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GIDADO v. STATE (2022)

GIDADO v. STATE

(2022)LCN/16732(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, March 30, 2022

CA/YL/114C/21

Before Our Lordships:

Chidi Nwaoma Uwa Justice of the Court of Appeal

Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal

Muhammed Lawal Abubakar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

AUWAL GIDADO APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) presumes the innocence of anyone who has been accused of a crime, this creates a legally rebuttable presumption of innocence on any person who is charged with the commission of an offence and the Evidence Act 2011 in Sections 131 and 135, contains provisions to the effect that in order for the presumption of innocence to be rebutted, the guilt of such accused person must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution.
Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 provides thus:
“135. (1) If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to Section 139 of this Act, on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action.
(3) If the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proving reasonable doubt is shifted on to the defendant.
In line with the above, it is settled beyond any form of controversy that in order for a Court to convict an accused person of an offence, every ingredient of the offence as gleaned from the law creating the offence must be established by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court in the case of ONWE v. STATE (2017) LPELR-42589(SC) (Pp. 65-66, Paras. E-A) Per GALINJE, J.S.C., reiterated this trite position of the law thus:
“The law is very clear on who the burden of proof in a criminal case reside. Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act have placed the burden of proof in criminal cases squarely on the prosecution, who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden does not shift. See Alabi v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 paras A-C; Solola v. The State (2005) 5 (Pt. 1) 135.”
See NNAJIOFOR v. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2015) LPELR 24666(CA), TOMETIM v. STATE (2014) LPELR-22788(CA) and ABBEY v. STATE (2017) LPELR-42358(SC).
The reason why the law fixes such a heavy burden on the Prosecution to clearly establish that the accused committed the offence he is being charged with beyond reasonable doubt, is as a result of the consequence of a successful criminal trial, which is punishment by the law, usually involving time spent in prison or some other deprivation of the Convict’s fundamental right and it would be regrettable indeed for an innocent man to be wrongly punished for a crime he did not commit.
PER TUKUR, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN SUCCESSFULLY CONVICT AN ACCUSED PERSON

 It is trite principle of law that the confessional statement of an accused person is a veritable means of establishing the fact that he committed an offence and can successfully ground conviction on its own.
The Supreme Court in the case of AKIBU v. STATE (2019) LPELR-47630(SC), per ABBA AJI, J.S.C. (Pp. 25-28, Paras. B-B), reiterated the above principle thus:
“A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime and this includes both extra-judicial and judicial confessions. It also includes an incriminating admission made that is not direct and positive and short of a full confession. Confession has also been held to be a criminal suspect’s oral or written acknowledgement of guilt, which often includes details about the crime alleged. In other words, a confession is an acknowledgement in express words by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the main fact charged or of some essential part of it. See Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C in ADEBAYO V. STATE (2014) LPELR-22988(SC). A person should not under whatsoever circumstance confess and admit what he is not guilty of except when it comes under the exceptions where a confession can be considered involuntarily obtained, otherwise, a crime confessed is a crime committed and ought to be convicted for because it may relieve the prosecution the duty and burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Per MOHAMMED, J.S.C in ABASI V. STATE (1992) LPELR-20(SC) clearly stated that it is not a general rule that each confession relieves the prosecution of its duty of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt but for a confession to form the basis of a conviction, it has to be shown to be free and voluntary, positive and proved to be true.
See SANNI v. THE STATE (2019) LPELR-48418(CA) and JIMOH v. STATE (2014) LPELR-22464(SC). 
PER TUKUR, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE RETRACTION OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

The law is firmly settled that when it comes to retraction of a confessional statement, that is where an accused person denies making extra-judicial statements containing admissions that he committed the offence charged, the implication is that the making of the confession becomes an issue of fact to be decided in the judgment and does not affect the admissibility of the confession. It is true that before a Court can convict on a retracted confession, the following must be taken into consideration:
i. Whether anything outside the confession which shows that it may be true;
ii. Whether the confession is corroborated in anyway;
iii. Whether the relevant statements of facts made in it are mostly true as far as they can be tested;
iv. Whether the Defendant had the opportunity of committing the offence;
v. Whether the confession is possible; and
vi. Whether the confession is consistent with other facts that have been ascertained and established.
See Amos v. The State (2018) LPELR-44694 (SC), Musa v. State (2014) LPELR-22912(CA) and Ugwu v. State (2020) 7 NWLR (Pt.1723). 
PER TUKUR, J.C.A.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Taraba State in CASE NO: TRSJ/27C/2013 delivered on 8th November, 2016 by Honourable Justice Josephine Y. Tuktur Chief Judge (as he then was) wherein the Court convicted the Appellant of causing death when intention is to cause hurt only, punishable under Section 225 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with a fine of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) only. Failure to pay the fine at the end of the ten years of imprisonment shall serve three years in lieu of the payment of the fine.

The material facts of the case leading to this appeal is that the Respondent upon complaint and investigation by the Police, acting on the belief that the Appellant had caused the death of his brother, one Bashir Gidado, via knife stab wound, brought a one count charge before the lower Court, charging the Appellant with the offence of culpable homicide punishable under Section 225 of the Penal Code. With the particulars of the offence stated thus:
“That you Auwal Gidado on or about the 5th day of April, 2013 at Iware, Ardo-Kola Local Government Area of Taraba State, caused the death of Bashir Gidado by doing an act with the intention of causing hurt to him in that you stabbed him with a knife and he died as a result of the injuries inflicted by you.”

The Appellant was duly arraigned before the trial Court on 5th November, 2013, he pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial commenced. Upon a full trial, the learned trial Court convicted the Appellant for the offence charged under Section 225 of the Penal Code.

Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed the decision via a Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 24th March, 2021, with 6 grounds of appeal.

The Appellant’s Brief of Argument is dated and filed on 4th October, 2021, but deemed as properly filed on 29th October, 2021. Appellant’s Reply Brief of Argument is dated 15th November, 2021 and filed on 19th November, 2021.

Appellant’s counsel formulated two issues for determination to wit:
1. Whether the confessional statement of the Appellant is direct, positive and unequivocal for the trial Court to convict on it. (Ground 1)
2. Whether or not the Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant to warrant his conviction. (Grounds 2,3 and 4)

The Respondent’s Brief of Argument is dated 4th November, 2021 and filed on 5th November, 2021.

Respondent’s counsel distilled a sole issue for determination thus:
1. Whether the trial Court was right to have convicted and sentenced the Appellant for the offence of death caused when intention is to cause hurt punishable under Section 225 of the Penal Code (Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5)

A careful examination of the issues raised by both counsel and the facts of this appeal reveals that the issues presented by both counsel are substantially the same, they also represent the bone of controversy herein. It is against that background that I adopt the sole issue distilled by the Respondent as the issue for determination in this appeal. For ease of reference, the sole issue is reproduced hereunder:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT TO HAVE CONVICTED AND SENTENCED THE APPELLANT FOR THE OFFENCE OF DEATH CAUSED WHEN INTENTION IS TO CAUSE HURT PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 225 OF THE PENAL CODE (GROUNDS 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5) Learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the Prosecution at trial failed to discharge the burden to prove the offence charged against the Appellant, by proving all the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
He relied on Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011; Effiong v. The State (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt.1553) 411, Udo v. State (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt.1553) 411, Igabele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.975) page 100, Aigbadion v. State (2000) 4 SC (Pt.1), Ankpegher v. State (2018) LPELR-43906 (SC) and Boniface Adonike v. State (2015) 11 NCC 97.

Appellant’s counsel submitted that the Prosecution failed to prove the first ingredient of the offence charged, that is: death of the deceased, as what informed the decision of the Court that there was an actual death was the testimony of PW2 who was only shown a grave and told by the victim’s father that the grave was where the victim, was buried, a piece of evidence which is hearsay and ought to be jettisoned; and that the Prosecution also failed to prove that it was the Appellant who caused the victim’s death, as they did not establish that the alleged murder weapon, that is the knife presented before the lower Court had the blood of the victim on it, neither did they tender any medical report that the victim died of knife wound. Counsel posited that the failure of the Prosecution to call the Police Officers who investigated the case and other eye witnesses is fatal to their case, as the presumption is that if they were called, their testimonies would have been against the Prosecution`s case.
He relied on the following: Musa v. State (2018) LPELR-46037(CA) pp 16-18, paras F-C, Joshua v. State (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt.474) 1672 (paras D-F) and Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt.631) 415.

Learned counsel for the Appellant further argued that the confessional statement of the Appellant: “Exhibit C”, which the trial Court relied on to convict the Appellant of the offence charged is not of a nature that could justify such conviction, as the confession is not direct, positive, unequivocal, or conclusive, the confession was retracted by the Appellant and there was no independent evidence to corroborate the confession.
He relied on: Adamu v. State (2019) LPELR-46902(SC) (pp21-22, paras E-C), Adeyemi v. State (2015) 11 NCC 376, Dibie v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) pg 30, Ogudo v. State ​(2011) 18 NWLR (Pt1278) pages 430-431 and Chiokwe v. State (2012) 52 2 NSCQR 170.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent argued that the confession of the Appellant was voluntary, same having been confirmed by Exhibit B was cogent enough to establish the offence for which the Appellant was charged and that the mere retraction of the confession by the Appellant at trial was not enough to render the confession untrue.
He relied on Basil Akpa v. The State (2008) 163 LRCN 186 at 192 at 270, Lasisi v. The State (2013) 2-3 MJSC (Pt.11) page 172 at 174-175 R.3 page 209, Olaoye v. The State (2018) 282 LRCN 161 at 173 R.11 at pages 191 and Idowu v. The State (2000) 7 SC Pt.11 page 50.

Learned counsel submitted that all the ingredients required for the offence were proved beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant by the Prosecution Witnesses as well as the exhibits tendered and admitted into evidence. He referred to the cases of Sale Mohammed v. The State (1997) NCAR 151 and Alao v. The State (2020) 304 LRCN 188 at 199-200 R.12.

Counsel argued that the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal and that there are other facts outside the confession which show that the confession is true and same is corroborated with other facts in material particulars, such as Exhibit B which confirms the voluntariness of the confession and Exhibit A the knife which caused the injury leading to the victim’s death. Counsel also argued that the Prosecution is not under obligation to call any witness, particularly in circumstances such as in this appeal, where there is a clear and unequivocal confession establishing all the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
He relied on Oyem v. FRN (2020) 307 page 211 at 219 R.7 page 230 para K and Akpa v. The State (2008) 163 page 186 at 192 R. 8 at page 207 paras E-E.

In the reply brief, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Supreme Court has held that where a confessional statement is retracted, the trial Court is enjoined to look for another evidence, no matter how slight to test the veracity and which would vindicate the Accused Person.
He relied on Chiokwe v. State (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt.1347) 205, Busari v. State (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt.1452) 343 at 367 and Kareem v. FRN (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt.770) 664.

Counsel submitted that there is an obligation on the Prosecution to call vital witnesses in the proof of an offence and the Prosecution at trial failed to do so.
He referred to the cases of Olayinka Afolalu v. The State (2010) NSCQR 227 and Bamidele v. The State (2018) LPELR-46389 (CA).

RESOLUTION OF THE SOLE ISSUE
Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) presumes the innocence of anyone who has been accused of a crime, this creates a legally rebuttable presumption of innocence on any person who is charged with the commission of an offence and the Evidence Act 2011 in Sections 131 and 135, contains provisions to the effect that in order for the presumption of innocence to be rebutted, the guilt of such accused person must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution.
Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 provides thus:
“135. (1) If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to Section 139 of this Act, on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action.
(3) If the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proving reasonable doubt is shifted on to the defendant.
In line with the above, it is settled beyond any form of controversy that in order for a Court to convict an accused person of an offence, every ingredient of the offence as gleaned from the law creating the offence must be established by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court in the case of ONWE v. STATE (2017) LPELR-42589(SC) (Pp. 65-66, Paras. E-A) Per GALINJE, J.S.C., reiterated this trite position of the law thus:
“The law is very clear on who the burden of proof in a criminal case reside. Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act have placed the burden of proof in criminal cases squarely on the prosecution, who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden does not shift. See Alabi v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 paras A-C; Solola v. The State (2005) 5 (Pt. 1) 135.”
See NNAJIOFOR v. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2015) LPELR 24666(CA), TOMETIM v. STATE (2014) LPELR-22788(CA) and ABBEY v. STATE (2017) LPELR-42358(SC).
The reason why the law fixes such a heavy burden on the Prosecution to clearly establish that the accused committed the offence he is being charged with beyond reasonable doubt, is as a result of the consequence of a successful criminal trial, which is punishment by the law, usually involving time spent in prison or some other deprivation of the Convict’s fundamental right and it would be regrettable indeed for an innocent man to be wrongly punished for a crime he did not commit.

Now in the appeal before us, it is clear that the major plank upon which the lower Court based its conviction of the Appellant for the offence of culpable homicide by causing the death of Bashir Gidado by doing an act with the intention of causing hurt to him, punishable under Section 225 of the Penal Code, is the confessional statement of the Appellant, that is Exhibit C. The pertinent question that therefore calls for determination is whether the Court was right in relying on the said confession. It is trite principle of law that the confessional statement of an accused person is a veritable means of establishing the fact that he committed an offence and can successfully ground conviction on its own.
The Supreme Court in the case of AKIBU v. STATE (2019) LPELR-47630(SC), per ABBA AJI, J.S.C. (Pp. 25-28, Paras. B-B), reiterated the above principle thus:
“A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime and this includes both extra-judicial and judicial confessions. It also includes an incriminating admission made that is not direct and positive and short of a full confession. Confession has also been held to be a criminal suspect’s oral or written acknowledgement of guilt, which often includes details about the crime alleged. In other words, a confession is an acknowledgement in express words by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the main fact charged or of some essential part of it. See Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C in ADEBAYO V. STATE (2014) LPELR-22988(SC). A person should not under whatsoever circumstance confess and admit what he is not guilty of except when it comes under the exceptions where a confession can be considered involuntarily obtained, otherwise, a crime confessed is a crime committed and ought to be convicted for because it may relieve the prosecution the duty and burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Per MOHAMMED, J.S.C in ABASI V. STATE (1992) LPELR-20(SC) clearly stated that it is not a general rule that each confession relieves the prosecution of its duty of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt but for a confession to form the basis of a conviction, it has to be shown to be free and voluntary, positive and proved to be true.
See SANNI v. THE STATE (2019) LPELR-48418(CA) and JIMOH v. STATE (2014) LPELR-22464(SC).

The Appellant’s main grouse against the judgment of the lower Court is that the Court ought not to have relied on the Appellant’s confession in convicting him as the confession was retracted and the ingredients were not established by other evidence. The law is firmly settled that when it comes to retraction of a confessional statement, that is where an accused person denies making extra-judicial statements containing admissions that he committed the offence charged, the implication is that the making of the confession becomes an issue of fact to be decided in the judgment and does not affect the admissibility of the confession. It is true that before a Court can convict on a retracted confession, the following must be taken into consideration:
i. Whether anything outside the confession which shows that it may be true;
ii. Whether the confession is corroborated in anyway;
iii. Whether the relevant statements of facts made in it are mostly true as far as they can be tested;
iv. Whether the Defendant had the opportunity of committing the offence;
v. Whether the confession is possible; and
vi. Whether the confession is consistent with other facts that have been ascertained and established.
See Amos v. The State (2018) LPELR-44694 (SC), Musa v. State (2014) LPELR-22912(CA) and Ugwu v. State (2020) 7 NWLR (Pt.1723).

The retraction of the extra-judicial statement made to the police by the accused person now Appellant herein after the admission of Exhibit ‘B’ without any objection by the accused person is in my humble view a mere attempt to hoodwink the lower Court into believing that the confessional statement of the accused person admitted as Exhibit ‘C’ was never made by him.

Adverting to the evidence of the Pw1 ASP Pagiel Lera and the proceedings of the lower Court at pages 24-25 of the record of appeal, it is clear to me that the accused person now Appellant made the said statement and that he did so voluntarily after all the legal safeguards have been explained to him. The proceedings of the trial Court which captures the point under reference, is for ease of reference reproduced thus:
“On the next date been 11th April, 2013, Samson Jumi the team leader brought the accused person with his confessional statement recorded by corporal Elkanah now sergeant for endorsement. I interacted with the accused person to confirm whether the confessional statement was obtained voluntarily. Accused admitted that the statement was made voluntarily. I read the statement and translated to Hausa and he admitted that it was the statement he made to the IPO and correct. I asked if he has anything to add or subtract, he said no. I fill the Police Confessional Endorsement Form and signed as the person that endorsed the statement. Accused also wrote his name as the signature. Yes if the state (sic) is shown to me I can identify it through sergeant Elkanah’s handwriting and signature having served under me for three years. I can identify my endorsement through the red ink and my signature.
Counsel: I apply to show the witness the statement and its endorsement. Having identified the endorsement I apply to tender it into evidence.
Mahanan: We hold no objection.
Court: The admission of confession statement of accuse person made to police form and endorsed by ASP Pagiel Lera, dated 9th April 2013 is hereby admitted into evidence and marked as Exhibit “B”
Shitta: We apply for a date to enable us summons the recorder of the statement identified by this witness.
Witness: That all I know
Cross-examination: No.
Court: The witness is hereby discharged. Accused will continue on remand to the next date. The case is further adjourned to 11/06/2014 for hearing.” Now in Exhibit ‘B’ titled “Admission of confessional statement of an accused made to the Police” which was tendered and admitted in evidence without any iota of objection by the accused person represented by a counsel in Court in it the accused person admitted before the Pw1 a superior Police officer before whom he was taken that he voluntarily made the statement in Exhibit “C” after all the necessary legal safeguards have been explained to him and he did signed same as the maker of the statement.

The Pw1 in his evidence before the trial Court testified that he read and interpreted the statement to the accused person and he admitted that it was his statement and further that he had nothing to either add or subtract from the extra judicial statement in Exhibit ”C”. He there upon appended his signature to Exhibit ‘B’ by writing his name.

The said Exhibit ‘B’ as I said earlier was admitted in evidence without objection by the accused person and neither was the Pw2 cross-examined by learned counsel for the accused person with respect to the said Exhibit ‘B’ which attested to the making of the contents of Exhibit ‘C’ by the accused person voluntarily nor was the PW1 cross-examined on any other aspect of his evidence before the trial Court. Let me further make the point which is trite that the fact that an accused person denies making a confessional statement to the Police does not render such extra-judicial statement inadmissible. In such circumstances, the duty upon the Court before which such a retraction is made is to determine the weight to be attached to such a retracted statement by examining the statement in the light of other credible evidence before it in order to test its truthfulness. See Wahab Alao v. The State (2019) LPELR – 47856 (SC), State v. Gwan Gwan (2015) LPELR 24837 (SC), Koku v. The State(2019) LPELR 48121 (CA) and Jubril v. State (2014) LPELR – 41093 (CA).

In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge in my humble view admirably undertook the task of testing the veracity and truthfulness of the extra-judicial statement as gleaned from his judgment at pages 74-75 of the record of appeal.

For ease of reference, the relevant portion of the judgment germane to the point is reproduced thus: “In the instant case Exhibit “C” was denied by the accused person on the strength of the said denial the learned counsel for the defence contended and urged this Court to hold that there is no evidence whatsoever connecting the statement to the accused person and to the offence with which the accused person is charged.
It is the duty of the Court to consider every evidence and documents tendered before it. On the authority of decided cases of numerous numbers, this Court admitted the statement of the accused person as Exhibit “C”.
Whether that exhibit is the truthful confessional statement of the accused person, this Court carefully perused through Exhibit “B” which is the admission of confessional statement of an accused person made to Police. In the said Exhibit “B” the superior officer in charge of culpable homicide cases recorded the answers given by the accused person to questions as provided in printed words.
It is evident from the answers that accused person admitted that he was cautioned before his statement was given to the investigating police officer who recorded the answers positively. Also disclosed on the form Exhibit “B” is the fact that accused admitted and understood the cautionary word and he gave the statement to the police voluntarily, with his name written on the statement Exhibit “C” which is very identical with that which was written in Exhibit “B”.
Further still the Exhibit clearly disclosed that the accused person admitted that the content of Exhibit “C” represent correctly what he told the investigating police officer.
The answers in Exhibit “B” having been answered in the positive confirming that Exhibit “C” was made voluntarily by the accused person corroborate and goes to support the prove of the principle laid down in R.V. SKYES supra.
Exhibit “B” been document at the statement of the accused corroborates and leave no doubt in the mind of this Court that the facts stated in Exhibit “C” are true, that the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence. The confession voluntarily given it is clear also that it is made by the accused person.
Having considered that the statement of the accused Exhibit “C” has passed the principles in R.V. SKYES. This Court has no any other hurdle than to consider same as an admission of the commission of the offence with which the accused person is charged.”

I agree with the findings and conclusion of the learned trial judge that the confessional statement of the accused person is consistent with the other evidence established before it and that it was made voluntarily by the accused person.

In the circumstances, I resolve the sole issue against the Appellant. In summation, I find the appeal lacking in merit and same is hereby dismissed. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the lower Court in its judgment delivered on 8th November, 2016 is hereby affirmed.

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.: I read before now a draft copy of the judgment delivered by my learned brother, JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, JCA. My Lord has adequately and comprehensively resolved the sole issue that arose in the appeal. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the leading judgment.

I cannot fault the findings of the trial Court, the trial judge rightly held that the confessional statement of the accused person is consistent with the other evidence established before it and that it was made voluntarily by the accused person. I also resolved the sole issue for the determination of the appeal against the Appellant.

It is my firm but, humble view that the appeal is lacking in merit and it is accordingly dismissed.

I abide by the order made by my learned brother in the leading judgment that the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the lower Court in its judgment of the High Court of Taraba State in Case No. TRSJ/27C/2013 delivered on 8th day of November, 2016 is hereby affirmed.

MUHAMMED LAWAL ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.: I have read in draft, judgment just delivered by my learned brother, JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, JCA. I entirely agree with the arguments and resolution of issues canvassed. The appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.

Appearances:

John Okezie, Esq., with him, P. E. Ibe and I. I. Daniel, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Hamidu Audu, DPP, Taraba State, with him, D. D. Shintema, Senior State Counsel, Taraba State Ministry of Justice For Respondent(s)