AGWU JOHNSON N. AMEFULE & ANOR v. JOHNSON NWANKWO NMECHA & ORS (2013)

AGWU JOHNSON N. AMEFULE & ANOR v. JOHNSON NWANKWO NMECHA & ORS

(2013)LCN/6029(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 18th day of March, 2013

CA/PH/14/2003

RATIO

LAND LAW: DECLARATION OF TITLE: A PLAINTIFF IN A CLAIM FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE MUST DEPEND ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS CASE AND NOT THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENDANTS CASE

It is trite that a plaintiff in a claim for declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his case. See KODILINYE v. MBANEFO ODU (1935) 2 WACA, 336.PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: DECLARATION OF TITLE: TO ESTABLISH THE TRADITIONAL HISTORY OF LAND , THE ROOT OF TITLE MUST SHOW THE NAME OF THE FOUNDER OF THE LAND

WITHDRAWN CASES: WHAT THE COURT MUST DO WHEN A CASE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN

JUSTICES

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. AGWU JOHNSON N. AMEFULE
2. SOLOMON OKORO AMEFULE
(For themselves and as representing the members of Ndi Amefule family of Atani village, Arochukwu) Appellant(s)

AND

1. JOHNSON NWANKWO NMECHA
2. MAZI EMEREUWA OHABUIRO
3. MAZI EDWARD OKORO
(For themselves and as representing the members of Ndi Agwueze family of Isinkpu village, Arochukwu) Respondent(s)

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against of the High Court of Abia State sitting at Ohafia in Suit No. HOH/1/81, delivered on 4th December, 2000 by I. F. Ogbuagu, J (as he then was), wherein the learned trial Judge dismissed the claim of the Appellant who were Plaintiffs at the court below. A synopsis of the facts of this case will suffice.
This case has a chequered history. It was commenced in 1981, about 31 years ago. As would be expected, it passed through many Judges and both parties amended their pleadings several times. The claim of the Appellants (as plaintiffs) was for declaration of title to a piece of land called “ORONTA” in Atani village, Arochukwu. Justice Elumankama commenced hearing sometime in 1987. The Appellants and their witnesses gave evidence relying on traditional history to prove their title to the disputed land. This was after two other judges i.e. Justices C. M. C. Abengowe and M. O. Maranzu had dealt with all preliminary matters over the years. Justices Wogu, Orji and finally Ogbuagu also took evidence before being transferred to another division. It was however, Hon. Justice I. F. Ogbuagu who delivered judgment in this matter.
It was when this matter was being heard before Justice Ogbuagu that the PW1, under cross examination stated that one Uche Abuaku deforested the land in dispute and denied ever hearing the name Okoro Eni whereas the same witness had earlier told the court before Justice Wogu that it was one Uche Abuaku Okoro Eni who deforested the land. It was specifically put to the PW1 that he had earlier given the name of the father of Uche to be Okoro Eni but he told the court that he had never heard the name Okoro Eni, let alone coming from him. On page 182 of the record, the witness said as follows in line 13-15.
“What I am now saying in court is the truth. Because another Judge is now sitting, the whole evidence has changed”
A certified true copy of the proceedings before Wogu, J was tendered as Exhibits D and D1 to contradict the witness. He continued under cross examination that Uche Abuaku deforested the land and gave it to his son Amaefule Uche Abuaku who also “deforested” it. This was not in line with their pleadings in their further amended statement of claim. At this point, their counsel Chief O. O. Dike asked for adjournment in order to confer with his clients. The application was granted. That was on 27th November, 2000. On 4th December, 2000, hearing resumed and Chief Dike, of counsel stated that in view of the material contradictions of the 2nd Plaintiff as PW1, the case should be discontinued. Chief Dike, counsel for the Appellants (as plaintiff at the court below) stated as follows on page 184 of the record:
“In the circumstance, I throw in the towel. I concede that the contradiction is very glaring. We hereby discontinue this case.
The application to discontinue the suit was not opposed by the Respondents’ counsel who rather asked for judgment. No judgment was entered for the defendants as according to the learned trial judge, they did not counter claim. The learned trial judge then dismissed the suit in view of the fact that hearing had commenced and issues joined. Dissatisfied with the dismissal of their case, the Appellants filed Notice of appeal on 12th January 2001. The said notice contains three grounds of appeal, out of which the Appellants have distilled two issues for determination. Briefs of arguments were filed and exchanged by both parties in accordance with, the Rules of this court.
In an amended brief settled by E. O. Igboho Esq. on behalf of the Appellants, two issues were formulated for the determination of this appeal to wit:
1. Whether the trial court was right in holding that plaintiff failed to establish his toot of title.
2. Whether the trial court was fight in holding that the contradiction in the evidence of PW1 was material enough so as to knock off his root of title.”
It was however the view of the Respondents that only one issue is germane for the proper determination of this appeal. The sole issue as contained in the Respondents brief settled by Chief C. A. Kalunta is:-
“Whether in the light of the evidence before the court and the application by the Appellants counsel, the learned trial judge was right in dismissing the case.”
After a careful perusal of the judgment of the court below, the three grounds of appeal in the Notice of appeal and the issues formulated by both parties, it is my view that only one issue is necessary for the determination of this appeal. The said issue is as couched by the Respondent herein. A calm reading of the two issues submitted by the appellant shows that they are one issue split into two. I shall therefore determine this appeal based on the sole issue as distilled by the Respondents. In other words, the two issues as couched by the Appellants are treated as one issue.
In his argument, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of PW1 was that Uche Abuaku deforested the land in dispute and that after his death his son Amefule Uche Abuaku inherited the said land. That this piece of evidence is consistent with the pleadings of the Appellants. He submitted that the name Okoro Eni as the father of Uche Abuaku was introduced to the PW1 during cross examination and that adding the said name to Uche Abuaku does not mean that Okoro Eni deforested the land. It is his view that the much that can come out of the introduction of Okoro Eni to the name Uche Abuaku is to make it appear as Ucheabuaku Okoro Eni and nothing more.
Learned counsel further submitted that for a contradiction to be substantial and affect the evidence of a witness, such contradiction must be material and fundamental in the determination of the facts before the court; relying on the case of FOLAYEMI v. OLAWOYE (1990) 10 NWLR (Pt. 624) page 600. He opined that the contradiction in the evidence of PW1 is not material as it did not affect his root of title as pleaded. Rather, that it is a mere discrepancy which should not have affected the reasoning of the trial court. It was his contention that although the PW1 denied hearing the name Okoro Eni, it was not enough to affect his root of title. He submitted that although the application for discontinuance of the suit came from the Appellant’s counsel, the trial court was not under any compulsion to grant the application. According to him, in spite of such an application, the trial court can disallow the discontinuance and ask the plaintiff to proceed with his case. He places reliance on the case of HRH UMEANADU vs. ATT. GEN. ANAMBRA STATE (2008) 34 NSCQR (Pt. 1) Page 1 at 37.
Furthermore, learned counsel submitted that Order 9 Rule 3(1) & (2) and Rule 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Abia State under which the application to discontinue was made, a party seeking to discontinue an action must do so with the leave of court and must be by motion on notice which was not the case here. He argued that since the application to withdraw the matter albeit made by the counsel for the plaintiff, was not based on the desire of the plaintiff to withdraw the suit but on a misconception as to whether there was contradiction in evidence of PW1, the court ought to have acted judicially and judiciously so that the interest of justice could be served. That a grave injustice have been done to the Appellants who are willing and ready to pursue their case to its logical conclusion. It is his contention that a party should not be punished because of the blunder of his counsel, citing the cases of AKINPELU v. ADEGBERO (2008) 34 NSCQR (Pt. 1) 434 at 457. He urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.
In his response, the learned counsel for the Respondents, after tracing the evidence of PW1, before justices Ekumankama, Wogu, Orji and Ogbuagu, submitted that a parry can use the previous evidence of a witness in an abortive trial to discredit him during cross examination in a new trial. In support, he cited the case of SANYAOLA v. MRS SHOLA COKER & ANOR (1983) 3 SC 124. He submitted that since the Appellants relied on traditional history to proof their title to the land, they ought to be consistent as to who deforested the land. That when the Appellants told the lower court at various times that Uche Abuaku deforested the land and at other times that it was Amaefule Uche Abuaku who deforested the land, it was clear that they were not sure of their root of title. Also, that whereas the PW1 had in a previous trial told the lower court that Okoro Eni was the father of Uche Abuaku who deforested the land, at a later trial he denied ever hearing of the name Okoro Eni.
Learned counsel submitted that these contradictions were material since it affected the Appellant’s root of title. He cited the cases of ERONINI & ORS v. IHEUKO (1989) 1 NSCC Page 503; AJANI v. LADEPO (1936) 3 NWLR (Pt. 76) page 276 and ADEBAYO v. IGHOLO (1976), 5 SCNJ 25.
Learned counsel contended that since evidence on traditional history had collapsed, it was therefore a wasteful exercise to allow the Appellants to continue as no amount of further evidence could have been led to patch up the already damaged evidence.
Furthermore, he argued that where a suit is being discontinued after some evidence has been given, the trial judge is bound to consider the effect of the evidence so far led before he can correctly arrive at the proper order to make i.e. whether to dismiss or strike it out. A plaintiff, he argued, should not be compelled to litigate a case against his will. Therefore, having applied to discontinue the case, the court below was right to dismiss same. He further referred to the case of ERONINI & ORS v. IHEUKO (supra), LORDRIGNESS v. THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE (1977) 4 SC, 29 and SONEKON vs. SMITH (1967) 1 All NLR 327.
Learned counsel further submitted that a suit withdrawn after issues have been joined should be dismissed and not merely struck out. He cited the case of OMO vs. AMANTU (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) Pt. 87.
Finally, he submitted that the application to discontinue the suit was made by counsel for the Appellants who had full authority to present his client’s case in court and there is no reason why the Appellants should complain now. He relies on the case of ADEWUNMI v. PLASTEX NIG. LTD (1986) 2 NSCC Pg. 852. He faulted the argument of counsel for the Appellants that the learned trial judge should have refused the application for discontinuance of the suit. He then urged this court to resolve this issue against the Appellants.
The narrow issue in this appeal which calls for determination is whether in the light of the evidence led before the learned trial judge and the application by Appellants’ counsel to discontinue the suit, the learned trial judge was right in dismissing the case. I think a convenient point to start is to consider the issue or issues which led to the application by Appellants’ counsel to discontinue the suit at the stage he did.
From the evidence led by the Appellants at the court below before four judges at different times, it is clear that they sought to prove their title to the land in dispute by traditional history. Before Justice Ekumankama on page 67 of the record, the Pw1 who is 2nd Appellant herein gave evidence as follows:-
“The land called Oronta was inherited by Amuefule Uche Abuaka from his father.” (Underlining mine for emphasis)
The above evidence shows that Amaefule Ucheabuaka did not deforest the land but merely inherited the land from his father. Unfortunately, Justice Ekumankama could not conclude hearing before his transfer and it had to be heard de novo by Justice Wogu. This is what the same witness said before justice Wogu:-
“This land was deforested by Amaefule Ucheabuaku. The land descended to his son by name Ucheabuaku Amaefule.”
(Underlining mine for emphasis).
It is clearly seen that before Justice Ekumankama, Amaefule Ucheabuaka “inherited” the land but before Justice Wogu, he “deforested” the same land. Under cross examination, he stated on page 199 of the record that:
“I said that Amaefule Ucheabuaku inherited the land from his father Ucheabuaku Okoro Eni. When Ucheabuaku Okoro Eni died, Amaefule Ucheabuahu deforested the land”
Still before Justice Wogu, PW2, one Simon Adiele Kanu told the court on page 126 lines 27 -29 of the record that it was Nwankwo Amaefule who deforested the land contrary to what PW1 told the court. Before Justice Wogu, three persons Ucheabuaku Okoro Eni, Amaefule Ucheabuaku and Nwankwo Amaefule were said to have deforested the land. Even at this stage, it appears that the traditional history of the Appellants in respect of the Oronta land was on quick sand as the two witnesses of the Appellants could not agree on who actually deforested the land. Again, Justice Wogu could not conclude the case till it fell on Justice Ogbuagu (as he then was). It was there that the PW1 who had given the name of the person who deforested the land as Ucheabuaku Okoro Eni before Justice Wogu, told Justice Ogbuagu that he has never heard the name of Okoro Eni before. To make matters worse, the PW1 told the court under cross examination as follows on page 128 lines 14-16 of the record:
“What I am now saying in court is the truth. Because another judge is now sitting, the whole evidence has changed.”
Unbelievable, but true. It is on record and nobody has challenged that record till date. The witness having admitted that his evidence has changed, it had therefore contradicted his previous evidence on a very material issue. On page 181 of the record, the witness told the court that he knows the difference between when land is deforested and when it is inherited. This is what he said in line 17 – 21:
“I know what it means by saying that a person deforested a land. If the land is a virgin land, the person who deforested it is said to have deforested the land. The person who deforested this land in dispute is Uche Abuaku. I know him as Uche Abuaku.”
It is trite that a plaintiff in a claim for declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his case. See KODILINYE v. MBANEFO ODU (1935) 2 WACA, 336.
It is therefore important for a plaintiff to plead positively and lead cogent and reliable evidence to prove the facts averred in the pleadings. If the evidence led is at variance with the pleadings, such evidence go to no issue. In order to assess the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the pleading and the evidence must be examined. See SUNDAY UKWU EZE & 6 ORS vs. GILBERT ATASIE & 3 ORS (2000) 2 NSCQR (Part 2) 1136. In this con therefore, I refer to page 138 of the record of appeal wherein contains the further amended statement of claim of the Appellants. Paragraph 5 thereof states in part:-
“The whole land in dispute was founded by Mazi Ucheabaaku which has descended by inheritance to the present Plaintiff…”
The above is the pleading as far as the progenitor and founder of the family land is concerned. In other words, the pleading is that Ucheabuaku deforested and founded the land. But the evidence before the lower court is not consistent with this pleadings. Was it Nwankwo Amaefule as stated by PW2 before Justice Wogu? OR was it Ucheabuaku as contained in the pleading? OR was it Amaefule Ucheabuaku as stated by PW1? Again, why was it necessary for the PW1 to deny ever hearing the name of Okoro Eni when he was the same witness who told Justice Wogu that Okoro Eni was the father of Ucheabuaku whom he alleged was the founder of the land? What did he expect to gain when he told Justice Ogbuagu that because another judge was sitting, the evidence has changed? Which of the three names touted by them did they expect the court to accept? It is trite that where a party gives inconsistent evidence, the court is not allowed to pick and choose which of them to believe. Evidence of traditional history must be cogent, reliable and unbroken else it will not sustain the claim.

In SUNDAY UKWU EZE & 6 ORS. V. GILBERT ATASIE & 3 ORS (supra) at pages 1146-1147 Paras H-B, the Supreme Court held succinctly as follows:-
“The law is that to establish the traditional history of land relied on as root of title, a plaintiff must plead the names of the founder and those after him upon whom the land devolved to the lust successor(s) and lead evidence in support without leaving gaps or creating mysterious or embarrassing linkages which have not been and cannot be explained. In other words, the pleading of the devolution and the evidence in support must be reliable, being credible or plausible, otherwise the claim for title will fail.”
Having muddled up their story to the extent that their counsel was extremely embarrassed, counsel had to ask for an adjournment. There is no modicum of doubt that the case of the appellants based on traditional history had broken down and was heading for the rocks. The application for the discontinuance of the case by Chief Dike, learned counsel for the appellant at the court below, was to my mind timely and the only sensible thing to do in the circumstance. No wonder the learned trial judge commended Chief Dike for his brave and courageous action.
In his argument, learned counsel for the Appellant had tried to impugn the conduct of learned counsel who handled the case at the court below as if the said counsel had no authority to do what he did. It is trite that once a counsel has been employed on a matter he has a general responsibility to conduct his client’s case in the best tradition of the profession. It is his duty as a professional to decide where and when or even whether to file the matter in court or to adopt other methods to seek redress for his client. He has the general duty as counsel and ought not to be inhibited. In ADEWUNMI v. PLASTEX (NIG) LTD (1986) 2 NSCC pg. 852, the Supreme Court held that a counsel has authority to present his client’s case in the best way he deems fit without taking express authority from his client. When Chief Dike decided to discontinue the case, it was after he had asked for an adjournment, slept over and considered the evidence adduced so far and on the next adjournment date threw in the towel having realized to futility of the case being heard to conclusion. Being in charge of the case the fact that learned counsel did not hold a meeting with the 1st Appellant before asking for the matter to be discontinued does not make any difference. It has been held that the dominant instruction of the client in all cases where litigation in court is involved, is that counsel should conduct the litigation in court to its finality. Hence, the actual legal relationship between counsel and his client is akin to that of an employer and independent contractor and not between one of principal and an agent. See ADEWUNMI v. PLASTEX NIG. LTD. (supra). In my respectful view, the learned counsel for the Appellants at the court below, Chief Dike acted within the confines of his brief and in his decision to discontinue the suit at the stage he did due to incoherent and contradictory evidence of his witnesses which according to the learned trial judge had “knocked off the root of title pleaded by the plaintiffs.”
The next issue to consider is whether at the stage the case was discontinued, the learned trial judge should have struck out the case instead of dismissing same. There are certain circumstances which a plaintiff can withdraw his suit from court. First he can withdraw his case after filing same but before the defendant files statement of defence. In that case he does not require the leave of court to do so. And in that circumstance the only option left for the court is to strike out the case. In another situation where the defendant has filed his defence, the plaintiff can only withdraw the suit or discontinue it with the leave of court. After the court has considered issues as to costs for the defendant, it can only strike out the case. I would even add that where hearing has commenced but the plaintiff finds it difficult to bring his witness or a particular witness to court or is unable to lay hand on an exhibit immediately, he can still withdraw his action until such an auspicious time when the witnesses and/or exhibits are available. In my view, the court should strike out the matter in such situation after the parties are heard on the issue as to costs.

The Supreme Court has held in BABATUNDE v. PAN ATLANTIC SHIPPING LTD (2007) 30 NSCQR 714 that withdrawn cases are not usually dismissed by just a mere wave of the hand. That the trial court must ensure that a point of no-return or Litis contestation has been reached by the parties. In NIGERIA AIRWAYS LTD. v. LAPILE (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 163) Page 392, the Apex court also stated clearly that the power of the court to dismiss a case in limine should be exercised with utmost circumspection and not lightly as a matter of course. Having been aware of the caution by the Apex court on how not to rush to dismiss a case which is withdrawn, I am now well equipped to discuss the last option. The last option relates to a situation where hearing has commenced but the plaintiff leads evidence which is at variance with his pleading or his witness gives contradictory material evidence. Where the plaintiff or learned counsel sees the futility of continuing with such a suit and decides to save both money and the valuable judicial time, the court has no option other than to dismiss the action. It has to be borne in mind that justice is not only for the plaintiff; it is also for the defendant.
The position I have taken above is strengthened by the case of LEONARD ERONINI & 4 ORS v. FRANCIS IHEUKO (1989) 1 NSCC 503, decided by the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The facts of that case are in all fours with the instant case. In Eronini’s case (supra) the Respondents sued the Appellants in the High Court of East Central State of Nigeria sitting at Owerri for declaration of title to land, damages for trespass and injunction. Pleadings were filed and settled. Hearing commenced with the Respondent giving evidence in chief. The Respondent gave some evidence which were at variance with his Statement of claim and his counsel just as in this case, stopped the examination in chief and applied for leave to discontinue the suit. The Appellant counsel on his own did not oppose the application exactly as it happened in the instant case. He however asked that the suit be dismissed but the trial court merely struck out the suit with costs to the appellant.
The Appellants appealed to the court of appeal which held inter alia that the decision of the trial judge to make an order of striking out the matter was proper in law and in the interest of justice so as to give the respondent another opportunity to regain his composure and prove his case since the application for discontinuance was made because the Respondent was not well composed at the time he was giving his evidence-in-chief.
The Appellants appealed further to the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeals’ decision that an order of striking out the matter was proper in law and in the interest of justice. In that case the Supreme Court held that where leave to discontinue an action is to be granted, the court should exercise its discretion (as to costs and to the institution of subsequent suit) judicially. Acting judicially in this circumstance imports the consideration of the interest of both sides and weighing them in order to arrive at a just or fair decision. It was a further decision of the Apex court in that matter that whenever a suit is being discontinued after some evidence has been given, a trial judge is bound to consider the effect of the evidence so far given before he can correctly arrive at the proper order to make i.e. whether an order of dismissal or an order of striking out. Also, that had the learned trial judge and the Court of Appeal adopted this course, they would have seen that the proper order to have been made when the respondent had done irretrievable damage to his case before applying to withdraw was one of dismissal and not striking out. The appeal was thus allowed.
In the instant case, the Appellant having seen the irreparable damage they had done to their case, decided to discontinue the case. As was held by the Supreme Court in the case of ERONINI & 4 ORS. V. IHEUKO (SUPRA), the proper order to make was that of dismissal as was properly made by the learned trial judge. The Appellants are actually asking for an opportunity to have a second bite on the cherry. This is not allowed as it will work great injustice on the Respondents. Accordingly, the two issues submitted by the appellant and the lone issue distilled by the Respondents which I have taken together are hereby resolved against the Appellants.
In the final analysis, this appeal is devoid of any scintilla of merit and is hereby dismissed by me. I uphold the decision of the learned trial judge made on 4th December, 2000 which dismissed the suit of the Appellants. I award costs in favour of the Respondents which I assess at N50, 000.00.

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.C.A.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother; J. I. Okoro JCA just delivered.
I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusions reached thereat that the appeal is devoid of any merit. I adopt the reasoning and conclusions as mine to the extent that I have nothing useful to add. I therefore dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential order as to costs.

HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read before now, the judgment delivered by my learned brother, JOHN INYANG OKORO, JCA.
My Learned brother admirably and lucidly considered and resolved all the pertinent issues that arose in this appeal. I have no hesitation in agreeing with his reasoning and conclusions thereon.
I only wish to observe that when Counsel is instructed to conduct a case, he is a master of it. Accordingly, where Counsel is given instructions, which is not limited or inhibited in any way, he is free to conduct his client’s ease and take such necessary actions as he considers necessary or expedient pursuant to his professional learning, in the best interest of his client. See N.N.S.C v. SABAWA (1988) NWLR (Pt.74) p.23 OYEGUN v. NZERIBE (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt.1220) p.568 and MAGIT v. UNIVERSITY OF AGRIC; MAKURDI (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt.959) p. 211. Counsel retained to conduct a case therefore has general authority to conduct his client’s case in the best traditional of the Legal Profession and in that case, he may enter into a compromise within his apparent authority, which will be binding on the client, even where the client may have dissented, unless such dissent was brought to the notice of the adversary. See A.G. FEDERATION v. A.I.C. LTD (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 378) p.388. Accordingly, where Counsel finds and knows that is client’s case has been badly damaged that there are no chances of his case succeeding, he should honourably throw in the towel, considering that, though he has a duty to his client, he is also a minister or priest in the temple of justice. The position is akin to that of a manager of a boxer, who sensing that his ward has been severely battered that his continuing with the fight will be dangerous to his ward, honourably throws in the towel. The ward may play the bravado, but the manager has done the most sensible thing by throwing in the towel.
It is for the above stated reason that I, like the learned trial judge in the Court below, do commend the courage of Learned Counsel for the Appellant in the Court below, when he decided to discontinue the Appellants’ case, considering the damage the Appellants had done to their own case. For this reason and the other reasons contained in the lead judgment, I am also of the view that this appeal is devoid of any merit. I accordingly dismiss same.
I abide by the order on costs.

Appearances

V. C. Anyadioha Esq.For Appellant

AND

Ladu N. Martins Esq.For Respondent