FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. CHIEF ONWUKA KALU & ORS
(2013)LCN/6204(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 17th day of May, 2013
CA/PH/115/2007
JUSTICES
JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC – Appellant(s)
AND
1. CHIEF ONWUKA KALU
and
2. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION
3. THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE
4. COMPTROLLER-GENERAL NIGERIAN PRISONS SERVICES
5. NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
6. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ABIA STATE
7. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, ABIA STATE – Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT GIVEN IN BREACH OF A PARTY’S RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING IS A NULLITY
Any judgment made in breach of a party’s right to fair hearing is a nullity. See (1) OKAFOR & ORS. V. A.G & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE & ORS. (1991) LPELR 692.
(2) BABA VS. N.C.A.T.C. (1991) 5 NWLR Pt. 192 388. PER EKPE, J.C.A.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING
By Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended), in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. A party cannot obtain a fair trial where he is not even made a party to the proceedings which has affected his right adversely. It is trite that any judgment made in breach of a party’s right to fair hearing is null and void. See BABA v. NCATC (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388. PER OKORO, J.C.A.
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal by the First Bank of Nigeria PLC, against the decision of the Federal High Court Umuahia delivered on the 18th day of July 2001 per Liman J. This court had on the 26th day of September 2006 granted leave to the Appellant to file this appeal.
The 1st Respondent, Chief ONWUKA KALU, had commenced this action against the 2nd – 7th Respondents at the Federal High Court, Umuahia via a motion ex parte on the 29th day of March 2001 under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules to enforce his fundamental rights allegedly breached by way of his trial, conviction and sentence in absentia before the now defunct Failed Bank II, Kano in charge No. FBT/II/KNZ/CR/6/97.
The 1st Respondent who went to the lower court to enforce his fundamental rights did not join the Appellant on whose complaint he was tried and convicted. The lower court on the 18th day of July 2001 gave judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent and held that the right of the 1st Respondent had been breached and declared the trial before the Failed Bank Tribunal a nullity.
The lower court per Liman J. thus held:
“I hereby remove it from the tribunal to this court for the purpose of being quashed and it is hereby quashed.”
The judgment of the lower court is on Pps. 222 – 244 of the record of appeal and it included the award of compensation to the Appellant adjudged in the quashed judgment to be 1,289,588.48 (British Pounds Sterling).
The appellant through his counsel filed a summons on notice supported by a 15 paragraph affidavit both dated and filed on the 15th day of October 2001 and also a further affidavit on the 8th day of March 2002. See pages 88 – 93 and 207 – 208 of the record of appeal. The 1st Respondent also filed a notice of preliminary objection both of which were argued before a new judge – J.T. Tshoho J. In his ruling, the application was refused, See pg. 257 – 262 of the record of appeal.
The appellant herein not being a party to the substantive suit before the lower court applied to the Court of Appeal, Port Harcourt on the 3rd day of February 2003 seeking leave for extension of time to appeal as an interested party. On the 26th September 2006, the Court of Appeal, Port Harcourt granted all the reliefs sought by the appellant as follows:
“1. That leave is granted the applicant to appeal as a person having interest in the matter delivered by the trial Judge in SUIT NO. FHC/UM/CS/128/2001.
2. That time is extended to file notice of appeal in 14 days from today
3. That the preliminary objection filed against the applicant is hereby struck out for want of diligent prosecution with cost of N2,500.00 each for two parties.”
The 1st Respondent being the International President of Children of Africa Limited obtained the sum of 1,289,588.48 (British Pound Sterling) by allegedly false pretences between the 28th day of October 1991 and the 28th day of November 1991 at Lagos. The said sum stands unpaid. The Appellant lodged a complaint against the 1st Respondent with the 4th Respondent sometime in 1996. The complaint was subsequently investigated by the police and the 1st Respondent was charged with various offences in Charge No. FBT/II/KNZ/CR/6/97 before the Failed Bank Tribunal, Kano. The 1st Respondent was then granted bail by the police on account of ill health and thereafter he travelled to England. Throughout his trial before the Tribunal the 1st Respondent was represented by his counsel – Chief Mike Ozekhome until judgment was delivered on the 26th day of November, 1999. See, Pg. 140 – 201 of the Record of Appeal. The Failed Bank had held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the 1st Respondent in respect of count 3 of the charge and accordingly ordered him to pay compensation into the Appellant Bank in the sum of 1,289,588.48 (British Pound Sterling).
The 1st Respondent then on the 29th day of March 2001 instituted a Fundamental Rights Enforcement Action at the lower court seeking the reliefs as contained in his statement. See, Pg. 76 – 79 of the record.
The Appellant herein however, in whose favour the Failed Bank Tribunal had made an award of compensation was not made a party by the 1st Respondent in the substantive suit before the lower court. Judgment was delivered on the 18th day of July 2001 and the lower court removed the entire proceedings from the Failed Bank Tribunal for the purpose of being quashed, and did same; hence this appeal.
The appellant has raised the following issues for determination:
“(i) Whether the lower court has the jurisdiction to quash or set aside the entire proceedings and judgment of the Failed Bank Tribunal in charge No. FBT/11/KNZ/CR/6/97 as it affects the award to compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British pounds Sterling) granted to the Appellant by the Failed Bank Tribunal through a Fundamental Rights Enforcement action when the Appellant was not made a party to defend the action.
(ii) Whether the lower court ought to have unilaterally removed the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal before it and granted a relief not sought at all by the 1st Respondent.”
The Appellant’s argument on issue No. 1, is that the lower court had no jurisdiction to either quash or set aside the entire proceedings and or/judgment of the Failed Bank tribunal in charge No. FBT/11/KNZ/CR/6/97 by way of an action brought under the Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. Learned counsel conceded to the fact that a High Court will only have jurisdiction to make an order of certiorari usually under its supervisory jurisdiction. He referred to the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION VS. ABULE (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt.936) 390 Para. E.
Learned counsel submitted that if the law prescribes the manner in which proceedings are to be commenced or initiated, it is only by that procedure could the relief be sought, else the court would be robbed of its jurisdiction. He then cited the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V. IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 113 at 178 Para. G. AND 182 PARA. E – F.
He further submitted that counsel to the 1st Respondent before the lower court did not ask to quash or set aside the award of compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British Pound Sterling) made to the Appellant by the Failed Bank Tribunal. Counsel then cited S. 1(5) of the Failed Bank (Recovery Debts) Decree No. 18 of 1994 which provides thus:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, or any enactment to the contrary, the supervisory jurisdiction or Power of judicial review of a High Court shall not extend to any matter or proceeding before the Tribunal duly constituted under this Decree.”
Learned counsel submitted that since the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court has been ousted, by S. 1 (5) of the Decree No. 18 of 1994, the order quashing the judgment of the Failed Bank Tribunal ought not to have been made in the first place. That since the Failed Bank Tribunal has all the powers of the Federal High Court, it will be without the jurisdiction of the lower court to declare the judgment of a Court/Tribunal with co-ordinate/concurrent Powers a nullity. That the said order can only be made by an appellate court. See, OKOYE V. N.C. & F. CO. LTD (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 501 at 538 Para. C.
That the lower court in declaring that the 1st Respondent’s trial in absentia was a nullity had questioned the validity of S. 27 of the Failed Banks Decree No. 18 of 1994 where the Supreme Court in the case of ABACHA V. FAWEHINMI (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228 at 289 Para. F. had held that the validity of any domestic statute cannot be affected by the mere fact that it violates the African Charter or any other treaty. He then cited S. 27 (1) of the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree No. 18 1994 which provides as follows:
“The absence from Nigeria of a debtor or a person who has committed an offence under this Decree shall not prevent his case being heard and determined or his being tried and convicted under this Decree.”
In a further submission by learned counsel for the Appellant he stated that even in his absence, the 1st Respondent was ably represented by his counsel throughout the entire trial thus counteracting the 1st Respondent’s claims that his fundamental rights to fair hearing have been thus breached. He further cited the case of S & D. CONSTRUCTION CO. V. CHIEF BAYO AYOKU & ANOR. (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 813) 278 at 300 Para. H where it was held that where in the course of hearing, a party had the opportunity to present his case, but failed to utilize the opportunity, he cannot thereafter put any blame on his adversary or indeed the court for his failure as he had been afforded a fair hearing.
Learned counsel further submitted that the 1st Respondent was properly tried in absentia on the complaint of the Appellant by a duly constituted Failed Bank Tribunal acting in accordance with S. 27 (1) of the Failed Bank Decree No. 18 of 1994. It is the submission of learned counsel that failure and/or omission of the 1st Respondent to join the Appellant on whose complaint his fundamental rights were allegedly breached has effectively hampered the jurisdiction of the lower court and curtailed the court from quashing the proceedings and judgment of the Failed Banks Tribunal which included the award of compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British pound Sterling) to the Appellant. That the court cannot give judgment against a person who will be affected by its decision if such a person is not made a party or has no opportunity of defending the suit. He then cited the case of BABATOLA V. ALADEJANA (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 928) 597 at 615 Para. C – D.
Learned counsel also submitted that the omission to make the Appellant a party before the lower court is a breach of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. That such a breach will vitiate the proceedings before the lower court rendering same null and void. See, ABANA V. OBI (SUPRA) 204 Para. G – H., NDULUE V. IBEZIM (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 780) 139 SC & 105 Para. G.
Learned counsel concluded that having due regard to the facts of this case, the Court of Appeal had joined the Appellant for the purposes of this appeal and urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
On Issue Two: Whether the lower court ought to have unilaterally removed the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal before it and granted a relief not sought at all by the 1st Respondent:
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the 1st Respondent did not in any of the processes filed by him urge the court to remove the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal to the Federal High Court for the purpose of being quashed in an order of certiorari. That the said order can only be made by the court where the appropriate procedure for its commencement has been adopted. He again referred to the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V. ABULE (supra) 396 Para. C – D. Counsel also referred to relief C at page 77 of the record where the 1st Respondent merely sought a declaration that his arraignment and trial in absentia is in breach of his fundamental rights and therefore the judgment of the tribunal is unenforceable by virtue of S. 1 of Decree No. 62 of 1999. That the grant of the said relief C. on page 77 of the record would only have affected the 2nd to 7th Respondents and definitely not the positive order of award of compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British Pound Sterling) payable by the 1st Respondent to the appellant if the lower court had not exceeded its jurisdiction to grant to the 1st Respondent a relief not sought by him.
He then concluded that the lower court is not empowered to unilaterally remove the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal before it without an express request to do so as it is a relief not sought by the 1st Respondent. Also that the said court lacked the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings of the Tribunal being a relief not sought by the 1st Respondent. He then urged the court to also resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
The 2nd to 4th Respondents filed their brief of reply on the 24th day of February 2011 where they adopted the two issues for determination as formulated by the Appellant. On issue No. 1, whether the lower court has the jurisdiction to quash or set aside the entire proceedings and judgment of the Failed Bank Tribunal in charge No. FBT/11/KNZ/CR/6/97 as it affects the award of compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British Pounds Sterling) granted to the Appellant by the Failed Bank Tribunal through a Fundamental Rights Enforcement action when the Appellant was not made a party to defend the action.
Learned counsel for the 2nd – 4th Respondents Miss Jane Akanno cited Order 17 Rule (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2007 which provides inter alia:
“Except where otherwise provided in these Rules any application to the court may be made by the Appellant or Respondent or by a Legal applications if the Appellant is unrepresented and in custody and is not entitled or has not obtained leave to be present before the Court, he shall make any such application by forwarding the same in writing to the Registrar who shall take the appropriate steps to obtain the decision of the Court thereon.”
Learned counsel went further to make the following concessions viz:
1. That the lower court lacked the jurisdiction to either quash or set aside the judgment and proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal in charge No. FBT/11/KNZ/CR/6/97 by way of an action brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 then in force.
2. That the provision in Section 1(5) of Decree No. 18 of 1994 then in force at the time the 1st Respondent was tried and convicted clearly ousted the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts. See A-G FEDERATION V. USMAN ABUBAKAR (2008) 16 NWLR (pt. 1112) 135 at 157 where Tobi JSC held inter alia:
“The crux of this appeal is Section 1(5) of the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks, Decree No. 18 of 1994. It reads:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, as amended, or any enactment to the contrary, the supervisory jurisdiction or power of judicial review of High Court shall not extend to any matter or proceeding before the tribunal duly constituted under this decree.”
That the Supreme Court further held as follows:
“There is no jurisdiction in law in a court saying that it has jurisdiction in all disputes. A court of law has jurisdiction to expound the limits of its jurisdiction; it has not the jurisdiction to expand it. Jurisdiction is a matter of hard and rigid law and courts of law must comply strictly with their jurisdiction as spelt out in either the Constitution or a Statute. On no account should courts of law be hungry or have the gluttony for jurisdiction, to the extent that they arrogate to themselves jurisdiction where they have none. By such an injudicious conduct, the particular court does not only erode to the jurisdiction of other courts, but also erode to the legislative power of the Legislature. Both are illegal and courts of law established to do legality, cannot afford any illegality.”
3. That failure to make the Appellant a party before the lower court is a breach of the party’s right to fair hearing as guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right. That this failure rendered the judgment of the lower court a nullity. See BABATOLA V. ALADEJANA (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 928) 597 where the Supreme Court held thus:
“It is well settled law and practice that the court cannot give a judgment against a person who will be affected by its decision if such person is not made a party or has no opportunity of defending the suit. The court has no jurisdiction to decide the fate of a person or a matter concerning him when such person is not made a party to the action. This issue has also failed.”
4. That the non-joinder of the Appellant at the hearing of the application in the court below vitiated the entire proceedings thus rendering the judgment liable to be set aside. See IFEANYICHUKWU (OSONDU) CO. LTD V. SOLA BONEH (NIG.) LTD. (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 322; (2000) 3 S.C. 42.
On issue No. 2, whether the lower court ought to have unilaterally removed the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal before it and granted a relief not sought at all by the 1st Respondent.
Learned counsel also made the following concessions.
1. That no order was sought by the 1st Respondent quashing his arraignment, trial and conviction in absentia. That he merely sought a declaratory relief which did not entitle him to an order removing his trial “from the tribunal for the purpose of being quashed.”
2. That the said order granted by the court below was tantamount to granting a party a relief not sought.
3. That the court not being a charitable organization will not grant parties ex gratia reliefs. See UGO V. OBIEKWE (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 99) 566, (1988) 2 SCNJ. 95. per Nnaemeka Agu, JSC.
“I cannot over-emphasize the fact that on no account should a court give to a party a remedy he has not asked for. If it does so, it cannot escape the accusation of playing “Father Christmas” to one party vis-a-vis the other. See: Nigerian Housing Development Society Ltd. V. Mumumi (1977) 2 SC. 57, at P.81; Ekpenyong & Ors. v. Nyong & Ors. (1975) 2 SC.71, at P. 80. The moment he raised the issue himself and, without hearing the parties, proceeded to base his judgment on it, there emerged a case of mistrial”.
Learned counsel also cited the case of A-G. ABIA STATE & ORS. V. A-G. FEDERATION & ORS., where the Apex Court held thus:
“It is elementary law that a court of law is confined to the relief or reliefs of the plaintiff. It does not go outside the relief or reliefs to grant what the plaintiff does not ask for. A court of law can grant all the reliefs sought by the plaintiff. It can also grant part of the reliefs. But it cannot grant reliefs not sought by the plaintiff. See generally Ojo v. Abogunri; Ugo v. Obiekwe; Ilodibia v. NCC; Udom v. E. Michelliti and Sons Ltd.; Olaopa v. OAU Ile Ife; Ezeakabekwe v. Emenike.”
Counsel however concluded that the 2nd – 4th Respondents are unable to support the judgment of the lower court and in that regard urged that the instant appeal be allowed.
Learned counsel for the 5th Respondent in his response and submissions also made all the concessions similar to those made by the 2nd – 4th Respondents with regard to the two issues herein raised by learned counsel for the Appellant; his argument being on all fours with the submissions of learned counsel for the 2nd – 4th Respondents. Counsel also concluded that the 5th Respondent is unable to support the judgment of the court below and urged that the instant appeal be allowed.
Learned counsel for the 6th – 7th respondents on his own part also adopted the two issues herein formulated by the Appellant for determination by the court. He proffered all his arguments in line with those of the Appellant on both issues. On issue No. 1, learned counsel submitted that it is not the duty of a trial court to consider and decide issues not raised by the parties or to grant a relief not claimed or sought by the party in whose favour the order was made. That in the same vein a court should not grant to a party an order, relief or declaration in excess of or outside what has been claimed or sought. See, EKPENYONG V. NYONG (1975) 2 SC 81 A.T.A. POLY V. MAINA (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) 487 at 512.
Also on issue No. 2. Learned counsel submitted that the proceedings in the lower court was incompetent for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. He further submitted that where a special statutory provision is made for filing and action before the court, the procedure so laid down must be followed. See CITY ENGINEERING NIG. LTD. V. NIG. ARPORT AUG. (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 625) 76. He also urged the court to resolve both issues in favour of the appellant and allow the appeal.
What can be gleaned from the submissions of the Appellant and all the Respondents is that the lower court acted without jurisdiction in issuing an order of certiorari on the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal. All the parties have also made heavy weather of the fact that a court of law must not grant to a party a relief which he has not sought or claimed. It therefore stands to reason that the lower court lacks the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings of the Failed Bank Tribunal, being a relief not sought and consequently the award of compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British Pound Sterling) to the appellant by that Tribunal subsists. From the totality of all of the above submissions and conclusions, it is worthy of note that all parties are ad idem with regard to the issues before this court. I have not on my own found any reason to deviate from the above reasoning and conclusions of counsel in this appeal. I too throw my weight behind these submissions and also reason likewise.
Consequent upon all of the above, I have arrived at the following conclusions:
1. An action brought under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Rules is not a proper one under which an order of certiorari to quash any proceedings of an inferior court or Tribunal can be made.
2. The Appellant in whose favour an award of 1,289,588.48 (British Pounds Sterling) was made in the judgment of the Failed Bank Tribunal was not made a party to the action before the lower court before the judgment of the failed Bank was set aside and the proceedings therein quashed by the order of the lower court.
3. The lower court cannot quash the judgment of a duly constituted Tribunal with co-ordinate/concurrent power by virtue of Section 3(3)(c) of the Failed Bank Decree No. 18 of 1994.
4. Any judgment made in breach of a party’s right to fair hearing is a nullity. See (1) OKAFOR & ORS. V. A.G & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE & ORS. (1991) LPELR 692.
(2) BABA VS. N.C.A.T.C. (1991) 5 NWLR Pt. 192 388.
5. The Appellant was not heard or given fair hearing before the lower court entered judgment affecting its interest. See THE COUNSEL OF FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC MUBI VS. T.L.M. YUSUF & ANOR. Where the court held as follows:
“In all trials whether judicial or administrative, the person against whom a complaint is laid must be heard in compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem. This is the course of S. 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and always reflected in statutes where persons could be put on trial or investigated with possible consequence of reprimand or punishment. For every accusation there must be a right to be heard. Per BELGORE JSC. Pg. 10 para. E – G.”
6. The lower court cannot unilaterally remove proceedings before it for the purpose of being quashed without a proper application to the court, and particularly where it has not been proved that that other body or tribunal is inferior to it. See, OKUPE VS. FBIR 1974 LPELR 2533 or 1974 4 SC 4.
7. The lower court cannot quash the award of compensation of 1,289,588.48 (British Pounds Sterling) to the Appellant payable by the 1st Respondent which the Appellant was not a party before that court.
Accordingly, I find that this appeal has merit and it is hereby allowed.
I make no order as to costs.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.: I read before now the judgment of my learned brother, PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, JCA, just delivered and I agree with her that this appeal has merit and ought to be allowed. There is a saying in my community that you cannot shave a man’s hair in his absence. This is a true saying and applies with full force in judicial proceedings. By Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended), in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. A party cannot obtain a fair trial where he is not even made a party to the proceedings which has affected his right adversely. It is trite that any judgment made in breach of a party’s right to fair hearing is null and void. See BABA v. NCATC (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388.
A trial which excluded the Appellant herein but which produced a judgment affecting the appellant cannot be allowed to stand. It is a nullity. Based on the above and the fuller reason enunciated in the lead judgment of my learned brother, Ekpe, JCA, I agree that this appeal has merit and I hereby join to allow it. I abide by all the consequential orders made in the lead judgment. I also make no order as to costs.
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I had the advantage to have a review of the judgment delivered by my learned bother, PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE; JCA.
The issues that called for determination were adequately and admirably considered and resolved by my learned brother. I have nothing else of value to add. Consequently, I agree that this appeal has merit and should be allowed. I therefore allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the Court below delivered on the 18th day of July, 2001.
I abide by the order on costs.
Appearances
Kayode Oje, Esq., with N.H. Eluchie, Esq. (Mrs.)For Appellant
AND
Emeka Ngige, Esq., with J. Akano, Esq. (Mrs.) and C. Duru Esq. (Mrs.) for the 1st, 3rd and 4th – 5th RespondentsFor Respondent
