TRUSTEES OF SIR HOWELL JONES WILLIAMS’ TRUST
v.
COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE
Viscount Simon
MY LORDS,
I have had the great advantage of reading in print and of
studying the exhaustive Opinion prepared in this case by my noble
and learned friend Lord Simonds. I agree with it, and need say
no more except that I move that the appeal be dismissed, with costs.
Lord Wright
MY LORDS,
I also have had the advantage of studying the Opinion about to
be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Simonds. I
agree with it, and have nothing to add.
Lord Simonds
MY LORDS,
My noble and learned friend Lord Porter has asked me to say
that he concurs in the Opinion which I am about to deliver.
[2]
Lord Simonds
MY LORDS,
The question raised in this appeal is whether under a trust deed
dated the 12th October, 1937, and made between Howell J. Williams
Ltd. as trustees of the one part and Sir Howell Jones Williams,
therein called the settlor, of the other part, certain properties were
vested in the trustees for charitable purposes within the meaning
of Section 37 (1) (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1918, and whether
the rents of those properties were in the years 1940-41 and 1941-42
applied by them to charitable purposes only.
Section 37 (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1918, is as follows:
” 37.—(1) Exemption shall be granted—
” (a) from tax under Schedule A in respect of the rents
” and profits of any lands, tenements, hereditaments,
” or heritages belonging to any hospital, public school
“or almshouse, or vested in trustees for charitable
” purposes, so far as the same are applied to
” charitable purposes only.”
. I will now state the relevant provisions of the Trust Deed.
It begins by reciting that it is supplemental to a transfer of
the 16th January, 1930, whereby certain freehold property specified
in the Schedule (together with other property) was transferred to
the trustees. This property consisted of certain premises in the
Gray’s Inn Road in the Parish of St. Pancras and No. 11 Mecklen-
burgh Square and Nos. 29, 30 and 31 Doughty Street in the same
parish.
It further recites that the property had been purchased by the
trustees out of moneys provided by the settlor, and that the Young
Wales Association (London) Ltd. (thereinafter called ” the Associa-
” tion “) had been incorporated on the 21st March, 1925, with (inter
alia) the following objects, namely: (i) to promote Welsh interests
in London and to provide means of social intercourse between
persons of Welsh nationality birth domicile education or
sympathies; (ii) to consider and discuss all questions affecting Welsh
interests; (iii) to foster the study of the Welsh language and to
procure the delivery of lectures on subjects connected with Welsh
history literature music and art; (iv) to form and maintain a library
of periodical historical and other literature in the Welsh language
or relating to Wales, and, finally, that the property had for some
time past been and was then occupied used and enjoyed by the
Association with the consent of the settlor for the purposes of the
Association.
I come to the operative part of the Deed. Clause 1 contains an
important definition. ” The expression ‘ Welsh people ‘ shall mean
” and include persons of Welsh nationality by birth or descent
” or born or educated or at any time domiciled in the Principality
” of Wales or the County of Monmouth “.
Clauses 2 and 3 I can pass over.
Clauses 4 and 5 cannot fairly be summarised and I state them
in extenso.
” 4. The Trustees shall hold the Settled Properties and the
” Endowment Fund for the purpose of establishing and main-
” taming an Institute and meeting place in London to be
” known as ‘ The London Welsh Association ‘ (hereinafter
” called ‘ the Institute’) for the benefit of Welsh people resident
” in or near or visiting London with a view to creating a centre
” in London for promoting the moral social spiritual and
[3] 2
” educational welfare of Welsh people and fostering the study
” of the Welsh language and of Welsh history literature music
” and art “.
“5. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing
” provisions the Trustees may use or permit such part of the
” Settled Properties as is required to be used as the Institute
” for all or any of the following purposes: —
” (a) For providing a meeting place for Welsh people in
” London and their friends where they can obtain facilities
” for social intercourse study reading rest recreation and
” refreshment.
” (b) For meetings concerts lectures and other forms of
” instruction discussion or entertainment especially in
” relation to subjects connected with the Welsh language
” and Welsh history literature music and art.
” (c) For any educational purposes connected with the
” Welsh language or Welsh subjects or likely to be of value
” or interest to Welsh people.
” (d) For establishing and maintaining a library of
” periodical historical and other literature in the Welsh
” language or relating to Wales or which is likely to be of
” use to Welsh people.
” (e) As a hostel for the accommodation of Welsh people
“in London.
” (f) For any of the purposes of the Association or of
” any similar association which may be formed for the
” benefit of Welsh people in London and which purposes
” may be within the general scope of the Trusts declared
” in Clause 4 hereof.
” (g) Generally for such other purposes being charitable
” and for the benefit of Welsh people as the Trustees may
” from time to time think fit provided always that the
” Trustees shall not permit any alcoholic liquor to be sold
” or consumed on any part of the Settled Properties for
” the time being occupied or used for the purposes of the
” Institute “.
Clause 9 will be found to be important and I set out the
substantive part of it.
” 9. The Trustees shall apply the income arising from the
” Endowment Fund and any rents and profits arising from
” the Settled Properties and any other profits income or contri-
” butions which may be received by the Trustees in carrying
” on the Institute and otherwise for the maintenance repair
” and insurance of the Settled Properties and in payment of
” the rates and other outgoings and towards the cost of main-
” taining equipping and using the Settled Properties for the
” purposes of the Institute and generally for carrying into
” effect all or any of the trusts of this Deed.
Clause 10 provided that the Institute should not be used for
meetings of any political party or for the purposes of any such
party and that no part of the property capital or income for the
time being subject to the trusts thereof should at any time be used
or applied for any such purposes or for any other purposes not
being charitable, with a proviso that that prohibition should not
prevent any application of money or property for purposes
necessarily incidental to carrying out the charitable trusts of the
Deed.
3 [4]
Clause 13 authorised the Trustees to delegate their power to
carry on the Institute by appointing Managers and Clause 14
to exercise that power by appointing the Association to act as
Managers of the Institute.
I do not think it necessary to refer to any other provisions of the
Deed.
On the day following its execution Howell J. Williams Ld.
resigned the trusteeship of the Deed and in their place seven
individuals (including the Settlor) were appointed trustees. The
survivors of them are the present appellants.
The relevant facts as found by the Commissioners for the special
purposes of the Income Tax Acts are these. I take them from
the Case stated, which will at the same time conveniently show the
nature of the claim which is the subject of appeal to this House.
Paragraph 4 of the Case states that the trust property had
always been maintained as two blocks, that the first block (therein-
after referred to as ” the Institute Block “) consisted of property
in Gray’s Inn Road and Mecklenburgh Square which was adapted
for use as an Institute in accordance with the trusts of the Deed,
that the second block consisting of 29, 30 and 31 Doughty Street
was let out to tenants, that the first block only—and not, as
incorrectly indicated in the recitals to the deed, the whole of the
trust property—was until May, 1941 occupied by the Young Wales
Association (London) Ld., which later changed its name to
London Welsh Association Ld., and was thereinafter referred to
as the Association.
In the next paragraph of the Case the claim is stated. I think
it worth while to set it out
” The Trustees were not on this claim contending that this
” Association was established for charitable purposes only.
” The claim before us was that not the Association but the
” Trustees were so established; that in applying the rents of
” 29, 30 and 31 Doughty Street to the purposes of the before-
” mentioned Association (which they claimed was an application
” of income of the Trust under clause 9 of the Trust Deed) they
” had applied the same to charitable purposes only and that
” consequently they were entitled to exemption from Income
” Tax, Schedule A, in respect of the rents of the said
” properties “.
From paragraph 7 of the Case it appears that the Trustees in
exercise of their powers under the deed allowed the Association to
occupy the Institute block and to act as managers of the Institute,
and that the Association so acted until May, 1941, and that before
that date they made two donations to the Association for the
purposes of the Institute, but that after that date the Association
had been unable to continue in occupation of the premises, which
had been let to the Welsh Services Club, and similarly after that
date no further donations had been made.
In paragraph 11 of the Case there is a summary of the evidence
given before the Commissioners by a Mr. V. J. Lewis, one of the
Trustees of the Deed, and at one time Secretary of the Association.
Since the question raised in this appeal appears in one aspect to
turn on findings of fact, I cannot omit a reference to this evidence.
It appears that Mr. Lewis and two of his co-trustees met and con-
sidered what should be done with the funds which they held under
the Deed and they decided to make two donations to the Institute.
They considered that they were carrying out the purposes of the
Deed, because it was necessary that the Institute should be
maintained. The Association were running the headquarters
premises at a loss, although making a profit on their other activities,
[5] 4
and he and his co-trustees knew that any donation which they
made would be paid into the Headquarters Account, from which
the activities of the Institute were financed. This was one of
two accounts, the other being the General Account. On the Head-
quarters account there was a debit balance. On the General
account there was a credit balance; into this account the sub-
scriptions of members of the Association were paid, and also
donations from another distinct trust, and out of it was paid
printing, postage and secretarial expenses, Corporation duty, etc.
The Association did not keep separate accounts as to the expendi-
ture of the donations. The objects (said Mr. Lewis) to which the
donations were intended to be devoted were numbers I, 4, 5, part
of 7, and 8 and 11 of the activities of the Association, as set out in
its booklet which was annexed to the Case. These activities are
there described as follows: —
” 1. Public lectures and debates, a Music Club, and literary
” and educational classes.
” ….
” 4. The maintenance of Headquarters premises at 11 Meck-
” lenburgh Square, W.C.1, comprising Lounge and Writing
” Room, Library (where current Welsh and English periodicals
” and newspapers may be found), Billiard Room, Tea and
“ Games Rooms, etc., available for the use of Headquarters
” Members of the Association, and of all Donors and
” Subscribers.
” The Headquarters Premises and in particular the London
” Welsh Hall are increasingly becoming the meeting place of
” the committees and functions of the various London Welsh
” societies and other organisations.
” 5. Badminton and Table Tennis Clubs are maintained in
” connection with the Headquarters Premises.
” ….
“ 7. Dances, whist and bridge drives, and annually a dinner
” and a garden party.
” 8. A weekly Social and Dance is held for headquarters
” members in the London Welsh Hall, on Saturday evenings.
” The charge made for admission is only 6d. (ordinary
” members, and visitors on the introduction of a member, may
” obtain admission at 2s.): a dance band is provided, and
” the popularity of these weekly functions among the younger
” members of the London Welsh community is undoubted.
” ….
” ii. The Headquarters office of the Association serves in
” many ways as a Central Information Bureau for London
” Welsh people and visitors to the metropolis “.
Mr. Lewis said that in making these donations the trustees
regarded themselves as contributing to dances, whist and bridge
drives held at the Institute, and as part of the activities taking
place there, and not to any such activities held elsewhere. A
prominent part of the activities of the Institute consisted of lectures,
debates, music club and literary and educational classes. Classes
were held in the Welsh language, history, and literature. The
Trustees did not contribute towards the Theatre Guild referred to
in No. 2 of the list of the activities.
I must assume that the Commissioners accepted as facts the
statements which they set out without comment in this Case.
The Commissioners then state (as should always be done with
clearness and particularity) the rival contentions of the trustees
and the Crown. I have referred earlier in this opinion to the
claim made by the trustees. Of the Crown it is only said that the
contention of the trustees was resisted on its behalf.
5 [6]
The decision of the Commissioners was as follows: —
“Under the terms of the trust deed the purposes of the
” Institute, to which the rents of the properties in question
” held by the trustees have been applied, are wide and inclusive.
” While certain of its features conform to the idea of a charity,
” we have come to the conclusion that these features are
” not so dominating, nor is the general character of the
” Institute such, as effectively to distinguish it from an ordinary
” social club. We are unable to say that it is established for
” charitable purposes only, and the application accordingly
“fails” .
I have thought it necessary to state the facts at this length because
it has been a matter of some controversy what the Commissioners
really decided. The issues being two-fold, (a) whether the trust
property was vested in the trustees for charitable purposes, and
(b) whether the rents were applied for charitable purposes only,
it is at least arguable that the Commissioners, notwithstanding
that the facts stated in the Case related mainly to the second issue,
yet decided only the first issue. It is not clear what view was
taken upon this point by Macnaghten J., before whom came the
appeal from the Commissioners. He found it sufficient to say
that he saw no ground for questioning their conclusion, adding
that, if their decision was open to criticism at all, it was that it
might have been expressed in even stronger terms.
When the matter came before the Court of Appeal, the con-
fusion was made apparent, and there was some difference of
opinion between the members of that Court, Scott L.J. thinking it
possible to read into the decision of the Commissioners a plain find-
ing of fact that the income in question was not applied to charitable
purposes only, while Morton, L.J. (if I read his judgment correctly)
was prepared to assume that there was no finding of fact fatal
to the appellants’ case.
In these circumstances, while I cannot entertain any doubt that
upon the facts stated in the case it was not open to the Commis-
sioners to come to any other conclusion on the second issue than
that the rents in question were not applied for charitable purposes
only, I think it right also to examine the question whether,
irrespective of the application of the rents in any year, the trust
property itself is vested in the appellants for charitable purposes.
That this expression means “for charitable purposes only” is
conceded by the appellants.
My Lords, the claim of the appellants that the property is vested
in them for charitable purposes is based on these contentions: (a)
that the dominant purpose of the trust is the fostering of Welsh
culture, which is a purpose beneficial to the community composed
of the people of the United Kingdom, (b) that the purpose afore-
said is beneficial to the community composed of the people of the
Principality of Wales and the County of Monmouth, which is an
integral part of the United Kingdom and in itself constitutes a
political body settled in a particular territorial area; and (c) because
the maintenance of the Institute (the expressed method ot
effectuating the purpose aforesaid) is itself a purpose beneficial to
a section of the British community which is determined by reference
to impersonal qualifications (namely persons with Welsh con-
nections who are resident in or near or visiting London) and is
not a selection of private individuals chosen on account of personal
qualifications.
I have taken this statement of the appellant’s contentions from
the formal reasons in their written case, because in them so clearly
appears the fallacious argument upon which, in this and other
cases which it has been my fortune to hear, an attempt has been
made to establish the charitable character of a trust.
[7] 6
My Lords, there are, I think, two propositions which must ever
be borne in mind in any case in which the question is whether
a trust is charitable. The first is that it is still the general law that a
trust is not charitable and entitled to the privileges which charity
confers, unless it is within the spirit and intendment of the pre-
amble to the Statute of Elizabeth, (43 Eliz. c. 4), which is expressly
preserved by S. 13(2) of the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act,
1888. The second is that the classification of charity in its legal
sense into four principal divisions by Lord Macnaghten in
Pemsel’s case (1891 AC 531) must always be read subject to the
qualification appearing in the judgment of Lindley L.J. in
re Macduft (1896 2 Ch. 451 at p. 466) “Now Sir Samuel Romilly did
” not mean, and I am certain Lord Macnaghten did not mean,
” to say that every object of public general utility must necessarily
” be a charity. Some may be and some may not be “. This
observation has been expanded by Lord Cave in this House
in these words: ” Lord Macnaghten did not mean that all trusts for
“purposes beneficial to the community are charitable, but that
” there were certain beneficial trusts which fell within that category:
” and accordingly to argue that because a trust is for a purpose
” beneficial to the community it is therefore a charitable trust is to
” turn round his sentence and to give it a different meaning. So
” here it is not enough to say that the trust in question is for public
” purposes beneficial to the community or for the public welfare:
” you must also show it to be a charitable trust”. see A.G. v.
National Provincial Bank (1924 A.C. 262 at p. 265).
But it is just because the purpose of the trust deed in this case
is said to be beneficial to the community or a section of the com-
munity, and for no other reason, that its charitable character is
asserted. It is not alleged that the trust is (a) for the benefit of
the community and (6) beneficial in a way which the law regards
as charitable. Therefore, as it seems to me, in its mere statement
the claim is imperfect and must fail.
My Lords, the cases in which the question of charity has come
before the Courts are legion, and no one who is versed in them will
pretend that all the decisions, even of the highest authority, are easy
to reconcile, but I will venture to refer to one or two of them to
make good the importance of my two general propositions. In
Houston v. Burns (1918 A.C. 337) the question was as to the validity
of a gift ” for such public, benevolent, or charitable purposes in
” connection with the parish of Lesmahagow or the neighbour-
” hood ” as might be thought proper. This was a Scotch case, but
upon the point now under consideration there is no difference
between English and Scotch law. It was argued that the limitation
of the purpose to a particular locality was sufficient to validate
the gift, that is to say, though purposes beneficial to the community
might fail, yet purposes beneficial to a localised section of the
community were charitable. That argument was rejected by this
House. If the purposes are not charitable per se, the localisation
of them will not make them charitable. It is noticeable that Lord
Finlay at p. 341 expressly overrules a decision or dictum of Lord
Romilly to the contrary effect in Dolan v. Macdermot (L.R. 5
Eq. 60).
Next I will refer to a case in the Privy Council which is the more
valuable because Lord Macnaghten himself delivered the judgment
of the Board. In that case the question was of the validity of
a residuary gift ” to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane
” and his successors to be used and expended wholly or in part
” as such Archbishop may judge most conducive to the good of
” religion in the diocese “. What could have been easier than to
say that such a trust was beneficial to the community, and more-
over to a section of the community sufficiently defined by a
reference to the diocese; and was therefore charitable? Yet the
7 [8]
only argument was that the benefit to the community was of a
character which fell within the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth,
i.e. for religious purposes, and therefore was charitable. And it
is to be observed that this contention was rejected on the narrow
ground that the terms of the bequest were not identical with
religious purposes. ” The language of the bequest”, said Lord
Macnaghten, ” would (to quote Lord Langdale’s words) be ‘ open
” ‘ to such latitude of construction as to raise no trust which a
” ‘ Court of Equity could carry into execution ‘ “. (Dunne v.
Byrne, 1912 AC 407, at p. 411.)
One more decision out of many to the same effect may be cited.
In Farley v. Westminster Bank (1939 AC 430) a testatrix had
bequeathed the residue of her estate in part to the respective vicars
and church-wardens of two named churches ” for parish work ”
Could it be doubted that the purpose of the gift was beneficial
to the community ? It could fairly be described in the very words
in which the appellants here assert the charitable nature of
their trust. Yet the gift failed. It was, in the words of Lord Russell
of Killowen, ” for the assistance and furtherance of those various
” activities connected with the parish church, which are to be
” found in every parish”. It would be unduly cynical to say
that that is not a purpose beneficial to the community. Yet it
failed. And it failed because it did not fall within the spirit and
intendment of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth.
My Lords, I must mention another aspect of this case, which
was discussed in the Court of Appeal and in the argument at
your Lordships’ bar. It is not expressly stated in the preamble
to the Statute, but it was established in the Court of Chancery,
and, so far as I am aware, the principle has been consistently
maintained, that a trust in order to be charitable must be of a
public character. It must not be merely for the benefit of par-
ticular private individuals: if it is, it will not be in law a charity,
though the benefit taken by those individuals is of the very
character stated in the preamble. The rule is thus stated by Lord
Wrenbury in Verge v. Somerville (1924 AC 496 at 499): ” To
” ascertain whether a gift constitutes a valid charitable trust so
” as to escape being void on the ground of perpetuity, a first
” enquiry must be whether it is public—whether it is for the benefit
” of the community or of an appreciably important class of the com-
” munity. The inhabitants of a parish or town, or any particular
” class of such inhabitants, may, for instance, be the objects of such
” a gift, but private individuals, or a fluctuating body of private
“individuals, cannot”. It is, I think, obvious that this rule,
necessary as it is, must often be difficult of application, and so the
Courts have found. Fortunately, perhaps, though Lord Wrenbury
put it first, the question does not arise at all, if the purpose of
the gift, whether for the benefit of a class of inhabitants or of a
fluctuating body of private individuals, is not itself charitable. I
may however refer to a recent case in this House which in
some aspects resembles the present case. In Keren v. Commis-
sioners of Inland Revenue (1932 AC 650) a company had been
formed which had as its main object (to put it shortly) the purchase
of land in Palestine, Syria or other parts of Turkey in Asia and
the peninsula of Sinai for the purpose of settling Jews on such lands.
In its memorandum it took numerous other powers which were
to be exercised only in such a way as should, in the opinion of
the company, be conducive to the attainment of the primary
object. No part of the income of the company was distributable
among its members. It was urged that the company was
established for charitable purposes for numerous reasons,
with only one of which I will trouble your Lordships,
viz. that it was established for the benefit of the community or of
a section of the community, viz. Jews, whether the association
was for the benefit of Jews all over the world or of the Jews
[9] 8
repatriated in the Promised Land. Lord Tomlin, dealing with
the argument that I have just mentioned upon the footing that,
if benefit to ” a community” could be established, the purpose
might be charitable, proceeded to examine the problem in that
aspect and sought to identify the community. He failed to do so,
finding it neither in the community of all Jews throughout the world
nor in that of the Jews in the region prescribed for settlement
It is perhaps unnecessary to pursue the matter. Each case must
be judged on its own facts, and the dividing line is not easily drawn.
But the difficulty of finding the community in the present case,
when the definition of ” Welsh people ” in the first deed is remem-
bered, would not, I think, be less than that of finding the community
of Jews in Keren’s case.
At an early stage in this opinion I said that cases on the law of
charity are not easy to reconcile. I would not be taken as suggest-
ing that there is any doubt about the present case. I agree with the
learned Judges of the Court of Appeal that, upon the construction
which they have adopted of the trust deed—and it is the only pos-
sible construction—the property is not vested in the appellants for
charitable purposes only. It is clear, as I have already said,
that they have not applied the income for charitable purposes
only, and I do not doubt that they have applied them strictly in
accordance with their trust. ” Matters”, said Lord Russell of
Killowen (then Russell L.J.), ” have been stretched in favour of
” charities almost to bursting point”; see re Grove-Grady (1929
1 Ch. 557). That point would be reached if your Lordships held
that this trust deed has a purpose which falls within the spirit and
intendment of the preamble. It clearly does not, and, if it does not,
let the community be what you will, let the purpose be as beneficial
as you like; here is no charity.
My Lords, it would not be right for me in a case which raises
in such a general form the broad question of charitable trusts to
ignore a line of authorities relied on by the appellants. More
accurately, I think, there are two lines of authorities which are
apt to converge and cross each other. There is, first, the class of
case of which re Smith (1932 I Ch. 153) is typical. In that case the
testator gave his residuary estate ” unto my country, England for—
” own use and benefit absolutely ” (sic). This was held to be a
good charitable trust. Here no particular purpose or benefit was
defined. Secondly, there is the class of case, of which Goodman v.
Saltash (7 A.C. 633) may be regarded as the prototype. There Lord
Selborne L.C. used the words cited so often in the reports: ” A
” gift subject to a condition or trust for the benefit of the inhabitants
” of a parish or town or of any particular class of such inhabitants
” is (as I understand the law) a charitable trust”. In the one
class of case there is no particularity of benefit and the widest
range of beneficiary, in the other the beneficiaries are localised and
the nature of the benefit defined. How are these cases to be
reconciled with the decisions of this House to which I earlier
referred ?
In the last edition of Tudor on Charities at p. 45 it is said, ” It is
” hard to avoid the conclusion that the foregoing cases, which
” establish that gifts for the benefit of particular districts are
” charitable, are anomalous. They cannot be related to the Statute
” of Elizabeth, and they logically involve the proposition that pur-
” poses which are not charitable in the world at large are charitable
” if their operation is confined to a specified locality; for, public or
” benevolent purposes are not charitable, while there is nothing to
” prevent the trustees of a fund given for the benefit of a parish from
” spending it upon public or benevolent purposes, and yet the gift
” of such a fund is charitable. Nevertheless, a gift for public pur-
” poses in a particular parish is not charitable “. Your Lordships
may think that this sounds like a cry of despair, and, in truth, there
9 [10]
is some ground for it. But I would suggest that it is possible to
justify as charitable a gift to ” my country England ” upon the
ground that, where no purpose is defined, a charitable purpose is
implicit in the context; it is at least not excluded by the express
prescription of ” public ” purposes. Where the gift is localised but
the nature of the benefit is defined, no reconciliation is possible
except upon the assumption that the particular purpose was in each
case regarded as falling within the spirit and intendment of the
preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, though I find it difficult to
ascribe this quality to the benefit taken by the freemen of Saltash.
If this affords no solution of the problem, I can only invite your
Lordships to maintain the principles which have consistently been
asserted in this House over the last 50 years in this difficult and
intricate branch of the law.
I would dismiss this appeal.
[11]
Lord Normand
I respectfully agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Simonds.
Discordant decisions have resulted from the occasional failure to keep in
mind the two propositions which my lord has now re-asserted and from the
tacit assumption that all trusts beneficial to the public at large or to some
section of it are entitled by a benevolent construction to the special privi-
leges of charitable trusts. Yet the line between charitable and non
charitable trusts is sometimes difficult to draw, even when correct
principles are applied, particularly where the claim is made that the
trust is charitable because its purpose is the furtherance of the moral
improvement of the community. The decision in The Inland Revenue
against Falkirk Temperance Cafe Trust 1927 s.c. 261, a case which has
some resemblance to the present, must, I think, rest on the ground that
the predominant purpose of the trust was the moral improvement by
means of temperance of the inhabitants of Falkirk and that the cafes
and temperance hotel provided by the Trust were so subordinated to the
predominant purpose that it was possible to distinguish them from an
ordinary commercial venture in catering and hotel-keeping. In the
present case the decision of the Commissioners was that, while certain
features of the Institute conformed to the idea of charity, they were not
so dominating, nor was the general character of the Institute such, as
effectively to distinguish it from an ordinary social club. In my opinion
this conclusion is amply supported by the facts and is well founded in law.
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