DANTATA FOODS & ALLIED PRODUCTS LTD v. A.G. LEVENTIS (NIG.) PLC (2022)

DANTATA FOODS & ALLIED PRODUCTS LTD v. A.G. LEVENTIS (NIG.) PLC

(2022)LCN/16371(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, February 04, 2022

CA/K/78/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Ita George Mbaba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Muazu Lamido Justice of the Court of Appeal

Usman Alhaji Musale Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DANTATA FOODS & ALLIED PRODUCTS LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

A.G. LEVENTIS (NIG.) PLC RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

STATUTORY TENANCY IS A CREATION OF STATUTE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE TENANT

Counsel relied on the case of Orhunhur & Anor Vs Iverver (2015) 1 NWLR (Pt.1439) 192 at 204 – 205, on the definition of Statutory tenant, per Oyewole JCA, who founded on the decision of Idigbe JSC and said:
“What then is a statutory tenancy? This was adequately answered by Idigbe JSC at PP. 12 – 13 who described it thus:
“At common law, a tenant who entered premises on a lawful demise or title but wrongfully continues in possession of the premises, without agreement, after a particular estate is ended, is also a tenant at sufferance… Put simply, the statutory tenant is an occupier who, when his contractual tenancy expires, holds over and continues in possession by virtue of special statutory provision… On the same subject Obaseki, JSC stated as follows:
“It is my view and opinion that a statutory tenancy is a creation of statute for the benefit of the tenant and does not depend on the will or acceptance of the landlord or on the existence of a contractual tenancy.” See Pan Asian African Co. Ltd Vs National Insurance Corporation Nig. Ltd supra… By Section 2 of the Recovery of Premises Act, a tenant is defined as including any person occupying premises whether on payment of rent or otherwise but does not include a person occupying premises under a bonafide claim to be the owner of the premises…” ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A.

FINDINGS AND DECISION OF A COURT NOT APPEALED AGAINST REMAIN BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE

ITA GEORGE MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Appellant filed this Appeal against the decision of Kano State High Court in Suit No. K/296/2017, delivered on 22nd January, 2019 by Hon. Justice Dije Abdu Aboki, wherein the learned trial Judge entered judgment in favour of the Plaintiff (Respondent herein) and dismissed the Counter claim by the Defendant (Appellant herein).

At the Lower Court, the Plaintiff had claimed against the Defendant, as follows:
(1) An Order for immediate recovery and possession of the premises occupied by the Defendant known as Plot 33, Challawa Industrial Estate Kano from the Defendant.
(2) An Order directing an appropriate person or persons to enter the said Plot No. 33 Challawa Industrial Estate for the purpose of ejecting the Defendant therefrom and deliver vacant possession of the said premises to the Plaintiff.
(3) An Order directing the Defendant to make an immediate payment of the arrears of rent of Nineteen Million Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira only (N19,250,000) to the Plaintiff and mense profit at the cost of N229,167 per month and N91,666 per day, with effect from 1st February, 2017 till vacant possession is given to the Plaintiff.
(4) The Plaintiff also claims the cost of this action which the Defendant is making the Plaintiff to incur as expenses on account of this Suit.

On 18/7/2017, when the matter came up for initial mention, in the absence of the Appellant, judgment was entered for Respondent in respect of the first and second reliefs, pursuant to Order 10 Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of Court. This judgment was eventually set aside on 11/10/2017 on the application of the Appellant. Appellant was there upon granted enlargement of time to file its defence, which it did on 23/2/2018, as per the Amended Statement of Defence and Counter claim on Pages 96 – 102 of the Records of Appeal.

In the Counter-claim, Appellant sought:
(1) A declaration of Court that it is not the Tenant of the Plaintiff in respect of Plot 33, Challawa Industrial Estate, Kano;
(2) Damages, cost and any other relief in the interest of justice.

After hearing the case and considering the evidence and addresses of Counsel, the trial Judge held for the Respondent and said:
“… The crux of the Plaintiff’s case in this regard is the letter written by its tenant, Premier Bottling Company Ltd, dated July 5, 2009, informing the Plaintiff of the company’s acquisition by the Defendant and the Defendant’s interest in buying the property and to continue the payment of rent from February, 2010.
Now while the Defendant argued that the said Premier Bottling Company Ltd is not an agent of the Defendant and so cannot speak for it, the Plaintiff’s position is that it is an admission against interest and the Defendant, being a privy in estate to Premier Bottling Company Ltd is bound by those admissions.
It is correct as submitted by the Defendant’s Counsel, that Premier Bottling Company Ltd is not an agent of the Defendant and therefore any admission or assertion made by her cannot bind the Defendant. Now it is in evidence that the Defendant came into the property in question and that entry was a lawful one which was as a result of the acquisition of Premier Bottling Company Ltd that was a tenant on the property. It is in evidence that the machineries and equipment the Defendant purchased from Premier Bottling Company Ltd which by the evidence of DW1, the Defendant’s M/D, were disposed of were in the property before their disposed.
The submission of Learned Counsel to the Plaintiff, that the Defendant having acquired the Company that holds the lease over the property is in the eyes of the law a tenant of the Plaintiff, is a valid one. The case of Nigerian Airways Ltd Vs Mahdi (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt.1417) (cited) by the Plaintiff’s Counsel defines a tenant to include any person in lawful occupation of a property. What is material here is the initial occupation of the property whether it was lawful or not; in the instant case it has been well established that the Defendant came into the property lawfully and thus qualified as a tenant of the owner of the property i.e. the Plaintiff. And this is so whether payment of rent is made or not.
Now while exhibit A3 cannot be said to be binding on the Defendant who may not have known about it, having not been copied the letter and given the evidence of PW1 himself under cross examination that it was not written on behalf of the Defendant, however, it led the Plaintiff into believing that the Defendant has continued with the tenancy, entered by the company it acquired as the letter clearly stated.
The said letter exhibit A3 intimated the Plaintiff of basically the full disclosure of the leasehold to the Defendant and the fact that the property will be put up for sale. And more importantly that the Defendant will continue with the lease and will open a formal negotiation for the purchase of the property in due course.
Now although the Defendant led no evidence on what transpired with Premier Bottling Company Ltd at the time of its acquisition, the Defendant gave evidence on the offer it made to the Plaintiff for the purchase of the property which the DW1 testified was done by a letter dated 8th April, 2010, which they wrote to the Plaintiff but got no response. The DW1, under cross examination, not only stated that they have the letter in question, but that it is through the same letter they communicated to the Plaintiff that they were leaving the premises… It is significant to state that the said letter was never produced by the Defendant nor tendered in Court…
The submission of Learned Counsel to the Plaintiff on Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 in this case iswell founded and by virtue of the said Section 167(d), this Court holds that the letter in question was not produced, because it would be unfavourable to the case put up by the Defendant. That is to say, it will not be in consonance with the evidence given by DW1 that the Plaintiff was informed of the fact that the Defendant vacated the premises.
Now the evidence before this Court is that the Defendant acquired Premier Bottling Company Ltd knowing the company was in occupation of the property in question which the Defendant know was not owned by the Company. The evidence of DW1 under cross examination that they were not aware that the company occupy the property as tenants at the time they bought the company is one that is really difficult to believe, given the facts established in this case and the contents of exhibit A3 and the offer the Defendant claimed was made to Plaintiff to buy the property…
Thus, having been established that the Defendant went into the property and disposed of the machineries and locked up the place, with no evidence showing that they have given possession back to the Plaintiff, I find and hold that the Plaintiff has established its claim on the preponderance of evidence. Accordingly, I hereby enter judgment for the Plaintiff against the Defendant, as per the Plaintiff’s claim. The Counter-claim as I had earlier stated, is dismissed.” (See Pages 143 – 147 and 148 of the Records of Appeal)

That is the judgment Appellant contested in this Appeal, being dissatisfied. It filed Notice of Appeal on 5/2/2019, as shown on Pages 150 to 154 of the Records of Appeal. Appellant filed brief on 14/5/2019 which was deemed duly filed on 7/10/2021. It formulated a lone Issue for the determination of the Appeal, as follows:
“Whether a tenancy agreement and or lease ever came into existence between the Respondent and Appellant over the Respondent’s property situate at Plot 33 Challawa Industrial Estate, Kano, between the period of 1st February, 2010 to 31st January, 2017 to entitle the Respondent to the judgment of the trial Court?

The Respondent filed its Brief on 17/6/2019 which was also deemed duly filed on 7/10/2021, the day the Records of Appeal was regularized.

The Respondent distilled 2 Issues for the determination of the Appeal, as follows:
(1) Whether the Lower Court was right in holding that in circumstance of this case, the appellant was a tenant of the Respondent by operation of law? (Ground 2)
(2) Whether the Lower Court properly evaluated Exhibit A3 in coming to its judgment?

Arguing the Appeal, Appellant’s Counsel, Salisu Sule Esq, answered the lone question in the negative. He submitted that on the basis of facts pleaded by Respondent and evidence led, as well as exhibits A1 to A7, no tenancy agreement was ever shown to exist between the parties on the property; that the law is trite that he who alleges must prove, and so failure of the Respondent to establish the existence of such tenancy agreement was fatal to its claim. He relied on UBN Vs Ayodare (2007) 30 NSCQR 1; David Mbani Vs Mbiabe Bosi (2006) 26 NSCQR 583; Section 132 of the Evidence Act.

Counsel said evidence had shown that Respondent’s tenant on the property was Premier Bottling Company Ltd, in line with Respondent’s pleadings; that Appellant had pleaded that it did not acquire the property (tenancy) as when it purchased the machineries and equipment of Premier Bottling Company Ltd and that it quickly removed and disposed off the said machineries and equipment to interested buyers and left the premises without entering into any tenancy agreement with Plaintiff. See Paragraph 2 of Appellant’s Amended Statement of Claim on Page 91 of the Records.

On the construing of the Exhibit A3 as binding on the Appellant, by the trial Court, to infer tenancy with Respondent, Counsel said the trial Court was wrong to make such inference, even though the Exhibit A3 had been shown to align with the Appellant’s attention. Counsel submitted that the trial Court was wrong to have placed probative value to the pleading and evidence of Respondent, that Appellant had locked up the property for the duration claimed – 7 years; that even if 7 years tenancy could be inferred (which Appellant did not concede) to exist between the parties herein, that the law was trite that any tenancy agreement (now a lease) exceeding 3 years must be in writing, to give any validity to such agreement. He relied on Section 54(2) of the Property Law Act, 1925.

Counsel argued that, to prove existence of contract of lease (tenancy) between Appellant and Respondent, there was need to establish offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relationship, as is required in every common contract. He relied on the case of Addeh Vs Onakomaiya (2017) ALL FWLR (Pt.097) 1609 at 1711.

He insisted that there was no tenancy contract between the parties as no element of contract could be established in this case between Appellant and Respondent. He relied on the case of Ezemba Vs Ibeneme (2004) 199 NSCQR 352, and Peter Ojoh Vs Owuala Kamalu (2005)24 NSCQR 256. He urged us to resolve the issue for Appellant and allow the Appeal.

Counsel for Respondent, Gideon OgechukwuUzu, Esq on their Issue 1, submitted that the law recognizes two classes of tenancy – contractual and statutory tenancy (tenancy by operation of law); that the facts of this case was undisputed that Appellant acquired Premier Bottling Company Ltd (as shown in Exhibit A3) which was the tenant of Respondent on the property; he said that upon the acquisition of Premier Bottling Company Ltd, Appellant took over the possession of the property rented by the company – Premier Bottling Company Ltd at Plot No. 33 Challawa Industrial Estate, Kano, as the tenancy between the company and Respondent was still extant and subsisting; that Appellant had held on to the possession of the property and failed to surrender same to the Respondent; that failure of Appellant to establish evidence of surrender of the premises (property) to Respondent, meant it was still in possession. Thus, the trial Court was right to hold as it did, that Appellant was the tenant of the property, by operation of law, relying on the case of Nigerian Airways Ltd Vs Mahdi (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt.1417) 32.

Counsel said the decision of the Lower Court, that Appellant was a statutory tenant of Respondent, cannot be impeached as the same was founded on established evidence and sound legal, reasoning, to wit; Appellant’s initial lawful entry and occupation of the property (Plot No.33 Challawa Industrial Estate, Kano) after the acquisition of the Premier Bottling Company Ltd. And there is the legal recognition of persons in occupation of premises, with or without payment of rent.

Counsel said Appellant did not deny the finding of fact that it took over possession of the property and did not appeal against those findings. Here lied on the case of Saleh Vs Abah (2018) ALL FWLR (Pt.933) 944 at 978, as to the effect of failure to appeal against finding/holding of a Court; that the same remained binding and conclusive.

Counsel relied on the case of Orhunhur & Anor Vs Iverver (2015) 1 NWLR (Pt.1439) 192 at 204 – 205, on the definition of Statutory tenant, per Oyewole JCA, who founded on the decision of Idigbe JSC and said:
“What then is a statutory tenancy? This was adequately answered by Idigbe JSC at PP. 12 – 13 who described it thus:
“At common law, a tenant who entered premises on a lawful demise or title but wrongfully continues in possession of the premises, without agreement, after a particular estate is ended, is also a tenant at sufferance… Put simply, the statutory tenant is an occupier who, when his contractual tenancy expires, holds over and continues in possession by virtue of special statutory provision… On the same subject Obaseki, JSC stated as follows:
“It is my view and opinion that a statutory tenancy is a creation of statute for the benefit of the tenant and does not depend on the will or acceptanceof the landlord or on the existence of a contractual tenancy.” See Pan Asian African Co. Ltd Vs National Insurance Corporation Nig. Ltd supra… By Section 2 of the Recovery of Premises Act, a tenant is defined as including any person occupying premises whether on payment of rent or otherwise but does not include a person occupying premises under a bonafide claim to be the owner of the premises…”

Counsel said tenancy agreement only applies to contractual tenant; that Appellant who entered through Premier Bottling Company Ltd and held over, cannot talk about absence of tenancy agreement.

Counsel noted that Appellant did not appeal against the findings of the trial Court, that Appellant took over possession of the property after acquiring Premier Bottling Company Ltd; that Appellant locked up the premises for 7 years. He argued that that finding and holding remained binding. Counsel said that a statutory tenant is liable for use and occupation of the property he holds over, and need not even be in physical possession, to be liable. Counsel relied on the case of Mrs. Grace Chiadi& Anor Vs Miss OpuineAggo&Ors (2018)175 at 219.

On Issue 2, whether the Lower Court properly evaluated Exhibit A3 in coming to its judgment, Counsel answered in the affirmative and urged to dismiss the Appeal.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
I do not think the Respondent’s Counsel needed to raise Issue 2, at all, as the Appellant did not make the proper evaluation of Exhibit A3 an issue in its arguments. If anything, Appellant had acknowledged the importance placed on the Exhibit A3 by the trial Court, and had quarreled with that when it said in Paragraph 4.9 of the Brief:
“It is submitted, with respect, that due to the following facts, the trial Court ought not to (sic) given Exhibit A3 probative value to neutralize the Appellant’s position, that no tenancy relationships ever took place between it and the Respondent herein viz.”

Since Appellant did not raise any specific complaint against the way the trial Court evaluated the Exhibit A3 to reach its conclusion in this Appeal, I do not think the Respondent needed to saddle itself with such responsibility, having been the beneficiary of the way the trial Court construed the said Exhibit A3.

An Appeal is usually heard on the issues raised by the Appellant, and where a Respondent raises an Issue, it should fall in line with that of the Appellant, and as per the grounds of Appeal by Appellant. The Respondent’s issue should interrogate the said issue or grounds by Appellant, and put a lie to the claims (contest the claims) of the Appellant, except where there is need to concede to the issue, in the interest of justice. See the case of Emesonye Vs The State (2016) LPELR – 40549 (CA), where we held:
“We have stated several times, that a Respondent has no room to raise an issue for determination of appeal, outside the grounds of appeal, formulated by the Appellant, except, of course, he (Respondent) has cross-appealed, or raised a Respondent’s Notice, on the strange or fresh issue he proposed. See the case of Onuegbu&Ors v. Gov. of Imo State &Ors (2015) 8 CAR 224 at 240; (2015) LPELR – 25968 (CA); Anyalenkeya v. Anya &Ors (2016) LPELR – 40218 CA (page 20 thereof); Musa v. State (2014) LPELR – 22912 CA; (2014) 25 WRN 101″
See also Fayemi Vs Oni &Ors (2019) LPELR – 49291 (SC), where it was held:
“Where theRespondents have not filed a cross appeal, and have also not filed a notice of intention to rely on other grounds in urging the Court to sustain the decision against which the appeal lies, they cannot formulate issues outside the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant.”

Appellant’s lone Issue for the determination of this Appeal is apt but does not appear to raise any valid appeal against the salient findings and decision of the Learned trial Court, which acknowledged Appellant as a statutory tenant on the premises, after Appellant had acquired the contractual tenant, Premier Bottling Company Ltd, and took over the machineries and equipment of the said Premier Bottling Company Ltd in the premises – Plot No. 33 Challawa Industrial Estate, Kano, and occupied same, sold the machineries and equipment and locked up the place.

The Learned trial Judge had held, beautifully, on Pages 145, 146 and 147:
“Now while exhibit A3 cannot be said to be binding on the Defendant who may not have known about it, having not been copied the letter and given the evidence of PW1 himself under cross examination that it was not written on behalfof the Defendant, however it led the Plaintiff into believing that the Defendant has continued with the tenancy entered by the company it acquired as the letter clearly stated.
The said letter exhibit A3 intimated the Plaintiff of basically the full disclosure of the leasehold to the Defendant and the fact that the property will be put up for sale. And more importantly that the Defendant will continue with the lease and will open a formal negotiation for the purchase of the property in due course.
Now although the Defendant led no evidence on what transpired with Premier Bottling Company Ltd at the time of its acquisition, the Defendant gave evidence on the offer it made to the Plaintiff for the purchase of the property which the DW1 testified was done by a letter dated 8th April, 2010 which they wrote to the Plaintiff but got no response. The DW1, under cross examination not only stated that they have the letter in question but that it is through the same letter they communicated to the Plaintiff that they were leaving the premises… This is the evidence of the DW1 under cross examination:
“…Yes we communicated to thePlaintiff that we have left the premises. I have a copy of the letter we wrote to the Plaintiff telling them that we are leaving the premises and the offer to purchase the property in my computer. The letter of 8th April, 2010 is making an offer to purchase the property and telling them we have vacated the premises as stated in paragraph 5 of my witness deposition. I don’t know if the letter is before the Court. Yes we have that letter in our possession as we are the makers…”
Now the evidence before this Court is that the Defendant acquired Premier Bottling Company Ltd knowing the company was in occupation of the property in question, which the Defendant knew was not owned by the company. The evidence of the DW1 under cross examination that they were not aware that the company occupy the property as tenants at the time they bought the company is one that is really difficult to believe, given the facts established in the case and the contents of exhibit A3 and the offer the Defendant claimed, was made to the Plaintiff to buy the property…”

Appellant did not appeal against those clear findings, that after acquiring thecompany (Premier Bottling Company Ltd) Appellant occupied the property, disposed of the machineries and equipment and locked up the premises for 7 years. It claimed to have written to Respondent to notify the Respondent of vacation of the property, but failed to produce such vital letter at the trial. Of course, such letter, if it existed, would also put a lie to Appellant’s claim that it was not Respondent’s tenant. Appellant could not have written to Respondent that it had vacated the property if it were not Respondent’s tenant!

The law is trite that findings and decision of a Court not appealed against remain binding and conclusive. See Opara Vs Dowel Shlumberger Nig. Ltd & Anor (2006) LPELR – 2746 (SC):
“It is also settled law that where a party fails to appeal against a finding of the trial Court or the Court of Appeal, he cannot be heard to question the finding on appeal to the Supreme Court, the essence of an appeal is to have an opportunity to have one’s suit re-examined before a higher Court. In effect the failure of the appellant to appeal against the decision of the trial Court refusing an order ofspecific performance is that that decision remains binding and conclusive between the parties – see Alakija v. Abdulai (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 552) 1 at 4. In Ndiwe v. Okocha (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 252) 129 at 139-140 it was held by this Court that where the trial Court makes a finding of fact on a specific issue before it, such an issue should be raised as a substantive ground of appeal by the appellant who is challenging the finding of fact and it cannot be covered under the omnibus ground of appeal.” Per ONNOGHEN, JSC
See also Daniel Vs FRN (2015) LPELR – 24733 (SC):
“It is also interesting to note that the appellant did not appeal against the finding and holding by the Court below that from the record, the learned trial Judge did not fulfill the statutory condition precedent under Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The implication of this is that he is satisfied with the said finding and therefore bound by the said finding and holding. The appellant can then not be heard to now complain that the Court below did not take decision on the issue of discretion under Section 218. It is too late, to say the least, for him to now complainabout that issue. See Uwazurike& Anor v. Nwachukwu & Anor (2012) 12 SCM (Pt.2) 534.” Per ARIWOOLA, JSC.

Appellant had argued at the Lower Court, that the letter (Exhibit A3) was not written on its behalf by the Premier Bottling Company Ltd, and that the said Company was not its (Appellant’s) agent and did not act on Appellant’s instruction. But having admitted the company (Premier Bottling Company Ltd) was acquired by Appellant, and that it (Appellant) took over the company’s premises and sold its machineries and equipment, and even offered to buy the said property (premises of Respondent),Appellant had assumed the place of the Company (Premier Bottling Company Ltd) it bought, in the property, as it could not have bought only the asset of the company, but also its liabilities (including rental) on the premises, until it yielded possession to the Respondent. Of course, one who acquires a company, enjoying its assets should also be responsible enough to accept its liabilities, as he cannot run away from the liabilities, in my opinion. See A.O. Afolabi &Ors Vs Western Steel Works Ltd &Ors (2012) LPELR – 9340 (SC),where it was held:
“The purchaser of a company buys its assets and liabilities. To prove to the satisfaction of the Court that a company had been bought by another company, the person who asserts must place before the Court, documents from the Corporate Affairs Commission to justify the assertion. Documents such as: (i) Instrument of transfer; (ii) Documents to show acquisition of shares of the 1st respondent by the 3rd respondent (iii) Filing of relevant papers. In the absence of documentary evidence (above) credible evidence was led to show that the 3rd respondent acquired, or bought the 1st respondent. Such an issue is never resolved solely on testimony on oath. There must be documentary evidence to support oral testimony, thereby making oral testimony more credible. The appellants, as plaintiffs failed woefully to discharge the burden of proof placed on them by law. Section 146 of the Evidence Act provides for the well known principle of law that possession is prima facie proof of ownership. That is to say possession of the property in dispute (the 1st defendant company) is good title against anyone who cannot prove a better title. Section 146 of the Evidence Actis irrelevant in deciding whether a company was acquired by another company. Issues such as acquisitions, mergers are regulated by the companies and Allied Matters Act.” Per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC.”
Appellant was therefore a statutory tenant of the Respondent and liable to satisfy its obligations under the tenancy, until it yielded possession to Respondent. See the cases of Chiadi& Anor Vs Aggo (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt.1603) 175; Samuel Orhunhur& Anor Vs TerhumumiIverver (2015) 1 NWLR (Pt.1439) 192.

I cannot fault the decision of the learned trial Court, and I so resolve the issue against Appellant and dismiss the Appeal.
Appellant shall pay the cost of this Appeal, assessed at One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000) only, to Respondent.

ABUBAKAR MU’AZU LAMIDO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother ITA G. MBABA, JCA, and I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein that this appeal is unmeritorious and be dismissed. I too dismiss the appeal and abide by all the consequential orders as contained in the lead judgment.

USMAN ALHAJI MUSALE, J.C.A.: My learned brother Ita G. Mbaba, JCA had availed me with a draft of the lead judgment before now. I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusions reached. The appeal is also dismissed by me and I abide by the consequential orders made therein.

Appearances:

SALISU SULE ESQ. For Appellant(s)

GIDEON O UZU ESQ with AUGUSTA UCHECHUKWU UZU (MRS.) For Respondent(s)