GLOBE MOTORS HOLDINGS (NIG) LTD v. OYEWOLE
(2022)LCN/16738(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Wednesday, February 23, 2022
CA/L/495/2014
Before Our Lordships:
Obietonbara Owupele Daniel-Kalio Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muhammad Ibrahim Sirajo Justice of the Court of Appeal
Adebukunola Adeoti Ibironke Banjoko Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
GLOBE MOTORS HOLDINGS NIGERIA LIMITED APPELANT(S)
And
AKINYEMI ADEGOKE OYEWOLE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF LAW ON WHEN THE JUDGMENT OF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IS SAID TO TAKE EFFECT
The law is that the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction takes effect upon delivery or pronouncement, and the winning party is entitled to take the benefit of it straight away, except where it is expressly stayed. There is nothing untoward or wrong in a Court ordering in a monetary judgment that the judgment sum shall be paid within a stipulated period. See Sir Emeka Offor vs. Leaders & Company Ltd (2006) LPELR-6117 (CA); Ogunleye vs. Aina (2012) LPELR-7877 (CA); Zenith International Bank Ltd vs. Alobu (2016) LPELR-40306. In the case of Hepa Global Energy Ltd vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR-44033 (CA), where the Federal High Court ordered the execution of the judgment within 21 days of delivery thereof, this Court, per Ikyegh, JCA, held that at page 39 of the E-Report:
“The enforcement of the judgment within 21 days as ordered by the Court below did not infringe any constitutional and/or statutory provisions. Judgment take effect on the day pronounced, unless specific date is assigned for the judgment to take effect at the time of its delivery or pronouncement.”
Dahiru Musdapher, JSC (as he then was) of blessed memory was more pungent when he postulated in the case of Olatunji vs. Owena Bank (PLC) & Anor (2008) LPELR-2578 (SC), as follows:
“In my view, unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment of Court to pay money takes effect from the day it is pronounced or delivered in Court. However, the Court at the time of making any judgment or order, or at any time afterwards, may direct the time within which the payment or other act is to be made or done. A person directed by a decree or order of Court to pay money or to do any other act is bound to obey the decree or order without any demand for payment or performance, and if no time is therein expressed, he is bound to do so immediately the decree or order is pronounced.” PER SIRAJO, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE STATUS OF AN EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN SUSPENDED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT FOR A FIXED TERM OR INDEFINITELY
The next important question arising under this issue is whether the Respondent is entitled to payment of his wages during the period of indefinite suspension. The question concerns the status of an employee who has been suspended from his employment either for a fixed term or indefinitely, as the Respondent in this appeal. Suspension is a temporary cessation of employment either pending investigation for an alleged wrong or as a disciplinary procedure for misconduct by the employee. These are the two types of suspension. Suspension of an employee from work only means suspension from ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his employment or office. See Esiaga vs. University of Calabar (2004) LPELR-1169 (SC); Akinyanju vs. University of Ilorin (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.923) 87; National Judicial Council vs Aladejana (2014) LPELR-24134 (CA). Either pending investigation or as a punishment, suspension does not amount to termination or dismissal from the employment, the contract of employment remains subsisting until it is formally or legally brought to an end by either party. PER SIRAJO, J.C.A.
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the National Industrial Court sitting in Lagos delivered on 26/03/2014, wherein the claim of the Claimant, now Respondent, partly succeeded and he was awarded the sum of N554,190.00 as unpaid salary from 2007 to the date of the judgment, together with N50,000.00 cost against the Defendant, now Appellant.
The straight and uncomplicated facts leading to this appeal can be summarized as follows: The Respondent was employed by the Appellant on 2nd September, 1999 as an Auto Mechanic and the appointment was confirmed on 19th January, 2001. He was appointed as Fore-Man of the Honda section of the Appellant on 1st March, 2005 but was placed on indefinite suspension vide a letter served on him on 11th September, 2007. He was neither recalled from the indefinite suspension nor his appointment formally terminated by the Appellant. He decided to approach the Citizens Mediation Centre of the Lagos State Ministry of Justice with his complaint on 25th October, 2011. The Centre’s invitation to the Appellant was not responded to. Earlier on 5th September, 2011, he sought the legal assistance of the Office of Public Defender where he sent a Petition against indefinite suspension. On 1st March, 2012, the Office of Public Defender invited the Managing Director of the Appellant for a meeting but the meeting did not yield any result. This prompted the filing of the action at the lower Court by the Office of Public Defender in which the Respondent as Claimant sought the following reliefs:
1. Salary arrears for September, 2007 – September, 2011: N1,680,000.00 (One Million Six Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira only).
2. General damages: N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira only);
3. Total: N1,880,000.00 (One Million Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira only).
Aggrieved by the award of N554,190.00 and N50,000.00 cost to the Respondent by the lower Court, the Appellant appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal dated 25th April, 2014 and filed the same date, containing four grounds of appeal. The extant Notice of Appeal was filed on 29/11/2018 pursuant to the leave granted on 13/11/2018, and is predicated on five grounds. Parties filed and exchanged written Briefs of Argument. The Appellant’s brief was filed on 16/03/2020 and deemed as properly filed and served on 29/11/2021 during the hearing of the appeal. The Respondent’s brief filed on 01/07/2020 and the Appellant’s reply brief filed on 10/09/2020, were all consequentially deemed as properly filed and served on 29/11/2021. Godwin C. Anyafulu Esq., adopted the Appellant’s brief and reply brief as his argument in this appeal and urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court. On the other hand, Victoria Alonge (Mrs.), adopted the Respondent’s brief as her argument in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
Two issues were distilled for determination in the Appellant’s brief of argument, viz:
a. Whether the learned trial Court was right in ordering the Appellant to pay the judgment sum within 30 days of the trial Court’s judgment contrary to the Appellant’s 90 days provided by statute time to appeal. (sic). (Ground 5 of the ground of appeal as contained in the Notice of Appeal dated 29/11/2018).
b. Whether the issue of the length of time when the Claimant/Respondent was indefinitely suspended should be with pay or without pay was suo motu raised by the learned trial Court and if so whether it is justifiable to have done so without giving the Defendant/Appellant the opportunity to address the Court on the issue before giving judgment based on the issue. (Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the grounds of appeal as contained in the Notice of Appeal dated 29/11/2018).
Similarly, two issues were identified for determination in the Respondent’s Brief of Argument, as below:
i. Considering extant law on Money Orders, the trial Court rightly ordered all payments in favour of the Respondents to be paid 30 days from the date of judgment. Is it not erroneous for the Appellant to contend that this time limit of payment has denied him of his right to appeal and fair hearing?
ii. Having joined issues at the trial on “Whether the Respondent is entitled to pay during the period of his suspension”, is the Appellant right to have contended that the trial Court raised suo motu the issue of “The length of time when the Claimant (Respondent in this appeal) has been indefinitely suspended should be with or without pay. I am of the view that the issues formulated by the Appellant can adequately resolve all the contentions in this appeal. I accordingly adopt them in the determination of the appeal.
Arguments
With the aid of decided authorities, such as U.I.T.H.M.B vs. Abdulrahman (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt.1589) 397 at 419; Ani vs Effiok (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt.1567) 281 at 304; Skye Bank Plc vs. Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt.1590) 24 at 119-120; PDP vs. Sheriff (2007), learned counsel for the Appellant submitted with respect to issue 1 formulated by him that the order of the trial Court that the judgment sum shall be paid within 30 days amounts to denying the Appellant her constitutional right of appeal. Reference was also made to Section 24 (2) of the Court of Appeal Act which provides for a period of three months within which an appeal against a final decision can be lodged at the Court of Appeal. It was argued that the order of the lower Court directing the payment of the judgment sum within 30 days from the date of judgment is a ploy to deny the Appellant his right of appeal and fair hearing. This Court was urged to resolve issue 1 in favour of the Appellant. On issue 2, Mr. Anyafulu submitted that neither the Appellant nor the Respondent raised in their pleadings the issue of whether the Respondent’s indefinite suspension, in view of the length of time, should be with or without pay. He argued that it was wrong for the lower Court to raise the issue suo motu without affording the parties the opportunity to address the Court on it, as parties and the Court are bound by the pleadings of the parties, citing in support the cases of Agboola vs. U.B.A. Plc (2011) NWLR (Pt.1258) 375 at 397-398; Kubor vs. Dickson (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt.1345) 534 at 586; Shasi vs. Smith (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt.1173) 330 at 344. On what a Court should do if it raises an issue suo motu, counsel referred to the authorities of Odu vs Jarigbe (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt.1556) 445 at 469-470; Akeredolu vs Abraham (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt.1628) 510 at 532 which decided that parties must be given opportunity to address the Court before decision on the point can be made. Learned counsel took a swipe at the lower Court’s reliance on common law principles as decided in some English cases when, according to him, the said principles have been codified with variation in Section 17 of the Labour Act, Cap L1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. He contended that the import of Section 17 (1) (b) of the Labour Act is that the employer shall not be bound to pay wages during the period of suspension where the worker was suspended from work as punishment for breach of discipline or any other offence, as happened in the instant case, placing reliance on University of Calabar vs. Esiaga (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt.502) 719 at 723; Longe vs. FB.N. Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt.1189) 1. It was argued that the English cases of Hanley vs. Pease & Partners Ltd (1915) 1 KB 698; Marshall vs. Midland Electric (1945) 1 All ER 653, relied on by the lower Court, while ignoring Section 17 (1) (b) of the Labour Act, are not binding on Nigerian Courts -Inakoju vs Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1025) 428 at 593. It was argued for the Appellant that taking into account the provisions of Section 17 (1) (b) of the Labour Act and the case of Longe vs. F.B.N. Plc (supa), the lower Court was wrong when it held that the suspension of the Respondent without pay is illegal, and this Court was urged to so hold. Furthermore, learned counsel referred to the evidence of DW1 to the effect that the indefinite suspension of the Respondent was as a result of his penchant for disobedience to the rules of the Appellant company and his lackadaisical attitude to work together with the particulars of the Respondent’s misconduct upon which DW1 was not cross-examined. He argued, relying on NBA vs. Obiora Esq (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1100) 317 at 323; Egom vs. Eno (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1098) 320 at 336; NBA vs. Ekemezie Esq., (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1100) 326 at 330, that the failure to cross-examine DW1 on the material evidence given by him with regards to the reason for the suspension of the Respondent is an admission of the evidence of gross misconduct given by him. He contended that the Respondent was lawfully suspended after he was given opportunity to respond to the allegations against him and that the Respondent did not show any remorse by apologizing either in writing or verbally, rather he disappeared and only showed up with this claim after four years. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Respondent is not entitled to any payment and to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court. In response, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the direction of the lower Court that the judgment sum be paid within 30 days has in no way deprived the Appellant of his constitutional right of appeal in that judgment takes effect on the day it is pronounced and the judgment debt becomes due and payable immediately, unless a future date is fixed by the Court – Hepa Global Energy Ltd vs. FRN (2017) LPELR-44033 (CA). It was argued that execution of judgment does not foreclose the right of appeal and that a Court has the power to direct in its judgment when the judgment sum shall be paid. Authorities cited in support of this submission includes Comptroller General, Nigeria Customs Service & Ors vs. Minaj Holdings Ltd (2017) LPELR-43055 (CA); Olatunji vs. Owena Bank Plc (2008) LPELR-2578 (SC). Counsel submitted that the Appellant’s contention on the perceived error of the trial Court in prescribing a 30-day period for the liquidation of the judgment sum is bereft of any basis in law as same has not impaired the Appellant’s right of appeal. The Court was urged to so hold.
On the second issue, while admitting the correct position of the law that parties are bound by their pleadings, Victoria Alonge (Mrs.) submitted that contrary to the argument of the Appellants that the issue of “Whether the length of time since the Claimant has been indefinitely suspended should be with pay or without pay” was raised suo motu by the trial Court, the pleadings and final addresses of the parties disclose otherwise. She referred to paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim and the relief claimed by the Respondent at pages 3 and 4 respectively of the Record of Appeal to buttress her argument that the payment of the Respondent’s salary during his suspension is an issue that existed during the exchange of pleadings in the case and same was also made an issue for determination in the final addresses of both parties before the lower Court including the Appellant’s reply address on points of law. Learned counsel submitted that this issue cannot be said to have been raised suo motu by the lower Court as it was the central issue for determination at the trial Court, citing Tobin vs. Idaibifiberesima & Anor (2019) LPELR-49023 (CA); Isiyaku & Anor vs Musa & Ors (2019) LPELR-49201 (CA) and Odu vs Jarigbe (supra).
While also admitting that the Labour Act is the controlling law in the employment relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent, the contention of the Respondent is that Section 17 (1) (b) of the Act heavily relied on by the Appellant does not apply to the instant appeal as no provision was made therein for the wages/entitlement of a worker during the period of his suspension. Placing reliance on a quoted passage of the Supreme Court judgment in Longe vs. FBN Plc (supra), learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the suspension of a worker cannot imply the diminution of his lawfully entitled wages. In the light of the cited cases of Bamisile vs. NJC & Ors (2012) LPELR-8381 (CA) and Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited & Anor vs. Udo (2008) LPELR-8440 (CA), counsel submitted that the power of an employer to suspend a worker without pay must stem from the contract of employment of such worker, and in the absence of such term in an employee’s contract of employment, the employer has a statutory duty to continue the payment of wages of such worker during his suspension. She argued that the Appellant has failed to establish through Exhibit B, the contract of employment, that she reserves the right to withhold payment of Respondent’s salary during the period of his suspension, which failure affirms the position of the lower Court that the Respondent is entitled to his salary arrears for September, 2007 – September, 2011. We were urged to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
Resolution of issues
Issue 1
In its judgment at pages 80 – 91 of the Record of Appeal, the lower Court directed that the judgment sum be paid within 30 days from the date of judgment. This direction/order is the crux of issue 1 formulated and argued by the Appellant. The Appellant contended that the said direction was aimed at denying the Appellant’s right of appeal which he can exercise within 90 days of delivery of judgment as provided for in Section 24 of the Court of Appeal Act. He argued that denial of right of appeal is tantamount to denial of fair hearing. I agree with the last argument of the Appellant that denial of right of appeal, where it is shown to exist, is a denial of right to fair hearing. The question however is whether the order of the lower Court directing the Appellant to pay the judgment sum within 30 days amounts to denial of the Appellant’s right to appeal against the said judgment. That the Appellant was not denied her right of appeal can easily be seen in the instant appeal upon which this judgment is being prepared. This appeal was filed against the said judgment directing the Appellant to pay the judgment sum within 30 days. There is nothing before this Court to show that the Appellant, who filed his appeal before the lower Court, was in any way hindered by the lower Court from filing the appeal.
That apart, legally and judicially speaking, there is no correlation between an order for payment of judgment sum within a stipulated period and exercise of the right of appeal which is constitutionally and statutorily guaranteed. Such an order cannot be a barrier to, or derogate from, a party’s exercise of his right to appeal against the judgment in which the order was made. The law is that the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction takes effect upon delivery or pronouncement, and the winning party is entitled to take the benefit of it straight away, except where it is expressly stayed. There is nothing untoward or wrong in a Court ordering in a monetary judgment that the judgment sum shall be paid within a stipulated period. See Sir Emeka Offor vs. Leaders & Company Ltd (2006) LPELR-6117 (CA); Ogunleye vs. Aina (2012) LPELR-7877 (CA); Zenith International Bank Ltd vs. Alobu (2016) LPELR-40306. In the case of Hepa Global Energy Ltd vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR-44033 (CA), where the Federal High Court ordered the execution of the judgment within 21 days of delivery thereof, this Court, per Ikyegh, JCA, held that at page 39 of the E-Report:
“The enforcement of the judgment within 21 days as ordered by the Court below did not infringe any constitutional and/or statutory provisions. Judgment take effect on the day pronounced, unless specific date is assigned for the judgment to take effect at the time of its delivery or pronouncement.”
Dahiru Musdapher, JSC (as he then was) of blessed memory was more pungent when he postulated in the case of Olatunji vs. Owena Bank (PLC) & Anor (2008) LPELR-2578 (SC), as follows:
“In my view, unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment of Court to pay money takes effect from the day it is pronounced or delivered in Court. However, the Court at the time of making any judgment or order, or at any time afterwards, may direct the time within which the payment or other act is to be made or done. A person directed by a decree or order of Court to pay money or to do any other act is bound to obey the decree or order without any demand for payment or performance, and if no time is therein expressed, he is bound to do so immediately the decree or order is pronounced.”
This judicial pronouncement from the apex Court has clearly preserved the power of Court to order payment of monetary judgment within a certain time frame at the time of delivering its judgment. I therefore hold that by ordering the Appellant to pay the judgment sum within 30 days of the judgment appealed against, the lower Court did not interfere with the Appellant’s right of appeal or her right to fair hearing. Consequently, I resolve the first issue against the Appellant.
Issue 2
Under the second issue, the Appellant accused the lower Court of raising suo motu “the issue of the length of time when the Claimant/Respondent was indefinitely suspended should be with pay or without pay” without giving her the opportunity to address the Court on the issue before delivering judgment. A look at the Respondent’s Statement of Claim and his adopted written evidence before the lower Court shows consistency on one thread, that is, that the whole claim of the Respondent was for payment of arrears of salary for the period of his suspension, i.e., September, 2007 to September, 2011. This was indeed the crux of the claim as well as the defence. The Appellant’s Statement of Defence maintained that the Respondent was not entitled to salary during the period of his indefinite suspension. Learned counsel for the Appellant made that issue so central in the Defendant’s Final Written Address at pages 39 – 49 of the Record of Appeal, particularly at page 41 thereof, that he framed issue 1 for determination of the lower Court in the following words: “Whether the Claimant is entitled to be awarded salary arrears for September 2007 – September 2011 (N1,680,000.00) being salary for the period when the Claimant was under indefinite suspension.” The lower Court merely asked the question whether the length of time of the Respondent’s suspension should be with or without pay, and that was the essence of the Respondent’s claim before the lower Court. In formulating issue 1 for determination in his Final Written Address before the lower Court, learned counsel for the Appellant asked if the Respondent was entitled to salary during the period of his suspension between September, 2007 and September, 2011. If the phrase “September, 2007 – September, 20011” as used by the Appellant’s counsel in his issue 1 for determination before the lower Court is not “length of time”, I wonder what is. The Appellant’s query with the phrase “length of time” after he has equally used it, albeit in a different semantic, is misplaced and calculated to mislead. It is crystal clear that it was not the lower Court that raised the issue suo motu, as alleged by the Appellant, but the parties themselves and their counsel, as counsel to the Appellant adequately addressed and argued against the said issue before the lower Court handed down its judgment. It is therefore wrong for the Appellant’s counsel to allege that the issue was raised suo motu by the lower Court without affording the Appellant the opportunity to address the Court.
The next important question arising under this issue is whether the Respondent is entitled to payment of his wages during the period of indefinite suspension. The question concerns the status of an employee who has been suspended from his employment either for a fixed term or indefinitely, as the Respondent in this appeal. Suspension is a temporary cessation of employment either pending investigation for an alleged wrong or as a disciplinary procedure for misconduct by the employee. These are the two types of suspension. Suspension of an employee from work only means suspension from ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his employment or office. See Esiaga vs. University of Calabar (2004) LPELR-1169 (SC); Akinyanju vs. University of Ilorin (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.923) 87; National Judicial Council vs Aladejana (2014) LPELR-24134 (CA). Either pending investigation or as a punishment, suspension does not amount to termination or dismissal from the employment, the contract of employment remains subsisting until it is formally or legally brought to an end by either party. In this light, I discountenance the submission of the Appellant urging the Court to hold that the suspension of the Respondent amounts to termination of his appointment. Suspension and termination are two distinct terms with different legal consequences, one cannot be a substitute or synonymous with the other. Under the common law, a right to suspend an employee is not an implied term of an employment contract. Therefore, where a contract of employment is not one with statutory flavour, for suspension to be validly made it must be so provided in the employment contract or in the Handbook regulating the terms of the employment.
I need to state however that the validity of the Respondent’s suspension by the Appellant is not in contention in this appeal and therefore I say no more on that.
Since suspension is not a termination of the employment contract nor a dismissal of the employee, the implication is that the employee is still in continuous employment of the employer until he is recalled or formally terminated or dismissed. Pending his recall or dismissal, a suspended employee is entitled to his wages or salary during the period of suspension, unless the terms of the contract of employment or the letter of suspension itself is specific that the suspended employer will not be paid salaries during the period of suspension. In the instant appeal, the letter suspending the Respondent, Exhibit B3, did not state that the Respondent will not be paid salaries. The letter of employment, Exhibit B1, did not contain any terms with respect to suspension of the employee without pay. Furthermore, there is no Employees’ Handbook or collective agreement specifying the terms of employment, including rules with regards to suspension, indefinite or for a fixed term. Where a suspension did not indicate that the suspended employer will not be paid salary or will be on half pay, the suspended employer is entitled to his emoluments during the period of the suspension. In justifying the indefinite suspension of the Respondent without pay, learned counsel placed heavy reliance on Section 17 (1) (b) of the Labour Act, 2004. I wish to state that Section 17 (1) (b) of the Labour Act cannot aid the Appellant. The section is dealing with the provision of work by the employer and the consequences of not providing work to an employee due to an emergency. In an emergency, where no work is provided, the employer is still obligated to pay wages to the worker except where the worker is on suspension during that period of emergency. The interpretation placed on that section of the Labour Act by learned counsel for the Appellant is utterly wrong. In Longe vs F.B.N. Plc (supra), the Supreme Court had this to say on the import of suspension of an employee:
“Admittedly, an employer suspending his employee may impose terms of the suspension but in a general sense suspension of an employee from work only means the suspension of the employee from performance of the ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his office. Suspension is not a demotion and does not entail a diminution of rank, office or position. Certainly, it cannot import a diminution of the rights of the employee given under the law.”
The basic and most important right of an employee is the right to his wages, and by the above quoted decision, the Appellant is obligated to pay the Respondent his wages during the period of suspension as his right to the wages has not been affected by the indefinite suspension. This point was further emphasized by this Court in the case of Bamisile vs. NJC & Ors (2012) LPELR-8381 (CA).
The lower Court was therefore on sound footing when it adjudged the Appellant liable to pay the Respondent his salary for the period of suspension. As a consequence of my finding above, I resolve the second issue against the Appellant. Having thus resolved the two issues formulated by the Appellant against her, I hereby dismiss this appeal as same is bereft of merit. I assess the cost of this appeal at N100,000.00 and award same to the Respondent.
OBIETONBARA OWUPELE DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.: I have read the judgment of my learned brother, MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, JCA. My Lord has comprehensively resolved the two issues in this appeal and I find nothing useful to add. Suffice it that I agree with the reasoning and conclusions of my Lord. Needless to add, I find no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed and the judgment of the lower Court is affirmed. I abide by the order as to costs.
ADEBUKUNOLA ADEOTI IBIRONKE BANJOKO, J.C.A.: Before now, I had carefully read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, JCA.
The fact that the Court gave a specific date, no matter how short, on when the judgment sum should be paid has not tampered with the Judgment Debtor’s right of appeal as it is clear that a judgment takes effect on pronouncement. See NIGERIAN ARMY VS MAJOR JACOB IYELA (2008) NSCQR VOLUME 36 PAGE 1153.
Further, as posited by my learned brother, an issue raised by a party for the Court’s determination, which in any event is central to the determination of his right is not a fresh issue which requires the Court to invite the parties to address it. See HALILCO NIGERIA LIMITED VS EQUITY BANK OF NIGERIA LIMITED (2013) NSCQR VOLUME 54 PAGE 339.
It is clear that a suspension is not a dismissal which denies an employee his rights, salary inclusive. See NWEKE VS UNIZIK AWKA (2017) 18 NWLR (PART 1598) PAGE 458.
Based on the forgoing, I totally agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by my learned brother. I hereby equally dismiss this appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
Appearances:
Godwin C. Anyafulu, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Victoria Alonge (Mrs.) For Respondent(s)
