SALISU ISIAKA v. THE STATE (2011)

SALISU ISIAKA v. THE STATE

(2011)LCN/4384(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 19th day of July, 2011

CA/IL/C.13/2011

RATIO

ONUS OF PROOF: WHETHER THE ONUS OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS ON THE PROSECUTION; EFFECT OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO DISCHARGE THE ONUS OF PROOF

It has been said on numerous occasions, that if a suspect or an accused is caught committing an offence the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt is on the prosecution and not on the accused to prove his innocence failure of which the accused will be acquitted, as the accused or suspect is entitled to a benefit of doubt. The doubt must be genuine and reasonable, one arising from evidence before a court. Any doubt whatsoever, must be resolved in favour of the accused. See OLALEKUN v THE STATE (2002) 4 NWLR Pt.146. PER SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A

SHIFT OF EVIDENTIAL BURDEN: WHEN DOES THE EVIDENTIAL BURDEN SHIFT TO THE ACCUSED PERSON

It is only after the prosecution has discharged this burden ,that is’ proved the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt that the evidential burden shifts to the accused person. It is only them that that evidential burden shifts to the accused person to adduce evidence of other fact which may raise reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution. See section 138(3) 139, 141 and 143 of the Evidence Act. And where the court is in doubt the effect is that the prosecution failed to discharge the onus laid down by the law and the accused person will be acquitted. See UGBENEYOVWE v. STATE (2004) 12 NWLR Pt.888. PER SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A

OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY :INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY

UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE: DUTY OF THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO AN UNCHALLENGED EVIDENCE

EMMANUEL OLAYINKA AYO OLA JSC as in OFORLETE V THE STATE (supra) that “Where there is an unchallenged evidence, the court is not only entitled to act on or accept such evidence but is in fact bound to do so provided that such evidence by its very nature is not incredible.” PER SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A

PROOF OF AN OFFENCE: WAYS BY WHICH AN OFFENCE MAY BE PROVED

To proof an offence it will by either direct evidence By circumstantial evidence and or By confessional statement. See the cases of EMEKA V STATE (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt734) 666 at 683 AND ADIO V STATE (1986) 5 SC 194 at 219-220. PER SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A

PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT: WHEN IS A PROSECUTION SAID TO HAVE PROVED ITS CASE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

The prosecution is said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, when it has proved all the ingredients of a particular offence with which the accused person is charged. See JAMANI v STATE (2005) 131 and NAASON v STATE (1993) 6 SCNJ (PT1) 55, 69. PER SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED: WHETHER A COURT CAN DRAW AN INFERENCE OF GUILT FROM MERE SUSPICION

…a court cannot draw an inference of guilt from mere suspicion. PER SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A

JUSTICES

TIJJANI ABDULLAHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SOTONYE DENTON WEST Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHINWE CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

SALISU ISIAKA Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

SOTONYE DENTON -WEST, J.C.A (Delivering the leading Judgment): The appellant was convicted for robbing Mutiyat AbdulKareem of her Nokia 3320 handset with a cudgel an offence punishable under section 1 (2) of the Robbery and firearms (special provisions) Act Cap R11 laws of the Federation of Nigeria. When the charge was read to the appellant, he pleaded not guilty and the prosecution called four witnesses and three Exhibits to prove their case.
The appellant gave evidence under oath and denied the allegation against him.
The trial Judge, Hon. Justice S.D Kawu gave his judgment on 30th day of June 2010 and convicted the appellant. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed three grounds of appeal. On 27/6/2010. When the appeal was heard. Learned counsel to the appellant adopted the brief of argument dated 24/2/2011 and filed same date, he prayed this court to allow the appeal, discharge and acquit the appellant.
The respondent in the same fashion adopted his respondent brief of argument dated 21/3/2011 and filed same date and prayed that this appeal be dismissed and affirm the decision of the lower court. From these briefs which two issues were distilled thus;
(1) Whether the learned trial judge was right in not considering the defence put forward by the appellant before the appellant’s conviction and sentence and
(2) Whether from the totality of evidence proffered in this case, the prosecution’s evidence was cogent enough to warrant the conviction of the appellant.
The learned DPP in his wisdom formulated two issue thus;-
(1) Whether the learned trial judge did not give any consideration to the defence of the accused/appellant before his conviction and sentence.
(2) Whether from the totality of evidence proffered in this case, the prosecutor’s evidence were cogent enough to warrant the conviction of the appellant.
In resolution of these issues, I which to adopt the Appellant’s two issues for the determination of this appeal more so the two issues have similar interpretation.
ISSUE 1.
Whether the learned trial judge was right in not considering the defence put forward by the appellant before the appellants’ conviction and sentence.
The learned appellant counsel submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have considered the defence put forward by the applicant before handing down the pronouncement of conviction, he thereafter argued that the verdict of guilt can only be sustained upon evidence which established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of an accused person and that if there is the slightest doubt in the evidence so adduced as to the guilt of the suspect, that doubt must be resolved in the accused favour.
He further contended that the respondent did not controvert the evidence of the appellant at the lower court, where the appellant alleges that it was when he woke up in the hospital that he was told that, phone was recovered from his pocket where he was arrested. That though the appellant admitted being at the scene of the crime, but denied ever attacking the victim, but that he took to his heels when he saw the police because he was in possession of Indian hemp.
Appellant’s counsel further submitted that the lower court judge did not consider the above mention defence and that the evidence if considered would have exonerated the applicant. He submitted that the defence of an accused person however foolish or stupid it may seem to be ought to be considered, that failure of the lower court to consider same is fatal to the case.
He referred to the cases of REX v KWABARA BIO (1945) 2 WACA 46, NSE UDO NITTA V THE STATE (1993) 3 SCNJ 28 C35 and RASAKI OLA DIPUPO v THE STATE (1993) 6 SCNJ 233-241 to support his submission.
Appellant urged this court to hold that failure of the lower court to consider the defence of the appellant as to why he took to his heels from the scene of the crime occasioned a miscarriage of justice that a court of law is bound to consider the totality of the evidence placed before it. He referred to the cases of ADELENWA v. THE STATE (1972) 7 NSCC 591 at 594 and ELEPENYONG v. THE STATE (1991) (pt 200) 682 at 95 to buttress his agreement.
He submitted that if the lower court had considered the defence, same would have created some doubt in the mind of the court and same would have been resolved in favour of the Appellant, he referred to the case of ANKWA V STATE (1969) 1 ALL NLR 133 at 136 to juxtapose his submission.
Appellant thereafter submitted that finding of facts must be found on credible evidence or reasonable trial, he referred this court to the case of NWOSU v THE STATE (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 348 to buttress his submission and he finally prayed that this court should resolve issue I in the appellants favour. The Learned DPP who is the counsel to the respondent concurred with the appellant that the defence raised by an accused person no matter how stupid or improbable should be given due consideration, he thereafter submitted that defences raised by an accused person must be considered along side the evidence led by the prosecution before lower court can arrive at a conclusion of guilt or otherwise of an accused person and that it is not the duty of the trial court either to expand or unearth any defence in order to make a finding on same. He referred this court to the case of MANAWA OGBONDU v THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 497 AT 304 to support his argument, he further stated that the lower court considered the defence of the appellant before arriving at the conclusion of guilt against the appellant. The DPP went further to summarise the defence of the Appellant that, the Appellant took to his heel because he was with Indian hemp.
The respondent counsel submitted that the defence lack the necessary potency to subsume the direct cogent reasonable and compelling evidence of the prosecution which not only fixes the accused at the scene of crime which provides no vacuum for a doubt between the alleged act and the appellant. He further submitted that the defence of the appellant were shifted incoherent and unreasonable and that no reasonable tribunal would ever belief same.
That the evidence of the prosecution is direct and believable.
The respondent counsel submitted that the only way the prosecution could have controverted the assertions of the appellant was for the appellant to put questions bordering on these assertions to the prosecution witnesses after their evidence in chief. He referred this court to the case of OFORLETE v THE STATE (2000) 12 NWLR (pt 681) 415 at 436 to support his position. The respondent argued that the appellant stating that he was drunk when he was shot and that he was taken away with his face covered goes to no issue as same was never put to any of the prosecution witnesses to elicit that reaction, he thereafter submitted that in the face of the unchallenged evidence of the PW2 and PW3, the trial court was entitled to convict the appellant as charged having considered the defence and found same to be incredible, he thereafter urged this court to resolve issue 1 in favour of the respondent.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE.
I have critically analysed the argument and submission of the two learned counsel and I have similarly gone through the record of proceeding and I am in agreement with the two parties that due consideration must be given to any defence raised by an accused person no matter how stupid or improbable same maybe. To the issue at hand before a court will consider the accused defence he must consider same with other available evidence to reach a veritable conclusion see MANAWA v THE STATE (1987) 3 sc 497 AT 304. The evidence of the respondent and appellant witnesses in the lower court were considered by the lower court. The summary of the case as enunciated by the lower court goes thus ” The accused in his defence denied the allegation of robbery attack but admitted the following facts-
“That he was at the scene of crime at the material time not in connection with the commission of the alleged crime but as an innocent passerby on his way to sawmill motor garage.
That on citing the police he took to his heels because he was not involved in any armed robbery but because he was in possession of Indian hemp. That the Police shot him.
That after being shot he ran in to a nearby house where the police arrested him and the lower court concluded by saying the Appellants evidence holds no water.”
But I pause a bit and ask that, was the defence in the evidence of the appellant considered? Let me reproduce and or paraphrase the evidence of the appellant. He went on thus;
“I am SALIU ISIAKA, I live in Lagos. I am a driver. On 27th August, 2009. I came from Kishi and a vehicle dropped me at Oloje Ilorin. After I ate food at Oloje I started trekking through Adewole estate with the aim of going to Grerialimi. My plan was to sleep at Sawmill so that the following morning I could enter vehicle to Lagos. On reaching Adewole Area, I saw a white vehicle packed with police men I was with cigarette in my pocket I had passed the police before they stopped me. I did not know that anything happened in the area. They stopped me I refused to stop because of the cigarette in my pocket I was about to run when the police shot me on the leg. I refused to stop because of the cigarette in my pocket I discovered that they wanted to kill me so I started running. I. ran inside a house and stayed beside a vehicle in the compound. The police came and met me in the house. They shot me again that is all what I know about the case….. when I woke up, I met myself in the general hospital. I was in the hospital when PW4 asked me for the things I collected from the woman. I told the policemen I did not collect anything from the woman, the police removed handset from their pocket and alleged that they recovered the set from me. The police told me that I was drunk when they arrested me and that I did not know what I was doing…”
The respondent did not cross examine the appellant on this salient issues which would have assisted the court to determine the truthfulness of the evidence of the appellant. The appellant gave reasons why he ran or why he took to his heels because he has Indian hemp in his pocket, this piece of evidence and others as enumerated in his evidence was not considered as a reasonable defence for the Appellant.
An ordinary Nigerian can take to his heels if he sees a Nigerian police man throttling a gun at him. This piece of evidence is germane and reasonable and ought to be considered by the lower court. The lower court should have considered the defence raised by the appellant; it is trite that an accused person’s defence should be considered however stupid or unreasonable for whatever it is worth. See NSE UDO NITTA Vs THE STATE (1993) 3 SENJ 28, 35. RASALU OLADIPUPO v THE STATE (1993) 6 SENJ 233.230-24r and ADELENWA V THE STATE (1972), 7 NSCC 591 and at 594I am very assertive and convinced that if the lower court had considered the defence of the appellant his conclusion could have been different. In Nwosu Vs State (1986) 4 NWLR (pt 35) 348, the Erudite jurist ANIAGOLU JSC held that;
“A judgement sending a man to the gallows must be seen to be the product of logical thinking based upon admissible evidence in which the facts leading to his conviction are clearly found on logical deduction there from carefully made. It cannot be allowed to stand if founded upon scraggy reasoning or a perfunctory Performance. Sic”
In view of the above I hereby resolve that the lower court did not consider all the available defence in favour of the appellant. A court or tribunal should consider the defence of an accused and be sure that the defence has not created any doubt in his mind. Any doubt or uncertainty in any case must be resolve to the advantage of the accused. In this present case the defence, as raised by the appellant created some doubt in my mind and I hereby resolve issue 1 in favour of the appellant against the respondent.
ISSUE TWO –
Whether from the totality of evidence preferred in this case, the prosecution’s evidence were cogent enough to warrant the conviction of the Appellant as found by the learned trial court.
The Appellant’s counsel submitted that the onus of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution to prove the element which is to make up the offence charged, he referred to Section 138(2) of the Evidence Act, he further submitted that the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt and not beyond shadow of any doubt. He thereafter contended that the appellant denied the allegation. He further argued that none of the prosecution witnesses gave cogent evidence linking the appellant to the commissioning of the crime. He thereafter assessed the evidence of all the witnesses.
Appellant counsel further argued that none of the witnesses gave cogent evidence linking the accused to the commission of the crime, that even though the lower court discountenanced the purported confessional statement of the accused, the court still held the appellant liable for the offence charged. He further argued that the PW2, who was hit, did not know what was used to hit her, and that based on the evidence of PW3, it shows that the appellant was not arrested at the scene of the crime. That the evidence of PW3 corroborates that of the appellant who took to his heels when he saw the police, and that the piece of evidence was neither investigated nor considered by the lower court.
Learned counsel further submitted, that Exhibit P1 (the cudgel) and Exhibit P2 (Nokia phone) were recovered from the appellant at the time of his arrest and that the victim could not have identified the accused because the incident took place in the dark and the victim was attacked from the back.
Appellant further submitted that given the surrounding circumstances of this case, and the state of mind of PW 2, she could not have identified the appellant. That the evidence of PW 2 was mere suspicion, counsel submitted that the totality of evidence before the learned trial judge only creates suspicion and doubt in the mind of the court. He thereafter submitted, that suspicion no matter how strong cannot ground conviction, he referred to the cases of ABACHA V STATE (2002) 7 SCNJ 35 AND SHEU V THE STATE (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt.523) 1841 AND 1860 AND ANUWA V STATE (1969) 1 ALL NLR 133 AND 136 to buttress his argument and submission.
Learned counsel submitted that the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery are as follows;
That there was a robbery or series of robberies.
That the robbery or each robbery was an armed robbery or robberies.
That the accused took part in the armed robberies, he referred to the case of SUBERV V STATE (2010) ALL FRLR (PT520) 1263 AND 1286
He thereafter submitted that there are no legally admissible evidence to link the appellant with the essential elements of the offence of robbery charged and he prayed this court to discharge and acquit the appellant. The appellant counsel submitted that albeit the judgment of the lower court was found on circumstantial evidence and he thereafter submitted that for circumstantial evidence to ground a conviction, it must lead only to one conclusion, namely the guilt of the accused person and that the proof of circumstantial evidence in this case falls short of the standard and quality required in law to sustain the conviction of the appellant and he referred this court to the case of STATE V OGUNBANJO (2001) 2 NWLR (PT698) 576 AND 587 to buttress his submission.
Finally, he prayed this court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower court.
The respondent on his part submitted that the expression, ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt” as a cardinal principle of criminal liability is not and should not be taken for proof beyond every shadow doubt, that what SECTION 133(1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT intends is that an offence must have been committed and that there is no other person other than the accused who committed the offence, and that once the two are established, it is then certain that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The Learned DPP further submitted that absence of reasonable doubt does not mean certainty of truth but means a high degree of probability of the accused’s commission of the offence, he referred this court to the case of MILLER V MINISTER OF PENSION (1947) 2 ALL ER 372, ILORI V STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 81 AND 99 AND AWALEZI V STATE (1993) 2 NWLR (PT. 273) 1 AND 13 CR to support his submissions.
The learned counsel went further to argue that the evidence led by the prosecution in their case particularly that of the PW2 and PW3 establishes the twin- fold principle in criminal culpability. Counsel further submitted that it is apparent that the prosecution established his case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, The Respondent counsel argued that paragraph 7 .02 of the Appellant Brief denied committing the offence, but said that the argument goes to no issue because;
The accused/appellant confessional statement which formed the basis of these denials is eventually rejected by the trial court in a well considered ruling.
The appellant was seen at the scene of crime and there was no breeding space between the commission of the crime alleged and the arrest of the Appellant.
The item stolen from PW3, Exhibit P2 and the cudgel used, Exhibit P1 were recovered from the accused at the scene of crime; That the community reading of the evidence of Pw2 and Pw3 as contained in pages 35-38 of the record will lead this court to just one conclusion, that the appellant herein was rightly convicted as charged and that the three ingredients of armed robbery were established. Learned counsel further submitted that the Appellant was arrested at the scene of the crime and Exhibit P2 was found on him and it will be wrong for the Appellant to contend that no evidence nailed the appellant. He thereafter submitted that evidence of PW2 and PW3 are not evidence based on suspicions but eye witnesses’ Account, whose evidence were neither challenged nor corroborated before the lower court. He referred this court to the case of OFARLEDE V STATE (SUPRA) and urged this court to discountenance the witnesses cited by the appellant under paragraph 7 .02- 80.1 and he prayed this court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO
As noted above, the prosecution called three witnesses and it is evidently clear that PW2 was hit with an object which the prosecution referred to as Exhibit 1, while the appellant claimed, he took to his heels when he saw the police because he has hemp in his pocket. The whole incident happened at night when it was dark, the PW3 gave an insight that it was the head light of their patrol vehicle that was on before they shot, pursued and arrested the appellant. From the evidence evaluated above, the appellant was not arrested at the scene but the prosecution claimed that Exhibit I was found on him when the Appellant was arrested.
It should be noted that the lower court in its wisdom never acted on the appellants statement. I do not agree with the submission of the learned DPP that absence of reasonable doubt does not me an certainty of truth, but means a high degree of probability of the accused commission of the offence. Unlike mathematics where proof is attained through addition and subtraction with assertive answers, proof in criminal trial is attained against the background of the burden enshrined in SECTION 133(1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT which provides thus.
“If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceedings is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt”
This Section does not impose a duty on the accused person to purge himself of guilt rather it imposes an obligation on the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 36(5) of the 1999 constitution provides that “Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until proven guilty provided that nothing in this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon any such person the burden of proving particular facts.”
The Courts have interpreted the section as putting the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person on the prosecution. See BELLO V STATE (2007)10 NWLR pt 1043, 564, OLADELE V NIGERLAN ARMY (2004) 6 NWLR pt 868 at pg 166 and OBIAKO V THE STATE (2002) 10 NWLR pt 776 at 612.
It should be noted that our criminal justice system in Nigeria is accusatorial in nature and not inquisitorial in nature. Hence, no matter the gravity of the charge it remains a mere allegation until it is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It has been said on numerous occasions, that if a suspect or an accused is caught committing an offence the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt is on the prosecution and not on the accused to prove his innocence failure of which the accused will be acquitted, as the accused or suspect is entitled to a benefit of doubt. The doubt must be genuine and reasonable, one arising from evidence before a court. Any doubt whatsoever, must be resolved in favour of the accused. See OLALEKUN v THE STATE (2002) 4 NWLR Pt.146. It is only after the prosecution has discharged this burden ,that is’ proved the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt that the evidential burden shifts to the accused person. It is only them that that evidential burden shifts to the accused person to adduce evidence of other fact which may raise reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution. See section 138(3) 139, 141 and 143 of the Evidence Act. And where the court is in doubt the effect is that the prosecution failed to discharge the onus laid down by the law and the accused person will be acquitted. See UGBENEYOVWE v. STATE (2004) 12 NWLR Pt.888

The ingredients of the offence of armed robbery further to the Robbery and Fire Arms Act are as follows;
(1) That there was robbery
(2) That the accused person was armed with dangerous weapon and
(3) That on the evidence before the court the accused person committed the robbery.
See SABERU v. THE STATE (2010) All FWLR (Pt.52D) 1263 at 12 86 paragraph C.D. BOZIN v. STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.8) 465) at 469 and NWACHUKWU v. STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.25) 765 at 776.
The victim in her testimony said and I quote;
“I went to my friends house called Mummy Mariam along Atiku road, Olorunsogo, Ilorin. I was coming back when my telephone handset rang. I answered it and got a bang on my head. I fell down and my phone dropped.”
Shun of any embellishment, she was hit with a hard substance from the back at night. She could not have identified the person that hit her nor the substance that was used in hitting her because it was in the night.
The Appellant’s evidence that he took to his heels because there was Indian
hemp in his pocket was given and this piece of evidence was not disputed in anyway and without a proper evaluation the evidence was discarded.
EMMANUEL OLAYINKA AYO OLA JSC as in OFORLETE V THE STATE (supra) that
“Where there is an unchallenged evidence, the court is not only entitled to act on or accept such evidence but is in fact bound to do so provided that such evidence by its very nature is not incredible.”
To my mind the Appellant cannot be tied to the scene of the commission of the crime more so, the prosecution cannot establish the object used to hit the alleged victim. To proof an offence it will by either direct evidence
By circumstantial evidence and or By confessional statement. See the cases of EMEKA V STATE (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt734) 666 at 683 AND ADIO V STATE (1986) 5 SC 194 at 219-220
The confessional statement of the accused person which was admitted by the court after a trial- within- trial would have formed a fulcrum of the case of the prosecution but in the wisdom of the lower court, same was discountenanced living the case of the appellant direct, cognate and believable.
The summary of the evidence of the accused person was;
That he was at the scene of the crime at the material time not in connection with the commission of the alleged crime but as an innocent passer-by on his way to sawmill motor garage.
That on sighting the police he took to his heels not because he was involved in any armed robbery but because he was in possession of Indian hemp.
That the police shot him. That after being shot he ran into a near-by house where the police later arrested him.
From the capsule summary of the evidence above, it is clear that the piece of evidence stands and it is not distorted in anyway. The prosecution is said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, when it has proved all the ingredients of a particular offence with which the accused person is charged. See JAMANI v STATE (2005) 131 and NAASON v STATE (1993) 6 SCNJ (PT1) 55, 69.

Consistent with this rule, a court cannot draw an inference of guilt from mere suspicion.
The prosecution did not establish the ingredient of armed robbery against the appellant. After assessing the totality of evidence proffered in this case. I hold that the prosecution’s evidence was not cogent enough to warrant the conviction of the appellant.
In view of the above, I resolve issue two in favour of the appellant against the respondent.
From the totality of the evidence before this honour able court, in which I held that essential ingredients of armed robbery were not proved, I hereby enter an order allowing this Appeal in view of the foregoing, I accordingly, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the lower court. I further discharge and acquit the Appellant. It is the cardinal principle of the law that it is better for a guilty person to go scot free than allow an innocent person to go to prison.

TIJJANI ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the lead judgment prepared and delivered by my learned brother, DENTON WEST; J.C.A., just delivered. My Lordship has meticulously dealt with all the live issues that call for our determination in this appeal.
I am in agreement with my noble Lord that the appeal is pregnant with a lot of merit and I too allow same in the terms set out in the lead judgment.

CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.: I agree

Appearances

DR AKIN ONIGBINDE WITH HIM TUNDE FALOLAFor Appellant

AND

J.A MUMINI, DPP KWARA STATEFor Respondent