ALHAJI SALIHU WUKARI SAMBO & ANOR V. CAPT. YAHAYA DOUGLAS NDATSE (RTD) & ORS (2013)

ALHAJI SALIHU WUKARI SAMBO & ANOR V. CAPT. YAHAYA DOUGLAS NDATSE (RTD) & ORS

(2013)LCN/5842(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 16th day of January, 2013

CA/J/260C/2010

RATIO

WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF LOCUS STANDI

The term locus standi denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law and is used interchangeably with terms like “standing” or title to sue”. See Senator Abraham Adesanya V. President Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor, (1981) 5 SC 112 at 28 -129 per Fatayi Williams Ogunsanya V. Dada (1992) 4 SCNJ 162 at 168 locus standi is the right or competence to institute proceedings in a court for redress or assertion of a right enforceable at law.

See. Attorney-General, Kaduna State V. Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR 453, at 496; Adefulu V. Oyeside (1989) 5 NWLR 377 at 418, Nwamkwo V. Ononeze Madu (2009) 1 NWLR (pt. 1123) 671 C.A, Wura V. Itam (2009) 17 NWLR (pt. 1170) 337 C.A. PER SOTONYE DENTON-WEST, J.C.A.

ACTION: ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT

The Constituent facts of a cause of action, as noted earlier, are the essential ingredients of an enforceable right.

The person in whom this enforceable right is vested as his personal right is the person that has the locus standi to sue. No one else can properly sue for the enforcement of that right. It has been stated that a party prosecuting an action would have locus standi if the relief claimed would confer some benefit on such party.

See Buraimoh Oluriode & Ors. V. Oyebi & Ors. (1984) 5 SC 1 at 16 per Irikefe JSC (as he then was). PER SOTONYE DENTON-WEST, J.C.A.

LOCUS STANDI: WHO HAS LOCUS STANDI TO INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

On appeal against the ruling to the Court of Appeal, that court by a majority upheld the trial Judge’s ruling on further appeal with, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiff had locus standi.

In its later decision in Fawehinmi V. Akiliu (supra), the Supreme Court went beyond the principles stated in Senator Adesanya’s case, the locus clasicus on locus standi. Eso JSC (as he then was) expressly conceded this in the following words:-

“In this instant appeal before this court, I think with respect, that the lead judgment of my learned brother Obaseki JSC is an advancement on the positive hitherto held by this court on locus standi. I think again with respect, that it is a departure from the narrow attitude of this court in Abraham Adesanya’s case and subsequent decision….”

His lordship Obaseki JSC (as he then was) further at 832 held thus:-

“The narrow confines to which section 6(6) (b) (of the constitution) restricts the class of persons entitled to locus standi in civil matters have been broadened by the criminal code, the criminal procedure law and the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. The powers of arrest and prosecution conferred by the various sections of the criminal procedure law and the criminal code on “any person” has the magic effect of giving locus standi to any person who cares to prosecute an offender, if, and only if, he saw him committing the offence or reasonably suspects him of having committed the offence” PER SOTONYE DENTON-WEST, J.C.A.

LOCUS STANDI: WHETHER THE ISSUE OF LOCUS STANDI IS NECESSARY IN CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

The Supreme Court and even this court have taken revolutionary and bold departures from the ubiquitous old concept of locus standi. See for instance, per Obaseki J.S.C. and his commendation by Eso J.S.C. where in Fawehinmi v. Akilu & Anor. (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (pt 66) 797 at 832 and 847 – 848; the former departure from the hitherto narrow attitude of the apex court in Adesanya’s case; Odeneye v. Efunuga (1990) 7 N.W.L.R. (pt 164) 618 at 631; Elendu v. Ekwuoaba (1995) 3 NWLR (pt. 380) 70 at 74, per Onalaja; A.G. Kaduna State v. Hassan (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (pt. 8) 483; Ogunmokun v. Milad Ogun State (1999) 3 N.W.L.R. (pt. 594) 261 at 285; and the recent cases of Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003) 16 N.W.L.R. (pt. 164) 618 at 638 paras. E – H; Alamieyieseigha v. Igoniwari No. 2 (2007) 7 N.W.L.R. (pt. 847) 554, Per Galadima J.C.A. and Fawehinmi v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) 14 N.W.L.R. (pt. 1054) 75 at 336 paras. H – E.

In the latter case Aboki J.C.A. restated what Fatayi-William C.J.N. said in the Adesanya v. President F.R.N. most admirably inter alia:-

“In this Country which establishes a Constitutional structure involving a tripartite allocation of power to the Judiciary, Executive and Legislature as the co-ordinate organs of Government, judicial function most primarily aims at preserving legal order by confining the Legislative and Executive within their powers in the interest of the public and since the dominant objective of the rule of Law is to ensure the observance of the rule of Law, it can best be achieved by permitting any person to put the judicial machinery in motion in Nigeria where by any citizen could bring an action in respect of a public derelict. Thus the requirement of locus standi becomes unnecessary in constitutional issues as it will merely impede judicial functions.”

Even in the most conservative of common wealth or Common Law jurisdictions like Britain, or in liberal jurisdictions like the United States of America from where we derived our judicial system and our present Constitution, nay India and Bangladesh the concept of locus standi has been broadened and the courts have departed from the undue reliance on sufficiency of interest as the primary consideration for the conferment of locus standi in administrative and Constitutional Law, as exemplified in R v. Secretary Of State, Exparte World Development Movement Ltd. (2000) 21 W.R.N. 177. PER IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

SOTONYE DENTON-WEST Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABUBAKAR ALKALI ABBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ALHAJI SALIHU WUKARI SAMBO & ANR. Appellant(s)

AND

CAPT. YAHAYA DOUGLAS NDATSE (RTD) & 2 ORS. Respondent(s)

SOTONYE DENTON-WEST, J.C.A., (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling of Hon. Justice Emmanuel A. Garba of Taraba State High Court delivered on 15th September, 2009.
The Appellants who were the complainants brought an application for leave to prefer a charge against the Respondents who were the accused persons at the trial court. The leave was granted. Thereafter the Respondents filed a motion on Notice seeking the following orders.
1. An order of the court setting aside its order of 12th November, 2008 which granted leave to the Appellants to prefer charges against the Respondents.
2. Further order quashing all the nine counts on the charge sheet.
3. An order striking out the entire case of the Appellants for being incompetent.
The trial lower court granted the prayers as contained in the motion and struck out the case. Hence this appeal and cross appeal by the Appellants and Respondents respectively.
The Appellants in their joint brief of argument dated 15th September, 2011 filed on 19th September, 2011 and deemed properly filed on 13th March, 2012 submitted only one issue for determination and that is:-
Whether the learned trial judge was justified in law when he held that the Appellants lack the locus standi to initiate the criminal proceedings against the Respondents.
The Respondents in their own joint brief of argument dated 29th May, 2012 and deemed properly filed and served on 27th June, 2012 formulated three (3) issues for determination as follows:-
1. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have relied on the case of FRN V. Osahon to hold that the Appellants (complainants) as private individual have the right to institute the complaint without a fiat because Section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code is superseded by Section 211(1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution (Ground 1 of the Notice of Cross Appeal).
2. Whether the proof of evidence filed before the trial court by the Appellants part of which is to the effect that the police refused to investigate their complaint coupled with the application for leave to initiate the Criminal Proceedings under Section 185 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code do not amount to fraudulent misrepresentation (ground 11 of the Notice of Cross Appeal).
3. Whether the learned trial judge’s conclusion to the effect that it will be absurd to hold that once a case has been reported to the police, nothing can be done even when it is clear that the police deliberately refused to prosecute without a justifiable reason, has not adversely affected the Respondents’ case (ground 111 of the Notice of Cross Appeal).
For the purposes of the main appeal, Appellant’s sole issue will be considered, that is:-
Whether the learned trial judge was justified in law when he held that the Appellants lack the locus standi to initiate the criminal proceedings against the Respondents.
The reason is because the above sole issue as it appears to me covers and determines the point in contention in the main appeal.
The Appellant submitted that by the combined effect of Section 211(1) (b) & (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) Cap 39 Laws of Taraba State of Nigeria, 1997, the Appellants have the locus standi to initiate the direct Criminal complaint against the Respondents and they need not show any special relationship with the deceased persons or demonstrate an interest more substantial than that of the general public to be enabled in that behalf as wrongly opined by the learned trial Judge.
It was also argued that the learned trial Judge appeared to have treated on pages 151 and 152 of the records, the issue of locus standi in the Criminal proceedings as if it were a civil suit, and not regulated by a clear provision of statutes or in any case as if same was regulated by the doctrine of common law.
Moreso, that it is not in doubt that the doctrine of locus standi is generally regulated by the principles of common law, but it is the law that where the issue of locus standi in respect of a subject matter is regulated by a statute, the principles of common law on the subject may have by implication been suspended from regulating the subject. The case of M.C.S. (NIG) Ltd/GTE V. Adeonkin Records (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 391) C.A at pp. 1637 paras C – D was referred to where this court herd inter alia:-
“Where a statute confers on a plaintiff the right to sue, a court of law has no jurisdiction to deny him of the standing to sue. A statutory right of a Plaintiff to sue abrogates a common law principle to the contrary, that is not to sue”.
It follows according to the Appellants that where as in the present case, a statute like Section 211(1) (b) and (c) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Section 143 (e) of the Criminal Procedure has vested any person (or authority) with the right to commence or institute Criminal proceedings against any other person, a court of law does not have the jurisdiction to qualify or limit the right by using the general common law principles on the subject, the enjoyment of that right as wrongly done by the learned trial Judge. The case of Okike v. LPDC (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 274) S.C 217 at 385 para G – H was relied on where the Supreme Court held thus:-
….the effect of the provisions of rules 2A of the Legal Practitioners (Disciplinary Committee) Rules which provide ‘a complaint by any person against a Legal Practitioner shall be forwarded in writing’ ought to be noted. The Rules does not state that the complainant must be by the actual person offended or cheated.
Consequently, the complainant in this case is complete at and qualified to make a complaint against the Appellant in writing as he had done. It is immaterial whether he is a donee of the power of attorney”
Also, the case of Nnamani V. Nnaji (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 610) C.A 313 at 330, paras. C – E, per Tobi, JCA (as he then was) was relied upon.
In the light of the above, this court was urged to hold that the Appellants are enabled in law to file the direct Criminal complaint against the Respondents, and they need not to show any special interest in the death of the deceased persons above that borne by the general public, the latter being a requirement of common law which Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code operates as an exception thereto in the case of Criminal Proceedings in Taraba State. That the said law presumes that criminality is one sensitive issue that everyone has special interest and as such any person can sue in respect thereof.
The cases of FRN V. Osahon (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 312) S.C 1975 at 2006, paras. A – C, and Fawehinmi V. Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 6) 797 at 832 were relied upon.
It was submitted that the learned trial judge having found that the Appellants as private individuals could be granted leave to prefer charges against the Respondents, and having actually so granted the said leave to the Appellants, he was wrong in further holding that the Appellants ought to have shown an interest above that of other members of the society.
The Appellants further submitted that Section 143 (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code which cloths the Appellants with locus standi in Criminal Proceedings in Taraba State is as lucid enough as to the effect that any person can sue. That it does not state anywhere that the people selling must show any special interest or an interest above that of other members of the society.
Also, that it was wrong for the trial Judge to impute that qualification into the said Section 143 (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Appellants therefore submitted that it is trite law that clear and unambiguous words of a statute should be given their simple, grammatical and ordinary meaning. The case of Fawehinmi V. IGP (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) S. C. 606 at 678, paras. B – D. The Appellant further argued that the circumstance of this appeal is quite different from the case of Fawehinmi V. IGP (supra) which the trial court anchored its decision on. That while in the latter, the competence of the Appellant to apply for an order of mandamus to compel the police to investigate some alleged forgeries which Section 59(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos never provided for was in question, but in this appeal, it is the competence (locus standi) of the Appellant to make a direct criminal complaint at the High Court.
It was submitted that assuming but not conceding that all the foregoing arguments are wrong, the Appellants would still be clothed with locus standi to sustain the Criminal Proceedings against the Respondents as they have adequately disclosed their relationships with the deceased persons and/or showed special interest or an interest above that borne by other members of the society and it was wrong of the learned trial Judge to have held otherwise.
It was submitted further that by paragraph 1 of the witness statement on oath of the 1st Appellant attached to the proof of evidence (as contained on page 9 of the record of proceedings) the 1st Appellant deposed that he is the paternal uncle of Yakubu Sambo, the 1st deceased person), and in paragraph 1 of the witness statement on oath of the 2nd Appellant (as contained on page 12 of the record of proceedings) attached to the proof of evidence, the 2nd Appellant deposed to the fact that he is the paternal uncle of late Masbau Abashe (2nd deceased person).
That the said witnesses statement on oath of the Appellants were part of the documents constituting the proof of evidence upon which the learned trial Judge earlier granted leave to the Appellants to prefer charges against the Respondents.
On the whole, the Appellants urged this court to hold that it was wrong for the learned trial Judge to have held that the Appellants did not disclose any special interest in the proceedings as to have locus standi to initiate the Criminal proceedings against the Respondents.
The Respondents in their own reaction erred grievously by anchoring their brief in respect of the Appellant’s brief on the grounds of the Notice of Cross-Appeal. This to my mind is a misdirection and misguidance in terms of practice and procedures in law.
The Respondents in accordance with our Rule of Court 2011, cannot be heard on oral arguments or circumvent the direct provision of the Rule by adopting an unusual style of filing a cross-appeal without response to the main appeal. The consequences of failure to file briefs were provided for under order 18 Rule 10(1) of the Court of Appeal Rule, 2011 wherein it is stated thus:-
“Where an Appellant fails to file his brief within the time provided for in Rule 2 of this Order, or within the time as extended by the Court, the Respondent may apply to the Court for the appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution. If the Respondent fails to file his brief, he will not he heard in oral argument. Where an Appellant fails to file a reply brief within the time specified in Rule 5, he shall be deemed to have conceded all the new points or issues arising from the Respondent’s brief”
Instead of complying with the above, the Respondents on the contrary in response filed a Notice of a Cross-appeal dated 14th day of February, 2012 and filed on 28th May, 2012.
However on 11th day of April, 2012 the Respondents have cause to file their Respondents brief wherein they raised the three issues already stated above. The sole issue raise by the Appellant encompassed the points raised in the three issues developed by the Respondent in their brief of argument. Shun of all embestliments, the Respondents submitted inter alia thus:-
“That “any other authority or persons” as contained in Sections 174 (1) (b) and (c) and 211 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution must be persons authorized by law to initiate and prosecute criminal proceedings in the Federal or State High Courts.
That Section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 39 Laws of Taraba State. 1997 does not authorize the Appellants to initiate this proceedings at the High Court.
That Section 143 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 39 Laws of Taraba State does not confer locus standi on the Appellants to initiate criminal proceedings at the High Court”.
From the brief filed, it is was the submission of the learned counsel to the respondent on issue one above that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have relied on the said Judgment of the Supreme Court to hold that the Appellants as private individuals have the right to initiate and prosecute criminal proceedings against the Respondent at the High Court without a fiat from the Attorney General of the State.
It was argued that the issue before the Supreme Court in the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Osahon (supra) which is completely different from the present case was whether the Court of Appeal was right when in interpreting Section 56 (1) of the Federal High Court Act, Section 23 of the Police Act and Section 174 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution, came to the conclusion that the Police Officers prosecuting the Respondents lack the competence to initiate or conduct prosecution before the Federal High Court.
That the Supreme Court after reviewing Section 56 (1) of the Federal High Court Act, Section 23 of the Police Act, and Section 174 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution came to the conclusion that the words ” any other authority or person” as contained in Section 174 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution are wide enough to include police officers who do not require fiat to initiate and prosecute a case on behalf of the Federal Government before the Federal High Court.
It was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case does not open a flood-gate for all persons to initiate criminal proceedings in all the courts in Nigeria without a fiat. For anybody to have the right to initiate and prosecute a criminal proceedings in all the court in Nigeria, without a fiat such a person must be a “person” that is authorized by law to do so. This is the position of the Supreme Court in that case when it was said per Kutigi JSC (as he then was).
“Needless to say that the “any other authority or person must be an authority or person authorized by law to institute or undertake criminal proceedings who as I said may not necessarily be legal practitioner such as Police Officer under the police Act in this case”
It was argued that Section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 39 Laws of Taraba State 1997 for ease of reference provides that “No person shall be tried by the High Court unless:
a. A charge is preferred against him in the High Court by Attorney General.
b. A charge of Contempt is preferred against him in accordance with the provision of Sections “314 and 315”.
Also that Section 211 (1) of the 1999 Constitution upon which the learned trial Judge relied also provides as follows:
1. The Attorney-General of a state shall have power-
a. To institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court of law in Nigeria other than a Court-Martial in respect of an offence created by or under any law of the House of Assembly;
b. To take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that may have been instituted by any other authority or person; and
c. To discontinue at any stage before Judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any other authority of person.
It was submitted that from the provision of section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code quoted above, that the Appellants as private individuals are not persons authorized by law to initiate and prosecute criminal proceedings before the High Court in Taraba State, without the authority of the Attorney General of the State.
It was further submitted that the provision of section 211(1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 constitution in the light of the Supreme Court’s definition of “any other authority or persons” does not give them the right to initiate and prosecute criminal proceedings before the High court in Taraba State.
More so, that contrary to the learned trial Judge’s position as held on page 151 of Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 39 Laws of Taraba State is neither inconsistent nor superceded by the provision of section 211 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution. That a provision is said to be inconsistent with another when it is contradicting, in opposition or mutually exclusive of the other. The cases of Asanya vs. State (1991) 4 SC p 42 at 52 (lines 25 – 32), Niger Care Company Ltd V. Adamawa S.W.B (2008) 20 WRN p.166 were referred to.
It was argued that the learned trial Judge’s reliance on the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Osahon (supra) to find that Section 211 (1) (b) and (c) of the 1999 Constitution opens a flood-gate for everybody or person to initiate and prosecute criminal proceedings in all courts including the High Court of Justice of Taraba State, stemmed from his lack of understanding of the issue and the Judgment of the Supreme Court in that case.
It was further canvassed that Section 143 (d) and (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 39 Laws of Taraba State could not and cannot be the source of the Appellants locus standi to initiate this criminal proceedings against the Respondents as submitted in the Appellants brief. That Section 143 (d) and (e) deals with how a court can generally take cognizance of any offence committed within the local limit of its jurisdiction, while Section 185 deals with who can initiate criminal proceedings before the High Court.
Further that the learned trial Judge accepted their view and held on page 149 (lines 6-13) that Section 143 of the Criminal Procedure Code, does not override the provision of Section 185 of the law. And that the High Court may take cognizance of an offence under Section 143, but when it comes to actual trial, the Court is bound by Sections 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That the trial court in other words was of the view that Section 143 alone does not confer locus standi on the Appellants to initiate this complaint, in the face of specific provision of Section 185.
Moreso, that the learned trial Judge having found that Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not confer locus standi on the Appellants to initiate and prosecute a criminal proceedings before the High Court, the Appellants, without more, cannot be heard to be making a case that the section gives them the locus standi to initiate and prosecute the Respondents at the High Court. That assuming that the Appellants could be heard on that, that the combined effect of Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 211, (1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution does not confer any locus standi on the Appellants. That the words “any other authority or person” is not wide enough to cover private individuals.
It was further argued that from the proof of evidence and the law upon which the Appellants relied to obtain leave, there was fraudulent misrepresentation before the trial court.
It was submitted that, the authors of Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Ed., by Bryan A. Garner at page 1022, defined fraudulent misrepresentation to mean “A false statement that is known to be false or is made recklessly without knowing or caring whether it is true or false and that is intended to induce a party to detrimentally rely on it.
That from paragraphs 9-11 of the statement on oath of the 1st Appellant on pages 9-11 of the record, and paragraphs 9-11 of the statement on oath of the 2nd Appellant on pages 12 – 14 of record, the Appellants were saying that despite their petition and the order from the Inspector General of Police, the Police refused to investigate the case as nothing was heard done about it.
That apart from their respective statements on paragraphs 11 of those statements on oath, there was no evidence before the trial court to show that they went to the Police and found the Police not investigating.
That on the contrary, the affidavit evidence of the 1st Respondent in support of their application for quashing the charges and striking out as can be found on pages 96-101 of the record and most particularly paragraph 14 (a) (b) and exhibits CPT-CPT9 thereto, showed clearly that the Police did investigate the case, concluded their investigation and forwarded the case file to the Director of Public Prosecution on the 2nd of May, 2008, even before the Appellants went to the High Court to initiate this complaint on 23rd September, 2008.
It was submitted that from the nature of this case, when viewed from the Inspector General’s directive, the order of mandamus and other documentary evidence before the trial court, it must be taken that the Appellants had knowledge that the Police did investigate the case, but chose to make false statement to the trial Court, in order to secure the prosecution of the Respondents at all cost for crime they know nothing about. Further that Section 185 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code upon which the Appellants relied to apply for leave to prosecute the Respondents before the trial Judge was not part of Criminal Procedure Code Cap. 39 Laws of Taraba State, 1997 by relying on that provision to secure leave from the trial court to initiate this case also amounted to fraudulent misrepresentation.
That from the above, it is quite clear that the Appellant, at the time they went to court either made false statement knowing it to be false, or were reckless, neither knowing nor caring whether it was false or true. The case of Afegbai V. Edo State (2001) 90 LRCN P.2929 AT 2934 R. 17 (page 2953 line E) was referred to.
The respondents argued that the basis upon which the Appellants came to court to initiate this criminal proceedings, as can be seen from their verifying affidavit, witnesses statement on oath of 1st and 2nd Appellants on pages 3, 10, and 13 of the record, was premised on the fact that the Police refused to investigate the killings of the two deceased even when the Inspector General of police and the High Court ordered them to investigate.
It was argued that the Police investigation report which is exhibit CPT at page 102 of the record found that one Umaru Yankari, Buba Yola and Safiyanu (alias) Wakilin Tauri were the culprits in the gruesome killings of the two deceased, and based on that the Director Public Prosecution recommended in exhibit CPT9 which is at page 120-129 of the record that the culprits. It was the respondents’ submission that, because the learned trial Judge was completely beclouded by his position at pages 145 line 26 and 146 lines 1-5 of the record, he failed to direct himself properly to the positive effect of the exhibits before him (showing that the police thoroughly investigated the case and the culprits are to be arrested and prosecuted) on the Respondents case.
It is our further submission that from the attitude of the learned trial Judge it can safely be inferred in the circumstance of this case that, if he had not found the ground upon which he relied to strike out the case, he was prepared, despite the Police report and the Director of Public Prosecutions legal advice, to put the Respondents through the difficult process of criminal trial in his court.
This court from the above submissions where urged to dismiss the appeal.

RESOLUTION OF THE SOLE ISSUE IN THE MAIN APPEAL.
The term locus standi denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law and is used interchangeably with terms like “standing” or title to sue”. See Senator Abraham Adesanya V. President Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor, (1981) 5 SC 112 at 28 -129 per Fatayi Williams Ogunsanya V. Dada (1992) 4 SCNJ 162 at 168 locus standi is the right or competence to institute proceedings in a court for redress or assertion of a right enforceable at law.
See. Attorney-General, Kaduna State V. Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR 453, at 496; Adefulu V. Oyeside (1989) 5 NWLR 377 at 418, Nwamkwo V. Ononeze Madu (2009) 1 NWLR (pt. 1123) 671 C.A, Wura V. Itam (2009) 17 NWLR (pt. 1170) 337 C.A.

The Constituent facts of a cause of action, as noted earlier, are the essential ingredients of an enforceable right.
The person in whom this enforceable right is vested as his personal right is the person that has the locus standi to sue. No one else can properly sue for the enforcement of that right. It has been stated that a party prosecuting an action would have locus standi if the relief claimed would confer some benefit on such party.
See Buraimoh Oluriode & Ors. V. Oyebi & Ors. (1984) 5 SC 1 at 16 per Irikefe JSC (as he then was).

In Attorney-General, Kaduna State V. Hassan (supra), one of two main issues that arose for determination was whether the Plaintiff had locus standi to bring the action. The Plaintiff was the father of the deceased who was killed in an outbreak of communal violence. Some members of the community were arrested and charged in the High Court with culpable homide of the deceased. But the solicitor-General of the State, purporting to act under the power vested in the Attorney-General of the State by section 191(1) (c) of the 1999 Constitution for discontinuance of criminal proceedings, entered a nolle prosequi in respect of the charges against the accused and thus terminated their prosecution. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action questioning the propriety of the exercise of the powers under the aforementioned section of the constitution. At the trial of the action in the High Court, an objection was inter alia, taken to the locus standi of the Plaintiff and was overruled.
On appeal against the ruling to the Court of Appeal, that court by a majority upheld the trial Judge’s ruling on further appeal with, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiff had locus standi.
In its later decision in Fawehinmi V. Akiliu (supra), the Supreme Court went beyond the principles stated in Senator Adesanya’s case, the locus clasicus on locus standi. Eso JSC (as he then was) expressly conceded this in the following words:-
“In this instant appeal before this court, I think with respect, that the lead judgment of my learned brother Obaseki JSC is an advancement on the positive hitherto held by this court on locus standi. I think again with respect, that it is a departure from the narrow attitude of this court in Abraham Adesanya’s case and subsequent decision….”
His lordship Obaseki JSC (as he then was) further at 832 held thus:-
“The narrow confines to which section 6(6) (b) (of the constitution) restricts the class of persons entitled to locus standi in civil matters have been broadened by the criminal code, the criminal procedure law and the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. The powers of arrest and prosecution conferred by the various sections of the criminal procedure law and the criminal code on “any person” has the magic effect of giving locus standi to any person who cares to prosecute an offender, if, and only if, he saw him committing the offence or reasonably suspects him of having committed the offence”

In the instant appeal, Section 211(1) (b) & (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) Cap 39 Laws of Taraba State of Nigeria, 1997, empower the Appellants to initiate the direct Criminal complaint against the Respondents and they need not show any special relationship with the deceased persons or demonstrate an interest more substantial than that of the general public to be enabled in that behalf as wrongly opined by the learned trial Judge.
Moreso, that it is not in doubt that the doctrine of locus standi is generally regulated by the principles of common law, but it is the law that where the issue of locus standi in respect of a subject matter is regulated by a statute, the principles of common law on the subject have by implication been suspended from regulating the subject. See the case of M.C.S. (NIG) Ltd/GTE V. Adeonkin Records (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 391) C.A at Pp. 1637 paras C – D where this court held inter alia:
“Where a statute confers on a Plaintiff the right to sue, a court of law has no jurisdiction to deny him of the standing to sue. A statutory right of a Plaintiff to sue abrogates a common law principle to the contrary that is not to sue”.
It follows from the above enunciated laws that where as in the present case, a statute like Section 211(1) (b) and (c) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Section 143 (e) of the Criminal Procedure have vested any person (or authority) with the right to commence or institute Criminal Proceedings against any other person, a court of law does not have the jurisdiction to disqualify or limit the right by using the general common law principles on the subject. It is therefore my humble view that the learned trial Judge erred. See Fawehimi V. Akilu (supra).
See also Nnamani V. Nnaji (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 610) C.A 313 at 330, paras. C – E, Every provision of the law has a purpose and the essence of Section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code to my mind is that criminality is one sensitive issue that everyone has special interest in respect thereof. As such any person can sue when there is a reasonable suspicion. See the case of FRN V. Osahon (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 312) S.C 1975 at 2006, paras. A – C, Fawehimi V. Akilu (supra).
The learned trial judge having found that the Appellants as private individuals could be granted leave to prefer charges against the Respondents, and having actually so granted the said leave to the Appellants, he was wrong with all due respect in further holding that the Appellants ought to have shown an interest above that of other members of the society, since the mission of the law is to eradicate crimes and it does not matter who arrest who so long as reasonable suspicion exist.
Assuming it were the requirement of the law that a special interest must be disclosed in the circumstance to have a right of suit, by paragraph 1 of the witness statement on oath of the 1st Appellant attached to the proof of evidence (as contained on page 9 of the record of proceedings) the 1st Appellant deposed that he is the paternal uncle of Yakubu Sambo, the 1st deceased person), and in paragraph 1 of the witness statement on oath of the 2nd Appellant (as contained on page 12 of the record of proceedings) attached to the proof of evidence, the 2nd Appellant deposed to the fact that he is the paternal uncle of late Masbau Abashe (2nd deceased person) and the said witnesses statements on oath of the Appellants were part of the documents constituting the proof of evidence upon which the learned trial Judge earlier granted leave to the Appellants to prefer charges against the Respondents. This relationship amounts to a special interest if this were the law. But it is not.
From the above proceedings in this appeal, it is clear that criminal matters involving high profile member of our society usually die naturally because they are never investigated to its logical conclusion. The police are hereby called upon to be alive to their responsibilities of thorough investigation of all matters especially murder. Murder should never be swept under the carpet but should constitute the fulcrum upon which serious investigations into the allegations of murder proffered against the Respondents.
May I from public opinion dare say that it is due to the reluctant, sluggish indifferent, delayed investigation of cases reported to it that has provoked the allegations of the Governor of Edo State, Comrade Adams Oshiomohle against the Nigeria Police Force in respect of the gruesome murder of the confidential secretary and the subsequent reaction by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Mr. Mohammed Abubakar.
See page 72 of the leadership newspaper of 12th January, 2013.
However, the Attorney General’s Office is hereby exhorted if it so desires to ensure that they react to the public outcry and endeavour to initiate prosecution where there is enough evidence otherwise the Appellants should be at liberty to seek for Justice and not to be so hindered, for a party should not be esttopped or deprived from seeking for justice. Consequently justice deprived and delayed is justice denied.
It is on the basis of the foregoing that I found this appeal as being meritorious and ought to succeed.
RESOLUTION OF THE CROSS-APPEAL BY RESPONDENT.
The Respondents have not filed a Cross Appellants’/Respondents’ brief pursuant to their notice of appeal. It would therefore serve no useful purpose to go in depth on the resolution of cross-appeal because there is no brief filed.
The Respondents instead of filing a Respondent’s brief and thereafter a Cross-Appellant/Respondents’ brief maintained only their Respondent’s brief before this court and same had accordingly been determined in the resolution of the main appeal which was decided on the sole issue of the Appellant and consequently there is no issue for the court’s determination in the notice of Cross-Appeal as raised and same is accordingly struck out and therefore the Cross appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
On the whole, this appeal has merit and it is hereby allowed in its entirety and the Cross-Appeal is accordingly dismissed. The Judgment of the Court below is hereby set aside.
The cost of N50, 000.00 and the cost of this appeal are hereby awarded in favor of the Appellants, against the Respondents jointly and severally.
Appeal allowed.

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in advance the draft of the lead Judgment of my Lord and Presiding Justice, S. Denton-West, JCA and I agree totally with his reasoning and conclusion that by virtue of Sections 211(1) (b) & (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and 143(d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) CAP. 3, Laws of Taraba State, 1997; the Appellants have the requisite locus standi to initiate direct criminal complaint against the Respondents without the need to show any special relationship with the deceased persons or demonstrate interest more substantial than that of the general public to be enabled to initiated Criminal proceedings against the said Respondents as erroneously opined by the learned trial Judge.
This case brings once more into the fore the concept of Public interest Litigation in our jurisprudence and the unrelenting attitude of some of our learned colleagues in still adhering tenaciously to the anachronistic concept of locus standi (which is predicated on special interest), in spite of some revolutionary decisions of Nigerian, British, American and Common wealth Courts in Countries like India, Bangledash and South Africa; on this vexed concept in years past and very recently.
Again, the learned trial Judge, as was rightly held by my Lord in the lead Judgment, appeared to have treated the issue of locus standi in Criminal proceedings as if it were a Civil Suit. For instance, Fatayi – Williams CJN in the celebrated case of Abraham Adesanya V. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 5 S. C. 112 at 128 – 129 and 140; had held that in cases where a Plaintiff seeks to establish a “private right” or “special damage”, either under the common Law or administrative Law, in non-constitutional litigation by way of the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, or for a declaratory and injunctive relief, “the law is now settled that the plaintiff will have locus standi in the matter only if he has a special legal right or alternatively, if he has sufficient special interest in the performance of the duty sought to be enforced, or where his interest is adversely affected.” According to the learned Law Lord of Blessed memory:
“What constitutes a legal right, sufficient or special interest or interest adversely affected will, of course depend on the facts of each case. Whether an interest is worthy of protection is a matter of judicial discretion which may vary according to the remedy asked for.”
In that case, Obaseki, JSC contributing to the lead Judgment of his learned brother, posed the pertinent question whether or not a Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or in his capacity as a citizen (who was subsequently driven away from the judgment seat on ground of want of special interest), had locus standi to challenge the constitutionality of an appointment made by the President of the Federal Republic and confirmed by the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 141(1) of the 1979 Constitution. This question was subsequently answered in the case of Attorney-General of Bendel State V. Attorney – General of the Federation (1981) 10 S. C. 1 at 159 – 160, thus:-
“To my mind, it should be possible for any person who is convinced that there is infraction of sections 1 and 4 of the Constitution which I have enumerated above to be able to go to Court and ask for the appropriate declaration and consequential relief if relief is required. In my view any person whether he is a citizen of Nigeria or not, who is resident in Nigeria or who is subject to the laws in force in Nigeria has an obligation to see it that he is governed by a law which is consistent with the Constitution indeed, it his civil right to see that this is so.” Page 137 of the Report.
At pages 140 and 141, the learned Emeritus Justice of the Apex Court posited:-
“Finally, in the Nigerian con and having regard to the detailed provisions of our 1979 Constitution, the point which I think needs to be stressed is that there are explicit provisions therein which deal with locus standi which is required in order to sustain a claim that there has been an infringement of particular provisions of the Constitution. Consequently, other infractions of the provisions of the said Constitution to which no restrictions are attached should not be fettered by the common law or the administrative concepts of lacus standi. The complainant in such cases should be accorded a hearing subject only to the constitutional restrictions to which I have referred to earlier.”
As I said elsewhere, the scope of locus standi has now been broadened in other jurisdictions even in Civil Proceedings contrary to the stance of Fatayi-Williams JSC in Adesanya V. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and cases like Inakoju V. Adeleke per Tobi, JSC; and Fawehinmi V. IGP (2002) 7 NWLR (pt. 767) 606 at pages 693 – 694 paras. H -A; 696 paras B-C; E and 698 para A. The usual reason always advanced for the restrictive approach to this concept, is the Common Law doctrine that in Public Law Litigations, an ordinary individual generally does not have locus standi as a Plaintiff because litigations in the public domain entail and concern public rights and duties which belong to or are owed all members of the public including the Plaintiff and that it is only where he has suffered special damage over and above that of the public generally, that he can be seised of the requisite locus standi to sue personally. See Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council (1903) 2 Ch. 556 followed in Gamioba v. Esezi II (supra) and Olawoyin v. Attorney-General Northern Nigeria (supra). See also Oputa J.S.C. who opined in A.G. Kaduna State v. Hassan (1983) 2 N.W.L.R. 483 at 522; that this Common Law concept has been encapsulated in Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution and accordingly reinforced.
With these conservative positions taken by what I termed elsewhere as the old school of thought, it is only the Attorney-General who can sue to assert a public right or to enforce the performance of a public duty as in this case where the Appellants allege that the Respondents murdered their brothers. See A. G. of the Federation v. A.G. of Imo State & Ors. (1982) 12 S.C. 274 at 306 -307 and A.G. for New South Wales v. The Brewery Employees Union (1908) 6 C.L.R 409 at 550 – 561. See also Fawehinmi V. IGP (supra). Thus, by this Common Law doctrine, where a private person feels so strongly on such a case, he can only bring a relator proceeding upon the fiat of the Attorney-General being given him. See the recent case of Nwankwo v. Ononeze-Madu (2009) 1 N.W.L.R. (pt. 1123) 713 para. H per Abdullahi J.C.A., Port Harcourt Division C.A. But see the case of Adediran v. Inter Land Transport Ltd. (1991) 9 N.W.L.R. 225, where the Supreme Court held that Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federation has removed the limitation of the Common Law whereby only the Attorney-General could bring an action for public nuisance. Now both the individual affected by the nuisance and the Attorney-General have equal rights to sue.
The moot question however, is what should happen in the scenario we have found ourselves where the where the Police has refused to prosecute and the Court had earlier granted the Appellant by Section 143(d) and (e) of the CPC leave to prefer a charge against the Respondents? It is however, salutary that the Courts have considerably departed from the old or conservative and restrictive idea of locus standi and have almost universally broadened the scope particularly in Public Law Litigations most especially where there is an infraction of the Constitution as can be seen from the dictum of Fatayi-William C.J.N. in the Abraham Adesanya’s case that where there has been an infraction of the Constitution, access to a Court of Law should be granted to any members of a society who is aware or believes, or is led to believe that there has been such infraction, to challenge the infraction and to air his grievances and that to refuse a party such access on such flimsy excuse as lack of sufficient interest is to provide a ready recipe for organized disenchantment, even though the Learned Law Lords made a volte face by denying Senator Adesanya his locus. See FRN V. Osahon (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 312), 1975 at 2006 paras. A -C
The Supreme Court and even this court have taken revolutionary and bold departures from the ubiquitous old concept of locus standi. See for instance, per Obaseki J.S.C. and his commendation by Eso J.S.C. where in Fawehinmi v. Akilu & Anor. (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (pt 66) 797 at 832 and 847 – 848; the former departure from the hitherto narrow attitude of the apex court in Adesanya’s case; Odeneye v. Efunuga (1990) 7 N.W.L.R. (pt 164) 618 at 631; Elendu v. Ekwuoaba (1995) 3 NWLR (pt. 380) 70 at 74, per Onalaja; A.G. Kaduna State v. Hassan (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (pt. 8) 483; Ogunmokun v. Milad Ogun State (1999) 3 N.W.L.R. (pt. 594) 261 at 285; and the recent cases of Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003) 16 N.W.L.R. (pt. 164) 618 at 638 paras. E – H; Alamieyieseigha v. Igoniwari No. 2 (2007) 7 N.W.L.R. (pt. 847) 554, Per Galadima J.C.A. and Fawehinmi v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) 14 N.W.L.R. (pt. 1054) 75 at 336 paras. H – E.
In the latter case Aboki J.C.A. restated what Fatayi-William C.J.N. said in the Adesanya v. President F.R.N. most admirably inter alia:-
“In this Country which establishes a Constitutional structure involving a tripartite allocation of power to the Judiciary, Executive and Legislature as the co-ordinate organs of Government, judicial function most primarily aims at preserving legal order by confining the Legislative and Executive within their powers in the interest of the public and since the dominant objective of the rule of Law is to ensure the observance of the rule of Law, it can best be achieved by permitting any person to put the judicial machinery in motion in Nigeria where by any citizen could bring an action in respect of a public derelict. Thus the requirement of locus standi becomes unnecessary in constitutional issues as it will merely impede judicial functions.”
Even in the most conservative of common wealth or Common Law jurisdictions like Britain, or in liberal jurisdictions like the United States of America from where we derived our judicial system and our present Constitution, nay India and Bangladesh the concept of locus standi has been broadened and the courts have departed from the undue reliance on sufficiency of interest as the primary consideration for the conferment of locus standi in administrative and Constitutional Law, as exemplified in R v. Secretary Of State, Exparte World Development Movement Ltd. (2000) 21 W.R.N. 177.
In that case, an application for judicial review of the decision of the Foreign Secretary was brought by the applicants a non-partisan pressure group (World Development Movements Ltd), which campaigned to increase the amount and quality of British aid to developing countries. They (the applicants) also applied for an order for the disclosure of two minutes, dated 5 & 7 of Feb. 1991, from the Permanent Secretary in the Overseas Development Administration to the Minister of Overseas Development. The Foreign Secretary on the other hand, contended, inter alia, that the applicant had no locus standi to make the application, and further that he was entitled to take account of wider political and economic considerations when deciding to make a grant of aid. In a unanimous decision, the Queen’s Bench Divisional court herd as follows:-
“On when a non partisan pressure group can be seised of locus standi to bring an action, Per Rose L.J at pg. 187 – 188) para. 15 – 5, posited:-
“For my part, I accept that standing (albeit decided in the exercise of the court’s discretion, as Donaldson MR. said) goes to jurisdiction, as Woolf L.J. said. But I find nothing in IRC v. National Federation of Self – Employed and Small Businesses Ltd to deny standing to these applicants.
The authorities referred to seem to me to indicate an increasingly liberal approach to standing on the part of the courts during the last 12 years. It is also clear from IRC v. National Federation of Self – Employed and Small Business Limited that standing should not be treated as a preliminary issue, but must be taken in the legal and factual con of the whole case (see 1981) 2 All ER 93 at 96, 110, 113, (1982) AC 617 at 630, 649, 653 per Lord Wilberforce, Lord Fraser and Lord Scarman). It seems pertinent to add this, that if the Divisional Court in Exp Rees -Mogg eight years after Exp Argyll Group was able to accept that the applicant in that case had standing in the light of his ‘sincere concern for constitutional issues’ a fortiori, it seems to me that the present Applicants, with their national and international expertise and interest in promoting and protecting aid to underdeveloped nations, should have standing in the present application”.
On factors that are considered in determining the issue of locus standi in modern times, the learned Justice further held:
“Furthermore, the merits of the challenge are an important, if not dominant factor when considering standing. In professor sir William Wades words in Administrative Law (7th edition, 1994) p 712.
‘…the real question is whether the Applicant can show some substantial default or abuse, and not whether his personal rights or interest are involved.’
Leaving merits aside for a moment, there seem to me to be a number of factors of significance in the present case: the importance of vindicating the rule of law, as Lord Diplock emphasized in IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Limited (1981) 2 ALL ER 93 at 107, (1982) AC 617 at 644; the importance of the issue raised, as in Exp Child Poverty Action Group; the likely absence of any other responsible challenger, as in Exp Child Poverty Action Group and Exp Green peace Ltd; the nature of the breach of duty against which relief is sought (see IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and small Businesses Limited (1981) 2 ALL ER 93 at 96, (1982) AC 617 at 630 per Lord Wilberforce); and the prominent role of these applicants in giving advice, guidance and assistance with regard to aid (see Exp Child Poverty Action Group (1989) 1 All ER 1047 at 1048, (1990) 2 Q.B. 540 at 546. All, in my judgment, point in the present case, to the conclusion that the applicants hereto have a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates within S. 31 (3) of the 1981 ACT and Order 53, R 3(7)”. Per Rose L.J (pt. 187) para 25-40.
Again, it is also necessary to refer to the position of the Law in India which we ought to borrow a leaf from their Public Interest Litigation system where locus standi can be given to any person who writes a letter of complaint in the name of the People’s Union for Democratic Rights to the Chief Justice, justifying the rationale of the complaint. As was held by Dayal J. in the case of People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Minister of Home Affairs:
“Following English and American decisions, our Supreme Court has of late admitted exceptions from the strict rules relating to locus standi and the like in the case of a class of litigation which have acquired classification known as “public interest litigation” that is, where the public in general are interested in the enforcement of fundamental rights and other statutory rights…….”
See further the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamaga Union v. Union of India (1981) A.I.R. (SC) 344, where Lord Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court of India stated the need for a broader scope of the rules of locus standi most appropriately in these words:
“Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical to a healthy system of growth of administrative law. If a Plaintiff with a good cause is turned away merely because he is not sufficiently affected personally that could mean that some government agency is left free to violate the law such a situation would be extremely unhealthy and contrary to the public interest. Litigants are likely to spend their time and money unless they have some real interest at stake; and in some cases where they wish to sue merely out of public spirit; to discourage then and thwart their good intentions would be most frustrating and completely demoralizing.”
In the recent case of Dr. Mohuiddin Farooque v. Bangladesh & Ors. (2002) 2 CHR 569 at 613 paras. H – 1 and 614 para. A, Latifur Rahman J. enunciated the social and philosophical basis for global expansion of standing rights thus:-
“The traditional rule to locus standi is that judicial remedy is available only to a person who is personally aggrieved. This principle is based on the theory that the remedies and rights are correlative and therefore only a person whose own right is violated is entitled to seek remedy. In case of private individual and private law this principle can be applied with some strictness, but in public law this doctrine cannot be applied with the same strictness as that will tantamount to ignoring the good and well being of citizens, more particularly from the view point of public good for whom the State and the Constitution exist.”
These authorities in the main, should persuade us in determining the vexed issue as to whether the Appellants in seeking leave to prefer charges against the Respondents who are reasonably suspected to have committed murder can initiate criminal proceedings with the leave of court or whether they are seised with requisite locus standi, to so do.
Although public interest litigation is still at infancy in this country, recent decisions of the Supreme Court have tended to jettison the old concept of sufficiency of interest as the bases for conferment of locus standi in constitutional matters. See for instance Odeneye v. Efunuga (supra) per Belgore, J.S.C; Fawehinmi v. The President F.R.N. (supra); A.G. Lagos State v. AG of the Federation (2004) 18 N.W.L.R (pt. 904) 1; A.G. Abia State (2002) 6 N.W.L.R (pt. 674) 542; Alamieyeseigha v. Igoniwari No. 2 (supra); Yusuf v. Obasanjo (supra); Amaechi V. INEC & 2 Ors (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1880) 227 at 310-311 paragraph H-D;
In this case, even on the basis of disclosure of special interest in order to be vested with the right to initiate proceedings against the Respondents, by paragraph 1 of the Witness Statement on Oath of the 1st Appellant attached to the Proof of Evidence as contained in page 9 of the Record of Proceedings; the 1st Appellant who deposed to the fact that he is the paternal uncle of Yakubu Sambo, the 1st deceased person, definitely has sufficient interest to prosecute the Respondents. Furthermore, since the 2nd Appellant has also deposed in the 1st paragraph of his Witness Statement on Oath which Witness Statements are annexed to the Proof of Evidence and which the Court below considered in granting the earlier leave to prefer charges against the Respondents; the Court ought not to approbate and reprobate at the same time.
Accordingly, I am also in tandem with my Lord the Honourable PJ, that the circumstances of this case are quite different from those of Fawehinmi v. IGP. I agree also that this Appeal is meritorious and is hereby allowed. The ruling of the learned trial Judge delivered on the 15th day of September, 2009 is hereby set aside and I abide by all other consequential orders including costs.