ALHAJI USMAN SHARU BABAN-LUNGU & ANOR V. ALHAJI AHMED ABUBAKAR ZAREWA & ORS (2013)

ALHAJI USMAN SHARU BABAN-LUNGU & ANOR V. ALHAJI AHMED ABUBAKAR ZAREWA & ORS

(2013)LCN/6045(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 22nd day of March, 2013

CA/K/259/2011

RATIO

NOTICE OF APPEAL: IMPORTANCE

Now, the notice of appeal is the foundation and substratum upon which every appeal is predicated. It is the only known and legitimate way or method of laying a complaint before a higher court to show grievances of an aggrieved party against the decision of a lower court and it contains the grounds of appeal – Akpan Vs Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt 1223) 421. It is the compass that guides the parties in presenting their respective cases before the higher court and the higher court has no business determining matters raised by the parties which are not within the confines of the notice of appeal. Hence, the Courts have consistently stated that issues for determination in an appeal must be distilled from and arise from the grounds of appeal and where they are not so distilled, they will be disregarded – see for example, Management Enterprises Vs Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt 55) 179, Alli Vs Alesinloye (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 177, Kraus Thompson Organisation Ltd Vs University of Calabar (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt 879) 631 and Baliol (Nig.) Ltd Vs Navcon (Nig) Ltd (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt 1220) 619.PER HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

BRIEF OF ARGUMENT: COUNSEL SHOULD CONNECT ISSUES FORMULATED TO THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL FROM WHICH IT IS DISTILLED FROM

ISSUE: WHAT IS AN ISSUE IN LAW

JUSTICES

DALHATU ADAMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. ALHAJI USMAN SHARU BABAN-LUNGU
2. ABAGIYAWA BROTHERS NIGERIA LIMITED Appellant(s)

AND

1. ALHAJI AHMED ABUBAKAR ZAREWA
2. MINISTRY OF LAND & PHYSICAL PLANNING, KANO STATE
3. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, KANO STATE Respondent(s)

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Kano State in Suit No K/113/2005 delivered by Honorable Justice A. T. Badamasi on the 28th of June, 2011. By an amended Writ of Summons dated and filed on the 1st of June, 2005, the first Respondent, as plaintiff, commenced an action in the High Court of Kano State in Suit No K/113/2005 against the two Appellants and the second and third Respondents, as the first to fourth defendants, praying, inter alia, for a declaratory order that he was the rightful holder of a right of occupancy over a parcel of land situate lying and being at Trade Fair Ground, Tarauni District of Tarauni Local Government of Kano State and more particularly delineated on a, survey plan approved by the Surveyor General of Kano State dated the 11th July, 1999, as well as for special, general and aggravated damages for trespass to the said land, damages for continuing trespass and injunction to restraining further trespass.
Pleadings were exchanged between the parties and the matter went to trial. In a judgment delivered on the 28th of June, 2011, the lower Court granted some of the reliefs sought by the first Respondent. The Appellants were dissatisfied with the decision and they filed a notice of appeal dated the 29th of June, 2011 against the judgment. The notice of appeal contained three grounds of appeal.
In compliance with the Rules of this Court, the Appellants filed a brief of arguments dated the 9th of November, 2011, and it consisted of eighteen pages. The first Respondent filed a brief of argument consisting of twenty pages and dated the 9th of December, 2011 in response. Pursuant to an order of extension of time granted by this Court on 4th of October, 2012, the Appellants filed a reply brief to the first Respondent’s brief of arguments and it was dated the 8th of October, 2012 but filed on 10th of October, 2012. The second and third Respondents filed a brief of arguments dated the 5th of March, 2012 but the brief was deemed properly filed by this Court on the 4th of October, 2012. The Appellants filed a reply brief to the second and third Respondents’ brief of arguments and it was dated and filed on the 11th of October, 2012. At the hearing of the appeal on the 17th of January, 2013, Counsel to the Appellants and to the Respondents relied on and adopted their respective briefs of arguments.
In his brief of arguments, Counsel to the Appellants distilled three issues for determination from the three grounds of appeal and these were:
i. Whether or not the learned trial Judge delivery of the ruling on the admissibility of a document tendered on the 22nd day of June, 2009 during the judgment dated the 28th day of June 2011 did not amount to a denial of fair hearing and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice when he eventually rejected the document in his judgment after the case of the Appellants (defendants at the lower court) had been closed.
ii. Whether or not the failure of the trial Judge to properly evaluate the evidence adduced by the Appellants (1st and 2nd defendants) at the lower Court did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.
iii. Whether or not the delivery of the judgment after the constitutional period did not affect a proper appreciation and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties.
In his brief of arguments, Counsel to the first Respondent also formulated three issues for determination and these were:
i. Whether the learned trial Judge was not right when he refused to admit a photocopy of the letter of grant sought to be tendered by the Appellants.
ii. Whether the trial Judge properly evaluated and appraised the evidence before him before arriving at his decision.
iii. Whether despite the lapse of time between final addresses of Counsel and the delivery of judgment, the Appellants can be said to have suffered a miscarriage of justice that would lead to the judgment of the trial court being declared a nullity.
The second and third Respondents agreed with the issues as formulated by the Appellants but suggested a re-formulation of the first issue for determination thus:
Whether the delivery of a reserved ruling on the date slated for judgment amounts to a denial of fair hearing and occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
The second and third issues for determination formulated by the Appellants and by the first Respondent say the same thing but in different ways while their respective first issue for determination are different. Now, the notice of appeal is the foundation and substratum upon which every appeal is predicated. It is the only known and legitimate way or method of laying a complaint before a higher court to show grievances of an aggrieved party against the decision of a lower court and it contains the grounds of appeal – Akpan Vs Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt 1223) 421. It is the compass that guides the parties in presenting their respective cases before the higher court and the higher court has no business determining matters raised by the parties which are not within the confines of the notice of appeal. Hence, the Courts have consistently stated that issues for determination in an appeal must be distilled from and arise from the grounds of appeal and where they are not so distilled, they will be disregarded – see for example, Management Enterprises Vs Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt 55) 179, Alli Vs Alesinloye (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 177, Kraus Thompson Organisation Ltd Vs University of Calabar (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt 879) 631 and Baliol (Nig.) Ltd Vs Navcon (Nig) Ltd (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt 1220) 619.

It is a requirement for a good brief of argument that Counsel to the parties should specifically connect the issues formulated in the brief of arguments to the ground of appeal they are distilled from – Chukwuma Vs Ifeloye (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt 1118) 204 at 234 – 235, Igwe Vs Ezeanochie (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt.1192) 61 at 78, Edoho Vs State (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt 1214) 651, and Owena Mass Transportation Co Ltd Vs Bidat Venture Ltd (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt 1252) 303 at 310.
Neither the Counsel to the Appellants nor the Counsel to the Respondents related the issues for determination that they formulated to the grounds of appeal they were distilled from. It is not the intention of this Court to make an issue of this omission in this appeal.
Reading the issues for determination as formulated by the parties, vis-a-vis the grounds of appeal, it is apparent that the first issue for determination formulated by the Appellants, and as re-formulated by the second and third Respondents, did not arise from any of the grounds of appeal. None of the grounds of appeal or the particulars of any of the grounds of appeal complained about the learned trial Judge’s delivery of a ruling on admissibility of document as part of the final judgment and none of them complained of lack of fair hearing. The first issue for determination of the Appellants, and as re-formulated by the second and third Respondents, is thus alien to this appeal and will be discountenanced. This appeal will be resolved on the first issue for determination formulated by the first Respondent and on the second and third issues for determination formulated by the Appellants.
This Court deems it pertinent to recount the brief facts of this case, before proceeding to treat the issues for determination. The case is in respect of the ownership of a parcel of land situate lying and being at Trade Fair Ground, Tarauni District of Tarauni Local Government of Kano State and more particularly delineated on a survey plan approved by the Surveyor General of Kano State dated the 11th July, 1999. The case of the first Respondent, as plaintiff before the lower Court, was that he was granted a right of occupancy No LKN/COM/98/101 over the said parcel of land by the Governor of Kano State vide a letter of grant dated the 4th of June, 1999 and that he thereafter completed all formalities and paid all necessary fees for the issuance of certificate of occupancy and he also processed an approved building plan in respect thereof.
It was the case of the first Respondent that the first Appellant owned two parcels of land adjoining the land in dispute and that on or about 1999/2000 he deposited building materials on the land in dispute with a view to fencing same but that the first Appellant, with the assistance of some thugs, drove his workmen from the land and thereafter fenced the land in dispute off with his adjoining parcels of land. It was his case that he reported the matter to the second Respondent who directed him to another government agency and the first Appellant was issued and served with stop order of further works on the land in dispute and that by this time all the building materials he deposited on the land had been stolen. It his case that he requested the first Appellant to remove the fence erected on the land in dispute and that he commenced the action when the first Appellant refused to do so.
The case of the Appellants, as first and second defendants before the lower Court, was that the first Appellant was the Chairman/Managing Director of the second Appellant and that sometime in 1993, the second Appellant was granted a piece of land at Trade Fair Ground, Tarauni District of Tarauni Local Government of Kano State by a certificate of occupancy No LKN/COM/88/47 for the purpose of operating a pharmaceutical company. It was their case that the piece of land granted was insufficient for the purposes of the second Appellant and whereupon the second Appellant in 1996 applied for the grant of the adjoining parcels of land. It was their case that the officer processing the request, one Mallam Lawan Zarewa, a brother to the first Respondent, informed the first Appellant that by reason of a planned access road, the second Appellant could not be granted the entire adjoining parcels of land and the said officer assisted them in putting up a sketch of the land to be granted, leaving space for said access road.
It was the case of the Appellants that the second Appellant was subsequently given a letter of grant in January, 1999 in respect of the sketched land and it commenced developments on the land. It was their case that they later learnt that the portion of land left for the access road together with about forty meters of the allocated parcel of land of the second Appellant was granted to the first Respondent and they thus addressed a petition to the Executive Governor of Kano State to protest the grant of land to the first Respondent. It was their case that the Executive Governor directed the second Respondent to investigate the petition and that at the conclusion of the investigation, it was found that the second Appellant was entitled to the grant of the entire area inclusive of the portion of land granted to the first Respondent. It was their case that consequently the letter of grant given to the first Respondent was withdrawn by the second Respondent by a letter dated the 12th of January, 2000 and the second Appellant was granted a certificate of occupancy over the entire area of land.
The three issues for determination formulated by the parties shall be treated separately.
Issue 1
This is – whether the learned trial Judge was not right when he refused to admit a photocopy of the letter of grant sought to be tendered by the Appellants. This issue arose from an event that occurred during the proceedings. In the course of trial, Counsel to the Appellants, as Counsel to the first and second defendants, sought to tender, through the first defence witness, the letter of grant of the additional land applied for by the second Appellant and Counsel to the first Respondent, as Counsel to the plaintiff, objected to the admissibility. The following took place:
Counsel to the first Respondent: I object to the admissibility of this document. It is a photocopy and no foundation has been laid as to where about of the original.
Counsel to the Appellant: The document is original and the basis for its admission in evidence is whether it is relevant. It has been pleaded. If eventually the plaintiff proved that the document is a photocopy that goes to weight and not its admissibility. We urge the court to admit the document in evidence.
The lower Court reserved ruling on the issue of admissibility of the document (see page 54 of the records). The ruling was incorporated in the final judgment and the lower Court stated thus:
“Before I produce the summary of witness testimonies, I feel it imperative at this juncture to rule on an objection raised by Counsel to the plaintiff on the admissibility of a photocopy of a letter of grant sought to be tendered through DW1.
In the course of his testimony in chief DW1 stated that he was granted an extension based on his application and that he would identify that letter of grant by the name of the 2nd defendant.
A photocopy of the document was then shown to the witness who identify it. Upon being tendered, learned Counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the document was a photocopy and the whereabouts of the original was not explained.
Counsel to the defendant on the other hand urged me to discountenance the objection and admit the documents in as much as it is relevant to the proceedings. While it is true that the cardinal principle of admissibility of a document is its relevance to the proceedings it must however pass the litmus test of admissibility.
By the provision of Section 94 – 96 of the Evidence Act a photocopy of a document is inadmissible save when the whereabouts of the original is explained…. DW1 in the instant case did not tell me the whereabouts of the original nor did he plead a photocopy in his statement of defense. This state of affair therefore renders the photocopy of the right of occupancy inadmissible and I so hold. Consequently the objection of the learned counsel to the plaintiff is hereby sustained and the document is rejected and shall be so marked.” (see pages 417 – 418 of the records)
The arguments of Counsel to the Appellants on the issue are contained in paragraphs 4.12 to 4.28 of his brief of arguments. Counsel stated that the issue at the stage of the objection to the admissibility of the letter of grant of the second Appellant was whether it was a photocopy or an original and that as such proceeding relating to admissibility of secondary evidence was inapplicable. Counsel stated that the learned trial Judge did not resolve this issue before proceeding to apply the provisions of Sections 94 and 96 of the Evidence Act and submitted that this failure was fatal to whatever ruling the learned trial Judge proceeded to give on the issue of admissibility of the document. Counsel submitted that without making a finding of fact on whether the document was original or not, the learned trial Judge ought not to have proceeded to make the conclusion which evidenced that the fact of the document being a photocopy had been proved contrary to the provisions of Section 121 of the Evidence Act. Counsel referred to the cases of Ogunyade Vs Oshunkeye (2007) All FWLR (Pt 389) 1179, Mohammed Vs State (2002) All FWLR (Pt 383) 46 and Akpan Vs Udoh (2007) All FWLR (Pt 395) 540.
Counsel submitted further that even if it was correct that the document was indeed a photocopy, the learned trial Judge ought not to have rejected the document because the basis of admissibility is relevance and he referred to the case of Abubakar Vs Chuks (2008) All FWLR (Pt 15) 2610. Counsel stated that the effect of the rejection of the document was that the learned trial Judge resolved the issue of priority of the allocation of the land in dispute in favour of the first Respondent and that this would not have happened had the document been admitted as it predated the letter of grant of the first Respondent. Counsel proceeded therefrom to argue on the effect of wrongful exclusion of evidence and he referred to the provisions of Section 251(2) of the Evidence Act and the case of Elias Vs Disu (1962) 2 NSCC 152 and submitted that but for the wrongful exclusion of the letter of grant of the second Appellant, the learned trial Judge would have come to the irreversible conclusion that the grant to the second Appellant was first in time and would have dismissed the case of the first Respondent. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.
In his response arguments on the issue, Counsel to the first Respondent stated that it was very obvious from the ruling that the learned trial Judge made a clear finding that the document was a photocopy and he referred to the provisions of Sections 96 and 97 of the Evidence Act and submitted that the Appellants did not satisfy the requirements for tendering secondary evidence. Counsel submitted that admissibility of a document was governed by three criteria; namely (i) is it pleaded; (ii) is it relevant; and (iii) is it admissible in law; and that where a document is relevant but is not admissible in law, it must be rejected by the Court and he referred to the cases of Okonji Vs Njokanma (1999) 12 SC (Pt II) 150 and Fawehinmi Vs IGP (2000) FWLR (Pt 12) 2015. Counsel stated that these principles were also restated in the case of Abubakar Vs Chuks supra relied on by the Counsel to the Appellants. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the first Respondent.
Counsel to the second and third Respondents did not proffer any arguments in respect of this issue in the brief of arguments.
The first grouse of the Counsel to the Appellants on this issue is that the learned trial Judge did not, in the ruling, follow the format of first finding whether the letter of grant sought to be tendered by the Appellants was an original or not before rejecting same as a photocopy. It is settled law that there is no specific format prescribed either by adjectival or substantive law for writing a judgment or ruling. Every Judge reserves the right as to his own style of writing whether sitting at the trial or appellate level of courts. What is most paramount is that a Judge must pronounce on the issues submitted by the parties for adjudication and state the reasons for his resolving the issues one way or the other – Nwankudu Vs Ibeto (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt 1231) 209, Aregbesola Vs Oyinlola (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt 1253) 458 and Ovunwo Vs Woko (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt 1277) 522.

Now, an issue is the question in dispute between the parties, usually raised by way of a question to be determined by the Court. It is usually a proposition of the law or fact in dispute between the parties necessary for determination by the Court – Nwaogwugwu Vs President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt 1030) 237 and Onafowokan Vs Wema Bank Plc (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt1260) 24.
Looking at the proceedings leading up to the ruling, the issue or question submitted by the parties to the learned trial Judge for resolution was whether or not the letter of grant of the second Appellant sought to be tendered was admissible in law, taking into consideration the circumstances in which the document was tendered by the witness. Reading through the ruling of the lower Court, it cannot be contested that this issue or question was resolved by the learned trial Judge and the reasons for the decision taken thereon were explicitly stated.
A photocopy of a document is a photographic reproduction of the document. The question whether a document is a photocopy or an original is a matter of perception; seeing it with the eyes. Where it is clear to the eyes that a document is a photocopy, there is no need for a learned trial Judge to first embark on stating the distinguishing features of an original document from a photocopy and then relating those features to the document in question and stating why he thinks the document is a photocopy, before rejecting the document as a photocopy. This will be an over simplification of the task of a Judge. The argument of Counsel to the Appellants amounts to “splitting of hairs” and an attempt to regard Judges as robots programmed to follow a particular course in arriving at answers all the time. Judges are no such things. This Court cannot fault the format of writing adopted by the learned Judge in the ruling.
Even assuming that indeed the learned trial Judge failed to properly evaluate whether the document was an original or a photocopy, it is settled that the proper steps for this Court to take, in the circumstances, is to carry out the evaluation itself from the evidence available on the records – Orianwo Vs Okene (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt 786) 156, Wachukwu Vs Owunwanne supra, Ovunwo Vs Woko (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt.1277) 522. Where the credibility of a witness is not in point, a court sitting on appeal can evaluate evidence. Where the conclusion is arrived at without any real controversy, such as in the case of documentary evidence, or where there is oral evidence which involves merely an admission by the adversary, or there is an unchallenged piece of evidence, an appellate court should consider itself to be in as good a position as the trial court, in so far as the evaluation of such evidence is concerned – Ebba Vs Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372, Ogundepo Vs Olumesan (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt1278) 54.
Looking at the documents transmitted along with the records of appeal in this matter however, the rejected letter of grant in question was not one of them; only the admitted exhibits were transmitted. This Court is thus not able to look at the exact document tendered by Appellants at the trial and titled “Letter of Grant Under Right of Occupancy No LKN/COM/88/47 and dated the 25th January, 1999, to see whether it is a photocopy or an original or counterpart of an original. It was the responsibility of the Appellants to ensure the production of the document before this Court. This Court is handicapped in impugning the finding of the learned trial Judge that the document was a photocopy.
This point was made by the Court of Appeal in Shell Petroleum Development Co Vs Farah (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt 382) 148 at 175 B-C thus:
“That apart, the document marked R1 and R2 are not shown to be part of the record of appeal. They have not been copied in the records nor are they seen in the envelope containing the exhibits. The normal procedure where a document is tendered and rejected is to mark the document rejected and make it part of the records so that in the event of an appeal, the appellate court would have the opportunity of examining it to see whether or not it ought to have been admitted and if admitted its evidential value in the matter in controversy. It is the duty of an appellant to produce before the appellate court the records which he seeks to challenge in that court…As the document R1 and R2 do not form part of the record of appeal, and having regard to what I have earlier stated about them, the complaint about their rejection is misconceived.”
Counsel to the Appellants argued further on this issue that the learned trial Judge ought to have admitted the document notwithstanding that it was a photocopy because it was relevant. The often cited authority for the proposition that once a document is relevant to a matter, it is admissible is Torti Vs Ukpabi (1984) 1 SCNLR 214 where the Supreme Court stated that the test of admissibility of a document is relevance. However, it is a misunderstanding of the law of evidence to assert the application of this statement of the Supreme Court in all situations. It is elementary that a document sought to be tendered in evidence by a party in the course of trial in the High Court must satisfy two requirements; (i) the rules of pleadings i.e. that it must be pleaded; and (ii) the rules of evidence i.e. that it must possess the quality required by the Evidence Act to make it admissible in law. Where a document is material but it is not pleaded, it will not become admissible simply because it is relevant – Hashidu Vs Goje (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 843) 353, Ogu Vs Ekweremadu (2006) 1 NWLR (Pt 961) 255, Agboola Vs United Bank for Africa Plc (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt 1258) 375.

Similarly, the fact that a public document is relevant does not make a photocopy of the public document admissible; it must be a certified true copy – Orlu Vs Gogo-Abite (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt 1196) 307, House of Representatives Vs Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt 1205) 213. Thus, the fact that a document is relevant is not always enough ground for its admissibility; there are other criteria to be considered. The point was ably captured by Oguntade, JCA (as he then was) in Fawehinmi Vs Inspector General of Police (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt 665) 481, at 524 to 525 G-B thus:
“I think the lower court was wrong in its approach. There was no doubt that Exhibits GF1 to GF3 were public documents. Section 97(1)(a) – (h) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 112 permits the use in any civil proceedings of secondary evidence. However, section 97(2) (c) provides that the only secondary evidence admissible is a “certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible.”
The reliance placed by the lower Court on Torti Vs Ukpabi supra was inappropriate. That case decided that the test of admissibility of a document was relevancy. But before a document is held relevant, it must first scale the test prescribed for its admissibility under Section 97 of the Evidence Act. A document that by the provision of Section 97 is inadmissible cannot be held relevant. Because such a document in the eyes of the law is worthless and irrelevant. The decision in Torti Vs Ukpabi supra was made in relation to whether or not a document could be rejected in evidence on the ground that it was not produced from proper custody. The case is inapplicable where the objection is that the document sought to be tendered has not met the conditions prescribed in Section 97 of the Evidence Act.”
Now, by Section 96 of the Evidence Act, Cap 112, Laws of the Federation 1990, which was the applicable law governing admissibility of evidence as at 22nd of April, 2009 when the document in question in this matter was tendered in court, it is trite that as a general rule, all documents intended to be used as evidence in proof of any matter before the court must be primary evidence and Section 94 of the same Evidence Act defined primary evidence to mean the original document itself or where executed in counterparts, the counterpart. Section 97 created exceptions to the general rule and stated instances where parties may tender secondary evidence of a document and the categories of secondary evidence admissible in those instances.

It is the duty of any party seeking to tender secondary evidence of a document, to locate his case within one of the stated exceptions in Section 97 and to produce the type of admissible secondary evidence allowed under the exception. A party does this by leading preliminary evidence prior to tendering the document; this is what is referred to as “laying the foundation” for the admissibility of the secondary evidence. Where this is not done, the secondary evidence will be inadmissible no matter how relevant the document is – Madueke Vs Okoroafor (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt 263) 69, Jacob Vs Attorney-General, Akwa Ibom State (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt 765) 18 and Independent National Electoral Commission Vs Action Congress (2009) 2 NWLR (Pt 1126) 524.
In the instant case, the document sought to be tendered was a photocopy, as found by the learned trial Judge. This is secondary evidence. The Appellants laid no foundation for the tendering of the document. The learned trial Judge was very correct in his conclusion that the document was inadmissible. The first issue for determination is resolved in favour of the Respondents.
Issue II
This is whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence led by the Appellants and, if not, did this lead to a miscarriage of justice. It was the contention of Counsel to the Appellants that the learned trial Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence adduced by the Appellants, particularly the documents tendered and admitted as Exhibits K and L. Counsel stated that the learned trial Judge held that Exhibits K & L were not properly arranged and thus treated them as doctored, mutilated and unarranged documents not credible enough to warrant consideration and learned trial Judge refused to properly evaluate them. Counsel stated that Exhibit K which runs from page 184 to page 214 of the records and Exhibit L which runs from page 329 to page 396 of the records were original files tendered by the staff of the second Respondent. Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge did not put the cases presented by the parties on an even scale and he referred to the case of Adebayo Vs Shogo (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt 925) 467. Counsel referred to some of the individual documents in the exhibits and submitted that had the learned judge given thought to them and placed them on the imaginary scale on the side of the Appellants’ case, they would have tilted the balance of probabilities in favour of the Appellants. Counsel referred to the case of Elegushi Vs Oseni (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt 945) 348. Counsel urged this Court to evaluate the said exhibits and give effect to them.
In his response arguments, Counsel to the first Respondent referred to the principle of evaluation of evidence of parties as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Odofin Vs Mogaji (1978) 11 NSCC 275 and submitted that the learned trial Judge in the instant case complied with every step of the principle in his treatment of the evidence led by the parties before the lower Court. Counsel took a voyage through the judgment of the lower Court to point out the instances of compliance with the principle of evaluation of evidence. With regards to Exhibits K and L, Counsel submitted that the finding of the lower Court that they were mutilated and doctored was supported by the evidence led by the witness who tendered them as to their being incomplete. Counsel stated that the exhibits were altered by removing documents not favourable to the case of the Appellant therefrom and that as such the learned trial Judge was right in not attaching any weight to them. Counsel referred to the cases of Orji Vs Dorji ile Mills (Nig) Ltd (2010) All FWLR (Pt 519) 999 and Nwaoba Vs Ihebie (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt 134) 589 on the fate of an altered document. Counsel urged this Court not to interfere with the findings of the lower Court and he prayed the Court to resolve the second issue in favour of the first Respondent.
Counsel to the second and third Respondents did not also proffer any arguments in respect of this issue in the brief of arguments.
The complaints of the Appellants on this issue for determination were specific and not general; they were on non-evaluation of Exhibits K and L by the lower Court. Exhibit K and L are not single documents. Each one is a file consisting of several documents. According to the Counsel to the Appellants, Exhibit K runs from page 184 through to page 214 of the records and Exhibit L runs from page 329 through to page 396 of the records. The first question that arises under this issue is – whether the said Exhibits K and L deserve to be accorded any probative value in the circumstances of this case? This is because where a document tendered at trial commands no probative value, the issue whether it was properly evaluated or not evaluated becomes completely irrelevant.

It is an established principle of law that documentary evidence cannot serve any useful purpose in a trial where there is no oral evidence led by any of the parties explaining its essence. This point was extensively dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Adike Vs Obiareri (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt 758) 537 and Olagunju, JCA, stated thus at pages 572 – 573 D-E:
“Exhibit ‘R’, on the other hand, is a legally admissible document which probative value is open to serious question. The document was tendered from the Bar at the tail end of the trial when no witness could be examined on it and none was in fact examined. The document contained information about several plots of land that make up Ozalla Layout out the subject matter of the survey being portrayed and the details upon which learned counsel for the appellant drew extensively in the appellant’s briefs to criticize the respondent’s survey plan, Exhibit A.
The evidential value of such a document came for examination in Duriminiya Vs Commissioner of Police (1961) NNLR 70, where the court considered the essence of a trial and the function of a trial Judge. At page 74 the court expounded that ‘a trial is not an investigation and investigation is not the function of court’. It explained that the function of a Judge is to decide between the parties on the basis of what has been demonstrated and tested by examination and cross-examination of the witness on the document the court opining that
‘It was not part of his duty to do cloistered justice by making an enquiry into the case outside court – not even by the examination of documents which were in evidence, when the documents had not been examined in court and the Magistrate’s examination disclosed things that had not been brought out and exposed to test in court, or were not things that, at least, must have been noticed in court.’
The above dictum was approved by the Supreme Court in The Queen Vs Wilcox (1961) SCNLR 296 and later applied in Bornu Holding Co Ltd Vs Bogoco (1971) 1 All NLR 324, Adesoye Vs Gardner (1977) NNLR 136 and Onibudo Vs Akibu (1982) 12 NSCC 199. The principle evolved by those decisions underscores the distinction between producing evidence at trial the contents of which must be brought by oral evidence that is subjected to … cross-examination and dumping a document on proceedings without examining the contents in the open court. The latter method is a short-cut that is not a fool-expedience as learned counsel for the appellant who chose to short-circuit the normal procedure for tendering a document by producing Exhibit ‘R’ from the Bar when the trial was winding to a close has by so doing shut out the contents of the document from being made known at the trial and even afterwards. He has in effect deposited the shell of the document in the proceedings without allowing the court access to the evidential kernel. Having by stealth foreclosed the credibility of the document being tested, question of giving any weight, medium or light, to a piece of writing without a particle of evidence is a pipedream.”
In Egba Vs Appah (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt 934) 464, the Court of Appeal again stated that documents are not objects that can be cross-examined and that therefore oral evidence must be called in support thereof. In Alao Vs Akano (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt 935) 160, Supreme Court held that documents admitted in evidence, no matter how useful they could be, would not be of much assistance to the court in the absence of admissible oral evidence that explains their purport.
Exhibit K was tendered through the second defence witness during the examination-in-chief and Exhibit L was tendered through the same witness during his cross-examination. The testimony of the second defence witness leading up to the admission of Exhibit K went thus:
“… I work with Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning Kano State. I am a Senior Land Officer. I know that in our Ministry files No COM /98/101 & COM/88/47 do exist. I know that in respect of COM/88/47 there was an application by a company called Abagiyawa Nig Ltd (the 2nd Defendant) for a plot to carry out different commercial activities the date of the application is 9/7/88 and the date of the application form is 1/7/88. The approval by the then Military Governor. A letter of grant was issued which is dated 9//10/90 in the name of Abagiyawa Brothers Nig Ltd No 341 Hausawa Zoo Road, Kano.
The allocation was made on a piece of land No 46 at Zaria Road Kano under Plan No SP/UDB/138A there was then an application for extension by the 2nd defendant that was around 1996. The application for extension was forwarded to KASEPPA when recommended the application the Ministry of Land then approved the extension and allocated same to the 2nd defendant. Later we received a complaint by the 2nd defendant that there is an encroachment on that land. A lot of submissions were made sequel to the petition. The encroachment was done by the title holder of COM/98/101 whose name I don’t know.
The petition was investigated by the Ministry and the outcome of the investigation is that title of COM/88/47 should be reinstated in respect of the extension. In the course of the investigation, it was discovered that the processing of COM/88/47 has been delayed which paved the way for the 2nd application that is COM/98/101.
I don’t know who caused the delay, this led to the reinstatement of title to COM/88 and the title of COM/98/101 was revoked. One of the reasons for the revocation of COM/98/101 is that the application of COM /88/47 came earlier than that of COM/98/101 the position now is that COM/88/47 is the holder of land in issue. I have with me the original file in respect of COM /88/47.”(see pages 61 to 62 of the records)
This was the entire evidence led by the witness before the certified true copy of the file in respect of COM/88/47 consisting of over thirty pages was tendered as Exhibit K. Thereafter, the testimony in chief of the witness was closed. The Appellants, as first and second defendants, called two witnesses at the trial and neither the first defence witness nor the second defence witness who tendered Exhibit K gave any oral evidence on the essence of tendering the file and/or evidence as to what fact Exhibit K was directed at establishing. The witnesses did not relate the many pages of the Exhibit K to any aspect of the case of the Appellants before the lower Court. The Appellants just dumped the bundle documents admitted as Exhibit K on the lower Court, and, apparently realizing this fact, Counsel to the Appellants, as counsel to the first and second defendants, made no reference to Exhibit K in his written address before the lower Court (see pages 118 to 123 of the records). It was in the Appellants’ brief of arguments in this appeal that Counsel to the Appellants sought, for the first time, to relate parts the documents tendered as Exhibit K to aspects of the case of the Appellants before the lower Court.
It is settled law that a party relying on documents in proof of his case must, in open court, specifically relate each of such documents to that part of his case in respect of which the document is being tendered. It cannot be done in the written address of his Counsel. In other words, there must be evidence showing the link between the documents and the specific areas of the case of the party. The court cannot assume the duty of tying each bundle of documentary exhibits to specific aspects of the case for a party when that party has not himself done so – Terab Vs Lawan (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt 231) 569, Awuse Vs Odili (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt 952) 515, All Nigeria Peoples Party Vs Usman (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt 1100) 1, Audu Vs Independent National Electoral Commission (No 2) (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt 1212) 456, All Nigeria Peoples Party Vs Independent National Electoral Commission (No 2) (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt.1212) 549,Adewale Vs Olaifa (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1330) 478.
Similarly, a party tendering a document before the court is expected or required to demonstrate in the open court the use he proposes to put it; and this too cannot be done in the written address of the Counsel. It is not for the Court to go on a voyage of discovery or speculation; investigation is not the work of the court – Nteogwuile Vs Otuo (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt 738) 58, Awuse Vs Odili supra. These two principles were stated by the Supreme Court in Jimoh Vs Akande (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt 1135) 549 when the Court held:
‘Documents are not simply dumped on the court through a witness. There must be evidence before the court connecting the documents to the matter before the Court. In the instant case, exhibits “D1” and “D2” related to the tax receipts of one Akano who was not a party to the matter. Akano did not testify and was not cross-examined on the exhibits before the court. There was no evidence before the court connecting the exhibits to the instant matter. They were simply dumped on the court through DW3. Therefore, the purpose of tendering the exhibits was at large.’
Exhibit L was the certified true copy of the file in respect of COM/98/101 consisting of over sixty-seven pages, according to the Counsel to the Appellants, and Counsel to the first Respondent while cross-examining the second defence witness requested for the production of the file “for cross-examination purposes” (see page 64 of the records). The file was produced for this purpose and it was admitted by the Court and Counsel did use it for the purpose of cross-examining the second defence witness. It is settled law that a” Court should only use a document for the purpose it was produced and admitted and it is not open to the court to use the document other than for that purpose – Onwumere Vs Agwunede (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 62) 673 at 681 – 682, Ishola Vs Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt 922) 422, Omega Bank Nigeria Plc Vs OBC Limited (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt 928) 547.
Given this state of affairs, the lower Court was not at liberty to proceed to evaluate either Exhibit K or Exhibit L for the purposes of establishing or deconstructing the cases put forward by the parties. Exhibits K and L were not deserving of any probative value in the circumstances and they ought to have been out-rightly discountenanced by the lower Court.
Going forward and assuming that the lower Court could have accorded probative value to the two exhibits, the next question is – whether the lower Court was right in declining to evaluate Exhibits K and L?
It is trite that a trial Court has two duties in respect of the evidence led by parties in a trial. The first is to receive into its records all the relevant evidence, and this is called perception. The second is to thereafter weigh the evidence in the con of the surrounding circumstances, and this is evaluation. A finding of fact by a trial Court involves both perception and evaluation – Guardian Newspapers Ltd Vs Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1256) 574, Nacenn Nigeria Ltd Vs Bewac Automotive Producers Ltd (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt 1257) 193, Wachukwu Vs Owunwanne (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt 1266) 1.

It is the primary responsibility of a trial court to hear the parties, watch and observe the demeanour of witnesses called to testify before it, admit or reject documents tendered, ascribe probative value to the evidence and then come up with a decision. This is regulated by time honoured procedure designed to mete out justice to both parties before the court. The procedure is crucial in its observance. The trial court is enjoined to place the totality of the testimonies of both parties on an imaginary scale. One side of the scale will contain the evidence of the plaintiff while the other side will harbor the evidence of the defendant. The court must then weigh them together to see which side is heavier than the other. This is in terms of quality, not quantity. To help the court in this regard, it should consider whether the evidence led by a party in its totality is relevant, admissible, credible, conclusive and more probable than that adduced by the other party. Once these considerations fall into line, the court will then apply the relevant laws to the facts or evidence adduced, in order to reach a decision. The observance of the procedure for evaluation of evidence is crucial to arriving at a just decision. Its breach will most likely lead to a perverse decision – Mogaji Vs Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91, Adeleke Vs Iyanda (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt729) 1, Okoko Vs Dakolo (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 401, Tippi Vs Notani (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt 1249) 285.

Where a judgment of a trial court is attacked on the ground of finding or non-finding of evidence or evaluation of evidence, the Court of Appeal will seek the following (i) the evidence before the trial court; (ii) whether the trial court accepted or rejected any evidence upon the correct perception; (iii) whether the trial court correctly approached the assessment of the value on it; (iv) whether it used the imaginary scale of justice to weigh the evidence on either side; or (v) whether it appreciated, upon the preponderance of evidence, which side the scale weighed more having regard to the burden of proof – Egonu Vs Egonu (1978) 11 – 12 SC 111, Daramola Vs Attorney-General, Ondo State (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt 665) 400, Momoh Vs Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt 1270) 217.
In the judgment of the lower Court, the learned trial Judge said of Exhibits K and L thus:
“I now move to consider some salient points raised by counsel in their addresses. It is the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff that exhibits K and L tendered by the defendants witnesses should not be relied on because they contained serious contradictions.
These exhibits were tendered through DW2 who stated under cross-examination that Exhibit L begins with page 4 while it is supposed to begin with page 1. He is not in a position to state what is at page 1. The pages of exhibit K are not properly arranged. I wonder if it (sic) my duty to arrange properly an exhibit tendered which is not properly arranged.
I have looked at the 2 exhibits closely, I discovered that they (sic) mutilated, unarranged and somehow doctored. I am of the view that these documents are not credible enough to warrant giving them consideration by this court and I so hold.” (see pages 429 to 430 of the records)
It must be recalled that the Appellants tendered Exhibit K at the trial as one single document consisting of many pages and not as a series of independent documents. The same thing was done in the tendering of Exhibit L; a single document consisting of many pages. It is the duty of a party seeking to tender a document consisting of several pages as an exhibit in a trial to ensure that the documents are numbered and/or arranged serially and in sequence, and he must provide a plausible and credible explanation for any missing pages of the document. A document is said to have been doctored when it is altered or tampered with and to be mutilated when it has been damaged by destroying or removing some essential parts of it.
The second defence witness who tendered Exhibits K and L admitted under cross-examination that Exhibit L began from page 4, instead of page 1, and that he was not in a position to state what was on pages 1 to 3 and that he did not know the whereabout of pages 1 to 3. The witness stated that Exhibit K, though numbered, was not arranged serially and that it did not contain the certificate of occupancy issued to the second Appellant and that the certificate of occupancy was in the main file; suggesting that there was another file on the subject matter of Exhibit K and that Exhibit K did not contain all the documents on the subject matter (see page 65 of the records). It is clear from the testimony of the witness that Exhibits K and L had been altered and tampered with and that some essential parts of the documents had been removed. And as rightly submitted by Counsel to the first Respondent, a doctored, altered or mutilated document is not credible and is not worthy of any probative value. The learned trial Judge was thus on very firm ground when he discountenanced Exhibits K and L in the assessment of the evidence led by the parties. The second issue for determination is resolved in favour of the Respondents.
Issue III
This is on whether the delivery of the judgment in this matter outside the ninety days stipulated by law affected the appreciation of the evidence led by the parties and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Counsel to the Appellants referred to the provisions of Section 294 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 which provides that Courts should deliver their decisions in a matter not later than ninety days after conclusion of evidence and final addresses. Counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 294(5) of the Constitution to the effect that the decision of a court shall not be set aside simply because it was not delivered within ninety days unless it is apparent that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof. Counsel stated that the judgment in the instant case was delivered by the lower Court four months and four days, a period outside the ninety days, after the conclusion of final addresses.
Counsel submitted that this amounted to an inordinate delay and that the Appellants suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof because, firstly, the learned trial Judge forgot to appreciate the fact that he needed to make a finding on whether or not the letter of grant tendered by the Appellants was a photocopy or an original before proceeding to apply the provisions of the Evidence Act thereto and that this led to a wrongful rejection of the document and the resolution of the issue of priority of grant in favour of the first Respondent. Secondly, that due to the inordinate delay, the learned trial Judge failed to appreciate the number of witnesses called by the Appellants, as first and second defendants, in proof of their case and remarked that “the first defendant testified for himself and tendered 5 exhibits and closed his case”. Meanwhile, the Appellants called two witnesses but the lower Court failed to acknowledge the second defence witness. Counsel referred to the cases of INEC VS Okoronkwo (2009) All FWLR (Pt 488) 227 and Owoyemi Vs Adekoya (2004) All FWLR (Pt 196) 881 on the interpretation of Section 294 of the Constitution and definition of miscarriage of justice. Counsel submitted that the two instances led to injustice being done to the Appellants.
Counsel to the first Respondent, in response, conceded that the judgment of the lower Court was delivered by the lower Court four months and four days after the conclusion of final addresses, a period outside the ninety days provided for in Section 294 of the Constitution but he submitted that the Appellants suffered no miscarriage of justice by reason thereof and this was the key factor in the provisions. Counsel referred to the case of Dibiamaka Vs Osakwe (1989) 2 NSCC 253 on the interpretation of Section 294 of the Constitution. Counsel stated that the instances of miscarriage of justice referred to by the Counsel to the Appellants were speculative as the learned trial Judge indeed made a finding that the document tendered by the Appellants was a photocopy before rejecting same and also that the learned trial Judge fully reviewed the evidence of the second defence witness and the exhibits tendered through the witness. Counsel referred to the case of Oyegoke Vs Iriguna (2001) FWLR (Pt 75) 448 on the meaning of miscarriage of justice and submitted that Appellants did not disclose any tangible or clear reason on the face of the records to support the allegation of miscarriage of justice.
Counsel stated further that this third issue for determination was distilled from the third ground of appeal of the Appellants and that the ground of appeal contained particulars of alleged instances of miscarriage of justice. Counsel stated that the instances of miscarriage of justice raised and argued by Counsel to the Appellants in his brief of arguments were completely different from the instances alleged in the particulars to the ground of appeal. Counsel submitted that this amounted to an abandonment of the ground of appeal by the Appellants and that this Court should disregard the entire arguments of Counsel to the Appellants on the issue and he referred to the case of Mba Vs Agu (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt 629) 1, on the essence of particulars of a ground of appeal.
Counsel to the second and third Respondents argued in the same vein as Counsel to the first Respondent on the meaning and effect of the provisions of Section 294 of the Constitution. Counsel referred to the cases of BCC Plc Vs Sky Insp (Nig) Ltd (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt 795) 86 and Oyegoke Vs Iriguna (2001) FWLR (Pt 75) 448 and submitted that the Appellants failed to show any tangible and clear instance of miscarriage of justice on the face of the records of appeal.
This third issue for determination was distilled from the third ground of appeal of the Appellants. The third ground of appeal contained particulars of the alleged instances of miscarriage of justice. It is trite that the purpose of the requirement of stating particulars of a ground of appeal is to inform the respondent and the court of the errors or misdirection alleged in a ground of appeal so as to enable the respondent meet the case of the appellant and for the court to be aware of the nature of the error or misdirection complained of – Munguno Vs Bluewhales & Co (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt.1231) 275. Particulars of error are intended to highlight the complaint against the judgment on appeal and they show how the complaint against the judgment is going to be canvassed by the appellant – Osasona Vs Ajayi (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt 894) 527, Diamond Bank Ltd Vs Partnership Investment Co Ltd (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt.1172) 67. Particulars of a ground of appeal are there to support and explain further the complaint raised in the ground of appeal – Federal Medical Center, Ido-Ekiti Vs Olajide (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt 1258) 256.
Thus, there must be a synergy between the arguments canvassed by an appellant on an issue for determination and the particulars contained in the notice of appeal in support of the ground of appeal from which that issue for determination was distilled. The whole purpose of the grounds of appeal and the particulars in support thereof is to give the respondent, notice of the case he has to meet in the appellate court. To canvass arguments on an issue for determination which are completely at variance with the particulars of the ground of appeal from which the issue was distilled, therefore, will amount to springing a surprise on the respondent, an act which the Courts frown at as being antithetical to the doctrine of fair hearing.

The adversarial nature of our legal system regarding practice and procedure makes it incumbent on a party to stick in all material particulars to the case he has set up in his originating processes unless he is allowed by an amendment to alter such case. A party cannot set up one case on his originating process and proceed to canvass a materially different one in court.
In the instant case, as rightly noted by Counsel to the first Respondent, the instances of alleged miscarriage of justice argued by Counsel to the Appellants in his brief of arguments are completely different from the instances alleged in the particulars of ground three of the grounds of appeal from where this third issue for determination was distilled. The arguments of Counsel to the Appellants on the issue of miscarriage of justice are thus off-point and totally misconceived. By the provisions of Sections 294(1) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a party cannot seek to nullify a judgment of court simply because it was delivered outside the ninety days period allowed by the Constitution. The party must proceed further to show the miscarriage of justice he suffered by the reason thereof. Without any cogent and credible argument on alleged instances of miscarriage of justice, the wind is taken out of the sail of the Appellants’ complaint under this third issue for determination.
Going forward and considering the arguments of Counsel to the Appellants on the issue of miscarriage of justice for completeness sake, it is essential to understand that the concept of miscarriage of justice is not a speculative concept and it is not considered in the abstract but in concrete terms based on the peculiar facts of each case. Thus, a party alleging miscarriage of justice by reason of delay in the delivery of judgment by a Court will not succeed by merely parroting the concept, but he must show in clear and real terms the injustice or injury he suffered on the face of the records and which is traceable to the failure of the Court to deliver judgment within the statutory period. Of the two alleged instances canvassed by Counsel to the Appellants in his brief of arguments, this Court has already found that the approach of the learned Judge in the ruling on the admissibility of the letter of grant of the second Appellant was proper and in accordance with the law. On the second alleged instance, the records of appeal show that though the learned trial Judge failed to acknowledge the second defence witness while summarizing the cases of the parties in the judgment, the lower Court fully and exhaustively considered and evaluated the testimony of the witness before reaching a decision in the matter (see pages 424 to 425 of the records). The alleged instances of miscarriage of justice are thus only make-believe and are not real. They cannot sustain the complaint of the Appellants on this issue for determination. All in all, the third issue for determination is resolved in favour of the Respondents.
In conclusion, this Court finds that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the High Court of Kano State in Suit No K/113/2005 delivered by Honorable Justice A.T. Badamasi on the 28th of June, 2011 is affirmed. The first Respondent is awarded the costs of this appeal assessed at N50,000.00. These shall be the orders of this Court.

DALHATU ADAMU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have gone through the lead judgment of my learned brother Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru JCA. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and the conclusion reached in the said lead judgment. I too hereby dismissed the appeal as lacking in merits. I abide by other consequential orders made in the lead judgment including the order on costs.

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading, before now, the draft of the lead judgment, just delivered by my learned brother H.A.O. ABIRU, JCA. In his characteristic manner, my Lord has dealt with all the outstanding issues, exhaustively and admirably, and I agree with him, completely. I have nothing to add, as I adopt his reasonings and conclusions as mine, and also dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
I also abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

Appearances

Mr. Okechukwu NwaezeFor Appellant

AND

Mr. Yusuf Ammani for the 1st Respondent
No appearance for the 2nd and 3rd RespondentsFor Respondent