TARABA STATE GOVT & ORS v. ORUME & ORS
(2022)LCN/16428(CA)
In The Court of Appeal
(YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, April 11, 2022
CA/YL/70/2019
Before Our Lordships:
Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal
Yusuf Alhaji Bashir Justice of the Court of Appeal
Abdul-Azeez Waziri Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. TARABA STATE GOVERNMENT 2. TARABA MICROFINANCE BANK NIGERIA LIMITED 3. MALLAM AMINU MAMMAN LAU APPELANT(S)
And
1. BARRISTER BENJAMIN ORUME 2. MALLAM NASIRU AUDU BABA 3. MR. POLYCARP ADI 4. ALHAJI HASSAN ADAMU 5. ALHAJI YUSUF M. BABA 6. MRS. PHOEBE ISAH 7. HON. TANKO BOBBO ANDAMIN 8. MR. JACOB S. YAMNJU RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction which is a mantra in adjudication connotes the authority/power of a Court to hear and determine a dispute brought to it by the contending parties in the proceeding. See the following cases: AJAMOLE VS. YADUAT NO (1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172, GARBA VS. MOHAMMED (2016) 16 NWLR (PT 1537) 144 CA.
It is settled that the issue of jurisdiction is very vital in adjudicatory process. A Court without jurisdiction has been likened to an animal being drained off its blood. Accordingly, it occupies an Olympian position in the pyramid of adjudication. The jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the statutes creating it, the subject matter and the parties involved. PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.
DEFINITION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
A cause of action is the technical legal name for the set of facts which give rise to a claim enforceable in Court. It is a legally recognized wrong that creates the right to sue. It is the whole of the material facts which it is necessary for the Plaintiff to allege and prove in order to succeed.
A reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chance of success. In the determination of a reasonable cause of action in the statement of claim, only the facts contained therein are deemed admitted. In the instant case, the affidavit of the Respondents as Plaintiffs take place of statement of claim. PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN GRANT DUOUBLE COMPENSATION ON A PARTY
I have considered the legal arguments, authorities proffered by the line of divide in this appeal, I wish to state that in the case of UTC (NIG) PLC VS. PHILLIPS (2012) 6 NWLR (PT 1295) 136 at 184 PARAS A-B it was held thus: “The Law frowns at award of double compensation. It is the law that where a party had been compensated fully under specific claims, it would be most inappropriate to compensate him again under general damages as that would amount to double compensation. It is an established principle, that if a Plaintiff recovers in full under special damages, he cannot be entitled to general damages for that would amount to double compensation. PER WAZIRI, J.C.A.
ABDUL-AZEEZ WAZIRI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appeal is against the judgment of the Federal High Court Jalingo delivered on the 4th of December, 2018 in Suit No. FCH/JAL/CS/8/2018 Coram Judice S.D Pam (J).
By an originating summons dated and filed on the 19/3/2018 the Respondents as Plaintiffs submitted a question for determination as follows:
“Whether the Plaintiffs, are still the subsisting members of the 2nd Defendant’s Board of Directors having not been removed at all and/or in accordance with the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004?”
After posing the above question they prayed the trial Court for various reliefs in the nature of declaration, orders and injunction against the Appellants as Defendants thus:-
(a) A DECLARATION that the Plaintiffs are still the subsisting members of the 2nd Defendant’s Board of Directors having not been removed as directed at all and/or in accordance with the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2004.
(b) A DECLARATION that there was no such press statement/release allegedly made on the 30th September purporting to suspend, dismiss and/or remove the Plaintiffs as the 2nd Defendant’s Board of Directors or as Directors of the 2nd Defendant or capable of dissolving or removing the Plaintiffs from the Board of the 2nd Defendant.
(c) AN ORDER of injunction restraining the Defendants from further interference in the management and administration of the 2nd Defendant.
(d) AN ORDER granting general damages in the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira only) as damages for unlawful interference.
(e) AN ORDER granting special damages in the sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira only) as cost of instituting this action.
PARTICULARS OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
Payment of Solicitors’ fees being the sum of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira only).
In support of their originating summons, the Respondents as Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of 17 paragraphs and attached thereto four (4) Exhibits marked as A-D respectively. The Respondents also filed a written address in accordance with the rules of Court.
In response, the Appellants as Defendants with leave of the lower Court filed a counter-affidavit in opposition to the Plaintiffs/Respondents originating summons filed on the 19/3/2018. Exhibits 1-10 were attached to the counter-affidavit. There was also a written address filed in support of the counter-affidavit.
The Respondents as Plaintiffs thereafter filed a further affidavit and a reply on points of law. The objection was heard with the main suit. In its considered judgment, the trial Court overruled the Appellants preliminary objection and determined the main suit in favour of the Respondents as all their reliefs succeeded except relief (D) as can be seen on pages 130-155 of the Record of Appeal. The Appellants became disillusioned with the judgment and approached this Hon. Court via their original Notice of Appeal contained on pages 156-160 of the printed Record of Appeal which was further amended on the 9/10/2020 and deemed proper on the 12th day of December, 2020 which consisted of seven (7) grounds of Appeal shorn of their particulars.
The Record of Appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Hon. Court on the 13/9/2019 and deemed properly compiled and transmitted on the 16/9/2019.
Appellants’ joint brief of argument was filed on the 9/10/2020 and deemed proper on the 20-10-2020. Appellants reply brief was filed on the 29/10/2021 and deemed proper on the 25/1/2022.
Respondents’ brief of argument was filed on the 28/10/2021 and deemed proper on the 25/1/2022. When the Appeal came up for hearing on the 25/1/2022 the respective learned counsel to the parties adopted and placed reliance on their briefs for and against this Appeal.
The Appellants’ joint brief of argument was settled by J.A Oguche Esq., of counsel wherein he distilled five issues as arising for the determination of this Honourable Court thus:
1. “Whether regard being had to the claims of the Respondents vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 254 C(1) (a) and (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 and determine same to finality”.
2. “Whether by the pleadings of the Respondents, they disclosed any reasonable cause of action to warrant the hearing and determination to finality of Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 by the trial Court? Distilled from ground five of the Further Amended Notice of Appeal”.
3. “Whether it is proper in law for the learned trial Judge to have relied upon incompetent affidavits to enter judgment in favour of the Respondents? Distilled from ground six of the further Amended Notice of Appeal”.
4. “Whether the learned trial Judge was right in law to have relied upon uncertified public documents to enter judgment in favour of the Respondents? Distilled from ground seven of the further Amended Notice of Appeal”.
5. “Whether the trial Court was right in law to have granted to the Respondents their claims of special and general damages? Distilled from ground three of the further Amended Notice of Appeal.”
The Respondents Brief of Argument was settled by Martin Milkman Esq., of counsel wherein he wholesale adopted all the issues nominated by the Appellants as issues arising for the determination of this Appeal.
In the resolution of this appeal one way or the other I shall be guided by the issues nominated and adopted by learned counsel to the parties herein, however where the jurisdictional issue succeeds, I would still proceed to resolve the other issues in this appeal being an intermediate Court.
APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUES
ON ISSUE ONE – Whether regard being had to the claims of the Respondents vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 254 C (1) (a) and (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain Suit No. FHC/JAL/8/2018 and determine same to finality? Distilled from ground one of the further Amended Notice of Appeal.
Learned Appellants counsel submits that the law is now well settled beyond equivocation that in proceedings commenced vide originating summons, the affidavits filed therein by the Plaintiffs in support of the originating summons constitute their pleadings therein placing reliance in the cases of GBAJABIAMILA VS. CBN & ORS (2014) LPELR-22756 (CA), PORTS AND CARGO HANDLINGS SERVICE COMPANY LTD AND ORS VS. MIGFO (NIG) LTD AND ANOR (2012) 18 NWLR (PT 1333) 555 at 609, N.N.P.C AND OTHERS VS. FAMFA OIL LTD (2012) 17 NWLR (PT 1328) 148 at 189, UWAZURUONYE VS. GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE & ORS (2013) 8 NWLR (PT 1355) 28 at 56. He posits that the pleadings of the Respondents in Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 are their affidavit in support of the originating summons which is at pages 7-10 of the printed records and their further affidavit which is at pages 98-100 of the printed records. Learned counsel referred us to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the printed records wherein the Respondents placed thus:
“10”. That there was no or never such press statement/release allegedly made on the 30th day of September, 2016 purporting to suspend, remove and/or dissolve the Plaintiffs as members of 2nd Defendant’s Board of Directors.
“11”. That since the appointment of the 2nd to 8th Plaintiffs and I as Directors and as members of the Board of Directors of the 2nd Defendant none of us has either been suspended and/or removed as Directors.
He submits that the Respondents are clearly bound by their pleadings placing reliance on the following case: AMERICAN CYANAMID CO VS. VITALITY PHARMACEUTICALS LTD (1991) LPELR-461 (SC).
He submits that going by the set out pleadings, it is very clear beyond any doubt whatsoever that the gravamen of Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 pertains to appointment into an office of the (purported) termination of the said appointment and/or removal from the said office by the 2nd Appellant. He submits that the learned trial Judge perfectly understood the gravamen of the dispute when he held at page 20 lines 5-24 of the Judgment (which are at page 155 of the printed records). He posits the trial Court made recourse to Exhibits 2-8 annexed by the Appellants to their counter-affidavit. He further posits that it is the termination and/or “unlawful interference” with these appointments by the 1st Appellant that the trial Court in page 26 lines 22-24 of its judgment (which are at page 155 of the printed records) declared unlawful and subsequently reinstated the Respondents into office as Directors of the 2nd Appellant and further nullified the stoppage of their salaries and allowances.
He submits that this being the case the trial Court had no jurisdiction by virtue of Section 254 C (1) (a) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.
Section 254 C (1) (a) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257 and 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters:
(a) Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health safety, welfare of labour, employee worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.
(k) Relating to or connected with or disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee workers, political or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto.”
He cites in support the following cases: DR. OLUBUKOLA ABUBAKAR SARAKI VS. FRN (2016) LPELR-40013 at 96 PARAS B-D (SC): NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (LIQUIDATOR OF ALLIED BANK OF NIGERIA PLC) VS. OKEM ENTERPRISES LTD (2004) LPELR at 55 PARAS D-F (SC), MR. PETER OBI VS. INEC (2007) LPELR-24347 at 41 PARAS B-F (SC), NNPC VS. ORHIOWASELE & ORS (2013) LPELR at 8-9 PARAS D-B (SC).
He submits that all cases of termination of employment whether private or public employment now fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. See COCA-COLA (TWC) LTD VS. AKINSANYA (2017) NWLR (PT 1593) 74, 131-132, HON. JUSTICE ISA AYO SALAMI VS. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & ORS (2014) LPELR-22773 at 24-22 PARAS A-C (CA), UNITED NIGERIAN TEXTILES PLC VS. ABU & ORS (2014) LPELR-23605 at 20-21 PARAS E-B (CA), APPEAL NO. CA/YL/116/2018 BETWEEN TARABA STATE GOVERNMENT & 3 ORS VS. MALLAM NASIRU AUDU BABA Per PJ YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION aptly espoused the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court at page 35 of the judgment delivered on the 9th day of December, 2019, BARRISTER FRANC FAGAH UTOO VS. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS & ORS (2018) LPELR-44352 at 2-28 PARAS C-A (SC), TIMPRE SYLVA VS. INEC & ORS (2015) LPELR-24447 at 57 PARAS A-B (SC): ABAWU JAMES WATHARDA & ORS VS. GOV. ADAMAWA STATE & ORS (SUPRA) PARAS E-A.
Learned counsel urges us to hold that the stoppage of the salaries of the Respondents was in issue relying in the following cases: UBA & ANOR VS. EZEKIEL (2018) LPELR-43779 (CA) PP. 17-18 PARAS D-A, MHWUN VS. EHIGIEGBA (2018) LPELR-44972 (CA) PP. 28-36 PARAS E-C, GASKIYA TEXTILE MILLS PLC VS. KHOSLA (2014) LPELR-24606 (CA) PP. 22-23 PARAS F-C, GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE & ANOR VS. IWUNZE (2018) LPELR-44005 (CA) PP. 19- 20 PARAS B-F. Learned counsel urges us to set aside the judgment of the trial Court and enter an order striking out the suit placing reliance in the following cases. See UBN PLC VS. BEAR MARINE SERVICES LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR-43692 at 37-38 PARAS F-B, FUTA BMA VENTURE (NIG) LTD (2018) LPELR-44429 at 28-29 PARAGRAPHS C-E.
ISSUE TWO: Whether by the pleadings of the Respondents, they disclosed any reasonable cause of action to warrant the hearing and determination to finality of Suit No: FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 by the trial Court?
Learned counsel urges us to answer the question framed in the negative. He proceeds to give the meaning of what a cause of action as provided in the case of OKOLI VS. ONWUGBUFOR (2018) LPELR-46660 (CA) PP. 39-40 PARAS F-A PER BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL JCA thus:
“A cause of action is a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in Court. He also defines it as the entire set of facts or circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. Placing reliance on the following cases:- SAVAGE VS. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 213, OGOH VS. ENPEE INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 17 NWLR (PT 904) 180, UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC VS. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT 904) 180, ADESINA VS. OJO (2012) 10 NWLR (PT 1309) 562, AKILU VS. FAWEHINMI (NO. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT 102) 122 at P. 169, GBADEHAN VS. KILADEJO (2012) 16 NWLR (PT 326) 399, ALHAJI ABUDU W. AKIBU VS. ODUNTAN (2000) 10 WRN 48, OMIN lll VS. THE GOVERNOR CROSS-RIVER STATE (2007) 41 WRN 158 at PP. 186-187.
He further poses a question as to what is a reasonable cause of action? Learned counsel places reliance in the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (NIG) LTD VS. NWAWKA (2003) 1 SC (PT. 11) 127 at P. 138 where the Supreme Court Per Ayoola JSC supplied the answer thus: “Facts do not by themselves constitute cause of action. For a statement of claim to disclose a reasonable cause of action, it must set out the legal rights of the Plaintiff and the obligation of the Defendant. It must then go to set out facts constituting infraction of Plaintiff’s legal right or failure of the Defendant to fulfill his obligation in such away that if there is no proper defence, the Plaintiff will succeed in the relief or remedy he seeks. In the instant case, the Respondent did not follow up with a demonstration of how his pleadings had compiled with the guidelines”. He also calls in aid the cases of YUSUF VS. AKINDIPE (2000) 8 NWLR (PT 669) at P. 376, SHELL B.P PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD VS. ONASANYA (1976) 6 SC 89 at P. 94, NBC PLC VS. EZIEFO (2001) 12 NWLR (PT. 726) 11 at PP 28-29, DADA & ORS VS. OGUNSANYA & ANOR (1992) VOL. 23 NSCC (PT 1) 569 at P. 575, THOMAS VS. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (PT. 18) 669, SHELL B.P PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA & 5 ORS VS. M.S ONASANYA (SUPRA) at 340. He submits that in actions commenced by way of originating summons the affidavit in support of the originating summons are the pleadings of the Claimants placing reliance in ATTOHFUDI VS. REGISTERED TRUSTEE OF ICPAN (2015) LPELR-25908 (CA), NNPC VS. FAMFA OIL LTD (2012) 17 NWLR (PT 1328) PG 148 at 189 PARA E-F.
Learned counsel refers us to paragraph ‘9’ of the affidavit. He submits that the case of the Respondents is entirely built on information supplied to them by the 2nd Respondent. He further contends that Exhibit C which is purportedly the letter written to the 2nd Respondent by the 1st Appellant was not written to the 1st, 3rd – 8th Respondents. He concludes that there is no any reasonable cause of action to warrant the hearing and determination to finality of Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 by the trial Court. He urges us to resolve issue two in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondents.
ON ISSUE THREE – It was submitted that it is now settled law that the Law forbids the inclusion of hearsay evidence or matter in an affidavit. Placing reliance on Section 115(1) of the Evidence Act 2011. He refers us to paragraph 9 of the Respondents’ affidavit in support of the originating summons which is at page 8 of the printed records. He posits that the facts deposed therein by the 1st Respondent are mere hearsay. He further submits that whatsoever that the learned trial Judge wholly relied on the vitiated paragraph 9 and the entire affidavit to render the judgment. He refers us to page 9 line 15 (at page 138 of the printed records) and page 11 line 16 (at page 138 of the printed records) wherein he had this to say:
“In the instant case, it has been deposed in the Plaintiffs affidavit that… paragraphs 5 to 16 of the Plaintiffs affidavit are as follows;…”
He also submits that the Law forbids the inclusion of extraneous matters in an affidavit placing reliance on Section 115(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. It was submitted if on examination of any paragraph it discloses that same is fit as a submission which counsel ought to urge upon the Court, such paragraph qualifies as a legal argument, but if turns out to be a conclusion upon such an issue, which is within the province of the Court, then it is a legal conclusion. See AGIP (NIG) PLC VS. OSSAI & ORS (2016) LPELR-40976 (CA), ISHAYA BAMAIYI VS. THE STATE (2001) 8 NWLR (PT 715) 270 at 289 C- F where Sections 86 and 87 of the repealed Evidence Act which is in pari-materia with Section 115(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. We were urged to strike out the offending paragraphs. It was argued that the Respondent who submitted the matter for resolution drew conclusions in the offending paragraphs of the further affidavit and usurped the powers of the Court by drawing conclusion on issues for resolution by the Court. He concluded that paragraph 4 thereof of the further affidavit should be struck out along with Exhibit E attached thereto.
ON THE FOURTH ISSUE
The Appellants challenged the reliance of public documents that were not certified which the trial Court gave credence to. He submits that they are public documents within the meaning of Section 102(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and ought to have been certified. He posits that Sections 85, 86, 87 and 105 of the Evidence Act 2011 are very apposite in this regard. He calls in aid the cases of OGUNLEYE VS. AINA (2011) 3 NWLR (PT 1235) 479, PDP VS. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT 1437) 525 at 563, TARABA STATE GOVERNMENT & 3 ORS VS. MALLAM NASIRU AUDU BABA (SUPRA).
On the whole, we were urged to resolve issue four (4) in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondents.
ON ISSUE FIVE
Learned Appellants’ counsel submits that it is well settled that special damages must be strictly proven by a Claimant to warrant the grant of same by a Court of Law. Placing reliance in the following cases: B.B APUGO & SONS LTD VS. OHMB (2016) LPELR-40598 (SC), OKUNZUA VS. AMOSU (1992) 6 NWLR (PT 248) 416 at 432 E-G, OSHINJINRIN & ORS VS. ELIAS & ORS (1970) 1 ALL NLR 151 at 156, YOUNG VS. CHEVRON (NIG) LTD (2013) LPELR-22126 (CA), NZENWATA & ORS VS. NZENWATA (2016) LPELR 41089 (CA).
On the award of general damages, he submits that the Respondents at the trial Court did not adduce evidence in proof of their allegation of unlawful interference. He referred us to paragraph 11 of the supporting affidavit. He posits that this pleading of the Respondents is a clear and unequivocal admission against interest which admission ought to have been relied upon by the learned trial Judge to dismiss their case for lacking in merit placing reliance in the cases of NAS LTD VS. UBA PLC (2005) 14 NWLR (PT 945) 421 at 431, MONEME VS. ONOJA & ORS (2011) LPELR-8972 (CA). We were urged to set aside the award of Twenty Million Naira (N20,000,000.00) general damages.
On the whole, we were urged to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the trial Court in its entirety.
RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS ON THE ADOPTED ISSUES SERIATIM
ON ISSUE ONE – On this, the Respondents counsel submits that he is in agreement with the Appellants that the law is settled that jurisdiction of a Court to adjudicate over a matter or suit cannot be determined without reference to the reliefs sought therein placing reliance on the following cases: PRINCE ABDULRASHEED ADESUPO ADETONA & 2 ORS VS. IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD (2011) LPELR-159 (SC) at 47, HON. ABAWU JAMES WATHARDA & ORS VS. GOVERNOR ADAMAWA STATE & ORS (2016) LPELR-43002 (CA) at 33 PARAGRAPHS F. Learned counsel reproduced the reliefs sought by the Respondents as Plaintiffs a-e. He posits the reliefs border on the management or operation of a company under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA). He submits that the proper thing for this Hon. Court to do is to apply the Law to the reliefs of the Respondents as contained on the originating process. He further submits that the reliefs of the Respondents had nothing to do with termination of appointment and claim for salary or any entitlement. He refers us to page 155 lines 12-23 of the record of Appeal. He posits that by Section 251(1) (e) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, it is the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction.
He contends that in determining the jurisdiction of the Court we are required to look at the originating process filed by the Respondents. He opines that the Board of Directors are not employees of the Company but supervisors placing reliance in the cases of ADENIYI VS. EJIGBO LOCAL GOV’T (2013) LPELR-22017 (CA) PAGE 32 PARAGRAPH A, LONGE VS. FBN PLC (2006) LPELR-7682 (CA) PAGES 35-37 PARAGRAPH F-C. He posits that the decision in Appeal No. CA/YL/116/2018 between TARABA STATE GOVERNMENT & 3 ORS VS. MALLAM NASIRU AUDU BABA delivered on the 9th day of December, 2019 is distinguishable with the case at hand so also the cases of NASARAWA STATE SPECIALIST HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD & ORS VS. MOHAMMED (2018) LPELR-44551 AT 15-21 PARAGRAPHS E-B (CA), HON. JUSTICE ISA AYO SALAMI VS. NJC & ORS (2014) LPELR-22773 AT 24-27 PARAGRAPHS A-C (CA), UNITED NIGERIAN TEXTILES PLC VS. ABU & ORS (2014) LPELR-23605 AT 20-21 PARAGRAPHS E-B (CA) which deal with industrial actions and nothing more.
He posits that decided cases are only precedent where the facts and circumstances of the previous case and the case the Court is called upon to decide are the same or similar placing reliance in the case of PDP VS. INEC & ORS (2018) LPELR-44373 (SC) PAGE 19 PARAGRAPHS A-B.
He urges us to hold that the trial Court was right in law to assume jurisdiction to hear and determine the case on the merit. He urges us to resolve issue one in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellants.
ON ISSUE TWO
He submits that a perusal of the entire record of Appeal reveals that the issue of whether or not the Respondents’ case disclose a reasonable cause of action was never raised and argued at the trial Court. The trial Court never considered and pronounced on whether or not the case of the Respondents disclosed a reasonable cause of action. That this issue is a fresh one raised before this Court.
He posits that reasonable cause of action is distilled from ground 5 of the grounds of appeal which does not emanate from the judgment of the trial Court placing reliance in the cases of GRENACO (NIG) LTD & ANOR VS. ABOLADE JOHNSON (NIG) LTD & ORS (2019) LPELR-46879 (CA) PAGES 25-26 PARAGRAPHS E-A, BANKOLE TAIWO OLANREWAJU VS. INEC & ORS (2010) LPELR-4749 (CA) at PAGE 14 PARAGRAPH B, YAU VS. DAUDA & ORS (2018) LPELR-44489 (CA) PAGES 7-8 PARAGRAPHS D-B PER SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, ONAFOWOKAN VS. WEMA BANK PLC (2011) VOL. 200 LRCN 33, 38, OJO VS. AYODELE OLUFEAGBA VS. ABDULRAHEEM & ORS (2010) VOL. 189 LRCN, VICTINO FIXED ODDS VS. OJO & ORS (2016) VOL. 185 LRCN 160, 170.
He submits that should this Court hold that the ground of appeal raised formed part of the decision of the trial Court then he contends that the Respondents case dismissed reasonable cause of action relying in the case of OKONTA & ANOR VS. EGBUNA (2013) LPELR-21253 (CA) PAGES 5-6 PARAGRAPHS E-G, YUSUF VS. AKINDIPE (2000) 8 NWLR (PT 669) at 376 cited by the Appellants at paragraph 5.04 of their brief of argument portrays what a reasonable cause of action is. He urges us to hold that the originating process of the Respondents disclose a reasonable cause of action. He finally urges us to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellants.
ISSUES NO. 3 AND 4 ARGUED TOGETHER
Learned Respondents counsel submits that grounds six (6) and seven (7) of the Further Amended Notice of Appeal as well as issues three (3) and four (4) of the Appellants Brief of Argument are grossly incompetent and liable to be struck out. He posits that the said grounds and the issues are not an attack against the judgment of the trial Court. Placing reliance on the cases of AJALA & ORS VS. ALADEJAN & ORS (2018) LPELR-44579 (CA) PAGES 13-28 PARAS D-A, SYSTEM METAL INDUSTRIES LTD VS. EHIZO (2002) LPELR-6143 (CA) PAGES 9- 11 PARAS F-C, AMABARA & ANOR VS. CUSTOMARY COURT OPOBO & ORS (2009) LPELR 8868 (CA) 18-19 PARAS D-B.
He submits grounds 6 and 7 of the further amended Notice of Appeal are fresh issues raised in this Hon. Court for the first time without leave of this Hon. Court or that of the trial Court placing reliance on the following cases: OLAIFA & ORS VS. TANIMOMO & ORS (2017) LPELR-43252 (CA) PAGE 10 PARAS A-B, GARUBA VS. OMOKHODION (2011) 6 SCNJ 334, ONWUKA VS. ONONUJU (2009) 5 SCNJ 65, A.G ADAMAWA STATE & ORS VS. WARE & ORS (2006) LPELR-609 (SC) PAGE 8 PARA E, COMPAGNIE GENERALE DE GEO PHYSIQUE (NIG LT) CGG NIG. LTD VS. MOSES AMINU (2015) LPELR-24463 (SC) PAGE 18 PARAS A-C. He urges us to strike out grounds 6 and 7 of the grounds of the further amended Notice of Appeal.
Learned counsel submits that should this Court hold the said grounds of Appeal and the issues distilled from them are competent then the Appellants contention that paragraph 9 of the Respondents supporting affidavit is incompetent as same is a hearsay and ought to be struck out is misconceived as the witness did not depose to what he was told but what transpired at a meeting he was present and proceeded to attach the minutes of the meeting and the letter referred to in the said meeting Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’.
He submits that paragraph 9 of the Respondents’ supporting affidavit as well as the entire affidavit did not offend Section 115(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He further submits that the judgment of the trial Court was not anchored on the said paragraph. On the contention of the Appellants’ counsel that paragraphs 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the originating summons and paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the further affidavit are legal arguments, conclusion and prayers only show that they are mere statements of facts and nothing more. He posits that the trial Court did not rely on the further affidavit to enter judgment as wrongly agued by the Appellants counsel.
On the submission of the Appellants counsel that Exhibits A1, B, C, D, E, F and G are public documents he opined that they are not public documents. He posits that the documents attached to the affidavit are admissible placing reliance on the cases of:- EZECHUKWU & ANOR VS. ONWUKA (2016) LPELR-26055 (SC) 37 PARAS C-D, NCC VS. MOTOPHONE LTD & ANOR (2019) LPELR 47401 (SC) PAGES 14- 17 PARAS F-D, NWOSU VS. IMO STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY (1990) 2 NWLR (PT 135) at 688.
We were urged to resolve the above issues in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellants.
ON ISSUE FIVE – Learned Respondents counsel concedes to the submissions of the Appellants as argued at paragraphs 6.01-6.04 of their brief of argument and posits that they had nothing to urge on this Hon. Court. That the Appellants’ argument as highlighted in those paragraphs clearly removed the foundation of their argument on issue one. He further submits that the Appellants’ argument at paragraphs 6.05-6.09 of their brief of argument was made without legal, factual and evidential basis and liable to be set aside by this Hon. Court.
On award of general damages, he posits that, it is entirely at the discretion of the trial Court having take into consideration the case of the parties before the Court. He refers us to paragraph 5 (g) of the Appellants counter-affidavit at page 52 of the Record of Appeal and Exhibit 9 attached thereto. He calls in aid the cases of DAUDA VS. LAGOS BUILDING INVESTMENT CO. LTD & ORS (2010) LPELR- 4024 (CA) PAGES 19-20 PARAGRAPHS C-A, GARI VS. SEIRAFINA (NIG) LTD (2008) 2 NWLR (PT 1070) 1 at 19 A-C, FAMOJIRO VS. OTAMU (1955-56) NWLR 67, OSUJI VS. ISIOCHA (1989) 3 NWLR (PT 111) 623 at 636 PARAGRAPH C-D: ODULAJA VS. HADDAD (1973) 11 SC 357 at 360, UBA PLC VS. SALMAN (2018) LPELR-45698 (CA) PAGES 43-45 PARAGRAPHS D-C, LAR VS. STIRLING ASTALDI (1977) 11/12 S.C 53, OMONUWA VS. WAHABI (SUPRA), YALAJU AMAYE VS. ASSOCIATED REGISTERED ENGINEERIGN CONTRACTORS LTD & ORS (1990) LPELR-3511 (SC) P. 45 PARAS B-E: (1990) 4 NWLR (PT 145) P. 422: (1990) 6 SC P. 157: INCAR VS. BENSON TRANSPORT (1975) 3 SC 117, LAR VS. STIRLING ASTALDI LTD (SUPRA): UDOFEL LTD & ANOR VS. SKYE BANK PLC (2014) LPELR-22742 (CA), ROCKONOH PROP. LTD VS. NITEL PLC (2001) 14 NWLR (733) 468 at 493.
He submits that the appeal of the Appellants is simply challenging the grant of the general damage on the ground that it was not proved. He submits that general damages are not granted based on its proof but naturally flow from the illegal act of the Defendant which resulted in the case. He urges us to resolve this arm of this issue three against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondents.
APPELLANTS REPLY SUBMISSIONS TO THE RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF OF ARGUMENT
In response to the Respondents’ argument on issue I, Appellants’ counsel opined that the Respondents did not dispute the Appellants’ submissions at paragraphs 4.02-4.11 at pages 5-8 of their joint brief of argument. He concludes that it was a concession or admission of all the points in the said paragraphs referred to placing reliance on the following cases: NIKA FISHING CO. LTD VS. LAVINA CORP (2009) VOL. 166 LRCN 236 at 245 RATIO 5, F.R.N VS. SARAKI (2017) LPELR- 43392 (CA), NWANKWO VS. YAR’ADUA (2010) ALL FWLR (PT 534) 1 at P. 22, INEC VS. NYAKO (2011) 12 NWLR (PT 1262) 439, MOBIL OIL (NIG) PLC VS. MOHAMMED & ANOR (2018) LPELR-43667 (CA) At PAGES 6-7 PARAGRAPH A. He submits that facts as pleaded by the Claimants are the fundamental determinants of the claims (or case) as put forward by the Claimants and not the reliefs sought by them. Placing reliance on the cases of AJIBULU VS. AJAYI (2013) LPELR-21860 SC at PAGES 16-17 PARAS G-A, ENERTECH ENG. CO. LTD VS. ALPHA PRAXIS (NIG) LTD (2014) LPELR-41105 CA. He reiterates his stand that it is the National Industrial Court as opposed to the trial Court (Federal High Court Jalingo) that was vested with the jurisdiction to have heard and determined the Respondents/Plaintiffs suit.
ON ISSUE TWO – He submits that the Respondents are challenging the competence of ground 5 of the Grounds of Appeal as issue no. 2 distilled therefrom. He posits that the Respondents are stopped from doing that as their consent was sought and obtained on the 11th day of March, 2020 placing reliance on the case of ALHAJI BANI GAA NUHU VS. ALHAJI ISHOLA ARE OGELE (2003) LPELR-2077 at 30 PARAGRAPHS C-F.
He also calls in aid the provision of Section 169 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the cases of ARIJE VS. ARIJE & ORS (2018) LPELR-44193 (SC), YUSUFF VS. DADA & 3 ORS (1990) 21 NSCC (PT 3) 125 at 143, MORAYO VS. OKIADE 8 WACA 46 at 47-48, CAINCROSS VS. LORINER (1860) 3 LT 130, ABE & ANOR VS. SKYE BANK PLC & ORS (2014) LPELR-24262 CA, MARK VS. ABUBAKAR (2009) 2 NWLR (PT. 1124) 79. He urges us to dismiss the Respondents’ objection against ground five of the grounds of appeal and issue no. 2 distilled therefrom as being misconceived and baseless in law.
In response to the argument of the Respondents in paragraph 4 – 35, it is submitted that in considering whether a suit discloses a reasonable cause of action it is the pleadings of the Claimants that can be examined placing reliance on the case of SHELL B.P PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD VS. ONASANYA (SUPRA).
He posits that the cases of USMAN VS. TAMADENA & CO LTD & ORS (SUPRA), INAKOJU & ORS VS. ADELEKE & ORS (SUPRA) cited and relied by the Respondents are good law but they are not applicable to the instant case at hand. He posits that by virtue of Section 136(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of proof was on the Respondents to point out a particular paragraph that had disclosed a reasonable cause of action. He urges us to resolve issue two in favour of the Appellants.
On Respondents issues no. 3 and 4, learned Appellants counsel submits that the Respondents did not file a notice of preliminary objection challenging the competence of the Appeal. All they did was to file a motion on notice dated the 28th day of October challenging only ground 5 of the amended notice of Appeal which is not the extant and subsisting Notice of Appeal. He submits that the Respondents are forbidden from raising an objection against grounds six and seven of the grounds of Appeal in their brief of Argument having not challenged the said grounds six and seven via a notice of preliminary objection or motion on notice as envisaged by the rules of this Court.
He submits that the law has now become well settled beyond equivocation that a complaint on wrongful admission or admission of inadmissible evidence by the trial Court is not a fresh issue and thus competent placing reliance on the following cases: ORIEBOSI VS. ANDY SAM INVESTMENT CO. LTD (2014) LPELR-23607 CA PAGE 31 PARAS A-C, OGUMA ASSOCIATED CO. (NIG) LTD VS. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR WEST AFRICA LTD (1988) NWLR (PT 73) 658, ONWE VS. OKE (2001) 3 NWLR (PT. 700) 406, SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. (NIG) LTD VS. OLANREWAJU (2002) 16 NWLR (PT 792) 55.
He further submits that grounds six and seven which are challenged by the Respondents are equally complaints bothering on evaluation of evidence by the trial Court which show that they are not raised as fresh issues placing reliance on the cases:- OBASANJO FARMS (NIG) LTD VS. MUHAMMAD (2016) LPELR-40199 CA, ORIEBOSI VS. ANDY SAM INVESTMENT CO. LTD (SUPRA). He urges us to dismiss the objections raised by the Respondents against grounds six and seven. He submits that the Respondents have relied on the case of EZECHUKWU & ANOR VS. ONWUKA (SUPRA) that notwithstanding the fact that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H are uncertified copies of public documents they are nevertheless admissible in law because they are attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons he opines that the position is not correct placing reliance in the cases of KASSIM VS. STATE (2017) LPELR-42586 SC, AROMOLARAN VS. AGORO (2014) LPELR-24037 (SC), GOODWILL & TRUST INVESTMENT LTD & ANOR VS. WITT & BUSH LTD (2011) LPELR-1333 SC, ITEOGU VS. LPDC (2009) LPELR-1559(SC), TARABA STATE GOVERNMENT & 3 ORS VS. MALLAM NASIRU BABA (SUPRA).
He urges us to discountenance the arguments of the Respondents on issues 3 and 4 and resolve same in favour of the Appellants.
REPLY ON ISSUE 5
He submits that the arguments of the Respondents in paragraph 4.64-4.68 at pages 25-27 of their brief of argument are misconceived and baseless in law while the cases of DAUDA VS. LAGOS BUILDING INVESTMENT CO. LTD & ORS (SUPRA), UBA PLC VS. SALMAN (SUPRA) are not applicable to the instant appeal. He posits that the award of general damages by the trial Court in favour of the Respondents after the award of special damages to them clearly amounts to double compensation which is forbidden by Law placing reliance on the case of OANDO (NIG) PLC VS. ADIJERE WEST AFRICA LTD (2013) LPELR-20591 (SC) PAGES 43-44 PARAGRAPHS F-B, ANTHONY SOETAN VS. OGUNWO (1975) 6 SC 67 at 72, KEREWI VS. ODUGBESAN (1967) NMLR 89 at 91, COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS & ORS VS. GUSAU (2017) LPELR-42081 (SC) PAGE 17 PARA D.
He urges us to hold that the trial Court was in error to have awarded general damages to the Respondent even when they emphatically and expressly pleaded that no wrong was done to them by the Appellants.
RESOLUTION OF THE NOMINATED AND ADOPTED ISSUES
Issue one of the Appellants challenges the jurisdiction of the trial Court to have entertained the matter and the failure of the trial Court to interpret Section 254 C (1) (a) and (k) of the Constitution. Jurisdiction which is a mantra in adjudication connotes the authority/power of a Court to hear and determine a dispute brought to it by the contending parties in the proceeding. See the following cases: AJAMOLE VS. YADUAT NO (1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172, GARBA VS. MOHAMMED (2016) 16 NWLR (PT 1537) 144 CA.
It is settled that the issue of jurisdiction is very vital in adjudicatory process. A Court without jurisdiction has been likened to an animal being drained off its blood. Accordingly, it occupies an Olympian position in the pyramid of adjudication. The jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the statutes creating it, the subject matter and the parties involved. The case of the Respondents/Claimants as revealed in their affidavit in support of their originating summons point out clearly that the reliefs sought therein touch on Employer-Employee relationship as salaries and allowances were involved. The Appellants’ contention that the Court vested with the jurisdiction to try and determine the suit was the National Industrial Court of Nigeria as encapsulated in Section 254 C (1) (a) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). In its place, the trial Court placed reliance on the provision of Section 251(1) of the same Constitution to assume jurisdiction simply because to the understanding of the learned trial Judge it affects the operation and management of a company.
The consideration of the section of the Constitution that created and donated jurisdiction to the Court and the nature of the claim giving rise to the suit ought and must be taken into account. If the learned trial Judge had put the case of the parties as presented before arriving at its decision a different result would have been found.
The law is settled that a decision of a Court of Law more especially a Court of Record must clearly show or demonstrate a dispassionate consideration of same. Since jurisdiction is so important any proceeding conducted without it, no matter the quantum of transparency, industry, dexterity and sophistry injected into it, will be marooned in the murky ocean of nullity. Having carefully scrutinized the Record of Appeal, the originating summons, the affidavit in support of same and the reliefs claimed therein it is beyond any equivocation the Federal High Court Jalingo lacked the vires to have embarked and determined the Respondents suit for lack of jurisdiction abinitio. It acted wrongly by resorting to Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. If the learned trial Judge had adverted his mind to Section 254 C (1) (a) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) he would have declined jurisdiction to have heard and determined the originating summons filed by the Respondents as Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, I am on one with learned counsel for the Appellants that the trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to do what it did. The judgment of the trial Court was made without jurisdiction and it cannot stand. Same is declared a nullity.
This appeal would have ended with the resolution of this jurisdictional issue and going into other issues would amount to merely academic exercise lacking practical utility value, but being an intermediate Appellate Court, I am prompted to examine the other issues raised in this Appeal.
ISSUE TWO – Whether by the pleadings of the Respondents, they disclosed any reasonable cause of action to warrant the hearing and determination to finality of Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 by the trial Court?
RESOLUTION – I have given an insightful and analytical consideration to the canvassed arguments of the line of divide herein and also considered the legion of judicial authorities being relied upon by them.
A cause of action is the technical legal name for the set of facts which give rise to a claim enforceable in Court. It is a legally recognized wrong that creates the right to sue. It is the whole of the material facts which it is necessary for the Plaintiff to allege and prove in order to succeed.
A reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chance of success. In the determination of a reasonable cause of action in the statement of claim, only the facts contained therein are deemed admitted. In the instant case, the affidavit of the Respondents as Plaintiffs take place of statement of claim.
Upon a careful perusal of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, it is not in doubt that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed to have warranted the lower Court to have heard and determined to finality Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018. Accordingly, issue 2 stands resolved against the Respondents and in favour of the Appellants.
ISSUE THREE – Whether it is proper in law for the learned trial Judge to have relied upon incompetent affidavits to enter judgment in favour of the Respondents.
I have given an indepth consideration to the arguments canvassed by the contending learned counsel in respect of this issue. It is apt and germane to reproduce the provision of Section 115(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 thus:
115(1) “Every affidavit used in the Court shall contain only a statement of fact and circumstances to which the witness deposes either of his own personal knowledge or from information which he believes to be true.
(2) An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter by way of objection, prayer or legal argument or conclusion.”
The contents of an affidavit can be elevated with sworn evidence, therefore, it ought to contain facts within the knowledge of the deponent not extraneous matters such as legal arguments and conclusions. It is trite that legal arguments are for the learned counsel to the parties while conclusions from facts deposed are function of the Courts. Paragraph 9 of and the entire affidavit guided the lower Court Judge in delivering the judgment subject of this appeal.
Paragraph 9 states thus: That at the Emergency Meeting of the Board of Directors (comprising the 2nd – 8th Plaintiffs and I) of the 2nd Defendant held on the 28th day of February, 2018, the 2nd Plaintiff informed the Board of Directors that he received a letter dated 13th day of February, 2018, from the 1st Defendant purporting to terminate the 2nd Plaintiffs appointment as Managing Director (CEO of the 2nd Defendant) and that in the said letter the 1st Defendant alleged that the Board of Directors of the 2nd Defendant alleged that the Board of Directors of the 2nd Defendant was dissolved through a press statement/Release allegedly made on the 30th September, 2016. The Board resolution of the said meeting dated 28th February, 2018 and the aid letter is hereby attached as Exhibits B and C respectively.
Having carefully perused paragraphs 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons and paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the further affidavit, I will reproduce paragraph 4 for ease of reference:
4. “That contrary to paragraph 3(a) of the Defendants’ counter-affidavit, the 4th Defendant was not duly appointed as Ag. Managing Director/CEO of the 3rd Defendant as the purported appointment was done by a stranger and without the requisite resolution of the 3rd Defendant’s Board of Director. The Central Bank of Nigeria refused to honour the said purported appointment because it was not done by the appropriate authority. Correspondence of the CBN dated 23rd November, 2016, is hereby annexed and marked as Exhibit ‘E’.
This referred paragraph with the greatest respect to the learned counsel to the Respondents was not competent to make, but it is only the Court that could draw such an inference from facts or Law as presented by learned counsel to the effect that the 1st Appellant did not appoint the Respondent as the MD/CEO. Placing reliance on Exhibit E attached to the Respondents’ further affidavit. The resultant consequence is that the paragraphs referred to above ought to be disallowed and struck out and in the same manner paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the further affidavit are accordingly disallowed and struck out. Notwithstanding that paragraph 4 of the further affidavit to which Exhibit E had been attached was struck out, I will still consider the merit of Appellants issue four (4) of the admissibility or otherwise of Exhibit E which is a photocopy of a letter said to have been written from the Central Bank of Nigeria. The letter is at page 108 of the printed Records of Appeal. There is no two ways that the Central Bank of Nigeria is a public officer being part of the public service of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To this end, any document coming from the bank for it to be admissible must satisfy the provisions of Section 104(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. The document must be either the original or certified true copy. Exhibit E was not certified. The contention of Respondents’ counsel that being an affidavit evidence, it was not necessary to certify same is untenable. The failure to have the said letter Exhibit E certified casts doubt to its authenticity. The learned trial Judge was therefore wrong in placing reliance on it. The Bankers Bank Central Bank of Nigeria in whose custody Exhibit E came into being did not deem it necessary to certify it in tandem with the requirement of Section 104(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. Accordingly, the lower Court did not possess the power to admit it and give probative value to it. We are of the view Exhibit E has no legs to stand and same is discountenanced in view of the following authorities:- OGUNLEYE VS. AINA (2011) 3 NWLR (PT. 1235) 479, NWABUOKU & ORS VS. ONWORDI & ORS (2006) LPELR-2082 (SC) P 21, PARAS A-C, UDO VS. STATE (2016) 40721 (SC) PP 14-15 PARA A, TELL COMMUNICATIONS LTD & ORS VS. NGILARI (2019) LPELR 46934 (CA) 40-42 PARAS D-C.
ON ISSUE FIVE (5)
Whether the trial Court was right in law to have granted the Respondents their claims of special and general damages.
I have considered the legal arguments, authorities proffered by the line of divide in this appeal, I wish to state that in the case of UTC (NIG) PLC VS. PHILLIPS (2012) 6 NWLR (PT 1295) 136 at 184 PARAS A-B it was held thus: “The Law frowns at award of double compensation. It is the law that where a party had been compensated fully under specific claims, it would be most inappropriate to compensate him again under general damages as that would amount to double compensation. It is an established principle, that if a Plaintiff recovers in full under special damages, he cannot be entitled to general damages for that would amount to double compensation. In the instant case, the N1,000,000.00 general damages awarded in favour of the Respondent after he had been awarded N2,000,000.00 as special damages was double compensation and is not justified”.
In the light of the above, the order made for special damages as contained at page 26 lines 21-24 of the judgment at page 155 of the Records of Appeal as well as the general damages awarded as contained at page 26 lines 8-11 page 155 of the printed Records of Appeal are set aside forthwith.
Having resolved all the issues decoded by the Appellants the undoubted owners of the appeal, I find and hold that the destiny of this appeal is obvious. It has tinge of merit and perforce must be allowed. The judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 4th of December by S.D Pam (J) of the Federal High Court Jalingo in Suit No. FHC/JAL/CS/8/2018 is set aside.
In its place, the suit stands struck out for lack of jurisdiction. I order “cost in the cause”.
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: I read in advance the draft copy of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, ABDUL-AZEEZ WAZIRI, JCA. I agree with the decision of my learned brother that the appeal has merit and should be allowed. I also allow the appeal with nothing further to add.
YUSUF ALHAJI BASHIR, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading before now the lead judgment just delivered by my Lord Abdul-Azeez Waziri, JCA. I agree that this appeal has merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower Federal High Court Jalingo in Suit No. FHC/JAL.CS/8/2018 must be and it is hereby set aside.
Appearances:
J.A Oguche, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Martin Milkman, Esq. For Respondent(s)
