to file an action or claim in Court for a remedy or relief. They include all those things which are necessary to give a right of action and every material facts which if proved would entitle a Plaintiff to succeed. In other words it is generally described as a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court of Law or those factual situations which if proved, will entitle a plaintiff to judicial relief against the defendant. See HUMBE v A.G; BENUE STATE (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt. 649) p.419; OWODUNNI v REG. TRUSTEES OF C.C.C (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.675) P.315; P.N. UDOH TRADING CO. LTD v SUNDAY ABERE & 1 OR (2001), 11 NWLR (Pt.723) p.114 at 129 and PATKUM INDUSTRIES LTD v NIGER SHOES LTD (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.93) p.138. Accordingly, where no factual situation has arisen, which if proved, will entitle the Plaintiff to a judicial remedy against the defendant, no right of action can be said to have arisen or accrued.
In the instant case, the learned trial judge after considering the arguments of court, lazily put the matter this way:-
“As for the other arm of the objection, I hold that having regards of the various under-taking and correspondence between the claimant in this matter some of which date up to 2009, the Limitation Law of Imo state as pleaded by the defendant does not estop the claimants from instituting this suit. Both the cause of action and the right of action in this suit are still extant.”
I have observed from the statement of claim that the relationship between the Appellant and the Respondents began in 1958, when the Appellant discovered oil on the Respondents’ land. However, the statement of claim does not reveal the state of affairs between them till 1989, when the Respondent blocked access to the Appellant’s oil wells, which resulted to the Respondent being charged for conduct capable of breaching the peace. From the pleadings, that is the event that led to the agreement between the parties and which agreement is dated the 18/12/89. It may be safe to presume that the relationship between the parties prior to 1989 was not cordial. It may also be reasonable to conclude that the Respondent had a right of action against the Appellant before 1989. However, it is my view, based on the state of the law that, the subsequent agreement between the parties on the 18/12/89 was an intervening factor which operated to neutralize any limitation period prior to 1989. I come to this conclusion because, it is the law that, though operation of statute of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose, there is the principle of law that, where the defendant in the cause of events acknowledges the debt or makes part payment of the debt, he has by so doing established a fresh contractual relationship, so that the calculation of the date of limitation starts to run from the date of the fresh contractual relationship. Accordingly, I hold that the agreement of 18/12/89 created a new or fresh contractual relationship between the parties.
Now, would it be right to contend, as done by the Appellant, that the period of limitation began to run from 18/12/89 when the Appellant agreed to pay, without delay, the merit claims and scholarship awards to the Respondents. I do not think so because, as at 18/12/89 when the agreement was signed, there was no more any dispute between the parties. The state of hostility only resurrected when the Appellant again failed to honour the agreement dated 18/12/89. The state of hostility therefore resurfaced in 1994 when the Respondent wrote the Appellant vide letter dated 27/7/1994, reminding the Appellant of its promise to pay the merit claims. Here again the Appellant wrote the Respondent vide letter dated 14/8/95, wherein it admitted indebtedness to the Respondent. See page 27 of the record of appeal. There were other letters from the Appellant to the Respondent dated 14/10/96, 11/12/98, 14/11/2000, 23/2/2001 and 10/12/2003 respectively. Specifically, in the letter dated 10/12/2003, the Appellant referred to a letter by the Respondent dated 15/6/99 and specifically stated that:
“The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited has agreed for all your merit claim and farmlands/Oil wells payment; blockade for each of your merit claim, which was the sum of N300,000.00. Please S.P.D.C. Nig. Ltd will not delay any payment of your merit claim.”
Despite this unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt it owes the Respondent, the Appellant deliberately failed or rather refused to pay and has now unconscientiously pleaded that the Respondent be barred from further making his claim. I am therefore of the view that here again, the period, of limitation, if it applied was interrupted by the agreement of the Appellant to pay the claim due from it to the Respondent. Though there were other communications between the parties, I am of the view that the letter from S. Eze Kpanuku & Co., Legal Practitioners, who wrote the Appellants on behalf of the Respondents, marked the water shed in the recurring dispute between the Appellant and the Respondent. The Appellant did not reply to that letter, which made it obvious that it had no intention of meeting her obligation to the Respondent. I am therefore of the view that, that is the time when the Respondent’s cause of action would validly be said to have accrued. I therefore hold that the combination of facts and circumstances which would give the Respondent a cause of action crystallized after the letter of 18/9/2008 written to the Appellant’s Solicitor, to which the Appellant failed or refused to respond to, and thereby gave the Respondent the right to sue the Appellant. See N.S.I.I.F.M.B. v KLIFCO NIG. LTD. (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1211) P.307 and THADANT & ANOR v NATIONAL BANK OF (NIG.) LTD & ANOR (1972) 1 S.C. (Reprint) p.75. See also Section 30(5) and (7) of the Limitation Law, 1994 of Imo State. It should be noted that the Respondent’s suit was commenced at the Court below on the 19/07/2010 when the writ of summons and statement of claim were filed.
Now the Limitation period prescribed by Section 18 of the Limitation Act of Imo State 1994 is five years from the date the right of action accrued. I have held that the right of the Respondent to sue the Appellant accrued on the 18/9/2008. The action was commenced in October, 2010. That is certainly a period of less than five (5) years from the date the right of action accrued. I had earlier observed that Limitation Laws are generally construed liberally. Thus in NWANAGO v SHELL PET. DEV. CO. LTD (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) P.332 at 338-339; KOLAWOLE; JCA observed that:
“It is not always that the Court permits the law of limitation to debar a bona fide claim; one of such exceptions is where there has been admission of liability during negotiation and all that remains is the fulfillment of the agreement: The Court always maintained that it cannot be just and equitable that the action should be barred after the statutory period of limitation giving rise to the action, if the defendant were to resile from his agreement during negation.”
See also KOKOORIN v PATEGI LOCAL GOVT (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt.1164) p.205.
Indeed, the Appellant in the instant case wrote several letters to the Respondent, wherein it admitted liability to the Respondent, culminating in the letter dated 10/12/2003. After the letter of 10/12/2003 wherein the Appellant again unequivocally admitted liability and even promised not to delay payment, it would be unfair and unequitable to expect the Respondent to have sued at that stage. The Respondent, in my view, did the right and proper thing, when having waited for the Appellant to fulfill its promise to pay, but failed, he again wrote the Appellant demanding for payment. The Appellant did not respond and the Respondent was left with no choice, but to commence the action against the Appellant, He did that within the period permitted by Section 18 of the limitation law (supra). The learned trial judge was therefore right when he held that the limitation Law pleaded by the Appellant could not operate or apply to debar the Respondent, who from all indications is a bona fide claimant, from instituting the action. Accordingly, the sole issue in this appeal is resolved in favour of the Respondent.
Having resolved the sole issue in this appeal against the Appellant, it is obvious that the appeal is without merit. It has failed and is hereby dismissed. Accordingly the Ruling of the Court below in Suit No.HOG/45/2010 delivered on the 6th day of March, 2012 is hereby affirmed.
I hereby award fifty thousand Naira (N50,000.00) against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent.

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, TSAMMANI, JCA, just delivered. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion, dismissing this appeal. In so doing, I hold the view that where a party holds out to the other that he is willing to settle a claim which is being sought and the later puts on hold his desire to go to court, the former cannot, after resiling from his promise to settle the claim, turn round to plead statute of limitation. The appellant herein-who had written to the respondent on 15/6/99, agreed to pay the respondent all his “merit claim” but had resiled from making good its promise, cannot be allowed to plead statute of limitation, although in this case it is not affected by the statute of limitation.. See NWANAGO VS. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.150) 332 at 338 – 339.
By virtue of Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011, when one person has by his declaration, or act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representatives in interest shall be allowed in any proceedings between himself and such person or such persons’ representative in interest to deny the truth of that thing. The appellant herein must be estopped from pleading limitation against the respondent. See KOKOORIN vs. PATIGI LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt.1164) 205; OZOKPO vs. PAUL (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.133) 494, MENAKAYA vs. MENAKAYA (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.738) 203.
For the above and the fuller reasons given by my learned brother, TSAMMANI, JCA, in the lead judgment, I too dismiss this appeal. I also award costs of N50,000.00 in favour of the respondent.

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, JCA and I agree completely with his reasoning and conclusions. The sole issue is resolved against the appellant and so the appeal is lacking in merit and is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the Ruling of the lower court in Suit No: HOG/45/2010 delivered on the 6th day of March 2012 is hereby affirmed. I abide by His Lordship’s order as to costs.

Appearances

F.N. Udekweleze; Esq.For Appellant

AND

E.F. Nwachukwu Esq.For Respondent