EJIKE JOE AJALA v. OGBONNA OKOGBUE & ANOR
(2010)LCN/4035(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 11th day of November, 2010
CA/OW/75/2009
RATIO
STATUTE BARRED: WHETHER THE ISSUE OF AN ACTION BEING STATUTE BARRED CAN ONLY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL WITH THE LEAVE OF COURT
…the issue of an action being statute barred is a substantial question of law, which the Respondents can only raise for the first time on appeal with leave of this court. DODO DABO v. ALH. IKIRA ABDULLAHI (2005) 2 SCNJ 76, LEBILE v. C & S CHURCH (2003) 1 SCNJ 463… PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL: WHETHER ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION MUST FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
…OLOWOSAGO v. ADEBANJO (1988) 4 NWLR Pt.88 Pg. 275 at 283, the Supreme Court held that issues for determination are not at large, but must fall within the purview of the grounds of appeal filed. See also LATUNDE v. LAJINFIN (1989) 3 NWLR Pt. 108 Pg. 177 at 184. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND: DUTY PLACED ON A CLAIMANT IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND
In an action for declaration of title to land there is need for the claimant to plead and proof his root of title before he can base his claim of title on acts of ownership or long possession. See JOHN OWHONDA v. ALPHONSO CHUKWUEMEKA EKPECHI (2003) 9 SCNJ 1. Also, in an action for declaration of title to land, where the claimant relies on traditional history, he has the duty to plead and prove who founded the land, how the land was founded, the intervening owners through whom he derived his title and their particulars. Where this has not been done, the claim is not proved. See OKPALA EZEOKWONKO & ORS. v. NWAFOR OKEKE & ORS. (2002) 5 SCNJ 1. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND: WHETHER A PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH ALL THE WAYS OF PROVING TITLE TO LAND BEFORE HIS CLAIM CAN SUCCEED
… the law is that although there are five established ways of proving title to land and a Plaintiff may succeed by proving one method, he is obliged to prove at least one method since not all the methods are mutually exclusive of each other. I do not with the greatest respect agree with the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the different ways of proving ownership of land are disjunctive. The methods are in fact independent and not disjunctive. Where a Plaintiff relies on traditional history as well as acts of ownership and long possession based or predicated on the same traditional history, he must fail where the evidence of traditional history is unproven. See COSMUS EZUKWU v. PETER UKACHUKWU & ANOR (2004) 7 SCNJ 189. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
DUTY OF COURT: DUTY OF THE COURT WHERE THERE IS A CONFLICT IN THE TRADITIONAL HISTORY PROFFERED BY THE PARTIES IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND
In an action for declaration of title to land, where there is conflict in the traditional history proffered by the parties, it is the duty of the court to accept or reject one version or the other fully or as a package. See LASISI MORENIKEJI & ORS. v. LALEKE ADEGBOSIN & ORS. (2003) 4 SCNJ 105. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDUL-KADIR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
EJIKE JOE AJALA Appellant(s)
AND
1. OGBONNA OKOGBUE
2. MAGGI S. OKOGBUE Respondent(s)
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal by the Appellant, who was the Plaintiff in the suit at the trial in the court below against the judgment of Hon. Justice Obisike Oji sitting at the High Court of Abia State, Isikwuato Judicial Division and delivered on 30th March, 2009.
The Appellant as the Plaintiff in the court below in his amended statement of claim had claimed against the Respondents who were the Defendants the following reliefs, inter alia:
“(a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy over and in respect of the parcels or pieces of land known as and called “Abor Uriem” situate at Elegwunta Ndi Ohia Amaba Isuikwuato in Isuikwuato Local Government Area of Abia State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court and verged pink in the Plaintiff’s survey plan in this suit.
(b) N=1,000,000.00 (one million Naira) being damages for the various acts of trespass by the Defendants on the said Plaintiff’s land.
(c) An order of injunction permanently restraining the Defendants or their agents, privies, servants or those claiming through them from further trespassing into and continuing their trespasses on the Plaintiff’s “Abor Uriem” land in whatever form or by whatever means whatsoever.”
The Appellant was the Plaintiff while the Respondents were the Defendants at the trial court. The Respondents did not counter-claim. Issues were joined and the case was tried by the lower court. At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge dismissed the Appellant’s claim. Hence this appeal.
The Appellant’s brief was dated and filed on 17/09/09 and reply brief also dated 25/11/09 was deemed filed on 11/10/10. The Respondent’s brief was dated 5/10/09 and filed on 6/10/09.
The Appellant identified four issues for determination as follows:
i. Whether the trial court properly evaluated the totality of the evidence adduced before it, particularly that of the Appellant, before arriving at its decision.
ii. Whether the trial court was right in law to have side-tracked the Appellant’s root of title which was predicated on traditional history or evidence and instead based its judgment on acts of possession or ownership.
iii. Whether the trial court was right to have relied on a Customary Court judgment in which the appellant was not a party in dismissing the Appellant’s claim.
iv. Whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence adduced before the trial court.
The Respondents also identified three issues for determination. They are set out below:
a) Whether the trial court properly evaluated the totality of the evidence before it before arriving at its decision.
b) Whether the learned trial judge was not right in referring to the Customary Court judgment, Exhibit D.
c) Whether the Appellant’s suit was not statute barred considering when the cause of action arose.
I will rephrase the issues in order to best set out the complaints of the Appellant and crystallize his complaints into two and will utilize them in the determination of this appeal. They are set out below:-
1. Whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence adduced before it and came to a right conclusion in view of the fact that both parties relied on traditional history as their root of title.
2. Whether the trial court was right in referring to or relying on a Customary Court judgment contained in Exh. D in deciding the appellant’s claim.
The Respondents raised the issue of statute bar for the first time on appeal as their 3rd issue for determination. I agree with the learned senior counsel for the Appellant as ably argued in the reply brief and will not deign to consider the issue at all as it is an affront to the Appellate jurisprudence. The argument of Respondents’ counsel that he can raise the issue of jurisdiction as a new issue for the first time on appeal without leave is preposterous. The issue of whether the action was statute barred did not come before the trial court and thus there was no pronouncement on it. Consequently, there was no ground of appeal based on it. Not only that, the issue of an action being statute barred is a substantial question of law, which the Respondents can only raise for the first time on appeal with leave of this court. DODO DABO v. ALH. IKIRA ABDULLAHI (2005) 2 SCNJ 76, LEBILE v. C & S CHURCH (2003) 1 SCNJ 463;
OLOWOSAGO v. ADEBANJO (1988) 4 NWLR Pt.88 Pg. 275 at 283, the Supreme Court held that issues for determination are not at large, but must fall within the purview of the grounds of appeal filed. See also LATUNDE v. LAJINFIN (1989) 3 NWLR Pt. 108 Pg. 177 at 184. The issue of statute bar being incompetent and completely valueless to this appeal is hereby struck out.
ISSUE ONE
There are two legs to this issue. The first leg is whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence of traditional history adduced in evidence. The 2nd leg is whether the trial court was right in considering acts of possession by the Respondents before concluding that the Appellant did not prove their claim to title of the land in dispute.
On the first leg of this issue, learned senior counsel for the Appellant in the brief settled by Chief C. A. B. Akparanta SAN argued that even though the trial court had earlier concluded that both parties relied on traditional history to prove their case, the court refused to weigh the two sets of traditional history to determine where evidence preponderates. Senior counsel argued that the trial judge picked holes in the testimony of the Appellant’s witnesses instead of evaluating the evidence. Senior counsel submitted that the failure to properly evaluate the evidence of the Appellant has led to miscarriage of justice. He cited ARABAMBI v. ADVANCE BEVERAGES LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR Pt. 959 Pg. 31; OGUANUHU v. CHIEGBEKA (2003) FWLR Pt. 165 Pg. 512 at Pg. 527; DARAMOLA v. GOV. OSUN STATE (2004) FWLR Pt. 192 Pg. 112.
Learned counsel for the Respondents in the brief settled by Chief E. T. O. Njoku argued that when an Appellant complains that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, all he means is that when the evidence adduced by him is weighed against the evidence adduced by the Respondents, the Appellant’s evidence by far totally out-weights the Respondents’ evidence. The judge determines this not by the number of witnesses called by each party but by the quality and probative value of the testimony of the oral evidence of witnesses and exhibits tendered. He cited MOGAJI v. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC.91.
Counsel argued that the learned trial judge had reviewed the evidence of the five witnesses called by the Appellant as the Plaintiff and the evidence of the two witnesses for the Respondents as Defendants. It was after a thorough review of the totality of the evidence that the trial judge made his findings and conclusions.
Let us examine how the learned trial judge determined this case. On page 114 of the records, from lines 4-19, the court set out the Appellant’s case and explained from lines 20-25 as follows:
“If this traditional history of the Plaintiff remained intact without any gap defying explanation, the evidence would preponderate on the Defendants to dislodge, failing which the Plaintiff will be held to have discharged the burden on him and so will be entitled to judgment.”
The learned trial court went on to highlight the gaps in the traditional history given by the Appellant and his witnesses. The learned trial judge then concluded that he was not in a position to pick and choose between pieces of contradictory traditional history. The court concluded that the discrepancies in the traditional history proferred by the Appellant made it unreliable. The trial court evaluated the evidence as follows on page 115 of the record:-
“The PW1 through whom the traditional history first emerged stated that the Plaintiff is his brother from the same father but not the same mother. His evidence is that the land in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff. He did not show why despite the fact that he is of the same father with the Plaintiff he is not included in the ownership of the land.
The evidence of the PW1 is that Uga who inherited this land as his shares of the estate of Ukatta had one son called Uriem. So this Uriem inherited the land on the death of his father Uga.
In his evidence PW4 stated that Uga begat Ibekwe, Uriem and Onyekwere. He did not show why Urien inherited this land to the exclusion of his other two brothers. So did Uga have only one son Uriem or did he have three sons? This is a contradiction in the evidence of traditional history of the Plaintiff which the court is not permitted to pick and choose.
Again, the evidence of the PW2 that Ukatta had two wives who begat Udeogu, Akwukwa and Nwaku by his first wife while his second wife begat Uga, Ukwa and Uriem, makes Uriem a brother of Uga. If that is so and it is Uga that inherited the land in dispute, how did it got transferred out of Uga’s linage to Uriem linage his brother? Again that is a contradiction from which the court cannot pick and choose. These are discrepancies in the traditional history of the Plaintiff which make it unreliable.”
In an action for declaration of title to land there is need for the claimant to plead and proof his root of title before he can base his claim of title on acts of ownership or long possession. See JOHN OWHONDA v. ALPHONSO CHUKWUEMEKA EKPECHI (2003) 9 SCNJ 1.
Also, in an action for declaration of title to land, where the claimant relies on traditional history, he has the duty to plead and prove who founded the land, how the land was founded, the intervening owners through whom he derived his title and their particulars. Where this has not been done, the claim is not proved. See OKPALA EZEOKWONKO & ORS. v. NWAFOR OKEKE & ORS. (2002) 5 SCNJ 1.
It is my humble view that the trial judge made a thorough evaluation of the Appellant’s case. The learned trial judge made the observation clear on the record that the features of this case show that both parties claim to be descendants of Ukatta who was agreed to be the founder of the land in dispute. Both parties claim that the other is a stranger to Ndi Ohia. While the Appellant claimed that the Respondents’ descended from strangers who came from Ututu, the Respondents claimed that the Appellant descended from strangers who came from Ezzagbe.
This leads us to the 2nd leg of the issue which is the propriety of the trial judge’s consideration of acts of possession over the land in dispute before arriving at the decision. Learned Appellant’s counsel submitted that there are five ways to prove title to disputed land namely –
a) Proof by traditional evidence.
b) Production of document of title duly authenticated.
c) Acts of ownership.
d) Acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land, and
e) Proof of possession of connected or adjacent land. See BALOGUN v. AKANJI (1998) NWLR Pt. 70 Pg. 301, SC.; EZINWA v. AGU (2003) FWLR Pt. 165 Pg. 473 CA at Pg. 487, B-C. It has also been held by the courts that these five ways are disjunctive and no cumulative and that each way is sufficient proof. See NWOSU v. UDEAJA (1990) 1 NWLR Pt. 125 Pg. 188, SC at Pg. 218 B-H.
Counsel argued that the trial court should have made a decision and chosen which side the evidence preponderates where the parties are claiming proof of title by traditional history and evidence rather than abandoning this root of title to consider another leg of proof not relied on by the parties.
Learned Respondents’ counsel in reply argued that where the traditional history of both parties are not reliable, the court is entitled to rely on acts of possession relied on by both parties based on the test set down in KOJO II v. BONSIE (1957) 1 WLR 1223 at 122. He also relied on MOGAJI v. CADBURY NIG. LTD. (1985) 2 NWLR Pt. 7 Pg. 393. He argued that the learned trial judge also referred to several sales of portions of the land in dispute by the Respondents in the exercise of acts of ownership and found that the Appellant did not effectively challenge these sales.
Let me first say that my own humble understanding of the law is that although there are five established ways of proving title to land and a Plaintiff may succeed by proving one method, he is obliged to prove at least one method since not all the methods are mutually exclusive of each other. I do not with the greatest respect agree with the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the different ways of proving ownership of land are disjunctive. The methods are in fact independent and not disjunctive. Where a Plaintiff relies on traditional history as well as acts of ownership and long possession based or predicated on the same traditional history, he must fail where the evidence of traditional history is unproven. See COSMUS EZUKWU v. PETER UKACHUKWU & ANOR (2004) 7 SCNJ 189.
Let me with humility clarify the state of the law regarding the test established in KOJO II v. BONSIE supra. The rule in KOJO II v. BONSIE applies when there is conflict in traditional evidence of the parties to resolve the conflict by testing recent history concerning acts of ownership and possession in deciding whose traditional evidence is more plausible. See IWURIE IHEANACHO & ORS. v. MATHIAS CHIGERE & ORS. (2004) 7 SCNJ 272. Thus, KOJO II v. BONSIE is applicable when the evidence of both parties are in conflict or inconclusive. See OBA YEKINI ELEGUCHI & ORS. v. SARATA OSENI & ORS. (2005) 7 SCNJ 416. The issue of conflict in evidence of traditional history exists where there is admissible, reliable and credible evidence from both sides that conflict with each other only. See CHIEF OKOKO v. MARK DAKOLO (2006) 7 SCNJ 284. Thus, for the rule in KOJO II v. BONSIE to be applicable, there must be conflict in traditional history of both parties, and the evidence of both sides must not suffer from any material defect. See CHIEF OKOKO v. MARK DAKOLO (2006) 7 SCNJ 284.
In the learned trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence, he concluded that the evidence proffered by the Appellant contained discrepancies which made them unreliable. In an action for declaration of title to land, where there is conflict in the traditional history proffered by the parties, it is the duty of the court to accept or reject one version or the other fully or as a package. See LASISI MORENIKEJI & ORS. v. LALEKE ADEGBOSIN & ORS. (2003) 4 SCNJ 105.
From the principles stated above, it is clear that the learned trial judge upon finding discrepancies in the evidence of the Appellant should have rejected the evidence as a whole instead of falling back on the test in KOJO v. BONSIE. Be that as it may, the trial court in an attempt to bend over backwards to determine all the issues in controversy then considered whether or not the Appellant was also able to prove that he was the owner through acts of recent possession. This, the Appellant was not able to do. The point being made here is that the Appellant was not even entitled to be considered under the rule in KOJO v. BONSIE. In other words, the trial court having found the evidence of traditional history of the Appellant unreliable ought to have rejected the claim on which it was based outright. In spite of the error of the learned trial judge in bending over backwards to consider facts of acts of recent possession, the consideration having not resulted in miscarriage of justice, against the Appellant, the Appellant’s complaint cannot stand. This issue is resolved in favour of the Respondents.
ISSUE TWO
Issue two is whether the trial court was right in relying on the Customary Court judgment contained in Exh.D in deciding the Appellant’s claim. Senior counsel argued that the Appellant was not a party to the suit at the Customary Court and was not a privy to any of the parties and that the legal principle of estoppel per res judiciata cannot apply to him as he was making a personal rather than a representative claim for the land in dispute. Senior counsel argued that in order to sustain a plea of estoppel per res judicata, the following must be established by the party relying on it, viz:
(i) That there was an adjudication of the issues joined by the parties.
(ii) That the parties or their privies (as the case may be) are the same in the present case as in the previous case.
(iii) That the issue and subject-matter in the previous case are the same as in the present case.
(iv) That the adjudication in the present case was by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(v) That the previous decision finally decided the issues between the parties that is the rights of the parties were finally determined.
He cited NWOSU v. UDEAJA (1990) 1 NWLR Pt. 125 Pg. 188 at 220; OMIYALE v. MACAULAY (2009) 2 NWLR Pt. 1141 Pg. 597 at 621; EZENWA v. KAREEM (1990) 3 NWLR Pt. 138 Pg. 258 at 264.
Learned counsel for the Respondents replied that in reviewing the acts of ownership and possession pleaded and relied on by the parties, the learned trial judge referred to the Respondents’ claim that they have successfully litigated over the land, the 1970 Amala Arbitration, a litigation with Ben Ejinwa and the 1989 Customary Court suit contained in Exh. E. The learned trial judge after reviewing this litigation found that the Customary Court suit of 1989 concerned the land in dispute. This issue raises the question of whether the learned trial judge refused the Appellant’s claim on the basis of the Respondents’ defence of res judicata or not.
A careful perusal of the judgment of the learned trial judge will reveal that in dismissing the Appellant’s case the court did not rely on the judgment in Exh.E, but on the inability of the Appellant to prove his traditional history.
The learned trial judge said at pages 117-118 of the record:
“The one that is undoubtedly concerned with the land in dispute is the Customary Court case of 1989. The Plaintiff, as PW5, agreed that it was his clearing of this land to build that made the father of the Defendants to place “omu” on it and eventually sue his mother and uncle. The case of the Plaintiff is that his mother and uncle did not attend court preferring to have the matter looked into by the natives who know about the land. There is no evidence of which native arbitration he took the case to. There is no evidence that any Amala looked into the matter and came up with any decision. It is not true that the Plaintiff’s mother and uncle did not attend court in those proceedings. A look at Exh. C shows that on 30/8/98 the suit came up for plea and the Defendants therein were present and pleaded not liable to the claims. The matter was then adjourned to 13/9/89 for hearing. On that day the Defendants were in court and presented to the court a note from their lawyer that he had taken out a suit over the land at the High Court Okigwe. Thereafter the Defendants refused to participate in the proceedings. The record of proceedings shows that they continued to attend court while not taking part in the proceedings. The court went on with the matter and delivered its judgment.
There is no evidence from the Plaintiff that any court restrained the Customary Court from proceeding with the suit before it. There is no evidence from the Plaintiff of what became of their High Court suit. There is no evidence from the Plaintiff that after the Customary Court gave its judgment in Exh. E any step was taken to annul what the Customary Court did. They simply chose to look the other way. When a person is sued before a court of law and being fully aware of the suit against him decides to look the other way, such a person must know that he does that at his peril.”
It is clear from the above, that the court did not dismiss the Appellant’s suit on grounds of res judicata. The court merely pointed out the lacuna in the case of the Appellant in view of the facts on which issues had been joined at the end of pleadings. The defence of the Respondents had been that his ancestors owned the land and he in turn had exercised various acts of ownership on same including challenging trespassers to court. The learned trial judge was in my humble view quite right in his consideration of the issue of whether the Appellant had rebutted the evidence of various acts of long possession including challenging acts of trespassers by the Appellant. Clearly the court did not base its decision on the doctrine of res judicata as it was never asked to do so.
ISSUE THREE
Whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence. Learned Senior Appellant’s counsel on this issue submitted that the Appellant established his claim before the trial court on a balance of probabilities. He argued that the gaps in the testimony of the Appellant was of no moment and did not detract from the heavier weight of the Appellant’s traditional evidence. He argued that the acts of possession relied on by the Respondents were tortuous trespass. He urged this court to hold that the judgment in favour of the Respondents was against the weight of evidence. He cited LAWAL v. AKANDE (2008) 2 NWLR Pt. 1126 Pg. 425 CA at Pg. 442, D-G; LAGGA v. SAHUNA (2009) ALL FWLR Pt. 455 1617, SC. At Pg. 1660-1661, G-A.
Learned Respondents’ counsel argued that the learned trial judge in his judgment reviewed first, the evidence given by each of the five witnesses called by the Appellant at pages 101-106, the evidence of the two witnesses of the Respondents at pages 106-109, the written addresses of the counsel at pages 109-111. After reviewing the evidence of the witnesses of both parties the addresses of the counsel, the learned trial judge proceeded to weigh the quality of the evidence preferred by both parties before arriving at his judgment. Under no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the learned trial judge did not properly evaluate the totality of the evidence before him.
This issue relates to the evaluation of evidence. It is trite that evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value are primary functions of the trial court.
An appellate court can only interfere when the trial court has failed in its duty to evaluate evidence or the conclusion upon evaluation is manifestly perverse. In any event, the appellate court can only re-evaluate evidence given at the trial court where no issue of credibility of witnesses arises. See GAJI v. PAYE (2003) 5 SCNJ 20; THOMPSON v. AROWOLO (2003) 4 SCNJ 30; OSOLU v. ENG. UZODINMA OSOLU (2003) 6 SCNJ 162; AROWOLO v. CHIEF TITUS IFABIYI (2002) 2 SCNJ 96; VICTOR NDOMA-EGBA v. A.C.B. (2005) 7 SCNJ 461.
It is clear that this court cannot interfere when the findings of facts are in accord with the evidence led. In evaluating evidence, the trial court and indeed the appellant court is to be concerned not with the number of witnesses but with the quality or probative value of the testimonies of the witnesses. See ALI PINDER KWAJAFFA & ORS. v. BANK OF THE NORTH (2004) 5 SCNJ 121.
In the case of MOGAJI v. ODOFIN supra, the Supreme Court set out the procedure to be applied by a trial court in evaluating the evidence of parties in a civil suit. At page 94 of the court stated per Fatayi-Williams JSC:-
“In short, before a judge whom evidence is adduced by the parties before him in a civil case comes to a decision as to which evidence he believes or accepts and which evidence he rejects, he should first of all put the totality of the testimony adduced by both parties on that imaginary scale, he will put, the evidence adduced by both parties on that imaginary scale, he will put the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the defendant on the other side and weigh them together. He will then see which is heavier not by the number of witnesses called by each party, but by the quality or the probative value of the testimony.”
The judgment of the trial court is on pages 100-119 of the record. It is lucid and well thought out. More importantly, the learned trial judge showed industry and knowledge of the law. Moreover, the judgment set out both sides of the issue brought for resolution and weighed both on an imaginary scale. What adds to or reduces from the weight of any side in the dispute include a consideration of all the legal parameters in determining the issue at hand. The learned trial judge used all the known parameters in the determination of whether the Appellant was entitled to the claim before the court and found the Appellant wanting. The scale titled clearly to the side of the Respondents. The learned trial judge examined at length the quality of evidence led by the Appellant and found it wanting. Some of the findings of the learned trial judge had been set out earlier in this judgment. I agree with the learned Respondents’ counsel that there is no basis in the argument of learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the trial court did not properly evaluate the evidence as presented. This issue is resolved in favour of the Respondents.
This appeal lacks merit. In the circumstances, the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. I award N=30,000 in favour of the Respondents.
ABUBAKAR JEGA ABDUL-KADIR, J.C.A.: I agree
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I agree
Appearances
Chief C. A. B. Akparanta SAN for the Appellant with him are Jane Nwadawa and Jane Ossiah.For Appellant
AND
E. T. O. Njoku with him Chief O. ChinyereFor Respondent
