OLUWASEUN OGUNBAMBO v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS (2013)

OLUWASEUN OGUNBAMBO v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS

(2013)LCN/6038(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 19th day of March, 2013

CA/L/952/2012

RATIO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AS REGARDS THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY

BAIL: APPLICATION FOR BAIL IN RESPECT OF A NON-CAPITAL OFFENCE: ONUS OF PROOF ON THE RESPONDENT OR PROSECUTION IN OPPOSING THE BAIL APPLICATION
Decidedly, where the prosecution opposes bail in an application for bail in respect of a non-capital offence, the onus is on the Respondent or prosecution to show that prima facie, the evidence against the accused is strong and cogent, and that the accused is not likely to appear to take his trial if admitted to bail.PER RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.

BAIL: APPLICATION FOR BAIL IN RESPECT OF CAPITAL OFFENCE: ONUS IS ON THE APPLICANT TO PROVE
ON THE OTHER HAND, in an application for bail in respect of a CAPITAL OFFENCE such as murder, where the state opposes bail, the onus is on the accused/applicant to show by credible affidavit evidence that very peculiar and coercive circumstances exist to justify the court in admitting the Applicant to bail – C.O.P. vs. JA USUMAN (1965-66) MNLR 111; R V MCATARY & MCTALLY 1850. 4 COX CC 444 @ 445, Where CRAMPTON J. observed as follows:-
“It is the rule of the court that where persons are in custody on an indictment for murder which has not been tried, the court will not, unless under very peculiar circumstances (grant bail) or interfere with a refusal to grant bail”PER RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.

BAIL: APPLICATION FOR BAIL PENDING TRIAL: GRANT OR REFUSAL BASED ON THE MAGNITUDE OF CRIME COMMITTED

JUSTICES

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

OLUWASEUN OGUNBAMBO Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 3 ORS Respondent(s)

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of Honourable Justice S. A. Onigbanjo of the Lagos State High Court, Ikeja Judicial Division delivered on the 5th of December 2012.
In it, the learned trial Judge dismissed the Appellant’s summons for bail.
The Appellant is dissatisfied with the Ruling and has appealed same by filing a Notice of Appeal on the 19th of December 2012 with four (4) Grounds of Appeal – pages 302-306 of the Record of Appeal.
The facts are brief.
The Appellant is facing a 13 counts charge of Forgery and obtaining by False Pretences, which offences are bailable. The charges were preferred against him by the 1st Respondent.
On the 21st of November 2012, he filed an application for bail, pending the determination of the substantive criminal case.
The 1st Respondent had filed a counter-affidavit to the bail application, with Exhibits EFCC 1, EFCC 3.
Sequel to oil subsidy crises in 2012, the Honourable Minister for Petroleum Resources and other Civil Society Organization petitioned the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission with a view to unravel the astronomical rise in subsidy paid to petroleum marketers – pages 127-134 of the Record of Appeal.
On the strength of this, the 1st Respondent investigated the petitions, and found that the Appellant’s name and companies were involved in fraudulently obtaining subsidy payments from the 1st Respondent to the tune of N4.2 Billion, and without supplying the said petroleum products.
After several attempts by the 1st Respondent to get the Appellant to report at its office in Abuja to answer to allegations against him, the Appellant, on the 15th day of July 2012 was arrested and consequently charged to court in suit No. ID/116C/2012.
The Appellant had applied for bail in that case. On the 30th of August 2012, he was granted bail by Honourable Justice Folami.
The Appellant was found to be culpable of other charges, when the same allegation of fraud involving another company known as Nasaman Oil Service Ltd, was found to have been involved, as the sole beneficiary of subsidy claims paid on that station, which amounted to N1.2 Billion. It is on the strength of this that the information culminating in this appeal was again preferred against the Appellant.
Before now, the Appellant had been standing trial in Suit No.ID/116C/2012 and ID/131C/2012.
The Appellant proffered one sole issue for determination in his brief of argument filed on the 20th of December 2012. It is settled by Adebayo Adenipekun SAN.
It is
“whether the lower court was justified in refusing the Appellant Bail.”
The Respondent in his brief of argument filed on 30/01/13 proffered two issues for determination. They are:
(a) “Whether the Honouroble Court of Appeal can interfere with the exercise of the judicial discretion of a lower Court.”
(b) “Whether the 7th Respondent has not supplied facts and materials sufficient enough to persuade the lower Court to refuse the Appellant bail.”
The brief of argument is settled by Usani Francis Oka-Phillips Esq. The appellant filed a reply brief on the 1st of February, 2013.
On the 5th of February 2013, counsel for the respective parties adopted their briefs of argument.
While the Appellant submits that this matter is predicated on a loan agreement, he further submits that failure of the Court to grant bail is perverse. Cites BOLAKALE v. STATE (2006) 1 NWLR (Pt. 962) 507 at 518.
He urges Court to allow the appeal.
In his reply, Mr. Usani submits that the Appellant had said that he earns one hundred million naira a month. That is why he was granted the loan of four hundred million naira, but has paid two hundred million naira. That the Appellant took other loans. He submits that the facts in the lower Court were weighty enough to enable Court refuse bail. That the Appellant is still being investigated, and there are three other matters against him in Court. He urges court to dismiss the appeal.
It is the Appellant’s contention that none of the offences for which the Appellant is being tried at the Court below is a Capital offence. Therefore they are bailable offences. That the Appellant is being tried for conspiracy to obtain money by false pretences; obtaining money by false pretences; forgery, and use of forged documents. Citing BOLAKALE v. STATE (supra) he submits that that case holds thus inter alia
“An accused person under Nigerian criminal jurisprudence is presumed innocent whether the offence with which he is charged is of a serious nature or not. Nigerian criminal Justice System is accusational and not inquisitorial”
That the same case at its page 516 paragraph B held thus
“Under Nigerian Law, bail is a right of an accused person. An accused person is not usually denied bail, except where the offence is a capital offence and where special circumstances genuinely exist.”
That in that case, the Court held further
“That in granting an application for bail to an accused person, the seriousness of the offence as alleged by the prosecution will guide the Court in determining the bail terms.”
Referring to Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, he submits that under the Nigerian Criminal Law and procedure, an accused person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence with which he is charged. He cites IKHAZUAGBE V. C.O.P (2004) 7 NWLR (pt.872) pg. 346 @ 363 paragraphs e-f.
The Appellant submits that the spirit behind this constitutional provision is to, inter alia, allow those who might be wrongly accused to escape punishment which any period of imprisonment would inflict while awaiting trial. That the stay out of person guarantees easy accessability to counsel and witnesses.
He argues that the lower court was wrong to have placed heavy reliance on the proof of evidence, as a basis for refusing the Appellant bail. That it is only in a murder charge that the Court will be persuaded by the proof of evidence; whether or not to grant or refuse bail to an accused person – AMINU MUSA v. C.O.P. (2004) 9 NWLR (pt. 879) at 483 at 499.
He submits that, relying on the proof of evidence before the Court to deny an accused bail, is tantamount to finding him guilty even before the prosecutor has opened its case.
He argues that the onus to show that the accused person is not entitled to bail is on the prosecutor – cites ANI v. STATE (2002) 7 NWLR (pt.747) 217 @ 230; EYU v. THE STATE (1988) NWLR 602 at 610.
That an accused person bears no burden to show that he is entitled to bail as the presumption of innocence enures in his favour.
That in the present case, the trial Court placed the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to bail, on the Appellant.
He argues that although in applying for bail, an accused person must place some material before the Court to persuade the Court to grant him, bail, however, the burden on him is not a high one, but one on the balance of probability.
He argues that it is not the case here that the Appellant jumped an administrative bail granted him by EFCC, neither is it their case that he jumped the Court bail granted him by the Court below in Charge No.ID/122C/2012. Neither was it alleged that he jumped any bail before.
That the criminal antecedents referred to by the lower Court were never proved before him. These are mere assertions of crime which the lower Court ought not to have looked into when considering the application for bail, having regard to the presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused person standing trial before any Court in Nigeria.
He argues that refusing the Appellant bail is tantamount to his conviction before trial.
The Appellant argues that as a general proposition, where a judicial discretion is properly exercised by a trial Court, an Appellate Court will be reluctant to interfere with, or disturb it. That, however an Appellate Court will always hasten to interfere or tamper with an exercise of discretion of a lower Court/or trial Court, which was exercised upon wrong principles of law or under misapprehension of the facts, or where such a trial/or lower Court took into consideration irrelevant or extraneous matters, or excluded relevant matters, thereby giving rise to injustice, in order to correct or prevent injustice; he submits that the lower Court failed to exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously. The Appellant submits that the lower Court failed to consider relevant matters placed before it through affidavit evidence in support of the Summons for bail. This rendered its exercise of discretion not judicially nor judiciously.
Citing IBORI V. FRN (2009) 3 NWLR (pt.1127) 94 at 106, he submits that the Appellant deserves to be granted bail.
The Respondents’ two issues for determination seem to me to be the same as the lone issue for determination and can safely be subsumed in it. It is the Respondents’ contention that the Provisions of Section 115 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State 2011 makes it a discretion on part of the trial Judge to give bail.
He submits that the exercise of discretion must be done judicially and judiciously according to the circumstances of a given case before it.
Therefore the Court of Appeal will not readily interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a lower Court except where such discretion is exercised capriciously. That where facts relied on by the trial Court from which it must draw conclusion governed by law and nothing else, the Appellate court must steer clear – EBE v. C.O.P (2008) 1. S.C. (Pt.11) 194; DOKUBO ASARI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2007) 5-6 S.C. 150.
Thus, an Appellate Court can only interfere with the discretion of the lower court where a miscarriage of justice has been established, or where there is a violation of some principles of Law or proceeding, or that the discretion is known to have been wrongly exercised, or where the exercise was tainted with some illegality or substantial illegality.
The Respondent argues that the grant of bail by a trial Court is not as a matter of course. He submits that it is for the applicant for bail to put before the trial Court, materials which will persuade the trial Court to grant him bail. It is therefore the duty of the Appellant to place before the lower court, enough material to entitle him to bail. After this, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show why bail should not be granted – ABIOLA V. FEDERAI REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.370) 155 @ 179.
The Respondent contends that paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the counter-affidavit sworn to by the 1st Respondent as well as the attached Exhibits at pages 283-287 of the Record as shown at pages 77-84 of the Record were never controverted by the Appellant. The facts therein are deemed admitted.
The lower court, he submits was therefore right in relying on the uncontradicted affidavit evidence of the 1st Respondent in refusing the bail application of the Appellant.
He submits that in the case OMODARA V. STATE (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt.853) 80, the fundamental principles that guide a Court in the granting or refusing of bail pending trial are:
(a) The nature of the charge
(b) strength of the evidence put in support of the charge
(c) The severity of the punishment in the event of conviction.
(d) Record of conviction, if any, of the suspect.
(e) Likelihood of the repetition of the offence.
The Respondent submits that the provisions of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution does not in itself make the grant to bail automatic neither does the Constitution provide specifically that a person arrested for an offence is entitled to bail – BAMAIYI v. STATE (2001) 2 NWLR (pt. 698) 435 at 449; DOKUBO ASARI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2007) All. FWLR (Pt.375) 588.
That the Appellant is standing trial in three other cases viz. ID/116C/2012, ID/122C/2012 and lD/131C/2012, which cases border on money laundering and fraud involving another company – EURAFRTC OIL AND GAS LTD, and charges are yet to be preferred in respect of those cases still under investigation.
I have painstakingly perused the submissions of learned counsel to the respective parties as exhibited in their briefs of argument.

By the provisions of section 35(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty, and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save for the purpose of bringing him before a Court in execution of the order of a Court or upon reasonable suspicion of him having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.
Ipso facto, by the Provisions of Section 35(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) shall be brought before a Court of law within a reasonable time, and if not tried within a period of two months from the date of his arrest or detention, in the case of a person who is not entitled to bail, he shall be released unconditionally or upon conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears for his trial at a later date.
The situation before the Court below was one of bail pending trial.
In an amended information filed on the 9th of November 2012, the Appellant as 4th Defendant and three others were charged with sundry offences ranging from conspiracy to obtain money by false pretences; forgery; and use of forged documents – pages 30-34 of the Record of Appeal.
On the 21st of November 2012, he filed a Summons for bail with a 12 paragraphs affidavit, and a written address in support of the Summons for bail – pages 40-42. The Appellant also filed a further affidavit in support of the Summons for bail of 22 paragraphs with Exhibits A-E annexed thereto – pages 45-49.
There is also another further affidavit in support of Summons for bail filed on the 27th of November 2012 of 22 paragraphs, with Exhibits A-E attached thereto.
The Respondent filed his counter affidavit to the Summons for bail in opposition thereto on the 28th of November 2012 of 35 paragraphs, and two Exhibits, EFCC 1 and EFCC 2, with a Respondent written address in opposition to the 4th Defendants/Applicants summons for bail filed on 21st November, 2012.
It is curious to me that none of the parties endorsed their respective exhibits and this is highly deprecated. Counsel is expected, indeed it is expedient that counsel endorses on the documents exhibited thus
“This is the document referred to as Exhibit XXX in the affidavit /counter affidavit…”
It is not the function of the Court to fish out exhibits. It is the function of parties to identify exhibits by marking them.
The Appellant filed a reply address in support of the Summons for bail – pages 98 – 102 of the Record of Appeal.
The learned trial Court, having perused the various processes filed, ruled in the application for bail on the 6th of December 2011, refusing same.
Now, in general terms, the prime consideration for remanding on bail, it the likelihood of the accused’s appearing to answer the charge, the nature of the charge and the evidence supporting it, the chance of the accused committing further offences if set free, the severity of the potential punishment and the independence of the sureties which should be considered.
In considering this appeal, it is necessary to draw a distinction between bail pending trial and/or appeal, in respect of capital offences, and non-capital offences.
Decidedly, where the prosecution opposes bail in an application for bail in respect of a non-capital offence, the onus is on the Respondent or prosecution to show that prima facie, the evidence against the accused is strong and cogent, and that the accused is not likely to appear to take his trial if admitted to bail.
ON THE OTHER HAND, in an application for bail in respect of a CAPITAL OFFENCE such as murder, where the state opposes bail, the onus is on the accused/applicant to show by credible affidavit evidence that very peculiar and coercive circumstances exist to justify the court in admitting the Applicant to bail – C.O.P. vs. JA USUMAN (1965-66) MNLR 111; R V MCATARY & MCTALLY 1850. 4 COX CC 444 @ 445, Where CRAMPTON J. observed as follows:-
“It is the rule of the court that where persons are in custody on an indictment for murder which has not been tried, the court will not, unless under very peculiar circumstances (grant bail) or interfere with a refusal to grant bail”

Generally, the grant or refusal of an application for bail pending trial is predicated on whether the crime allegedly committed, and for which the accused is standing trial is of the highest magnitude. In other words, the court must be satisfied whether or not there is high prevalence of the offence charged within the polity, or society, in the exercise of its undoubted discretion. ODO v. C.O.P (2004) 8. NWLR (Pt.874) 46; OLUGBUSI v. C.O.P (1970) 2 All NLR 1; UGBEDE ALI v. THE STATE (2012) 10 NWLR (part 1309) 589 at 612 paragraphs F-G.
The Appellant had in his 12 paragraphs affidavit in support of his summons for bail deposed inter alia viz, in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 10 thereof. I shall reproduce same verbatim.
Paragraph 6: “The 4th Defendant has been attending his trials in the said charge No ID/122C/12 and has not jumped bail.”
Paragraph 7: “I am aware, that prior to the arraignment of the 4th Defendant, the 4th Defendant through his counsel had written to the office of EFCC for possible settlement of the issues being investigated.
Paragraph 8: “The 4th Defendant and his counsel have in the last one month attended meeting twice at the Headquarters of EFCC in Abuja.”
Paragraph 10: It is in the interest of justice to allow the 4th Defendant to continue on the bail granted him in the charge No.ID/122C/12 pending before this Honourable Court or grant him bail on very liberal terms. A copy or, the Enrolled Order granting bail to the Applicant in Charge No ID/122C/12 is attached as Exhibit “A”.
At page 2 of the Ruling, the learned trial judge had this to say inter alia
“…although I agree with Applicant’s counsel’s submission that the offences for which the Applicant is arraigned not being capital offences are ordinarily bailable, I am unable to agree with learned counsel that granting the Applicant’s application as prayed would be a proper exercise of my judicial and judicious discretion in the circumstances. This is because although the facts that the Applicant was earlier granted bail on health grounds by this Court in a sister case and showed up in Court for his trial on the relevant date, the Applicant has necessarily been making moves towards settlement of the various financial and criminal issues he has with the prosecution and other persons are well articulated before the court in support of this application, I am afraid that those facts do not on their own avail the Applicant when juxtaposed with affidavit evidence proffered by the Respondent against this application…”
He went on
“That much being clear to me, I think that processes filed by the Respondent against this application not only tend to show the criminal antecedents of the Applicant, but also tend to show that the Applicant is involved in other financial and criminal matters some of which are already in court while investigation is yet to he concluded in others and all of which involve huge sums of money, a fact not denied but in fact corroborated by processes filed in support of this application examples of which are Exhibits B and C attached to the Further Affidavit in support of this application and FF2 – FF4 attached to the Further Affidavit in support of this application.”
Again he went on
‘The implication of the foregoing therefore appears to me to be and as has rightly been urged on the court by learned counsel for the prosecution that in view of the numerous financial and criminal issues now facing the Applicant as well as court cases involving him, it would be risky to assume that his present mindset remains the same as at the time he was granted bail primarily on health grounds by this court in a sister case because Applicant’s present situation, the amount of money he is seeking to repay in settlement of the numerous suits and issues as well as the strength of the evidence against him in the proof of evidence he is now privy to, all provide a likely incentive for him to abscond upon being released on bail.”
Notably is that in the Counter-affidavit filed by the Respondent in opposition to the Appellant’s Summons for bail, in its paragraph 3, he did not deny paragraphs 7 and 8 of the affidavit in support of the Summons to bail. He however denies paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of the Summons for bail, as well as paragraphs 8, 15(f), 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the Further Affidavit in support of the Summons to bail, but the denial was in form of a general traverse which is no traverse. The facts therein paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of the affidavit in support of the Summons for bail are deemed therefore admitted.
Now, the offences for which the Appellant is charged are serious offences and attract serious sanctions in law, if found guilty. The monies involved is colossal. There is no doubt about these facts.
There is also no doubt that the offences are very prevalent in the society and has eaten deep into the fabric of it.
The Appellant had deposed to the fact that he is making every attempt to settle the debt, and indeed the issues being investigated. Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the affidavit in support of the Summons for bail – pages 36-37 of the Record of Appeal and Exhibits B, C, D, and E attached to the further affidavit in support of the Summons for bail – pages 46-48 of the Record of Appeal.
These show a conscious effort by the Appellant to arrive at a settlement with the victim in the transaction that led to his arrest. There is nothing to show, on the part of the Respondent that the Appellant attempted to abscond, or that he does not attend court.
No doubt, as earlier observed, the crime allegedly committed, and for which the Appellant is standing trial, is dire and one which is prevalent within the polity and/or society. But the Court is vested with unfettered discretion to entertain, grant or refuse application for bail as the trial Court did.
But considering that he had been granted bail hitherto on grounds of ill health, and his attempts to settle the matter, I am of the view that the application is one that deserved to have been treated favourably on behalf of the Appellant by the court below, howbeit on steep terms.
The reasons given by the trial Court for refusing the application are not tenable.
The offences for which the Appellant is charged are all bailable offences.
For a Court to act judicially imports the consideration of the interest of both sides and weighing them in order to arrive at a just or fair decision.
Ipso facto, to act judiciously means proceedings from, or showing sound judgment; having or exercising sound judgment; marked by discretion, wisdom and good sense.
If the Appellant is at this stage locked away, how can the other offences with which he was charged be investigated? They would be truncated. The availability of the Appellant to stand his trial is paramount.
It is pertinent that however courts act or react, in the exercise of the discretion at their behest, they must endeavour to achieve, all things put together, the justice of the matter. The end result must be “in the interest of justice.”
It is my view that the sole issue for determination must be answered in the negative, and the issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.
Accordingly, the Ruling of the learned trial Court delivered on the 6th of December 2012 is hereby set aside while I allow the Appeal. Resultantly I hereby make the following order.
Bail is hereby granted the Appellant in the sum of Fifty Million Naira (N50,000,000.00) with two sureties in like sum.
The sureties shall be persons, one of whom must not be below the rank of Permanent Secretary in the Federal Civil Service, who must swear to an affidavit of means, and must be resident in Lagos State. They must each have property worth over N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) situate in Lagos State, preferably in the Ikoyi, Lekki or Ikeja area of Lagos State with the Original Certificate of Occupancy which shall be deposited with the Deputy Chief Registrar of the Court of Appeal upon verification at the Lands Registry, Alausa, Lagos pending the determination of the case.
One of the sureties shall deposit in Court his International Passport with the Deputy Chief Registrar of this Court, pending the determination of the case.
The Residential and office addresses of the sureties shall be verified by a senior officer in the office of the Deputy chief Registrar of this court.
The Appellant shall also deposit his International passport in court.
No order as to costs.

AMINU A. AUGIE, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Pemu, JCA and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. It is trite law that the main function of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial – See Suleman v. COP, Plateau State (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt.1089) 298, where Tobi, JSC, held that that this criterion “is the cynosure of all the criteria. It is the centerpiece. And – – is regarded as not only the omnibus ground for granting or refusing, but the most important”, and Bamaiyi v. The State (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt.715) 270 SC, where the Supreme Court per Uwaifo, JSC, observed that – “it is a proper and useful test whether bail should be granted or refused to considered the probability that the accused will appear in Court to take this trial”.
In this case, the Appellant was granted bail earlier and has since been treading the Nigerian soil and breathing the Nigerian air as free as any innocent man – see Saidu v. State (1982) (1) NCR 89. The Respondent has not complained that he ever jumped bail or has never appeared for his trial, and it is for this and other reasons in the lead judgment that I also allow this appeal, and grant him bail. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI, J.C.A.: The appellant’s name and companies were involved in fraudulently obtaining subsidy payment from the 1st respondent to the tune of N4.2 Billion and without supplying the said petroleum products.
The 1st respondent had difficulty in getter the appellant to report at its office in Abuja to answer to allegations against him sequel to his arrest on the 16th day of July, 2012. He was subsequently charged to court in Suit No. ID/116C/2012. The appellant applied for bail and he was released on bail by Justice Folami on the 30th of August 2012.
The appellant was charged for fraud involving another company known as Nasaman Oil Service Ltd and as sole beneficiary of subsidy claims paid on that station which amounted to N1.2 Billion. Information was preferred against him that allegation and he was remanded. This appeal is premised on the court refusing to grant him bail. He appealed against the court’s refusal to grant him bail. He had been previously standing trial in Suit No. ID/116C/2012 and ID/131C/2012.
The offence for which the appellant has been charged not being a capital offence, the court could express its discretion in favour of the appellant which I agree with my learned brother Pemu, JCA. that bail be granted the appellant. I abide by the consequential orders in the judgment.

Appearances

Adebayo Adenipekun (SAN) with Gboyega Oyewole Esq. and Chukwudi Maduka Esq.For Appellant

AND

Usani Francis Oka-Philips Esq. for the 1st Respondent.For Respondent