CIJEYU OJONG v. CHRISTOPHER SUNNY ETA & ORS
(2011)LCN/4821(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 7th day of October, 2011
CA/C/NAEA/219/2011
RATIO
ELECTION PETITIONS: THE PECULIAR NATURE OF THE ELECTION PETITIONS
I have taken into consideration the fact that election petitions are by their very nature neither criminal nor ordinary civil proceedings hence they are referred to as “sui generis” which means, “of its own kind; the only one of its kind.” See Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 9th edition p.367 and Abubakar vs INEC (2004) 1 NWLR (pt.854) 207; Jemide vs Harriman (2004) All FWLR (Pt.233) 1765 at 1778 and Buhari vs Yusuf (2003) FWLR (Pt. 174) 329. For instance in Buhari vs INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 380 paragraph “A-B” Niki Tobi, JSC, held that: “…The whole concept of election petitions being sui generis, in my view, is to project the peculiarity of the petition in terms of the reliefs sought, the time element and the peculiar procedure adopted for the hearing of the petition and all that. The Practice Directions, 2007 is a classic example of referring to election petitions as sui generis. No single section of the Act or paragraph of the Schedule to the Act can qualify for the latinism, sui generis. It is the total jurisprudence of election that is sui generis, not a section of the Act or Schedule to the Act. ” For this reason the legislature has made special provisions to regulate proceedings before Election Tribunals based on their special jurisdiction. The procedure laid down for determining petitions before the Tribunals should be strictly observed and complied with. This ensures speedy trial. Secondly, much as possible, the petitions are to be heard on the merit. See Ajadi vs Ajibola (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.898) 91 at 174 paragraph A-D. PER JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION: WHETHER A PETITIONER CAN SHROUD THE IDENTITY OF HIS WITNESSESS IN INITIALS OR ALPHABETS HE INTENDED TO CALL AT THE TRIBUNAL
In this appeal the petitioner included a list of the witnesses he intended calling at the Tribunal to prove his petition supported by copies or the list of the documents to be relied upon at the hearing. The written statements were on oath. They contained the evidence the petitioner shall rely upon at the hearing. The identity of the witnesses is shrouded in initials or alphabets in compliance with paragraph 1 and 2 of the Practice Directions, 2011. My Lord, Akeju, JCA, held in Ballantyne vs Ayi supra at page 26-27 as follows: “The appellant in this appeal argued that he applied the concept of using initials or alphabets to denote his witnesses so as to hide their true identities and thereby prevent them from possible attack. That idea is neither novel nor unlawful. That was the purport of the amendment of the Election Tribunal and Practice Directions, 2007 by the Amendment Directions, 2007 and in the case of Abubakar vs Yar’Adua (2008) 19 NWLR (pt.1120), 2009 All FWLR (pt459) I, Niki Tobi, JSC, reiterated his position in Buhari vs INEC (supra) in the following words at page 159 of the NWLR report: “What is the intendment of the amendment? The intendment of the President of the Court of Appeal in the amendment, in my humble view is to protect the witnesses from possible attack by the opposite party. This is a valid reason and I commend the amendment which for all intents and purposes did not defeat the administration of justice. Considering the volatile nature of Nigerians, in matters of party politics propelled by their do or die attitude, there is real need to protect the witnesses. All the parties know, including the appellants behind the letters of the English alphabets are the deponents. All the parties know, including the appellants that the letters of the English alphabets had not the brain and human mind and automation to swear to affidavit and so it is more of a caricature than anything real. Why the furore? I regard the issue as arid legalism and mere technicality in relation to the alleged conflict between the Practice Directions and the Evidence Act. The issue fails.” PER JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A.
PRE-HEARING SESSION: WHAT ARE THE MATTERS TO BE DETERMINED AT THE PRE-HEARING SESSION
The admission of documents and facts, hearing and determination of objections on points of law; inspection and production of documents, etc, are matters to be determined at the pre-hearing session. see paragraph 18(6) (a)-(f); 7(a)-(i) and 8(a) and (b) of the 1st schedule to the Electoral Act No.6 of 2010 as amended. PER JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH TINE TUR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
CIJEYU OJONG Appellant(s)
AND
1. CHRISTOPHER SUNNY ETA
2. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
3. THE RESIDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER, CROSS RIVER STATE Respondent(s)
JOSEPH TINE TUR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant contested election into the National Assembly to represent Ikom/Boki Federal Constituency in Cross-River State under the platform of the Action Congress of Nigeria on 9th April, 2011 but lost to 1st Respondent of the Peoples Democratic Party. The Appellant polled 11,780 votes against 40,515 votes polled by the 1st Respondent who was duly declared elected by the 2nd Respondent and 3rd Respondents. Other contestants and their votes were Stanislaus Afu of the All Nigeria Peoples Party – 3,555 votes; Sophia Ajrja Ewa of the ALP – 11,217 votes. Being aggrieved by the declaration the appellant presented a petition before the National and Legislative House of Assembly Election Petition Tribunal holden in Calabar, Cross-River State on 29-04-2011 on the following grounds:
“(i) The election in Ikom/Boki Federal Constituency was invalid by reason of corrupt practices and/or non-compliance with the provisions of Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).
(ii) 1st Respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes.”
Upon service of the petition the 1st Respondent filed Reply on 20-06-2011. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents did so on 16-06-2011. On 03-08-2011 the 1st Respondent came by way of preliminary objection seeking that the petition be dismissed on several grounds. Arguments were taken. The Tribunal dismissed some grounds but granted relief to the Respondents as follows:
“The deposition of the petitioner’s witness whose name is represented by the letter”CO” clearly offends Section 90(b) of the Evidence Act which requires every affidavit, which a deposition is, to contain the full names of the deponent among other requirements.
This conclusion enjoys the blessing of the Supreme Court in BUHARI VS INEC.
The deposition of the Petitioner, however, bears his full names and describes his trade or profession as politician. The 7th Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines politics as:
” …the activity or profession of engaging in political affairs. ”
In this light we define a politician as one whose profession is politics. Accordingly the deposition of the Petitioner is in consonance with Section 90(b) of the Evidence Act.
Paragraphs 5-66 of the Petitioner’s deposition are information which the deponent avers he got from his agents. The paragraphs form the core of the deposition. The deponent has not stated the names of his informants and the circumstances forming the basses of his believe in the information given to him.
Paragraphs 5-66 of the deposition are therefore defective for failing to provide the information relating to the names of the informants and the bases of believing the information they offered as required by Sections 86,88 and 89 of the Evidence Act. (See BUHARI VS INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (PART 1120) 240.
We have to deal with these issues of law raised at this or any stage of the proceedings despite any number of steps taken by the applicant and inspite of the fact, that the objections are not embedded in the applicant’s pleadings. The authorities are legion that there is no limitation to the time and venue for raising issues relating to law.
In view of our findings we conclude that there are no valid depositions accompanying this petition us required by paragraph 4(5) of the 1n Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 which renders the petition incompetent and liable to be dismiss and same is, accordingly, dismissed. ”
See page 282 lines 6 to 25 and page 283 lines 1-13 of the printed record.
Two grounds accompanied the Notice of Appeal filed on 30-08-2011. When the appeal came up for hearing on the 05-10-2011 learned Counsel adopted their respective briefs of arguments and the issues for determination. The appellant identified two issues for determination in the brief of argument filed on 15-09-2011 to wit:
“1. Whether the lower Tribunal was right in striking out the petitioner’s witness statement on Oath for using alphabets to represent his name in compliance with the Election Tribunal and court Practice Direction, 2011? (Ground 1).
2. whether the lower Tribunal was right in striking out the petitioner’s statement on oath for alleged infringement of Section 86, 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act. (Ground 2).”
The 1st Respondent distilled the following two issues from the brief of Argument filed on 21-09/2011:
“1. Whether the learned Judges of the Election Tribunal were right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant’s witness’s deposition which is represented by alphabets offends Section 90(b)of the Evidence Act.
2. Whether the learned Judges of the Election Tribunal were right in striking out certain paragraphs of the petitioner’s written deposition on the ground that they offend sections 86, 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act. ”
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents formulated the following issues for determination:
“1. Whether the lower Tribunal was right in striking out the Petitioner’s witnesses statement on Oath for using alphabet to represent his name in compliance with the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Direction, 2011.
2. Whether the lower Tribunal was right in striking out the Petitioner’s Statement on Oath for alleged infringement of Sections 86, 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act.”
ISSUE ONE: APPELLANT
On issue one learned Counsel to the Appellant cited the Court of Appeal Judgment in Ballantyne vs Ayi (unreported) in Suit No.CA/C/NAEA/164/2011 delivered on, 19-08-2011 by my learned brother Akeju, JCA, of the Court of Appeal, Calabar Division Cross River State where reference was made to Abubakar vs Yar’Adua (2009) All FWLR (Pt.459) 1 to the effect that by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Election Petitions and Court Practice Directions, 2011 the parties had the option of employing alphabets or initials to protect the identity of their witnesses. Learned Counsel urged this Court to allow the appeal.
ISSUE TWO:
Counsel drew this Court’s attention to paragraphs 86-89 of the Evidence Act, 2004 and submitted that there is a wall of difference between an affidavit and a deposition hence the Tribunal should not have struck out the depositions of the witnesses, citing Ballantyne vs Ayi supra as representing the correct position of the law, not as held by the Tribunal. Counsel urged that this appeal be allowed and the petition should be remitted to the Tribunal to be heard on the merit.
1ST RESPONDENT’S ISSUE ONE:
Counsel to the 1st Respondent examined the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 2004 the equivalent of Section 117(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel submitted that there is a wall of difference between the two provisions. Counsel argued that the Tribunal was right to have struck out the depositions of the witnesses for failing to state the full names of the deponents since the written depositions were akin to affidavits. Counsel made reference to Section 13 of the Oaths Act, Cap 01 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and the 1st Schedule thereto, citing Nkeiruka vs Joseph (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt.1135) 501 and a host of other judgments. Counsel’s further argument was that where there is a conflict between the Practice Directions and the Evidence Act, the Directions should give way, citing Buhari vs INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt.1120) 246 at 342 paragraphs “A-D” per Niki Tobi, JSC. Counsel however conceded that election petitions are sui generis hence special provisions have been made to govern election petition proceedings, citing Ajadi vs Ajibola (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt.898) 91 at 174 per Adekeye, JCA, (as he then was) and Buhari vs Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt.841) 446 at 498-499 paragraph “F-B”. Learned Counsel urged this Court to resolve issue one in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE TWO:
Learned Counsel drew this Court’s attention to Sections 86-89 of the Evidence Act, 2004 and paragraphs 5-66 of the petitioner’s witnesses’ depositions to show that the Tribunal was right to strike them out as hearsay evidence, citing Section 76 and 77 of the Evidence Act, 2004 now Section 125 and 126 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Having examined the depositions the learned Counsel urged this Court to uphold the ruling of the Tribunal and dismiss this appeal.
2nd – 3rd RESPONDENTS: ISSUE ONE
Learned Counsel’s main argument is that an affidavit and a deposition that does not comply with the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 2004 should be struck out. That there was no difference between an affidavit and a sworn deposition on Oath in this regard, citing the opinion of Niki Tobi, JSC, in Buhari vs INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 342 paragraph “A-D”.
Counsel argued that on the above authority the Tribunal could not have picked and chosen which paragraphs in the depositions were to be struck out or retained by the Tribunal. Counsel compared and contrasted Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2007 as amended with Election and Court Practice Directions’ 2010 and 2011 as amended with their accompanying schedules and submitted that they cannot amend the provisions of the Evidence Act or Oaths Act. counsel urged this court not to follow the judgment in Udeagha vs Omegara (2010) 11 NWLR (pt.1204) 1095 and Ballantyne vs Ayi (unreported) but to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE TWO:
Learned Counsel submitted that the failure to name the petitioner’s informants in the depositions offended the provisions of Sections 86, 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act, 2004. Reference was made to Josien Holdings Ltd vs Lornamead Ltd. (1995) 1 NWLR (pt.371) 254 at 265 paragraph “E-G” per Kutigi, JSC, (as he then was). Counsel urged that this appeal should be dismissed and the ruling of the Tribunal affirmed.
I shall consider all the issues raised by learned Counsel together in determining this appeal.
I have taken into consideration the fact that election petitions are by their very nature neither criminal nor ordinary civil proceedings hence they are referred to as “sui generis” which means, “of its own kind; the only one of its kind.”
See Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 9th edition p.367 and Abubakar vs INEC (2004) 1 NWLR (pt.854) 207; Jemide vs Harriman (2004) All FWLR (Pt.233) 1765 at 1778 and Buhari vs Yusuf (2003) FWLR (Pt. 174) 329. For instance in Buhari vs INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 380 paragraph “A-B” Niki Tobi, JSC, held that:
“…The whole concept of election petitions being sui generis, in my view, is to project the peculiarity of the petition in terms of the reliefs sought, the time element and the peculiar procedure adopted for the hearing of the petition and all that. The Practice Directions, 2007 is a classic example of referring to election petitions as sui generis. No single section of the Act or paragraph of the Schedule to the Act can qualify for the latinism, sui generis. It is the total jurisprudence of election that is sui generis, not a section of the Act or Schedule to the Act. ”
For this reason the legislature has made special provisions to regulate proceedings before Election Tribunals based on their special jurisdiction. The procedure laid down for determining petitions before the Tribunals should be strictly observed and complied with. This ensures speedy trial. Secondly, much as possible, the petitions are to be heard on the merit. See Ajadi vs Ajibola (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt.898) 91 at174 paragraph A-D”.
Section 145(1) and (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended provides as follows:
“145(1) The rules of procedure to be adopted for election petitions and appeals arising therefrom shall be as set out in the First Schedule to this Act.
(2) The President of the Court of Appeal may issue practice directions to election tribunals. ”
Paragraph 4(5) of the Rules of Procedure for Election Petitions 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended reads as follows:
“(5) The election petition shall be accompanied by:-
(a) a list of witnesses that the petitioner intends to call in proof of the petition;
(b) written statements on Oath of the witnesses; and
(c) copies or list of every documents to be relied upon at the hearing of the petition.
(6) A petition which fails to comply with sub-paragraph (5) of this paragraph shall not be accepted for filing by the Secretary.”
Strict compliance with the above provisions appeared to work hardship or difficulties on petitioners especially where they intended to shield the identity of their witnesses for security or safety purposes. That explains the reason the President of the Court Appeal issued the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2011. This came into effect on 1st April, 2011.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Practice Directions reads as follows:
“1. The list of witnesses referred to in paragraph 4(5)(a) of the First schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) shall be deemed complied with where the identify of the witnesses are represented by initials, alphabets or a combination of both.
2. The requirements of paragraph 4(5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), shall apply mutatis mutandis to a petitioner’s reply and the list of witnesses there shall also be deemed complied with where the identity of the witnesses are represented by initials, alphabets or a combination of both.”
In Buhari vs INEC supra Niki Tobi, JSC, held at page 343 paragraphs “A” to “B” that:
” …a Practice Direction declared by the President of the Court of Appeal qualifies as a rule of the Court. Order 19 rule 7 says so and very clearly too. That is also the decision of this Court in Abubakar vs Yar’Adua, (supra).”
In this appeal the petitioner included a list of the witnesses he intended calling at the Tribunal to prove his petition supported by copies or the list of the documents to be relied upon at the hearing.
The written statements were on oath. They contained the evidence the petitioner shall rely upon at the hearing. The identity of the witnesses is shrouded in initials or alphabets in compliance with paragraph 1 and 2 of the Practice Directions, 2011.
My Lord, Akeju, JCA, held in Ballantyne vs Ayi supra at page 26-27 as follows:
“The appellant in this appeal argued that he applied the concept of using initials or alphabets to denote his witnesses so as to hide their true identities and thereby prevent them from possible attack. That idea is neither novel nor unlawful. That was the purport of the amendment of the Election Tribunal and Practice Directions, 2007 by the Amendment Directions, 2007 and in the case of Abubakar vs Yar’Adua (2008) 19 NWLR (pt.1120), 2009 All FWLR (pt459) I, Niki Tobi, JSC, reiterated his position in Buhari vs INEC (supra) in the following words at page 159 of the NWLR report:
“What is the intendment of the amendment?
The intendment of the President of the Court of Appeal in the amendment, in my humble view is to protect the witnesses from possible attack by the opposite party. This is a valid reason and I commend the amendment which for all intents and purposes did not defeat the administration of justice. Considering the volatile nature of Nigerians, in matters of party politics propelled by their do or die attitude, there is real need to protect the witnesses. All the parties know, including the appellants behind the letters of the English alphabets are the deponents. All the parties know, including the appellants that the letters of the English alphabets had not the brain and human mind and automation to swear to affidavit and so it is more of a caricature than anything real. Why the furore? I regard the issue as arid legalism and mere technicality in relation to the alleged conflict between the Practice Directions and the Evidence Act. The issue fails.”
In my humble view there is no conflict with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2011 and the Evidence Act, 2004 as argued by learned Counsel to the Respondents. Once the written statement of the witnesses are on oath they are to be adopted at the hearing by virtue of the provisions of paragraphs 41(1)-(4) of the 1st Schedule to the Act supra which reads as follows:
“41 (1) subject to any statutory provision or any provision of these paragraphs relating to evidence, any fact required to be proved at the hearing of a petition shall be proved by written deposition and oral examination of witnesses in open Court.
(2) Documents which parties consented to at the pre-hearing session or other exhibits shall be tendered from the Bar or by the party where he is not represented by a legal practitioner.
(3) There shall be no oral examination of a witness during his evidence-in-chief except to lead the witness to adopt his written deposition and tender in evidence all disputed documents or other exhibits referred to in the deposition.
(4) Real evidence shall be tendered at the hearing.
The Tribunal was yet to hold a pre-hearing session for the witnesses to adopt their sworn depositions. Any fact required to be proved at the hearing of a petition shall be proved by written deposition and oral examination of witnesses in open Court or Tribunal. Nevertheless the Tribunal dismissed the petition the first reason being that the depositions were not signed but initialed by alphabets. I have shown that the Practice Directions, 2011 paragraphs 1 and 2 supra is authority for what the petitioner did. The second reason is the failure of the petitioner’s witnesses to disclose their sources of information by naming the agents or informants and the circumstances forming the basis of the petitioner’s belief in their information.
My humble opinion is that this is precisely what paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Practice Directions, 2011 seeks to avoid, namely, to protect the names and identities of petitioner’s witnesses. Furthermore, paragraph 5(a)-(c) of the 1st Schedule to the Act provides that:
” (5). Evidence need not to be stated in the election petition, but the Tribunal or Court may order such further particulars as may be necessary:-
(a) to prevent surprise and unnecessary expense;
(b) to ensure fair and proper hearing in the same way as in a civil action in the Federal High Court; and
(c) on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be ordered by the Tribunal or Court.”
If the petitioner furnished the names of his informants or agents or that he believed them and why, that would amount to pleading evidence contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 of the 1st Schedule as amended. But if that was necessary the Respondents could have applied to the Tribunal to direct the petitioner to furnish further particulars to prevent surprise and ensure fair and proper trial, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be ordered by the Tribunal, but not to dismiss the petition.
In Buhari vs INEC supra the Court of Appeal struck out 18 out of the 19 witnesses’ depositions because they were sworn before Val. I. Ikeonu, Esq, a Notary Public who had since been employed by the appellant and was consistently appearing for him before the Presidential Election Tribunal contrary to the provisions of Section 83 of the Evidence Act, 1990 read together with Section 19 of the Notaries Public Act Cap 331 Laws of the Federation, 1996.
These provisions read together rendered the depositions inadmissible evidence since Val. I. Ikeoru, Esq., had an interest in the subject matter of the litigation. That was the crux of the argument before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. But these are not the reasons that propelled the Tribunal to dismiss this petition.
In my humble view an election petition proceeding is to be proved, by the petitioner by sworn depositions and cross-examination of the witnesses. It was premature for the Tribunal to have struck out the petition. This is because at the pre-hearing session, the Tribunal or court shall enter a scheduling order for order of witnesses and tendering of documents that will be necessary for the expeditious disposal of the petition and consider other matters that will promote the quick disposal of the petition in the circumstances.
The admission of documents and facts, hearing and determination of objections on points of law; inspection and production of documents, etc, are matters to be determined at the pre-hearing session. see paragraph 18(6) (a)-(f); 7(a)-(i) and 8(a) and (b) of the 1st schedule to the Electoral Act No.6 of 2010 as amended.
In Buhari vs INEC supra it is evident that hearing took place before the depositions of eighteen out of the nineteen witnesses were struck out. This is made clear by Muktar, JSC, at page 469 paragraphs “F-G” to wit:
“All the respondents filed their various replies to the petition. In compliance with the practice Direction of the court there was frontloading of evidence and documents, and witnesses testified. All learned counsel addressed the court viva voce. The evidence and the addresses were duly evaluated and considered respectively by the lower court. At the end of the day the petition was dismissed.”
The facts that necessitated striking out eighteen out of nineteen witnesses’ depositions in Buhari vs INEC’s case supra were therefore not before the Tribunal. The Tribunal jumped the gun and shut out the petitioner from having his petition determined on the merit even before the pre-hearing session thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
The duty of the respondents is to defend the ruling of the Tribunal but not to seek to disparage same on appeal without a cross-appeal or Respondent’s Notice on the issue of the paragraphs applicability paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Practice Directions, 2011. see Adefuru vs oyesile (1989) 12 SCNJ 44 at 79; Njaba vs L.G.C. (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1218) 166 at 192-193; Obi vs INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (pt.1046) 565 at 673-674 and Olaniyan vs Adeniyi (2007) 3 NWLR (pr. 1020) 1 at 15.
The ruling of 10th day of August, 2011 dismissing the petition cannot be allowed to stand. The appeal is allowed. The petition is remitted to the Tribunal for hearing on the merit. I make no order as to costs.
UZO I. NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft form, the judgment just delivered by learned brother J. T. Tur. JCA.
The Election Tribunal and court Practice Direction 2011 paragraph I reads as follows:
“The list of witnesses referred in paragraph 4 (5) (a) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) shall be deemed complied with where the identity of the witnesses are represented by initials, alphabets or a combination of both.”
The Tribunal failed to advert its mind to the above Paragraph where a petitioner identifies his witnesses by alphabets numbers or a combination of both, is acceptable.
The Tribunal was therefore wrong in striking out the Petitioners witnesses represented by alphabets. The appeal has merit and is therefore allowed. The judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. The Petition EPT/CR/NA/5/2011 is remitted for trial.
No orders as to costs.
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.: I read before now the lead judgment in this appeal just delivered by my learned brother, Joseph Tine Tur, JCA, I agree fully with the reasons advanced therein and the conclusion that the appeal is resoundingly meritorious. The appeal is consequently allowed by me and I make no order as to costs.
Appearances
Joe Oloko & Ejike-UmeFor Appellant
AND
M.E. Ekwene; Chief P.A. Akpoke; Mrs. A.N. Ekwumankama – for 1st Respondent.
B. Oloyo – Hold briefs for Oshoma – for 2nd and 3rd respondent.For Respondent
