UKI WE v. FRN (2021)

UKI WE v. FRN

(2021)LCN/15761(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, November 25, 2021

CA/PH/19CR/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Tani Yusuf Hassan Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ridwan Maiwada Abdullahi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Olabode Abimbola Adegbehingbe Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

JOHNSON ABRAHAM UKI WE APPELANT(S)

And

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE OFFENCE OF OBTAINING BY FALSE PRETENCE

The offence of obtaining by false pretence is prescribed under Section 1(1)(a), (b), (c) and (3) of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 2006 thus:
Section 1(1) provides: notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, any person who by any false pretence and with intent or defraud
a) Obtains, from any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country for himself or any other person;
b) Induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to deliver to any person; or
c) Obtains any property, whether or not the property is obtained or its delivery is induced through the medium of a contract induced by the false pretence, commits an offence under this Act.
Section 1(3) provides: A person who commits an offence under Subsection (1) or (2) of this Section is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years and not less than seven years without the option of a fine. To secure conviction for obtaining by false pretence, the Courts have in plethora of cases held that the prosecution must prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt. PER ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.

RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court, Port Harcourt Judicial Division (the lower Court) delivered on 22nd November, 2019 wherein the Honourable Justice A. T. Mohammed convicted the Appellant of obtaining monies by false pretence and sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment without option of fine and ordered him to refund the sum of N10,055,000 to the norminal complainant, PW3.

The Appellant was arraigned on 9th January, 2018 on a five count charge. At conclusion of the trial, the lower Court acquitted the Appellant of count 1 of the charge but convicted him on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court, the Appellant has now appealed to this Honourable Court via his Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 17th February, 2020.

SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Appellant on 9th January, 2018 was arraigned before the lower Court on a five count charge bordering on illegal dealing in petroleum products and obtaining monies by false pretence. Specifically, count 1 bordered on illegal dealing in petroleum products contrary to and punishable under Section 1 (17)(b) of Miscellaneous Offences Act, Laws of the Federation, Cap M17, 2004, while counts II–V bordered on obtaining monies by false pretence contrary to and punishable under Sections 1(1)(a) & (3) of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 2006. See pages 1-4 of the Record of Appeal.

In accordance with the Rules of Court on Criminal Appeals, the parties filed and exchanged briefs of arguments. When the appeal came up for hearing on the 23rd September, 2021, the briefs were identified and adopted on behalf of the parties by their respective learned Counsel.

Tonye Krukrubo, Esq. who appeared with Isdore Ozuo, Esq. for the Appellant, adopted the Appellant’s Brief of Argument settled by him, which was filed on the 16/10/2020 but deemed properly filed and served on the 4/12/2020. He also adopted the Appellant’s Reply Brief settled by him and filed on the 14/1/2021.

The Respondent’s was not in Court even though served by text message and phone call on the 13/8/2021 of the hearing date – 23/9/2021. Nothing excused the absence, either written or verbal. Hence, the Respondent’s Brief of Argument settled by Eunice Dalyop Vou, Esq. of EFCC office, Enugu and filed on the 12/1/2021 was deemed argued vide Order 19 Rule 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Appellant submitted a lone issue for determination, thus:
“Whether the Appellant had the intention to defraud the complainant to warrant the trial Court’s conviction and sentence.” (Distilled from grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal).

Respondent formulated two (2) issues for determination, as follows:
a) “Whether from the totality of evidence, the lower Court was right in holding that the prosecution proved the offences of obtaining money false by pretence against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as to warrant his conviction?
b) “Whether in view of the conviction of the Appellant, the lower Court was right in making an order of restitution against him?

A close look at the two sets of issues shows that they mirror each other in substance and each set can conveniently determine the appeal. I will therefore decide the appeal on the lone issue submitted by the Appellant being the owner of this appeal.

ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUE
In his argument of the sole issue as stated above, the learned Counsel for the Appellant said that the burden of proof in criminal cases is always on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offence with which the Defendant is charged. That it is based on the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise. He referred to Section 36(5) of the 1999 CFRN (as amended); Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 211 and the cases of Ankpegher V. State (2018) LPELR–43906 (SC) 24-25 (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1630) 249; Anyasodor V. State (2018) LPELR (SC) 13 -14, Paras. F – E.

That in this case, the lower Court found the Appellant guilty of the offence of obtaining monies by false pretence and sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment without option of fine. Referred to pages 422 and 423 of the Record of Appeal.

He is of the opinion that the Respondent did not succeed in proving all the essential ingredients of the offence charged against the Appellant to justify the lower Court’s conviction and sentence.

That to secure a conviction for obtaining by false pretence, the Courts have held in plethora of cases that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. There must be a pretence;
2. The pretence emanated from the accused person;
3. That it was false;
4. That the accused person knew of its falsity or did not believe in its truth;
5. That there was an intention to defraud;
6. That the thing is capable of being stolen;
7. That the accused person induced the owner, to transfer his whole interest in the property. Emphasis ours.

He referred to the case of Odiawa V. FRN (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 439) 436; Alake V. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 205) 567; Onwudiwe V. FRN (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 319) P. 774; Abraham V. FRN (2018) LPELR–44136 (CA) (PP. 18–21, Paras. B–C).

Counsel contended that the fifth element stated in paragraph 4.4 of the Appellant’s brief – “that there was an intention to defraud” was not proved by the prosecution against the Appellant to warrant the trial Court’s conviction and sentence. He referred to the holden of the trial Court at pages 421 and 422 of the Record of Appeal and said that “it is clear that the lower Court’s position on the Appellant’s intention to defraud is premised on the following two facts.”
a) The Appellant showed PW3 two trucks that were loaded and disappeared.
b) The monies transferred to JEKSBROOKS LTD. & SOFT PET LTD. were meant to set off the Appellant’s debts.

He said that the law is trite, an Appellate Court will interfere with the findings of facts by a trial Court where such findings are perverse, illogical or not supported by evidence. Relied on the cases of Aminu V. Hassan (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 922) 422. He then submitted that the learned trial Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence presented by the Respondent before reaching the conclusion at pages 421 and 422 of the records; thereby arrived at a perverse decision.

That the learned trial Judge ought to have adverted his mind to the following evidence presented by the parties during the course of the trial which according to counsel would have altered the Court’s conclusion:
a) The business model of the Appellant
b) The relationship between the Appellant and the nominal complainant
c) Delay in supply of products or breach of contract or failed business transaction does not amount to “intention to defraud.”
d) Exhibit E, the statement of the Appellant, did not corroborate the evidence of PW3, the nominal complainant and PW5, the staff of EFCC.

On the business model of Appellant, learned Counsel contended that from the evidence led by the Respondent, it is clear that the Appellant’s business model is that he acquires petroleum products under a deferred payment arrangement. He referred to Exhibit E, the statement of the Appellant tendered by the prosecution, wherein the Appellant explained his business model; contained at pages 48 and 49 of the Record of Appeal. He also referred to the evidence of PW1 and PW4 at pages 339–341 and 355 of the records.

He submitted that the lower Court erred in law when it came to the conclusion that the Appellant had the intention to defraud PW3 because the monies transferred to JEKSBROOKS RESOURCES LTD. and to SOFT PET. LTD. were from the beginning meant to set off the Appellant’s debt.

That the trial Judge did not advert his mind to how the Appellant carries on his business, that is, he first settles his outstanding debts before requesting for new supplies. He said that the settlement was done in order to facilitate new supplies.

He opined that in view of the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW4 and Exhibit E, the Appellant had no intent to defraud PW3, notwithstanding that the monies transferred to JEKSBROOKS LTD and SOFT PET. LTD were used to set off the Appellant’s debt. Counsel urge us to so hold.

On the relationship between the Appellant and the complainant, the learned Counsel referred again to Exhibit E and contended that in the evidence before the trial Court, the Appellant clearly stated that he was a staff of EXPLOIT ENERGY LTD for a year and half and was in charge of logistics, sourcing and procuring petroleum products in Port Harcourt. He referred to Exhibit F (ID Card) issued to him by the nominal complainant, contained on pages 383 and 384 of the Record of Appeal.

That corroborating the Appellant’s evidence, PW3 in his statement to the EFCC admitted that the Appellant was their “Depot Rep. Contractor who is always on commission with Exploits Energy Ltd. for Truck Hiring Services.” Referred to page 39 of the Record of Appeal. He said that under cross-examination, PW3 expressly denied it by saying that he cannot remember at the moment. Referred to page 352 of the records. Counsel said that this goes to show unequivocally that PW3 was not a witness of truth. Cited the case of Ezemba V. Ibeneme & Anor. (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 894) 617 where the Supreme Court held that no witness who has given inconsistent evidence is entitled to the honour of credibility and such a witness does not deserve to be treated as a truthful witness. That the learned trial Judge ought not to have believed the evidence of PW3, particularly that the Appellant showed him two trucks loading and disappeared.

Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong when he concluded that the Appellant had intention to defraud PW3 based on the fact that the Appellant allegedly showed PW3 two trucks that were loading and later disappeared without considering the fact that the Appellant’s resident was known to PW3; the cordial business relationship between the Appellant and PW3 before the instant transaction and that PW3 was not a witness of truth.

On delay in supply of products or Breach of Contract or failed business transaction does not amount to intention of Defraud, learned Counsel contended that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to show the timeline agreed to supply the products to PW3. That at best, the instant transaction is a delay, not a refusal to supply the petroleum product and delay does not amount to an intention to defraud. That the evidence before the lower Court established that the Appellant had connected with suppliers of petroleum products and monies made available by PW3 were used to settle related outstanding debts in line with the Appellant’s business model, not for personal gains. Reliance placed on the cases of Egube V. FRN (2020) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1734) 103 @ 131, Paras. C-F; 134, Paras. H–A; 136, Paras. C–E & Solomon Maken V. FRN (2019) LPELR–48707 (CA) 23-26.

He said that in the instant case, the relationship between the nominal complainant and the Appellant was purely a commercial relationship that did not work out as planned. That there was no intent whatsoever on the part of the Appellant to defraud PW3. That the nominal complainant can always initiate an action under breach of contract against the Appellant. That it is disheartening that the nominal complainant, rather than proceed against the Appellant for breach of contract, decided to involve the Security Agency, that is the EFCC. He said that this Court has warned time without number that neither the EFCC nor the police is a debt recovery or contract enforcement agency. Referred to the cases of Omuma Micro-Finance Bank V. Ojinnaka (2018) LPELR–43988 (CA); Oceanic Securities International Ltd. V. Balogun & Ors. (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 677) and Igwe V. Ezeanochie (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1192) 61 @ 93.

Counsel opined that this is a clear case of improper employment of the EFCC and urge the Court to so hold.

On Exhibit E, the statement of Appellant, did not corroborate the evidence of PW3, the nominal complainant and PW5, the learned Counsel contended that the lower Court did not properly evaluate Exhibit E before reaching the conclusion that it corroborated the evidence of PW3 and PW5.

He submitted that Exhibit E does not support the prosecution’s case as it did not contain any evidence that the Appellant had the intent to defraud PW3 as captured in counts 2–5 of the charge.

Counsel urge the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant and set aside the conviction and sentence, as the learned trial Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence before the Court, thereby reaching a wrong decision. That none of the prosecution’s witnesses and exhibits established an intent on the part of Appellant to defraud the nominal complainant.

In conclusion, learned Counsel urged this Court to allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the Appellant as well as the consequential order by the lower Court.

In response, the learned Counsel to the Respondent referred to Section 1 (1) of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 2006 and contended that for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and sustain a conviction, the evidence led has to show that there is a pretence from the accused person, that it’s false, that the accused knew that the pretence was false or did not believe in its truth, that there was an intention to defraud and that the thing is capable of being stolen as decided in the cases of Alake V. The State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 205) 567; Nwankwo V. FRN (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 809) 1; FRN V. Helen Banke Laoye (2007–2011) E. C. L. R. Vol. 2, 69 and Rev. Victor Mukoro V. FRN (2015) LPELR–24439 (CA).

He said that there is unchallenged and uncontradicted evidence wherein the Appellant informed PW3 to transfer money to JEKSBROOK RESOURCES LTD and MAX CONSULT LTD as they were companies that will deliver oil product to him but that indirectly PW3 never knew that the said money was for the Appellant to offset his debt. That the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 were very clear on that and stated their evidence together with that of PW3. He analysed the evidence of the said witnesses and submitted that the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 adduced by the prosecution and which established that the money the Appellant made PW3 to transfer through Max Consult to Jeksbrook Ltd. and Soft Pet. Ltd. was from the beginning meant to offset the Appellant’s debt which further proved that the Appellant had intention to defraud PW3.

Counsel said that evidence of PW5 corroborated the evidence of PW1–PW4 and Exhibit E, the statement of the Appellant corroborates evidence of PW5. That the Appellant’s confessional statement is also apt to this case as same corroborates the evidence of PW1-PW4.

He contended that there is no business model between the complainant and Appellant as the Appellant does not acquire Petroleum Products under a deferred payment arrangement. That the Appellant did not inform PW3 that the N10,055,000.00 paid to the Appellant twice was to settle an outstanding debts; rather, he made a representation to the complainant that Jeksbrook and Max Consult will supply products to him (PW3) and that made the complainant to part with a whooping sum of N10,055,000.00.

Counsel referred to Exhibit C3 and said that by it, Maxconsult is an Engineering firm that has no relationship with oil business. That the Appellant used its account to perpetuate his fraud against the PW3.

He argued that Appellant being at one time Depot Rep. contractor did not make him an employee or a staff of Exploit/Energy Ltd. That the Appellant only tendered a staff ID card with designation “Public Relation Officer” and no more.

Counsel contended that the issue of delay in supply of products or breach of contract or failed business transaction does not arise in this case as evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 revealed that the Appellants made a representation to PW3 that he will supply and deliver product to him, but indirectly same were to offset his debts with the fund which PW3 obtained as loan from First Bank Plc.

He reiterated on Exhibit E that it corroborated the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 and as such supports the prosecution’s case as it relates obtaining money by false pretence and intention to defraud PW3 as captured in counts 2–5 of the charge.

Learned counsel to the Respondent by issue two of the Respondent, referred to Section 11(1) (a) of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006. He referred also to Section 11(2) of the same law and Sections 319(1)(a) and 321(a) of Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 in submitting that the Appellant having been found guilty of the offences charged in counts 2, 3, 4 and 5, convicted and sentenced appropriately, the justice of the case demands that appropriate compensation be made to the injured victim and nominal complainant who testified as PW3 in this case.

In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appeal, affirm the Appellant’s conviction and sentence by the lower Court and the consequential order for Restitution.

In reaction to the response, the learned Counsel for the Appellant by Reply Brief argued that the submissions of the Respondent on the issues are completely misconceived and misplaced, as such, should be discountenance by this Court.

He argued that a conviction and sentence for obtaining monies by false pretence, the law is that the prosecution must not only prove that the Defendant made false representation but also that he had intention to defraud. That whilst the first ingredient touches on ‘actus reus’, the latter borders on ‘mens rea’. That the two ingredients are mutually exclusive. Referred to Onwudiwe V. FRN (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 319) 774 & Abraham V. FRN (2018) LPELR–44136 (CA) 18–21, Paras. B–C.

He said that admittedly, the Appellant did not inform the nominal complainant that the sums of money he transferred to Jeksbrook Resources Limited and Max Consult Limited were to settle his outstanding debts that this can only suffice as false pretence; it does not translate to intention to defraud. Cited the case of Ojukwu V. FRN (2020) NWLR (Pt. 1717) @ 375–376, Paras. A–E.

Learned Counsel further argued that the second issue of the Respondent is incompetent and ought to be struck out as it does not arise from any of the grounds of appeal. Cited and relied on Bakoshi V. Chief of Naval Staff (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 896) 284, Paras. A–G & Ceekay Traders Ltd. V. Gen. Motors Co. Ltd. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 132 @ 151, Para. D.

He urged this Court to discountenance the Respondent’s second issue for being incompetent and fundamentally defective.

RESOLUTION
This appeal is predicated on whether or not the lower Court rightly convicted and sentenced the Appellant herein in view of the allegation and evidence adduced in proof thereof before the trial Court.

The Appellant who was the Defendant at the lower Court was tried and found guilty which resulted in his conviction for the offences of obtaining the total sum of N10,055,000.00 by false pretence. He was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment without option of fine and a consequential order of restitution of the sum of N10,055,000.00 was made by the trial Court; Federal High Court, Port Harcourt.

The offence of obtaining by false pretence is prescribed under Section 1(1)(a), (b), (c) and (3) of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 2006 thus:
Section 1(1) provides: notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, any person who by any false pretence and with intent or defraud
a) Obtains, from any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country for himself or any other person;
b) Induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to deliver to any person; or
c) Obtains any property, whether or not the property is obtained or its delivery is induced through the medium of a contract induced by the false pretence, commits an offence under this Act.
Section 1(3) provides: A person who commits an offence under Subsection (1) or (2) of this Section is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years and not less than seven years without the option of a fine. To secure conviction for obtaining by false pretence, the Courts have in plethora of cases held that the prosecution must prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt.

In the light of the overwhelming oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution at the lower Court, can it truly be said that elements of the offences were proved beyond reasonable doubt?

From the evidence adduced by the Prosecution and Defence, there is no dispute as to deposited total sum of N10,055,000.00 in two installments by the nominal complainant, PW3 in this case to Max Consult Ltd. and Jeksbrook Ltd on the representation of the Appellant that they will load the trucks faster and supply the petroleum products for which monies were paid for. No dispute as to the use of the monies transferred in offsetting Appellant’s outstanding debts without the knowledge of the nominal complainant, PW3. Also no dispute as to non-supply and delivery of the petroleum products which the total sum of N10,055,000.00 was paid for.

The only point of dispute is that the representation made by the Appellant to the PW3 which led to the payment of the said sum of N10,055,000.00 was not intended to defraud PW3, the nominal complainant.

According to the submission of learned Counsel for the Appellant, the prosecution was not only required to prove that the Appellant made false representations, the ‘actus reus’ of the offence, but must also establish the Appellant’s intention to defraud, the ‘mens rea’ of the offence. He cited and relied on the case of Taiwo V. FRN (2019) Supra on the point.

Counsel is of the opinion that the fifth element stated in paragraph 4.4 of the Appellant’s Brief – “that there was an intention to defraud” was not proved by the prosecution against the Appellant to warrant the trial Court’s conviction and sentence.

It is on record that the learned trial Judge, in his consideration of the totality of the evidence adduced before the trial Court, came to the conclusion that the Appellant as Defendant had the intention to defraud the nominal complainant; where he held as follows:
“…the evidence of the prosecution, through PW3 (i.e. the complainant), which the prosecution is relying has shown that the Defendant, by taking PW3 to the refinery and showed him the two trucks and disappeared, has established that the Defendant, has intention to defraud PW3 ab initio. I so hold. The evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 adduced by the prosecution and which established that the money the Defendant made PW3 to transfer through Max Consult to Jeksbrooks Ltd and to Soft Pet Ltd, was from the beginning meant to set off the Defendant’s debt further proved that the Defendant had intention to defraud.
I am therefore satisfied that the prosecution has discharge the burden of proving that the Defendant had intention to defraud.” See pages 421 and 422 of the Record of Appeal.

It is on record that the nominal complainant/PW3 testified that he came down to Port Harcourt from Lagos and the Appellant took him to the Refinery and showed him two trucks that were loading. He waited for the trucks to load, after which the Appellant disappeared. This evidence was not in any way controverted by the defence when they cross-examined the PW3. The trial Court therefore rightly ascribed probative value to the evidence in line with the decision in Ebeinwe V. State (2011) 7 NWLR 402.

The Appellant’s acts of taking the Respondent’s nominal complainant/PW3 to the refinery, showed him two trucks that were loading and disappeared disclosed Appellant’s motive and consequence intention to defraud the PW3 from the beginning. The evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4 adduced by the prosecution which established that the money the Appellant made PW3 to transfer through Max Consult to Jeksbrook Ltd. and Soft Pet. Ltd. was from the beginning meant to offset the Appellant’s debt and that further proved the Appellant’s intention to defraud the PW3.

Nowhere on record to show that the Appellant disclosed to the PW3 that the N10,055,000.00 was meant to settle an outstanding debts. The representation made by the Appellant to the nominal complainant/PW3 was that Jeksbrook and MaxConsult will supply products to him which made PW3 to part with his money

The cases of Egube V. FRN and Solomon Maken V. FRN (Supra) cited by the Appellant’s Counsel at paragraphs 4.38 and 4.39 of the Appellant’s Brief to the effect that the transaction was on a commercial relationship and there was no criminal intent do not apply in the instant case. They were cited out of context. I found and hold that the representation in this case disclosed an intention to defraud ‘ab initio’. Exhibit E is a confessional statement of the Appellant which corroborates the evidence of PW1-PW5 and as such supports the prosecution’s case as it relates to obtaining money by false pretence and intention to defraud PW3 (nominal complainant).

Looking at the provisions of Section 11(1) and (2) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 together with Sections 319(1)(a) and 321(a) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015; the learned trial Judge was not in error for his order on restitution. I so hold.

The Appellant having been found guilty, convicted and sentenced, the lower Court was right in making an order for restitution. The Justice of the case demands that appropriate compensation be made to the injured victim, the nominal complainant who suffered from the acts of the Appellant herein. I so hold.

Flowing from the above enunciations, the issue is resolved in favour of the Respondent against the Appellant.

This appeal is bereft of merit and hereby dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court delivered by Hon. Justice A. T. Muhammed on the 22nd day of November, 2019 in Suit No. FHC/PH/174C/2017 is therefore affirmed.

TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I have read before now, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion. If I may add, the fact remains that since the appellant took the respondent to the refinery and showed him the trucks that were loading, after which the appellant disappeared goes to show the appellant’s motive to defraud the respondent. In the circumstance, this Court is not in a position to interfere but to dismiss the unmeritorious appeal and affirm the decision of the Court below.

OLABODE ABIMBOLA ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.: I read the draft of the judgment delivered by my learned brother, RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI,

I agree with the reasoning and order stated in the judgment and which I hereby adopt as mine.