OKON v. STATE
(2021)LCN/15490(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Friday, January 08, 2021
CA/C/09C/2016
Before Our Lordships:
Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal
Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
OKON NSINI OKON APPELANT(S)
And
THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT A TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL SHOULD BE HELD WHEN AN ACCUSED PERSON DENIES MAKING A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT BUT ADMITS SIGNING UNDER DISTRESS
Let me start by saying that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and the earlier decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in AJODHA v. STATE are unassailable, given the facts of the cases presented to the two highly revered Courts and indeed logical and refreshing in all circumstances.
In the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE the nature of the objection/complaint/defence to the admissibility of the confessional statements involve not just denying that the statements were not made by the accused persons, but also explaining that the situation was so because the statements were made under threats and duress suggesting that the mark or signature on the document was involuntarily made.
Thus, in the case of SAIDU v. STATE (1982) 1 NCR 49 @ 64 his Lordship Obaseki JSC questions thus:
Underlying the restrictions in the instant appeal was the unresolved issue of whether, when an accused person who signs a statement disowns the statement in Court and explains that his signature on it was put on it forcibly or fraudulently or obtained by trick, it does not raise an issue as to admissibility calling for a trial within trial, i.e. a voir dire to determine the issue. (underlined emphasis supplied)
The simple rationale for the decisions in SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE (supra) as later explained by Obaseki JSC in the SAIDU v. STATE case (supra) is that a signature to a confessional statement is an acknowledgement that the statement was made by the owner of the signature, and where the signature is obtained by force or threat of force or by inducement or by trick or fraud, it cannot be said that the statement was voluntary.
For example, in AJODHA v. STATE (supra), the Defendant (Ajodha) was tried in 1975 on charges of murder, robbery and rape. The only prosecution evidence against him was a confessional statement which he had signed. His defence was that he was not the author of the statement as he had been forced to sign it. In those circumstance, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered that a trial within trial ought to have been conducted.
In other words, the decisions in both the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE (supra) emphasize that where the accused denies authorship of the statement but admits signing it under duress, there ought to be a trial within trial. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERE RETRACTION OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT RENDERS IT INADMISSIBLE
It remains to say that conviction for any crime may be based on a single confession if voluntarily made. See GIRA v. THE STATE (1996) 4 SCNJ 94; EFFIONG v. STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 362 SC; IHUEBEKA v. STATE (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) 203; IDOWU v. STATE (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 50; ALARAPE v. THE STATE (2000) 14 WRN 1 SC, and it is trite law that mere retraction of a confessional statement by an accused does not necessarily make it inadmissible. However, where an accused had retracted his earlier confession, it is desirable to have some evidence outside the confession which will make it probable that the confession was true. See NWAEBONYI v. THE STATE (1994) 5 SCNJ 86; EDET EKPE v. THE STATE (1994) 12 SCNJ 131; R. V. EBONG (1997) 12 WACA 1. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, Uyo Judicial Division delivered by Honourable Justice I. E. Ukanna on 9/5/2014.
The Appellant was charged along with one other accused (co-accused, who was 2nd accused at trial) on a two count Information for Conspiracy to effect unlawful purpose, to wit: Child Stealing contrary to Section 556(1)(f) and Murder of Idara Ekop Udoh contrary to Section 326(1) both of the Criminal Code, Cap. 38 Vol. 2 Laws of Akwa Ibom State.
The Appellant and the co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution called five (5) witnesses and tendered Exhibits.
The Appellant testified on Oath, called no witness and did not tender any Exhibit.
The case of the prosecution was/is that the Appellant and the co-accused lured the deceased along with her child on 29th day of November, 2009, carried them on a motorcycle and then along Ibiaku Uruan (Ikpa Road) they killed the deceased, took her child and sold the baby for N115,000 (One Hundred and Fifteen Thousand Naira, only).
At the trial, learned counsel to the Appellant objected to the admissibility of the Appellant’s confessional statement at page 111 of the Record of Appeal thus:
We seek to be objecting. The 1st accused person did not make the statement in question, we are also saying that it was involuntary. We urge the Court to refuse to admit it.
The learned trial judge treated the Appellant’s confessional statements as retracted and admitted same as Exhibits C, C1 and C2 respectively.
The learned trial judge relied on the confessional statements of the Appellant and the co-accused alongside the evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 and convicted the Appellant and the co-accused as charged.
Dissatisfied with the conviction, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal containing three (3) Grounds of Appeal in this Court.
Appellant’s Brief of Argument was filed on 22/1/2016. It is settled by Chinwe Godwin-OMOAKA (Mrs).
Respondent’s Brief of Argument was filed on 18/9/2020. It is settled by Friday J. Itim, Esq., Assistant Director, Ministry of Justice, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State.
Learned counsel for the Appellant nominated two issues for determination of the Appeal.
They are:
i. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have admitted and relied on Exhibits C, C1 and C2 – Appellant’s confessional Statements, in convicting the Appellant without conducting a trial within trial despite timely objection to the voluntariness of the statements by counsel to the Appellant and if not, whether the Appellant did not thereby suffer a miscarriage of justice in doing so? (Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal).
ii. Whether the learned trial judge was right to hold that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as required by law? (Grounds 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal).
Learned counsel for the Respondent formulated a sole issue for the determination of the appeal. It is:
Whether the Prosecution proved its two count charge of conspiracy and murder against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s Issue No. 1 challenges the decision of the trial Court in convicting the Appellant based on the alleged confessional Statement of the Appellant without a mini-trial despite the objections raised by the Appellant’s counsel to the authorship and voluntariness of the confessional statements. He submitted that the trial Court was wrong to have admitted and relied on Exhibits C, C1 and C2 in convicting the Appellant for the offences of murder and conspiracy.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that when Exhibits C, C1 and C2 were sought to be tendered in evidence by the prosecution during the trial, the Appellant promptly challenged the admissibility of the statements on two grounds: (i) he denied authoring or making the statements and (ii) the statements were obtained from him by involuntary means. For the avoidance of doubt, said counsel, the Appellant’s counsel’s objection to the admissibility of the said exhibits which is contained at page 111 of the Records reads thus:
We seek to be objecting. The 1st accused person did not make the statement in question, we are also saying that it was involuntary. We urge the Court to refuse to admit it.
He submitted that given the Appellant’s objection to the admissibility of Exhibits C, C1 and C2 on the basis of their involuntariness, the only duty cast upon the lower Court at that stage was to conduct a mini-trial (i.e. trial within trial) to ascertain the voluntariness or otherwise of the said confessional statement of the Appellant. Rather than adopt this time-honoured procedure, the lower Court, said counsel, proceeded to admit the documents without more. This fact is evident at pages 111 to 112 of the Records where the lower Court held as follows:
There is no doubt that counsel must strike in the conduct of cases to show a high level of professionalism and integrity. A plea of not making a statement and a claim of involvement are inconsistent. In the result of the Statement of the 1st accused person recorded by PW5 on 26/12/2009 and the additional statement of 29/12/2009 and the Confessional Statement for evidence before a superior Police Officer are admitted and marked Exhibits C, C1 and C2 respectively.
With respect to the learned trial judge, said counsel, he was wrong. There is nothing inconsistent about an accused denying authoring a statement and simultaneously saying that the statement was not the product of his free will. He submitted that there are dicta in several decided cases of our Courts, which appear to suggest that such a distinction does exist. But that those decisions are misleading and apparently stems from the judges’ inability to appreciate the difficulty inherent in deciding the twin question of admissibility and authorship in the course of trial.
Appellant’s counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court per Obaseki JSC in the case of SAIDU v. STATE (1982) 13 NSCC 70 @ 80 (1982) 1 NCR 49 @ 65 – 66 where Obaseki JSC said it is not illogical or inconsistent for a Defendant to disown his statement and additionally allege the statement was obtained from him involuntarily. Even though both issues overlap, deciding such issues are at the heart of the function of a judge from which a judge must not shy away, under any circumstance otherwise he may infringe on the Defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Leaned counsel for the Appellant quoted in extenso from the judgment of Obaseki JSC in the case of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and the learned Justice’s reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of AJODHA v. STATE (1982) A.C 204 (1981) 2 ALL E.R. 193 to come to the conclusion that:
In all cases where the accused denies authorship of the contents of a written statement but complains that the signature or signatures on the document which he admits to be his own were improperly obtained from him by threat or inducement, he is challenging the prosecution’s evidence on both grounds and there is nothing illogical or inconsistent in his doing so.
In applying the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and the decision of the Privy Council in AJODHA v. STATE (supra) to the instant case, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted it follows that the learned trial judge erred by abdicating his responsibility to make findings of fact on the admissibility of Exhibits C, C1 and C2 in a mini-trial. This, said counsel, prejudiced the Appellant because he lost the safeguard of the ruling on the admissibility of the statements leading to an infraction of his right to fair hearing. He referred to the case of OGUNTOLA v. STATE (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1049) 617.
For the same above reason, Appellant’s counsel urged us to expunge Exhibits C, C1 and C2 from the Record as the statements are not legal evidence on which the Court can act. He referred to the cases of EMEKA v. STATE (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 666 @ 681; C.O.P v. UDE (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1260) 189 @ 219 and Section 29(2) of the Evidence Act 2011.
He further submitted that having relied on inadmissible evidence (i.e. Exhibits C, C1 and C2) to convict the Appellant, the lower Court occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant because, outside his alleged confession, there is no evidence to sustain his conviction. He referred to the case of IROLO v. UKA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 786) 195 and urged us to resolve Issue No. 1 in favour of the Appellant.
Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted on Issue No. 1 that the trial Court was right to admit Exhibits C, C1 and C2 as there was no proper objection to the voluntariness of the statements. That a trial Court is entitled to admit and rely on retracted confessional statement. He referred to the cases of LASISI v. STATE (2014) 10 ACLR 333 @ 338; SMART v. STATE (2016) LPELR – 408 27 (SC) pages 13-17.
He added that the surrounding circumstances and other proved facts of the case all point to the fact that the Appellant made the Statements admitted as Exhibits C, C1 and C2 respectively.
He concluded that there was no part of the trial, either the procedure adopted or Exhibits tendered that occasioned miscarriage of justice against the Appellant.
It seems to me that the crucial question in Issue No. 1 is whether the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the Appellant are applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case in determining whether the learned trial judge was in error not to have ordered a trial within trial for the admissibility of Exhibits C, C1 and C2.
Let me start by saying that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and the earlier decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in AJODHA v. STATE are unassailable, given the facts of the cases presented to the two highly revered Courts and indeed logical and refreshing in all circumstances.
In the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE the nature of the objection/complaint/defence to the admissibility of the confessional statements involve not just denying that the statements were not made by the accused persons, but also explaining that the situation was so because the statements were made under threats and duress suggesting that the mark or signature on the document was involuntarily made.
Thus, in the case of SAIDU v. STATE (1982) 1 NCR 49 @ 64 his Lordship Obaseki JSC questions thus:
Underlying the restrictions in the instant appeal was the unresolved issue of whether, when an accused person who signs a statement disowns the statement in Court and explains that his signature on it was put on it forcibly or fraudulently or obtained by trick, it does not raise an issue as to admissibility calling for a trial within trial, i.e. a voir dire to determine the issue. (underlined emphasis supplied)
The simple rationale for the decisions in SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE (supra) as later explained by Obaseki JSC in the SAIDU v. STATE case (supra) is that a signature to a confessional statement is an acknowledgement that the statement was made by the owner of the signature, and where the signature is obtained by force or threat of force or by inducement or by trick or fraud, it cannot be said that the statement was voluntary.
For example, in AJODHA v. STATE (supra), the Defendant (Ajodha) was tried in 1975 on charges of murder, robbery and rape. The only prosecution evidence against him was a confessional statement which he had signed. His defence was that he was not the author of the statement as he had been forced to sign it. In those circumstance, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered that a trial within trial ought to have been conducted.
In other words, the decisions in both the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE (supra) emphasize that where the accused denies authorship of the statement but admits signing it under duress, there ought to be a trial within trial.
In the instant case, unlike the cases of SAIDU v. STATE (supra) and AJODHA v. STATE (supra), the objection/defence did not explain that the reason for the denial of the statement was that it was made due to threats or duress etc.
At page 111 of the Records, the objection to the admissibility of the Appellant’s statements was in this form:
F. J. Itim Esq.: We seek to tender the statement of the 1st accused persons as Exhibit.
Nsikak Edet Esq.: We seek to be objecting. The 1st accused person did not make the statement in question. We are also saying that it was involuntary. We urge the Court to refuse to admit it.
F. J. Etim Esq.: We are asking the Court to ignore the submission by the learned counsel. Counsel has not even shown the statement in question to the 1st accused person. He has not even said his client told him. Counsel must avoid fabricating stories. This type of style must be condemned. Learned counsel cannot give evidence.
Court: There is no doubt that counsel must strive in the conduct of cases to show a high level of professionalism and integrity. A plea of not making a statement and a claim of involvement are inconsistent.
In the result, the statement of the 1st accused person recorded by the PW5 on 26/12/2009 and the additional statement of 29/12/2009 and the confessional statement for evidence before a superior Police officer are admitted and marked Exhibits C, C1 and C2 respectively.
I will like to say that in these circumstance, the learned trial judge was right to have admitted Exhibits C, C1 and C2 as retracted confessional statements without the necessity of conducting a trial within trial. Indeed, each case must be decided on its own facts. And, each case is authority for what it decides.
In the above excerpt from page 111 of the Records, it is obvious that the counsel to the Appellant in the trial Court made two different statements, indeed inconsistent statements to wit:
(1) The 1st accused person did not make the statement in question.
(2) We are also saying that it is involuntary.
This is quite different from a denial of statement on the ground that it was forcibly secured or made.
The learned trial judge was right in the circumstance, to have treated the objection of the Appellant to mean a denial of the statement rather than an objection to the voluntariness of the statement.
Issue No. 1 is resolved against the Appellant.
On Issue No. 2, learned counsel for the Appellant reiterated the three essential ingredients the prosecution must prove before a conviction of murder that is (a) the deceased has died (b) death of the deceased was caused by the accused and (c) the act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
On this, Appellant’s counsel relied on the cases of OGBA v. STATE (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 164; NWAEZE v. STATE (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 143) 375; GIRA v. STATE (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 375 and KADA v. STATE (1991) 11/12 SC 1.
He also submitted that the onus is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He referred to the provisions of Section 135(1) and (2), 139(3)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011 and Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
Still on the burden and standard of proof, he also referred to the cases of NJOKU v. STATE (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 548; AJAYI v. STATE (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 589.
Learned counsel for the Appellant then submitted that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the offence of murder allegedly committed by the Appellant. Thus, the learned trial judge was wrong according to counsel to have convicted the Appellant based on inconclusive evidence which was primarily supported by placing reliance on Exhibits C, C1 and C2.
Learned counsel for the Appellant broke down the stated ingredients of murder and made submissions as follows:
a. Whether the deceased has died
On (a) above, Appellant’s counsel submitted that it is not certain that the deceased is dead. There is no evidence before this Court, which positively and conclusively attest to the death of Idara Ekop Udoh.
He submitted that the deceased was alleged to have been killed on 29th November, 2009. However, that on 30th December, 2009, exactly a month after the death of the deceased, PW4, Dr. Ime Usanga purportedly performed an autopsy on a decomposed corpse identified by one Gloria Ekop Udoh.
That in Exhibit A, the autopsy report, PW4 described the condition of the corpse:
Decomposed scalp with the face devoid of any flesh, a decomposed abdomen with the entrails hanging out. Decomposed upper and lower limbs. Fracture of the base of the skull.
Appellant’s counsel questioned on what basis did Gloria Ekop Udoh arrive at the decision that the decomposed corpse was that of the deceased? That evidence he says is lacking. As such, there is shroud of mystery over the identity of the recovered corpse.
He submitted that proof of identity of the corpse of a deceased person is vital to the successful prosecution of the offence charged. He referred to the cases of PRINCEWILL v. STATE (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 353) 703 @ 715; ENEWOH v. STATE (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 469 @ 480-481 and ISANG v. STATE (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 473) 458 @ 468 and submitted that nothing positively and conclusively show that the recovered corpse was that of the deceased.
b. Whether the death of the deceased was caused by the Appellant.
On (b), learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to prove that the death of the deceased was caused by the Appellant. That the prosecution failed to link the Appellant to death of the deceased, as the prosecution failed to bring a witness who saw how and when the Appellant allegedly caused the death of the deceased. Rather, said counsel, the witnesses of the prosecution all testified about an alleged confession of a co-accused person (Okon Nsini Okon) and how he implicated the Appellant.
He reasoned that in proof of its case, the prosecution relied predominantly on circumstantial evidence, which in appropriate cases may form the basis for a conviction.
After referring to the case of NWEKE v. STATE (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 588 @ 600 on circumstantial evidence, Appellant’s counsel submitted that the testimony of those who reportedly said the Appellant and the co-accused person (Okon Nsini Okon) were seen carrying the deceased person on a bike is at best inadmissible hearsay.
He concluded on item (b) that the failure of the prosecution to link the Appellant directly to the alleged crime creates a doubt which must be resolved in favour of the Appellant. He referred to the cases of AKPAN v. THE STATE (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 368) 347; OGUNTOLU v. STATE (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 432) 503; OGUNTOLA v. STATE (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1049) 617.
c. The act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
On (c) that is the third ingredient of the offence of Murder, Appellant’s counsel submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the mens rea or guilty intent for the offence of murder for which the Appellant was charged.
He referred to the cases of NWOKEARU v. STATE (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1215) 1, 37 and AMAYO v. STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 1, that even if it were the case that the Appellant caused the death of the deceased, the prosecution is in addition, required to show beyond doubt that the act or omission of the Appellant which caused the death of the deceased was intended by the Appellant and with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.
He added, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, failure of which creates a doubt which must be resolved in favour of the Appellant.
He referred to the cases of AMODU v. STATE (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1177) 47 @ 52; KALU v. NIGERIAN ARMY (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1185) 433 @ 440; KINGSLEY v. STATE (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1191) 393 @ 595.
He urged us to resolve Issue No. 2 in favour of the Appellant.
Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant and his co-accused in explaining how the deceased met her death, voluntarily confessed and gave details of how and why they killed the deceased, who was a sister in-law to Okon Nsini Okon, the co-accused (1st accused) in the trial Court and followed up their confession with leading the Police to where they left the deceased in the bush to rot away.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>
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Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to the case of OBOSI v. STATE (2005) 4 ACLR 184-185 and submitted that the discovery of the corpse following the confession of the Appellant is a corroboration of the confession as being true.
He referred to the evidence of PW4 and the autopsy report, Exhibit ‘A’. He reminded us that contrary to the suggestion by the Appellant’s counsel, PW4, Dr. Ime Jacob Usanga stated inter alia that the corpse was identified to him by the sister of the deceased.
He submitted that it is begging the question to say that the identity of the corpse is in doubt. Moreover, that the Appellant who killed the deceased knew where he kept the corpse and took the Police to the exact spot, where the decomposing corpse was seen.
He concluded that Exhibits C and C1, D, D1 and D2 stated how the Appellant and his co-accused hit the deceased on the head with sticks until she collapsed and died on the spot. That the evidence of the medical doctor, PW4 disclosed that the corpse had a fracture at the base of the skull bone. And that PW4 stated cause of death to be head injury leading to fractured skull which the deceased could not have inflicted on herself.
He urged us to resolve Issue No. 2 in favour of the Respondent.
First, I adopt my decision on Issue No. 1 for the resolution of Issue No. 2 in this appeal. Exhibits C, C1 and C2 were voluntarily made by the Appellant and were rightly admitted by the learned trial judge.
Second, the Appellant’s Confessional Statement, Exhibits C, C1, and C2 coupled with the evidence of PW3, PW4 and PW5 and the Autopsy Report Exhibit ‘A’ corroborated each other in fulfilling the three ingredients of the offence of murder in this case. It remains to say that conviction for any crime may be based on a single confession if voluntarily made. See GIRA v. THE STATE (1996) 4 SCNJ 94; EFFIONG v. STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 362 SC; IHUEBEKA v. STATE (2000) 4 SC (Pt. 1) 203; IDOWU v. STATE (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 50; ALARAPE v. THE STATE (2000) 14 WRN 1 SC, and it is trite law that mere retraction of a confessional statement by an accused does not necessarily make it inadmissible. However, where an accused had retracted his earlier confession, it is desirable to have some evidence outside the confession which will make it probable that the confession was true. See NWAEBONYI v. THE STATE (1994) 5 SCNJ 86; EDET EKPE v. THE STATE (1994) 12 SCNJ 131; R. V. EBONG (1997) 12 WACA 1.
In the instant case, the prosecution has proved the guilt of the Appellant for the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue No. 2 is resolved against the Appellant.
Having resolved the two (2) issues in this appeal against the Appellant, the appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
The judgment, conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the Honourable I. E. Ukanna of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State delivered on 9/5/2014 are hereby affirmed.
HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A.: The judgment of my Learned brother, Mojeed Adekunle Owoade, JCA, was available to me in draft before now.
Having also studied the record of appeal and the submissions of Learned counsel, I agree that the appeal lacks merit and I dismiss the same.
Appeal dismissed.
MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A.: I was afforded the opportunity of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mojeed A. Owoade, JCA, and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the judgment. I too dismiss the unmeritorious appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
Appearances:
CHINWE GODWIN-OMOKA (Mrs), ESQ. For Appellant(s)
FRIDAY J. ITIM, ESQ.
(Assistant Director, Ministry of Justice, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State.) For Respondent(s)
