LABOUR PARTY v. ATEGBOLA & ORS (2022)

LABOUR PARTY v. ATEGBOLA & ORS

(2022)LCN/17010(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(AKURE JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, October 27, 2022

CA/AK/211M/2022(R)

Before Our Lordships:

Ayobode Olujimi Lokulo-Sodipe Justice of the Court of Appeal

Cordelia Ifeoma Jombo-Ofo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Yusuf Alhaji Bashir Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

LABOUR PARTY APPELANT(S)

And

1. DR VICTOR OLUSEGUN ATEGBOLA 2. MR ADEGBOYEGA ADEFARATI 3. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS 4. NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS 5. MR ADE ADETIMEHIN, ONDO STATE CHAIRMAN ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS 6. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE VALIDLY BE ON GROUND BEFORE THE 60 DAYS STARTS COUNTING

An appeal in a pre-election matter must be determined 60 days from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal. A notice of appeal therefore must properly and validly be on ground before the 60 days can start counting. An application for leave not being the appeal itself, the Applicant therefore needed to have first approached the lower Court for the orders it seeks in the instant motion to enable the lower Court decide on the issue as to whether or not it will grant the Applicant leave to appeal within the 14 days it has to appeal against the consent judgment in question and I have not come across any decided case that relieves the Applicant in the instant case of strict compliance with the provisions of the Rules of this Court in Order 6 reproduced above in order to save time. If the method adopted by the Applicant in respect of the instant motion is to prevent undue delay because its motion could have been refused by the lower Court and therefore it would not have been able to file its notice of appeal within the 14 days as stipulated by law, then it would have been better for the Applicant to have gone straight to the Supreme Court to ask for leave because if the instant application is refused, the 14 days within which it is to appeal would have expired. So, the undue delay the Applicant was trying to avoid by doing the needful at the lower Court is the same thing that would arise in this Court as appeals in pre-election matters can always get to the Supreme Court. All I am endeavoring to say is that Applicant’s refusal to comply with the provisions of the Rules of this Court in Order 6 Rules (2) to (4) on the ground of undue delay is preposterous and discloses a hollow appreciation of the Rules of this Court relating to leave to appeal. PER LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON CAN CHALLENGE WHATEVER WENT ON IN THE PRIMARIES OF A POLITICAL PARTY

The cases of ANYAKORAH V. PDP and AGUMA V. APC (supra) amongst many others clearly shows that a person that can challenge whatever went on in the primaries of a political party can only be an aspirant in the said primaries of the political party in question and or the political party itself and not a non-aspirant or a political party whose primary election is not the subject of the litigation. Such a non-aspirant or a non-party in relation to the primaries of another political party have been described by this Court in the case of ACN V. LABOUR PARTY (2012) LPELR-8003(CA) as a meddlesome interloper. See also the cases of DANIEL V. INEC (2015) LPELR-24566(SC) and DAHIRU V. APC (2016) LPELR- 42089 (SC).
The Supreme Court in the case of SOCIETE GENERALE BANK V. AFEKORO (1999) LPELR-3082(SC) has shown that for a person or party to be an interested party or have interest in a matter, he/it must be one who shows that he/it is aggrieved by the judgment of the Court in question and that the words “person aggrieved” do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. That a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. In this regard, see also the cases of ALIOKE V. OYE (2018) LPELR- 45153(SC) and CHUKWU V. INEC (2014) LPELR-25015 (SC). PER LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgement): The application filed before the Court on 20/10/2022 was brought by the Labour Party (hereafter to be simply referred to as ‘’the Applicant “) pursuant to Section 243(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended (hereafter to be simply referred to as “the amended 1999 Constitution”), Order 6 Rules (1) and (4) and Order 25 Rule (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules. 2021; and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The Applicant in the said application prays for the following: –
“1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Applicant to appeal as an interested party, the judgment of the Federal High Court, Akure Judicial Division delivered by Honourable Justice Adefunmilayo Adekemi Demi Ajayi on 13 October 2022 in SUIT NO. FHC/AK/CS/62/22 BETWEEN DR. VICTOR OLUSEGUN ATEGBOLA AND MR. ADEGBOYEGA ADEFARATI & 4 ORS.
2. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Applicant to appeal the consent judgment of the Federal High Court, Akure Judicial Division delivered by Honourable Justice Adefunmilayo Adekemi Demi Ajayi on 13 October 2022 in SUIT NO. FHC/AK/CS/62/22 BETWEEN DR. VICTOR OLUSEGUN ATEGBOLA AND MR. ADEGBOYEGA ADEFARATI & 4 ORS.
3. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court granting accelerated hearing of the Applicant’s Appeal.”

The grounds upon which the application is brought as copiously set out therein are as follows:
“1. The 1st Respondent (Plaintiff at the lower Court) and the 2nd Respondent (1st Defendant at the lower Court) are two aspirants of the 3rd Respondent for the House of Representatives primary election for Akoko South East/Akoko South West Federal Constituency scheduled to hold at St. Patrick’s Secondary School, Iwaro-Oka, Akoko South West Local Government Area of Ondo State on 27th May 2022 in preparation for the 2023 House of Representatives election in the constituency
2. After the conduct of the said primary election, the 2nd Respondent was declared winner and his name was subsequently forwarded to the 6th Respondent as the 3rd Respondent’s candidate for the 2023 House of Representatives election in the constituency.
3. The 1st Respondent being dissatisfied with the conduct of the said primary commenced an action in Suit No: FHC/AK/CS/62/22 before the Federal High Court sitting in Akure challenging the said primary election and complained of various infractions including non-conduct of the primary election at St. Patrick’s Secondary School, Iwaro-Oka, Akko (sic) South West Local Government Area of Ondo State on 27th May, 2022 as well as the relocation of the venue of the primary election from St. Patrick’s Secondary School, Iwaro-Oka, Akoko South West Local Government to the DOME, Akure, in Akure South Local Government Area.
4. The 1st Respondent further contended that despite his several appeals to the appeal committee of the 3rd Respondent, the 3rd Respondent affirmed the conduct of the said primary election.
5. Upon the exchanged (sic) of pleadings, the parties entered into terms of settlement which was entered as the consent judgment of the Court in the following terms:
a. It is hereby agreed between the Plaintiff on the one part and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants on the other part that the present Suit as constituted be discontinued in the interest of the All Progressives Congress (APC).
b. It is further agreed that the 2nd Defendant, the All Progressives Congress (APC), shall within 7 days from the date of pronouncing this Terms of Settlement as the judgment of this Court in this suit or so soon thereafter, write officially to inform the 5th Defendant of its readiness to conduct a fresh APC’s primaries for the Akoko South- East and Akoko South West Federal Constituency at the approved venue of the primaries, being St. Patrick’s Secondary School, Iwaro- Oka, Akoko South West Local Government Area of Ondo State within the Federal Constituency.
c. The 2nd Defendant shall invite the appropriate officers of the 5th Defendant to monitor the proposed fresh primaries for Akoko South East/Akoko South West Federal Constituency.
d. That the foregoing terms shall be the judgment of this Honourable Court in this suit.
6. That the Applicant herein who has also fielded its candidate for the Akoko South East/Akoko South West Federal Constituency is seeking this opportunity to be heard on the propriety or correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the trial Court.
7. Whereas by the provision of Section 84(13) of the Electoral Act, 2022 (the Act), where a political party fails to comply with the provisions of Section 84 of the Act, in the conduct of its primaries, its candidate for election shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue.
8. That the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents, having realized the futility as well as voidity of their action and the consequence of an unfavourable decision of the Court, entered into the purported terms of settlement which was subsequently entered as the judgment of the Court in order to circumvent the sledge hammer of the provision of the Act.
9. That the Act does not allow for the conduct of a fresh primary election where the Court finds that a political party has violated the provisions of Section 84 of the Act in the conduct of its primary election.
10. That having submitted the name of the 2nd Respondent as its candidate for the 2023 House of Representatives election in the constituency, the 3rd Respondent cannot substitute its candidate by conduct of a fresh primary election under the guise of the purported terms of settlement after the time slated for the conduct of primary elections and submission of names of candidates of political parties to the 6th Respondent have elapsed.
11. That the 6th Respondent who ought to act as an unbiased umpire also colluded with the parties by signing the said terms of settlement in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Electoral Act as well as its timetable for the conduct of election.
12. That the terms of settlement which was entered as the consent judgment of the lower Court was an attempt by the Respondents to use the process of Court to perpetrate illegality. That the consent judgment is a flagrant abuse of the lawful process of the Court and the lower Court does not have the jurisdiction to enter same.
13. Whereas by plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court, a consent judgment obtained by fraud or deceit either in the Court or of one or more of the parties or where same is a nullity, may be impeached or set aside. Similarly, a consent judgment or order may be set aside for cogent and sufficient reason which in law would constitute a ground for setting aside the agreement on which such consent judgment or order was based.
14. That it will be in the interest of justice as well as the society and for the purpose of ensuring probity and fair democratic process to set aside the consent judgment of the lower Court delivered on 13 October 2022.
15. Whereas by a plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court, a consent judgment may be set aside on appeal by a person whose interest is affected by the subject matter before the Court to which he was not made a party as an interested party.
16. That by virtue of Section 285(14)(C) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Applicant herein is entitled to approach this Honourable Court to complain that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other applicable law has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the nomination of candidates of political parties for an election as well as timetable for an election among others.
17. That being an interested party, the Applicant herein is desirous of setting aside the consent judgment of the lower Court delivered on 13 October 2022.
18. That the leave of this Honourable Court is a conditional (sic) precedent for the Applicant to appeal the said consent judgment of the lower Court as interested parties.
19. That the Applicant is desirous of appealing the decision of the trial Court and on cogent and arguable grounds of Appeal. That the Applicant’s proposed Grounds of Appeal annexed to this application as Exhibit K3, raise serious and substantial jurisdictional and legal issues to be tried by this Honourable Court.
20. That given the nature of the suit, being a pre-election matter, filing the instant application at the lower Court will occasion an undue delay.
21. That time is of essence as there is a need for an Appellate resolution of the issue of legality or otherwise of the consent judgment of the lower Court before the conduct of the 2023 general election.
22. That it will be in the interest of justice for this Honourable Court to hear and determine the Applicant’s application.”

The application is supported by a 29-paragraph affidavit to which is annexed as Exhibit K1 – a document titled “terms of settlement” filed at the Federal High Court, Akure Judicial Division (hereafter to be simply referred to as “the lower Court”); and a proposed notice of appeal containing the Applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal as Exhibit K2. A written address dated 20/10/2022 was also filed alongside the application. On 26/10/2022 the Applicant filed a further affidavit to which the judgment order made by the lower Court on 13/10/2022, was attached as Exhibit A1.

The 2nd Respondent filed a counter affidavit on 27/10/2022 accompanied by a written address. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Respondent filed no counter affidavit and/or written addresses. The 1st and 2nd Respondents based their attack or opposition to the motion before the Court on the facts deposed to by the Applicant in the supporting affidavit.

The motion was entertained on 27/10/2022 and learned counsel for the Applicant, A.O. Ajayi holding brief for Dr. Kayode Ajulo relied on the supporting affidavit of the motion and the further affidavit filed on 26/10/2022 and also adopted the written address attached to the supporting affidavit, in urging the Court to grant the motion before the Court. In opposing the motion, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, O.C. Oke, submitted that the motion is a waste of judicial process as the reliefs being sought before the Court should have been first sought before the lower Court. Learned counsel referred to Section 14(2) of the Court of Appeal Act; and submitted that the Applicant has no cause of action. Learned leading senior counsel for the 2nd Respondent Chief Olusola Oke, SAN; in urging the Court to dismiss the motion relied on the counter affidavit deposed to on 27/10/2022 and also adopted the written address filed on the same date. He further referred the Court to the case of ABDULLAHI V. LOKO (2022) LPELR — 57578(SC) and submitted that the motion was spent by effluxion of time. Learned counsel for the 6th Respondent O.A. Kuku urged the Court to do justice to the matter.

The lone issue formulated by the Applicant for the determination of the instant motion reads thus: –
In the light of the entire facts/circumstances of this case, whether Applicant is entitled to Leave to Appeal the decision of the lower Court as an interested party?

Dwelling on the said issue for determination, the Applicant submitted to the effect that it will be directly affected by the consent judgment sought to be appealed against as it is a political party that has fielded a candidate for the 2023 House of Representatives Election for the Akoko South East/South West Federal Constituency. That by the provisions of Sections 285(14) and 243(1)(a) of the amended 1999 Constitution, it is entitled to approach the Court to complain of the failure of the 6th Respondent to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 (hereafter to be simply referred to as the “Electoral Act”) as it relates to the nomination of candidates of political parties for an election. The Applicant referred to “the explanatory memorandum to the Electoral Act, as well as Section 84(13) of the said Act and submitted that given the prescribed period within which a political party is to forward the names of its candidates for an election to the 6th Respondent, the 3rd Respondent having submitted the name of the 2nd Respondent and the same having being published by the 6th Respondent, the said 3rd Respondent cannot substitute its candidate or conduct a fresh primary election except by a procedure provided by law. That Exhibit K1 was made by the 2nd to 5th Respondents in collusion with the 6th Respondent to circumvent the provisions of the law and aimed at perpetrating illegality with the use of Court processes.

It is the stance of the Applicant that Section 285(14) of the amended 1999 Constitution empowers political parties to challenge the actions of the 6th Respondent as it relates to the nomination of candidates of political parties for election(s) and time table for election(s) amongst others and as such it has sufficient legal interest to challenge the actions of the 6th Respondent with respect to the nomination of the 2nd Respondent as the 3rd Respondent’s candidate as well as the failure of the 6th Respondent to comply with its timetable in respect of the election in question. Applicant further posited that a consent judgment obtained by fraud or deceit may be set aside and the same may be set aside on appeal by a person whose interest is affected by the said order of Court. That where it is shown that there is abundant evidence to demonstrate that the interest of the Applicant would be affected by the Court’s decision, it becomes necessary to make an order for joinder (sic) of the said Applicant. In conclusion, the Applicant urged the Court to grant the instant motion. It stated to the effect that the proposed notice of appeal and grounds of appeal therein disclose cogent and arguable grounds which raise substantial issues of law.

In my considered view, the issue for determination of the instant motion as formulated by the Applicant vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the motion has been brought as well as the written address of the 2nd Respondent: and oral submissions of the 1st and 6th Respondents admits of the consideration of the following questions/issues: –
“1. Whether or not the motion before the Court is competent having regard to the circumstances of its being filed in this Court;
2. Whether or not the Applicant has the locus standi to apply for leave to appeal against the decision or the consent judgment entered by the lower Court for the parties before it having regard to the nature of the proceedings in which the said consent judgment was entered;
3. Whether or not the motion even if competent can be granted having regard to the time that it is now being argued vis-a-vis the period stipulated by the amended 1999 Constitution and the Election Judicial Proceedings Practice Directions, 2022 (hereafter to be simply referred to as “the EJPP Directions”) for lodging an appeal against a judgment in a pre-election matter; and
4. If the answers to 1 to 3 above, are in the affirmative or resolved in favour of the Applicant, whether or not it has established the conditions that must co-exist before an application for leave to appeal is granted.’’

The 1st of the three issues identified by this Court is informed by the provisions of Order 6 Rules (2) to (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2021 which states as follows: –
(2) Any application to the Court for leave to appeal (other than an application made after the expiration of the time for appealing) shall be by notice of motion, which shall be served on the party or parties, affected.
(3) Where an application has been refused by the lower Court, an application for a similar purpose may be made to the Court within fifteen(15) days after the date of the refusal.
(4) Wherever under these Rules an application may be made either to the lower Court or to the Court, it shall not be made in the first instance to the Court, except where there are special circumstances, which make it impossible or impracticable to apply to the Court below.
There is no doubt that Order 6 Rules (2) – (4) dealing with leave to appeal is clearly applicable to the judgment the Applicant is seeking to appeal against even though a pre-election case which is by its very nature sui generis and to which the provisions of the EJPP Directions are applicable. In the processes which the Applicant filed, it clearly brought to the fore its noncompliance with the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Rules of this Court set out above. The Applicant in not complying with this provision relied on the fact that given the nature of the suit, being a pre-election matter, filing the instant application at the lower Court will occasion an undue delay. I have perused the supporting affidavit and I do not see anywhere the Applicant deposed to the fact constituting the undue delay.
By the Constitutional provisions in Section 285(11), an appeal against the decision of the lower Court in a pre-election matter is to be filed within 14 days from the date of the delivery of the judgment appealed against. The same period within which an appeal can be lodged in a pre-election matter was echoed as 14 days in paragraph 6(2) of the EJPP Directions. Bringing the instant motion directly to this Court on the ground that there will be undue delay in disposing the appeal has apparently disclosed the misapprehension the Applicant has in respect of instituting an appeal and the hearing of an appeal. An appeal in a pre-election matter must be determined 60 days from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal.
A notice of appeal therefore must properly and validly be on ground before the 60 days can start counting. An application for leave not being the appeal itself, the Applicant therefore needed to have first approached the lower Court for the orders it seeks in the instant motion to enable the lower Court decide on the issue as to whether or not it will grant the Applicant leave to appeal within the 14 days it has to appeal against the consent judgment in question and I have not come across any decided case that relieves the Applicant in the instant case of strict compliance with the provisions of the Rules of this Court in Order 6 reproduced above in order to save time. If the method adopted by the Applicant in respect of the instant motion is to prevent undue delay because its motion could have been refused by the lower Court and therefore it would not have been able to file its notice of appeal within the 14 days as stipulated by law, then it would have been better for the Applicant to have gone straight to the Supreme Court to ask for leave because if the instant application is refused, the 14 days within which it is to appeal would have expired. So, the undue delay the Applicant was trying to avoid by doing the needful at the lower Court is the same thing that would arise in this Court as appeals in pre-election matters can always get to the Supreme Court. All I am endeavoring to say is that Applicant’s refusal to comply with the provisions of the Rules of this Court in Order 6 Rules (2) to (4) on the ground of undue delay is preposterous and discloses a hollow appreciation of the Rules of this Court relating to leave to appeal.
In the instant motion, the Applicant admits that not being a party to the consent judgment of the lower Court, he can only exercise a right of appeal against the consent judgment by procuring the leave of Court which leave it should have first sought from the lower Court and seek again from this Court in the event the lower Court did not grant the same and not necessarily by way of an appeal. See the provisions of Order 6 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court which permits an Appellant seeking for leave to appeal to make the same application to this Court within 15 days of the refusal of the said application by the lower Court.
This is however if the time period for the filing of the notice of appeal in the case has not elapsed before the expiration of the 15 days. In other words, the Applicant if it wanted to take advantage of the provisions of Order 6 Rules (2) and (3) should have filed its application for leave to appeal and to have had the same entertained by the lower Court well within the period of the expiration of the 14 days it has to file its notice of appeal and to have proceeded to this Court to procure the same relief within the 14 days required for the filing of notice of appeal against the consent judgment of the lower Court. The Applicant cannot have the period of 14 days within which a notice of appeal is to be filed against the consent judgment of the lower Court extended as it were, under the cloak that it is not a party but an interested party. The law is settled that in time bound proceedings, time within which to take any step in such time bound proceeding cannot be extended. See the case of PDP V. INEC (2014) LPELR-23808(SC).
Against the backdrop of all that has been said therefore, is that the instant motion not having been first made to the lower Court on the Applicant’s showing, without disclosing any extenuating circumstances therefore is incompetent. The motion before the Court is therefore liable to be struck out.

The second of the four issues identified above as arising from the one issue formulated by the Applicant is as to whether or not it (Applicant) has the locus standi to appeal as an interested party in a pre-election matter not in respect of its own primaries that is, Applicant’s and in which the parties to the pre-election case in question never ventilated any grievance relating to the Applicant.
It is apparent from the other processes filed in the instant motion, that the subject matter of the instant case as it relates to the 1st -5th Respondents at the lower Court was one in respect of the conduct of the primary election(s) of the 3rd Respondent for the 2023 House of Representatives Election for the Akoko South East/South West Federal Constituency. It is therefore undeniable that the case in which the Applicant wishes to come in as a party by the orders which it seeks is clearly a pre-election matter. See also paragraph 25 of the Applicant’s affidavit in support of the motion before the Court. In this wise, I wish to reproduce the provisions of Section 285(14) of the amended 1999 Constitution. The said provisions read as follows: –
For the purpose of this Section, “pre-election matter” means any suit by-
(a) an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating the conduct of primaries of political parties and the provisions of the guidelines of a political party for conduct of party primaries has not been complied with by a political party in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates for an election;
(b) an aspirant challenging the actions, decisions or activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of his participation in an election or who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating elections in Nigeria has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates and participation in an election; and
(c) a political party challenging the actions, decisions or activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission disqualifying its candidate from participating in an election or a complaint that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other applicable law has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the nomination of candidates of political parties for an election, timetable for an election, registration of voters and other activities of the Commission in respect of preparation for an election.”
See also the cases of ANYAKORAH V. PDP (2022) LPELR-56876(SC) and AGUMA V. APC (2021) LPELR-55927(SC) amongst many others.
The cases of ANYAKORAH V. PDP and AGUMA V. APC (supra) amongst many others clearly shows that a person that can challenge whatever went on in the primaries of a political party can only be an aspirant in the said primaries of the political party in question and or the political party itself and not a non-aspirant or a political party whose primary election is not the subject of the litigation. Such a non-aspirant or a non-party in relation to the primaries of another political party have been described by this Court in the case of ACN V. LABOUR PARTY (2012) LPELR-8003(CA) as a meddlesome interloper. See also the cases of DANIEL V. INEC (2015) LPELR-24566(SC) and DAHIRU V. APC (2016) LPELR- 42089 (SC).
The Supreme Court in the case of SOCIETE GENERALE BANK V. AFEKORO (1999) LPELR-3082(SC) has shown that for a person or party to be an interested party or have interest in a matter, he/it must be one who shows that he/it is aggrieved by the judgment of the Court in question and that the words “person aggrieved” do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. That a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. In this regard, see also the cases of ALIOKE V. OYE (2018) LPELR- 45153(SC) and CHUKWU V. INEC (2014) LPELR-25015 (SC).
Juxtaposing the position of the law as enunciated in the cases cited above with the provisions of the Electoral Act as reproduced hereinbefore, it is clear as crystal that the Applicant does not qualify as a person interested or person aggrieved within the parameters of the law in respect of a consent judgment delivered in a pre-election matter relating to the primaries of another party (APC) and which the Applicant (Labour party) was not an aspirant and in any case could never have been an aspirant. The Applicant having regard to all that have been said would glaringly have no locus standi to have challenged anything it conceived to have been amiss in respect of the primaries concerning the Respondents and or any of them. See the case of ALAHASSAN V. ISHAKU (2016) LPELR- 40083 (SC). A fortiori the Applicant therefore cannot have the locus standi to question anything flowing from the judgment in a case which it could not have instituted on its own, as an interested party. In other words, the Applicant having not qualified as a person interested or person aggrieved in respect of the consent judgment of the lower Court which emanated from a pre-election action involving the APC and its members who were aspirants at one of the said APC’s primaries cannot and does not have the locus standi to challenge the consent judgment delivered by the lower Court and therefore the motion for leave now brought by the said Applicant is clearly not well founded. Again, the motion is incompetent and is liable to be dismissed on this ground.

The third of the four issues stated hereinbefore, relates to whether or not the motion before the Court is already spent by effluxion of time. It is now an immutable position of the law that pre-election proceedings like election petitions are sui generis. Hence, and as has been demonstrated in issue 1 above, (relating to the time within which an appeal is to be lodged against the judgment of the lower Court in a pre-election matter) an appeal against the decision of a Court in a pre-election matter must be lodged in this Court within a certain time frame. See again, Section 285(11) of the amended 1999 Constitution as well as Paragraph 6(2) of the EJPP Directions. The EJPP Directions, also provide specific rules for the quick dispensation of justice in the prosecution of appeals in pre-election matters. The Supreme Court and this Court have virtually interpreted the provisions of the EJPP Directions which in my considered view are very similar to the provisions of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2011, and the position of the law in many cases expounding the provisions of the aforementioned subsidiary enactments, has consistently been that the time frame or periods provided therein for the doing of an act cannot be extended because of the sui generis nature of both pre-election proceedings and election petitions. See again the case of PDP V. INEC (supra). The 2nd Respondent has argued at the hearing of the instant motion that the period of 14 days the Applicant has within which to appeal even if the same was available to it, has expired before now; and the case of Abdullahi v. Loko (2022) LPELR-57578(SC) was cited in support of this position. The Court has read the case cited by the 2nd Respondent and it is clear therefrom that in calculating the period of 14 days that an appeal can be validly lodged against the decision of a Court in a pre-election matter, the notice of appeal in that regard, must be lodged at the registry of the appropriate Court within a period of 14 days and that the 14 days must be calculated from the very date of the decision being sought to be appealed against. While it can be argued that there are at least two recent decisions of this Court that decide to the contrary (in this wise see the case of OJO V. APC (2022) LPELR-58723(CA) decided on 7/10/2022; and the case of ONAMADE V. APC (2022) LPELR-58719(CA) decided on 10/10/2022), there is no doubt that this Court in total deference to the doctrine of stares decisis, must apply the position of the law as has now been laid down in the case of ABDULLAHI V. LOKO (supra) and must agree with the position of the 2nd Respondent that the instant motion is indeed spent as today is the 15th day after the lower Court delivered its consent judgment on 13/10/2022. I cannot but assume that the case of Abdullahi v. Loko (supra) decided by the Supreme Court on 16/3/2022, was not brought to the notice of this Court that decided the Ojo and Onamade cases, or that the Court itself did not have knowledge of the said cases as at the date it decided the said cases of Ojo and Onamade.
Flowing from the fact that this Court even if it was minded to grant the motion before it, cannot now do so having regard to the fact that it is now a day beyond when the Applicant can appeal and there been no power in the Court to extend the time within which the Applicant can appeal, it follows that the motion before the Court has again become incompetent despite the readiness of the Court to have entertained the said motion on 25/10/2022 and on which date it was adjourned till 27/10/2022 as suggested by the Applicant through its counsel. The instant motion having become spent is therefore liable to be struck out.

The fourth and the last of the issues set out hereinbefore relates to the merit of the motion before the Court. I see no useful purpose dwelling on the merit of the said motion will serve having earlier found the same to be incompetent based on my resolution of issues 1, 2 and 3 earlier identified as arising from the broad lone issue the Applicant formulated for the determination of its application.

In the final analysis and flowing from all that has been stated hereinbefore is that the instant motion for leave to appeal as an interested party brought by the Applicant is hereby struck out for being incompetent; and in any case as the said Applicant lacks the locus standi to bring the same even if the 14 days it could have lodged an appeal against the consent judgment of the lower Court had not expired before today.

Costs of N500,000.00 is awarded against the Applicant and in favour of the Respondents save the 6th Respondent which is a government agency and which routinely or ordinarily does not pay costs.

CORDELIA IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the leading Ruling of my noble lord AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, JCA. I agree in toto with the reasoning conclusion reached therein.

The applicant who was not a party in a consent judgment entered into by the parties on record, has suddenly appeared to seek leave of Court to appeal against the judgment.

By the Provisions of Order 6 Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021:
Wherever under these Rules an application may be made either to the lower Court or to the Court, it shall not be made in the first instance to the Court, except where there are special circumstances which made it impossible or impracticable to apply to the lower Court.
(Emphasis mine).
The application did not disclose in its affidavit and or further affidavit in support of its motion, the exceptional circumstances that militated and prevented it from applying in the first instance to the lower Court.
Coming straight to this Court is an affront to the Court. The law is settled that by the provisions of Section 243(1) (a) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended Constitution, a person interested in an appeal who was not a party to the decision complained of must first seek leave as an interested party. An applicant seeking leave of Court to appeal as an interested party must therefore make detailed and credible depositions in his affidavit in support of the application to show his interest in the matter. See Waziri v. Gumel (2012) 9 NWLR pt. 1304, pg. 185. Applicant cannot avail itself of the excuse of undue delay to circumvent the clear and strict provisions of Order 6 Rule 4 supra, more so as it relates to pre-election matter which is sui generis in nature.
The applicant has not led before the Court any special circumstance that will warrant the grant of leave for it to appeal against the consent judgment.

Aside from being an interloper, I see no reason for this application which I find to be incompetent and for which reason I shall strike it out and it is so struck out.
I abide by the consequential order as to cost made by my learned brother.

YUSUF ALHAJI BASHIR, J.C.A.: My noble brother, AYOBODE O. LOKULO-SODIPE, PJ has graciously availed me a draft copy of this ruling.
I totally agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by his lordship in this ruling.

Using the accepted judicial standard my lord has defined who an interested party or who a person having an interest in a matter should be. That is to say for a person to qualify as such the Applicant must show not only that he is a person having interest in the matter but also that the order or judgment of the Court below he is seeking leave to appeal against, prejudicially affect, his interest. In other words, to succeed in the application the Applicant must show that they are persons who are aggrieved, or persons who have legal grievances or person against whom decision have been pronounced which have wrongfully deprived them of something or wrongfully refused them something. See: RE. Ugadu (1988) 5 NWLR (93) 189, Re Modaki (1990) 4 NWLR (143) 266, Tabansi-Okoye V. Ikpeazu (2016) LPELR 40329 (CA).

The Applicant has failed to establish any of this requirements rather the Applicant has only succeeded in proving that it is a mere busy body whose interest was in no way affected by the decision of the Court given in an action principally between two members of the same political party (APC) I cannot see how the Applicant “Labour Party” a different platform from the Respondent, can harbor any justifiable interest in the intra party affairs of the APC (3rd Respondent).

For the more comprehensively detailed and eloquent reasons contained in the lead decision; I too find no merit in this application which in any case is incompetent ab initio for not first being made before the Trial Court before coming over here.
The application is therefore hereby struck out. I abide by the orders made by my noble brother Lokulo-Sodipe JCA as to cost.