KENTE v. INEC & ORS
(2022)LCN/17005(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, November 24, 2022
CA/YL/211/2022
Before Our Lordships:
Tani Yusuf Hassan Justice of the Court of Appeal
Misitura Omodere Bolaji-Yusuff Justice of the Court of Appeal
James Gambo Abundaga Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
CHIEF DAVID SABO KENTE APPELANT(S)
And
1. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) 2. SENATOR EMMANUEL BWACHA 3. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF THE COURTS ON GROUNDS OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court stated what should be the attitude of the Court towards an inelegantly ground of appeal in IGHEDO & ANOR v. PHCN (2018) LPELR-43863(SC) AT 39-42(B-A) as follows:
“Generally, rules of Court are meant to regulate matters in Court and assist parties in the prosecution of their cases to achieve fair hearing and quick dispensation of justice, See; Solanke Vs Somefun (1974) 1 SC 141; Ibodo Vs Enarofia (1980) 5-7 SC 42; Ana vs Ana (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 316; John vs Blakk (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 648. And rules of Court are meant to be obeyed and complied with by parties and the Court. See; Afolabi Vs. Adekunle (1983) 14 NSCC 398 405; University of Lagos vs. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 143. However, the rule of our appellate procedure relating to formulation of grounds of appeal, has been held to be primarily designed to ensure fairness to the other party. And therefore the application of such rules should not be reduced to a matter of mere technicality, whereby the Court will consider the form rather than the substance. In Alhaji Salami O. Aderounmu & Anor Vs Emmanuel Oajide Olowu, (2000) 4 NWLR (pt.652) 253; (2000) LPELR 141 (SC) this Court had opined as follows: “The prime purpose of the rules of appellant procedure, both in this Court and in the Court of appeal, that the appellant shall file a notice of appeal which shall set forth concisely the grounds which he intends to rely upon on the appeal, and that such grounds should not be vague or general in terms and must disclose a reasonable ground of appeal, is to give sufficient notice and information, to the other side, of the precise nature of the complaint of the appellant and consequently, of the issues that are likely to arise on the appeal. Any ground that satisfies that purpose should not be struck out, notwithstanding that it did not conform to a particular form… What is important in a ground of appeal, and the test the Court should apply, is whether or not the impugned ground shows clearly what is complained of as error in law and what is complained of as misdirection, or as the case may be, error of fact.” PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS CAN GRANT RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR AS A CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER
It is the law that Courts of law have the power to grant a relief not specifically asked for as a consequential order. In fact, it is the duty of the Court to make consequential orders in the interest of justice even if the order or relief is not specifically asked for especially if it is aimed at giving effect to the judgment of the Court. It is not the practice of the Court to invite parties or counsel to address it before making a consequential order that is aimed at giving effect to the judgment especially when the consequential order will not deprive the parties of any right. See EYIGEBE V. IYAJI (2013) LPELR-20522(SC) AT 24-25 (F-B). EZE & ORS V. GOV OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2014) LPELR-23276(SC) AT 30 (B-E). In NOEKOER V. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE & ORS (2018) LPELR-44350(SC) AT 20-21 (E-E), the Supreme Court reiterated the inherent power of the Court to make consequential order as follows:
“It is trite law, that a Court has inherent power to make consequential order. A consequential order is simply one which flows directly and naturally from the decision or order made on issues litigated upon and inevitably consequent upon it. See Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb [1992] 2 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266 or (1992) 7 SCNJ 119 or (1992) LPELR – 325 (SC). A consequential order is one which gives effect to a judgment or order to which it is consequential. See Funduk Engineering Ltd vs Mcarthur & Ors (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 153; Obayagbona vs Obazee (1972) SC 247; Odofin & Anor vs Agu & Anor (1992) NWLR (Pt.229) 350. Every Court, be it of first instant or appellate has the power and in fact, has the duty and obligation to make any consequential order in the interest of justice and it is irrelevant and of no moment that the particular order was not specifically asked for by either party to the proceedings or appeal. See Prince Yahaya Adigun & Ors Vs Attorney General of Oyo State & Ors (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.53) 678 at 710; Chief Ebenezer & Ors vs S.K. Owodunni & Anor (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 57) 367.” PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court of Nigeria delivered in suit no. FHC/JAL//CS/24/2022 on 20th September, 2022. The appellant as the plaintiff instituted the suit by originating summons wherein he presented the following questions for determination:
1. Whether having regard to Section 84(1), (4), (5), (13) & 14 of the Electoral Act, 2022 and paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 23 of the 3rd defendant’s guidelines for nomination of candidates for the 2023 general elections, the 3rd defendant conducted any primary election known to law for the nomination of its governorship candidate for Taraba State for 2023 governorship elections when there was no accreditation or any …within the time frame prescribed by the guidelines, no voting or counting of votes or collation of votes or equal opportunity for the aspirants to vote or be voted for?
2. Whether having regard to Section 84(4) of the Electoral Act, 2022, the plaintiff as an aspirant to the office of the Executive Governor of Taraba State, under the platform of the 3rd defendant was afforded fair and equal opportunity by the 3rd defendant to vote and be voted for at the purported primary election for nomination of the 3rd defendant’s governorship candidate for Taraba State in the 2023 governorship general elections when having informed the plaintiff and made public press statement as well as informed the 1st defendant that it was going to conduct the gubernatorial primaries in every state in Nigeria including Taraba State on the 26th May, 2022 by indirect primaries except for three states of Abia, Benue and Osun then made a summersault and surreptitiously in connivance with the 2nd defendant purported to adopt direct primaries on 26th May, 2022 for gubernatorial primaries to the disadvantage of the plaintiff who had no opportunity to vote nor appoint and deploy his agents to voting centres in the wards spread across Taraba State nor mobilize his supporters who are members of the 3rd defendant to vote for him at the purported direct primary of the 3rd defendant?
3. Whether the 3rd defendant was not thereby in breach of its contract with the plaintiff as an aspirant and in breach of its statutory duties in the manner in which it purported to conduct the primary election for the nomination of candidate for the 2023 governorship election of Taraba State?
4. Whether in the circumstances of this case, the purported announcement/declaration by the 3rd defendant’s governorship primary election committee, chaired by one Lawrence Onochukwu with one Abbas Braimoh as Secretary of 2nd defendant as the governorship candidate of the 3rd defendant for Taraba State and winner of an unlawful primary election in complete violation of the Electoral Act, 2022, the constitution of the 3rd defendant of March, 2022 (as amended) and the 3rd defendant’s guidelines for the nomination of candidate for the 2023 general elections was not a sham and illegal?
5. Whether in the circumstances, the 3rd defendant has any validly nominated candidate for the 2023 governorship elections for Taraba State that should not be excluded from the list of candidates for the general elections in 2023?
He sought for the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that by mandatory provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022, the 3rd defendant’s Constitution of March, 2022 (as amended) and the 3rd defendant’s guidelines for the nomination of candidate for the 2023 general elections, there was no governorship primary election known to law conducted by the 3rd defendant in Taraba State for the nomination of the 3rd defendant’s candidate for the 2023 governorship election for Taraba State.
2. A declaration that the purported governorship primary election conducted by the 3rd defendant for the nomination of its candidate for the 2023 governorship election in Taraba State, violated the Electoral Act, 2022, the 3rd defendant’s constitution of March, 2022 (as amended) and the 3rd defendant’s guidelines for the nomination of candidates for the 2023 general elections and was therefore a sham and illegal.
3. A declaration that the 3rd defendant has no validly nominated candidate for the 2023 governorship elections of Taraba State of Nigeria and no candidate should be presented by the 3rd defendant in respect of the governorship of Taraba State should be accepted by the 1st defendant.
4. A declaration that the 3rd defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to provide an equal opportunity to vote and be voted for in the governorship primary election to nominate its candidate for the office of the governor in the general elections coming up in 2023 and its failure to do so constituted a breach of its contract with the plaintiff as an aspirant as well as its statutory duty to conduct the primary election for nomination of its candidates for the 2023 governorship elections for Taraba State of Nigeria in accordance with the Electoral Act, 2022.
5. Perpetual injunction restraining the 3rd defendant from presenting 2nd defendant as its governorship candidate for the governorship elections for Taraba State in the 2023 general elections and from submitting its name to the 1st defendant as its candidate for the governorship election for Taraba State.
6. Perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from holding out or carrying on or parading himself as the 3rd defendant’s governorship candidate for the 2023 general elections for Taraba State.
7. Perpetual injunction restraining the 21st defendant or any of its officers, servants or agents from accepting any submission by the 3rd defendant of the name of the 2nd defendant or recognizing the 2nd defendant as the defendant’s gubernatorial candidate for the 2023 governorship election in Taraba State.
8. A mandatory injunction compelling the 1st defendant to delist the names of the 2nd and 3rd defendants (if substituted or accepted) from among the list of political parties and gubernatorial candidates respectively for the February 2023 general elections for the office of governor of Taraba State.
9. An order directing the 3rd defendant to refund to the plaintiff, at once and in full, the sum of N58,120,000 (Fifty- eight million, one hundred and twenty thousand Naira only) being the cost of expression of interest and nomination form and sundry expenses incurred/purchased by the plaintiff for the gubernatorial primary election for Taraba State in his bid to be the 3rd defendant’s candidate’s candidate for the 2023 governorship election for Taraba State.
10. An order directing the 3rd defendant to pay interest on the said sum of N58,120,000 (Fifty- eight million, one hundred and twenty thousand Naira only) at the rate of 26% per annum from the 29th day of April, 2022 when the sum was paid, till same is fully and finally liquidated by the 3rd defendant.
11. N1,000,000,000 (One billion naira) payable by the 3rd defendant being exemplary and general damages for its breach of contract and statutory duties in failing to conduct a primary election according to law to the detriment of the plaintiff.
Parties filed and exchanged all necessary processes including written addresses. After hearing all the parties, the lower Court resolved the questions presented for determination in favour of the appellant and granted him reliefs 1-8. Reliefs 9, 10 and 11 were refused. In their stead, the Court made the following orders:
1. That the 3rd defendant shall within fourteen days from the date of this order conduct a fresh gubernatorial primary election for Taraba State, ensuring compliance with the provisions of Electoral Act and its Constitution and Guidelines and may adopt any mode of its choice, provided notice of the mode adopted shall be made public, not later than seven (7) days before the date of the election
2. That whereas the order of this Court is made for the conduct of the 3rd defendant’s gubernatorial primaries of Taraba State for the 2023 governorship elections within 14 days from the receipt of this order, the grant of prayers 9, 10 and 11 of the plaintiff’s originating summons are no longer necessary at this point in time. They are accordingly refused.”
The cross-appellant is aggrieved by the part of the judgment refusing his monetary claims. He filed a notice of cross-appeal containing two (2) grounds of appeal against the judgment on 30th September, 2022. Cross-appellant’s brief of argument was filed on 25th October, 2022. The 2nd cross-respondent’s brief of argument was filed on 10th November, 2022. 3rd cross- respondent’s brief of argument was filed on 4th November, 2022. The 1st cross-respondent did not file any brief of argument. Cross-appellant’s reply to 2nd cross-respondent’s brief was filed on 12th November, 2022. Cross-appellant’s reply to 3rd cross- respondent’s brief was filed on 7th November, 2022.
The 2nd cross-respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection to the cross-appeal on 10th November, 2022 on the ground that ground 2 of the cross-appeal which appears to be an omnibus ground but is not is incompetent, the sole issue formulated from the two grounds of appeal is incompetent as it is polluted by the incompetent ground 2 of the appeal and the issue is not confined to the grounds of appeal.
In reaction to notice of preliminary objection, the cross-appellant filed a motion on notice on 12th November, 2022 seeking an order to strike out the entire arguments of the 2nd cross-respondent incorporated in his brief in support of his objection on the ground that the 2nd cross-respondent formulated and argued three (3) issues in respect of one ground of objection.
I have considered the grounds of objection by the 2nd respondent, the objection thereto by the appellant and the arguments of counsel. The following are my resolutions:
Order 7 Rules 2-4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2021 stipulates the contents and requirements of a ground of appeal:
2 (1) All appeals shall be by way of rehearing and shall be brought by notice (hereinafter called “the notice of appeal”) to be filed physically in the Registry of the lower Court, which shall set forth the grounds of appeal, stating whether the whole or part only of the decision of the lower Court is complained of (in the latter case specifying such part) and shall state also the exact nature of the relief sought and the names and addresses of all parties directly affected by the appeal and shall be accompanied by a sufficient number of copies for on such parties.
(2) Where a ground of appeal alleges misdirection or error in law, the particulars and the nature of the misdirection or error shall be clearly stated.
(3) The notice of appeal shall set forth, concisely and under distinct heads the grounds upon which the Appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal without any argument or narrative and shall be numbered consecutively.
(4) The notice of appeal shall be signed by the Appellant or his legal representative.
3. Any ground which is vague or general in terms or which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall not be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. A ground of appeal or any part thereof which is not permitted under this Rule may be struck out by the Court suo motu or on application by the Respondent.
4. The appellant shall not without the leave of the Court urge or be heard in support of any ground of appeal not mentioned in the Notice of Appeal, but the Court may in its discretion, allow the Appellant to amend the grounds of appeal upon payment of fees prescribed for making such amendment and upon such terms as the Court may deem just.
5. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the Court in deciding the appeal shall not be confined to the grounds set forth by the Appellant: Provided that the Court shall not if it allows the appeal, rest its decision on any ground not set forth by the Appellant unless the Respondent has had sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground.
By the above rules of Court, it is clear that grounds of appeal should not be vague or general in terms. A ground of appeal must give sufficient notice and information to the other side, of the precise nature of the complaint of the appellant and the issues that are likely to arise on the appeal. However, the application of the rules of Court should not be reduced to a matter of mere technicality, whereby the Court will consider the form rather than the substance. I have perused the two grounds of the cross-appeal. There is no doubt that ground 1 complains about the refusal of the lower Court to award the sum of N58,120,000.00 being the cost of expression of interest and nomination form and sundry expenses claimed by the appellant Ground 2 may have been inelegantly crafted but the substance of the complaint of the cross-appellant is surely not difficult to understand. The cross-respondents cannot claim to be in the dark or confused as to what the cross-appellant’s complaints are all about. The Supreme Court stated what should be the attitude of the Court towards an inelegantly ground of appeal in IGHEDO & ANOR v. PHCN (2018) LPELR-43863(SC) AT 39-42(B-A) as follows:
“Generally, rules of Court are meant to regulate matters in Court and assist parties in the prosecution of their cases to achieve fair hearing and quick dispensation of justice, See; Solanke Vs Somefun (1974) 1 SC 141; Ibodo Vs Enarofia (1980) 5-7 SC 42; Ana vs Ana (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 316; John vs Blakk (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 648. And rules of Court are meant to be obeyed and complied with by parties and the Court. See; Afolabi Vs. Adekunle (1983) 14 NSCC 398 405; University of Lagos vs. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 143. However, the rule of our appellate procedure relating to formulation of grounds of appeal, has been held to be primarily designed to ensure fairness to the other party. And therefore the application of such rules should not be reduced to a matter of mere technicality, whereby the Court will consider the form rather than the substance. In Alhaji Salami O. Aderounmu & Anor Vs Emmanuel Oajide Olowu, (2000) 4 NWLR (pt.652) 253; (2000) LPELR 141 (SC) this Court had opined as follows: “The prime purpose of the rules of appellant procedure, both in this Court and in the Court of appeal, that the appellant shall file a notice of appeal which shall set forth concisely the grounds which he intends to rely upon on the appeal, and that such grounds should not be vague or general in terms and must disclose a reasonable ground of appeal, is to give sufficient notice and information, to the other side, of the precise nature of the complaint of the appellant and consequently, of the issues that are likely to arise on the appeal. Any ground that satisfies that purpose should not be struck out, notwithstanding that it did not conform to a particular form… What is important in a ground of appeal, and the test the Court should apply, is whether or not the impugned ground shows clearly what is complained of as error in law and what is complained of as misdirection, or as the case may be, error of fact.”
I have also considered the sole issue raised by the cross-appellant, there is no doubt that the issue encompasses the two grounds of appeal.
The appellant’s objection to the issues formulated and argued by the 2nd cross-respondent is misconceived because the principle guiding formulation of issues in an appeal is not applicable to grounds of objection. Issues that are usually thrown up for determination in respect of a preliminary objection are usually based on the grounds upon which the objection is predicated. The result is that both objections fail and are hereby dismissed.
MAIN APPEAL.
The sole issue raised in the main appeal is:
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he refused the appellant’s claims for refunds as well as compensatory damages, on the basis of a relief not sought by the appellant?
The 2nd cross-respondent formulated the following issue for determination:
Whether taking into consideration the facts and circumstances upon which the originating summons was hinged, the lower Court can be said to have erred in law when it declined to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the cross-appellant refund of money paid for the purchase of nomination form and sundry expenses as well as damages sought?
The 3rd cross-respondent formulated the following issue for determination:
Whether the cross-appellant was entitled to the grant of the reliefs for monetary, compensatory damages and interest claimed by him in reliefs 9.10 and 11 of his originating summons?
The issues raised by the cross-appellant, 2nd and 3rd respondents are the same except that they are couched in different words. The cross-appellant’s counsel submitted that the lower Court after making a finding that the cross-appellant purchased an expression of interest and nomination form and paid N50,000,000.00, he was screened and cleared to contest the gubernatorial primary election and even attended several meetings with stakeholders failed to grant the monetary claims of the cross-appellant. The Court instead made others not fought for. He conceded that in some special circumstance, the Court may grant reliefs which are incidental to the occasion but before such order is made, the Court must hear the view of the parties. He referred to OYEYEMI & ORS. V. OWOEYE & ANOR. (2017) LPELR-41903(SC) AT 55-56 (D-B). He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the cross-appellant and grant his claims.
In response, the 2nd cross-respondent’s counsel contends that the cross-respondent having lost interest in the primary election by deliberately excluding a prayer for fresh election and his rejection of unsolicited orders made by the lower Court, his remedy lies in an action for damages which is outside the confines of Section 84 (14) of the Electoral Act. He contends that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is limited to the determination of complaints brought by an aspirant who participated in a primary as to whether the primary election was conducted in line with the provisions of the Electoral Act and party guidelines. He relied on MAIHAJA V. GAIDAM (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC) AT 18-26 (D-B).
The learned 3rd respondent’s counsel referred to the processes filed by the parties at the lower Court and the judgment of the lower Court. He submitted that on the basis of the affidavit before the trial Court, the cross-respondent did not prove his entitlement to reliefs 9-11 in his originating summons.
In his reply, the cross-appellant’s counsel submitted that the conduct of the 3rd respondent is oppressive and warrant a grant of exemplary damages.
RESOLUTION
It is the law that Courts of law have the power to grant a relief not specifically asked for as a consequential order. In fact, it is the duty of the Court to make consequential orders in the interest of justice even if the order or relief is not specifically asked for especially if it is aimed at giving effect to the judgment of the Court. It is not the practice of the Court to invite parties or counsel to address it before making a consequential order that is aimed at giving effect to the judgment especially when the consequential order will not deprive the parties of any right. See EYIGEBE V. IYAJI (2013) LPELR-20522(SC) AT 24-25 (F-B). EZE & ORS V. GOV OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2014) LPELR-23276(SC) AT 30 (B-E). In NOEKOER V. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE & ORS (2018) LPELR-44350(SC) AT 20-21 (E-E), the Supreme Court reiterated the inherent power of the Court to make consequential order as follows:
“It is trite law, that a Court has inherent power to make consequential order. A consequential order is simply one which flows directly and naturally from the decision or order made on issues litigated upon and inevitably consequent upon it. See Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb [1992] 2 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266 or (1992) 7 SCNJ 119 or (1992) LPELR – 325 (SC). A consequential order is one which gives effect to a judgment or order to which it is consequential. See Funduk Engineering Ltd vs Mcarthur & Ors (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 153; Obayagbona vs Obazee (1972) SC 247; Odofin & Anor vs Agu & Anor (1992) NWLR (Pt.229) 350. Every Court, be it of first instant or appellate has the power and in fact, has the duty and obligation to make any consequential order in the interest of justice and it is irrelevant and of no moment that the particular order was not specifically asked for by either party to the proceedings or appeal. See Prince Yahaya Adigun & Ors Vs Attorney General of Oyo State & Ors (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.53) 678 at 710; Chief Ebenezer & Ors vs S.K. Owodunni & Anor (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 57) 367.”
In the instant case, the Court having found though wrongly that there was no governorship primary election known to law conducted by the 3rd respondent in Taraba State for the nomination of the 3rd respondent’s candidate for the 2023 governorship election for Taraba State, the consequential order for conduct of fresh primary election was made for the sole aim of giving effect to the Provision of Section 84(1) of the Electoral Act, 2022 that provides that a political party seeking to nominate candidates for election under the Act shall hold primaries for aspirants to all elective positions which shall be monitored by the INEC. The consequential order did not in any way deprive the cross-appellant of his right to participate in the fresh primary election. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not necessary to invite the parties to address it before making the consequential order.
Having made an order for fresh election in which the appellant would have been free to participate, his claim for a refund of the expression of interest and nomination form could not have been granted.
Apart from the above, any issue relating to expression of interest and nomination form, the fee to be paid forms by an aspirant and whether or not such fee is refundable is an internal affair of the political party which the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with. Whether or not the fee for expression of interest and nomination form is to be refunded to an aspirant who participated in a primary election is entirely within the discretion of the party. Whichever way the monetary claims is considered, they were bound to fail. The provision of Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act is not meant to operate at large so as to open a floodgate for all sorts of litigations by political party members, who are dissatisfied with the conduct of the primary elections. The jurisdiction of the Courts, under Section 84 (14) of the Electoral Act is limited to ascertaining whether the primary election of a party was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, Party’s Constitution and the Party guidelines. See UFOMBA V. INEC & ORS (2017) LPELR-42079(SC) AT 30-33(A-C).
The monetary claims of the appellant is an attempt to expand the window created for aspirants who participated in a political party primary to seek redress under Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act. For the above reasons, I am of the view that the lower Court was right not to grant the monetary claims of the appellant.
The cross-appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother M. O. Bolaji Yusuff, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the lead judgment. I have nothing useful to add.
JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in draft, the judgment delivered by my learned brother Misitura Omodere Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the judgment. I have nothing else to add.
Appearances:
J. A. Oguche, with him, G.T leave For Appellant(s)
S.D. Toklen – for 1st Cross-Respondent
Dr. E. A. Ibrahim-Effiong, with him, D.G. Tukura – for 2nd Cross-Respondent
F.K. Idepefo, SAN, with him, I.A. Simon, M.D. Arosanyin, S.Y. Audu and S.A. Tyongbeha – for 3rd Respondent For Respondent(s)
