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OYIBO IRIRI & ORS VS ESERORAYE ERHURHOBARE & ANOR (1991)

OYIBO IRIRI & ORS VS ESERORAYE ERHURHOBARE & ANOR

(1991) LCN/2472(SC)

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Friday, March 1, 1991


Case Number: SC.214/1987

 

JUSTICES:

ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

OLAJIDE OLATAWURA    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

EPHRAIM OMOROSE IBUKUN AKPATA    Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

 

Between

  1. OYIBO IRIRI
    2. SADI IRIRI
    3. OGBERODIORAYE IRIRI
    4. AKPENSUOME AKPOME
    5. BENEDICT ONOKPASA
    (For themselves and on behalf of Idiemo family) Appellant(s)

AND

  1. ESERORAYE ERHURHOBARA
    2. DAMUGOLO ERAKPOTOBOR
    (For themselves and on behalf of Enaide Family of Mereje) Respondent(s)

 

RATIO

THE DUTY OF A TRIAL JUDGE

“It is the duty of the trial Judge to evaluate the evidence and to make primary findings of fact. This duty, unless it is shown not to have been done according to well laid down principles of law, an appeal court cannot interfere with such findings” (Per Olatawura, J.S.C.)

 

O. OLATAWURA, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal arose out of two consolidated suits which were separately instituted by both parties in Sapele Judicial Division of the Bendel State High Court. The appellants were the defendants in the first suit filed by the respondents, whilst the respondents were the defendants in the second suit instituted by the appellants.

The issue at stake is the ownership of a parcel of land called by different names, a practice not unusual in land matters. The suit by the present respondents: S/34/69 against the present appellants was filed on 25/11/69. The other suit S/2/71 was filed by the present appellants. Both suits were later consolidated. The present respondents were plaintiffs whilst the present appellants were defendants in the court of trial In their amended statement of claim, the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants as follows:
“As against all the defendants
(1) A declaration of Title to that parcel of land at Mereje sub-clan Okpe Western Urhobo known as Okpirien or Okinokwa land lying between Ovbivbi stream and Ore Stream along Sapele Warri Road in an area edged yellow in plaintiffs’ plan No. AR.1005 filed in this suit.
(2) The sum of N500 being general damages for trespass when the defendants entered on a portion of the land without the plaintiffs’ permission to disturb the plaintiffs in their use of the land in November, 1969.
(3) Injunction to restrain the defendants and their agents from further acts of trespass on the land.
As against the 5th Defendant only
(4) An order of forfeiture against the 5th defendant only in respect of that portion of the said Okpirien land edged black in plaintiffs’ plan adjacent to the area edged green in the plan in which is inscribed the words “Trinity College Okwidiemo Grammar School for Boys” or the payment of rent in lieu of forfeiture.”
Pleadings were ordered and delivered. The facts relied upon by the plaintiffs in the court of trial were that the plaintiffs’ ancestor was one Enaide. The action was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of Enaide Family of Mereje. The land in dispute is situate on the left side of Sapele/Warri Road after Adeje and is part of Mereje land. The defendants who are of Idiemo Family are members of Erhuohwo family of Ugolo, Okpe.
The original home of the parties is Ororokpe. It was founded by four brothers: Orhue, Evrike, Esezi and Orhua. It was during the reign of the first Esezi and after his assassination that people fled into all directions. This assassination led to an upheaval, and consequently a one-time community became small settlements around the original settlement. Both Udegbeme and Odorume from Orhue Quarter founded Mereje Village. Their descendants founded other settlements within the virgin forests in Mereje Village. Enaide who was the son of Udugbeme founded a place called Okwuvo and he later cleared the land in dispute called Okpirien land. The land was blessed with palm trees hence Enaide and his people collected a lot of palm fruits. The place is also called Okinokwa. Enaide family exercised maximum acts of ownership over the land in dispute: built farm huts on the land and fished in the streams and ponds. Apart from fishing, they also hunted on the land. There were also economic trees and cash crops like rubber and cocoa.
The cause of the dispute was the challenge to their title by the defendants (1-4) who claimed the land in dispute as the property of Idiemo family. It is the version of the plaintiffs that Idiemo came from Ugolo. He collected  palm fruits on the land but paid tribute in the form of palm oil. The 5th defendant applied to be joined and was joined by the court as a 5th defendant on 3/4/70. The 5th defendant is related to both parties. The 5th defendant approached the plaintiffs’ family for a piece of land on which to build a school. His request was granted but subject to the payment of rent after the school could have been well-established. He built the school, Trinity College but later turned round to disown the plaintiffs and switched over to the defendants to enter into a private arrangement about the ownership and title of the plaintiffs, hence the claim for forfeiture against him.
The defendants’ case (i.e. the 1st-4th defendants) was that the plaintiffs are not Okpe citizens. They denied that Enaide, the plaintiffs ancestor was one of Orhue’s descendants who fled Ororokpe after the upheaval following the assassination of Esezi. It was their case that Udugbome was not the father of Enaide and Enaide did not found any village in Okpe. He was, according to the defendants, a slave to one Okokor the daughter of Okpo who was the defendants’ ancestor. Enaide grew up and later got married to one of Okpo’s slaves, it was that union that led to the birth of “Idiemo.” This Idiemo was not the same Idiemo who was the defendants’ grandfather. The plaintiffs Idiemo was, according to the defendants, called Idiemo-Enaide. It was the defendants’ ancestor who settled the plaintiffs’ ancestor in Okuwo. This Okuwo is beyond Ovwivwi stream, which is the boundary of Emereje clan and Ugolo clan.
The defendants denied that the land in dispute is called Okpirien or Okinokwa but that the land called Okpirien had been litigated upon in an earlier suit S/6/68 and that it was in that suit that the plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged this fact. The Solicitor’s letter was admitted in the course of the proceedings as Exhibit K.
With regard to the village called Iginene, the defendants’ evidence was that the village can still be traced on the land in dispute and that it was founded by a descendant of Okpo, the defendants’ ancestor. The defendants maintained that the land on which the 5th defendant built his school – Trinity College – was granted to the 5th defendant by ldiemo people who are the owners of the parcel of land.
The defendants also executed various acts of ownership farming and fishing.
Although the 5th defendant did not file a separate Statement of Defence, his fortune in the case is tied to the outcome of the case if in favour of the defendants. He gave evidence, he denied the title of the plaintiffs. He admitted that the land belongs to the defendants from whom he took a conveyance. He admitted building the Trinity College on the land in dispute, although that school was dosed, down as at the time the case was being tried. He also confirmed that the land is not called Okpirien.
After the conclusion of evidence both Counsel addressed the court. After a painstaking review of the evidence and considerations of the submissions made, the learned trial Judge Akpovi, J. (as he then was) dismissed the defendants’ claims in suit No.S.2/71 and gave judgment for the plaintiffs in respect of THEIR CLAIMS IN SUIT No.S./34/69. The land granted to 5th defendant on which the Trinity College was built was also forfeited, but the learned trial Judge gave him the opportunity “to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiffs as to a new tenancy.”
The defendants appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal.
In a unanimous decision, Coram, Eboh, Musdapher and Ajose-Adeogun, JJ.C.A., the appeal was dismissed. A further Notice of Appeal to this court was filed by the Appellants.
The following grounds of appeal filed against the judgment of the lower court read as follow:
“(i) The Court of Appeal erred in law and on the facts in failing to uphold the submission that the traditional evidence given by the two parties is inconclusive and the case can only properly be determined by reference to recent acts of ownership and possession within living memory.
(ii) The Court of Appeal erred in law and on the facts in failing to give due weight and consideration to various acts of ownership and possession put forward by the Appellants herein in support of their case.
Particulars
(a) evidence of selling or leasing of the land in dispute by the Appellants;
(b) a portion of the land in dispute was leased to the 5th appellant by the appellants and he exercised acts of possession thereon;
(c) various other acts of possession put forward by the appellant.
(iii) The Court of Appeal erred in law and on the facts failing to attach any probative value to the admission contained in Exhibit K
(iv) The Court of Appeal erred in law and on the facts in giving no consideration or no adequate consideration to the evidence relating to acts of possession (by the appellants) of land adjacent to the land in dispute.”
Briefs were filed by both parties. In the appellants’ brief the following issues were raised by the appellants:
“(i) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the decision of the learned trial Judge to reject the traditional evidence of the appellants
(ii) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence of acts of possession given by the appellants
(iii) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence of ownership of surrounding parcels of land given by the appellants and
(iv) Whether Exhibit ‘K’ was not an admission to which some probative value ought to have been given”
Whereas the respondents have formulated the following issues:
“(i) Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the findings of fact which the lower court arrived at after a careful examination and appraisal of the evidence before the court.
(ii) Whether the Court of Appeal was right in confirming the view of the trial court that Exhibit ‘K’ does not constitute any admission by the respondents on which the appellants can rely as admission against the interest of the respondents.
(iii) Whether any act or acts of possession enjoyed by a customary tenant as in this suit with leave of the owner or founder of the land in dispute can defeat the claim for a declaration of title to the land by the true owner or founder of the land in dispute.”
In his oral submission in amplification of the appellants’ brief, Mr. Sofunde, S.A.N., the learned counsel for the appellants after adopting his brief referred to Issue No. 1. The learned Senior Advocate drew our attention to specific passages in the judgment of the trial court and pointed out why the trial court rejected the defendants’ evidence: Conflicts in the evidence of the defendants, that it was impossible to have deforested the entire area including four villages and that the question of Enaide being a slave is bizarre and hard to accept. Learned Senior Advocate then submitted that the learned trial Judge did not pin-point the conflicts; learned Senior Advocate then pointed to the passage where the Court of Appeal considered the area of conflict but concluded that the trial court came to the right decision.
On issues II and III, learned Counsel referred to paragraph 4-1 of this brief on the issue of extinct village of Iginene, and drew our attention to Exhibits C and D i.e. the parties plans. Exhibit D was drawn by the Survey Department in 1959. He pointed of that the extinct village is part of the land in dispute.
With regard to the evidence of possession and ownership, he referred to the evidence on the exercise of ownership; farming etc. Also, there was evidence that the 4th defendant lives on the land in dispute, but that the learned trial Judge did not evaluate the evidence. He referred to p. 170 line 16 to page 179 line 9. Learned Counsel then submitted that the Court of Appeal failed to deal with specific issues relating to acts of possession. He asked for a retrial if the Court accepts his submissions.
On the 4th issue which deals with Exhibit K, learned counsel then pointed to what he considered to be an admission on part of the respondents that the land does not go beyond Ovbiubi stream. He finally urged that the appeal be allowed.
In his own reply Chief Ororho the learned counsel for the respondents adopted and relied on the respondents’ brief. He also referred to the issues already set out above and pointed out that the action was defended in a representative capacity.
On the acts of possession, learned counsel submitted that the trial court was right in believing the evidence of the respondents, he also pointed out where the Court of Appeal considered the issue.
On Exhibit K, learned counsel submitted that the appellants tendered Exhibit K so as to confuse issue as Exhibit K was in respect of a different piece of land and that the Court of Appeal considered the findings and came to the conclusion that these findings of fact were justified. These, learned Counsel submitted are concurrent findings of fact and that the issue of retrial does not arise.
He finally urged that the appeal be dismissed.
I will now consider the written and oral submission of the learned Senior Advocate on issue No. 1. One must, in considering the evidence on which the learned trial Judge relied upon in finding in favour of plaintiffs, bear in mind that the first three witnesses who gave evidence (see pages 98-106 of the record of appeal) were not cross-examined due to the absence of the defendants and their counsel in court. Their evidence was vital. Where the evidence of a witness is not inadmissible in law, uncontradicted and unchallenged, a court of law can act on it and accept it as a true version of the case it seeks to support. The first plaintiff Eseroraye Erhurhobare in his evidence said:
“The Idiemo family (i.e. the defendants) came and settled on the land as tenants who paid rent in palm oil but they later refused to pay. Their family paid a kast (sic) of oil per year. One Eradavwe was the first tenant…
I know Benedict Onokpasa. He approached my family to get a piece of land to build a Grammar School. I gave it to him to use it as a school and not to plant economic crops or trees. ONOKPASA is related to me on my maternal side.”
The second plaintiff – Damugolo Erhakpotobor said inter alia:
“I know Idiemor…
…He collected palm fruits and paid tribute to Enaide family as they crossed over from Egboma village to our land. They paid a cask of oil yearly…
I know Benedict Onokpasa. Paternally he comes of (sic) Idiemor family. Sometime ago he came to our family to ask for land for a school…
We gave him the land for a school on condition that after the school had become grant-aided, he should agree with us the annual rental…
I have cassava, coconut trees, rubber plantations and other cash crop on the land. I showed them to the surveyor.”
Although the learned trial Judge did not refer specifically to these three witnesses who gave evidence the totality of his findings about the ownership and possession of the land, exercise of acts of ownership on their part is summarized thus:
“I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have always occupied the land by collecting palm fruits and farming on it and so own several fish ponds, palm oil troughs, old camps, economic and cash crops including the P.W.D. Camp which they had given to late Otemewo.”
There is ample justification for the findings of the learned trial Judge. These findings were confirmed by the Court of Appeal. It has been the consistent practice of this court not to disturb concurrent findings of fact once they are not perverse and are based on the evidence before the trial court: Obi I. Ezewani v. Obi Onwordi (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.33) 27; Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Constance O. Ngonadi (1985) 5 S.C. 317.319; (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 739; Ogbechie v. Onochie (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.70) 370/390.
I now come to the traditional evidence accepted by the trial court. The learned Senior Advocate has drawn attention to a portion of the judgment where the learned trial Judge preferred the traditional evidence given by the respondents to the traditional evidence given by the appellants, and that these findings were confirmed by the Court of AppeaL However, the learned Senior Advocate cited Agedegudu v. Ajenifuja and Ors. (1963) 1 All NLR 109/115; [1963] 1 SCNLR 205 for his submission that the learned trial Judge cannot “accredit and discredit witnesses as to traditional history but should test the competing stories by recourse to recent acts of ownership and possession.” It was further submitted that the Court of Appeal should have corrected the error the learned trial Judge fell into by taking that course. With respect to the learned Senior Advocate, the case of Agedegudu v. E Ajenifuja & Ors. (supra) is different from the facts and findings made by the trial Judge in this case. In Agedegudu’s case the learned trial Judge ran into difficulty about which story is worthy of credence and confessed his inability to know which side to believe, he then said:
“The evidence as to the traditional history of the land is confusing and I am unable to arrive at any definite conclusion as to what really took place. The plaintiffs claim that their family came from Ife and not from Igbesa and the Revd. Ogundipe gave a truthful account of the family history as it has been handed down. The truth probably lies somewhere between both accounts.”
It appears to me that the learned trial Judge ran into difficulty of knowing which side to rely upon, and it is for that reason that where a Judge in such a situation finds himself at cross-roads with regard to traditional history, it is better to test the competing stories by recourse to recent acts of possession. That is not the position in this appeal before us. The Judge had no difficulty in finding for the respondents. The learned trial Judge said:
“I accept the evidence of the plaintiffs that when their remote ancestor left Orerokpe, he settled in Mereje whence they branched off to found Okwovo where they lived and deforested the land now in dispute. I am satisfied that the proper name of the land is Okpirien or Okpirie and not Otebe”
This to my mind is a definite and clear finding of fact on the traditional history. The finding is also borne out by the pleading and evidence led in support. Paragraph 5 of the Amended Statement of Claim reads:
“5.     “Enaide, the son of Udugbeme after the death of Udugbeme moved from Mereje Village to found the place now known as Okwuvo in Mereje sub-clan in Okpe and later cleared the land in dispute known as Okpirien land of its virgin forest, and farmed on it with his family. As the main occupation of Enaide and the male members of his family was the collection of palm fruits, the entire area now in dispute was named Okpirien land because of the abundance of fruitful palm trees on the land. The area is also called Okinokwa land because of Okinokwa stream which flows into the land.”
To give a clear picture of the traditional history put forward by the appellants i.e. the defendants, the learned trial Judge had no hesitation in rejecting their evidence. He found thus:
“I reject the conflicting evidence of the defendants and their witnesses that Okpe (sic) founded the whole area including the land in dispute. It must be well nigh impossible for a man in his life time to have deforested the entire area including the nine villages, I am satisfied that Idiemo is a descendant of Okpo and he settled in the village that now bears his name, which is outside the land in dispute. I do not find it necessary to make a finding on the point whether he met Egboma there or not as this is not relevant to the present case. That will be touching on land not here put in dispute. I am also satisfied that Idiemo family founded no settlement and owned or occupied no land beyond Idide or Okinokwa stream. Those of them who crossed that stream did so to collect palm fruits and did so with the permission and payment attribute in the past until the incident that resulted in the scuffle that ended one of their men’s life called Oga.”
The Court of Appeal was right in the conclusion reached in the lead judgment of Ajose-Adeogun, J.C.A., when he said:
“After a most anxious and careful consideration of all the arguments from both sides, I am fully satisfied that apart from the justified acceptance of the traditional evidence of the respondents in preference to that of the appellants, there are ample materials from the available evidence which could also justify the findings of the learned trial Judge on the issues relating to the acts of possession set up by either of them. These findings of facts in favour of the respondents, not being perverse but based on reasonable acceptable evidence, cannot be lightly set aside by this court.”
I agree with the submission of Chief Ororho in the respondents’ brief where he said:
“This preference (i.e. on traditional history) is based not only on the traditional evidence of the respondents but also on the acts of possession testified to by the respondents.”
Since the appellants have admitted that there were two concurrent findings of fact and have not shown that these findings were perverse, I will answer the question on the first issue by saying that the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the decision of the learned trial court on traditional evidence.
With regard to issues II and III which were argued together, I will deal first with Iginene village. The learned Senior Advocate has referred to the two plans Exhibit C and D. In Exhibit C, the ruins of the village were shown. The conclusions of the learned trial Judge on this village were high-lighted in the Appellants’ brief. The fact that part of the village was awarded to Awenuvie family appears to me that the appellant has lost title to that half. There is nothing on record that the judgment on that issue has been challenged. Learned counsel fell far short of revealing why the learned trial Judge did not accept the story put forward on Iginene. While it is true that features on a disputed piece of land must be shown on a plan of the land in dispute, it is not enough to draw the plan showing the features without giving credible or convincing evidence linking the ownership of the disputed land with the features. In other words, to show the feature on the plan is one thing, but to lead credible and convincing evidence about the ownership is another. It is the totality of the evidence led on this issue that led the trial Judge to conclude thus:
“How much of the ruins and economic trees of the camp remains on the left side of the road which is the land now in dispute, is not made clear. The 5th defence witness who says she was born there in the village but lives at Okwidiemo, an area completely outside the land in dispute has not told a convincing story. She says her father Iginene belongs to Effurun, his paternal side but lived in the camp apparently by virtue of his maternal relationship to Idiemo. I have my doubts if Iginene came to the site as of right or because of his relationship to the Idiemo family. More particularly, I am not satisfied that the ruins of the old camp whose extent is not clearly shown do fall within the land now in dispute.”
It is the duty of the trial Judge to evaluate the evidence and to make primary findings of fact. This duty, unless it is shown not to have been done according to well laid down principles of law, an appeal court cannot interfere with such findings: Ibanga v. Usanga (1982) 5 S.C. 103; Kuforiji v. V. Y.B. Ltd. (1981) 6-7 S.C. 40; Akpapuna v. Nzeka II (1983) 2 SCNLR 1:
The onus to show that those findings are not based on the proper evaluation of evidence is on the party who sets out to challenge them. This has not been done in this case.
An appeal court deals with complaints of the appellant against the judgment. Where an issue has not been raised by the appellant, it is not the business of the Appeal Court to formulate an issue unrelated to the issues raised in the appeal for itself. Adeniji & Ors. v. Tawa Adeniji Mrs. (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt.1) 298; Oke-Bola & Ors. v. Molake (1975) 12 S.C. 61; Veronica Graham & Ors. v. Lawrence Esumai & Ors. (1984) 11 S.C. 123.
If however the court decides to raise an issue arising from the case but not raised by the parties the court must call on the parties to address the court. The issue of Iginene village has been laid to rest, when the learned trial Judge concluded that it was not clearly shown to fall within the land in dispute. This in effect is direct opposition to the pleading in paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Defence and the evidence led in support. The Court of Appeal was right to have confirmed the finding of the trial court.
I regret to say that there is too much generalisation in the Appellants’ brief concerning the duty of the Court of Appeal. Where the trial court has made specific findings of fact supported by the evidence, it is not the duty of the Court of Appeal to recapitulate such findings once the Court of Appeal is satisfied that the findings were based on the evidence. The best guide to the findings of fact in so far the appeal court is concerned, together with the inferences that can be drawn, or refusal of the Court of Appeal to substitute its own views for those of the trial court can be found in the case of Chief Ebba v. Chief Ogodo &Anor. (1984) 1 S.C. N.L.R. 372. This case was relied upon by the lower court. A careful reading of this case will reveal that nearly all the authorities on the findings of fact were carefully reviewed. I find nothing wrong in the approach of the Court of Appeal. It is a misconception of the facts, the law and the role of the Court of Appeal to come to the conclusion that on the authority of Olubode and Others v. Salami (1985) 2 N.W L.R. (Pt. 7) 282/288 that the lower Court has abdicated its role.
I now come to the last issue which deals with Exhibit K. Learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the most important fact in this exhibit is that the respondents had admitted that Ovbivbi stream is the boundary between the two of them. It is the contention of the appellants also that “whoever owns the land beyond the stream, is irrelevant to the admission that the respondents’ land does not extend beyond the stream.” Any natural boundary between two pieces or parcels of land ought to be so indicated on a plan of the land in dispute that, prima facie, it represents the boundary. True it is, Ovbivbi stream is shown in the plans. What did the Judge say about it. The learned trial Judge’s finding has been quoted in the appellants’ brief, the kernel of his finding on that issue has not been challenged as being inaccurate or not supported by evidence. The learned Judge said inter alia:
“If, I accept that Okwirie land which is separated from the land of the plaintiffs by Ovwivwi (sic) stream belongs to the defendants or that they have a common boundary in that area, I will be speculating as there is no evidence on that point.”
It is now the duty of the appellants not only to show that there was evidence before the trial court, but that in truth and in fact that stream is the boundary. It would appear that since the appellants failed to show positively and decisively, the importance of the stream to their case they now want to rely on Exhibit K as having established it.
The respondents in their brief when dealing with Exhibit K submitted thus:
“This document is not relevant to the case in hand as the area referred to in this letter was not shown in any of the plans. There is nothing in the letter which can be interpreted to show that the respondents conceded any area of the land in dispute to the appellants.”
(Italics supplied for emphasis).
I think this is an area in which the appellant should have filed a reply. If the land in S/6/68 falls within the land in dispute, one can then see the relevance of Exhibit K in this matter.
I think the lower court has come to a correct decision on Exhibit K when it said (per Ajose-Adeogun. J.C.A.)
“It is apparent that the trial Judge actually considered the letter Exhibit “K” (marked “Without Prejudice”). His final conclusion that it would be merely speculative to accept the purport of the said letter would appear to be correct since there was no evidence that Okwirie land belonged to the appellants.”
I now come to the case of the 5th appellant who has forfeited his holding. The learned trial Judge having held that the land on which the School Trinity College – was built was granted to the 5th Appellant by the respondents and since the 5th Appellant denied their title, the Judge was right to have granted the claim for forfeiture:
Asani Taiwo & Ors. v. Akinwunmi & Ors. (1975) 4 S.C. 143; M. Onolaire & Ors. v. Onakpasa & Anor. (1984) 12 S.C. 19.
On the whole there has heen no effective challenge to the findings of fact made by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at N500.00 in favour of the appellants.

A. O. OBASEKI, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Olatawura, J.S.C., and I agree with the opinions expressed therein on all the issues raised in this appeal for determination and that the appeal be dismissed. It is desirable that I make the following contribution for emphasis.
The facts have been adequately set out in the judgment of my learned brother, Olatawura, J.S.C., and except where necessary for the purpose of this judgment. I shall not repeat them here. The appellants herein were the defendants and the respondents, the plaintiffs in suit No.S/34/69 filed in the Sapele Judicial Division of the High Court Mid-Western Nigeria on the 24th day of November, 1969.
Pleadings were on the order of the High Court filed by the parties. The appellants’ claim was set out in paragraph 21 of the amended statement of claim which reads:
“Wherefore the plaintiffs institute this action and claim as follows:
As Against all the Defendants
(1) A declaration of title to that parcel of land at Mereje sub-clan Okpe, Western Urhobo known as Okpurien or Okinokwa land lying between Ovbivbi stream and are stream along Sapele-Warri road in an area edged yellow in plaintiffs’ Plan No. AR1005 filed in this suit;
(2) The sum of N500.00 being general damages for trespass when the defendants entered on a portion of the land without the plaintiffs’ permission to disturb the plaintiffs in their use of the land in November, 1969.
(3) Injunction to restrain the defendants and their agents from further acts of trespass on the land;
As Against the 5th Defendant only
(4) An order of forfeiture against the 5th defendant only in respect of that portion of the said Okpirien land edged black in plaintiff’s plan adjacent to the area edged green in the plan in which is inscribed the words “Trinity College Okwidiemo Grammar School for Boys” OR the payment of rent in lieu of forfeiture.”
In suit No. S/2/71 filed by the defendants against the plaintiffs, they claimed:
1. A declaration of title to that piece or parcel of land at Okwidiemo, Ugolo, Western Urhobo being part of Idiemo family land lying and situate on Warri/Sapele Road between OREN and OVBIVBI streams. The exact area and situation of the said piece of land is more particularly described and shown on the survey plan No. T.M. 904 filed by the plaintiffs defendants in suit S/34/69 in this Honourable Court. The annual value of the land is ‘a310.00.
2. The sum of N800.00 being general and special damages for trespass committed by the defendants on the said piece of land which has always been in possession of the plaintiffs resulting in financial loss to the plaintiffs between the years 1969 and 1970.
3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their privies, servants and/or agents from trespassing and/or further trespassing on the said piece of land.
Both suits were later consolidated for trial and the learned trial Judge, Akpovi, J. (as he then was) gave his judgment on the 14th day of September, 1979 granting the claims of the plaintiffs and dismissing the claims of the defendants. The case suffered inattention or lay dormant from 7th October, 1971 to 6th January, 1976 and hearing started only on 8th November, 1976. Parties should be interested in the quick disposal of cases and Judges of the High Courts should take all steps to bring any matter in their courts to quick disposal; the non-chalance of the parties notwithstanding.
The appeal to the Court of Appeal was heard on the 4th day of November, 1986 and judgment dismissing it was delivered on the 2nd day of February, 1987. The appeal to this court was heard on the 3rd day of December, 1990. It is observed that hearing in the appeal courts take very little time but the period of getting the matters to that of hearing is unnecessarily prolonged by the parties inaction or misaction. Over the years, efforts by the State and Federal Judiciary have, to my knowledge, been made to reduce this period of delay. This effort has to continue.
The learned Judge at the conclusion of the trial of the consolidated suit (S/34/69 and S/2/71) examined the traditional evidence led by both parties. He rejected that of the defendants now appellants together with the evidence of acts of possession given by the defendants. He granted the claims of the plaintiffs and dismissed the claims of the defendants. The defendants were dissatisfied and so appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision. They were unsuccessful and their appeal was dismissed. They were still dissatisfied and have brought this appeal to this court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The complaints of the appellants reflected in the grounds of appeal are:
(1) Error in rejecting their traditional evidence;
(2) Failure to consider at all some recent acts of possession and failure to consider properly those acts of possession considered; and
(3) Failure to consider and act on an admission by the respondents.
Arising from these complaints, the appellants have formulated in their brief, four issues for determination. These issues are:-
(i) whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the decision of the learned trial Judge to reject the traditional evidence of the appellants
(ii) whether learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence of acts of possession given by the appellants
(iii) whether learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly nd/or at all the evidence of ownership of surrounding parcels of land given by the appellants and
(iv) whether Exhibit K was not an admission to which some probative value ought to have been given
In his arguments both orally and in the appellant’s brief, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. E. O. Sofunde, S.A.N., submitted that it is not within the province of a trial Judge to accredit and discredit witnesses as to traditional history but should test the competing stories of recourse to recent acts and possession. In support, he cited the case of Agedegudu v. Ajenifuja & Others (1963) 1 All NLR 109 at 115; (1963) 1 SCNLR 205. He then contended that the Court of Appeal was in error in not pointing this out and allowing the defendants’ appeal on the ground of improper appraisal of the evidence.
I am unable to agree with learned counsel for the appellants that the trial Judge accredited and discredited witnesses as to traditional evidence and that the traditional evidence given by the witnesses were not tested by recorded acts of possession. The law is that where the evidence of traditional history is inconclusive, the learned trial Judge is estopped from accepting one set of evidence against the other conflicting set of evidence. If the evidence of traditional history is conclusive, a trial Judge is entitled to accept it as against evidence of traditional history which is in conflict and which is not supported by evidence of recent acts of possession. See Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223.
The learned trial Judge is entitled to reject evidence of traditional history which is incredible. The learned trial Judge in the instant appeal said at page 175:
“I reject the conflicting evidence of the defendants and their witnesses that Okpe founded the whole area including the land in dispute. It must be well nigh impossible for a man in his life time to have deforested the entire area including the nine villages.”
The rejection of the evidence does not stigmatise the credit of the witnesses. In the normal course of events the defendants’ traditional history was fanciful and not probable. Traditional evidence being hearsay upon hearsay do not always have the sanctity of truth although the witness may be testifying truthfully about the information handed down to him. When the learned trial Judge held:
“I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have always occupied the land by collecting palm fruits and farming on it and so own several fish ponds, palm oil broughs, old camps, economic and cash crops including the P.W.D. camp which they had given to late Otomewo.”
he settled the foundation for accepting the tniditional evidence given by the plaintiffs’ respondent.
At this juncture, it is necessary to bear in mind the guiding principle or rule laid down by Kojo v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223 at 1226 by the Privy Council per Lord Denning, M.R. In that case, Lord Denning delivering the opinion of the Privy Council observed at page 1226 as follows:
“Their Lordships notice that the Judges in the Appeal Court who were in favour of upholding the decision of Asantehene’s  Court did so on two grounds: first that it was a decision of fact depending on the demeanour of the witness and almost inviolable on that account; second that on a review of the evidence it was the correct decision.
So far as the first ground is concerned, their Lordships do not think that it was the correct approach to this case. Their Lordships notice that there is no dispute as to the primary facts, that is, the facts which the witness actually observed with their own eyes or knew of their own knowledge in their own lifetime. The dispute was all as to the traditional history which had been handed down by word of mouth from their forefathers. In this regard it must be recognised that in the course of transmission from generation to generation, mistakes may occur without any dishonest motives whatever. Witnesses of the utmost veracity may speak honestly but erroneously as to traditional history; one side or the other must be mistaken yet both may be honest in their belief.  In such a case, demeanour is little guide to the truth. The best way to test the traditional history is by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of the two competing history is more probable. That is how both the native courts approached the matter and their Lordships think they were right in so doing.”
I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge, in accepting the traditional history narrated by the plaintiffs and their witnesses, have not violated the guiding rule enshrined in the above dictum.
The Court of Appeal was, in my view, justified in not disturbing the finding of the learned trial Judge and holding as follows per Ajose Adeogun, J.C.A.:
“After a most anxious and careful consideration of all the arguments on both sides, I am fully satisfied that apart from the justified acceptance of the traditional evidence of the respondent in preference to that of the appellants, there are ample materials from the available evidence which could also justify the findings of the learned trial Judge on the issues relating to acts of possession set up by either of them. These findings of facts not being perverse but based on reasonably acceptable evidence, cannot be lightly set aside by this court. See the case of Okafor v. Idigo III (supra) where the Supreme Court (per Obaseki, J.S.C.) stressed inter alia as follows:
“Court of Appeal, must, in the absence of compelling evidence indicating an erroneous appraisal of facts and erroneous conclusion, show the utmost restraint and reject any temptation to interfere with well-considered findings made by the learned trial Judge in the court of first instance.”
The appellants appeal fails on the first issue and also fails on the second issue.
Both the Court of Appeal and the learned trial Judge gave adequate and proper consideration to the evidence of acts of possession given by the appellants. The appellants must also fail on issue No.3 for the same reason. Turning to issue No.4, the question whether Exhibit K is an admission must be answered in the negative. Exhibit K speaks for itself and the main body of the letter reads:
“I am acting for the children of Elajido family of Okwuvo Village Okpe Clan represented by Mr. Eseroraye Erhurhobare and James Osia.
I am informed that you are laying claim to a parcel of land called Okwuvo land which is not part of the land known as Okwirie which is the subject-matter of a suit No.S/8/1968 between you as representative of Okuidiemo people and the people of Awunivie Okwuvo and Okuokolo villages in Ope Clan. I understand that Okwirie land is separated from my clients’ land by Ovbivbi stream.
I hope you will desist from further acts of trespass into my clients’ land which you were alleged to have surveyed in part on 17/7/68 and to say that if you persist in further acts of trespass, I shall be obliged to take appropriate legal steps to assert my clients’ interest.
Yours faithfully,
J.A. Ororho, Esq.”
There is nothing in Exhibit K indicating that the appellants owned any land. That the defendants were in court in suit S/8/68 in respect of Okwurie is not an admission that defendants are owners of Okwurie land and the extent. The learned trial Judge quite properly commented on Exhibit K as follows:
“Although we have Ovbivbi stream marked in the plans in this case, the entire course of the stream is not indicated. There is no evidence of Okwirie land led before me. Moreover, this is a letter of protest written long before this action arose in suit S/8/68 between Awenuvie and Idiemo families, the subject matter of the action according to Exhibit K is Okwirie land. If I accept that Okwirie land which is separated from the land of the plaintiffs by Ovbivbi streams belong to the defendants or that they have a common boundary in that area, I will be speculating as there is no evidence on the point. On the whole, I reject the document as establishing nothing in favour of the defendants and nothing against the plaintiffs in this case.”
I entirely agree that Exhibit K establishes nothing in favour of the appellants. It certainly is not an admission by the respondents. The appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with N500.00 costs to the respondents.

A. G. KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother, Olatawura, J.S.C. in this appeal. I agree entirely with him that his appeal ought to be dismissed.
I do not consider it necessary to repeat the facts of the case, which have been fully set out in the judgment of my learned brother, Olatawura, J.S.C. The point on which I have dismissed this appeal is that the appeal having been based on a challenge of the concurrent findings of facts in the two courts below, appellants have not been able to show why these findings against them ought to be disturbed.
Learned counsel to the appellants has formulated the following issues for determination.
“(1) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the decision of the learned trial Judge to reject the traditional evidence of the appellants
(ii) Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence of acts of possession given by the appellants
(iii) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence or ownership of surrounding parcels of land given by the appellants and,
(iv) Whether Exhibit K was not an admission to which some probative value ought to have been given”
All these issues are formulated in respect of findings of fact in the courts below. The findings of fact complained of were made by the trial Judge, and were affirmed on appeal to the court below. This court is being called upon to set them aside.
The law is now well settled and needs no citation of cases in support that this court will not lightly interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. – See Woluchem & Ors. v. Gudi & Ors. (1981) 5 S.C. 291.
The trial court has found, and the court below affirmed that appellants have no right to be on the land, subject matter of dispute, because it belongs to the respondents. I agree entirely with this finding.
I find no merit in this appeal, which I dismiss with N500 as costs to the respondents.

S. M. A. BELGORE, J.S.C.: Despite the big issue of law raised in the grounds of appeal in this matter, the issues for determination in the appellants’ brief indicate clearly that the matters being fought concern findings of fact. This is manifest in the issues for determination which reads:
(i) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in affirming the decision of the learned trial Judge to reject the traditional evidence of the appellants
(ii) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence of acts of possession given by the appellants
(iii) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in failing to hold that the learned trial Judge did not consider properly and/or at all the evidence of ownership of surrounding parcels of land given by the appellants and
(iv) Whether Exhibit ‘K’ was not an admission to which some probative value ought to have been given
The viva voce argument followed the brief filed and very little of the law has been adverted to. In short what this court is now being asked to look into and reverse is the findings of fact by the trial court which the Court of Appeal would not have. The line of authorities in this court on all this important point is inexhaustible and all tend to emphasise that an appellate court should be wary of interfering with findings of fact by the trial court. This is in accord with common sense, and common sense and justice must be inseparable partners, in that the trial court has too many advantages that an appellate court does not have. The trial court hears the evidence of the parties and their witnesses. This opportunity allows the trial court to assess the witnesses whose evidence in chief, answer to cross examination and re-examination give the court the opportunity to assess each witness for demeanour, truthfulness, credibility and reliability. No appellate court has this opportunity as that court sees only the written record. The appellate court can therefore not substitute its eyes, ears and mind for that of the trial court in assessing the evidence.
Therefore, believing or disbelieving a witness or a piece of evidence is in the exclusive competence of the trial court and where such belief and disbelief is clearly supported by evidence on record, the appellate court should not interfere in such a finding. [Fabunmi v. Agbe (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 299]. This court will not entertain questions of fact where the lower courts have made concurrent findings. To open facts already found upon by the two lower courts will surely lead to injustice. This court, reading written records only has no opportunity of seeing the witnesses to assess them for the respective demeamours as the trial court is privileged to do. [Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Ngonadi (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 739; Henry Stephens Engineering Ltd. v. Complete Home Ent. Ltd. (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt 47) 40; Chinwendu v. Mbamali (1980) 3-4 S.C. 31, 75; Akpere v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1971) 1 S.C. 47.]
Unless the facts from the evidence before the trial court are at variance  with the findings of that court, or the evidence relied upon is that not legally admissible or the conclusion is against public policy, the appellate court should not interfere with the findings of the trial court on facts. [Kakara v. Imonikhe (1974) 4 S.C. 153; Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 S.C. 91; Woluchem and Ors. v. Cudi and Ors. (1981) 5 S.C. 291, 326; Chief Frank Ebba v. Chief Wani Ogodo & Ors. (1984) 4 S.C.84; [1984] 1 SCNLR 372; Okafor v. Idigo II (1984) 1 SCNLR 481. Matters admitted into evidence that I have in mind concern facts unpleaded which go to no issue; facts diametrically opposed to land governing the subject-matter, e.g. where notice is statutorily necessary before such matter could be tendered as evidence, or an entire finding of facts which in the peculiar circumstance occasion miscarriage of justice e.g. where the other party is not aware of the evidence to react to it. In such situations, the appellate court will interfere simply because such evidence ought not to be relied upon by the trial court. In the instant case before us, the trial court, on the clear evidence before it, found the appellants have no right to be on the land in issue because it belongs to the respondents. The Court of Appeal refused and rightly so, to disturb this finding. These two concurrent findings of the lower courts cannot be disturbed by this court. It is on the foregoing reasons and the fuller judgment of my learned brother, Olatawura, J.S.C., with which I am in agreement, that I find no merit in this appeal and it ought to be dismissed. I dismiss this appeal with N500.00 costs to the respondents.

E. O. I. AKPATA, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Olatawura, J.S.C. I agree with him that the appeal be dismissed with costs assessed at N500.00.

Appeal dismissed.

 

Appearances

E.O. Sofunde, S.A.N. (with him, G.N.O. Osakwe and Chief J.J.A. Rerri) For Appellant

 

AND

Chief J.A. Ororho (with him, G.M. Dumi) For Respondent