ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. v. DEACON CHIJIOKE ONYEABOR (2011)

ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. v. DEACON CHIJIOKE ONYEABOR

(2011)LCN/4485(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 18th day of April, 2011

CA/PH/39/2009, CA/OW/112/2010

RATIO

GROUND OF APPEAL/PARTICULARS: WHETHER GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND ALL THE PARTICULARS THERETO ARE TO BE READ AND CONSTRUED TOGETHER IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT AGAINST THE LOWER COURT

it is trite that a ground of appeal as formulated and all the particulars thereto are to be read and construed together in order to ascertain the appellant’s complaint against the lower court. See Odukwe vs. Achebe (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 40 at 53. Osahon vs. F. R. N. (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 89 at 116. PER MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.

FRESH POINT ON APPEAL/NEW LINE OF ARGUMENT: WHETHER THERE IS A DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RAISING A FRESH POINT ON APPEAL AND RELYING UPON A NEW LINE OF ARGUMENT OR NEW AUTHORITIES, TO SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

In Kwajaffa vs. B. O. N. Ltd. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 146 at 168, the Supreme Court put the law thus: “It may also be argued that the true positions of the law is that whereas a party to a suit cannot ordinarily without leave of the Supreme Court raise an argument not canvassed in the court below, that party can rely upon any new line of argument or new authorities, Judicial or Statutory, to support his argument in an issue which is properly before the Supreme Court.” PER MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.

RULE OF INTERPRETATION: POSITION OF THE LAW ON A STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO APPEAL AS AN INTERESTED PARTY: WHETHER THERE IS ANY STATUTORY PROVISION ON THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN INTERESTED PARTY MAY BRING APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN A MATTER

As a matter of law, neither the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor the Court of Appeal Act or the Court of Appeal Rules prescribe any period within which an interested party may bring application for leave to appeal as a person having an interest in a matter. Per Uwais C. J. N. In Re. Madaki (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 153 at 164 Adeleke vs. Oyo State House of Assembly (2006) 10 NWLR Pt. (987) 50 at 69. Ojora vs. Agip (Nig) Plc (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 515 at 547. The appellants do not in the circumstance require to seek for a trinity prayer in order to apply for leave to appeal as persons interested in the appeal. PER MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.

JUSTICES:

ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDUL-KADIR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (ABSIEC).
2. RETURNING OFFICER ISUIKWUATO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA.
3. THE ELECTORAL OFFICER ISUIKWUATO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA
4. ABIA STATE CHIEF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER – Appellant(s)

AND

DEACON CHIJIOKE ONYEABOR – Respondent(s)

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment):This is a consolidated appeal arising from the judgment of Onuoha A. K. Ogwe .J. delivered on 20th April, 2009 in Suit No. HOS/137/2008 at Umuahia in the Umuahia Judicial Division of the High Court of Abia State.
Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor, the respondent in Appeal No. CA/PH/39/2009 and the 1st set of respondent in CA/OW/112/2010 was the Chairmanship candidate for the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA) in the Local Government Chairmanship and councillorship Election for Isuikwuato Local Government Area of Abia State While the local Government Elections were successfully held in 16 out of the 17 Local Government Areas of Abia State, the Election in Isuikwuato Local Government was cancelled by the Abia State Independent Electoral Commission (ABSIEC) and her officials on account of disruption and violence ABSIEC and her officials are the appellants in Appeal No. CA/PH/39/2009 and the 2nd set of respondents in CA/OW/112/2010. Dissatisfied by the cancellation of the Local Government Elections in Isuikwuato Local government by ABSIEC, Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor and ten councillorship candidates at the election individually filed petitions at the Abia State Local Government Council Election Tribunal holden at Umuahia praying that they be returned as the Chairman and Councillors respectively of the said Isuikwuato Local Government on the ground that they were the sole Chairmanship and Councillorship candidates nominated for the said election and that they ought to be returned unopposed.
In a considered judgment delivered by the said Abia State Local Government Council Election Tribunal on the 4th day of October 2008, Deacon Onyeabor’s petition as well as that of the councillorship candidates were dismissed on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal does not extend to the claims and reliefs therein sought by the petitioners.
Thereafter, Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor and the ten councilors proceeded again to separately file Originating summons before the Abia State High Court.
Hon. Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor as plaintiff in suit No. HOS/37/2008 which led to the consolidated appeals submitted the following questions for determination.
1. Whether upon a proper interpretation of Paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, Law No. 2 of 2006, the plaintiff who was the only nominated Chairmanship candidate for the 19th of January 2008 Local Government Elections in respect of Isuikwuato Local Government Council after the latest time of the delivery of nomination forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an Election, ought not to be declared elected by the defendants.
2. Whether upon a proper interpretation of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, Law No. 2 of 2006, the purported cancellation of the Isuikwuato Local Government Council Election on the 20th day of January 2008 by the defendants when the plaintiff was the only nominated Chairmanship candidate for the 19th day of January 2008 Local Government Elections in respect of Isuikwuato Local Government Council after the latest time for the delivery of nomination forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an Election, and ought to have been declared elected by the defendants, was proper in law.
The 1st respondent (Deacon Onyeabor) sought the following reliefs
(a) A declaration that upon a proper interpretation of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, Law No. 2 of 2006, the plaintiff who was the only nominated Chairmanship candidate for the 19th day of January 2008 Local Government Elections in respect of Isuikwuato Local Government Council after the latest time for the delivery of nomination forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an Election, ought to have been declared elected by the defendants.
(b) A declaration that upon a proper interpretation of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule of Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, Law No. 2 of 2006, the purported cancellation of the Isuikwuato Local Government Council Election on the 20th day of January 2008 by the defendants when the plaintiff was the only nominated Chairmanship candidate for the 19th day of January 2008 Local Government Council Elections in respect of Isuikwuato Local Government Council after the latest time for the delivery of nomination forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an election, and ought to have been declared elected by the defendants, was not proper in law.
(c) An Order nullifying the purported cancellation of the said Isuikwuato Local Government Council Chairmanship Election of the 19th day of January 2008 for being contrary to the Provisions of Paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, Law No. 2 of 2006
(d) An Order compelling the defendants to declare the plaintiff as the elected Chairman for the Isuikwuato Local Government Council in respect of the election held on the 19th day of January 2008.
(e) An Order compelling the defendants to issue the plaintiff with the Sealed Certificate of Return as the duly elected Chairman of the Isuikwuato Local Government Council held on the 19th day of January 2008.”
In his judgment delivered on 20/1/2009, the learned trial Judge (Onuoha A. K. Ogwe, J) granted respondent’s reliefs Nos. (a) and (d) but found it unnecessary to grant reliefs (b), (c) and (d), on account of his “earlier view” that holding the election was unnecessary having regard to the provisions of the said Local Government Law.
At pages 61 -62 of the printed record, the learned trial Judge continued in his judgment as follows:
“As agreed by counsel, this judgment shall bind and apply Mutatis Mutandis in suit numbers
1. HOS/138/2008: Anthony Ihemegbulem vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
2. HOS/139/2008: Kelechi G. Okorie vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
3. HOS/140/2008: Nwosu Jane (Mrs) vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
4. HOS/141/2008: Adiele Onwukwe vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
5. HOS/142/2008: Peters Innocent vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
6. HOS/143/2008: Chief Kingsley Onwuka vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
7. HOS/144/2008: Ibeaja K. Nnabuile vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
8. HOS/145/2008: Nkeiruka Joy Kalu vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
9. HOS/146/2008: Augustine A. Anozie vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
10. HOS/148/2008: Anusi S. John vs. ABSIEC and 4 Ors.
Numbers 1 to 10 above applied to the office of councillorship for the Wards mentioned in the various originating summonses. The reasoning is the same in that in each case the plaintiff was the only validly nominated councillorship candidate at the close of nominations and return of forms and ought to have been returned as councilor without the necessity of an election. The election conducted into those wards on 19/1/2009 was unnecessary, a blunder and runs in violent conflict with the words and spirit of the said paragraph 11 (1) and (2) of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State Local Government Law 2006”.
And concluded:
“By the above judgment in HOS/137/2008, each plaintiff in HOS/138/2008 to HOS/146/2008 and HOS/148/2008 is declared properly elected as councillor for his listed ward in this judgment. Every order or declaration made in this suit applies to the said HOS/138/2008, HOS/146/2008 and HOS/148/2008.”
Dissatisfied with this judgment, ABSIEC and others as appellants in Appeal No. CA/PH/39/2009 filed a Notice of Appeal containing four(4) grounds of appeal in this court on 28th April 2009.
On the 5th February 2010, this Honourable Court granted the appellants leave to amend their Notice of Appeal in terms of the Proposed Amended Notice of Appeal attached to the appellants Motion on Notice for amendment.
Also, the Progressive People Alliance (PPA) and Hon. Raph Nkoro sought and on 15/2/2010 were granted leave of Court to appeal the judgment in suit No. HOS/137/2008 as interested parties. Consequent upon this, the Progressive People s Party (PPA) and Hon. Raph Nkoro filed Notice of Appeal and became the appellants in Appeal No. CA/OW/112/2010.
On 9/11/2010, this Honourable court granted the following prayers of the appellants in Appeal No. CA/OW/112/2010 based on their Motion on Notice dated and filed on 2/6/2010.
1. An order granting the applicants leave to withdraw the applicants Notice of Appeal dated 21st day of April, 2010 filed on the 27th day of April, 2010 attached herewith as Exhibit AA and the accompanying Brief of Argument dated 21st day of April 2010 filed on the 27th day of April, 2010 attached herewith as Exhibit BB.
2. An Order further extending the time within which the applicants may file appeal by way of notice of appeal against the judgment of Hon. Justice Onuoha A.K. Ogwe in Suit No. HOS/137/2008; ABIA STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (ABSIEC) and 3 ors. delivered on the 20th day of April, 2009 at the High Court of Abia State in the Umuahia Judicial Division holden at Umuahia.
3. An Order granting departure from the Rules by deeming the applicants Notice of Appeal dated 21st day of April, 2010 filed out of time on the 1st day of June, 2010 attached herewith as Exhibit CC as regular.
4. An Order granting leave to the applicants to raise and argue a fresh point in this appeal as it relates to the provision of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006, under which the Local Government Election was conducted in Abia State on 19th January 2008, which is the subject matter of this appeal.
5. An Order deeming as regular the applicants Brief of Argument dated 21st day of April, 2010 filed out of time on the 1st day of June, 2010 attached herewith as Exhibit DD and filed pursuant to the said applicants Notice of Appeal filed on the 1st day of June, 2010 as regular inclusive the argument founded on the provision of Section 15(4) of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006, under which the Local Government Election was conducted in Abia State on 19th January 2008, which is the subject of this appeal.
CA/PH/39/2009
The relevant briefs in Appeal No. CA/PH/39/2009 are as follows:
1. Appellants brief of Argument dated 10th March, 2010 and filed on the same date – settled by M.U. Uzoma, Esq
2. Respondent’s Brief of Argument dated 31st March, 2010 and filed on 8th April, 2010- settled by K.C. Nwufo, Esq.
3. Appellants Reply brief dated 22/4/2010 and filed on 27/4/2010 – settled by M.U. Uzoma, Esq.
The respondent in this appeal raised a preliminary objection to wit:
(i) The appeal is grossly incompetent and a gross abuse of the process of this Honourable Court in that they, as the bodies who conducted the said Election, have no right of appeal, but should remain neutral and independent. They can only defend a petition and respond to an Appeal.
On the above ground of objection, Learned Counsel to the Respondents referred us to the cases of Dr. Ngige & Ors vs. Mr. Peter Obi & Ors. (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1 at 224, Harun vs. Modibbo (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 489 at 569, and the case of INEC VS. ABONTA Appeal No. CA/PH/EPT/157A/2008 delivered on the 14th day of July 2008 by the Port-Harcourt Division of this Honourable Court.
By these cases, counsel submitted that INEC or as in this case ABSIEC being an independent body whose duty is to conduct election has no right of appeal against a judgment delivered in respect of the election. The appeal, said counsel, is a gross abuse of court process.
In reply to the preliminary objection appellants counsel submitted that the respondent’s contention is a legal novelty, which is not supported by any precedent. The right of appeal, said counsel is a constitutional issue which cannot be derogated from and that the case of Ngige vs. Obi (supra) and Haruna vs. Modibbo, (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 990) 489 of 569, 573, were cited by the respondent out of context.
Appellant’s counsel argued that the Court of Appeal in the case of Ngige vs. Obi (supra) never held that INEC has no right of appeal in Election matters. That, all that the Court of Appeal decided was that INEC should observe the provisions of paragraph 47 (1) and (2) of the 1st Schedule of the Electoral Act 2002 by defending petitions challenging the election they conducted and can only appeal with a view of defending the conduct of the election and not to partisan by supporting one candidate in place of the other.
In deciding the respondent’s preliminary objection, I do agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that neither the case of Haruna vs. Modibbo (supra) or Ngige vs. Obi (supra) after it decided that INEC has no right of appeal. The peculiar facts in Ngige vs. Obi (supra) for example is that INEC and her officials defended the result of the Election at the Tribunal stage in line with their statutory rule by contending that the election which they conducted and which returned NGIGE as the Governor was conducted in full compliance with the law. The same INEC and her officials filed an appeal and summersaulted by alleging that the same election they conducted was voided by malpractices, irregularities and non compliance with the law. It was on this premise that the Court of Appeal found that the appeal filed by INEC challenging the election instead of defending the petition is a negation of the provisions of paragraph 47 (1) and (2) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2002 which enjoins INEC and her officials to defend the petition in defence of the election conducted by them. It is the idea of fighting the same election they conducted in an express support of a candidate in the election that made the Court of Appeal in Ngige vs. Obi (supra) to hold as follows:
“..It is embarrassing, mischievous and scandalous for INEC to present this Appeal and call for the nullification of the same election that is conducted. It is a shame. INEC is the body authorized by law to conduct elections in this country. Can the same body who by law is supposed to conduct the election and defend it now make a summersault and claim that the same election which it conducted was voided by malpractices… The combine effect of paragraph 47 (1) and (2) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2002 clearly indicate that INEC and its officials and ad-hoc staff cannot decline from defending a petition against the election it conducted.”In the instant appeal, unlike the situation in the case of Ngige vs. Obi (supra) heavily relied upon by the respondent, the appellants (ABSIEC) appeal is in defence of their position that election should be conducted in the Isuikwuato Local Government Council notwithstanding the fact that the respondent was the sole candidate for the election.
The respondent’s preliminary objection is unfounded and it is accordingly overruled. The appellants nominated two (2) issues for this appeal. They are:
1. Whether by the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 under which the Local Government Election was conducted in Abia State on 19th January, 2008, the respondent who claimed to be the only nominated candidate for the Chairmanship position in Isuikwuato Local Government ought to be declared the Chairman of the said Local Government without any election being conducted to determine whether he has majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of least two-third of all wards in the Local Government
2. Whether the single judgment delivered by the Court below in respect of eleven distinct unconsolidated cases involving eleven different parties with different causes of action is not invalid.
The respondent also formulated two (2) issues for determination
(1) Whether by the provisions of paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 under which the said Election was conducted and which paragraph 11 (2) was placed before the lower court for interpretation, the respondent who was the sole candidate for the election ought to be declared the Chairman of the Isuikwuato Local Government Council?
(2) Whether the judgment delivered by the Court below in suit No.HOS/137/2008 is invalid when it was not consolidated with any other suit.
This appeal shall be decided on the issues formulated by the appellants counsel. On Issue No. 1, learned counsel for the appellants referred us to the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 as well as the provision of paragraph 11(2) of the 5th Schedule of the said Law.
Counsel submitted that the key words to the provision of paragraph 11(2) of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State Local Government Law, 2006 are the words “subject to the provision of this Law.”
He submitted that under the canon of statutory interpretation, the words “subject to” introduces a restriction and limitation and equally subordinates the provisions of that part of legislation to a master provision of the same statute or any other statute.
On this, counsel referred to the cases of Ezenwos vs Ngonadi (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 228) 154 of 173 and Okereke vs. Yar’Adua (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082) 37 at 58.
Counsel submitted further that the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 made provisions for the Chairmanship and councillorship elections. There is therefore no conflict between the provisions of paragraphs 11 of the 5th Schedule and that of the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, Law No. 2 of 2006.
Counsel explained, that paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law, provides that Subject to the provisions of this Law No. 2, 2006 where only one candidate remains duly nominated, that candidate shall be declared elected. Section 15 (4) of the same Law No. 2 of 2006 on the other hand limits the provision of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule of Law No. 2 2006 by excluding the Chairmanship position from the effect of the provisions of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule by expressly providing that where the Chairmanship candidate is the only nominated candidate for the election he shall still undergo an electoral process to determine if he has a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government failing which there shall be fresh nominations.
On another wicket, appellants counsel submitted that if this Honourable Court is of the view that there is conflict between the provisions of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule and that of Section 15 (4) of Law No. 2 of 2006, then, under the Rules of Statutory interpretation, where there is a conflict between the provisions in a Schedule and that of the enacting clause, the latter prevails.
On this, counsel referred to the cases of Federal Civil Service Commission vs. Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652 at 711 Mangaji vs. Balat (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 876) 449 at 476.
Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand observed in respect of appellant’s Issue No. 1 that Section 15 (4) of Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 raised in the appellants brief was raised for the first time on appeal without prior leave sought and obtained. That, it was not raised before the lower court by either party neither was it raised by the lower court suo motu.
Respondent’s counsel referred to the cases of Niger Progress Limited vs. North East Lline Corporatio (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 68 at 100, Oforlete vs. The State (2000) 7 SCNJ 162 at 169 and submitted that the Court of Appeal will not entertain any issue that is fresh and not brought and decided before the lower court.
Counsel submitted that there was no decision by the lower court in respect of Section 15 (4) of Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006. There was also no decision by the lower court in respect of a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election. He furthered that the said appellants Issue No. 1 is said to arise from ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal. But a glance at ground five reveals that the complaint on that ground is in respect of paragraph 11(2) of Abia State law No. 2 of 2006 and not on Section 15 (4) of the said law. Respondent’s counsel urged us to dismiss the appellants Issue No. 1 for not arising from any decision of the court below as well as the Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal.
Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the appellants quoted the provisions of Section 15 (4) of Law No. 2 of 2006 out of context. That, the provision of Section 15 (4) cannot be read alone. It must be read in conjunction with the provisions of Section 15 (3) (b) to appreciat the fact that Section 15 (4) is not applicable to this case.
Counsel said the submission in the appellants brief of argument to the effect that Section 15 (4) of Law No. 2 of 2006 limits the applicability of the provisions of paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule by excluding the Chairmanship position from the effect of the provision of the said paragraph 11 (2) is misconceived and amounts to importing into the said Section 15 and paragraph 11 (2) what they did not provide.
After referring to the case of Tony Dimegwu vs. Independence Ogunewe (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 116) 358 at 366 – 367 respondent’s counsel submitted that Section 15 (4) can only come into play when Section 15 (3) (b) has been considered and that is where there was more than one candidate nominated for the election but others were either disqualified, withdrawn, incapacitated, disappeared or dead. He said, paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule of Law No. 2 of 2006 provide for a situation where there was only one candidate nominated at latest time for delivery of nomination forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an election.
Respondent’s counsel submitted that there is indeed no conflict between the provisions of Section 15 (4) and paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule of Law No. 2 of 2006 to warrant determining which of them will prevail over the other. He submitted based on the above that the case of Okereke vs. Yar’adua (supra) Ezenwosu vs. Ngonadi (supra) and Mangaji vs. Balat (supra) cited in the appellants brief of argument are inapplicable to the circumstances of this appeal.
Counsel submitted that the provisions of paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule to the 2006 Law is clear and unambiguous. There is no other provision of the law which deals with a sole candidate to be declared elected after the latest time for delivering nomination Forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an election. There is no doubt, said counsel, that the respondent was the sole candidate after the latest time for delivery of Nomination Forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an election and ought to have been declared the winner without any election being conducted as in line with paragraph 11 (2) of Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 On this, counsel referred to the case of Bichi vs. Haladu (2004) 1 EPR 587.
On the respondent’s contention that appellants Issue No. 1 relating to the provision of Section 15 (4) of the law does not arise from Ground 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal, appellants counsel submitted in his reply brief that in ascertaining the complaints of an appellant in a Notice of Appeal, both the grounds of appeal and the accompanying particulars should be read and construed together.
In other words, Grounds of Appeal cannot be read in isolation of the particulars in support. On this, appellants counsel referred to the cases of Odukwe vs Achebe (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 40 at 53 and Osahon vs. F.R.N (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 89 at 166 and submitted that a calm reading of Ground 5 of the appellants Amended Notice of Appeal together with particulars in support particularly particulars ( C), (D) and (E) show that they raised a complaint relating to the applicability of the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Local Government Law No. 2, 2006 of Abia State.
On the respondent’s contention that the provision of Section 15 (4) of the said Law was raised as a fresh issue without the leave of this Court, appellant counsel observed that the argument is non sequitor. The law relating to the interpretation of statutes, said counsel, is that when any part or section of the statute is called for interpretation, the Court of law cannot restrict itself to that specific section or clause of the statute, the whole content of the statute is put in issue before the court.
In other words, such statute must be subjected to a holistic interpretation by construing the statute as a whole. The rational behind this position of the law, said counsel, is to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy either within the section to be construed or as between that section and other parts of the statute.
Counsel referred to the cases of Ekpo vs. Calabar Local Government (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 324 at 337 and Tegwonor vs. State (2008) 1 NWOR (Pt. 1069) 630 at 656 to emphasize the point that when any section of a statute is called for construction before a court of law, the corresponding sections are equally in issue even if not specifically raised by any of the parties.
Based on the above premise, appellant’s counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State Local Government Law, 2006 being part of the provisions of the Abia State Local Government Law, 2006 considered for interpretation by the court below cannot be said to be a new issue before this court on grounds that the court below failed to pronounce on that part of the section of the law that was already before it. The baseline, said counsel, is that the Abia State Local Government Law No. 2 2006 was the issue for consideration before the court below and that presupposes the totality of the contents of the law.
Appellant’s counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 15 (4) of Law No. 2, 2006 cannot be said to constitute a new issue before this court as to necessitate seeking leave of the court to raise same. In fact, said counsel, there is a distinction between a fresh point on appeal and new line of argument. Counsel referred to the case of Kwajaffa vs. B.O.M. Ltd 2004 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 146 of 168 and submitted that the law is that whereas a party to a suit cannot ordinarily without leave raise an issue not canvassed at the court below, a party can rely upon any new line of argument or on new authorities, judicial or statutory, to support his argument.
Counsel submitted that the issues at the court below were the accurate interpretation of the Abia State Local Government Law No. 2, 2006 and whether the respondent, a sole nominated Chairmanship candidate, could be declared the elected Chairman of Isuikwuato Local Government without any election.
Counsel submitted that following the decision in Kwajaffa vs. B.O.N. Ltd (supra) 168, these said issues having been before the court below for consideration, the fact that the appellants at this court drew attention to further provision of the same law in Section 15 (4) relating to the procedure for the election of a sole nominated Chairmanship candidate in a given election under the same law does not transform the argument into a new issue that should demand seeking the leave of this Honourable Court to proffer. The reference to Section 15 (4) of the law could at best be a new line of argument and not a new issue on appeal.
Counsel submitted further that the cases of Niger Progress Ltd vs North East Line Corporation (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 68 and Oforlet vs. The Stat (2000) 7 SCNJ 162 relied on by the respondent are not in any manner apposit to the facts of the instant appeal. On the respondent’s contention that a combined reading of the provision of Section 15 (3) (b) and 15 (4) of the Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 shows that paragraph 11(2) of the 5th Schedule applied to the respondent as a chairmanship candidate, appellants counsel reproduced the said provisions of the law and pointed out that the clear intention of the draftsmen of the law on a combine reading of the provisions of Section 15 (3) (a) (b) (4) (5) (6) (a) (b) (c) and 7 of the law is that the office of Chairman must be subjected to a poll even where the person nominated to contest for the office of chairman was the sole nominated candidate. This position, according to counsel is further confirmed by the marginal note to Section 15 of the Law which reads “Election of Chairman.” He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Schroder vs. Major (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 1 at 18 and said that the marginal note to Section 15 of the law corroborated the case of the appellants to the effect that Section 15 of the law specifically relates to the chairmanship candidate and that the court below was in clear error when it held that no Election is necessary for the respondent to be declared elected as chairman and that no minimum number of votes is required for him to be elected.
Learned counsel to the appellants submitted that the contention of the respondent that paragraph 11 (2) of the law apply to the respondent, a chairmanship candidate, because, according to him, there is no other provision of the said law which deals with a sole candidate is incomprehensible.
Counsel submitted that Section 15 (4) of the law also relates to a sole nominated candidate particularized to the office of the chairman. And, that while paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule is a mere schedule of the law, Section 15 (4) is a substantive provision of the law The draftsman of the law, said counsel, knowing that the same law already made provision for the election of chairman where there is a sole nominated chairmanship candidate made the provision of paragraph 11 (2) of the law to be “subject to the provisions of this law.”
Finally, on this score, appellants’ counsel submitted that, Section 15 (4) of the law is ex facie restricted to the specifically named office of chairman and therefore a special provision of the law. That, on the other hand, the procedure for a sole nominated candidate in paragraph 11 (2) of 5th Schedule of the law does not relate to any named office at all and therefore a General Provision of the Law.
Counsel then relied again on the Supreme Court decision in Schroder vs. Major (supra) to demonstrate the accepted canon of interpretation, that where there are two provisions, one special and the other general, covering the same subject matter, a case falling within the words of special provision must be governed thereby and not by the terms of the general provision.
In deciding appellants Issue No. 1, two points, in the nature of preliminaries must first be settled.
First, is the contention of the respondent that appellants Issue No. 1 does not arise from Ground 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal.
In my humble opinion, this point or perhaps objection by the learned counsel to the respondent is unfounded if not flimsy. Truly, and as pointed out by the learned appellants counsel, it is trite that a ground of appeal as formulated and all the particulars thereto are to be read and construed together in order to ascertain the appellant’s complaint against the lower court. See Odukwe vs. Achebe (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 40 at 53. Osahon vs. F. R. N. (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 89 at 116. For ease of reference, I reproduce appellants Ground 5 with the particulars below as follows
GROUND FIVE
ERROR OF LAW
The learned trial Judge at the court below erred in law when he answered the two issues raised by the plaintiff/respondent for determination of this suit in the affirmative by holding that by sub section 2 of paragraph 11, 5th Schedule to the Local Government Law No. 2 2006 of Abia State that If at the close of nominations and the time limited for the withdrawal of candidate, only one candidate stands duly and validly nominated, that candidate shall be declared elected without any necessity for an election as he cannot contest against himself and no minimum or maximum number of votes is required for him to be elected.
Particulars of Error
(a) The plaintiff in suit No. HOS/137/2008, Deacon Chikioke Onyeabor vs. Abia State Independent Electoral Commission & 3 Ors in which the above decision was made by the court below was a chairmanship candidate in the Abia State Local Government Election of 19th January, 2008 for Isuikwuato Local Government Area.
(b) Sub Section 2 of paragraph 11, 5th Schedule to the Local Government Law No. 2, 2006 of Abia State relied by the court below to hold that if at the close of nomination and the time limited for the withdrawal of candidature, only one candidate stands duly and validly nominated, that candidate shall be declared elected without any necessity for an election is merely a schedule of the law which is expressly made to be subject to the provisions of the Principal/Substantive law.
(c) The Principal/Substantive Law, particularly Section 15 (4) of the Local government Law No. 2 2006 of Abia State provides that where a candidate for election to the office of Chairman is the only nominated candidate for the election, he shall still undergo an election process to determine if he has majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the wards in the Local Government failing which there shall be fresh nominations.
(d) There was no election conducted to determine if the plaintiff who claims to be the only nominated candidate for the chairmanship position for Isuikwuato Local Government Area of Abia State has majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government.
(e) The Isuikwuato Local Government Election of 19th January 2008, in Abia State was cancelled by the Electoral Body as a result of violence.The plaintiff conceded to this cancellation in the process filed by him at the court below.
Indeed, a calm reading of Ground 5 of the appellants Amended Notice of Appeal together with particulars in support show that they raised a complaint relating to the applicability of the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Local Government Law No. 2, 2006 of Abia State. Consequently, the point raised by the respondent in this regard cannot be countenanced.
Second, is the respondent’s idea that the provision of Section 15 (4) of the said Law No. 2 of 2006 was raised as a fresh issue in the appellants brief of Argument without the leave of this Honourable Court.
Here again, and as rightly pointed out by the appellants counsel, the provision of Section 15 (4) is not an issue and cannot be said to be a fresh issue in this appeal. This is because the issue before the lower court properly so called devoid of applicable laws was whether the respondent who was the only nominated chairmanship candidate for the 19th day of January 2008 Local Government Elections in respect of Isuikwuato Local Government Council could be declared elected without undergoing the process of election.
In the process of interpreting the applicable laws on the subject matter, the learned trial Judge directed his attention only to the provision of paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule of the law without making relevant references to any other section or provisions of the same law.
In the circumstance, the appellants who are now before this court to say that the learned trial Judge was in error when it held that “no election is necessary for the respondent to be declared elected as Chairman and that no minimum or maximum number of votes is required for him to be elected” cannot be said to have raised a new issue.
Learned counsel for the appellant’s was right when he argued that the fact that the appellants at this court drew attention to further provision of the same law in Section 15 (4) relating to the procedure for the election of a sole nominated chairmanship candidate in a given election under the same law does not transform the argument into a new issue that should demand seeking the leave of court
In this respect, a distinction has always been drawn between a fresh point on appeal and a new line of argument. In Kwajaffa vs. B. O. N. Ltd. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 146 at 168, the Supreme Court put the law thus:
“It may also be argued that the true positions of the law is that whereas a party to a suit cannot ordinarily without leave of the Supreme Court raise an argument not canvassed in the court below, that party can rely upon any new line of argument or new authorities, Judicial or Statutory, to support his argument in an issue which is properly before the Supreme Court.”

In the construction of statutes, the context(s) of words which are to be construed includes not only the particular phrase or section on which they occur but also the other parts of the statute. statute should be construed as a whole so as, so far as possible to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy either within the section to be construed or as between that section and other parts of statute. The literal meaning of a particular section may in this way be extended or restricted by reference to other sections and to the general purview of the statute. See, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 36, page 395 at paragraph 594. Ekpo vs. Calabar Local Government (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 218) 324 at 337 TEG Wonor vs. State. (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) 630 at 656.
In the Ekpo vs. Calabar Local Government case (supra) Uwaifor, JCA, speaking for the Court of Appeal made reference to the old English case of In Lincoln college (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 586 to say that the above principle of construction is ancient but that it is valid and helpful now as then. In the same Ekpo vs. Calabar Local Government case(supra) further reference was made to the statement of Lord Herschell in Colquhoun vs. Brooke (1889) 14 App. Cas 493 at 509 that:
“It is beyond dispute, too, that we are entitled and indeed bound when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute to consider any other parts of the Act which threw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart from the rest of the Act.”In the light of the above, I do not have any doubts in my mind that the argument in this appeal in relation to the provision of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 cannot by any stretch of imagination be taken to be raising a new issue on appeal. Indeed, the learned trial Judge was duty bound in the first piace to consider the provision of Section 15 (4) of the Law along with the provision of paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule and indeed with any other relevant provisions of that Law in the determination of the issue before it to wit Whether the respondent, a sole nominated chairmanship candidate, could be declared the elected chairman of Isuikwuato Local Government without any election.
The main argument of the learned counsel for the respondent as against appellants Issue No. 1 is that the provision of Section 15 (4) must be read in conjunction with the provisions of Section 15 (3) (b) of Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 in order to appreciate the fact that Section 15 (4) is not applicable to the case. And, that there is no other provision of the said law outside of paragraph 11 (2) of the law which deals with a sole candidate.
At this stage, it is pertinent to reproduce the provision of Section 15 (3) (b), 15 (4) and paragraph 11 (2) of the said Abia State Local Government Law.
Section 15
(3) Where in an election to the office of chairman.
(a) At the close of nomination, only one candidate has been nominated, the commission shall extend the time for nomination: or,
(b) At the close of nomination, one or more of the candidates nominated for the election by reason of disqualification, withdrawal, incapacitation, disappearance or death cannot participate in the election, the commission shall extend the time for nomination, so however, that where after the extension, only one candidate remains validly nominated, there shall be no further extension.
(4) A candidate for election to the office of chairman shall be deemed to have been only duly elected where being the only candidate nominated for the election, he has a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government failing which, there shall be fresh nominations
Paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 on the other hand provides thus:
“Subject to the provisions of this law if after the latest time for the delivery of Nomination Forms and or for withdrawal of candidates for an election under this law, only one candidate remains duly nominated, that candidate shall be declared elected.”
On the face of these provisions, Section 15 (3) (a) and (b) of the law deal essentially with extension of time for nomination where only one candidate evolved. In 3 (a) there shall be extension of time when the nomination process brings out a sole candidate. In 3 (b) there shall equally be extension where one or more of the candidates nominated could not participate in the election for any of the reasons stated in Section 15 (3) (b) of the Law. By these provisions, whether the sole candidate evolves at the initial nomination as in Section 15 3 (a) or evolves after the withdrawal or disqualification of another as in 15 3 (b) and an extension has been granted, no further extension as regards nomination shall be entertained. It would be seen that the end result of the provision of Section 15 3 (a) and (b) are the same. That is, where extension has been granted for nomination on the emergence of a sole candidate, no further extension would be granted and the only one candidate remains validly nominated.
Obviously, the intention of the draftsman of the provision of Section 15 3 (a) and (b) is to have a checking procedure and to make assurance doubly sure when a single candidate emerges, that the position represents the wishes of the voters.
Ordinarily, if the provisions of Section 15 3 (a) and (b) are read in conjunction with the provision of paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule, it would seem that such sole candidate could be declared elected by virtue of the provision of the said paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule. But then, paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule started with the proviso “subject to the provisions of this law” which means whatever would have been the effect of paragraph 11 (2) has necessarily been modified by the provision of Section 15 (4) of the law which stipulates that “A candidate for election to the office of chairman shall be deemed to have been duly elected where being the only candidate nominated for the election, he has a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government failing which, there shall be fresh nominations.”
The key words to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 are the words “subject to the provisions of this law.” Under the canon of statutory interpretation, the words “subject to” as used in paragraph 11 (2) of the 5th Schedule to the Law No. 2, 2006 introduces a restriction and limitation and equally subordinates the provisions of that part of legislation to a master provision of the same statute. See Okereke vs. Yar’adua (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082) 37 at 58. In the Okereke vs. Yar’adua case (supra) the court held thus:
“The expression “subject to” used in paragraph 14 (1) (supra) introduces a condition, a proviso, a restriction, and a limitation. The expression subordinates the provisions of the subject to the section referred to which is intended not to be affected by the provision of latter. See also, Ezenwosu vs. Ngonadi (1992) 3 NWLR Pt. 228 154 at 173.”
In the instant case, I must equally point out that there is no conflict whatsoever between the provision of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule and the provision of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law. The Abia State Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 made provisions for the chairmanship and councilorship elections. Section 15 (4) of the law limits the provision of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule by expressly providing that where the chairmanship candidate is the only nominated candidate he shall undergo the process of election.
In the light of the foregoing, I hold in respect of appellants Issue No. 1 that by the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006, the respondent who claimed to be the only nominated candidate for the chairmanship position in Isuikwuato Local Government ought not to be declared the chairman of the said Local Government without any election being conducted to determine whether he has majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government.
Issue No. 1 is resolved in favour of the appellant.
On Issue No. 2, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there were eleven suits pending at the court below emanating from the cancelled Isuikwuato Local Government Election. That, while suit No. HOS/137/2008 Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor vs. ABSIEC (subject matter of this appeal) was filed by the respondent herein challenging his not being returned as the chairman of Isuikwuato Local Government, the rest of the suits were filed by the various councillorship candidates challenging their not being returned as the councillors of their respective Wards in Isuikwuato Local Government.
Counsel submitted that the suits were not consolidated as the plaintiff’s counsel application for consolidation was refused by the court below. This, notwithstanding, said counsel, the court below proceeded to deliver a single judgment in respect of the eleven distinct suits which were not consolidated.
Counsel referred to the case of Kalu vs. Chima (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 187 at 194 and said that even if the trial court had consolidated these suits, the law is that each of such suits remains separate and distinct and its judgment must be given seperately at the end of the common trial.
Appellant’s counsel submitted that the fundamental vice that characterised the single judgment delivered by the trial court in the instant case where the eleven suits were not even consolidated is worse that the single judgment delivered in the case of Kalu vs. Chima because in the Kalu vs. Chima case, there was at least an order consolidating the three suits of which the learned trial judge invalidly delivered a single judgment, whereas in the instant case the learned trial judge delivered a single judgment in respect of eleven unconsolidated suits.
Counsel submitted that the single judgment delivered by the trial court in respect of the eleven unconsolidated suits has indeed denied the appellants or any other party appealing as person interested from making choice of which of the distinct suit to appeal against.
Appellant’s counsel finally urged this court to allow this appeal by setting aside the judgment of the court below delivered on 20th day of April 2009 in Suit No. HOS/137/2008 based on the Appellants Ground five and Issue one having abandoned Grounds One, Two and Four raised thereto “OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE follow the decision of this court in Kalu vs. Chima (supra) by remitting this suit to the Chief Judge of Abia State for same to be tried de novo before another Judge of the High Court of Imo State based on the Appellants Ground Three and Issue Two raised thereto.
On Issue No. 2, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment in suit No. HOS/137/2008 which led to this appeal is not invalid because it was not consolidated with any other suit.
Counsel submitted that a perusal of the Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal eloquently reveals that the appellants appeal is in respect of judgment in Suit No. HOS/137/2008 and no other suit. The other eleven suits which the appellants are referring to are not before this Honorable Court. This Court, therefore, said counsel, cannot, speculate on matters not placed before it. On this, respondent’s counsel referred to the cases of Biyu vs. Abram (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 981) 1 at 60 and Ayogu vs. Nnamani (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 981) 160 at 195 to demonstrate that speculation is not in the character of the law and administration of justice.
Counsel distinguished the instant case from the facts in the case of Kalu vs. Chima on the ground that the judgment therein was in respect of consolidated suits. The worst case scenario in the circumstance, said counsel, is for the other suits which were not consolidated with suit No. HOS 137/2008 and for which no separate judgements was given to apply to the lower court to deliver judgment in their suits.
Counsel submitted that the plaintiffs in the said suits are the ones to complain about denial of fair hearing because they purportedly had no judgments in their suits and not the appellants. The entire judgment cannot be invalid because of the order that it binds other suits.
In his reply brief, learned counsel for the appellants submitted on Issue No. 2 that the suggestion of the respondent’s counsel at page 10, paragraph 4.23 of the respondent’s brief of argument that the plaintiff in the ten unconsolidated suits in which no judgment was delivered to separately apply to the court below for the judgments in those suits to be delivered is non sequitor because the court below is already functus officio. The only justifiable legal option is for this court to set aside the said judgment same being fundamentally vitiated.
In deciding appellants Issue No. 2 it is necessary to take a look at what exactly transpired at the court below.
In concluding Suit No. HOS/137/2008 at pages 60 – 62 of the printed record, the learned trial granted the plaintiff’s reliefs and added that as agreed by counsel the judgment shall bind and apply mutatis mutandis to the ten other suits concerning councillorship election before his Lordship.
Clearly, the remarks of the learned trial Judge which tries to apply his findings and conclusions in Suit No. HOS/137/2008 to the other ten suits in his court cannot invalidate the findings and conclusions in respect of Suit No. HOS/137/2008.
The learned counsel for the respondent was right in pointing out that it is common ground that there was no order of consolidation of Suit No. HOS 137/2008 with the other ten suit mentioned in his Lordship’s judgment. Therefore, the case of Kalu vs. Chima heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants is indeed distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case.
The true position of things for the respondent, is not that Suit No. HOS/137/2008 ought to be set aside but that the plaintiffs in the other ten suits probably do not have any judgements in their suits. All the ingredients of a valid adjudication and judgment are contained and complete in the judgment in Suit No. HOS/137/2008. Any attempt to probe into the legal status of the other ten suits would in the circumstance be outside the domain of this appeal.
Issue No. 2 is resolved in favour of the respondent
In conclusion, this appeal is allowed in part. The Judgment and Orders of Onuoha A. K. Ogwe J. in favour of the plaintiff in Suit No. HOS/137/2008 (respondent herein) between Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor vs. Abia State Independent Electoral Commission & 3 Ors delivered on 20th day of April 2009 at the High Court of Abia State is hereby set aside. There shall be no orders as to costs.
CA/OW/112/2010
The relevant briefs of argument in Appeal No. CA/OW/112/2010 are as follows:
1. Appellants brief of argument dated 21st April 2010 filed on 1/6/2010 and deemed filed on 9/11/2010 settled by P. C. Adighije
2. 1st set of respondent’s brief of argument incorporating Notice of preliminary Objection dated 3/5/2010 filed on 20/5/2010 settled by K. C. Nwufo, Esq.
3. Appellants Reply Brief dated 10/10/2010 filed on 11/11/2010 settled by P. C. Adighije, Esq
At the oral hearing of this appeal M.U. Uzoma, Esq represented the 2nd set of respondents who did not file any briefs and held the brief of A.M.O. Onukaogu, Esq for the appellants.
The learned counsel for the respondents raised and argued the following grounds of preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal.
(i) The appeal is grossly incompetent and an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court in that the appellants who were not parties at the lower court did not seek the Trinity prayers to appeal as persons interested in their application of 25th June 2009 and filed on 30th June 2009.
(ii) The appellants did not state, ex facie, the motion paper of 25th June 2009 the particulars of which judgment they were appealing against
(iii) The purported Notice of Appeal in this appeal did not comply with Order 7 Rule 10 (2) and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Rules of this Honourable Court.
(iv) The provision of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 was not in issue before the lower court and did not arise from the judgment of the lower court.
(v) The Notice of Appeal was not signed by any known legal practitioner
On respondent’s 1st ground of objection that the appellants Notice of Motion for leave to appeal as persons interested was brought beyond a period of three months without seeking trinity prayers, appellants furnished a two fold reply.
(1) That there is no time limit within which an interested party may file an application for leave to appeal as a person interested.
(2a) That as a matter of fact, having been granted leave by this Court on the 15th February 2010 to appeal as persons interested, the appellants by Motion dated 24th February 2010 sought for a trinity prayer which this Honourable Court of Appeal granted on 20th April 2010.
(2b) That even the trinity prayer sought by the appellants in the said motion dated 24th February 2010 is a surplusage in view of the fact that the High Court judgment sought to be appealed against is not an interlocutory ruling but the final decision which does not even require the trinity prayers.
Learned counsel for the appellants is right in the assertions contained in his reply as answers to the 1st ground of preliminary objection by the respondent.
The record of appeal bears witness to appellant’s counsel assertions in paragraph (2) above. As a matter of law, neither the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor the Court of Appeal Act or the Court of Appeal Rules prescribe any period within which an interested party may bring application for leave to appeal as a person having an interest in a matter. Per Uwais C. J. N. In Re. Madaki (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 153 at 164 Adeleke vs. Oyo State House of Assembly (2006) 10 NWLR Pt. (987) 50 at 69. Ojora vs. Agip (Nig) Plc (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 515 at 547. The appellants do not in the circumstance require to seek for a trinity prayer in order to apply for leave to appeal as persons interested in the appeal. The 1st ground of preliminary objection of the 1st set of respondent is accordingly overruled. Second, the respondent’s counsel contended in support of Ground Two of his preliminary objection that the appellants did not state the particulars of the judgment they are appealing against ex facie the motion paper dated 25th June 2009.
On this, appellants counsel submitted that the 1st respondent’s objection is not founded in law. That the particulars of the High Court judgment sought to be appealed against by the appellants is clearly stated on the face of the motion papers as High Court Suit No. HOS/137/2008 Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor vs. Abia State Independent Electoral Commission (ABSIEC).
Moreover, said counsel, the 1st respondent is fully aware of the judgment of the High Court sought to be appealed against. That, it was based on this knowledge that the 1st respondent’s counsel indicated that he was not opposing the appellants said application for leave to appeal.
Suffice to say that the 1st respondent’s second ground of objection is belated, baseless and perhaps frivolous. No such objection can be entertained at this stage after the order of court granting leave to appeal had been granted and so to say regularised any as such defect now been raised by 1st respondent’s counsel. The 1st respondent 2nd ground of objection is also overruled.
Third, the 1st respondent argued that the appellants notice of appeal filed on 27/4/2010 did not comply with the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules having not annexed to the notice of appeal a copy of the order granting enlargement of time.
In reply to the above, appellants counsel observed that the objection is most inconsequential and stated that the basis of the objection has been overtaken by event in view of the fact that the said appellants notice of appeal dated 21st April 2010 and filed on 27th April 2010 is no longer before this court same having been withdrawn vide the appellants Motion on Notice dated 2nd June 2010 and filed on 2nd June 2010. That, the appellants present Notice of Appeal is that which is dated 21st April 2010 and filed on 1st June 2010 duly regularized by the Orders of this Court made on 9th November 2010 vide the appellants Motion on Notice dated 2nd June 2010 and filed on 2nd June 2010, which was not opposed by the 1st respondent’s counsel. The same position , said counsel applied to the 1st respondent’s objection in paragraphs 2.07 and 2.08 of his brief of argument in respect of filing Notice of Appeal at the wrong venue.
The 1st respondent’s third ground of objection from the records has indeed been overtaken by events. The objection is accordingly overruled.
Fourth, 1st respondent argued that the argument relating to the provision of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 in the appellants brief is a fresh issue which required the leave of the court.
Here again, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the basis of the above objection has been overtaken by events. That, by the orders of this Court made on 9th day of November 2010, appellants were granted leave to argue on the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the Abia State Law No. 2 of 2006 vide the appellants notice of motion dated 2nd June 2010 and filed on 2nd June 2010 of which 1st respondent’s counsel did not oppose. The position taken by the appellants counsel tallies with the printed record. Accordingly, the 1st respondent’s 4th ground of preliminary objection is also overruled.
Fifth, 1st respondent argued that the appellants notice of appeal dated 21st April 2010 and filed on 27th April 2010 was not duly signed. In reply appellants counsel said that the instant notice of appeal dated 21st April 2010 and filed on 1st June 2010 was duly signed by P. C. Adighije, Esq. The 1st respondent’s fifth ground of preliminary objection is also overruled.
The 1st respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection is dismissed.
The appellants nominated two (2) issues for determination in this appeal:
1. Whether the court below in its interpretation of the enabling statute was right to have restricted itself to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 in arriving at judgment in this case without regard to the provisions of Section 15 (4) of the same law which provides that “A candidate for election to the office of chairman shall be deemed to have been duly elected where being the only candidate for the election, he has a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government failing which, there shall be fresh nomination
2. Whether the judgment of the court below is not invalid being a single judgment delivered in respect of multiple distinct and unconsolidated suits.
The 1st set of respondent also formulated identical issues for determination. The 2nd set of respondents did not file any brief of argument in this appeal. In answer to the 1st issue formulated by the appellants, I do accept the undisputed position from the facts of the instant case that the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 is the Enabling Law that was called for interpretation at the court below. And, that the court below restricted its interpretation of the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006 only to the provisions of paragraph 11, 5th Schedule of the law without reference to the other parts of the law including Section 15 (4) thereof. The question in this appeal as in Appeal No. CA/PH/39/2009 is what is the position of the law where a chairmanship candidate is found to be the only nominated candidate for the chairmanship position under the Abia State of Nigeria Local Government Law No. 2 of 2006? The provision of Section 15 (4) of the said law makes it manifestly clear that the intention of the draftsmen of the Abia State Local Government Law, 2006 is to test the acceptability of a sole nominated chairmanship candidate by subjecting him to poll in the Local Government to determine whether such candidate has a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election in each of at least two-third of all the Wards in the Local Government failing which, there shall be fresh nomination to select an acceptable chairmanship candidate for the Local Government.
There is no doubt that the provisions of paragraph 11 of the 5th Schedule to Law No. 2 of 2006 are made subject to the provisions of Section 15 (4) of Law No. 2 of 2006. A sole nominated Chairmanship candidate cannot be returned unopposed in view of the express and unambiguous provisions of the law specifically relating to Chairmanship candidate in Section 15 (4) of the Law. It is trite that the duty of the Court is to interpret the law or statutes and not to expand on them or to import meanings into the clear words of statutes.
Issue No. 1 is resolved in favour of the Appellants.
In answering appellants issue No.2, I do agree with the learned counsel to the respondents as it is the case with Appeal No.CA/PH/39/2009 that the judgment delivered by the court below in suit No.HOS/137/2008 is valid because it was not consolidated with any other suit.
Issue No.2 is accordingly resolved against the Appellants.
In conclusion, this appeal succeeds in part. The judgment and orders of Onuoha A. K. Ogwe, J. in favour of the plaintiff in Suit No.HOS/137/2008 (1st set of respondent herein) between Deacon Chijioke Onyeabor vs. Abia State Independent Electoral Commission & 3 Ors. Delivered on 20th day of April 2009 at the High Court Abia State is hereby set aside.
There shall be no orders as to costs.

ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDUL-KADIR, J.C.A.: I agree.

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.: I have read the consolidated judgment just delivered by my learned brother M. A. Owoade JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. I will add a few words on the issue of the proper interpretation of S.15(4) of the Abia State Local Government Law No.2 of 2006. The learned trial judge had restricted his interpretation of the law to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the 15th schedule of the law. I agree with the view of my learned brother that paragraph 11 of the 5th schedule was made subject to the provisions of S.15 (4) of law No.2 of 2006.
It is obvious that specifically in relation to Chairman of Local Government Councils they must subject themselves to election to determine acceptability even where they have been nominated unopposed. Indeed that is the interpretation that accords with the spirit and the letters of S.7 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that the State Government must ensure that a Local Government is comprised of democratically elected Chairman and Councilors.
I concur with all the orders made in the judgment.

Appearances

M. U. Uzoma, Esq, for the appellants in CA/OW/39/2009, holds the brief of M. O. A. Onukogwu for the Appellants in CA/OW/112/2010 and appears for the 2nd set of Respondent in CA/OW/112/2010. For Appellant

AND

K. C. Kwufo, Esq. for the Respondent in CA/OW/39/2009 and for the 1st set of Respondents in CA/OW/112/2010. For Respondent