YA’U MOHAMMED V. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2011)

YA’U MOHAMMED V. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2011)LCN/4963(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 6th day of December, 2011

CA/PH/389/2009

RATIO

PLEA OF GUILT TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE: CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH THE COURT WILL CONVICT AN ACCUSED PERSON WHO PLEADS GUILTY TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE SUMMARILY

The law is settled that an accused person who pleads guilty to a criminal charge can be convicted summarily if the court is satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence. The burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecutor is made lighter. See Omoju v. FRN [supra] PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A

PLEA OF GUILT: STATUTORY PROVISION ON THE DUTY IMPOSED ON THE TRIAL JUDGE WHEN AN ACCUSED PERSON PLEADS GUILTY TO AN OFFENCE

Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act Cap C41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 provides as follows:- “If the accused pleads guilty to an offence with which he is charged, the court shall record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him and if satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence of which he has pleaded guilty, the court shall convict him of that offence and pass sentence upon or make order against him unless there shall appear sufficient cause to the contrary.” [Underlining is mine and for emphasis] The provision of S. 218 of the C.P.A. reproduced herein above, imposes an obligation on the court before which an accused person pleads guilty, to record such plea in the words used by the said accused person. In State v. Duke [2003] 5 NWLR [Pt 813] 394, this court per Olagunju JCA [as he then was] said at page 425 paragraph C as follows: “Where as person pleads guilty to the charge read and explained to him, that the duty is imposed (by section 218) on the trial Judge to record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him. No such obligation arises where the accused pleads not guilty to the charged as by operation of section 217 by pleading not guilty the accused is deemed to have put himself upon his trial.” PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A

CHARGE: WHAT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS SATISFIED THAT AN ACCUSED PERSON UNDERSTOOD THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM

Indeed, in determining whether the trial court was satisfied that an accused person understood the charge against him, the record must be looked at as a whole and not in an isolated way of recording every incident that would normally be presumed had been done. The requirement is that the accused must understand the charge he faced from the trial court through to the Court of Appeal. See Umuolo v. State [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt 808) 493, Okeke v. State [2003] 15 NWLR [Pt 842] 25. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A

BRIEF OF ARGUMENT: WHAT A BRIEF OF ARGUMENT ENTAILS

…A Brief of argument is not an all purpose document. It is a document in which arguments are presented based on issues formulated from grounds of appeal. Arguments that are canvassed from issues not related to those issues formulated from valid grounds of appeal cannot be entertained. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A

REASONABLE DOUBT: THE EFFECT OF A REASONABLE DOUBT IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL

In a criminal trial, the standard of proof is always beyond reasonable doubt, the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty notwithstanding. If there is reasonable doubt it must be resolved in favour of the accused. See IGABELE V. THE STATE (2006) 6 NWLR (PT. 975) 100, OZAKI V. THE STATE 1990) ALL NLR 94. PER T. O. AWOTOYE J.C.A.

JUSTICES

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

YA’U MOHAMMED Appellant(s)

AND

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein was arraigned before the Federal High Court Port Harcourt on the 12th of June 2008, charged with being in unlawful possession of eight kilogram of Indian hemp otherwise known as cannabis sativa contrary to and punishable under section 19 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act cap 30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The plea of the Appellant could not be taken on the day he was arraigned because there was not available an interpreter who could interprete the days proceedings to the Appellant from English to Hausa and vice versa. Further proceedings, were adjourned to 8/7/08 for the Deputy Chief Registrar to assign an interpreter for the benefit of the Appellant.
However, the Appellants plea could not be taken until on the 19th day of December 2008. The charge was read and interpreted to the Appellant by one Isa Tanko from English to Hausa and vice versa, and this is what is recorded as the plea of the Appellant thus:-
“Charge read to accused person and interpreted from English to Hausa for the accused person who perfectly appeared to understand same. And pleaded guilty to the charge.”
After the plea of the Appellant, the following proceedings are recorded at page 14 thus:-
“In view of the plea of the accused person we are prepared to review the facts. The facts are as contained in the charge before the honourable court. In further proof of the prosecution’s case we have the following to tender in evidence.”
The court proceeded to admit in evidence the bulk exhibit which it said was the Indian hemp recovered and seized from the accused person that is cleverly concealed in the Green Ghana-Must-Go as Exhibit A despite opposition from the Appellant that the said exhibit A belonged to one Dahiru Dan Mallam who lived at Obigbo in Rivers State. It was after the admission of the substance in evidence that the Learned Trial Judge gave the following directive:-
“The accused must be taken to Obigbo forth with to identify and arrest forthwith the owner of the 8 Kilogrames of cannabis sativa. The said man must be produced in this court to explain before this court who owns the said Indian hemp”
On this note, the case was further adjourned to 17/12/2008. On that day nothing was said about the order to have one Dahiru Dan Mallam arrested
Instead further items were admitted in evidence as follows:-
1. Certificate of test analysis as exhibit B,
2. Packing of substance form as exhibit C,
3. Request for scientific aid form exhibit D,
4. Receipt for 8 kilogrammes of Indian hemp exhibit E,
5. Statement of the Appellant, exhibit F.
It is interesting to note that the persons who tendered these exhibits in evidence and how they were tendered and the reaction of the Appellant to the application to tender them in evidence are absent. Thereafter it is recorded that counsel urged the court to convict the Appellant as charged. It is on the basis of this urge that the Learned Trial Judge convicted the Appellant as charged.
Under the heading of Allocutus, the court recorded evidence of previous conviction and the evidence of character and went on to impose a sentence of 15 years imprisonment which he said is the minimum sentence recommended and provided for by our law as a deterrent to other jail birds like him.
It is against this conviction and sentence that the Appellant has appealed to this court. His initial notice of appeal dated 17/3/2009 and filed on the same date contains one ground of appeal. However, the appellant applied for and was granted leave to argue additional 13 grounds of appeal. Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. Appellant formulated three issues for determination of this appeal.
They read thus:-
(a) Whether the conviction and sentence of the appellant on the lone count charge against him was not null and void, the prosecution having failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) Whether non service of Exhibits on Appellant and reliance on them by the trial court did not result in miscarriage of justice?
(c) Whether the none interpretation to the Appellant of substantial part of the proceedings of the trial in the court below was not unconstitutional?
For Respondent, three issues were formulated for determination of the appeal. These issues are reproduced hereunder as follows:-
1. Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the conviction and sentence of the appellant on the single count charge against him is lawful and proper.
2. Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the non service of the Exhibits on the Appellant and the reliance on them by the trial court resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
3. Whether from the facts and circumstance of this case, the Appellant was denied his right to interpretation of the proceedings in the language he understands.
In reaction to the Respondent’s brief of argument, the appellant filed a reply brief on the 18/7/2011.
The three issues formulated by the Appellant and the Respondent are similar. Indeed the Respondents issues constitute replies to the issues raised by the Appellant. I will therefore adopt the issues formulated by the appellant and proceed to treat them in the order in which they have been argued.
On issue one, Mr. Tuduru Ede, Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecution woefully failed to prove the ingredients of the offence for which the Appellant was charged and that the plea of guilt by the Appellant at the lower court was immaterial. Learned Counsel cited section 138[1] and (2) of the Evidence Act and section 36(5) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and contended that even though the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, the prosecution was still bound to lead evidence in proof of the charge against him. According to the Learned Counsel, there is nothing in the proceedings at the lower court that shows clearly that the appellant admitted all the ingredients of the offence in his words as nearly as possible, especially when he mentioned Dahiru Dan Mallam as owner of the Indian hemp. In aid Learned
Counsel cited Ahmed v. Commissioner of Police (1971) 1 NMLR 409; Onuhoa v. Police (1956) NRNLR 96; Oguji v. IGP (1965) LLR 143; Danjuma Usman v. The State (2006) 5 CLPR 1, 11; Iko v. State (2001) SC (Pt.11) 155.
Finally, Learned Counsel’s argument is that the offence for which the Appellant was convicted could only be proved by expert evidence and that the failure to call such an expert as a witness is fatal to the prosecution case. In support of this fine of submission the authority in Abele v. Tiv N.A. [1963] NMLR 425; Stevenson v. Police (1966) 2 All NLR 261 were cited. In conclusion, Learned Counsel urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
In reaction to the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. A.C. Igboekwe, Learned Counsel for the Respondent, who also settled the Respondent’s brief of argument submitted that the conviction and sentence passed on the Appellant is lawful because the Appellant not only pleaded guilty to the sole charge but admitted making exhibit “F” which is his statement voluntarily in which he admitted being in possession of Indian hemp. According to the Learned Counsel, by this plea of guilty, the Appellant had elected not to go into trial, as such there was no need for the prosecution to call witnesses or lead any evidence in proof of the charge whatsoever. In aid Learned Counsel cited section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act Cap C41 Laws of the Federation 2004.
In a further argument, Learned Counsel submitted that on the authority of Omoju v. FRN (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt 1085) 38, it is mandatory for a trial Judge to convict an accused person who pleads guilty as after the plea of guilt there is no controversy left for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt. It is the Learned Counsel’s submission that S. 138 of the Evidence Act and S.36 (5) of the constitution were cited out of con by the Learned Counsel for the appellant.
Finally Learned Counsel went on to comment on the submission of the Learned Counsel for the appellant on section 77 and 180 of the evidence Act which deals with the administration of oath on witnesses. This argument is inappropriate in this appeal as no witnesses were called during the trial of the appellant at the lower court. Delving into this angle of argument will only amount to an academic exercise in which this court is not interested. In a nutshell the contention of the appellant’s counsel on this issue is that the appellant did not admit the offence for which he was charged when he was arraigned before the trial court. According to the Learned Counsel even if the Appellant had admitted his guilt, the prosecution was still bound to call evidence.
The law is settled that an accused person who pleads guilty to a criminal charge can be convicted summarily if the court is satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence. The burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt on the prosecutor is made lighter. See Omoju v. FRN [supra]
Now in the instant appeal, did the appellant admit the offence for which he was arraigned before the lower court when the charge was read and explained to him? For this question to be properly answered, I will like to reproduce a portion of the proceeding of the 1st December 2008. The proceeding which is at page 13 of the record reads as follows:-
“The interpreter is sworn on the Bible and states in English. My name is Isa Tanko. I work with NDLEA. I am Jukum by tribe. We speak Hausa.
PLEA OF THE ACCUSED
Charge read to accused person and interpreted from English to Hausa for the accused person who perfectly appeared to understand same and pleaded guilt to the charge.”
The passage reproduced above is the only portion of the proceedings in the trial where the appellant was adjudged to have admitted the essentials of the charge that led to his conviction and sentence of 15 years.
Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act Cap C41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 provides as follows:-
“If the accused pleads guilty to an offence with which he is charged, the court shall record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him and if satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence of which he has pleaded guilty, the court shall convict him of that offence and pass sentence upon or make order against him unless there shall appear sufficient cause to the contrary.”
[Underlining is mine and for emphasis]
The provision of S. 218 of the C.P.A. reproduced herein above, imposes an obligation on the court before which an accused person pleads guilty, to record such plea in the words used by the said accused person.
In State v. Duke [2003] 5 NWLR [Pt 813] 394, this court per Olagunju JCA [as he then was] said at page
425 paragraph C as follows:
“Where as person pleads guilty to the charge read and explained to him, that the duty is imposed (by section 218) on the trial Judge to record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him. No such obligation arises where the accused pleads not guilty to the charged as by operation of section 217 by pleading not guilty the accused is deemed to have put himself upon his trial.”
The court below did not comply with the provisions of S. 218 of the CPA in recording what it referred to as the plea of guilt of the Appellant, as the words used by him in his admission of guilty is not recorded anywhere.
For accused to plead guilty, he must have understood the meaning of the charge in all its ramification.
The comment under the plea of the accused at page 13 of the record of appeal is that of the trial judge and not an admission made by the Appellant. The Learned trial judge’s comment is that the charge was read and interpreted from English to Hausa for the accused person who perfectly appeared to understand same. The words appeared to understand clearly portrays uncertainty in the mind of the trial judge when he recorded that appellant understood the charge. This degree of uncertainty falls far short of the requisite emphatic understanding of the charge deducible from the provisions of the law. Indeed, in determining whether the trial court was satisfied that an accused person understood the charge against him, the record must be looked at as a whole and not in an isolated way of recording every incident that would normally be presumed had been done. The requirement is that the accused must understand the charge he faced from the trial court through to the Court of Appeal. See Umuolo v. State [2003] 3 NWLR (Pt 808) 493, Okeke v. State [2003] 15 NWLR [Pt 842] 25.
For the reasons I have set out herein above, I am of the firm view that there is no evidence that the appellant admitted or intended to admit the offence for which he was charge. This being so the lower court should have ordered for a full trial in which the prosecution would have called evidence in proof of its case beyond reasonable doubt. The lower court was therefore in error when it convicted the appellant on a plea of guilt that is not apparent on the face of the record.
The 1st issue for determination is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant and the grounds 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14 upon which it is formulated are allowed.
The second issue for determination is whether none service of Exhibits on the Appellant and reliance on them by the trial court did not result in miscarriage of justice. This issue is formulated from the 1st ground of appeal.
On this issue Mr. Tuduru Ede, Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the failure of the prosecution to make available the materials tendered in court as exhibits to the Appellant prior to his arraignment in court especially the scientific report, has resulted to grave departure from settled standard procedure in criminal trial. Learned Counsel cited in aid S.35 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, Emine v. State (1991) 7 NWLR (pt 204) 480; Okaroh v. State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 128, Flowers v. the Queen (2000) 1 WLR 2396 and a host of other authorities and urged the court to hold that the failure to make available to the Appellant the materials tendered in evidence in this case before the commencement of trial has resulted in miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.
In support bf the Learned Counsel’s submission, the case of Anyankpele v. Nigerian Army [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt 684) 209 is cited.
In a further submission, Learned Counsel urged the court to expunge Exhibits A-F from the record because they were admitted contrary to section 77 and 180 of the Evidence Act and had a prejudicial effect on the Appellant which resulted in his conviction not withstanding his plea. At this point learned counsel at paragraph 4.32 page 10 of the Appellant’s brief went on to make submission under the heading “GENERAL SUBMISSIONS ON THE ABOVE ISSUES’. This is strange, A Brief of argument is not an all purpose document. It is a document in which arguments are presented based on issues formulated from grounds of appeal. Arguments that are canvassed from issues not related to those issues formulated from valid grounds of appeal cannot be entertained. The argument that exhibits A-F be expunged from the record and the argument under the heading General Submission on the above issues are hereby discountenanced as they are not based on the three issues identified by the Appellant.
For the Respondent, Mr. Andy Igboekwe of Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s plea of guilt effectively nullified all the Appellant’s argument that the non service of the Exhibit on the Appellant resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This, according to the learned counsel, is because in law, consequent upon his plea of guilty, the trial court, without more, was entitled to immediately convict and sentence him as provided for in S.218 of the Criminal procedure Act as the Learned Trial Judge was not bound to admit and rely on Exhibits A-F. Learned Counsel insists that the tendering of exhibits A-F and the courts reliance on them was superfluous as the hearing that took place was unnecessary because at that stage the issue of hearing became automatically forecloged. In aid Learned counsel cited Omoju v. FRN [supra] where the supreme court, per Tobi JSC at page 60 paragraph A held:-
“An accused person who pleads guilty to an offence is not entitled to a hearing and so the issue of fairness or unfairness of a hearing is neither here nor there. In other words, by entering a guilty plea, hearing is foreclosed, as the next and last procedural step of the Judge is to convict and pass appropriate sentience:
In a further argument Learned Counsel submitted that the exhibits complained about by the Appellant’s counsel were expressly admitted by the Appellant at the trial. Learned counsel referred the court to page 16 of the record of this appeal where the Appellant allegedly admitted ownership of the exhibits and contended that what is admitted needs no further proof. In aid Learned Counsel cited Chief Okparaeke v. Egbuonu (1914) 7 WACA 53 AND Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 241 at 483-484 paragraphs H-A.
Finally learned counsel urged this court to resolve this issue in favor of the Respondent.
In my resolution of the first issue in this appeal, I came to conclusion that there is nowhere in the record of appeal where the Appellant is recorded in his own words to have admitted the ingredients of the offence as reflected in the charge against him.
I emphatically stated that the provision of S.218 of the CPC was not followed. In a criminal trial where the plea of guilty by the accused is not so certain and clear, the trial Judge is at liberty to order for a full trial. In the instant case, the learned trial Judge in his wisdom decided to listen to the prosecutor. At page 16 of the record of this appeal, after recording the appearance of the accused and Learned Counsel for the respondent herein, the court went on to enumerate the items that were admitted as exhibit at the last adjourned date. The enumeration continued to page 16. At the end of the enumeration, the court stated thus:-
“The accused admits being the owner of all the exhibits and making the statement to NDLEA. Counsel urged the court to convict the accused as charged. Accused is convicted as charge.”
The record of appeal is not bulky and the proceeding of the court is short. I have read through the proceedings and there is nowhere where the appellant admitted ownership of all the exhibits. The proceedings in which some items were admitted as exhibits A – F is at page 14. Nether the prosecutor nor any independent witness was recorded as having tendered the exhibits in evidence and accused was called upon to react to the application to tender those items in evidence. Nobody was recorded as having interpreted the proceedings at pages 15 and 16 of the printed record of Appeal. Although it could be argued that since an interpreter was provided on the first day the appellant was arraigned, there is a presumption that the same interpreter was present throughout from the beginning to the end of the case on the authority of Anyanwu v. The State [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt 783) 107. The position in the instant case is different from the position in Anyanwu v. The State [supra]. In that case the interpreter was the court clerk who in absence of any reason was bound to be in court. The interpreter in the present case is a staff of NDLEA, who was procured only after several adjournment. Also in the case of Anyanwu [supra] the matter progressed to full trial where witnesses were called and as the case progressed, it was found that the accused could speak
English. In the instant matter, such opportunity was not created for the court to look at the record as a whole to find out whether the appellant understood every proceeding, especially as the Appellants direct utterances were not recorded. It is therefore my firm view that the trial at the lower court did not meet the standard of trial in a criminal case. The failure of the prosecution to make available the scientific analysis of the alleged Indian hemp to the appellant is fatal to the prosecutions case. This is so because the Appellant is illiterate and does not have the capacity to know that he could have demanded for the materials to prepare his case.
The only document that tend to show that the appellant admitted possession of the Indian hemp is his alleged statement to the NDLEA which was admitted and marked exhibit F. That exhibit which is at pages 2 and 3 of the record of appeal did not provide the name of the person that interpreted the statement of the Appellant from Hausa to English and vice versa. The exhibit was recorded by one B.G. Jabo who did not state whether he was also the interpreter. There is no evidence that the statement was tendered in court by B.G. Jabo who would have taken the opportunity to state clearly whether he is also the interpreter. Now the law is settled that where an interpreter has had to be used in the taking down of a statement, that statement is inadmissible unless the person who interpreted it is called as a witness as well as the person who wrote it down. This is so because such statement is hearsay and can only be confirmed by the interpreter who must testify as to the questions he put to the accused on behalf of the interviewer and the answers given to him by the accused person in the latter’s language which he interpreted to the interviewers in English Language.
In R v. Ogbuewu 12 WACA 483, the West African Court of Appeal held as follows:
“It often happens that statements have to be made to the police through an illiterate interpreter and so cannot be written down in the language in which made. What this court has said, as have other courts also on innumerable occasions is that, where an interpreter has had to be used in the taking down of a statement, the statement is in admissible unless the person who interpreted it is called as a witness as well as the person who wrote it down.”
In Nwaeze v. The State [1996] 2 NWLR (pt 428) 1 at 20 paragraph G-H, the supreme court per Iguh JSC restated the principle in R v Ogbuewu [supra] in the following words:-
“The point cannot be over emphasized that where an interpreter is used in the recording of the statement of an accused person, such a statement is in law inadmissible unless the person who was used in the interpretation of the statement is called as a witness in the proceedings as well as the person who recorded same. Accordingly failure on the part of a trial court to appreciate the inadmissibility in evidence of an alleged statement by an accused person when such statement is not confirmed and established by that person who acted as interpreter when it was being recorded in a different language can be fatal to a conviction which is based on such a statement in that the court would have misdirected itself in accepting the statement as having been proved.”See R v. Gidado 6 WACA 60, R. v. Eakwah=Kwa [1960] 5 FSC 12.
In the instant appeal, it is very clear that the plea of the Appellant is not clearly written in his words. It follows therefore that there is no evidence that the Appellant pleaded guilty. There is a clear indication in the record that the Appellant does not understand English language in which his statement exhibit F was written. An interpreter was used in recording the statement. The name of the interpreter is not disclosed in the statement and neither the interpreter nor the police officer who recorded the statement was called as a witness before same was admitted in evidence. The procedure adopted by the lower court is in breach of the provision of S.36 [6] of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the appellant was not given a fair hearing throughout the trial. The error committed by the trial court goes to the root of the principle of fair hearing and therefore fatal to the prosecution’s case.
For reasons I have given here, this issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant and the ground of appeal upon which it is formulated is hereby allowed.
The 3rd issue for determination of this appeal is whether the non interpretation to the Appellant of substantial part of the proceedings of the trial in the court below was not unconstitutional. This issue is formulated from grounds 11, 12, 13, 14 in the notice of appeal.
In my consideration of the previous issues I had clearly distinguished the case of Anyanwu v. The State [supra] from the instant case. In that case the interpreter was the court clerk who apart from any contrary evidence, was always in court. In the instant case the interpreter is a staff of the NDLEA. It was because of his absence that the plea of the Appellant could not be taken until after several adjournments. The presumption therefore was that he was always at his duty post. For that reason it was mandatory for the court to record his presence as interpreter each time he appeared as it was possible to use other person as interpreter. The failure of the court to record on the subsequent days that there was interpreter in court has given rise to the conclusion that the proceeding at page 15-16 of the record were not interpreted to the Appellant. This procedure also offends section 36(6) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria and so, I hold. On this premise this issue is also resolved in favour of the Appellant.
The grounds upon which it is formulated are hereby allowed.
Having resolved all the issues in favour of the Appellant, this appeal shall be and it is hereby allowed.
The Appellant is hereby discharged and acquitted.

M. DATTIJO MUHAMMAD,J.C.A: I have read before now the lead judgment of my learned brother GALINJE JCA; I have nothing useful, beyond his lordship’s reasonings and conclusion, to state. I agree entirely that this appeal has merits and also allow same. I abide by the consequential orders decreed in the lead judgment.

T. O. AWOTOYE J.C.A.: I had a preview of the draft of the judgment just read by my learned brother P.A. GALINJE JCA.
I completely agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein.
In a criminal trial, the standard of proof is always beyond reasonable doubt, the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty notwithstanding. If there is reasonable doubt it must be resolved in favour of the accused. See IGABELE V. THE STATE (2006) 6 NWLR (PT. 975) 100, OZAKI V. THE STATE 1990) ALL NLR 94. I am of the respectful view that where an accused pleads guilty but some circumstance indicates otherwise it is safe to record the plea of not guilty for him and allow the matter to proceed to trial. This does not amount to an acquittal of the accused. It rather ensures that an innocent man is not unjustifiably sent to jail. The delay caused in ascertaining the truth or guilt of the accused is justifiable as it is a step is the interest of justice.
I am also of the view that court proceedings are not magical.
The court record must be explicit enough to reflect what transpired during the proceeding. There should be no cause to speculate as to what transpired.
It must in my view be clear from the record, notwithstanding that the accused pleads guilty, that the accused is informed of the details of the nature of the offence and given facilities for the preparation of his defence. See section 36(6)(a) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) 2011 it reads:-
“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to.
(a) Be informed promptly in the language that he understands and is detail of the nature of the offence.
(b) Be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.”
It does not appear to me that this has been done in this case; at least this is not reflected in the court record.
On the day of arraignment on 1/12/2008, the court recorded the accused to have said that the owner of the Indian Hemp was Dabiru Dan Mallam who lived at Obigbo Rivers State and that he could identify him. This to my mind is a clear retraction of the plea of guilty earlier made by the accused. The learned trial judge, with due respect should have entered a plea of not guilty for him and fix a date for hearing. Rather his Lordship ordered that the said Dabiru Dan Mallam be produced in court to explain who owned the Indian Hemp. This order was clearly not complied with on the return date before the learned trial judge proceeded to convict the accused and sentence him.
The above I am convinced has vitiated the proceedings.
I also hold that this appeal succeeds for the reasons ably stated by learned brother P.A. GALINJE JCA and the above reasons.
I hereby allow the appeal and order that the judgment conviction and sentence of the appellant be set aside.