HON. HADI ABUBAKAR SIRIKA & ANOR. V. SEN. MAHMUD KANTI BELLO & ORS.
(2010)LCN/3923(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 5th day of July, 2010
CA/K/EP/NA/33/08
RATIO
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE : INTERPRETATION OF SECTION OF 141 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT 2006 AS TO THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN ELECTION PETITION MUST BE PRESENTED
141 – An election petition under this Act shall be presented within (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared”. It is crystal clear that the rendering of this section of the Electoral Act 2006 is simple, straight forward and without any obfuscation in style usually adopted by the legal draftsman. It is trite and indeed a golden rule of interpretation that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the court has the duty to ascribe to them their ordinary and plain meaning without resort to any other cannon of interpretation or any external aid of any sort. See Yusuf V. Obasanjo (2004) 5 SC (pt I) 27, Ibrahim V. Ojomo (2004) 1 SC (pt II) 136, Onochue V. Udogwu (2006) All FWLR (pt 317) 544. I hold the view that section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006, is very clear and unambiguous and must be given its simple, literal and ordinary meaning. This is in accord with the holding of a full panel of this court in Kumalia V. Sheriff (2009) 9 NWLR (pt 1146) 420 at 433 – 4 where R. D. Muhammad, JCA stated thus:- “In construction of statute, the plain words must be given their plain meaning. In the instant case, the section 141 of Electoral Act, 2006 are clear and unambiguous and as such must be given their literal meaning without recourse to the Interpretation Act”. This position of the court in interpreting section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 has been maintained by this court in quite a number of cases including the following:- A.C V. Jang (2009) All FWLR (pt 467) 156, Akume V. Lin (2008) 16 NWLR (pt 1114) 490, Agbai V. INEC (2009) All FWLR (pt 499) 596, Kupolali V. Oke (2009) All FWLR (pt 486) 1858. For me, I am bound by these decisions and I have no reason to depart from them. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.
SHALL: MEANING OF THE WORD “SHALL” WHEN USED IN A STATUTE
… the word “shall” when used in a statute connote a command or what is legally unavoidable or inescapable and mandatory. See Onochie V. Odogwu (supra) Omokeodo V. IGP (1999) 6 NWLR (pt 607) 467. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.
COURT OF APPEAL: CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE COURT OF APPEAL CAN DEPART FROM ITS PREVIOUS DECISION.
In Kumalia V. Sheriff (supra) at pp 456 – 457 of the report, this court stated situations in which the court can depart from its previous binding decision as follows:- “The Court of Appeal unlike the Supreme Court, is bound by its previous decision. It can only depart from its previous decision in the following circumstances:- (a) Where two decisions of the Court of appeal are in conflict the court must choose between them; (b). Where the Court of Appeal comes to the conclusion that a previous decision although not expressly overruled, cannot stand with a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court; (c). Where the court of Appeal comes to the conclusion that a previous decision was given per incuriam, i.e in ignorance of a statute or other binding authority the court is not bound by it, and (d) Where the previous decision was decided without jurisdiction”. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.
ELECTION PETITION: NATURE OF THE ELECTION PETITION
I think, it must be restated that election petitions are suigeneric, i.e in a class of its own. Care must be taken to follow meticulously the condition set in order to successfully ventilate one’s grievance before an election Tribunal. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in Buhari V. Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (841) 446 at 498 -499 F – B is apposite here. It was held per Uwaifo JSC (as he then was) that – The admonition of the Supreme Court, in Buhari V. Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (841) 446 at 498 -499 F – B is apposite here. It was held per Uwaifo JSC (as he then was) that – “The jurisdiction of an election tribunal to deal with election petition is of a very special nature different from that in an ordinary civil case: See Onitiri V. Benson (I960) SCNLR 314 at 317. It is plain that the proceedings are special for which special provisions are made under the constitution. See Oyekan V. Akinjide (1965) NMLR 381 at 383, a decision of this court. Election petitions are distinct from the ordinary civil proceedings: See Obih V. Mbakwe (supra) at p. 200 per Bello, JSC at p. 211 per Eso and Aniogolu JJSC. It is such that in certain circumstances the slightest default in complying with a procedural step which otherwise could either be cured or waived in ordinary civil proceedings could result in fatal consequences to the petition so an election petition is neither seen as a civil proceeding in the ordinary sense not, of course, a criminal proceeding. It can be regarded as a proceedings suigeneric”. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.
STATUTE BARRED PETITIONS: CONSEQUENCE OF FILING AN ELECTION PETITION OUTSIDE THE PERIOD ALLOWED FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE ELECTORAL PETITION UNDER SECTION 141 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT 2006
In this appeal, as earlier stated, time started to run on the 21st April, 2007 when the result of the election was declared. The thirty (30) days allowed for the presentation of the Electoral Petition under section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 started running on the 21st April, 2007, therefore the petition presented by the Appellants on the 21st May, 2007 is doubtless statute – barred and the Tribunal lacked the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this petition. That is the tragic position in this appeal. The non compliance with section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 has dealt a devastating blow to the petition as it is statute barred. The legal consequence of being statute barred is that the petition is rendered incompetent and the lower court lacked the jurisdiction ab initio to entertain the petition. See Nonye V. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR (pt 101) 110, Balogun V. Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR (pt 592) 590. That being the case the petition is hereby struck out. The preliminary objection is accordingly upheld on this ground. Having struck out the petition, the bottom is knocked off the appeal. I shall also refrain from considering the other grounds as that will amount to an academic exercise and a waste of precious judicial time. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
BABA ALKALI BA’ABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. HON. HADI ABUBAKAR SIRIKA
2. ALL NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY (ANPP) Appellant(s)
AND
SEN. MAHMUD KANTI BELLO & 1,420 ORS. Respondent(s)
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellants were Petitioners at the National Assembly/Governorship and Legislative Houses Elections Tribunal in Katsina State, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal. The 2nd Appellant, the ANPP was the platform on which the 1st Appellant contested the 21st April, 2007 Nationwide elections into the National Assembly including the seat of the Katsina North Senatorial District in focus. The 1st Respondent contested the same election for the seat in the same Senatorial District under the platform of the 2nd Respondent, his political party; he was also the candidate declared and returned by the 5th Respondent herein as the winner of the election.
The said declaration was made on 21st April, 2007. Dissatisfied with the declaration and return of the 1st Respondent, the Appellants, on the 21st day of May, 2007, filed their petition before the lower Tribunal. After a full trial the Tribunal, on 10th March 2008, delivered its judgment wherein it dismissed the petition. Not being satisfied with the stance of the lower court, the Appellants filed Notice of Appeal dated 28th March, 2008 containing nine grounds of appeal.
Out of the nine grounds of Appeal, the Appellants have distilled seven issues for the determination of this appeal. The issues are:-
1. Whether the Tribunal was not in error when it found and held that the evidence tendered by the Petitioner/Appellants in respect of non accreditation of voters in the 11 Local Government Areas contradicted their pleadings?
2. Whether the Tribunal was not in error when it held and found that the Petitioners/Appellants abandoned their pleadings on shortage of election materials in respect of 9 Local Governments, and whether they have not been able to prove substantive non compliance with the Electoral Act 2006 against the 3rd – 1398th Respondents.
3. Whether the finding of the trial Tribunal in respect of Hamcheta, Tsagem/Takusheyi, Jani, Magami, Bujawa/Gewayau, Duwan/Makau, Machika, Kwatta and Bagiwa wards of Mani Local Government, and Ingawa, Dara, Kurfeji/Yankaura B Kwari wards of Ingawa Local Government Area was not perverse?
5. Whether the Tribunal was not in error when it found and held that the Petitioners/Appellants have failed to lead evidence in proof of their allegations in Bindawa Local Government Area, and whether same were deemed abandoned.
6. Whether the Tribunal was not in error when it found that the Petitioners/Appellants have failed to establish their allegations in Dutsi Local Government Area?
7. Whether having regards to the pleading and the totality of the evidence adduced the Petitioners/Appellants did not proved(sic) any of the allegations in Sandamu Local Government Area.
Let me quickly point out here that the learned counsel for the Appellants had stated in paragraph 5.0 (page 36) of his brief that 7 issues were distilled from the 9 grounds of appeal but as can be seen clearly, only 6 issues have been formulated by him. There is no issue 4 as it were. There is no explanation to the whereabout of issue no 4. I shall return to this matter in the course of this judgment if need be.
In the brief settled by Uyi Igunma Esq. on behalf of the 1st Respondents, six issues are also decoded from the nine grounds of appeal filed. The issues are as follows:-
1. Whether the finding of the Tribunal that the Appellants’ evidence contradicts their pleadings which complain of “no proper accreditation” is correct.
2. Whether the Tribunal was right in its finding that the allegation of shortage of election materials in 9 Local Government Areas is deemed abandoned.
3. Whether the Tribunal was right to prefer the testimony of RW 23 to the testimony of PW 10 in respect of Hamecheta Ward in Mani Local Government Area.
4. Whether the Tribunal’s finding that the election result in “Form EC8(ii)”(sic) Exhibit p. 19, in respect of Tsagem/Takusheyi Ward contradicts the evidence of PW 14 is perverse.
5. Whether the Election Tribunal considered the electoral documents tendered by the Appellants and if not whether the Appellants have suffered any miscarriage of justice.
6. Whether the Election Tribunal was right to accord more weight to the evidence of RW 2 and RW 15 than the evidence adduced by the Appellants in respect of Sandamu Local Government Area especially that of PW 11.
The 2nd – 1421st Respondents did not file any brief in this appeal. When this case came up for hearing on 12th April, 2007, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent drew the attention of the court to the fact that he had filed Notice of preliminary objection and in keeping with the practice in this court, the said preliminary objection was heard first and although the learned counsel for the Appellant was absent without any excuse, his brief was deemed argued in line with Order 17 Rule 9(4) of the court of Appeal Rules, 2007.
I shall determine the preliminary objection first, before considering the issues formulated by the parties in this appeal.
The Notice of preliminary objection is contained on pages 6-7 of the 1st Respondents’ amended brief of argument and the argument on it is found on pages 7 – 20 of the said brief. The Notice states:
“TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Order 10 Rule 1 of the court of Appeal Rules, 2007, the 1st Respondent will at the hearing raise a preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal and consequently urge the Honourable court to dismiss or strike out the petition on the following grounds:-
1. The court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as the appeal arose from a petition which was ab initio incompetent for being statute barred in that the petition was filed outside the 30 days period limited by section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006: the petition was filed on 21st May, 2007 against the result of the election which was declared on 21st April, 2007.
2. The Appeal is merely academic and theoretical in that none of the grounds of appeal raises any issue that can lead to the grant of the reliefs sought by the Appellants.
3. Every one of the nine grounds in the Notice of Appeal is incompetent and liable to be struck out because:
(i). Grounds 1 and 9 raise merely academic and theoretical issues.
(ii). Ground 2 has been abandoned.
(iii). Grounds 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9 are not bourne out by the record of appeal.
(iv). Issues nos. 3, 5 and 6 were argued together with issue 4 which is non-existent and incompetent thereby rendering grounds 3,4,5,6,7 and 8 encompassed in issues 3, 5 and 6 incompetent and liable to be struck out.
(v). Non-existent issue Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were argued by the Appellants at pages 222-275 of the Appellants brief of argument (hereinafter referred to as the Appellants’ brief).
4. The decision of the court of Appeal, Kaduna Judicial Division in Arc. Ahmad Musa Dangiwa V. Mahmud Kanti Bello & 3 others (unreported) appeal No. CA/K/EP/SHA/39/07 delivered on the 15th day of December, 2009 has removed the Appellants’ locus standi to initiate or prosecute the appeal and rendered the continued prosecution of the appeal an abuse of the court process.
I intend to consider the first ground of objection first, and thereafter the other grounds if need be. The learned counsel for the first Respondent submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal which according to him arose from an incompetent petition. It was his further contention that the petition is statute – barred vides section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006. That the petition was filed outside the 30 days period limited by the Act , whereas the result of the election was declared on 21st April, 2007, the Appellant did not file his petition until 21st May, 2007. Referring to several paragraphs of the petition and Exhibit P.22 which was tendered by the Appellants to show when the result of the election was declared, he submitted that the decision of this court in Kumalia V. Sheriff (2008) All FWLR (pt 431) 1032 at 1042 – 1046 H – D and Ogbebor V. Danjuma (2003) 15 NWLR (pt 843) 403 clearly establish that the time for filing an election petition is 30 days commencing from the date of the declaration of the result and not the following day. On when time starts to run, learned counsel referred to the Supreme Court decision in Fadare V. Attorney General, Oyo State (1982) 4 S.C 1.
It was learned counsel’s further submission that although this issue was not raised at the Tribunal and is being raised for the first time in this court, it is an issue of jurisdiction which can be raised at any time and even on appeal. He relies on the cases of N.D.C Ltd V. A.S.W.B & Ors (2008) All FWLR (pt 422) 1052; Odofin & Anor V. Chief Agu & Anor (1992) 2 NWLR (pt 229) 350, Onyeama V. Oputa (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 60) 259, Ojokolobo V. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 61) 377.
Finally, he urged this court to give section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006, its ordinary meaning stressing that the words used are clear and unambiguous citing and relying on the case of Kraus Thompson Org. V. MIPSS (2004) 17 NWLR (pt 901) 44. He then urged this court to uphold the preliminary objection on this ground.
In the Appellants’ reply brief deemed filed on 4/3/09, is their reply to the preliminary objection. In it, the Appellants admit that the result of the election was declared on 21st April, 2007 and that the Petition was filed on 21st May, 2007. Learned Counsel submits that although the 30 days allowed by section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 ended on 20th May, 2007, they were entitled to file their petition on 21st May, 2007 since 20th May, 2007 was Sunday. Relying on the case of Agbai Vs INEC (2008) 14 NWLR (pt 1108) 417 at 434 B – F, he submitted that where the statutory period for filing election petition expires on a Sunday or on a public holiday, the cut off date is then shifted to the next following working day. He urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection on this ground.
It is a fact that both parties in this appeal are ad idem on the date the result of the election was declared and the date which the petition was filed. The parties agree that the result of the election was declared on 21st April, 2007 and also that the petition giving birth to this appeal was filed on the 21st May, 2007. The task of ascertaining the date which the result was declared as is always the case in most election petitions having to do with this issue, does not arise at all as I agree with both the parties and the court below, and based on all relevant exhibits and paragraphs of the petition that the result of the election was declared on 21st April, 2007. From that date, the petitioner had 30 days within which to file his petition failure of which is fatal to the case.
Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 under which this objection is anchored states:-
“141 – An election petition under this Act shall be presented within (30) days from the date the result of the election is declared”.
It is crystal clear that the rendering of this section of the Electoral Act 2006 is simple, straight forward and without any obfuscation in style usually adopted by the legal draftsman. It is trite and indeed a golden rule of interpretation that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the court has the duty to ascribe to them their ordinary and plain meaning without resort to any other cannon of interpretation or any external aid of any sort. See Yusuf V. Obasanjo (2004) 5 SC (pt I) 27, Ibrahim V. Ojomo (2004) 1 SC (pt II) 136, Onochue V. Udogwu (2006) All FWLR (pt 317) 544.
I hold the view that section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006, is very clear and unambiguous and must be given its simple, literal and ordinary meaning. This is in accord with the holding of a full panel of this court in Kumalia V. Sheriff (2009) 9 NWLR (pt 1146) 420 at 433 – 4 where R. D. Muhammad, JCA stated thus:-
“In construction of statute, the plain words must be given their plain meaning. In the instant case, the section 141 of Electoral Act, 2006 are clear and unambiguous and as such must be given their literal meaning without recourse to the Interpretation Act”.
This position of the court in interpreting section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 has been maintained by this court in quite a number of cases including the following:- A.C V. Jang (2009) All FWLR (pt 467) 156, Akume V. Lin (2008) 16 NWLR (pt 1114) 490, Agbai V. INEC (2009) All FWLR (pt 499) 596, Kupolali V. Oke (2009) All FWLR (pt 486) 1858. For me, I am bound by these decisions and I have no reason to depart from them. Clearly, this petition filed on 21st May, 2007 was filed outside the statutory period of 30 days allowed. The use of the word “shall” in the provision makes it mandatory that the petition must be presented within the period prescribed by the Act. This is because the word “shall” when used in a statute connote a command or what is legally unavoidable or inescapable and mandatory. See Onochie V. Odogwu (supra) Omokeodo V. IGP (1999) 6 NWLR (pt 607) 467.
One issue I need to point out is that in determining whether an action is statute – barred or not, it is important to first determine when time began to run. It was the view of the Supreme Court in Fadare V. Attorney General Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1 that time begins to run when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and all facts have happened which are materials to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. In an election petition such as this, time begins to run on the date the result of the election was declared in accordance with section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006. In fact on 21st April, 2007 when the result was declared, the cause of action had arisen. There were persons to sue (Petitioners) and persons to be sued (Respondents), and that will continue for 30 days from 21st April, 2007 which ought to have terminated on 20th May, 2007. Any petition filed after 20th May, 2007 would be statute – barred.
There was this argument by the learned counsel for the Appellant that since the last day i.e 20th May, 2007 was a Sunday, they were entitled to file the petition on the 21st May, 2007, being a Monday. He relied on the case of Agbai V. INEC (supra). For me, there is no basis to exclude Sunday as one of the days included in the 30 days. Should that last day being a Sunday be excluded, what about other Sundays within the 30 days? Would they also be excluded? Had the law maker intended to exclude Sunday, he could have said so. Remember that I had held that the aid of the Interpretation Act does not arise in this case.
Interestingly, Garba, JCA who decided the case of Agbai V. INEC (supra) relied upon by the Appellant, subsequently decided the case of The Electoral Officer, Bichi Federal Constituency & 2 Ors V. Rtd Capt Ahmed Haladu Bichi & 2 Ors (unreported) No. CA/K/EP/NA/14/2008 delivered on 11th February, 2010 wherein His Lordship stated at page 25 – 26 as follows:-
“But all the above apart, it should be remembered that due to the peculiar nature of election petitions, in the computation of the period prescribed for their presentation, no day of the week is excluded whether Sunday or other days that may be declared either public holiday or non working day. For instance in the computation of the 30 days limited in section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006, all Sundays and other days are included in the calculation such that no Sunday which fall within the 30 days is excluded”.
I agree with this later view of His Lordship as it accords with the clear meaning and interpretation of section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 given in a vast majority of decision in this court. By this later decision, it appears to me that His Lordship has departed from the former view in Agbai’s case (supra).
In Kumalia V. Sheriff (supra) at pp 456 – 457 of the report, this court stated situations in which the court can depart from its previous binding decision as follows:-
“The Court of Appeal unlike the Supreme Court, is bound by its previous decision. It can only depart from its previous decision in the following circumstances:-
(a) Where two decisions of the Court of appeal are in conflict the court must choose between them;
(b). Where the Court of Appeal comes to the conclusion that a previous decision although not expressly overruled, cannot stand with a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court;
(c). Where the court of Appeal comes to the conclusion that a previous decision was given per incuriam, i.e in ignorance of a statute or other binding authority the court is not bound by it, and
(d) Where the previous decision was decided without jurisdiction”.
In the circumstance, I am unable to follow Agbai’s case (supra) as far as exclusion of Sunday is concerned. I agree with the later holding of his Lordship in Bichi’s case (supra). I think, it must be restated that election petitions are suigeneric, i.e in a class of its own. Care must be taken to follow meticulously the condition set in order to successfully ventilate one’s grievance before an election Tribunal. The admonition of the Supreme Court, in Buhari V. Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (841) 446 at 498 -499 F – B is apposite here. It was held per Uwaifo JSC (as he then was) that –
“The jurisdiction of an election tribunal to deal with election petition is of a very special nature different from that in an ordinary civil case: See Onitiri V. Benson (I960) SCNLR 314 at 317. It is plain that the proceedings are special for which special provisions are made under the constitution. See Oyekan V. Akinjide (1965) NMLR 381 at 383, a decision of this court. Election petitions are distinct from the ordinary civil proceedings: See Obih V. Mbakwe (supra) at p. 200 per Bello, JSC at p. 211 per Eso and Aniogolu JJSC. It is such that in certain circumstances the slightest default in complying with a procedural step which otherwise could either be cured or waived in ordinary civil proceedings could result in fatal consequences to the petition so an election petition is neither seen as a civil proceeding in the ordinary sense not, of course, a criminal proceeding. It can be regarded as a proceedings suigeneric”.
In this appeal, as earlier stated, time started to run on the 21st April, 2007 when the result of the election was declared. The thirty (30) days allowed for the presentation of the Electoral Petition under section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 started running on the 21st April, 2007, therefore the petition presented by the Appellants on the 21st May, 2007 is doubtless statute – barred and the Tribunal lacked the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this petition. That is the tragic position in this appeal. The non compliance with section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006 has dealt a devastating blow to the petition as it is statute barred. The legal consequence of being statute barred is that the petition is rendered incompetent and the lower court lacked the jurisdiction ab initio to entertain the petition. See Nonye V. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR (pt 101) 110, Balogun V. Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR (pt 592) 590. That being the case the petition is hereby struck out. The preliminary objection is accordingly upheld on this ground. Having struck out the petition, the bottom is knocked off the appeal. I shall also refrain from considering the other grounds as that will amount to an academic exercise and a waste of precious judicial time.
Having struck out the petition, the appeal ensuing therefrom is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
ABA ALKALI BA’ABA, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity to read before now the judgment of my learned brother Okoro, JCA with which I entirely agree.
For the same reasons contained in the said judgment which I adopt as mine, I too dismiss the ppeal.
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.: I have read a draft of the lead judgment written by my learned brother, Okoro, JCA in this appeal.
The issue raised in the preliminary objection by the 1st Respondent that the petition filed by the Appellant on 21/5/07 to question the result of the election declared on 21/4/07 has been comprehensively considered and resolved in line with the extant position of the law. The questions of when an election petition shall be presented under Section 141 of the Electoral Act, 2006 and whether any Sunday in the period of the thirty (30) days limited would be excluded in the computation of the time, have been answered and put beyond further viable arguments by the court in the decisions cited in the lead judgment.
All that needed to be said on the issue in this appeal has been proficiently stated in the lead judgment and I entirely agree with the conclusion thereon.
For all the reasons set out in the lead judgment which I adopt, the preliminary objection by the 1st Respondent is upheld by me and the appeal is dismissed having enured from a statute barred petition. Each party to bear their respective costs in prosecuting the appeal.
Appearances
For Appellant
AND
UYI IGUNMA Esq. with M.I. Abubakar Esq. for the 1st RespondentFor Respondent
