MR.VITALIS E. ODUNZE V. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS.
(2010)LCN/4144(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 15th day of December, 2010
CA/A/71/2008
RATIO
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION: WHETHER A RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL HAVING ADOPTED AND ARGUED THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE APPELLANT, CAN GO AHEAD TO FORMULATE AN ISSUE OUTSIDE THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL FILED BY THE APPELLANT
… Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondent in addition to adopting and arguing the issues formulated in the Appellants’, brief, raised his own issue and argued his own issue which he did not indicate from which of the grounds of appeal it was derived. This is quite strange to the established practice because having adopted and argued the issues raised by the Appellant, the Respondents’ Counsel was no longer at liberty to formulate an issue outside the two grounds of appeal from which the said issues were distilled since he did not file a Cross appeal or file a Respondent’s notice. See: AKINBOBOLA V. STATE (1991) 8 NWLR (208) 191, AKINLAGUN V. OSHOBOJA (2006) ALL FWLR (325) 53, JAWANDO v. BAKARE (2006) ALL FWLR (332) 1590. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
FORMULATION OF ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION: POSITION OF THE LAW ON PRACTICES NOT PERMITTED BY THE COURT IN FORMULATION OF ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
…there are only two grounds of appeal from which the two (2) issues were distilled in the Appellant’s brief, it would amount to prolife- ration of issues for the Counsel to raise and argue an additional issue. That is a practice that has always been deprecated by the Courts in cases that include: IBRAHIM V. OJOMO (2004) 1 SC (II) 136; NWAIGWE V. OKERE (2008) 9 MJSC, 86; UBA V. ABDULLAHI (2003) 3 NWLR (807) 359; IGWEGBE V. EZUMA (1999) 6 NWLR (606) 205. Apart from proliferation of issues by formulating more issues in number than the grounds of appeal, splitting issues into bits and pieces is also not permitted and is unacceptable in law. See: OSAZUMA V. ISIBOR (2004) 3 NWLR (859) 16; UNOKAN EWI V. OMUVWIE (2005) ALL FWLR (262) 501 at 514; SALAMI V. LAWWAL (2008) ALL FWLR (438) 200 AT 229. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: WHAT WILL BE CONSIDERED WHEN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IS CHALLENGED
As a foundation, learned Counsel is right that where the jurisdiction of a Court is challenged in a case, the relevant materials to be considered in the determination of the issue are the writ of summons or /and the statement of claim as the case may require. See: ABDULHAMID v. AKAR (2006) ALL FWLR (321) 1191: SHELIM v. GOBANG (2009) 6 MJSC (II) 162, OLORUNTOBAOJU v. DOPAMU (2008) 41 MJSC 1; NIKA FISHING v. LAVINA (2008) 11 MJSC.43. In ONUORAH v. KPRC (supra) also reported in (2005) 2 SC (II) 1 at 10. it was held by the Supreme Court, per Dozie, JSC that:- “It is settled law that in order to determine the claim before the Court and consequently, whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertained the action, it is necessary to have recourse to the writ of summons und the statement of claim.” PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT: WHETHER THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER MATTERS INVOLVING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCIES WHICH ARISE FROM SIMPLE CONTRACT
The law is settled that in actions involving the Federal Government or any of its agencies which arise from simple contract the Federal High Court does not enjoy that exclusive jurisdiction vested by the provisions of Section 251(1)(p) and (r). In the case of ADELEKAN v. ECU-LINE (2006) ALL FWLR (321) 1213 at 1226, the Supreme Court had this to say on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution:- “section 251 of the 1999 Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court but the jurisdiction so conferred does not include dealing with any case of simple contract or damages for negligence.” See also ONUORAH v. KPRC (supra) PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT: WHAT ARE THE PRE-CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED OR MET TOGETHER BEFORE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT CAN BE PROPERLY INVOKED
Generally speaking, the law is that under the provisions of Section 251(1)(p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution the Federal High court is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction in matters or causes involving the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies and any action for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. See: ASO MOTEL KADUNA v. ADEYEMO (2006) 7 NWLR (978) 87; ONUORAH v. KPRC (Supra); NEPA v. ADEGBENRO (2002) 18 NWLR (789) 79; OWENA BANK PLC. V. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK (2000) 5 NWLR (658) 635. For the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction in the cases against Federal Government or any of its agencies, the action must involve the administration or management and control of such agencies or for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any exclusive or administrative action or decision by any of the agencies of the Federal Government. In other words for the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 251(1)(p) and (r), there are conditions precedent which are thus:- (i) The action must be one against the Federal Government or any of its agencies; (ii) The action must be for declaration or injunction; (iii) The action must affect the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. These pre-conditions must be satisfied or met together before the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court can properly be invoked. See: ASO MOTEL KADUNA V. ADEYEMO (2006) 7 NWLR (979) 87 at 113-4; ACHEBE V. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (818) 103 AT 127-8. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
ACADEMIC ISSUES: ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS TOWARDS ACADEMIC ISSUES
Since the courts have no business in considering issues which are no longer live in the matters before them but only offer academic opinion, it is unnecessary to proceed with a consideration of the Appellant’s issue 2. See: ONOCHIE v. ODOGWU (2006) ALL FWLR (317) 544; NKWOCHA v. GOVERNOR, ANAMBRA STATE (1984) 6 SC 362; A.G. ANAMBRA v. A.G. FEDERATION (2005) ALL FWLR (268) 1557 at 1602. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MR.VITALIS E. ODUNZE Appellant(s)
AND
1. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SERVICE COMMISSION
2. THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SERVICE COMMISSION
3. SENATOR EXE DARLINGTON AJOKU
4. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant had taken out a writ of summons from the Registry of the F.C.T. High court (to be called High court hereafter) claiming declarative reliefs, payment of outstanding salaries, severance benefits and general damages against the Respondents for wrongful termination of contract of employment. The 1st and 2nd Respondents objected to the competence of the High court to entertain the suit on the ground that the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents are agencies of the Federal Government over which that Court had no jurisdiction. In reaction to the objection, the Appellant contended that though the 1st, 2nd and 4th Respondents are contract of employment and so the High court had the jurisdiction to entertain it. In a ruling delivered on 17/12/07, the High Court upheld the objection and held that the suit arose from the administrative and executive decision of the Respondents which was caught up by the provisions of Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution That it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and so struck it out.
Apparently, the Appellant was dissatisfied with the said decision and caused a Notice of Appeal to be filed on the 16/1/08 on two (2) grounds.
In the Appellant’s brief filed on the 18/4/08 in line with the practice of the Court, two (2) issues were formulated from the grounds as follows:-
“1. Whether the failure of the lower Court to make a finding of fact as to the status of the plaintiffs contract of employment before reaching the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff is caught by Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not amount to miscarriage of justice.
2. Whether contracts of employment which do not have Statutory flavor cannot be categorized as ‘simple contracts’.”
The 1st and 2nd Respondents, brief of argument was filed on the 25/11/08 but deemed filed on 6/10/10.
In what is a practice unknown to the Rules of practice and procedure in brief writing, Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondent in addition to adopting and arguing the issues formulated in the Appellants’, brief, raised his own issue and argued his own issue which he did not indicate from which of the grounds of appeal it was derived. This is quite strange to the established practice because having adopted and argued the issues raised by the Appellant, the Respondents’ Counsel was no longer at liberty to formulate an issue outside the two grounds of appeal from which the said issues were distilled since he did not file a Cross appeal or file a Respondent’s notice. See:
AKINBOBOLA V. STATE (1991) 8 NWLR (208) 191, AKINLAGUN V. OSHOBOJA (2006) ALL FWLR (325) 53, JAWANDO v. BAKARE (2006) ALL FWLR (332) 1590.
If the learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not think that the issues formulated in the Appellants’ brief represent the crucial or germane issue/s that require determination in the appeal, he had the option to formulate issue/s which in his view would determine the appeal from the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. But he cannot adopt and argue the issues formulated by the Appellant and still go ahead to raise and argue his own different and separate issue. Because there are only two grounds of appeal from which the two (2) issues were distilled in the Appellant’s brief, it would amount to prolife- ration of issues for the Counsel to raise and argue an additional issue. That is a practice that has always been deprecated by the Courts in cases that include: IBRAHIM V. OJOMO (2004) 1 SC (II) 136; NWAIGWE V. OKERE (2008) 9 MJSC, 86; UBA V. ABDULLAHI (2003) 3 NWLR (807) 359; IGWEGBE V. EZUMA (1999) 6 NWLR (606) 205.
Apart from proliferation of issues by formulating more issues in number than the grounds of appeal, splitting issues into bits and pieces is also not permitted and is unacceptable in law. See: OSAZUMA V. ISIBOR (2004) 3 NWLR (859) 16; UNOKAN EWI V. OMUVWIE (2005) ALL FWLR (262) 501 at 514; SALAMI V. LAWWAL (2008) ALL FWLR (438) 200 AT 229. For these reasons, the issue raised and argued as Issue 3 in the 1st and 2nd Respondent’s brief after adopting and arguing the Issues raised in the Appellant’s brief of argument, is an incompetent issue which is hereby struck out. In the result, the appeal would be considered on the basis of the arguments by learned counsel on the two (2) issues set out in the Appellant’s brief to which I now turn.
On the issue 1, it was submitted for the Appellant that it was wrong for the High Court not to have evaluated the Appellant’s statement of claim (s/claim) to find out the nature of the contract of employment before deciding that it was caught by Section 251(1(p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution. That it was the claim that the High court was to look at and not the parties in order to find out whether or not it had jurisdiction over the suit, relying on ONUORAH v. KPRC MJSC, 137 at 154 where it was to have been held that the question whether a defendant is an agent or agency of Federal Government plays no role when a consideration of the jurisdiction of a court is being made because jurisdiction is donated by the claim and not parties before the Court. The cases of ADEYEMI v. OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC. 31;IZENKWE v. NNADOZIE (1952) 14 WACA. 36; TUKUR v. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (117) 517 at 549 and ADETAYO v. ADEMOLA (2010) 3-5 SC (II) 87 at 105 were in addition, cited on the point. It was further submitted that if the High court had considered the nature of the Appellant’s claim as contained in Annexture 1, and paragraph 4 of the statement of claim, it would have assumed jurisdiction since it had the duty to evaluate the nature of the claim before it and the authorities cited at the hearing of the objection. SAGAY v. SAJERE (2000) 6 NWLR (661) 360 at 364; ODUGBO v. ABU (2001) 14 NWLR (732) 45; ONUORAH v. KPRC (supra) and ADELEKAN v. ECU-LINE NV (2006) 31 WRN, 1 were cited on the duty of the High Court to evaluate the statement of claim in its decision and we were invited to evaluate the Appellant’s statement of claim and contract of employment and allow the appeal.
For the 1st and 2nd Respondent, it was submitted on the Issue 1 that the High court had carefully evaluated the Appellant’s statement of claim before holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
After setting out the reliefs contained in the Appellant’s statement of claim it was contended that the claim is for wrongful termination of employment and so is different from the breach of a commercial contract involved in the case of ONUORAH v. KPRC (supra) relied on by the Appellant. Further, that the Appellant’s case is on the administrative action of terminating the employment of a staff by an agent of the Federal Government which on the authority of AYENI v. UNILORIN (2000) 2 NWLR (644) 290 at 294 is caught up by the provision of Section 251(1)(p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution. It was then argued that the case of SAGAY V. SAJERE (supra) does not apply as it borders on a final judgment of a Court which had jurisdiction to hear a matter unlike in the Appellant’s case which in the absence of jurisdiction, the High Court had no business going into evidence as it would have amounted to an exercise in futility. The cases of:
MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (2000) 2 SCNLR, 341 and JERIC (NIG) LTD V. UBN PLC. (2000) 15 NWLR (691) 447 at 449 inter alia, were referred on jurisdiction and it was finally submitted that the Appellant had admitted the source of his employment in paragraphs 2-4 of the statement which shows that the termination of the employment is an administrative action of the 1st Respondent and no more. Once again, the case of AYENI v. UNILORIN (supra) was relied on and we were urged to resolve the issue in the Respondents’ favour.
I would determine this issue first before a look at the submissions on the issue 2.
As a foundation, learned Counsel is right that where the jurisdiction of a Court is challenged in a case, the relevant materials to be considered in the determination of the issue are the writ of summons or /and the statement of claim as the case may require. See: ABDULHAMID v. AKAR (2006) ALL FWLR (321) 1191: SHELIM v. GOBANG (2009) 6 MJSC (II) 162, OLORUNTOBAOJU v. DOPAMU (2008) 41 MJSC 1; NIKA FISHING v. LAVINA (2008) 11 MJSC.43.
In ONUORAH v. KPRC (supra) also reported in (2005) 2 SC (II) 1 at 10. it was held by the Supreme Court, per Dozie, JSC that:-
“It is settled law that in order to determine the claim before the Court and consequently, whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertained the action, it is necessary to have recourse to the writ of summons und the statement of claim.”
The complaint of the Appellant in his issue 1 is that the High court did not consider or evaluate the statement before its decision appealed against.
The position of the learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondent is that the High Court had carefully evaluated the said statement of claim before arriving at its decision. A close look at the relevant part of the decision appealed against would reveal and show who, between learned Counsel is right on the issue.
The Ruling of the High court against which the appeal was filed is contained at pages 53-56 of the record of appeal (written at the top of the record in bold black ink). Pages 53-55 contain a review of the submissions by learned Counsel on the objection before that Court while the last two (2) lines of page 55 and page 56 contain the decision by the Court on the objection.
It is expedient to set out the finding of the High Court on which the decision was based since it is about half a page in aggregate. It is as follows:-
“On the part of the Court after careful perusal of all the processes filed and also examine the arguments of Counsel from both sides it is the opinion of this Court that the 1st defendant is an agency of the Federal Government as contemplated by S. 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
In the circumstances of this case, it seems to me that the termination of the appointment of the Plaintiff was both an executive and administrative decision therefore the action instituted by the Plaintiff arose from that administrative and executive decision of the defendants which is caught by S. 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High court. This case is hereby struck out.”
The above decision by the High court leaves no doubt on the fact that neither the writ of summons nor the statement of claim filed by the Appellant was specifically mentioned. Let alone considered before the decision that the 1st Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government as contemplated by Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the termination of the Appellant’s appointment was both an executive and administrative decision of the 1st Respondent. I should say that it was not sufficient for the High Court to have merely said “on the part of the Court after careful perusal of all processes filed and also examine the arguments of Counsel from both sides…”
The High court’s primary duty was to have specifically considered on the record, the relevant materials from the processes filed in line with the law as decided in the authorities cited by the learned Counsel and then arrive at its decision one way or the other on the objection. It is only when the record of appeal shows such a consideration that the High court would have dutifully discharged its primary function of “careful perusal of all the processes filed and examine arguments of Counsel from both sides. The opinion or findings of the High Court can only come from the proper assessment or evaluation of the writ of summons and statement of claim along with submissions by learned Counsel which should appear clearly in the record of appeal. In the absence of the record of such assessment or evaluation of the relevant processes, I have no difficulty in agreeing with the learned counsel for the Appellant that the High court did not evaluate, assess of even consider the Appellant’s writ of summons or statement of claim before the decision that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s suit’ As can easily be observed’ the only basis, ground or reason for the High court decision was that the 1st Respondent was an agency of the Federal Government and so the termination of the Appellant’s employment was its executive and administrative decision.
The law is settled that in actions involving the Federal Government or any of its agencies which arise from simple contract the Federal High Court does not enjoy that exclusive jurisdiction vested by the provisions of Section 251(1)(p) and (r). In the case of ADELEKAN v. ECU-LINE (2006) ALL FWLR (321) 1213 at 1226, the Supreme Court had this to say on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution:-
“section 251 of the 1999 Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court but the jurisdiction so conferred does not include dealing with any case of simple contract or damages for negligence.”
See also ONUORAH v. KPRC (supra)
Generally speaking, the law is that under the provisions of Section 251(1)(p) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution the Federal High court is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction in matters or causes involving the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies and any action for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. See:
ASO MOTEL KADUNA v. ADEYEMO (2006) 7 NWLR (978) 87; ONUORAH v. KPRC (Supra); NEPA v. ADEGBENRO (2002) 18 NWLR (789) 79; OWENA BANK PLC. V. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK (2000) 5 NWLR (658) 635.
For the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction in the cases against Federal Government or any of its agencies, the action must involve the administration or management and control of such agencies or for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any exclusive or administrative action or decision by any of the agencies of the Federal Government. In other words for the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 251(1)(p) and (r), there are conditions precedent which are thus:-
(i) The action must be one against the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(ii) The action must be for declaration or injunction;
(iii) The action must affect the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
These pre-conditions must be satisfied or met together before the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court can properly be invoked. See:
ASO MOTEL KADUNA V. ADEYEMO (2006) 7 NWLR (979) 87 at 113-4; ACHEBE V. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (818) 103 AT 127-8.
In the present appeal, the parties do not dispute that the 1st Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government charged with inter alia, employment of members of staff of the National Assembly as well as provision of support staff to the members of the National Assembly.
This was provided for in Section ? of the National Assembly Commission Act. In addition, it is not disputed that the Appellant was employed by the 1st Respondent into the Service of the National Assembly as a Senior Legislative Aid to the 3rd Respondent vide a letter of appointment pleaded in paragraph 4 of the Appellant’s statement of claim which is at pages 5-7 of the record of appeal. The cause of action in the FCT High Court was the alleged wrongful and illegal termination of the said employment vide a letter pleaded in paragraph 6 of the statement of claim and the claims or reliefs sought therein were as follows:-
“1. A declaration that the termination of the Plaintiffs employment was wrongful and illegal
2. An Order of Court directing the defendant to pay the Plaintiff all his accrued salary and severance benefits from the date of the illegal termination of his employment to the end of March 2007 when the Plaintiffs employment shall have come to an end by effluxion of time.
3. General damage against the defendants of Ten million Naira N10,000,000.00 for wrongful termination of employment, loss of income and putting the Plaintiff in shock and hardship.
4. Cost for bringing this action.”
Looking at the above claims alongside the letters of employment and termination upon which the claims were based, it is prima facie clear that though the claims were made against all the Respondents, including the 1st Respondent, an agency of the Federal Government, the action is not one which challenged the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision of the 1st Respondent. By the averment in paragraph 6 of the statement of claim and annexture ‘2’ named therein, the alleged wrongful termination of the Appellant’s appointment was not an executive or administrative action or decision of the 1st Respondent as envisaged by the provisions of Section 251(1)(p) and (r) to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the action/claims in the Federal High Court. In the circumstances, the mere presence of the 1st Respondent as a Respondent to the action did not change the character of the claim to one over which the Federal High Court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction. Like I have alluded to before now, it is the claims either on the writ of summons or statement of claim that determines the jurisdiction of a Court and not the parties even in cases provided for under Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Once the claims do not fall within those specifically provided for and set out in the provisions of the subsection, the fact that a party to the action was a Federal Government Agency would be of no moment in the determination of the jurisdiction of the Court.
The nature of the claim and not the status of a Respondent as a Federal Government agency is what should and what determines whether the Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction or not over the case. Put another way, the nature of the claims and not the parties is fundamental in the determination of whether or not the Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an action.
It is for this reason that the FCT High Court was in error in the finding that simply because the 1st Respondent was an agency of the Federal Government, the Federal High court had exclusive jurisdiction over the Appellant’s claims irrespective of their nature. See: ADELEKAN v. ECU-LINE (supra); ASO MOTEL KADUNA v. ADEYEMO (supra).
In the result, I resolve the Issue 1 in favour of the Appellant.
My determination of the Appellant’s Issue 1 has subsumed and overtaken the Issue 2 since it is capable and sufficient to dispose of the appeal. Whether contracts of employment which do not have statutory flavor cannot be categorized as simple contracts is purely academic with the determination of the Issue 1 as its determination would have no bearing or effect whatsoever on the appeal. Since the courts have no business in considering issues which are no longer live in the matters before them but only offer academic opinion, it is unnecessary to proceed with a consideration of the Appellant’s issue 2. See:
ONOCHIE v. ODOGWU (2006) ALL FWLR (317) 544; NKWOCHA v. GOVERNOR, ANAMBRA STATE (1984) 6 SC 362; A.G. ANAMBRA v. A.G. FEDERATION (2005) ALL FWLR (268) 1557 at 1602.
In the final result, with my resolution of the issue one in favour of the Appellant I find merit in the appeal and allow it for the reasons set out earlier. Accordingly the decision of the FCT High Court striking out the Appellant’s case No. FCT/HC/CV/403/07 contained in the ruling delivered on the 17/12/07 is hereby set aside. The said suit is hereby restored on the Cause list of that Court and hereby remitted to the Chief Judge for assignment and determination.
The parties shall each bear their costs of prosecuting the appeal.
HON. JUSTICE PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A: I have had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Garba, JCA and I entirely agree with the lucid reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat. I have nothing useful to add to the judgment as my learned brother has covered the field. For the same reasons as ably articulated in the lead judgment, I too allow the appeal and endorse all the consequential orders therein, including order as to cost.
HON JUSTICE REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A.: I have read the Lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, GARBA, J.C.A. and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion.
He has covered the issues canvassed in this appeal and I have nothing useful to add, other than re-emphasis that Jurisdiction vested in the Federal High Court is not unlimited. The Federal High Court is a creation of Statute and enjoys limited jurisdiction specifically conferred by the Federal High Court Act, Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any enabling Statute, Thus the subject matter of a case is fundamental in the determination of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court from the nature of the claim in the instant case the Federal High Court is not vested with exclusive Jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
For the above reasons contained in the Lead judgment I hold this appeal has merit and is allowed.
I abide by the consequential Order made.
Appearances
O. J. AbojeFor Appellant
AND
Onyebuchi Obeta – for the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
3rd and 4th Respondents absent and not represented. Both served on 7/10/10.For Respondent
