MALEEK ATANDA KAZEEM V. THE STATE
(2011)LCN/4873(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 3rd day of November, 2011
CA/IL/C.4/2009
RATIO
NOTICE OF APPEAL: WHETHER THE SIGNING OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL IN A CRIMINAL APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT PERSONALLY CAN BE WAIVED OR COMPROMISED
The signing of a notice of appeal in a criminal appeal by the appellant himself is always treated as a fundamental issue of jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or compromised by the parties-see Uwazurike and Ors v. The Attorney – General of the Federation (2007) 8 NWLR (pt. 1035) page 1 at page 17 thus: “It must be borne in mind always and this is also settled that a notice of appeal is the foundation and substratum of every appeal. Any defect thereto or therein will render the whole appeal incompetent and the appellate court will lack the required jurisdiction to entertain it.” Further, in the Uwazurike and others v. The Attorney – General of the Federation case (supra), the notice of appeal in the criminal appeal was signed by appellant’s learned counsel and, the Supreme Court (per the lead judgment of Ogbuagu, J.S.C.) held in respect, of the same statutory provision at pages 13-15 of the Law Report that: “It is worse if the notice of appeal is signed by the learned counsel for the appellant or appellants’ (as is/was the case in the notice of appeal leading to the instant appeal). The statutory provision is that every notice of appeal shall be signed by the appellant himself and no other (including counsel). Period! The provision is not only clear and unambiguous but it is mandatory. This is not one of the exceptions in sub-rules (5) and (6) of the Rules … There is no evidence or averment in any of the affidavits of the appellants that their counsel was unable to have access to them … In the recent case of The State v. Jammal (1996) 9 NWLR (pt. 473) 394 at 399 C.A., it was held that the Court of Appeal ought to take judicial notice of the fact and law, that a notice of appeal in a criminal appeal fired in the lower or trial court which was signed by a counsel for the appellant instead of the appellant himself is defective by virtue of order 4 Rule 4 (1) of the court of Appeal Rules, 1981. That the provisions are clear, unambiguous and mandatory. That the notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant himself and not by his counsel. In the recent case of Dr. Femi Adekanye and 2 ors v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005) 15 NWLR (pt. 949) 433 at 454-456 also referred to by the court below, the above cases were referred to and followed. In effect, it is now beyond doubt, argument or speculation that: i. the provision of order 4 Rule 4 (1) of the said Rules (the same as order 17 Rule 4 (1) of the Rules of this court) is not one of the exceptions under sub-rules 4 (5) and (6) of the Rules; ii. that the provision is clear, unambiguous and mandatory; iii. that Rules of court prima facie must be obeyed in compliance and not in breach; iv. that failure to comply with the provisions of the court of Appeal Rules will render the notice of appeal filed fundamentally defective and incompetent and therefore liable to be struck out; v. that the said Rules do not permit the filing of a joint notice of appeal nor the signing of such notice by counsel for the appellants…” See also the case of Umaru Cham v. Gombe Native Authority (1964) N.N.L.R 94 at 95-96 where the Supreme Court, in construing a similar statutory provision, held inter aria that: “Order 8, Rule 4, of the Federal Supreme Court Rules provides that except where a corporation wishes to appeal , or where a question as to the sanity of a convicted person is involved, a notice of appeal in a criminal matter shall be signed by the appellant personally. We were asked to hold that the court had power to waive this requirement either under Order 1, rule 5, or under Order 9, but without deciding that there are no circumstances in which the requirement may be waived, we do not consider that any such circumstances exist in the present case. There are good reasons for insisting that a notice of appeal should be signed by the convicted person himself. He may believe that an appeal would be hopeless and be unwilling to suffer the suspense of waiting for it to be determined. In a non-capital case, he may fear that he would fare worse is a retrial was ordered, and in the case of an appeal against sentence, he may not wish to take the risk of having the sentence increased. He may recognize that he has done wrong and feel that he can best expiate his wrong-doing by undergoing the sentence passed on him.” (My emphasis). See again the cases of State v. Jammal (supra) and Adekanye v. FRN (supra) cited by Mr. Mumini (learned DPP of Kwara State) for the respondent. PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: EFFECT OF THE SUCCESS OF A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
Having sustained the preliminary objection to the competence of the notice of appeal, there is no need to go further to consider the arguments on the substantive appeal – See once more Uwazurike and Ors v. The Attorney – General of the Federation (supra) at page 18 as follows: “Thus, where a preliminary objection to an appeal succeeds, there would be no need to go further to consider the arguments in support of the issues for determination, see Bright Onyemeh and Ors. V. Lambert Egbuchulam & Ors. (1996) 5 NWLR (pt. 448) 255 at 268, 269; NEPA v. Ango (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 737) 627 at 645-646… PER JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.
TRIAL – WITHIN – TRIAL: WHEN CAN A TRIAL – WITHIN – TRIAL BE CONDUCTED
…as trial – within – trial can only be conducted at the point of admission of the statement complained of. See the case of ALARAPE V. THE STATE (2001) FWLR (pt.41) 1895. PER TIJJANI ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.
JUSTICE
TIJJANI ABDULLAHI (PJ) Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MALEEK ATANDA KAZEEM – Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE – Respondent(s)
The appellant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to ten (10) years imprisonment by the High Court of Justice of Kwara State sitting at Ilorin (the court below) for the offence of belonging to, or engaging in, or associating with a secret cult or society called the Eiye confraternity under sections 7 (1) (2) and 11 (1) of the Secret Cults and Secret Societies in Educational Institutions (Prohibition) Law (CAP. 53), contained in volume 4 of the Laws of Kwara State, with commencement date on 23/4/04; giving rise to the present appeal.
Sketchily stated, the appellant was at all material times a student of Physical and Health Education at the University of Ilorin in Kwara State. He was arrested on accusation of robbing a female student of the same university of a mobile phone (hand-set) at gun point in the night of 18.6.04. In the course of police investigation, the appellant confessed his membership of a secret cult or society called the Eiye Confraternity with operational base in the said university.
The appellant was, subsequently, put on trial for the offences of armed robbery and belonging to a secret cult or society. The offence of armed robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It collapsed. Appellant was acquitted and discharged of it. However, the court below relied on the confessional statements of the appellant to convict and sentence him on 19.8.05, for the offence of membership of a secret society or cult named the Eiye confraternity.
The appellant could not appeal within the statutory period. He sought for an extension of time to appeal on a motion dated and filed on his behalf by his learned counsel on 4.2.08, which was granted by this court on 2.3.09, and the notice of appeal conveying two grounds of appeal was deemed filed on the same 2.3.09. Three issues for determination were formulated from the two grounds of appeal. When the attention of the appellant’s learned counsel, Mr. Sulu-Gambari, was drawn to the impropriety of formulating issues for determination in excess of the grounds of appeal, on the hearing of the appeal on 10.10.2011, appellant’s learned counsel took the hint and abandoned issue C of the issues for determination which was struck out in consequence.
The survived issues (A) and (B) of the appellant’s issues for determination are, for ease of reference, reproduced below:
“ISSUE A:-
Was the Trial Judge right and not in grave error leading to miscarriage of justice by his refusal to conduct trial within trial on the alleged statements of the appellant before making use of same to arrive at his judgment.
ISSUE B:-
Was the trial judge right and not in grave error to have denied the Appellant the right of fair hearing when he refused to conduct trial within trial before arriving at his judgment.”
The above issues for determination were not tied to the grounds of appeal. They were, contrary to established practice, argued in seamless manner in the appellant’s brief of argument, which was formally adopted by his learned counsel on 10.10.11, as his arguments on the appeal.
It was contended on issue A that the appellant, acting through his learned counsel, challenged the voluntariness of the confessional statements of the appellant to the police when they were sought to be put in evidence by the respondent in the court below with the rider that the involuntariness of the statements shall be raised during the defence of the appellant.
It was also argued that the court below should have ignored or not accepted the invitation of appellant’s learned counsel to postpone the issue of resolving the voluntariness of the statements at the time they were tendered in evidence by the respondent to the defence stage of the case, as it was obliged to order a trial-within-trial at that stage of the proceedings to settle the issue of torture of the appellant by the police in extracting the statements from him vide Emeka v. The State (2001) 6 S.C.N.J. 259 at 267: and that the appellant’s sworn evidence showing he was tortured before the statements were obtained by the police was not discredited or cross-examined upon by the respondent and amounted to undenied facts or admissions, which the court below should have used in favour of the appellant and, having failed to do so, the decision it arrived at convicting the appellant on the said statements should not be allowed to stand.
It was contended on issue B that the failure of the court below to order a trial-within-trial in order to resolve the allegation by the appellant that he was tortured before the statements he was forced to make to the police were admitted in evidence as Exhibits C, C1, and C2 denied the appellant his constitutional right to fair hearing and amounted to great injustice as the statements were not corroborated by any other evidence; nor did the court below consider any other defences open to the appellant on the evidence before it, consequently the appellant’s appeal be allowed and his conviction and sentence by the court below should be quashed vide the cases of Ukwunnenji and Anor v. The State (1989) 7 S.C.N.J. 34, Ayo Gabriel v. The State (1989) 12 SCNJ 33, Samuel Ogele and Anor v. The State (1988) 2 S.C.N.J. 231 and Ubierno v. The State (2005) All F.W.L.R. (pt. 254) 804 at 812.
The learned Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of Kwara State, Mr. Mumini, settled the respondent’s brief of argument dated and filed on 15.3.2010, but deemed duly filed and served on 29.10.2010. The respondent’s brief commenced with a preliminary objection brought under Order 10 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2007 (the Rules of this Court). It has two limbs. The first limb attacked the competence of the notice of appeal on the ground that it was signed by the appellant’s learned counsel when the appellant, a natural person, was at all material times accessible to his counsel and could have signed the notice of appeal himself. Order 16 Rule 4 of the Rules of this Court and the cases of State v. Jamal (1996) 9 NWLR (pt. 473) 384 at 399 and Adekanye v. FRN (2005) NWLR (pt. 949) at 433 were cited in support of the preliminary objection to the effect that a notice of appeal in a criminal appeal signed by appellant’s counsel is incompetent.
The second arm of the preliminary objection attacked the appellant’s brief of argument predicated on the premise that, the issues for determination formulated therein in page 6 thereof exceeded the grounds of appeal making the brief grossly incompetent, citing in support the case of Amodu v. Commandant Police College (2009) All FWLR (pt. 488) 185 at 203.
Respondent’s brief argued on the merits of the appeal that appellant was given fair hearing by the court below and that the issue of the voluntariness of the confessional statements of the appellant to the police in Exhibits C, C1 and C2 were formally raised by the appellant in his evidence in defence and was evaluated by the court below in its judgment occasioning no miscarriage of justice, consequently the appeal should be dismissed following the cases of Alarape v. The State (2001) FWLR (pt. 41) 1895) and Amanchukwu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) All FWLR (pt. 465) 1672 at 1669.
A reply brief of argument dated 10.5.2010 and filed on 28.9.2010, contended that the proviso to Order 16 Rule 4 (1) of the Rules of this Court enjoins the Court in the interest of justice and for good and sufficient cause to entertain an appeal signed by appellant’s counsel, if satisfied that the appellant exhibited a clear intention to appeal to the Court against the decision of the court below, which the appellant exhibited by briefing counsel to appeal out of time without objection from the respondent in the instant matter; and the respondent should not be heard to object to the competence of the appeal at this stage of the proceedings.
The reply brief reiterated that the involuntariness of the appellant’s statements to the police in Exhibits C, C1 and C2 was tentatively raised at the time the statements were tendered in evidence by the respondent, obligating the court below to have ordered a trial-within-trial to ascertain the voluntariness of the statements before it admitted them in evidence as Exhibits, without the court below paying due regard to the fact that the statements were not endorsed by a superior police officer; and that there was no shred of evidence from the respondent’s witnesses in proof of the offence charged to warrant appellant’s conviction by the court below.
The second arm of the preliminary objection on the proliferation of issues for determination by the appellant was conceded to, with demure, by appellant’s learned counsel at the hearing of the appeal on 10.10.011, and was on that account dealt with on the spot by the court by striking out issue C of the appellant’s issues for determination at the instance of the appellant’s learned counsel.
The first arm of the preliminary objection on the competence of the notice of appeal deserves consideration anon. It is necessary to reproduce the notice and grounds of appeal for the purpose of appreciating the ambit of the preliminary objection.
The said notice and grounds of appeal read:
“Take notice that appellant being dissatisfied with the decision/conviction delivered on the 19th day of August, 2005 by Hon. Justice M.A. Folayan sitting at Ilorin High Court of Kwara State hereby appeal to the Court of Appeal upon the ground(s) set out in paragraph 3 and will at the hearing or the appeal seek the relief(s) set out in paragraph 4 below.
AND the Appellant further states that the name and address of the person directly affected by the appeal are those set out in paragraph 5.
2. PART OF THE DECISION COMPLAINED AGAINST
The conviction on count 4 of the charge.
3. GROUND(S) OF APPEAL
1. The trial Judge erred in law and misdirected himself when he held thus:
That the Accused has not alleged any form of threat or force in the taking of his statement by the police.
PARTICULARS
1.1 The accused gave evidence to the fact that he was tortured and hang and that the statement was given to him to sign by the police.
1.2 The prosecution did not deny the statement but solely rely on Exhibit ‘C’ as their case against the accused.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law and misdirected himself when he held thus:
“It is not necessary to have a trial within trial”
PARTICULARS:-
2.1 The accused vehemently denied making a voluntary statement and maintained that he was tortured.
2.2 The accused statement was not made by him personally but by a police officer investigating a case of robbery.
3. The conviction of the accused is unreasonable and against the principle of fair hearing as enshrine in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
4. Additional grounds of appeal shall be filed upon receipt of the record of proceedings.
4. RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
Allow the appeal, set aside the conviction of the accused by the trial Court delivered on the 19th day of August, 2005 and discharge and acquit the accused accordingly.
PERSONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE APPEAL
NAME ADDRESS
THE STATE The Director of public prosecution
Kwara State Ministry of Justice.
Ilorin.
DATED THIS 4TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2008.
A.H. Sulu Gambari Esq.
Legal practitioner for the Appellant,
Bawa-Alla Chambers,
55, Amilegbe Street, Ilorin.”
Undoubtedly, the notice of appeal with the grounds of appeal (supra) was signed by “A.H. Sulu Gambari Esq., Legal Practitioner for the Appellant, Bawa-Allah Chambers, 55 Amilegbe Street, Ilorin;” not by the appellant in person contrary to Order 17 Rule 4 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011, (formerly Order 16 Rule 4 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2007 relied upon by the respondent’s learned counsel), which provides:
“Every notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal or notice of application for extension of time within which such notice shall be given, shall be signed by the Appellant himself, except under the provision of sub-rules (5) and (6) of this Rule.”
The sub-rules (5) and (6) of Order 17 of the Rules of this Court stipulate:
“5. Where on the trial of a person entitled to appeal it has been contended that he was not responsible according to law for his actions on the ground that he was insane at the time the act was done or the omission made by him or that at the time of the trial he was of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, any notice required to be given and signed by the Appellant himself may be given and signed by his legal representative.
6. In the case of a body corporate where any notice or other document is required to be signed by the Appellant himself, it shall be sufficient compliance therewith if such notice or other document assigned by the secretary, clerk, manager or legal representative of such body corporate.”
But the appellant, a natural person of sound mind at all material times, cannot derive benefit from the above sub-rules (5) and (6) of Order 16 (now 17) of the Rules of this court, as the said sub-rules do not apply to him, in my view. The appellant was, therefore, obliged by Order 16 (now 17) Rule 4 (1) of the Rules of this Court (supra) to sign the notice of appeal personally, not by Proxy through his learned counsel; as there was no evidence that he was incommunicado at the material time, as to hinder his learned counsel’s access to him to sign the notice of appeal himself.
The signing of a notice of appeal in a criminal appeal by the appellant himself is always treated as a fundamental issue of jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or compromised by the parties-see Uwazurike and Ors v. The Attorney – General of the Federation (2007) 8 NWLR (pt. 1035) page 1 at page 17 thus:
“It must be borne in mind always and this is also settled that a notice of appeal is the foundation and substratum of every appeal. Any defect thereto or therein will render the whole appeal incompetent and the appellate court will lack the required jurisdiction to entertain it.”
Further, in the Uwazurike and others v. The Attorney – General of the Federation case (supra), the notice of appeal in the criminal appeal was signed by appellant’s learned counsel and, the Supreme Court (per the lead judgment of Ogbuagu, J.S.C.) held in respect, of the same statutory provision at pages 13-15 of the Law Report that:
“It is worse if the notice of appeal is signed by the learned counsel for the appellant or appellants’ (as is/was the case in the notice of appeal leading to the instant appeal). The statutory provision is that every notice of appeal shall be signed by the appellant himself and no other (including counsel). Period! The provision is not only clear and unambiguous but it is mandatory. This is not one of the exceptions in sub-rules (5) and (6) of the Rules … There is no evidence or averment in any of the affidavits of the appellants that their counsel was unable to have access to them …
In the recent case of The State v. Jammal (1996) 9 NWLR (pt. 473) 394 at 399 C.A., it was held that the Court of Appeal ought to take judicial notice of the fact and law, that a notice of appeal in a criminal appeal fired in the lower or trial court which was signed by a counsel for the appellant instead of the appellant himself is defective by virtue of order 4 Rule 4 (1) of the court of Appeal Rules, 1981. That the provisions are clear, unambiguous and mandatory. That the notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant himself and not by his counsel.
In the recent case of Dr. Femi Adekanye and 2 ors v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005) 15 NWLR (pt. 949) 433 at 454-456 also referred to by the court below, the above cases were referred to and followed. In effect, it is now beyond doubt, argument or speculation that:
i. the provision of order 4 Rule 4 (1) of the said Rules (the same as order 17 Rule 4 (1) of the Rules of this court) is not one of the exceptions under sub-rules 4 (5) and (6) of the Rules;
ii. that the provision is clear, unambiguous and mandatory;
iii. that Rules of court prima facie must be obeyed in compliance and not in breach;
iv. that failure to comply with the provisions of the court of Appeal Rules will render the notice of appeal filed fundamentally defective and incompetent and therefore liable to be struck out;
v. that the said Rules do not permit the filing of a joint notice of appeal nor the signing of such notice by counsel for the appellants…”
See also the case of Umaru Cham v. Gombe Native Authority (1964) N.N.L.R 94 at 95-96 where the Supreme Court, in construing a similar statutory provision, held inter aria that:
“Order 8, Rule 4, of the Federal Supreme Court Rules provides that except where a corporation wishes to appeal , or where a question as to the sanity of a convicted person is involved, a notice of appeal in a criminal matter shall be signed by the appellant personally. We were asked to hold that the court had power to waive this requirement either under Order 1, rule 5, or under Order 9, but without deciding that there are no circumstances in which the requirement may be waived, we do not consider that any such circumstances exist in the present case. There are good reasons for insisting that a notice of appeal should be signed by the convicted person himself. He may believe that an appeal would be hopeless and be unwilling to suffer the suspense of waiting for it to be determined. In a non-capital case, he may fear that he would fare worse is a retrial was ordered, and in the case of an appeal against sentence, he may not wish to take the risk of having the sentence increased. He may recognize that he has done wrong and feel that he can best expiate his wrong-doing by undergoing the sentence passed on him.” (My emphasis).
See again the cases of State v. Jammal (supra) and Adekanye v. FRN (supra) cited by Mr. Mumini (learned DPP of Kwara State) for the respondent.
The net result is that the preliminary objection to the competence of the notice of appeal is meritorious and is hereby upheld. Having sustained the preliminary objection to the competence of the notice of appeal, there is no need to go further to consider the arguments on the substantive appeal – See once more Uwazurike and Ors v. The Attorney – General of the Federation (supra) at page 18 as follows:
“Thus, where a preliminary objection to an appeal succeeds, there would be no need to go further to consider the arguments in support of the issues for determination, see Bright Onyemeh and Ors. V. Lambert Egbuchulam & Ors. (1996) 5 NWLR (pt. 448) 255 at 268, 269; NEPA v. Ango (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 737) 627 at 645-646…”The notice of appeal is, accordingly, struck out on ground of incompetence and/or fundamental defect earlier high-lighted in this discourse. The appeal itself is, also, hereby struck out in consequence – see Hambe & Anor v. Hueze and ors (2001) 4 NWLR (pt. 703) 372, Shelim and another v. Gobang (2009) 12 NWLR (pt. 1156) 435 at 460 (alphabet C). So much on the appeal.
TIJJANI ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, J.S. IKYEGH, J.C.A just delivered in this appeal and I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
It is now settled beyond peradventure that the notice of appeal in criminal matters must be signed by the Appellant himself save as provided under Order 17 Rule 4(1) sub-rules (5) and (6) of the Rules of this Court.
It is my considered view that although in the interest of justice and for good and sufficient cause shown the court can entertain an appeal if satisfied that an intending Appellant has established a clear intention to appeal against the decision of the lower court, the circumstances in this appeal are quite different from the scenario adumbrated above. This is so because; firstly, the Appellant has not shown good and sufficient cause why he has refused to enter an appeal by signing the notice of appeal therein.
Secondly, the affidavit in support of motion upon which the notice of appeal was deemed filed and served by this Court showed clearly that Counsel had unrestrained access to the Appellant sufficient to have allowed the Appellant sign the notice of appeal.
Thirdly, the affidavit in support of the motion upon which the notice of appeal was deemed filed and served did not state any reason whatsoever talkless of showing good and sufficient course why he did not enter an appeal.
For these reasons and the more detailed ones ably stated in the lead judgment of my learned brother, I too uphold the preliminary objection of the Respondent and strike out both the notice of appeal and the appeal itself for being incompetent.
ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Ikyegh JCA. I agree with him completely that the Appeal is incompetent, by reason of the flaws made by the Appellant Counsel.
Many things were wrong, not only with the way Counsel for the Appellant handled this Appeal, but also with the way the Counsel at the Lower Court defended the Appellant at the Court below, as even the allegation that the learned Trial Judge failed to conduct a trial-within-trial was rather the failure of the defence Counsel, who mere alleged, at the time of tendering the Appellant’s confessional statements, that the same were made under duress (as if he was a witness in the case) but shifted attack thereof to the defence stage!
On page 14, lines 21 to 26 of Record, the learned Counsel for the Accused (Mr. Gegele) told the Court (when the Court called his attention to the application to admit the Appellant’s confession statements):
“Although the accused says the statements were obtained under duress, beaten up by the police and hanged before he made the statement, but in order that the case may be disposed of on time, we shall not at this stage be objecting its being admitted. We can raise this during the evidence for defence”.
Of course that was a fatal error as trial – within – trial can only be conducted at the point of admission of the statement complained of. See the case of ALARAPE V. THE STATE (2001) FWLR (pt.41) 1895.
The Appellant’s Counsel had no business signing the Notice and Grounds of Appeal meant for the Appellant to sign or endorse, personally, pursuant to Order 16 (now 17) Rule 4 (1) of the Rules of this Court. For this reason and the more elaborate reasons stated in the lead judgment by my learned brother, Ikyegh J.C.A, I too strike out the Appeal and abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
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Appearances
MR A.H SULU GAMBARIFor Appellant
AND
MR J. A. MUMINI (DPP, KWARA STATE)For Respondent
