FRN v. NWAOBOSHI & ORS (2022)

FRN v. NWAOBOSHI & ORS

(2022)LCN/16694(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, July 01, 2022

CA/LAG/CR/988/2021

Before Our Lordships:

Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abdullahi Mahmud Bayero Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Oyinkenimiemi Affen Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA APPELANT(S)

And

1) PETER NWAOBOSHI 2) GOLDEN TOUCH CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS LIMITED 3) SUIMING ELECTRICAL LIMITED RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE OF WHAT AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER RECOVERED, HEARD OR SAW IN THE COURSE OF INVESTIGATION IS ADMISSIBLE AND NOT HEARSAY EVIDENCE

The position of the law settled by this noble Court and the Apex Court has been consistent that evidence of what an investigating officer recovered, heard or saw in the course of his investigation is admissible, reliable and not hearsay evidence. In the case of Anyasodor vs. State (2018) LPELR-43720 (SC) 20-21, Paras E-C, the Apex Court held that:
“On the appellant’s counsel’s submission that the testimony of PW3 was hearsay, I am also at one with the lower Court’s conclusion that such testimony as given by the PW3 was not and cannot be described as hearsay evidence. To my mind, all that the PW3 (IPO) did was to give evidence on what he actually saw or had witnessed, or discovered in the course of his work as an investigator. His testimony on what the appellant told him was positive and direct which was narrated to him by the appellant and other witnesses he came into contract within the course of his investigation of the case. Evidence of an IPO is never to be tagged as hearsay. This Court in a plethora of its decided authorities had adjudged such evidence as direct and positive evidence and therefore not hearsay evidence. See Arogundade vs. The State (2009) All FWLR (pt. 469) (SC) 423.”
In Koku vs. State (2020) LPELR-49606 (CA), this Court held that: “The law is that evidence discovered by an investigating police officer in the course of investigation is positive and direct evidence.” See also Kamila vs. The State (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1621) 252 and Olaoye vs. The State (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1621) 281. PER BAYERO, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON INSTANCES WHERE THE COURT OF APPEAL WILL INTERFERE IN THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

In Abiodun vs. State (2013) LPELR-20343 (SC), the Supreme Court lucidly explain instances where this noble Court will interfere with the evaluation of evidence of a trial Court, particularly where it was improperly done. This is what the apex Court had to say:
“It is settled law that it is the primary function of the trial Court or Tribunal to evaluate evidence placed before it, before arriving at a conclusion/decision. It is only where and when the Judge/Court fails to evaluate the evidence at all or properly that an appellate Court can intervene and in itself evaluate or re-evaluate such evidence. As a general rule therefore, when the question of evaluation of evidence does not involve the credibility of witnesses but against the non-evaluation or improper evaluation of the evidence adduced, an appellate Court is in a better position as the trial Court to do its own evaluation – see Doma vs. Ogiri (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt.541) 246 at 267,Abisi vs. Ekwealor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 643.” PER BAYERO, J.C.A.

THE METHODS IN WHICH THE PROSECUTION CAN PROVE THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE

It is the settled position of the law that the prosecution can prove the commission of an offence through different methods such as confession of the accused, direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or by combination of some or all of these methods. In the case of Abdullahi Umar vs. State (2014) LPELR-23190 (SC) also cited as Umar v. State (2015) 13 NWLR 497 at 528, the Apex Court held:
“My Lords, the law of proof in criminal matters, particularly those relating to murder or culpable homicide is very clear and straight forward. We should all be reminded of the concurrent dictum made each by OPUTA and KARIBI-WHYTE, former Justices of the Supreme Court, in the case of BAKARE v. THE STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (part 52) 581, that: “proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of the compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of cogency consistent with an equal/high degree of probability.” Further, there are several methods laid down by the law in proof of such a crime in discharging the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Several authorities of this Court, repeatedly, made the point clear. For instance, in ADIO v. THE STATE (1986) 5 SC 194 at page 219-220, it was stated as follows: “How is a case proved beyond reasonable doubt? A case can be proved by direct oral evidence if the testimony of the witness who saw and heard them are believed, there will be proof beyond reasonable doubt… the local case of Joseph Ogunbadejo v. The Queen (1954) 14 WACA 458 (otherwise known as Apalara’s case) is an excellent example of proof beyond reasonable doubt based purely on inference from circumstantial evidence but far above these two methods of proof is voluntary confession of guilty by an accused person if it is direct and positive and satisfactorily proved should occupy the highest place of authority when it comes to proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is why such a confession by itself is sufficient without further consideration to warrant a conviction unless the trial Court is satisfied that the case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.” PER BAYERO, J.C.A.

ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court, Lagos Division delivered on 18th June, 2021 in which the lower Court discharged and acquitted the Respondents for the offences of Money Laundering and Conspiracy Contrary to Sections 15 (2)(d) and 18(a) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011.

FACTS
Sometimes in the year 2014, the 3rd Respondent (whose alter ego is the 1st Respondent) applied for and was granted a term loan by Nigerian Import Export Bank (NEXIM) of the sum One Billion, Two Hundred Million Naira (N1,200,000,000.00) for the express purpose of acquiring additional equipment and machinery for use in the 3rd Respondent’s factory as shown in Exhibit A3 at pages 1313-1319 and Exhibit A15 particularly at Page 1409. The loan was granted when the 1st Respondent was serving as a member of the board of NEXIM. The 3rd Respondent, acting through the 1st Respondent (who is the sole signatory to its Zenith Bank account as shown in pages 1144-1145, 1169-1171 of the record of appeal) allegedly transferred the sum of Three Hundred and Twenty-Two Million Naira (N322, 000,000.00) to the Sterling Bank account of Delta State Government as part of the payment for the purchase of Guinea House, Marine Road, Apapa, Lagos on behalf of the 2nd Respondent whose alter ego is also the 1st Respondent as confirmed by the 1st Respondent in Exhibit G particularly between pages 1651-1654 of the record of appeal. These facts, among others, emerged from Exhibit P1 which was the petition forwarded to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) by PW1. The allegations were investigated and a criminal charge of two counts was filed against the Respondents on the 20th of April, 2018. The Respondents were arraigned and the Prosecution called four (4) witnesses and Exhibits P1-R3 were tendered in the course of the trial. At the close of the Prosecution’s case, the defence opted to rest its case on that of the Prosecution. Thereafter, the trial Court delivered its judgment discharging and acquitting the Respondents. Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant filed this appeal by a notice of Appeal filed on 6th September, 2021. The Appellant’s Brief of argument was filed on 9th February, 2022 but deemed as properly filed and served on 10th February, 2022. In it, the Appellant formulated the following issues for determination:
1) Whether the trial Court was right to hold that the failure to call officials of Sterling Bank or officials of Delta State Government as prosecution witnesses rendered Exhibits F and F1 of no evidential value because PW4 cannot testify on the contents of those documents. (Grounds 2 and 3)
2) Whether the trial Court properly evaluated the evidence of PW4 and accord it with the appropriate evidential value it deserves. (Ground 4).
3) Whether Exhibit G was a piece of relevant evidence before the trial Court that was improperly evaluated and consequently ascribed with no evidential value by the trial Court. (Grounds5 and 6).
4) Whether the learned trial Court was right to hold that the prosecution must tender the agreement between the owners of Guinea House, Marina Road, Apapa, Lagos and the respondents in order to prove that the respondents acquired Guinea House. (Grounds 7 and 9).
5) Whether the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence and proved the essential ingredients of the offence charged. (Grounds 1, 8, 10, 11 and 12).

On issue one, it was submitted that Exhibits F-F1 that are at Pages 1623 to 1648 of the record are statement of the Escrow bank account of Delta State Government which were requested by the EFCC and forwarded by the bank. That the position of the law settled by this noble Court and the Apex Court has been consistent that evidence of what an investigating officer recovered, heard or saw in the course of his investigation is admissible, reliable and not hearsay evidence – Edet vs. State (2019) LPELR-46844 (CA).

That the decision of the trial Court refusing to attach any evidential value to Exhibits F-F1 on the basis that they were tendered by an investigating officer who is not their maker is erroneous – Olaoye vs. State (2018) LPELR-43601 (SC) at Pg.42-43, Paras D-A. According to Counsel, the failure of the trial Court to follow the settled position of the case law has occasioned a miscarriage of justice which ought to be remedied by this noble Court through reversal of this erroneous decision. Nwankwoala vs. FRN (2018) LPELR-43891 (SC).

On issue two (1), it was submitted that the trial judge after evaluating the evidence of PW4 which according to learned Counsel was done improperly, did not give reasons for his findings which is perverse because the judge improperly and erroneously refused to attach evidential value to Exhibit F tendered by PW4 and also wrongly evaluated Exhibit G tendered through him. Counsel urged this Court to evaluate the evidence of PW4 for the following reasons: Exhibit G which is the cautionary written statement of the 1st Respondent at page 1649 of the record clearly shows that the 1st Respondent admitted that he served on the board of NEXIM and during that material time the 3rd Respondent was granted a loan of One Billion, Two Hundred Million Naira (N1,200,000,000.00) for the purpose of acquiring additional equipment and provision of working capital for the integrated electrical and plastic Factory in Asaba, Delta State (as shown in Exhibit A3 at Page 1313 of the record).

That the 1st Respondent also stated in Exhibit G, particularly at page 1650 of the record, that he was a Director of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and one other entity called Bilderberg Nigeria Limited. Bilderberg Nigeria Limited also serves as a Director of the 3rd Respondents and presented itself as one and the same person with the 1st Respondent as shown in the Corporate Affairs Corporate (CAC) incorporation documents of the 3rd Respondent at page 1609 of the record which is part of Exhibit E1 tendered by PW4. Counsel further submitted that Exhibit E1 tendered by PW4, shows at Page 1594 that one Nwaoboshi Augustine Agom is a Director of the 2nd Respondent. That pages 1607 and 1610 of Exhibit E similarly discloses that the same Nwaoboshi Augustine Agom is a shareholder and a Director of the 3rd defendant.

That Exhibit F-F1 at page 1647 of the record shows the credit transaction of 14th May, 2014 for the sum of Three Hundred and Twenty-Two Million Naira (N322,000,000.00) paid by the 3rd Respondent from the aforesaid loan sum into the Sterling Bank account of Delta State Government as part of the purchase price of Guinea House, Marine Road, Apapa, Lagos purchased by the 2nd Respondent. That, this sum of N322,000,000.00 is the basis of counts 1 and 2 of the criminal charge at page 1 and 2 of the record of appeal before this noble Court. That the said sum was fraudulently taken from the loan granted by NEXIM bank (when the 1st Respondent was serving there as a Director) to the 3rd Respondent for the purpose stated in Exhibit A15 starting at page 1405 particularly at paragraph 3.0 of page 1405 and Paragraph 2.0 at page 1409 of the record of appeal. According to Counsel, it is manifestly clear that the 1st and 2nd Respondents knew or ought to know that the sum of N322,000,000.00 which they took from the loan given to the 3rd respondent and paid to Delta State Government for the purchase of Guinea house was a proceed of their fraudulent act, to wit: Criminal conversion of loan meant for the acquisition of equipment and provision of working capital for the integrated electrical and plastic factory of the 3rd Respondent and the 3rd Respondent also knew or ought to know that it was Conspiring, aiding and abetting the 1st and 2nd Respondents to commit the offence in count 1 of the criminal charge.

That it is instructive to note that all the Respondents have a common and single operating mind which is that of the 1st Respondent being the only biological person among them who controls the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. According to Counsel, this picture becomes clearer when this noble Court looks at pages 1144, 1145 and 1169 (Part of Exhibit R1 wrongly rejected by the trial Court) which clearly shows that the 1st Respondent is the sole signatory to the 3rd Respondent’s Zenith Bank account wherein the loaned funds were received. Counsel argued that the law is settled that the minds of companies are the minds of their Managers, Directors or alter egos – H.L. Bolton Engineering Co. Ltd. vs. T.J. Graham & Sons (1957) 1 QB 159.

Learned Counsel further argued that Exhibit R1 is a certificate of compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act issued by PW3 Eyituoyo Mogbeyiteren, a compliance officer of Zenith bank. That despite this certificate, the trial Court rejected the Zenith Bank account opening documents and statement of account of the 3rd Respondent which shows the 1st Respondent as its sole signatory and also shows how the loaned funds were received and part of it used unlawfully to purchase Guinea House on behalf of the 2nd Respondent who is also controlled by the 1st Respondent.

As to issue three (3), it was argued that the crux of the allegations in count one are that the 1st and 2nd Respondents committed the unlawful act of fraudulently converting the sum of N322,000,000.00 from the loan given to the 3rd Respondent by NEXIM to pay for the purchase of Guinea House. While the second count alleged that the 3rd Respondent conspired with aided and abetted the 1st and 2nd Respondents to commit the offence in count one.

That in the course of investigation, the 1st Respondent wrote Exhibit G under words of caution at pages 1650 to 1656 of the record of appeal wherein his explanation confirmed what the eventual criminal charge alleged before the trial Court as explained in the preceding paragraph herein. That the only defence put forward by the 1st Respondent in Exhibit G justifying the alleged unlawful conduct of the Respondents was that the 3rd Respondent was owing the 2nd Respondent which was the reason for 3rd Respondent using the loaned funds to partly pay for purchase of Guinea House by the 2nd Respondent. Counsel further submitted that justice and logic demands that the trial Court ought to have attached evidential value to Exhibit G (which is very relevant) and convict the Respondents rather than discharging and acquitting them having rested their case on that of the Prosecution. As to issue four (4), it was submitted that it is a settled position of the law that the prosecution can prove the commission of an offence through different methods such as confession of the accused, direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or by combination of some or all of these methods – Abdullahi Umar vs. State (2014) LPELR-23190 (SC). That to prove that the 1st and 2nd Respondents acquired Guinea House, the prosecution also tendered Exhibits F-F1 (i.e. Sterling Bank account details of Delta State Government) which shows payments made by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the purchase of Guinea House at Page 1647 of the record of appeal.

According to Counsel, the decision of the trial Court which says that the prosecution must tender the agreement between owners of Guinea House and the 1st and 2nd Respondents in order to prove its acquisition by the said respondents is also perverse and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice against the appellant. As to issue five (5), learned Counsel referred to the evidence of PW1 – PW4 and submitted that the testimony of PW3 shows at page 1205 of the record of appeal that on the 14th May, 2014 the 3rd Respondent transferred the sum of N322,000,000.00 to Delta State Government for the purchase of Guinea House acquired by the 2nd Respondent. That this transaction also reflects as credit in the statement of account of Delta State Government which is Exhibit F-F1 particularly at page 1647 of the record.

That PW4 also testified that Exhibits F-F1 are the Sterling Bank account records and statements of Delta State Government through which 3rd Respondent paid N322,000,000.00 for the purchase of Guinea House on behalf of the 2nd Respondent; and that Exhibit G is the cautionary extra-judicial statement of the 1st Respondent wherein he confessed to engineering the unlawful transaction in relation to the purchase of Guinea House using the 2nd and 3rd Respondents whose minds are one and the same thing with his. That despite the overwhelming credible oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution without any rebuttal from the Respondents, the trial Court discharged and acquitted the Respondents contrary to the provisions of Section 135(3) of the Evidence Act. According to Counsel, a summary analysis of the evidence before the trial Court when juxtaposed to the essential ingredients of the two count offences charged leaves no doubt that the prosecution has adduced credible evidence which proves the commission of the offences by the Respondents contrary to the decision of the trial Court that nothing else was proved by the Prosecution. He urged the Court to resolve all the five issues in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.

The 1st Respondent’s brief was filed on 21/02/2022 in which the five issues formulated by the Appellant were adopted. On issue one, it was submitted that Exhibits F and F1 are letters from Sterling Bank dated 5th of June, 2018, its attachments and letter from Sterling Bank dated 2nd of March, 2017 and its attachments. That the attachments to the letter dated 5th June, 2018 and the letter dated 2nd of March, 2017 fall within the definition of Bankers Book provided for by Section 258, 89(h) and 90(e) of the Evidence Act 2011 and computer generated evidence provided by Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. According to Counsel, the lower Court during trial admitted the documents in evidence but had not attached any evidential value to them at the point of writing the judgment due to non-compliance with the clear provisions of the Section 258, Section 89(h), Section 90(e) and Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. That the action of the lower Court is in tandem with the principle of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Nwabuoku & Ors v. Onwordi & Ors (2006) LPELR-2082 (SC).

It was further submitted that Section 83(1)(a)(b)of the Evidence Act 2011 makes it imperative for a document to be tendered by its maker else it would amount to hearsay which renders it inadmissible and consequently bereft of evidential value. That PW4 through whom Exhibits F and F1 were tendered was not the maker of those Exhibits, and that there was no certificate of identification attached in compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. That in respect of F1, there was a certificate of identification deposed to by the staff of Sterling Bank but that the staff of sterling bank was not called upon as witness to give evidence on the contents of the said documents – Abdulmalik vs.Tijani (2012)12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) CA. Arguing issue (2), Counsel submitted that throughout the oral testimony of PW4, there was no attempt to explain the contents of Exhibits E and E1(found in Pages 1594-1610 of the Records of Appeal, Volume III), F, F1, G and H or tie their contents to the Appellant’s case. That he did not testify that the 1st Respondent purchased Guinea House neither did he explain the relationship between the 1st and 2nd Respondents – Maku vs. Almakura & Ors (2016) LPELR-48123(SC).

That in respect of Exhibits F and F1 which contain statement of account of Delta State and in respect of which PW 4 gave no oral evidence on and dumped same on the Court – Okoye & Anor vs. EcoBank & Anor (2019) LPELR-47350 (CA). According to Counsel, the Appellant failed to tie the 1st and 2nd Respondents to Exhibits E and E1 which are the CAC Forms and there is nothing in the said documents which suggests that. That even the Appellant even has affirmed in Paragraph 3.13 of its Appellant’s Brief that by Exhibit E1, Nwaoboshi Augustine Agom (and not the 1st Respondent herein) is a Director in the 2nd and 3rd Respondent and that this evidence apparently has no value to the case of the Appellant and does not prove the ingredients of the offence charged against the 1st Respondent – Isheno vs. Julius Berger (Nig) Plc. (2008) LPELR-1544(SC). In his submissions regarding issue three (3), Counsel submitted that Exhibit G which is the extra-judicial statement of the 1st Respondent was tendered through PW4 and that the trial Court has in pages 14 and 15 of its judgment rightly stated that the Exhibit not being a confessional statement has no evidential value to the Prosecution’s case – Esangbedo vs. The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 113) 57 at 66.

That the 1st Respondent rested its defence solely on the evidence of the Prosecution, therefore the situation in which the extra-judicial statement would have been useful did not arise. Counsel further submitted that the 1st Respondent did not state in Exhibit G that he committed the crime and according to Counsel, it is not a confessional statement. That the trial Judge was right to have held that Exhibit G has no evidential value to the case of the Appellant and urged the Court to discountenance the arguments and the authorities relied upon by the Appellant in Paragraphs 3.19 to 3.30 of its Brief of Argument in respect of this issue as they are not in tandem with the correct position of the law.

On issue four (4), it was submitted that it is trite law that where there is a transfer of interest in a property, a document of transfer or title is the only way by which such transfer can be proved – Section 128 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Atunrase vs. Philips (1996)1 SCNJ 145 at 158. According to Counsel, the Appellant has not backed up its assertion by production of any document of title which is very fatal to its case.

As to issue five, it was the argument of learned Counsel that a careful appraisal of the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses shows that PW1 Comrade Prince Kpokpogiri identified himself as the author of Exhibit P1 (Pages 7-13 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 1), the Petition to EFCC which contains allegations of the crime of money laundering against the 1st Respondent. PW1 explained that the sole source of the allegations in Exhibit P1 was from a telephone conversation with an anonymous caller. That the anonymous caller was not called as a witness by the Prosecution (Pages 825-834, 850-858 of the Records of Appeal Volume II); as such Counsel submitted his testimony is hear say and inadmissible – Zubairu vs. State (2015) 16 NWLR Pt. 1486 504 at 524-525.

Responding to issue two (2), Counsel opined that PW2 the head of Enterprise Risk Management of NEXIM explained that the actual loan amount (principal) for =N=1.2 Billion Naira has been fully repaid and that the 3rd Respondent has also paid interest of over =N=700 million, as such there is no unlawful act committed and there is no evidence of any fraudulent act as the said loan was fully repaid by the 3rd Respondent. That PW3 answered during cross-examination that “Apart from tendering documents, you do not know anything? PW3: No.”

Counsel submitted that PW4 an operative of EFCC whose statement was tendered as Exhibit H shows that he knows nothing about the charge and did nothing else outside writing to agencies, receiving and considering their responses, taking the 1st Respondent’s statement and supposedly dispatching an investigation report, which was not produced, to their legal department. That he made no deductions, no analysis and no reference to the documents tendered through the entirety of his testimony. That PW4’s testimony showed that the allegations culminating in the present charge were uninvestigated. Counsel urged this Court to affirm the judgment of the lower Court which discharged and acquit the 1st Respondent.

In the Appellant’s reply brief on points of law to the 1st Respondent’s brief filed on 30/03/2022 but deemed as properly filed and served on 4/04/2022, it was submitted that on the issue raised by the 1st Respondent in Paragraphs 5.1 – 5.11 that the trial Court refused to attach any evidential value to Exhibits F-F1 due to non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 84, 89(h), 90(e) and 258 of the Evidence Act, 2011, it was submitted that the trial Court never made reference to those Sections of the Evidence Act as the reason or basis why it held, at Paragraph 3 of Page 1668 of the record of appeal, as follows:
“There is no doubt that because P.W.4 neither works with Sterling Bank nor Delta State Government, no evidential value will be accorded to Exhibit F series. P.W.4 cannot testify on the contents of these documents. Therefore, this Court will not accord any evidential value to these exhibits.”

Counsel therefore submitted that the lower Court did not give its reason for the above decision – EFCC vs. Dada (2014) LPELR-24256 (CA). On Exhibits F – F1, Counsel submitted that they qualify as ‘banker’s book’ within the contemplation of Section 258 of the Evidence Act, that the statement of account in them also qualify as ‘entry in a banker’s book’ as provided in Section 89(h) of the Evidence Act; while the certificate of compliance with Section 84 of the Act was issued and is part of the Exhibits which also satisfies the provisions of Section 90(e) of the Act by confirming the entries in those exhibits as made in the ordinary course of business, into one of the ordinary books of the bank, under the control and custody of the bank.

On the issue that PW4 did not speak to those Exhibits, it was submitted that the witness adequately spoke to the Exhibits he tendered as shown between pages 990 and 999 of the record. According to Counsel, it has been held by this honourable Court that it is the duty of the trial Court to consider all relevant exhibits before it. That Exhibits E, E1, F, F1, G and H tendered by PW4 were explained and relevant but not acted on by the trial Court.

That the refusal to act on these relevant pieces of evidence by the trial Court is contrary to the law – A.I.C. Ltd vs. Pivot Engineering Co. Ltd & Anor (2015) LPELR-25857(CA).

Counsel also submitted that Exhibit R1 was wrongly rejected by the trial Court as it complied with the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act, as shown in page 1202 of the record of appeal. In response to issue three (3), it was submitted that the 1st Respondent’s reliance on the case of Esangbedo vs. The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.113) 57 at 66; (1989) LPELR-1163 (SC) is misplaced and quoted out of context because what the Supreme Court clearly said therein is not what the 1st Respondent quoted and presented to this honourable Court. That the Supreme Court was referring to extra-judicial statements of witnesses and not suspects cum defendants as the 1st Respondent in this case. That the Supreme decision was on untendered extra-judicial statements of witnesses and not tendered extra-judicial statement of suspect cum defendant like the 1st Respondent in this matter. Responding to issue four (4), Counsel stated that the Respondents acquired Guinea House, Marina Road, Apapa, Lagos is not in doubt and has been proved even though it is not an essential ingredient of the offences charged against the Respondents. That proving such acquisition by tendering the sale agreement is not an essential ingredient of the offences charged herein.

According to Counsel, there is nothing in Section 128 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which states that a document of transfer of title is the only way by which a transfer of interest in a property can be proved and even if that is the purport of that Section, tendering such document or otherwise cannot by any means have any bearing on the proof of the offences charged herein since the 1st Respondent had admitted the acquisition of the House in his extra-judicial statement Exhibit G (Pages 1651 and 1652 of the record of Appeal and Paragraph 3.32 of the Appellant’s brief. In reply to issue five (5), it was submitted that the entire testimony of PW1 cannot be tagged hearsay as the 1st Respondent wrongly argued and there is no material contradiction therein. According to Counsel, there is no issue of overdraft in the instant case but a clear case of fraudulent conversion (stealing) which led to the commission of the money laundering offences charged herein.

That the 1st Respondent’s reliance on Garba vs. State (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1266) 98 at 120, C.O.P. vs. Amuta (2017) LPELR-41386 (SC) and FRN vs. Ademola (2021) LPELR-53238 (CA) at Paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3 of his brief, is also completely misplaced because the Courts therein made such pronouncements on the backdrop of no case submissions which is different from the instant case where the 1st Respondent rested his case on that of the Prosecution seeing that the trial Court wrongly rejected vital evidence placed before it, refused to attach probative value to crucial exhibits admitted and disregarded the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

In the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ brief filed on 21/02/2022, the following issues are formulated for determination. Thus:
1) “Was the learned trial judge right in refusing to accord evidential value to Exhibits F-F series.” (Grounds 2, 3 and 4) (Appellant’s issues 1 & 2).
2) “Whether the learned trial Judge was right in his decision that the prosecution ought to have tendered an agreement in proof of the sale of Guinea House.” (Ground 7 & 9) (Appellant’s issue 4).
3) “Whether the learned trial judge was right in the decision not to ascribe probative value to Exhibit G.” (Grounds 5 & 6) (Appellant’s issue 3).
4) ”Whether the trial judge was right in his decision that the prosecution did not prove the offences charged.” (Grounds 1, 8, 10, 11 & 12) (Appellant’s issue 5.

In arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that in 2014, the 3rd Respondent took a loan of N1.2 Billion from Nexim Bank to be repaid within five (5) years together with interest. That from the evidence of PW2 (Pages 864 & 867 of the record of appeal) the total amount repaid as at the 4th year of the loan was N1.8Billion with only about N24Million left to complete repayment. According to Counsel, all what PW4 did was to tender the bank statement as material recovered during investigation and did not utter a single word on its contents, that the documents were dumped on the Court – Pages 991-997 of the record of appeal. That parties are not entitled to dump documents on the Court – Dung vs. Railway Property Management Company Ltd. (2018) LPELR-45378 (CA).

Learned Counsel referred to Paragraph 3.13 of the Appellant’s brief and submitted that the Appellant seeks to give evidence in the address of Counsel which was not evidence given at the trial to be subjected to cross-examination – Fatoba vs. Ogundahunsi (2003) FWLR (Pt. 154) 561 at 582. According to Counsel, a careful look at Exhibit F, it does not show N322 Million was payment into the account of Delta State Government for the purchase of Guinea House. That the Appellant in Paragraph 3.14 said that Exhibit R1 which was rejected by the lower Court shows evidence of such payment. Counsel submitted that rejected document is not evidence before the Court – Agboola vs. State (2011) LPELR-8948 (CA).

That it is wrong for the Appellant to argue that the trial Court was wrong to have rejected the Zenith Bank documents without an appeal against the decision rejecting them – Agboola vs. State (Supra) at Page 22. On issue two (2), it was submitted that the trial Court was right to have posited that the Appellant ought to have produced an agreement for the purchase of the building.

On issue three (3), it was submitted that in Exhibit G, the 1st Respondent admitted the allegation but sought to justify same by saying that the payment was a refund of money owed the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent. According to Counsel, the exhibit was not a confession or admission of the offence – Adeniyi vs. The State (Supra) and that no where in the statement Guinea House or N322 Million was mentioned. As to issue four (4), learned Counsel adopted his submissions in issues 1, 2 & 3 above and submitted that the prosecution woefully failed to prove the ingredients of the offences charged. That the gravamen of the Appellant’s case is that the Respondents breached a covenant in the loan agreement as shown in Paragraph 3.48 of the Appellant’s Brief.

According to Counsel, breach of the covenant to apply the loan exclusively for a stated purpose is not an offence – Onagoruwa vs. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 49 at 97. That there is no breach because Exhibit G says in part that all the equipment that suiming needed and informed the bank that they want to buy have all been bought and the contract has fully been executed. That from 2014 when the loan was granted to 2017 N700 Million of the N1.2 Billion had been repaid as shown in the exhibit. Learned Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.

In the Appellant’s reply brief to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents brief filed on 30/03/2022 on issue one it was submitted that as regards Paragraphs 5.1 to 5.26 of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents brief, the trial Court made it clear in its judgment that the reason why it will not attach evidential value to Exhibits F-F1 series is because, according to it, PW4 was not a staff of Sterling Bank or Delta State Government – Page 1668 of the record of appeal.

That PW4 being the investigator, who received Exhibits F-F1in the course of his investigation is competent to testify on their content contrary to the decision of the trial Court.

On the issue that PW4 did not speak to those Exhibits, it was submitted that the witness adequately spoke to the Exhibits he tendered as shown between Pages 990 and 999 of the record. According to Counsel, it has been held by this honourable Court that it is the duty of the trial Court to consider all relevant exhibits before it. That Exhibits E, E1, F, F1, G and H tendered by PW4 were explained and relevant but not acted on by the trial Court. That the refusal to act on these relevant pieces of evidence by the trial Court is contrary to the law – A.I.C. Ltd vs. Pivot Engineering Co. Ltd & Anor (2015) LPELR-25857(CA). Counsel also submitted that Exhibit R1 was wrongly rejected by the trial Court as it complied with the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act, as shown in Page 1202 of the record of Appeal.

That the Respondents acquired Guinea House, Marina Road, Apapa, Lagos is not in doubt and has been proved even though it is not an essential ingredient of the offences charged against the Respondents. That proving such acquisition by tendering the sale agreement is not an essential ingredient of the offences charged herein.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
The following issues are apt in the resolution of this appeal:
1) Whether the trial Court was right to hold that the failure to call officials of Sterling Bank or officials of Delta State Government as prosecution witnesses rendered Exhibits F and F1 of no evidential value because PW4 cannot testify on the contents of those documents.(Grounds 2 and 3)
2) Whether the trial Court properly evaluated the evidence of PW4 and accord it with the appropriate evidential value it deserves. (Ground 4).
3) Whether Exhibit G was a piece of relevant evidence before the trial Court that was improperly evaluated and consequently ascribed with no evidential value by the trial Court. (Grounds 5 and 6).
4) Whether the trial Court was right to hold that the prosecution must tender the agreement between the owners of Guinea House, Marina Road, Apapa, Lagos and the respondents in order to prove that the respondents acquired Guinea House. (Grounds 7 and 9).
5) Whether the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence and proved the essential ingredients of the offence charged. (Grounds 1, 8, 10, 11 and 12).

The trial Court at page 1668 of the record of appeal held: “There is no doubt that because P.W.4 neither works with Sterling Bank nor Delta State Government, no evidential value will be accorded to Exhibit F series. P.W.4 cannot testify on the contents of these documents. Therefore this Court will not accord any evidential value to these exhibits.”

Exhibits F-F1 tendered through PW4 that are at pages 1623 to 1648 of the record are statement of the Escrow bank account of Delta State Government which were requested by the EFCC and forwarded by the bank.

It is important to note that the failure of the trial Court to abide by the Appellate Courts’ decisions as reproduced above is a complete disregard for the cherished principle of stare decisis in our jurisprudence. Furthermore, the trial Court was wrong to hold that Exhibits F-F1 can only be accorded evidential value if they are tendered by the official of Sterling Bank or Delta State Government, this is because the prosecution is not under any duty to call any particular witness in proof of its case. In Idiok vs. State (2008) LPELR-1423 (SC), the Supreme Court held that:
“The prosecution has a discretion to call witnesses of its choice. The prosecution is under no constitutional or statutory duty to call a particular witness or particular witnesses. The prosecution has not the legal duty to call a village or community of witnesses. An accused person cannot dictate to the prosecution witnesses it should call to prosecute him”

It therefore follows that PW4 who tendered the Exhibits is the investigating officer of the case who can competently tender them and give evidence of his examination or scrutiny of these documents. Issue one (1) is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents. As to issue two (2), the evidence of PW4 Detective Ani Davies Stanley is at Pages 990 and 999 of the record of Appeal. At Page 1663 of the record Exhibits E to G series were tendered through him by the prosecution. The trial Court held between Pages 1672-1673 of the record thus:
“In the end, the evidence of P.W.4 did very little to enhance the duty of the Prosecution to prove all the essential elements of the charge beyond reasonable doubt and the requirements of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended) under which the three Defendants were charged.”

It is an elementary and essential ingredient of the judicial function that reasons are to be given for decisions. That it is crucial or important where appeals lie from the decisions and the reasons for decisions enable the determination on appeal whether the decision was merely initiative and arbitrary or whether it is consistent with established applicable principles. It has to be stated and emphatically too that if a judgment is delivered without supporting reasons it is an irritation or arbitrariness, a rule akin to tossing the coin and whatever side shows up is the decision, a situation that would likely produce a judicial anarchy. From the holding of the lower Court as quoted above, it is crystal clear that the trial judge after evaluating the evidence of PW4, did not give reasons for his findings which is perverse because the judge improperly and erroneously refused to attach evidential value to Exhibit F tendered by PW4 and also wrongly evaluated Exhibit G tendered through him.

In Abiodun vs. State (2013) LPELR-20343 (SC), the Supreme Court lucidly explain instances where this noble Court will interfere with the evaluation of evidence of a trial Court, particularly where it was improperly done. This is what the apex Court had to say:
“It is settled law that it is the primary function of the trial Court or Tribunal to evaluate evidence placed before it, before arriving at a conclusion/decision. It is only where and when the Judge/Court fails to evaluate the evidence at all or properly that an appellate Court can intervene and in itself evaluate or re-evaluate such evidence. As a general rule therefore, when the question of evaluation of evidence does not involve the credibility of witnesses but against the non-evaluation or improper evaluation of the evidence adduced, an appellate Court is in a better position as the trial Court to do its own evaluation – see Doma vs. Ogiri (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt.541) 246 at 267,Abisi vs. Ekwealor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 643.”

Exhibit G which is the cautionary written statement of the 1st Respondent at page 1649 of the record clearly shows that the 1st Respondent admitted that he served on the board of NEXIM and during that material time the 3rd Respondent was granted a loan of one billion, two hundred million naira (N1,200,000,000.00) for the purpose of acquiring additional equipment and provision of working capital for the integrated electrical and plastic Factory in Asaba, Delta State (as shown in Exhibit A3 at page 1313 of the record). The 1st Respondent also stated in Exhibit G, particularly at Page 1650 of the record, that he was a Director of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and one other entity called Bilderberg Nigeria Limited. Bilderberg Nigeria Limited also serves as a Director of the 3rd Respondents and presented itself as one and the same person with the 1st Respondent as shown in the Corporate Affairs Corporate (CAC) incorporation documents of the 3rd Respondent at Page 1609 of the record which is part of Exhibit E1 tendered by PW4.

It is also in evidence that Exhibit E1 tendered by PW4, shows at page 1594 that one Nwaoboshi Augustine Agom is a Director of the 2nd Respondent. Pages 1607 and 1610 of Exhibit E similarly discloses that the same Nwaoboshi Augustine Agom is a shareholder and a Director of the 3rd defendant. Exhibit F-F1 at Page 1647 of the record shows the credit transaction of 14th May, 2014 for the sum of three hundred and twenty-two million naira (N322,000,000.00) paid by the 3rd Respondent from the afore said loan sum into the Sterling Bank account of Delta State Government as part of the purchase price of Guinea House, Marine Road, Apapa, Lagos purchased by the 2nd Respondent. This sum of N322,000,000.00 is the basis of counts 1 and 2 of the criminal charge at pages 1 and 2 of the record of appeal before this Court. The said sum was fraudulently taken from the loan granted by NEXIM bank (when the 1st Respondent was serving there as a Director) to the 3rd Respondent for the purpose stated in Exhibit A15 starting at page 1405 particularly at paragraph 3.0 of page 1405 and Paragraph 2.0 at page 1409 of the record of appeal.

That it is manifestly clear that the 1st and 2nd Respondents knew or ought to know that the sum of N322,000,000.00 which they took from the loan given to the 3rd Respondent and paid to Delta State Government for the purchase of Guinea house was a proceed of their fraudulent act, to wit: Criminal conversion of loan meant for the acquisition of equipment and provision of working capital for the integrated electrical and plastic factory of the 3rd Respondent and the 3rd Respondent also knew or ought to know that it was conspiring, aiding and abetting the 1st and 2nd Respondents to commit the offence in count 1 of the criminal charge. The law is settled that the minds of companies are the minds of their Managers, Directors or alter egos. Lord Denning, in the case of H.L. Bolton Engineering Co. Ltd. vs. T.J. Graham & Sons (1957) 1 QB 159 decided that: “The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.’’

Exhibit R1 is a certificate of compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act issued by PW3 Eyituoyo Mogbeyiteren, a compliance officer of Zenith bank. Despite this certificate, the trial Court rejected the Zenith Bank account opening documents and statement of account of the 3rd Respondent which shows that the 1st Respondent as its sole signatory and also shows how the loaned funds were received and part of it used unlawfully to purchase Guinea House on behalf of the 2nd Respondent who is also controlled by the 1st Respondent. As a result of this erroneous exclusion and rejection of these documents, the trial Court found at page 1672 of the record, while evaluating the evidence of PW3 that:
“He is a truthful witness. His evidence was not contradicted in cross-examination. However, with the rejection of the admissibility in evidence of the account opening documents and the statements of account of the 3rd Defendant with Zenith Bank, his testimony has no evidential value to the Prosecution. In fact, it becomes impossible for the charges to be proved without those documents!”

Had this Exhibit R1 been rightfully admitted, it would not have been difficult for the trial Court to see how part of the loaned funds (N322,000,000.00) were unlawfully transferred from the 3rd Respondent’s Zenith Bank account on the 14th of May, 2014 into the Delta State Government’s Sterling Bank account admitted through PW4 as Exhibits F-F1 but denied evidential value by the learned trial Court. These transfers are confirmed at pages 1095 and 1647 of the record appeal.

It is instructive to note that all the Respondents have a common and single operating mind which is that of the 1st Respondent who is the only biological person among them who controls the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. This picture becomes clearer when one looks at Pages 1144, 1145 and 1169 (Part of Exhibit R1 wrongly rejected by the trial Court) which clearly shows that the 1st Respondent is the sole signatory to the 3rd Respondent’s Zenith Bank account wherein the loaned funds were received.

Exhibit R1 is hereby admitted into evidence and marked as Exhibit R1. Issue two (2) is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.

As to issue three (3), the crux of the allegations in count one are that the 1st and 2nd Respondents committed the unlawful act of fraudulently converting the sum of N322,000,000.00 from the loan given to the 3rd Respondent by NEXIM to pay for the purchase of Guinea House. While the second count alleged that the 3rd Respondent conspired with aided and abetted the 1st and 2nd Respondents to commit the offence in count one.

The 1st Respondent wrote Exhibit G under words of caution at pages 1650 to 1656 of the record of appeal wherein his explanation confirmed what the eventual criminal charge alleged before the trial Court as explained in the preceding paragraph herein. The only defence put forward by the 1st Respondent in Exhibit G justifying the alleged unlawful conduct of the Respondents was that the 3rd Respondent was owing the 2nd Respondent which was the reason why the 3rd Respondent used the loaned funds to partly pay for purchase of Guinea House by the 2nd Respondent. Justice and logic demands that the trial Court ought to have attached evidential value to Exhibit G (which is very relevant) and convict the Respondents rather than discharging and acquitting them having rested their case on that of the Prosecution. Issue three is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.

On issue four (4), the trial Court at page 1676 of the record held that:
“I agree with the 1st to 3rd defendants when they submitted that for the Prosecution to prove that the 1st and 2nd Defendants acquired Guinea House, Marine Road, Apapa Lagos they need to tender an Agreement between the owners of the House and the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The admissible evidence in this case does not even show the owners of the said Guinea House.”

It is the settled position of the law that the prosecution can prove the commission of an offence through different methods such as confession of the accused, direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or by combination of some or all of these methods. In the case of Abdullahi Umar vs. State (2014) LPELR-23190 (SC) also cited as Umar v. State (2015) 13 NWLR 497 at 528, the Apex Court held:
“My Lords, the law of proof in criminal matters, particularly those relating to murder or culpable homicide is very clear and straight forward. We should all be reminded of the concurrent dictum made each by OPUTA and KARIBI-WHYTE, former Justices of the Supreme Court, in the case of BAKARE v. THE STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (part 52) 581, that: “proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of the compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of cogency consistent with an equal/high degree of probability.” Further, there are several methods laid down by the law in proof of such a crime in discharging the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Several authorities of this Court, repeatedly, made the point clear. For instance, in ADIO v. THE STATE (1986) 5 SC 194 at page 219-220, it was stated as follows: “How is a case proved beyond reasonable doubt? A case can be proved by direct oral evidence if the testimony of the witness who saw and heard them are believed, there will be proof beyond reasonable doubt… the local case of Joseph Ogunbadejo v. The Queen (1954) 14 WACA 458 (otherwise known as Apalara’s case) is an excellent example of proof beyond reasonable doubt based purely on inference from circumstantial evidence but far above these two methods of proof is voluntary confession of guilty by an accused person if it is direct and positive and satisfactorily proved should occupy the highest place of authority when it comes to proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is why such a confession by itself is sufficient without further consideration to warrant a conviction unless the trial Court is satisfied that the case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.”

The lower Court was therefore in error when it held that the Prosecution must tender the agreement for the sale of Guinea House in order to prove that the 1st and 2nd Respondents acquired the house. This is because the Prosecution can as well prove that by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence or confessional statement of the Respondents such as Exhibit G wherein, at pages 1651 and 1652 of the record of appeal, the 1st Respondent wrote thus under caution:
“…I can remember the Guinea House which was sold by Delta State Government to Golden Touch Company around 2014. I remember it was sold for 805 million naira…”

To prove that the 1st and 2nd Respondents acquired Guinea House, the prosecution also tendered Exhibits F-F1 (i.e. Sterling Bank account details of Delta State Government) which shows payments made by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the purchase of Guinea House at page 1647 of the record of appeal. This goes contrary to the findings of the lower Court at page 1676 of the record of appeal that: “the admissible evidence in this case does not even show the owners of the said Guinea House.” It is obvious from the foregoing that the prosecution indeed satisfactorily proved that 1st and 2nd Respondents acquired Guinea House and the acquisition was done partly and unlawfully with the loaned funds given to the 3rd Respondent by NEXIM bank for a different purpose. Issue four (4) is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents. On issue five (5), it is apt to reproduce the provisions of Section 15(2) (d) and (3) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended) under which the 1st and 2nd Respondents were charged in Count 1 provides:
(2) Any person or body corporate, in or outside Nigeria, who directly or indirectly-
…(d) acquires, uses, retains or takes possession or control of; any fund or property, knowingly or reasonably ought to have known that such fund or property is, or forms part of the proceeds of an unlawful act; commits an offence of money laundering under this Act.
(3) A person who contravenes the provision of Subsection (2) of this Section is liable on conviction to a term of not less than 7 years but not more than 14 years imprisonment.

Similarly, Section 18 (a) of the same Act under which the 3rd Respondent was charged provides thus:
A person who –
(a) Conspires with, aids, abets or counsels any other person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to the same punishment as is prescribed for that offence under this Act.

The issue for determination is whether the Prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of the offence in Count 1 of the Criminal charge against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

The Prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of the offence in count 1 of the criminal charge against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

PW1 is the nominal complainant to the EFCC whose oral testimony is between Pages 768-780, 826-834, 850-859 of the record of appeal. Through him, the Prosecution tendered Exhibits P1 and P2 in addition to his oral testimony. Exhibit P1 is the petition he authored and forwarded to the EFCC.

PW2 is a staff of NEXIM Bank who testified about the loan granted the 3rd Respondent for the purpose of acquisition of additional factory equipment. Through him Exhibits A1-A28 were tendered which showed how the 3rd Respondent applied for loan for the aforesaid purpose which was granted by NEXIM bank. Exhibit A15 at Pages1403-1445 Paragraph 2.0 titled ‘‘Loan Purpose’’ at Page 1409 of the record of Appeal states thus:
The borrower hereby covenants that the Loan shall be applied exclusively for the carrying out of the project as approved by NEXIM for the acquisition of additional equipment and provision of working capital for the integrated electrical and plastic Factory in Asaba, Delta State.

PW3 is a Compliance Officer of Zenith Bank whose testimony is at Pages 880-884, 921-935, 951-955, 963-968 and 985-986. He tendered Exhibits R1-R3, the account opening package, statement of account and certificate of compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act in relation to the Zenith Bank account of the 3rd Respondent. Exhibit (R1-R3) shows that on the 14th May, 2014 the 3rd Respondent transferred the sum of N322,000,000.00 to Delta State Government for the purchase of Guinea House acquired by the 2nd Respondent. This transaction also reflects as credit in the statement of account of Delta State Government which is Exhibit F-F1 particularly at page 1647 of the record.

PW4 is the investigating officer who investigated the petition (Exhibit P1). He testified about the conduct of his investigation and his testimony is at pages 990-999 of the record of appeal. Through him, the Prosecution tendered Exhibits E, E1, F, F1, G and H. Exhibits E and E1, the responses from the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) which shows the incorporation documents of 2nd and 3rd Respondents and also confirmed 1st Respondent as the controlling mind of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents manifesting either as promoter, alter ego, director or shareholder of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. Exhibits F-F1 are the Sterling Bank account records and statements of Delta State Government through which the 3rd Respondent paid N322,000,000.00 for the purchase of Guinea House on behalf of the 2nd Respondent and that Exhibit G is the cautionary extra-judicial statement of the 1st Respondent wherein he confessed to engineering the unlawful transaction in relation to the purchase of Guinea House using the 2nd and 3rd Respondents whose minds are one and the same thing with his.

The above overwhelming credible oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution without any rebuttal from the Respondents, shows that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence and proved the essential ingredients for the offences of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (as amended) and Conspiracy to commit the said offence Contrary to Sections 15 (2)(d) and (3), and 18 (a) of the Act. The trial Court ought not to have discharged and acquitted the Respondents.

A summary analysis of the evidence before the trial Court when juxtaposed to the essential ingredients of the two count offences charged leaves no doubt that the prosecution has adduced credible evidence which proves the commission of the offences by the Respondents contrary to the decision of the trial Court that nothing else was proved by the Prosecution. The judgment of the lower Court in Charge No. FHC/L/117C/2018 delivered on 3rd September, 2021 discharging and acquitting the Respondents for the offences of Money Laundering and Conspiracy Contrary to Sections 15(2)(d), 15 (3) and 18 (a) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, is hereby set aside. The 1st and 2nd Respondents are hereby found guilty for the offence of Money Laundering contrary to Section 15 (2)(d) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 and are hereby convicted. While the 3rd Respondent is found guilty for the offence of conspiracy contrary to Section 18(a) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 and is hereby convicted.

SENTENCE
As regards the 1st Respondent he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment for seven (7) years in accordance with Section 18 (3) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011. As to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents this Court hereby orders for the winding up of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and all their properties to be forfeited to the Federal Government of Nigeria Pursuant to Section 22 (2) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011.

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.: I had the singular opportunity to peruse, in draft, the leading judgment delivered by my learned brother, Abdullahi Mahmud Bayero, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion in it. I too allow the appeal in the manner decreed therein. I abide by the consequential orders made in it.

PETER OYINKENIMIEMI AFFEN, J.C.A.: I agree.