MOMODU v. AMADIN
(2022)LCN/17128(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Tuesday, July 05, 2022
CA/B/307/2021
Before Our Lordships:
Theresa Ngolika Orji-Abadua Justice of the Court of Appeal
James Gambo Abundaga Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ademola Samuel Bola Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
P. I. MOMODU APPELANT(S)
And
MR. GABRIEL AMADIN RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT AN UNSIGNED DOCUMENTHAS PROBABTIVE VALUE
The law is that an unsigned document is a worthless piece of paper.
No probative value can be foisted on it and it ought to be discountenanced by the Court. See A. G. Abia State V. Agharanye (1999) 6 NWLR Pt. 607 Pg 362.
In the circumstance, I have no option than to invoke the provisions of Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011 which states:-
“Nothing in this Section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute is to any fact which the statement might tend to establish”.
Thus, the evidence of the Claimant which tends to establish the fact that he informed the Defendant of his intentions to charge him under Scale III of the Order cannot be believed and same is accordingly discountenanced. It is my view also that Exhibit “C1” tendered in proof of the above cannot stand. I attach no probative value to it. I am fortified in my believed (sic) with the decision of the NBC Plc V. Ubani (2014) All FWLR (Pt.718) 803 at 811 ratio 8, where Court held as follows;-
“A document which is prepared or authenticated by a person interested in the outcome of a matter before the trial Court, that is when the proceedings are pending or anticipated and which document is intended to be used and relied on by the person and indeed has been so used or relied on by the person and indeed has been SO used or relied on to establish a fact in issue in the pending matter, albeit in the outcome of the case, is clearly inadmissible for a party to a suit to indulge in such exercise is self serving as it is capable of gross abuse to the advantage of the maker”. PER ORJI-ABADUA, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON RENUMERATION OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS
Augie, JSC, (as she then was) in the decision of this Court in GTB Plc vs. Anyanwu, Esq. 2011 LPELR-4220(CA), said thus:
“Section 16 of the LPA deals with “Remuneration of Practitioners” and the Section provides as follows – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a legal practitioner shall be entitled to recover his charges by action in any Court of competent jurisdiction. (2) Subject as aforesaid, a legal practitioner shall not be entitled to begin an action to recover his charges unless – (a) A bill for the charges containing particulars of the principal items included in the bill and signed by him, or in the case of a firm, has been served on the client personally or left by him at his last address as known to the practitioner or sent by post addressed to the client at that address; and (b) The period of one month beginning with the date of delivery of the bill has expired. A legal practitioner has a right to be remunerated for his services; he can either be paid in advance upon named fees or rely on the terms of any agreement reached for his fees. However, if he has not received his fees and no agreement was reached as to what they would be, he must submit his bill of charges – see Oyo V. Mercantile Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 213. All the relevant authorities say that reasonable remuneration must be given for the actual work or service rendered by a claimant on quantum meruit, which is Latin for ” as much as he deserved’ – see SBN Ltd V. Opanubi (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 437 SC. In effect, when the bill of charges or fees (as they are called) are properly brought by the legal practitioner in compliance with the provision of the LPA, the Court will normally give judgment for the amount of fees so claimed unless there are other factors preventing it from doing so, such as the absence or non-existence of any agreement for the payment of the fees by the client or an attempt by the legal practitioner to illegally enrich himself at the expense of his client (by way of champarty) – see Oyo V. Mercantile Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (supra) and Akingbehin V. Thompson (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 270, where Adamu, JCA added as follows – “In some cases, even where the charges or fees were not agreed upon or fixed by a contract between the parties – – the Court can award a reasonable fees or remuneration to the legal practitioner for his services actually rendered or admitted to have been rendered by him at the request or instruction of his client on the basis of quantum meruit or quasi-contract. See also SBN Ltd. V. Opanubi (supra), where Uwaifo, JSC held – “- – The Respondent – – was expected to provide parameters and necessary evidence upon which the Court would assess what is reasonable compensation on quantum meruit for the services rendered by him – – He ought to have indicated in the bill of charges the nature of the various aspects of the services he rendered; his experience at the bar which matched the skill the particular legal matters demanded; and in evidence justified the reasonableness of the charges for the services. – – A legal practitioner should be able to present a bill of charges which, among other facts, should particularize his fees and charges, e.g. (a) perusing documents and giving professional advice; (b) conducting necessary (specified) inquiries; (c) drawing up the writ of summons and statement of claim; (d) number of appearances in Court and the dates; (e) summarized statement of the work done in Court, indicating some peculiar difficult nature of the case (if any) so as to give an insight to the client as to what he is being asked to pay for; (f) the standing of counsel at the bar in terms of years of experience and/or the rank with which he is invested in the profession. It is necessary to indicate amount of fees against each of these items. – – In compensating a legal practitioner upon a quantum meruit for services he has actually rendered, it will be more realistic to make assessment on the basis of the particulars of the nature of work done by him to arrive at what can be considered a reasonable compensation. It is then a sum which “the Judge appears to have arrived at on consideration of all necessary factors would be a reasonable remuneration in all the circumstances” as observed by Lord Atkinson in Way v. Latilla.”In this case, notwithstanding anything the Respondent may have said to the contrary, there is no evidence whatsoever before the Court that his fees were agreed upon or fixed by any contract between the parties. As the Appellants pointed out, he never pleaded that the parties agreed on any fees not to mention N12.5 Million Naira fees he demanded from them and he never gave any such evidence either. Nonetheless, a Court can award a reasonable fees or remuneration to a legal practitioner for his services actually rendered or admitted to have been rendered by him – see Akingbehin V. Thompson (supra), SBN Ltd. V. Opanubi (supra).” PER ORJI-ABADUA, J.C.A.
THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant instituted Suit No: B/505/2011 before the State High Court of Edo State on 18/7/201 via a Writ of Summons filed on the same day alongside a Statement of Claim. The same was amended by the leave of the lower Court granted on 14th April, 2016. The Amended Statement of Claim was filed on the 19th April, 2016 wherein the Appellant claimed against the Respondent thus:
“1. The total sum of N1, 000, 000.00 (One million Naira) only being the cost of Legal services, cost of investigation & research, out-of-pocket expenses and general damages.
2. The order of Court on the Defendant to pay 30% interest on the total sum claim from the 12th day of May, 2010 till the delivery of judgment and 20% interest on the judgment debt from the date of Judgment is fully liquidated.”
The Respondent filed an amended Statement of Defence and to which the Appellant filed a reply. The parties testified on their behalf. The judgment of the lower Court was delivered on12/12/2017 finding that the Claimant has not proved his case and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims. He filed his Notice of Appeal on 6/4/2018 which was founded on four grounds of appeal. The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on 22/6/2018. The Appellant’s Brief of Argument, the Respondent’s Brief of Argument were filed on 25/6/18 and 7/11/2018 respectively.
Two issues were postulated by the Appellant in his brief thus:
“1. Whether there are errors in law and facts and inadmissible pieces of evidence sufficient enough to enable the appeal to succeed.
2. Whether the Honourable Court sufficiently examined the legally admissible facts as presented by witnesses.
The Respondent for his part propositioned a lone issue thus:
“Whether the trial Court sufficiently examined and admitted the legally admissible evidence as presented by the parties before arriving at the judgment dismissing the claim of the Appellant.”
In respect of issue one, the Appellant argued that the mode of service of documents between the Respondent and himself was one on one. All the documents that passed through him and the Respondent were served one on one. He said that he served Exhibit C1, indicating mode of charge to be applied on the Respondent without any endorsement of the paper by the Respondent to establish that he received it. He further referred to Exhibits D, C1 and C and submitted that it was erroneous for the trial Court to believe that there was endorsement on all those documents mentioned to show that one was received from person to the other. He submitted that Exhibits C2, C1 and D were all handed over to the Respondent and the Respondent did not sign any paper indicating receipt of any of them.
He submitted that the Court was in error when it held that Exhibit D4 is a photocopy of Exhibit C1. He said that Exhibit C1 was signed by the Appellant while Exhibit D4 was not signed by him. He argued that Exhibit D4 is a photocopy tendered without foundation and urged this Court to expunge it. He argued that Exhibit C1 which the Court believed is forged is erroneous, that it was the unsigned Exhibit D4 tendered by the Respondent that was forged and urged this Court to expunge it. He further stressed that the lower Court erred in law when it allowed Exhibits D1, C7 and D4 that are photocopies to be tendered as Exhibits without foundation, he then urged that they should be marked rejected and expunged from the proceeding. Learned Counsel repeated his argument under issue 1 touching on Exhibits D1, C7 and D4 and urged this Court to allow the appeal.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent relied on several legal authorities on where a statute has prescribed the steps to be taken, one cannot embark on another procedure. He referred to the provisions of Section 16 Sub-sections (1) and (2) stating that a legal practitioner shall be entitled to recover his charges by action in any Court of competent jurisdiction, and, that the condition precedent for commencement of such proceeding to recover charges are set out in Section 16(2) of the Act. He made reference to pages 132-133 of the record of appeal in support. Counsel then referred to Sections 1(a), (b) (c) and 5 of the Legal Practitioners (Remuneration For Legal Documentation And Other Land Matters) Order which provide the remuneration of a legal practitioner in respect of business connected with any sale, purchase, lease, mortgage and other matter of legal documentation. He said that by Section 5, the legal practitioner may, before taking any business, by writing under his hand communicated to the client, elect that his remuneration shall be in accordance with the provisions of Scale III also set out in that Schedule. In other words, he should give notice on election to charge under scale III set out in the schedule to the Order. He also referred to pages 128-148 of the record of appeal. He submitted that the Appellant in line with Order 3 Rule 3 of the Edo State High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2012 filed his suit, his statement of claim, witness written statement on oath, copies and list of documents to be relied upon at the trial which included Exhibit D4, an unsigned copy of the notice dated 12/5/210 purportedly served by the Appellant on the Respondent.
Then, the Respondent, on receipt of the processes, filed his Statement of Defence, witness written statement on oath, list and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial which included Exhibit D4, the unsigned copy of the Notice dated 12/5/2010. He also referred to pages 54 and 72 of the record. Learned Counsel for the Respondent made it clear in his submission that it was after the Appellant received the processes filed by the Respondent and on noticing and realizing that his front-loaded Exhibit D4 was unsigned, the Appellant then amended his Statement of Claim and filed and front-loaded Exhibit C1, a signed copy dated 12/5/2010. The Respondent amended his Statement of Defence in consequence thereof.
Learned then cited the cases of Agwaramgbo vs. Idumogu (2008) 5 NWLR Part 1081 page 564, Akinyele vs. Afribank Plc (2005) 17 NWLR Part 955 page 504 at 515 and Onuigbo vs. Nwekeson (1992) 3 NWLR Part 283 page 533 and submitted that it is the Appellant who bears the onus to prove that he served and gave notice on election to the Respondent to charge under Scale III. Counsel submitted that it was the plaintiff who alleged and asserted that he gave notice on election to the Respondent to charge on scale III that has the onus or burden to prove the same.
He said that the Respondent denied that and said in his evidence that the Appellant did not serve him with any Written Notice on election, Exhibit C1 or D4 to charge under Scale III. He referred to Exhibit D4, the unsigned copy of the document dated 12/5/2010 which was filed and front-loaded by both parties. He said that Exhibits C1 and D4 are one and the same in contents except that while Exhibit C1 is signed, D4 is unsigned, the two Exhibits came from the Appellant and he front-loaded them. He contended that there is discrepancy between Exhibits C1 and D4, and that since the two Exhibits emanated from the same source, the Appellant cannot pick and choose between them. He cannot pick and choose Exhibit C1 and disregard and reject Exhibit D4 and that the Court also cannot choose either of them and reject the other. He made reference to the cases of Ola vs. Unilorin (2014) 15 NWLR Part 1431 page 453 at 483 and Ekweozor vs. Reg. Trustees SACN (2014) 16 NWLR Part 1434 page 433 at 475, and Sani vs. State (2014) 1 NWLR Part 1387 page 1 at 24, and submitted that the appropriate thing for the Court to do is to disregard and reject the two notices. The Court cannot rely and act on any of them. He argued that it was upon realising that he did not sign Exhibit D4 that the Appellant amended his statement of claim and front-loaded Exhibit C1, now a signed copy, that Respondent pleaded and gave evidence that Exhibit C1 was made by the Appellant for the purpose of this case or during the pendency of this case as Exhibit C1 was not in existence when Appellant filed his case that was why he did not file and front-load the same as he filed and front-loaded only Exhibit D4. Counsel cited the case of Anyaebosi & Ors vs. R. T. Briscoe Nig. Ltd (1987) 2 NSCC 85 SC and contended that Exhibit C1 being a document procured during the pendency of the case, is inadmissible and if admitted, should be expunged. He then submitted that the lower Court was right when it did not countenance Exhibit C1 and failed to attach any probative value to it.
He stated that although Exhibit D4 was tendered by the Respondent, it originated from the Appellant and the same was front-loaded by him as the Notice he served the Respondent, he made it clear that Exhibit D4 is unsigned and that an unsigned document is a worthless piece of paper. He cited the case of FRN vs. Banjoko (2014) 11 NWLR Part page 337 in support and that the lower Court was right when it discountenanced Exhibits C1 saying it cannot stand and D4 as an unsigned document. He contended that by the lower Court expunging the two Exhibits, it shows there was no proof that the Appellant gave or served the Written Notice of Election to Charge under Scale III as required by Law under Order 5 of the Legal Practitioners (Remuneration For Legal Document and Other Land Matters) Order to the Respondent.
He cited the case of Kida vs. Ogunmola (2006) 13 NWLR Part 997 page 377 at 393-394 and submitted that the Appellant having failed to give or serve the Respondent with Notice of Election to Charge under Scale III as provided under Section 5 of the Legal Practitioners (Remuneration For Legal Document And Other Land Matters) Decree, he cannot charge the Respondent on Scale III of the Schedule to the Order as anything done consequently upon such non-service is a nullity. Any professional fee charged by the Appellant is a nullity and of no effect. He contended that since the Appellant failed to establish that he served and gave the Notice of the Election to Charge under Scale III to the Respondent as required by law, this Court ought to hold that the Appellant did not serve any Notice on the Respondent, therefore, the Appellant cannot charge the Respondent professional fee under Scale III.
Counsel referred to Exhibit D1 being a letter from the Respondent’s employers to the Appellant terminating the Appellant’s retainership with the Respondent’s employers. He said that the original copy of it is in the possession of the Appellant which he had refused to produce, that the photocopy is inadmissible based on Section 89(1)(a) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He argued that since Exhibit D1 was pleaded and front-loaded, it is relevant and therefore, admissible. He identified Exhibit C7 as a letter written by the Appellant to the Respondent’s employers, he admitted making Exhibit C7, therefore, he is in possession of Exhibits of the originals of D1, D4 and C7, therefore, the trial Court was right in admitting the photocopies in evidence after proper foundation had been laid. He submitted that the Appellant wrote Exhibits C2 and D3 dated 21/3/2011 to the Respondent and in response thereto, the Respondent sent Exhibits C4 and D2 dated 4/3/2011. He said that the Respondent pleaded and gave evidence that Exhibits C4 and D2 were erroneously dated 4/3/2011 instead of 4/4/2011. He argued that common sense dictates that the Respondent’s letters dated 4/3/2011 can never be his response to the Appellant’s letters C1 and D3 dated 31/3/2011 as the opening paragraph of Exhibits C4 and D2 referred to the Appellant’s letter PIMC/2011/3/37of 21st March, 2011. He asserted that Exhibits C4 and D2 dated 4/3/2012 is a reply to the Appellant’s C2 and D3 dated 21/3/2011 denying the content of Exhibits C2 and D3. He said that the Exhibits were erroneously dated as found by the trial Court. It was further argued that the Respondent pleaded and gave evidence that he paid the sum of N25,000.00 to the Appellant for the preparation of the agreement, Exhibits C and D, and that the Appellant did not issue him with receipt for the money. He said that the Appellant denied this saying that he would have issued with receipt if he had received the said sum of N25,000. He referred to the Appellant’s Reply and his evidence that the communication between him and the Respondent in May, 2010 to June 2010 was by hand and no documentation of the same, and submitted that it was the period Exhibits C and D were prepared, executed and delivered to the Respondent by the Appellant and that the only inference that can be made is that the Respondent paid the sum of N25,000 to the Appellant for the preparation of Exhibits C and D and that the Appellant received the same from the Respondent but did not give him receipt or acknowledgment of the same to the Respondent. He therefore urged this Court to dismiss this appeal.
In considering the two issues raised by the Appellant, it should be recalled that his main claim before the lower Court was for the sum of N1,000,000.00 only being the cost of Legal services, cost of investigation & research, out-of-pocket expenses and general damages in respect of the brief given to the Appellant sometimes in the year 2010 for preparation of an agreement between the Respondent and one Mr. Ilawe Osayi for the purchase of a piece of land measuring 100feet by 200feet lying and situate at Ogunmwenyi village, Benin City, Oredo Local Government Area, Edo State valued at N3 million. See paragraph 3 of the Appellant’s Amended Statement of Claim. He also pleaded that at paragraph 4(a) that the defendant was informed of the mode of charge for legal services and a bill to that effect was sent after the whole exercise. Then at paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Respondent’s Amended Statement of Defence, the Respondent averred that he paid the sum of N25,000.00 cash to the Appellant which he accepted for drafting the said deed of transfer, and, that he was never informed of any mode of charge, verbally or in writing, for legal services and no bill was sent to him until this case was filed and served on him. It should also be recalled that by the Writ of Summons shown at page 1 of the record of appeal, this action was instituted on the 18th July, 2011.
In the Appellant’s evidence under cross-examination, he said that he drafted the agreement, Exhibit C and the date on it was the date it was prepared. The trial Court noted Exhibit C as being dated 3/6/2010. The Appellant tendered his supposed Notice of Mode of Charge dated 12/5/2010 as Exhibit C1. The Notice of Termination or Discontinuance of the Appellant’s Legal Services/Retainers with the Respondent’s employers, Rubber Estates Nigeria Ltd dated 16/2/2011 and received by the Appellant on 23/2/2011 was tendered as Exhibit D1. It is also interesting to note that prior to the said date of 23/2/2012 from the date of 3/6/2010 after Exhibit C was prepared by the Appellant for the Respondent, no question whatsoever had been raised about the mode of charge applied by the Appellant in preparing the said agreement for the Respondent and no Demand Notice for the payment of any alleged sum by the Respondent to the Appellant was made by the Appellant. By every indication, there seemed to have existed some peace and tranquillity between the duo until the Respondent’s employers stirred up a real hornet’s nest by serving their letter discontinuing the Appellant’s legal services on him. It was a day after, that the Appellant mailed his Demand Notice to the Respondent on 24/2/11.
It is clear by Section 5 of the Legal Practitioners (Remuneration For Legal Documentation And Other Land Matters) Order, that the Appellant may Give Notice on Election to Charge under Scale III. But whether this Notice was as a matter of fact given by the Appellant to the Respondent is a different thing all together as the alleged Notice given by the Appellant supposedly dated 12/5/2010 surfaced for the first time in 2011 after Exhibit D1 was served on the Appellant by the Respondent’s employers. There was no proof before the lower Court that Exhibit C1 was indeed served on the Respondent nor communicated to him before Exhibit C was prepared and executed. The Respondent did not have knowledge of the existence of the same until the Appellant commenced this action and front-loaded the unsigned copy of it which was observed by the Respondent and indeed tendered by him as Exhibit D4. The lower Court remarked on this at pages 141-142 of the record of appeal. It found that the Respondent was not served with Exhibit C1 before the action was instituted, that the defendant only got a copy through the documents front-loaded by the Claimant while the suit was instituted and pending. The Court noted that Exhibit D4 tendered by the defendant is unsigned and same with the copy earlier front loaded by the defendant. It then held thus:
“Exhibit “C1” tendered by the Claimant Without acknowledgment of its receipt by the Defendant further proves and only goes to show that the Defendant was not served with Exhibit “C1” before this action was instituted. It is my view that Defendant only got a copy through documents frontloaded by the claimant while this suit was instituted and pending. Exhibit “D4” tendered by the defendant is unsigned and same with the copy earlier frontloaded by the defendant. The law is that an unsigned document is a worthless piece of paper.
No probative value can be foisted on it and it ought to be discountenanced by the Court. See A. G. Abia State V. Agharanye (1999) 6 NWLR Pt. 607 Pg 362.
In the circumstance, I have no option than to invoke the provisions of Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011 which states:-
“Nothing in this Section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute is to any fact which the statement might tend to establish”.
Thus, the evidence of the Claimant which tends to establish the fact that he informed the Defendant of his intentions to charge him under Scale III of the Order cannot be believed and same is accordingly discountenanced. It is my view also that Exhibit “C1” tendered in proof of the above cannot stand. I attach no probative value to it. I am fortified in my believed (sic) with the decision of the NBC Plc V. Ubani (2014) All FWLR (Pt.718) 803 at 811 ratio 8, where Court held as follows;-
“A document which is prepared or authenticated by a person interested in the outcome of a matter before the trial Court, that is when the proceedings are pending or anticipated and which document is intended to be used and relied on by the person and indeed has been so used or relied on by the person and indeed has been SO used or relied on to establish a fact in issue in the pending matter, albeit in the outcome of the case, is clearly inadmissible for a party to a suit to indulge in such exercise is self serving as it is capable of gross abuse to the advantage of the maker”.
Having found earlier that the Defendant was not served with Claimant’s intention to charge him his professional fee under Scale III of the Order, the charges in Exhibit “C2/D3” are liable to be set aside since they are in breach of Order.”
Further, as rightly found by the lower Court:
“The Claimant was officially served with a notice of discontinuance of Legal retainership on 23/2/2011. The Claimant mailed his Demand notice (Exhibit C2/D3) to the Defendant on 24/3/11. Whereas the work done (Exhibit C) for which Claimant is demanding his fee has been concluded since 3/6/2010. From 3/6/2010 to 22/3/11 is a period of over 9 months and just few weeks after Claimant’s notice of discontinuances of Legal retainership.
No doubt, this raises some suspicion on the part of the Claimant, which shows that the initiation of this Suit is linked with the discontinuance of Claimant’s retainership with Defendant’s employer.”
Augie, JSC, (as she then was) in the decision of this Court in GTB Plc vs. Anyanwu, Esq. 2011 LPELR-4220(CA), said thus:
“Section 16 of the LPA deals with “Remuneration of Practitioners” and the Section provides as follows – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a legal practitioner shall be entitled to recover his charges by action in any Court of competent jurisdiction. (2) Subject as aforesaid, a legal practitioner shall not be entitled to begin an action to recover his charges unless – (a) A bill for the charges containing particulars of the principal items included in the bill and signed by him, or in the case of a firm, has been served on the client personally or left by him at his last address as known to the practitioner or sent by post addressed to the client at that address; and (b) The period of one month beginning with the date of delivery of the bill has expired. A legal practitioner has a right to be remunerated for his services; he can either be paid in advance upon named fees or rely on the terms of any agreement reached for his fees. However, if he has not received his fees and no agreement was reached as to what they would be, he must submit his bill of charges – see Oyo V. Mercantile Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 213. All the relevant authorities say that reasonable remuneration must be given for the actual work or service rendered by a claimant on quantum meruit, which is Latin for ” as much as he deserved’ – see SBN Ltd V. Opanubi (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 437 SC. In effect, when the bill of charges or fees (as they are called) are properly brought by the legal practitioner in compliance with the provision of the LPA, the Court will normally give judgment for the amount of fees so claimed unless there are other factors preventing it from doing so, such as the absence or non-existence of any agreement for the payment of the fees by the client or an attempt by the legal practitioner to illegally enrich himself at the expense of his client (by way of champarty) – see Oyo V. Mercantile Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (supra) and Akingbehin V. Thompson (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 270, where Adamu, JCA added as follows – “In some cases, even where the charges or fees were not agreed upon or fixed by a contract between the parties – – the Court can award a reasonable fees or remuneration to the legal practitioner for his services actually rendered or admitted to have been rendered by him at the request or instruction of his client on the basis of quantum meruit or quasi-contract. See also SBN Ltd. V. Opanubi (supra), where Uwaifo, JSC held – “- – The Respondent – – was expected to provide parameters and necessary evidence upon which the Court would assess what is reasonable compensation on quantum meruit for the services rendered by him – – He ought to have indicated in the bill of charges the nature of the various aspects of the services he rendered; his experience at the bar which matched the skill the particular legal matters demanded; and in evidence justified the reasonableness of the charges for the services. – – A legal practitioner should be able to present a bill of charges which, among other facts, should particularize his fees and charges, e.g. (a) perusing documents and giving professional advice; (b) conducting necessary (specified) inquiries; (c) drawing up the writ of summons and statement of claim; (d) number of appearances in Court and the dates; (e) summarized statement of the work done in Court, indicating some peculiar difficult nature of the case (if any) so as to give an insight to the client as to what he is being asked to pay for; (f) the standing of counsel at the bar in terms of years of experience and/or the rank with which he is invested in the profession. It is necessary to indicate amount of fees against each of these items. – – In compensating a legal practitioner upon a quantum meruit for services he has actually rendered, it will be more realistic to make assessment on the basis of the particulars of the nature of work done by him to arrive at what can be considered a reasonable compensation. It is then a sum which “the Judge appears to have arrived at on consideration of all necessary factors would be a reasonable remuneration in all the circumstances” as observed by Lord Atkinson in Way v. Latilla.”In this case, notwithstanding anything the Respondent may have said to the contrary, there is no evidence whatsoever before the Court that his fees were agreed upon or fixed by any contract between the parties. As the Appellants pointed out, he never pleaded that the parties agreed on any fees not to mention N12.5 Million Naira fees he demanded from them and he never gave any such evidence either. Nonetheless, a Court can award a reasonable fees or remuneration to a legal practitioner for his services actually rendered or admitted to have been rendered by him – see Akingbehin V. Thompson (supra), SBN Ltd. V. Opanubi (supra).”
I completely agree with the findings of the lower Court that no proof was laid before it over the charges allegedly agreed upon by the parties now being claimed by the Appellant. The Appellant appeared economical with the facts surrounding his dealings with the Respondent over the land agreement he prepared for him. The facts building up to this case started rearing their heads the moment the Respondent’s employers terminated the Appellant’s Legal Services with them, that was when the Demand Notice was issued, then the unsigned and apparently unserved Notice on Election to Charge under Scale III emerged, etc. I also agreed with the lower Court that the Claimant received the sum of N25,000.00 from the Respondent in 2010 after Exhibit C was prepared as payment for preparation of the agreement although no receipt was issued for it by the Appellant for the preparation of the same. I wondered how the Appellant could have stayed from 3/6/2010 to 23/3/2011, a period of over 9 months and few weeks as computed by the lower Court without being paid the land agreement fee by the Respondent and without him having confronted him with it.
After considering the two issues propositioned by the Appellant and submissions of Counsel I find this appeal unmeritorious and it is bound to fail. All the legally admissible evidence as presented by the parties were adequately examined by the lower Court before arriving at its decision. Accordingly, this appeal will be and is hereby dismissed. Judgment of the Edo State High Court in suit No. B/505/2011 delivered on 12/12/2017 is hereby affirmed. I make no order as to costs.
JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.: I agree.
ADEMOLA SAMUEL BOLA, J.C.A.: I have the privilege to have read in draft the Judgment learned brother, THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADIJA, PJCA. I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. I adopt as mine.
I abide by the decision. I equally hold that the appeal will be and is hereby dismissed. Judgment of the Edo State High Court in suit no. B/505/2011 delivered on 12/12/2017 is hereby affirmed.
I make no order as to costs.
Appearances:
N.D Ebon, Esq, For Appellant(s)
Nosa Obaizamomwan, Esq, For Respondent(s)
