UMAR v. KATAGUN & ANOR
(2022)LCN/16579(CA)
In the Court of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, May 06, 2022
CA/A/224/2019
Before Our Lordships:
Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal
Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal
Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
AIR CMDR MOHAMMED UMAR APPELANT(S)
And
1. LADI SULE KATAGUN Suing Through Her Attorney Northland Yard Ltd 2. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (FCDA) RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT EVERY INSTRUMENT TRANSFERRING INTEREST IN LAND MUST BE REGISTERED
The law is trite that every instrument transferring interest in land must be registered in accordance with Section 15 of the Land Instrument Registration Law. See also ABDULLAHI V. ADETUTU (2019) ALL FWLR (PT. 1005) 349 AT 380-382 PARAS G-A, ONOBA V. ABUJA BUILDING PRODUCTS LTD & ORS (2014) LPELR-22704 (CA), ABUBAKAR V. ABUBAKAR WAZIRI & ORS (2008) LPELR-54 (SC). PER SENCHI, J.C.A.
THE DEFINITION OF AN “INSTRUMENT”
Section 2 of Land Registration Law of Kwara State defines an instrument to mean as follows: “A document affecting land in Kwara State whereby one party (hereinafter called the Grantor) confers, transfers, limits, charges or extinguishes in favour of another party (hereinafter called the Grantee) any right or title to an interest in land in Kwara State and includes a Certificate of Purchase and Power of Attorney under which any instrument may be executed but does not include a “will”, under Section 15 of the Land Instrument Registration Law of Kwara State, an unregistered document affecting land must not be pleaded and is not admissible. Even in a situation where it was pleaded, the trial Court is duly bound to strike out paragraph(s) where it was pleaded and also where it was mistakenly admitted in evidence, the trial Court must expunge it since it has no any value evidentially. See OSSAI V. NWAJIDE (1975)4 SC. In the instant case, there is no doubt that considering the purpose Exhibit A was tendered and relied upon, it satisfies the meaning of an instrument, contrary to the view held by the Appellant’s learned Counsel. Therefore, in order to have any evidential value, it ought to have been registered by the Appellant. Failing to be so registered under the relevant law, it is automatically rendered inadmissible for the purpose it was meant by the Plaintiff/Appellant as stated above.”
The Supreme Court of Nigeria further stated thus:
“However, non-registration of a registrable instrument renders such instrument inadmissible as evidence in a litigation, as in this instant case, where such instrument (i.e., Exhibit A) is relied upon as evidence of title. See ABDALLAH, JAMMAI V. SAID & FETUGA 11 NLR 86, OGUNBAMI V. ABOWAH (SUPRA), ELKALI & ANOR V. FAWAZ 6 WACA 272, COKER V. OGUNYE (1939) 15 NLR 57 and AMANKRA V. ZANKLEY 364. PER SENCHI, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOPT AN ALLEGATION OF FORGERY OR FRAUD MUST BE SPECIFICALLY PLEADED
I have perused the facts and evidence in proof of the counter-claim. I have also gone through the finding of the trial Court and I agree with the trial Court that the averments of collusion, connivance, fraud, misrepresentation and forgery are serious criminal allegations and therefore the Appellant must specially plead same and adduce credible evidence in proof thereof. See SEGUN BABATUNDE V. BANK OF THE NORTH & ORS (2011) LPELR-8249 (SC).
In the case of PRINCE ADEMUYIWA ADEDEJI & ANOR V. CFAO (NIGERIA) PLC (2014) LPELR-22309, this Court as per PEMU, JCA held as follows:
“An allegation of forgery or fraud for that matter must be specifically pleaded and particularized. In actualizing this, the party must state who committed the offence of forgery, and the document forged. Facts must be pleaded to show that he had the necessary intention. Failure to specifically plead the commission of a crime is failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt as required by Jaw that a crime has been committed.”
See also IDI MARAFA & ANOR V. HAJIYA HABIBA UMAR (2013) LPELR-22821 (CA), ABUBAKAR V. JOSEPH (2008)13 NWLR (PT. 1104) 307. PER SENCHI, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEAL HAS THE POWER TO RAISE AN ISSUE SUO MOTU
The law is trite that the trial Court or even this Court has the power to raise an issue suo motu. However, the Court will not have the jurisdiction to resolve the issues so raised suo motu without inviting parties to address it on same. Thus, the decision of the trial Court at page 539 of the Record of Appeal was wrong, the trial Court having raised the issue of Section 5(2) of the Land Reform (Contract) Act LFN and resolved same without inviting the parties to address it. See G I B & ANOR V. RAJI, (2013) LPELR-20475 (CA); SHASI & ANOR V. SMITH & ANOR (2009) LPELR-3039 (SC), where the Supreme Court held:
“It is settled law that though a Court of law may raise an issue sou motu, it cannot base its determination of the appeal or case on the issue so raised except it calls on the parties or their Counsel to address it on that issue. In other words, a Court of law has the vires to raise an issue necessary for the determination of the matter before it subject to its being addressed on the point/issue by Counsel for the parties if the decision of the Court is to be rooted or grounded on the issue so raised suo motu. To raise an issue suo motu and proceeded to decide the matter on the same without hearing Counsel for the parties thereon is to deny the parties their right to fair hearing and an appellate Court is duty bound, in the circumstance, to set aside the determination so made.”
See also STATE V. KAPINE & ANOR, (2019) LPELR-40511(SC), SANI V KOGI STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS, (2019) LPELR-46404(SC).
Thus, the finding of the lower Court occasions miscarriage of justice and it is hereby set aside. PER SENCHI, J.C.A.
DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/85/2014, delivered by O. O. Goodluck J. on the 29th day of January, 2019. The 1st Respondent commenced this action as Plaintiff before the lower Court vide a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 10/1/2014 (see pages 1-8 of the Record of Appeal). By the Order of the lower Court the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim was amended. Thus by the Amended Statement of Claim, the 1st Respondent claims the following Reliefs:
a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is the rightful owner/title holder in respect of plot 2415 Maitama District, Cadastral Zone AO6, Abuja by virtue of the Certificate of Occupancy No. 190Cw-3adbz-6275rdb1ou-10 dated 08/02/94 and file No. BA10267 and all the buildings and appurtenances therein.
b) A declaration that the 1st Defendant is a trespasser over plot 2415 Maitama District, Abuja, belonging to the Plaintiff.
c) An order of this Honourable Court directing the 1st Defendant and his agents, assigns, privies and or Mobile policemen or by whomsoever or by whatever name called to vacate the said house plot 2415 Maitama District, Abuja.
d) A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st Defendant, whether by himself, his assigns, servants, agents, proxies, privies, officers’ or by whomsoever or by whatever name called from harassing, intimidating, threatening and or stopping the work/renovation of the building of the Plaintiff in respect of plot 2415 Maitama District Abuja.
e) A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st Defendant, whether by himself, his assigns, servants, agents, proxies, privies, officers’ or by whomsoever or by whatever name called from occupying the said house of plot 2415 Maitama District, Abuja and or interfering or doing anything inimical with the possessory right of the Plaintiff and her attorney oven the property situate and known as plot 2415 Maitama District, Abuja.
f) The sum of N50 Million as general damages against the 1st Defendant.
(See pages 235-271 of the Record of Appeal)
On his part, the Appellant, as 1st Defendant/counter-claimant before the lower Court, also amended his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. By his Amended counter-claim, the Appellant sought the following reliefs:
a) A DECLARATION that the acts of collusion, connivance, fraud misrepresentation and forgery that resulted in the 2nd Defendant issuing to the Plaintiff the documents in respect of the counter-claimant’s property 1. Donau Crescent Property Street, Maitama Abuja are illegal, illegitimate, unlawful, null and void and of no consequence whatsoever and howsoever.
b) A DECLARATION that the counter-claimant is in lawful possession and at all material time rested with equitable and legal rights over all that property situate at No. 1 Donau Crescent off Amazon Street, Maitama Abuja and covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. 190cw-3adbz-6275r-dblou-10.
c) AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Plaintiff/defendant and 2nd defendant from in any manner interfering with the possession and occupancy rights is vested on the defendant counter-claimant with regard to all that property situate at No. 1 Donau Crescent off Amazon Street, Maitama District, Abuja and covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. 190cw-3adbz-6275r-dblou-10.
d) The sum of N50 Million being general damages for inconveniences cause on the 1st Defendant to his quiet and good enjoyment of his house No. 1 Danou crescent off Amazon Street Maitama District Abuja and the cost of instituting as well as maintenance of this counter claims.
After being joined as a party to this suit, the 2nd Respondent in this appeal did not file any process before the lower Court. The Appellant as well as the 1st Respondent filed other processes, including their Final Written Addresses in furtherance of their causes before the lower Court.
The facts of this case revolve around the subsisting ownership of Plot 2415 Maitama District, Cadastral Zone AO6 and all the buildings and appurtenances therein.
In delivering the judgment, the learned trial Judge held to the effect that the 1st Respondent’s case succeeds. Reliefs (a), (b) and (d) were granted as prayed. Regarding the counter-claim, the learned trial Judge held to the effect that the 1st Defendant failed to establish lawful ownership or possession of Plot 2415, and no credible evidence was led in proof of ownership upon which he predicated his occupation, hence, the Plaintiff who established ownership has proved a better interest than the Defendant/counter-claimant. The counter-claim was dismissed.
Aggrieved by the decision of the lower Court, the Appellant filed a notice of Appeal on 6/2/2019. (See pages 551-555 of the Record of Appeal). The Notice of Appeal was amended by the Order of this Court. Thus, by an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 9/9/2020, and it was deemed properly filed on 17/11/2020. The Record of Appeal was transmitted on 21/03/2020 and additional record of Appeal was transmitted and filed on 15/6/2020.
The Grounds of Appeal as contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal are reproduced hereunder (without their particulars) as follows:
GROUND ONE
The Honourable trial Court erred in law and misdirected itself when it admitted and relied on the Witness Statement on Oath of Odo Augustine Ogar signed in the office of and before the Counsel to the Plaintiff/1st Respondent contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 2011, Section 10(1) and 11(1) of Oaths Act Cap 333, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
GROUND TWO
The learned trial Judge erred in law when his Lordship held or found that the identity of the land is not in dispute and thus granted the Plaintiff/1st Respondent’s declaration of title as contained in Relief No. 1 of the Amended Writ despite the Plaintiff’s failure to lead any evidence of identity or to identify the said plot in dispute with the required certainty expected in law.
GROUND THREE
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he once again heard and considered the objection of the Plaintiff’s Counsel to the admissibility of Exhibit DW4A in his judgment after the Plaintiff had not in the first place (during trial) objected to the admissibility of the same Exhibit when tendered in evidence by the Defendant. The trial Court held “the contents of Exhibit DW4A is inadmissible proof of sale”
GROUND FOUR
The learned trial Judge erred in Jaw when he declared the contents of Exhibit DW4a inadmissible and as a proof of sale on ground that same is hearsay under Section 37 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
GROUND FIVE
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he admitted an undated Power of Attorney and Sales Agreement purportedly executed by the Plaintiff/1st Respondent in favour of Northland Yard Ltd in evidence as Exhibits PW1G and PW2A respectively when same are not duly registered in compliance with Section 15 of Land Registration Act, Cap 515, Laws of FCT.
GROUND SIX
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held thus:
“1st Defendant’s contention is that he got into possession following the payment of the purchase price of plot 2415 to the plaintiff. No credible evidence has been lead in proof of ownership upon which he has predicted his occupation. This being the case, the plaintiff who established ownership has proved a better interest than the defendants counter-claimant. The counter-claimant’s claim for equitable interest and possession accordingly fails in the lights of the foregoing considerations the 1st defendant’s counter-claim fails and is hereby dismissed.”
GROUND SEVEN
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he admitted a certified true copy of a Certificate of Occupancy tendered by the Plaintiff/1st Respondent in evidence as Exhibit PW1E when same is not in compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
GROUND EIGHT
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the Plaintiff has established her legal right in Plot No. 2415 by production of certificate of occupancy as well as her Deed of Sale, that Power of Attorney and that Exhibit PW1E, the Certificate of Occupancy is a sufficient proof of ownership of land that the Plaintiff has established her claim in line with the Supreme Court decision in KYARI V ALKALI (2001) 11 NWLR (PT724) PAGE 412.
GROUND NINE
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he attached probative value to the materially inconsistent and contradictory evidence of the PW1 and the PW2 to grant the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff contrary to the trite principle of law on materially contradictory evidence of a witness as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of F.R.N. V. IWEKA (2013) NWLR (PT. 1341) 285.
GROUND TEN
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he refused to grant the declaration of title by way of possession sought by the 1st Defendant/Appellant to Plot 2415, situated at No, 1 Donau Crescent, off Amazon Street, Maitama Abuja, despite the fact that the Plaintiff did not join issues with the 1st Defendant on his claim and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 143 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
GROUND ELEVEN
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he raised the issue of enforceability of a sale of land by oral evidence under Section 5(5) of the Land Reform (Contract) Act Cap 517 LFN, 2004 suo motu without inviting the 1st Defendant or any of the Parties to be heard on same issue before resolving the issue against the 1st Defendant.
GROUND TWELVE
The trial Court erred in law when he held that:
“The only document remotely linking the Plot 2415 to the Plaintiff is Exhibit DW4A addressed to Mr. Mohammed Umar by one Fatima Saidi (on behalf of Ladi Katugun) dated 17th November, 2005. By the letter, the said Fatima Saidi stated that the Plaintiff has instructed her i.e. Fatima Saidi to inform the Defendant to collect the original documents from AGIS having collected the sum of N60,000,000.00 (Sixty Million Naira) purchase price of Plot 2415. Neither the said Fatima Saidi nor the Addressee, the 1st Defendant came to testify in Court. In so far as the contents of the letter are facts related to Fatima Saidi by the Plaintiff, Fatima Saidi herself ought to have tendered the letter in Court more so as she is allegedly the link between the Plaintiff and 1st defendant in the purported sale of Plot 2415. It constitutes hearsay. Be that as it may, Exhibit DW4A does not suffice as acknowledgment of sale of land. In fact, it cannot qualify as a document creating an equitable interest in Plot 2415″
GROUND THIRTEEN
The trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to have entertained the claims of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent as the Plaintiff did not have the locus to either sue on her own or sue through her purported Attorney.
GROUND FOURTEEN
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he suo motu raised the issue of admissibility of various documents tendered in evidence by the 1st Defendant/Appellant without calling on the parties to address the Court on same and thus proceeded to reject the documents in evidence and marked them rejected.
GROUND FIFTEEN
The decision of the trial Court is against the weight of evidence.
On 9/9/2020, the Appellant filed the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, which was deemed properly filed on 17/11/2020. In the Appellant’s brief which was settled by Azeez Taiwo Hassan Esq., the following issues were raised for the determination of this appeal:
1. Whether the Witness’s Statement on Oath of the PW1 is competent in law in view of the Provisions of Sections 112 of the Evidence Act, 2011, Sections 10(1) and 11(1) of the Oaths Act Cap 333, LFN and a clear admission by the PW1 under cross-examination to the effect that he deposed to or sworn to his Witness’s Statement on Oath in the Plaintiff/1st Respondent’s Lawyer’s Office? (Distilled from Ground 1)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when his lordship found that the identity of the land claimed by the Plaintiff/1st Respondent is not in dispute thereby relieving the Plaintiff/1st Respondent of the onerous duty to prove the identity of the disputed land with credible evidence. (Distilled from Ground 2)
3. Whether in view of the combined provisions of Sections 2 and 15 of the Land Instruments Registration Act, Cap 515, Vol. 3 Laws of the Federal Capital Territory, Exhibit PW1G (the sale agreement between the Plaintiff and Northland Yard Limited) and Exhibit PW2A (the Power of Attorney in favour of Northland Yard Limited) are admissible in law when same are not registered in compliance with the law. (Distilled from Ground 5)
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have dismissed the 1st Defendant/Appellant’s counter-claim in view of the evidence on record on one hand and that fact the Plaintiff/1st respondent did not join issue with the 1st Defendant/Appellant on his Counter Claim of ownership. (Distilled from Grounds 6 and 10)
5. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he admitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Occupancy in evidence as Exhibit PW1E when same is not in compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
6. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have attached probative value to the evidence of the PW1 and PW2 in view of the clear contradictions and inconsistencies in their evidence? (Distilled from Ground 9)
7. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law, to have raised and resolved the issues of enforceability of oral evidence under Section 5(5) of the Land Reform (Contract) Documents tendered in evidence by the 1st Defendant/Appellant suo motu, without inviting Parties to address the Court on same. (From Grounds 11 and 14)
8. Whether the contents of Exhibit DW4A constitute hearsay evidence under Section 37 of the Evidence Act, 2011 to warrant same being held to be inadmissible by the learned trial Judge as a proof of sale of the land to the Defendant/Appellant. (Distilled from Grounds 3, 4 and 12 of the Notice of Appeal)
9. Whether the Plaintiff/1st Respondent has the locus standi to institute the matter through her Attorney in view of paragraph 14 of the Plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Claim. (Distilled from Ground 13)
10. Whether by oral evidence of the PW1 and PW2 and the documentary evidence led by the Plaintiff, the trial Court was right to have held that the Plaintiff had established her title or claim. (Distilled from Ground 8)
Pursuant to the grant of leave by this Court to the 1st Respondent to amend her Brief of Argument dated and filed on 24/2/2021, the 1st Respondent filed an Amended Brief of Argument on 16/6/2021, which was deemed properly filed on 21/9/2021. In the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument which was settled by Henry A. Iyanya Esq., a lone Issue for Determination was raised, to wit:
Whether the judgment of the trial Court has occasioned a miscarriage of justice against the Appellant to warrant it being set aside.
On 1/3/2021, the Appellant filed a Reply Brief of Argument in Response to the Respondent’s Brief of Argument. The Appellant’s Reply Brief was deemed properly filed on 21/9/2021.
The 2nd Respondent did not file any process before this Court.
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
APPELLANT’S ISSUE ONE (1)
At paragraphs 4.6-4.11 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that PW1 clearly admitted in the course of cross-examination that he deposed to his Witness Statement on Oath dated 10/2/2014 in the office of Counsel to the 1st Respondent, hence, by virtue of the provisions of Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 2011, Sections 10(1) and 11(1) of the Oath Act, Cap 333, LFN 2004, the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 is incompetent and liable to be set aside and expunged. He relied on the cases of BUHARI V. INEC (2008)4 NWLR (PT. 1078) PG 546 AT 608-609, ALIYU V. BULAKI (2019) LPELR-46513 (CA). Counsel submitted further that the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 being incompetent, null and void, every documentary evidence referred to in it, tendered and admitted in evidence by the trial Court are also inadmissible and liable to be expunged by this Court. Counsel made specific reference to Exhibits PW1A, PW1B, PW1C-12, PW1D, PW1E, PW1F and PW1G. He urged this Court to resolve Issue 1 in favour of the Appellant and expunge the said Witness Statement on Oath.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE TWO (2)
At paragraphs 4.13 – 4.19 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that the Appellant joined issues with the 1st Respondent vide paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, where he categorically stated that he bought a plot of land at No. 10 Donau Crescent, Off Amazon Street, Maitama District Abuja from the Plaintiff since 2004, which is nowhere close to Panama Street Maitama Abuja where the plot of land the Plaintiff claims is situate. The Appellant’s Counsel submitted further that the 1st Respondent did not join issues with the Appellant, as she openly waived her right to do so. He contended that with the aforementioned paragraph 7, the issue of identity was raised and the learned trial Judge’s finding that the identity of the land is not in dispute is not borne from the records, it is perverse and has occasioned serious miscarriage of justice on the Appellant. Counsel contended further that the Plaintiff/1st Respondent was bound to discharge the onus of proof of identity but the trial Judge relieved her of this duty. He referred this Court to the case of GBADAMOSI V. DAIRO (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 357) PAGE 812, urging the Court to set aside the finding of the lower Court and the grant of declaration to title, for failure of the 1st Respondent to prove title.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE SIX (6)
At paragraphs 4.21 – 4.32 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, learned Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of PW1 and PW2, the Plaintiff/1st Respondent’s Witnesses, which the trial Court failed to make findings on, and in effect failed to take full advantage of having seen and heard the Witnesses, thus warranting this Court to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. Counsel submitted that the law is settled that a piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what the evidence has stated and two pieces of evidence contradict one another when they are by themselves inconsistent. He relied on the case of WACHUKWU V. OWUNWANNE (2011) ALL FWLR (PT. 589) AT PAGE 100, PARAS B-E. He submitted further that a juxtaposition of the introductory paragraph and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 with his evidence under cross-examination will show a very sharp contradiction and inconsistency which goes to the credibility of the entire evidence of PW1 as far as the case of the Plaintiff is concerned. The Appellant’s Counsel contended that PW2, who claimed to be a lawyer to Northland Yard Limited on account of which he had their authority, turned around under cross-examination to say that he did not know the Directors of Northland Yard Limited. Counsel urged this Court to expunge the two Witness Statements on Oath on the ground of the material inconsistencies of same with the testimonies of the Witnesses before the Court.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE TEN (10)
At paragraphs 4.34-4.39 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that the burden of proof is squarely on the Party claiming declaratory reliefs and such reliefs cannot be granted on admission and the onus of proof in an action for a declaration of title to land squarely lies on the Plaintiff and in proving his case, a Plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his case alone and not on the weakness (if at all any was established) of the Defendant’s case. He relied on the cases of OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015)15 NWLR (PT. 1482) PG 205 AT 297-298, PARAS F-A, PG 311, PARAS E-G and FALEYE V. DADA (2016) ALL FWLR (PT. 845) PG SC 150 AT PG 198, PARAS F-G. Counsel submitted that a holistic consideration of the oral evidence of the two Witnesses called by the Plaintiff/1st Respondent viz-a-viz the documents tendered in evidence, the Plaintiff/1st Respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on her, thus, the learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the Plaintiff established her legal title in Plot No. 2415 by producing a Certificate of Occupancy as well as her Deed of Sale. The Appellant’s Counsel submitted further that the Witness Statement on Oath adopted by PW1 as his evidence in chief predated the Amended Statement of Claim, as the original Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim were amended pursuant to the Order of Court, thus, there was a fresh Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 which was not adopted, instead, it was the defunct Witness Statement on Oath dated 10th January, 2014 which was purportedly adopted as PW1’s evidence in chief. He submitted that it is not possible in law for a piece of evidence made on oath to predate the Statement of Claim, hence, to this effect, the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1, having predated the Amended Statement of Claim is no evidence at all. He referred to the cases of REGD. TRUSTEES, A.O.O. V. N.A.M.A. (2014)8 NWLR (PT. 1408) PG 1 AT 29, PARAS E-H and ABE V. SKYE BANK PLC (2016) ALL FWLR (PT. 819) PAGE 1081.
APPELLANT’S ISSUES THREE (3) & FIVE (5)
At paragraphs 5.2 – 5.10 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant contended to the effect that the Sale Agreement and the Power of Attorney which are pleaded at paragraphs 4 and 14 of the Amended Statement of Claim are by virtue of paragraph 14 of the said Amended Statement of Claim instruments of title meant to transfer the purported title of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent to her Attorney. Thus, both instruments are instruments of transfer under the Lands Registration Act, Cap 515, Laws of FCT and by virtue of Section 15 of the said Act, they are registrable instruments which must be duly registered before they can be pleaded or admitted in evidence by any Court. He relied on the cases of ABDULLAHI V. ADETUTU (2019) ALL FWLR (PT. 1005) PAGE 349 AT PAGES 380-382, PARAS G-A, DAGACI OF DERE V. DAGACI OF EBWA (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 306) PAGE 786 AT PAGES 824, PARAS F-B, ATANDA V. C.L.H. KWARA STATE (2017) ALL FWLR (PT. 902) PAGE 929 AT PAGE 950, PARAS A-G and OGUNAMEH V. ADEBAYO (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 467) PAGE 188 AT PAGE 201, PARAS C-E. Counsel submitted further that an intimate and careful consideration of the CTC of the Certificate of Occupation will reveal that it is a computer generated evidence and without compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 84(2) and (4) of the Evidence Act, it is inadmissible, notwithstanding the fact that no objection was raised to its admissibility at trial. He relied on the case of KUBOR V. DICKSON (2013)4 NWLR (PT. 1345) PG 534 AT 577-578, PARAS D-E.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE FOUR (4)
At paragraphs 6.3-6.21 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that where issues are raised in the Defendant’s Defence and counter-claim and a Plaintiff neglects and or refuses to file a Reply to the Statement of Defence and a Defence to the Defendant’s counter-claim, there is no joinder of issues on the Defendant’s pleadings and a Court of law is obliged to enter judgment for the Defendant on those issues. He relied on the case of SAAD V. KWARA STATE INV. AND PROPERTY DEV. COM. LTD (2019) ALL FWLR (PT. 999) PG 451 AT PAGE 488, PARAS E-G. Counsel submitted further that the learned trial Judge erred in law when he dismissed the Defendant’s counter-claim, notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff/Defendant to the counter-claim did not join issues with the Defendant on some fundamental facts and issues raised therein. It is the contention of the Appellant’s Counsel that the finding of the trial Judge that the Appellant’s evidence in support of his counter-claim is not credible is perverse and not borne out of record, since DW4, the son of the Appellant who was privy and personally aware of the sale of land to his father through the 1st Respondent’s business partner (Fatima Saidi) gave evidence of undisturbed possession in line with the Appellant’s pleadings, and also maintained his evidence in chief under cross-examination, which was in no way discredited. He relied on the case of Relying on the cases of GAJI V. PAYE (2003) 8 NWLR (PT. 823) AT 601-602 and MINI LODGE LTD V. NGEI (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 506) AT 1829-1830 PARAS H-A, he urged this Court to interfere with the findings of the lower Court.
APPELLANT’S ISSUES SEVEN (7) & EIGHT (8)
At paragraphs 6.23 – 6.31 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that the law is trite that the onus is on the Court to afford parties a hearing on an issue raised suo motu, and where the Court neglects to do so, any decision on the said issue raised amounts to a nullity which ought to be set aside. He relied on the case of OSOKOYA V. ONIGEMO (2018) ALL FWLR (PT. 942) PAGE 424 AT PAGES 456, PARAS C-D, 457, PARAS E. he submitted further that the issue of the enforceability of oral evidence under Section 5(2) of the Land Reform (Contract) Act, Cap 517 LFN, 2004 and the admissibility of all documents material to the Defendant/counter-claimant’s case was never raised by any of the parties, and for the trial Court to have raised it, it amounts to a new issue upon which the trial Court ought in law to have heard the parties, especially the 1st Defendant/Appellant whose interest is more affected by the issue. Counsel urged this Court to set aside the issue raised by the lower Court and also hold that Exhibit DW4A does not constitute hearsay evidence and it is evidence of purchase as pleaded.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NINE (9)
At paragraphs 6.34 – 6.39 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted to the effect that by paragraph 14 of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent’s Amended Statement of Claim- contained in page 240 of the Record of Appeal, she unequivocally disclosed that she no longer has any proprietary interest in the property which is the subject matter of this suit, same having been transferred to her Attorney vide a Power of Attorney and Sale Agreement, hence, she has no locus standi to sue and cannot be a proper party to approach the Court for declaration of title to Plot 2415. He relied on the case of EKPENYONG V. JEGA (2019) LPELR-47694 (CA).
In conclusion, learned Counsel to the Appellants urged this Court to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial Court in its entirety.
1ST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
In arguing the 1st Respondent’s lone Issue for Determination, Counsel to the 1st respondent adopted the Appellant’s issues and reacted to same serially, as argued in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument.
ISSUE ONE (1)
At paragraphs 1 – 12 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that the issue in the case of BUHARI V. INEC (2008)4 NWLR (PT. 1078) 546 cited by the Appellant to support his argument that PW1’s Witness Statement on Oath is incompetent is different from the issue in the instant case, as unlike in the instant case, the issue in BUHARI V. INEC is not where the Witness Statement on Oath was signed but who attested to it as Notary Public or Commissioner for Oaths, and the finding in the case had nothing to do with where the deponents signed their Statement on Oath. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted further that PW1’s Statement on Oath is a document and no oral evidence obtained under cross-examination can be used to contradict it. He relied on the cases of OGBE V. KOGI STATE GOVERNMENT & ORS (2018) LPELR-44796 (CA) and SKYE BANK & ANOR V. AKINPELU (2010) LPELR-3073 (SC).
At paragraphs 13 and 14 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument, Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in ALIYU V. BULAKI (2019) LPELR-46513 (CA) heavily relied on by the Appellant was made per incuriam, as the Court of Appeal and the Appellant misconceived the import of the decision of the Supreme Court in BUHARI V. INEC (Supra), also, recent decisions of the Court of Appeal, such as: TAR & ORS V. MIN. OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES & ORS (2018) LPELR 44216 (CA), ALALADE V. ODODO (2019) LPELR-46888 (CA) and UNION BANK V. KOLEOSO (2019) LPELR-47970 (CA), have deferred from the judgment in ALIYU V. BULAKI.
Counsel to the 1st Respondent contended at paragraphs 15-17 that the provisions of Section 112 of the Evidence Act relied on by the Appellant refers to Affidavits specifically, therefore it is wrong to read into the Evidence Act what is not there. He relied on the case of FIRS V. CNOOC EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION & ORS (2018) LPELR-45345 (CA). He contended further that Witness Statements on Oath being provisions of rules of Court, they ought not to be allowed to impede on the administration of substantial justice. He relied on the case of DURO V. INEC (2011)21 WRN 83 (RATIO 1) AT 87. He urged this Court to reject the argument of the Appellant and hold that the 1st Respondent’s PW1’s Witness Statement was properly filed and constitute valid evidence in support of the 1st Respondent’s case.
At paragraphs 18 and 19 of his Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted that in view of the fact that the documents referred to by the Appellant at paragraph 4.6 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument were pleaded and evidence was led on them by the 1st Respondent through PW2, those documents cannot be expunged from the 1st Respondent’s evidence; and in the most unlikely event that PW1’s Witness Statement on Oath comes under the hammer of ALIYU V. BULAKI (Supra), PW2’s statement, which is not challenged, is available to salvage those documents. At paragraph 20 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument, Counsel submitted that the five ways of proving title to land as enunciated in the case of IDUNDUN V. OKUMAGBA (Supra) is only relevant where the title to land is in dispute, and in the instant case, the 1st Respondent’s title was not challenged, thus, the production of title documents is a surplusage.
ISSUE TWO (2)
At paragraphs 21- 29 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that the argument of the Appellant that there is a dispute as to the identity of land claimed was decided by the trial Court in its ruling on a Preliminary Objection raised by the Appellant dated 15th February, 2015 and the Appellant did not appeal against the findings of the trial Court. He submitted that the only way to raise this issue is by an interlocutory appeal against the interlocutory order or ruling complained of. Counsel submitted further that in view of their precise pleadings, there is practically no dispute as to the identity of the property in issue, which is covered by Exhibit PW1E, hence, it is curious that the Appellant is contending that the identity of the property is in dispute without setting out the particulars of the property they claimed to contradict the property particulars set out in the 1st Respondent’s Relief One. He submitted that the name of the street is irrelevant, as no registry identifies any property by street names and street names or numbers are totally irrelevant for the purpose of declaration of title to land. He relied on the case of FALEYE V. DADA (2016) ALL FWLR (PT. 845) P. 150 AT 170 PARAS E-F.
ISSUE SIX (6)
At paragraphs 31-38 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel submitted to the effect that it is trite law that an appeal must be against the judgment of a Court and more specifically against a ratio in the judgment. He relied on the case of ATANDA V. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS (2017) 42 WRN 48 (RATIO 3) AT 51. He submitted further that after cross-examining PW1 on the seeming inconsistency in his Witness Statement! on Oath, the Appellant did not canvass arguments on the issue in his Final Written Address and the trial Court did not make any pronouncement on the issue, thus, this issue not being an appeal against the ratio decidendi of the judgment of the trial Court, it is incompetent and liable to be struck out. Counsel relied on the case of OFORISHE V. NIG. GAS CO. LTD (2017)50 WRN 27 (RATIO 12) AT 33. Counsel to the 1st Respondents contended that the seeming contradictions in the evidence of PW1 with regards to whether he is also the administrative manager of Northland Yard Ltd does not go to the root of the issue in contention in this case, which is the title of the property situated at Plot No. 2415 Maitama District, Cadastral Zone A 06, Abuja, thus, such inconsistency does not rise to the degree as to vitiate the entire trial. He relied on the case of GBEMI & SONS (NIG) LTD V. SKYE BANK PLC (2018) 50 WRN 137 and SHEU V. STATE (2018)36 WRN 155 (RATIO 40) AT 159.
ISSUE TEN (10)
At paragraph 41 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted that the trial Court found that the 1st Respondent proved her title by the production of the title document, which is one of the five ways title to land can be proved. And the alleged contradictions or inconsistencies in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 had nothing to do with Exhibit PW1 E (Certificate of Occupancy) which document, at any rate, both parties accept to be valid root of title. He submitted at paragraph 42 of his Brief of Argument to the effect that contrary to the contention of the Appellant, the Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent and the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 were filed on 10th January, 2014, as it is not possible to file one without the other in the present dispensation. Counsel submitted further that the fact that the Witness stated, apparently through an oversight, that he filed his Witness Statement on Oath on 10th February, 2014 does not detract from the fact that it was filed along with the Statement of Claim.
ISSUES THREE (3) & FIVE (5)
At paragraph 44 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted that while it is correct that an unregistered Power of Attorney is inadmissible as instrument of transfer of legal interest in a landed property, it is admissible as proof of equitable interest; it is admissible as instrument of transfer of legal title. He relied on the case of ATANDA V. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS (2017) WRN 55. He submitted at paragraphs 45 – 48 of his Amended Brief of Argument to the effect that Exhibit PW1G and PW2A were tendered to prove the attorney’s equitable interest in the property and not as instruments of divestment of the legal interest of the 1st Respondent. He submitted further that the letter by the 1st Respondent to the Director, Lands, compiled at page 14 of the Record of Appeal, was never tendered in evidence by the 1st Respondent through any of her witnesses, hence, the document having not been admitted in evidence, cannot be relied on by the Court in making a finding. He relied on the cases of ORANIKA V. STATE (2018) LPELR-45481 (CA) and AGBI V. OGBE (2005)8 NWLR (PT. 926). At paragraphs 49 and 50 of his brief, the 1st – 4th Respondent’s Counsel submitted to the effect that a Certificate of Occupancy is not a computer-generated evidence; and its certification by the appropriate authority is by itself a certificate of authentication, which does not require any further certificate to authenticate it. He relied on the authority of BRILA ENERGY LTD V. FRN (2018) LPELR-43926 (CA) and submitted further that for a document to qualify as computer generated, the statement must be such that is stored in a computer in the ordinary cause of business and was produced from the computer; however, a Certificate of Occupancy is not a statement, neither is it stored in a computer, and in the instant case, it was the original copy of the Certificate of Occupancy in the custody of the 2nd Respondent that was photocopied and certified for the 1st Respondent.
ISSUE FOUR (4)
At paragraphs 51 – 53 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that once the Court has declared that a Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the property, the claim for declaration of equitable possession is dead on arrival, as possession is always attached to the title holder. He relied on the case of OTUKPO V. JOHN & ANOR (2012)7 NWLR (PT. 1299). He submitted further that the Appellant’s Counterclaim is predicated solely on long possession, but the law is trite that long possession cannot metamorphose to title. He relied on the case of OLAGOKE V. OLANIYAN (2018)16 WRN 67. Counsel submitted that it is settled beyond peradventure that in a suit for claim for declaration of title, the Appellant must succeed on the strength of his own case notwithstanding that there is no defence to the suit.
ISSUE SEVEN (7)
At paragraphs 54 and 55 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that contrary to the Appellant’s argument that Section 5(5) of the Land Reform (Contract) Act was raised by the trial Court suo motu, as can be gleaned from page 539 of the records, the learned trial Judge was resolving an issue raised by the 1st Respondent that the Appellant did not substantiate his claim for equitable title with any documentary evidence. He submitted further that it is trite law that a trial Court has the right to refer to any authority known to it to resolve an issue before it, notwithstanding that parties did not refer to the authority themselves. He relied on the case of ACCESS BANK V. AGEGE LOCAL GOVT. & ANOR (2016) LPELR-40491 (CA). Counsel contended further to the effect that as held in the case of CHUKWUEKEZIE V. APGA & ANOR (2019) LPELR-47240 (CA), there are exceptions to the general rule that a Court cannot raise issues suo motu and decide on them without availing parties opportunity to address them. ISSUE EIGHT (8)
At paragraphs 56 – 58 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that the finding of the learned trial Judge concerning the note sent by Fatima Saidi is unassailable. He relied on the provisions of Sections 37 and 83(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. Counsel submitted further that the fact that the note was admitted without objection is of no moment, as an inadmissible evidence admitted in a proceeding can be expunged by the Judge at the point of writing his judgment, and there is a difference between admissibility of a document and the probative value to be attached to it, and in the instant case, Exhibit DW4A has no probative value whatsoever. He relied on the case of FRN V. SARAKI (2018)22 WRN 119.
ISSUE NINE (9)
At paragraphs 59 – 63 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted to the effect that the argument of the Appellant that the 1st Respondent lacks the locus standi to sue is incompetent, as same issue was raised by the Appellant before the lower Court via a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 5th February, 2015 and the trial Court delivered its Ruling on 26th February, 2015, and the there is no interlocutory appeal against the ruling, neither is there any relief in the Notice of Appeal seeking to set aside the Ruling of the lower Court on this issue; also, the Appellant did not canvass any argument on the issue of locus standi of the 1st Respondent in their final argument before the trial Court. He relied on the cases of OLAYINKA V. ADEPARUSI (2012)43 WRN 128 (RATIO 9) AT 137 and PURIFICATION TECHNIQUE (NIG) LTD V. JUBRIL (2013)9 WRN 1 AT P. 7. At paragraphs 64 – 74 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel submitted to the effect that the Power of Attorney donated by the 1st Respondent is not registered, therefore, the mere averment in paragraph 14 of the 1st Respondent’s Statement of Claim is insufficient to divest her of her title in the property, as landed property cannot be transferred by mere averment in a Statement of Claim without a supporting document of transfer. In conclusion, learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent urged this Court to dismiss this appeal and order the Appellant to vacate the property forthwith.
APPELLANT’S REPLY TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT’S
AMENDED BRIEF OF ARGUMENT
At paragraphs 1.1 – 1.5 of the Appellant’s Reply Brief, learned Counsel contended to the effect that the lone Issue for Determination raised by the 1st Respondent is incompetent and liable to be struck out, as it is not tied to any of the Grounds of Appeal contained in the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal. He relied on the cases of NWAGU V. FADIPE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 746) PG 564 AT 574, PARA C, JOHN V. STATE (2016)11 NWLR (PT. 1523) PAGE 202 AT 202 PARAS B-F, GWEDE V. INEC (2015)4 ALL FWLR (PT. 617) PAGE 644 AT 596 PARAS F-G. He submitted further that the letter surreptitious adoption of the Appellant’s issues for determination by the 1st Respondent in her Amended Brief of Argument will not, and does not give any protection to the 1st Respondent’s brief.
In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 7-20 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, the Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent failed and or neglected to react to the Appellant’s argument at paragraphs 4.4 – 4.6, page 6-7 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument to the effect that PW1 adopted a dead Witness Statement on Oath, thus conceding the said argument of the Appellant. He submitted that the mere act of signing a deposition concludes the process of swearing and until a deposition is signed by a Deponent before any person who has the authority to take a deposition, such a deposition is not worth the piece of paper upon which it is written. Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent’s submission to the effect that the Witness Statement on Oath is a document and no oral evidence under cross-examination can be used to contradict same is a misrepresentation of the law and the portion of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in SKYE BANK & OR V. AKINPELU highlighted by the 1st Respondent is a dissenting Judgment without any binding force. It is the contention of the Appellant’s Counsel that the Court of Appeal decision in BULAKI’s case represents the decision in BUHARI V. INEC (Supra) regarding the defective nature of a Written Statement on Oath sworn or attested before a Notary Public who is a Counsel representing an interested party in the proceedings; and the Supreme Court reiterated this position of law in the recent case of NAMMAGI V. AKOTE (2021)3 NWLR (PT. 11762) PG. 170 AT 195-196. PARAS G-I.
In reply to the 1st Respondent’s submissions at paragraph 21-29 of her Amended Brief of Argument, the Appellant’s Counsel contends that the Appellant joined issues with the Plaintiff/1st Respondent on the identity of the plot during trial and this informed the finding of facts by the learned trial Judge at page 545, lines 11-17 of the record of Appeal also, ground 2 of the Amended Notice of Appeal is a direct challenge or complaint against this finding of the trial Court.
In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 30 – 38 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief, the Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the materiality of the contradicting nature of the evidence of PW1 is that the entire pieces of evidence given by him were given in his capacity as the Administrative Manager of Northland Yards Limited as deposed in paragraph 2 of his Witness Statement on Oath, thus, the moment he gave evidence to the contrary under cross-examination to the effect that he was never the said Administrative Officer of Northland Yards Limited, his entire evidence collapsed and the trial Court thus erred in law to have relied on his evidence in granting the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff/Respondent. Counsel relied on the case of SHOFOLAHAN V. STATE (2013)17 NWLR (PT. 1383) PG 281 AT 311, PARA A.
In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 39-42 or the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, Counsel to the Appellant submitted that the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 of the 10th day of January, 2014 is a dead Witness Statement in view of the amendment which related back to the original Witness Statement on Oath. He relied on the cases of GORAN V. OLOMU (2013)11 NWLR (PT. 1365) AT PAGE 254, PARAS F-H, UZODINMA V. IZUNAZO (NO.2) (2011)17 NWLR (PT. 1275) PG 30 AT 88, PARAS C-D, OFORISHE V. N.G.C. LTD (2018)2 NWLR (PT. 1602) PAGE 35 AT 56-57, PARAS G and ABE V. SKYE BANK PLC (2016) ALL FWLR (PT. 819) PG 1081 AT 1101, PARAS F-H.
In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 43 – 49 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief, Counsel to the Appellant submitted that the 1st Respondent is bound by her pleadings and all documents pleaded therein, and cannot run away from the legal consequences on appeal, hence, contrary to the 1st Respondent’s arguments that the Power of Attorney and Sale Agreement were pleaded as proof of the Attorney’s equitable interest, both documents were pleaded as instruments of transfer of title in the Amended Statement, and the learned trial Judge relied on same as documents of transfer of title alongside the Certificate of Occupancy to find in favour of the Plaintiff.
The Appellant’s Counsel submitted that assuming without conceding that the Court cannot rely on the 1st Respondents’ letter to the Director of Lands, which she alleged was never tendered in evidence through any of her witnesses, the Court can look at the document while writing its judgment. He relied on the cases of OYEWOLE V. AKANDE (2009) ALL FWLR (PT 491) PG 813 @836 PARA B; ADEBOWALE V. ADEMOLA (2021) NWLR (PT. 1767)4 PP 415 PARAS F-G, B-C, C-D. He submitted further that the authority of ORANIKA V. STATE cited at paragraph 47 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument is, apart from being a criminal appeal, a decision of this Court on the impropriety of a Judge relying on a Confessional Statement of an Accused Person which was not tendered in evidence by the prosecution during trial, but in the instant case, the document was pleaded, frontloaded and referred to in the Witness Statement of Oath. In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 51-53 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, learned Counsel to the Appellant submitted that the Plaintiff/1st Respondent did not file a defence to the counter-claim of the Defendant/Appellant, nor a reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, thus the issues therein are deemed conceded.
In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 54-55 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief, the Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the law is clear that the onus is on the Court to afford parties a hearing on issues raised suo motu and where the Court neglects to so do, any decision on the issue so raised amounts to nullity. He relied on the case of OSOKOYA V. ONIGEMO (2018) ALL FWLR (PT. 1009) PT. 942 PAGE 424.
In reply to the submissions at paragraphs 57-74 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument, the Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the issue of jurisdiction cannot be brushed aside by the Court, regardless of how it was raised.
The Appellant’s Counsel submitted that contrary to the entire submissions of the 1st Respondent at paragraphs 61-63 and 67 of the 1st Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument, the Appellant could not have appealed against a non-existent decision, as the learned trial Judge did not resolve the issue of the legal implication of the averment of the Plaintiff at paragraph 14 of the Amended Statement of Claim. He submitted further that a holistic consideration of the interlocutory decision of the trial Court will show that the learned trial Judge did not resolve ground C of the Appellant’s objection wherein the issue of locus standi was raised. In conclusion, learned Counsel to the Appellant urged this Court to allow the appeal and grant the reliefs sought therein.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
To determine this appeal, I will, and I hereby adopt the issues for determination distilled by the Appellant’s Counsel in their Brief of Argument and the sole issue for determination formulated by the 1st Respondent will be considered thereunder.
ISSUES 1, 2, 6 and 10
The learned Counsel to the Appellant has submitted in their Appellant’s Brief of Argument at paragraphs 4.3 – 4.11 to the effect that the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1 adopted in Court as his evidence in his case is inadmissible and be expunged as it was sworn in PW1’s lawyer’s office.
Now I have perused the Records of Appeal in this appeal. At page 495 of the Record of Appeal, PW1 under cross-examination testified as follows:
“I swore to my witness statement in any lawyer’s office”
(See page 495 line 1 of the Record of Appeal).
I have seen the arguments of the 1st Respondent’s Counsel the Respondent’s Brief of Argument in respect of issue one to the effect that the Appellant’s counsel misunderstood the decision of the Apex Court in BUHARI V. INEC (SUPRA). Be that as it may, the position of the law is that an affidavit when sworn to, there is a presumption that it was sworn before a person authorize to administer Oath. See Sections 111 and 112 of the Evidence Act which provide as follows:
“(111) The fact that an affidavit purports to have been sworn in the manner prescribed in the preceding sections shall be prima facie evidence of –
(a) The seal or signature, as the case may be, of any such Court, Judge, Magistrate or other officer or person mentioned in, or appended or subscribed to, any such affidavit; and
(b) The authority of such Court, Judge, Magistrate or other officer or person to administer oaths.”
However, this presumption is rebuttable and if it is shown that the affidavit was not sworn to before a person authorized to administer Oath, then such affidavit cannot be used. Section 112 of the Evidence Act provides:
“An affidavit shall not be admitted to be used, which is proved to have been sworn before a person on whose behalf the same is offered, or before his legal practitioner, or before a partner or clerk of his legal practitioner.”
In the case of BUHARI V. INEC & ORS (SUPRA), TOBI JSC (as he then was and of blessed memory) at page 99 paras A-C, on the instances where an Affidavit will not be admitted, said:
“That takes me straight to Section 83 of the Evidence Act. It reads: “An affidavit shall not be admitted which is proved to have been sworn before a person on whose behalf the same is offered, or before his legal practitioner, or before a partner or clerk of his legal practitioner. The section provides for four instances where an affidavit will not be admitted. They are if sworn before (a) a person on whose behalf the same is offered; (b) his legal practitioner; (c) a partner; (d) a clerk of his legal practitioner.”
See also MADUAKOLAM SAMUEL CHIDUBEM V. OBIOMAEKENNA & ORS (2008) LPELR-3913 (CA), RICHARD IDOWU AKANMODE & ANOR V. MELAYE DANIEL DINO & ORS (2008) LPELR-8405 (CA).
In the instant appeal, the presumption has been rebutted and proved by the evidence of PW1 under cross-examination that he deposed to his Witness Statement on Oath in his lawyer’s office. See also SECTION 10 OF THE OATH ACT as to the persons authorized to administer Oath on a deponent. See also BUHARI V. INEC (SUPRA) and plethora of judicial authorities.
Further, SECTION 13 OF THE OATHS ACT provides:
“it shall be lawful for any commissioner for Oaths, notary public or any other person authorized by this Act to administer an Oath, to take and receive the declaration of any person voluntarily making the same before him in the form set out in the Fifth Schedule to this Act.”
Thus, what makes legitimacy in oath taking is the Deponent standing before a person authorized to administer Oath. In the instant case before the trial Court, the presumption that the Witness Statement on Oath was sworn before a person authorized to administer Oath has been rebutted and proved that PW1 deposed to his Witness Statement on Oath in his lawyer’s office. It would have been different if PW1 simply testified that he deposed to his Witness Statement on Oath in any named Registry of the Court or a Notary Public different from his lawyer’s office in case his lawyer is a Notary Public.
Hence, the trial Court was wrong to have relied on the Statement on Oath of PW1 and the documents or exhibits attached thereto. Thus therefore, PW1’s Witness Statement on Oath, having failed to comply with the provisions of SECTION 112 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT and SECTIONS 10 and 13 OF THE OATHS ACT, and the decision of the Apex Court in BUHARI V. INEC and plethora of decisions of this Court, PW1’s Witness Statement on Oath and all documents attached thereto are hereby expunged from the Record of this case. Issue one is hereby resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.
ISSUE TWO
The Appellant’s Counsel heavily relied on paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Defence and Amended counter-claim to contend that the 1st Respondent failed to lead evidence in proof of the identity of the land in dispute and that the trial Court arrived at a perverse finding that the identity of the land is not in dispute.
I have perused the Amended Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff filed before the trial Court especially paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 19; the Plaintiff is consistent that the subject property is No. 2415 Cadastral Zone AO6, Maitama District, Abuja. Conversely, the Appellant at paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 9 of his Amended Statement of Defence/Counterclaim avers facts in respect of the same subject property. In other words, parties at the trial Court by their pleadings are ad idem as regards the subject property and it is a property situate at No. 2415 Cadastral Zone AO6, Maitama Abuja. The question of the Appellant’s land being situate and lying at 1, Donau Crescent, off Amazon Street Maitama, Abuja is immaterial because the parties are on the same page as to the subject property. In the case of HON. COMMISSIONER, MINISTRY OF LANDS, SURVEY AND URBAN PLANNING V. DANIEL OSUJI & ANOR (2014) LPELR-22866, this Court held as follows:
“On the identity of the land in dispute, it is trite that the mere fact that one party has ascribed a name to the land in dispute and the other party has given it a different name does not affect the identity of the land. See OYO V. RECD TRUSTEES CHURCH OF LORD (2003) FLWR (PT. 153) 303 AT 316 PARAGRAPH F; CHUKWUEKE V. OKORONKWO (1999) 1 SCNJ 44 AT 57.”
The finding of the trial Court that the identity of the land is not in dispute is right, not perverse, and it does not lead to any miscarriage of justice. Issue two is therefore resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents.
ISSUES 3, 5 AND 10
As rightly submitted by the Appellant’s Counsel, the claims of the Plaintiff at the trial Court are declaratory. For a party to be entitled to such declarations, the burden of proof lies squarely on him or her to prove, even where the Defendant or adverse party admits the claims. In the instant case, PW1 is the Principal Witness of the Plaintiff at the lower Court. However, his Statement on Oath and other documents attached had been expunged from the records. The question now is whether the evidence of PW2 can sustain the claims of the 1st Respondent?
I have seen the evidence of PW2, Bako Abdulsalam at pages 269- 271 of the Record of Appeal. The only document tendered and admitted in evidence through PW2, Bako Abdulsalam, was the Power of Attorney between the Plaintiff and Northland Yard Limited marked as Exhibit PW2A 1-3 (See page 505 of the Record of Appeal).
At paragraphs 5.1 – 5.10 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, learned Counsel submits that the Sales Agreement, Exhibit PW1G, and the Power of Attorney, Exhibit PW2A and the CTC of C of O, Exhibit IE; Exhibits PW1G and PW2A are registrable pursuant to Sections 2 and 15 of the Land Instruments Registration Act Cap 515, LFN.
Without much ado, Exhibits PW1G and PW1E were expunged alongside the Witness Statement on Oath of PW1, Odo Augustine Ogar, deposed to on 10th February, 2014.
As regards the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, paragraph 14 of the Amended Statement of Claim states:
“The Plaintiff avers that the said plot 2415 Maitama District, Abuja contained a building and the same has been transferred to her attorney vide a Power of Attorney and Sale Agreement. The said Sale Agreement is hereby pleaded.”
The law is trite that every instrument transferring interest in land must be registered in accordance with Section 15 of the Land Instrument Registration Law. See also ABDULLAHI V. ADETUTU (2019) ALL FWLR (PT. 1005) 349 AT 380-382 PARAS G-A, ONOBA V. ABUJA BUILDING PRODUCTS LTD & ORS (2014) LPELR-22704 (CA), ABUBAKAR V. ABUBAKAR WAZIRI & ORS (2008) LPELR-54 (SC).
I have seen the arguments of the learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent at paragraphs 43 – 48 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument to the effect that Exhibits PW1G and PW2A are admissible in evidence as proof of equitable interest and they are not instruments for transfer of interest or legal title to the donee. He relied on the case of ATANDA V. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS (SUPRA). He further submitted that exhibits PWG and PW2A were tendered to prove the Attorney’s equitable interest in the property and not as an instrument of divestment of the legal interest of the 1st Respondent. According to learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent, Exhibit PW1G is only an intention to transfer interest in any of the two documents, and he relied on the ruling of the trial Court at page 489 of the Record of Appeal.
Now, it has been conceded by the 1st Respondent’s learned Counsel, and that is the position of the law, that unregistered Power of Attorney is inadmissible in evidence as an instrument of transfer of legal interest in a landed property. I also agree that documents can be tendered and admitted in evidence if the purported documents are not tendered to prove transfer of interest or legal title in the property. The decision in the case of ATANDA V. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS (SUPRA) is handy, where the Supreme Court held as follows:
“This brings me to Exhibit A on which this appeal virtually revolves. As I remarked (Supra), the Appellant tendered Exhibit A as his sole proof of title to the land in dispute. The trial Court admitted such document at the proceedings despite vehement opposition to its admissibility by the Respondents because being a registrable instrument, it was however not so registered. There is no gainsaying that Exhibit A is more or less a deed of conveyance in all its ramification since it was tendered by the Plaintiff for the sole purpose of vesting title of the land in dispute upon the Plaintiff/Appellant. The Plaintiff/Appellant however argued that Exhibit A did not require any registration. The question is: is Exhibit A an instrument that the law requires to be registered before it can be admissible in evidence? Section 2 of Land Registration Law of Kwara State defines an instrument to mean as follows: “A document affecting land in Kwara State whereby one party (hereinafter called the Grantor) confers, transfers, limits, charges or extinguishes in favour of another party (hereinafter called the Grantee) any right or title to an interest in land in Kwara State and includes a Certificate of Purchase and Power of Attorney under which any instrument may be executed but does not include a “will”, under Section 15 of the Land Instrument Registration Law of Kwara State, an unregistered document affecting land must not be pleaded and is not admissible. Even in a situation where it was pleaded, the trial Court is duly bound to strike out paragraph(s) where it was pleaded and also where it was mistakenly admitted in evidence, the trial Court must expunge it since it has no any value evidentially. See OSSAI V. NWAJIDE (1975)4 SC. In the instant case, there is no doubt that considering the purpose Exhibit A was tendered and relied upon, it satisfies the meaning of an instrument, contrary to the view held by the Appellant’s learned Counsel. Therefore, in order to have any evidential value, it ought to have been registered by the Appellant. Failing to be so registered under the relevant law, it is automatically rendered inadmissible for the purpose it was meant by the Plaintiff/Appellant as stated above.”
The Supreme Court of Nigeria further stated thus:
“However, non-registration of a registrable instrument renders such instrument inadmissible as evidence in a litigation, as in this instant case, where such instrument (i.e., Exhibit A) is relied upon as evidence of title. See ABDALLAH, JAMMAI V. SAID & FETUGA 11 NLR 86, OGUNBAMI V. ABOWAH (SUPRA), ELKALI & ANOR V. FAWAZ 6 WACA 272, COKER V. OGUNYE (1939) 15 NLR 57 and AMANKRA V. ZANKLEY 364. It is noted by me that Appellant was piques by the lower Court’s resolve to delve into the admissibility of Exhibit A even though there was no Appeal by the Respondent on the admission of the said exhibit by the trial Court before the lower Court at interlocutory stage and no ground of appeal was raised on that. However, by mere looking at ground No. 2, it was couched in such a way that the Appellant tendered and relied on Exhibit A as the sole proof for his claim for declaration of title to the land in dispute. To my mind, the lower Court was entitled to refer to the document and determine its admissibility and to also determine its evidential value. As I said earlier, the said exhibit, i.e., Exhibit A is a registrable instrument which was not registered as required by law as rightly found by the Court below. It is therefore not admissible evidence to prove title to the land in dispute as claimed by the Plaintiff/Appellant. Rather, it can be of evidential value if and only if it was aimed at proving payment of money for purchase of land but is certainly not admissible to prove claim to title to land as done by the Appellant, as rightly held by the lower Court.”
In the instant case, though learned Counsel only quoted a fraction of the ratio decidendi of SANUSI, JSC, the position of the law is that if the 1st Respondent wants to tender the two exhibits, i.e., Exhibits PW1G and PW2A as evidence of purchase or transaction, the pleadings of the 1st Respondent must be distinctively clear and it must convey the information it purports to convey. The Courts have no business with hypothetical, assumptive, speculative, theoretical, empty sound guesses or allusions. A Court of law deals with hard facts and evidence as disclosed in pleadings and evidence of Witnesses, as I said earlier, the 1st Respondent’s paragraphs 4 and 14, especially paragraph 14, states, for the purpose of clarity at the expense of repetition, thus:
“The Plaintiff avers that the said Plot 2415 Maitama District, Abuja contained a building and same has been transferred to her Attorney vide a Power of Attorney and Sale Agreement. The said Sale Agreement is hereby pleaded. (See also paragraphs 16 and 19 of PW1’s Witness Statement on Oath).
The pleading above is devoid of any ambiguity and supported by the purported evidence of PW1. The Power of Attorney and Sales Agreement as pleaded are not for the purpose of evidencing transaction or documents of purchase but that the Plot No. 2415 Maitama District that contained a building and same has been transferred to her Attorney vide a Power of Attorney and Sales Agreement. The argument of the learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent is that Exhibits PW1G and PW2A were tendered to prove the Attorney’s equitable interest and not as instruments of divestment, and that the only intention of Exhibit PW1G is to transfer equitable title to the Attorney and not actual transfer.
I disagree with the 1st Respondent’s submissions that Exhibits PW1G and PW2A are instruments not meant for actual transfer of title to the Attorney. This is because by the Amended Statement of Claim of the 1st Respondent and the testimony of PW1, there is no doubt that Exhibits PW1G and PW2A, i.e., Power of Attorney and Sales Agreement are instruments of transfer of interest in Plot 2415 Maitama District.
Thus, issues 3, 5 and 10 are resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.
ISSUE 4
This issue is culled from Grounds 6 and 10 of the Amended Notice of Appeal and it is a challenge or complaint on the trial Court’s refusal to grant the Appellant’s counter-claim.
The Appellant also sought in his counter-claim a declaration that the acts of collusion, connivance, fraud, misrepresentation and forgery that resulted in the 2nd Defendant issuing to the Plaintiff documents of the subject property is illegal, null and void and a declaration that the Appellant is in lawful possession and vested with equitable and legal rights over the subject property.
I have perused the facts and evidence in proof of the counter-claim. I have also gone through the finding of the trial Court and I agree with the trial Court that the averments of collusion, connivance, fraud, misrepresentation and forgery are serious criminal allegations and therefore the Appellant must specially plead same and adduce credible evidence in proof thereof. See SEGUN BABATUNDE V. BANK OF THE NORTH & ORS (2011) LPELR-8249 (SC).
In the case of PRINCE ADEMUYIWA ADEDEJI & ANOR V. CFAO (NIGERIA) PLC (2014) LPELR-22309, this Court as per PEMU, JCA held as follows:
“An allegation of forgery or fraud for that matter must be specifically pleaded and particularized. In actualizing this, the party must state who committed the offence of forgery, and the document forged. Facts must be pleaded to show that he had the necessary intention. Failure to specifically plead the commission of a crime is failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt as required by Jaw that a crime has been committed.”
See also IDI MARAFA & ANOR V. HAJIYA HABIBA UMAR (2013) LPELR-22821 (CA), ABUBAKAR V. JOSEPH (2008)13 NWLR (PT. 1104) 307.
Mere assertion is not sufficient and I therefore agree with the trial Court that the Appellant failed to prove these allegations against the 2nd Respondent and the 1st Respondent. However, with respect to the second ambit of the declaration, the Defendants did not file any defence to the Counterclaim. Although the Appellant has to succeed on the strength of his own case, the law is also trite that there is nothing wrong if the Appellant relies on the case of the adversary to strengthen his case in a claim for declaration. See WEMA BANK PLC V. ARISON TRADING & ENGINEERING CO. LTD & ANOR (2015) LPELR-40030 (CA).
I have gone through the testimonies of DWs 1, 2, 3 and 4. I have also perused Exhibit DW4A linking the 1st Respondent with the Appellant in respect of the sale of the subject property in the sum of N60,000,000.00 and the letter instructing one Fatima Saidi to inform the Appellant to collect the original title documents from AGIS. And by the testimony of Ibrahim Umar in his Witness Statement on Oath, the C of O was picked up by his father (Appellant) and his details were given in the acknowledgment copy of the C of O.
Thus, by the evidence of the Witness of the counter-claimant, and the Appellant being in possession, the Appellant is entitled to the 2nd and 3rd reliefs of the counter-claim. Issue 4 is therefore resolved in part in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondents.
ISSUES 7 AND 8
The law is trite that the trial Court or even this Court has the power to raise an issue suo motu. However, the Court will not have the jurisdiction to resolve the issues so raised suo motu without inviting parties to address it on same. Thus, the decision of the trial Court at page 539 of the Record of Appeal was wrong, the trial Court having raised the issue of Section 5(2) of the Land Reform (Contract) Act LFN and resolved same without inviting the parties to address it. See G I B & ANOR V. RAJI, (2013) LPELR-20475 (CA); SHASI & ANOR V. SMITH & ANOR (2009) LPELR-3039 (SC), where the Supreme Court held:
“It is settled law that though a Court of law may raise an issue sou motu, it cannot base its determination of the appeal or case on the issue so raised except it calls on the parties or their Counsel to address it on that issue. In other words, a Court of law has the vires to raise an issue necessary for the determination of the matter before it subject to its being addressed on the point/issue by Counsel for the parties if the decision of the Court is to be rooted or grounded on the issue so raised suo motu. To raise an issue suo motu and proceeded to decide the matter on the same without hearing Counsel for the parties thereon is to deny the parties their right to fair hearing and an appellate Court is duty bound, in the circumstance, to set aside the determination so made.”
See also STATE V. KAPINE & ANOR, (2019) LPELR-40511(SC), SANI V KOGI STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS, (2019) LPELR-46404(SC).
Thus, the finding of the lower Court occasions miscarriage of justice and it is hereby set aside.
Further, the Supreme Court gave the distinction as to the effect, on appeal, of the failure to raise objection to the admissibility of inadmissible evidence at the trial Court in the case of GOODWILL & TRUST INVESTMENT LTD V WITT & BUSH LTD, (2011) LPELR-1333(SC) as follows:
“…In a trial by a Judge alone, as in the case at hand, a distinction must be drawn between those cases where the evidence complained of is admissible under certain conditions. In the former class of cases, the evidence cannot be acted upon even if parties admitted it by consent and the Court of Appeal will entertain a complaint on the admissibility of such evidence by the lower Court (although the evidence was admitted in the lower Court without objection) in the latter class of cases; if the evidence was admitted in the lower Court without objection or by consent of parties or was used by the opposite party (e.g. for the purpose of cross-examination) then it would be within the competence of the trial Court to act on it and the Court of Appeal will not entertain any complaint on the admissibility of such evidence.”
In respect of Exhibit DW4A, the document is an acknowledgment of the receipt of payment of the sum of N60,000,000.00 paid by the Appellant to the Plaintiff in respect of the subject property. The letter dated 17/11/2005 was admitted in evidence without objection, and the finding of the trial Court at page 526 of the Record of Appeal that Exhibit DW4A constitutes documentary hearsay is wrong, and I so hold. DW4 gave evidence based on his personal knowledge of the facts and it is not in all cases that the maker or addressee must be called as a Witness. See the case of EZEANAH V. ATTA (2004)7 NWLR (PT. 873) PAGE 468 where the Supreme Court held that:
“The law and the Rules of Court do not foist on a party the duty to give evidence. While it is desirable that he gives evidence, there are situations where from the facts of the case, some other person is in a better position to give evidence because that person participated in the particular matter and did it and saw it all.”
In OJO V. GHARORO, (2006) LPELR 2383, the Supreme Court held:
“Where a document, by its contents, conveys hearing evidence then the parole or oval evidence based on that document will definitely or invariably be hearsay. The reverse position is also correct and it is that where a document, by its contents, does not convey hearsay evidence, then parole or oral evidence based on it will not be hearsay evidence, if the witness has an intimate relationship with the document and gives evidence of that relationship.”
In the instant case, records show that DW4 gave unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence on the document i.e. DW4A from his intimate and personal relationship with the document and thus, his parole or oral testimony cannot be regarded as documentary hearsay evidence.
Also the document, from the Records on Appeal, was admitted in evidence without opposition from the Respondents and the witness, DW4 was subjected to cross-examination without discrediting his testimony on the document. Further, exhibit DW4A was admitted in evidence without objection by the Respondents. In the case of FHOMO (NIG) LTD V. ZENITH BANK, (2016) LPELR-42233, this Court held as per NIMPAR, JCA as follows:
“All documents tendered were admitted in evidence without any objection from the Appellant and being part of evidence before the Court, the Court had to evaluate and apply same in determining the claim.”
In respect of issue 9, I had already declared Exhibit PW2A inadmissible and therefore issue 9 is of no moment.
In the whole, issues 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 are hereby resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent. Issues 2, 6 and 9 are resolved in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellant. Consequently, this Appeal succeeds in part.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial Court that the Plaintiff’s leg one succeeds and thereby declaring the Plaintiff as rightful owner/title holder of Plot No. 2415, Maitama District, Cadastral Zone AO6 and declaring the Appellant a trespasser in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/85/2014 delivered on 29th January, 2019 by O. O. Goodluck, J. (as she then was) is hereby set aside.
The 2nd leg of the Appellant’s counter-claim succeeds, that is, Reliefs (ii) and (iii) of the counter-claim succeed and are granted as prayed.
No award as to cost. Parties to bear their respective cost, if any.
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Danlami Zama Senchi, JCA.
I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal be allowed in part and that the 2nd leg of the appellant’s counter-claim succeeds which are reliefs (ii) and (iii). I do so order.
I therefore abide by the consequential orders made therein and I award no cost as well.
PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, SENCHI, JCA and I agree with all the conclusions therein.
Appearances:
Fukky Danlidi Mashat, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Henry A. Iyanya, Esq., with him, Kennedy Ozo Enemmo, Esq. For Respondent(s)
