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OSIBE v. GOVERNING COUNCIL, AKANNU IBIAM FED. POLY., UNWANA & ANOR (2020)

OSIBE v. GOVERNING COUNCIL, AKANNU IBIAM FED. POLY., UNWANA & ANOR

(2020)LCN/15432(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, November 20, 2020

CA/E/94/2012

RATIO

 

DECLARATORY RELIEF: WHETHER A PLAINTIFF MAY RELY ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENCE TO PROVE HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE DECLARATION

The law is trite that a declaratory relief is not granted as a matter of cause and not even on the admission of the defendant. A party seeking a declaratory relief has the burden to prove his entitlement to the relief sought by placing cogent and credible evidence and materials before the Court. In MOHAMMED V. WAMAKO & ORS (2017) LPELR-42667(SC) AT 21-22(A-B) the Supreme Court Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C, held that:
“It is further settled and well established that declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission. The plaintiff who sought for such relief must prove and succeed on the strength of his case and not rely on the weakness of the defence. See the case of Emenike v. P.D.P (2012) 50 NSCQR 94 at 130 per Fabiyi, JSC where it was held that:- “the burden of proof on the plaintiff in establishing declaratory relief to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission bythe defendant where the plaintiff fails to establish his entitlement to the declaration by his own evidence.” The same principle was emphasized also in the case of C.P.C. V. INEC (2012) 1 NWLR (pt. 1280) 106 of 131 where this Court held and said:- “The Court does not make declarations of right either on admission as in default of defence without having evidence and being satisfied by such evidence to the plaintiff’s entitlement to such a right. The requirement of oral evidence arises from the fact that the Court has discretion to grant or refuse a declaratory relief and its success depends entirely on the strength of the plaintiff’s own case and not on the defence.”
See also EDOSA & ANOR. V. OGIEMWANRE (2018) LPELR-46341 (SC) AT 12-14(F-A) MTN V. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION INVESTMENT (2019) LPELR-47042 (SC) AT 39 (A-D). ASHAKACEM PLC V. ASHARATUL MUBASHSHURUN INVESTMENT LTD (2019) LPELR-46541(SC) AT 16 (D-F). PER MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. 

 

GROUNDS OF APPEAL: WHETHER AN ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION CAN BE RAISED FROM A COMBINATION OF TWO OR MORE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

An issue can be raised from a combination of two or more grounds of appeal but a counsel is not allowed to raise more than one issue from a ground of appeal. Proliferation of issues is unacceptable. See AMODU V. COMMANDANT, POLICE COLLEGE, MAIDUGURI & ANOR (2009) LPELR-467 (SC) AT 10-11 (B). PHILLIPS V. EBA ODAN COMMERICIAL & INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD (2012) LPELR-9718 (SC) AT 6 (B-C). NDUUL V. WAYO & ORS. (2018) LPELR-4515 (SC) AT 19 (B-F).

Issues 1 and 3 of the appellant and issue 2 of the respondent do not arise from or relate to any ground of appeal. It is glaring that those issues were distilled from the particulars of the sole ground of appeal. In OBIAGWU & ORS. V. OKOROAFOR (2019) LPELR-46689(SC) AT 62-63 (F-C), this Court per Lokulo-Sodipe, JCA was emphatic that an issue or issues for determination in an appeal should not be disled or formulated from the particulars of ground of appeal. Formulation of an issue for determination from the particulars of a ground of appeal amounts to an acknowledgement that the particulars should have formed a ground or grounds of appeal. Issues for determination in an appeal must arise from or relate to the grounds of appeal. Any issue which does not relate to the grounds of appeal must be struck out. Any issue distilled from the particulars of a ground of appeal is grossly incompetent and should be struck out. See BISIRIYU AKINLAGUN & ORS V. TAIWO OSHOBOJA & ANOR. (2006) LPELR-348 (SC) AT 15 (C-D). ATUNRASE & ORS. V. S. C. O. PHILLIPS & ORS. (1996) LPELR-636(SC) AT 14 (A). CARLEN NIGERIA LTD. V. UNIVERSITY OF JOS & ANOR. (1994) LPELR-832 (SC) AT 17 (C-E). PER MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. 

Before Our Lordships

Misitura Omodere Bolaji-Yusuff Justice of the Court of Appeal

Joseph Olubunmi Kayode Oyewole Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Sadiq Umar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

JONATHAN OSIBE APPELANT(S)

And

1. THE GOVERNING, AKANNU IBIAM FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC, UNWANA 2. AKANU IBIAM POLYTECHNIC, UNWANA, EBONYI STATE RESPONDENT(S)

MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant herein commenced suit no. FHC/A/CS/14/2011, fundamental right (enforcement) proceedings by a motion on notice filed on 16/3/2014, at the Federal High Court of Nigeria, sitting at Abakaliki, Ebonyi State and sought the following reliefs:
1. “A declaration that the setting up of the reconstituted Governing Council Committee by the 1st respondent and the deliberations of the said committee on the 16th day of March, 2011 without hearing the applicant in respect of the White Paper on the Operations of the Local Government Councils in Abia State between 18th November, 1993 to 30th April,1994 is unconstitutional as it violates the applicant’s fundamental right to fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and under Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
​2. An order of this honourable Court setting aside the decisions reached at the said deliberation of the Governing Council Committee set up by the 1st respondent on the 16th day of March, 2011.
3. An order of this honourable Court directing the respondents, their agents, servants or privies to desist from implementing whatever decisions that might otherwise have been reached by the Governing Council Committee set up by the 1st respondent consequent upon White Paper on the Operation of the Local Government Council in Abia State between 18th November,1993 to 30th April, 1994.
And for such further order or orders as the honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.
GROUND UPON WHICH THE APPLICATION IS BASED.
1. That setting up of the Governing Council Committee by the 1st respondent and the sitting of the said committee on the 16th day of March, 2011 without hearing the applicant in respect of the White Paper on the Operation of the Local Government Council in Abia State between 18th November, 1993 to 30th April, 1994 is unconstitutional as it violates the applicant’s Fundamental Right to fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and under Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and People Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004

  1. That the respondents were in the know of the pendency of suit no. HU/221/2009: Jonathan Osibe vs The Hon. Attorney General of Abia State & Anor. and still went ahead to set up a Governing Council Committee respecting the subject matter in the said suit.”Parties filed and exchanged all necessary processes including affidavits and written addresses which they adopted as their arguments before the Court. In its considered judgment delivered on 31/10/11 by S. SAIDU, J. The Court below dismissed the appellant’s case.

    Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the judgment on 5/12/2011. The sole ground of appeal in the notice of appeal with its particulars is as follows:
    GROUND 1- ERROR IN LAW AND FACT
    “The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing has not been infringed by the activities of the respondents in not giving the applicant the opportunity of representation by the reconstituted Governing Council

Committee set up by the respondents in respect of the White Paper on The Operations of the Local Government Council in Abia State between 18th November, 1993 and 30th April, 1994.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. The judgement/decision of the Court below is against the evidence.
2. The learned trial Court erred in law when it inadvertently struck out paragraphs 14 and 15 of the applicant’s affidavit of facts upon which the application is made on the grounds that the said paragraphs failed to comply with the provisions of the Evidence Act.
3. The learned trial judge failed to consider adequately the evidence adduced by the applicants and came to a wrong decision thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.”

The appellant’s brief of argument was filed on 25/2/2013 pursuant to the order of this Court made on 13/2/2013. Respondents’ brief of argument was filed on 13/4/2018. The appellant’s reply brief was filed on 22/1/2019. All the briefs were consequentially deemed as properly filed and served on 21/9/20 upon the record of appeal being deemed as properly compiled and transmitted that day.

The appellant

formulated the following issues for the determination of this appeal:
1. “Whether the learned trial Court upon the proper direction of evidence was right to have struck out the said paragraphs 14 and 15 of the applicant’s affidavit suo motu without calling on counsel to address him on the propriety of the said paragraphs vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 89 of the Evidence Act, respecting time, place and circumstances of the information received from Mrs. Imaga.
2. Whether the learned trial Court upon the proper direction of evidence was right to have held that there was nothing before him to show that there is a threat that the respondents would not comply with the law in dealing with the applicant.
3. Whether technicalities should be allowed to be defeat of cause of justice.”

The respondent formulated the following issues for determination:
1. “Whether the trial Court was right in holding that there was nothing before the Court to show that there is a threat that the respondents would not comply with the law in dealing with the appellant.
2. Whether, upon the proper evaluation of evidence, the triCourt was right in striking out paragraphs 14 and 15 of the appellant’s affidavit suo motu.”

It is glaring from the issues formulated by counsel to both parties that multiple issues have been formulated in respect of the sole ground of appeal. This is totally against the settled principle of law that a party cannot raise more issues than the grounds of appeal. An issue can be raised from a combination of two or more grounds of appeal but a counsel is not allowed to raise more than one issue from a ground of appeal. Proliferation of issues is unacceptable. See AMODU V. COMMANDANT, POLICE COLLEGE, MAIDUGURI & ANOR (2009) LPELR-467 (SC) AT 10-11 (B). PHILLIPS V. EBA ODAN COMMERICIAL & INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD (2012) LPELR-9718 (SC) AT 6 (B-C). NDUUL V. WAYO & ORS. (2018) LPELR-4515 (SC) AT 19 (B-F).

Issues 1 and 3 of the appellant and issue 2 of the respondent do not arise from or relate to any ground of appeal. It is glaring that those issues were distilled from the particulars of the sole ground of appeal. In OBIAGWU & ORS. V. OKOROAFOR (2019) LPELR-46689(SC) AT 62-63 (F-C), this Court per Lokulo-Sodipe, JCA was emphatic that an issue or issues for determination in an appeal should not be disled or formulated from the particulars of ground of appeal. Formulation of an issue for determination from the particulars of a ground of appeal amounts to an acknowledgement that the particulars should have formed a ground or grounds of appeal. Issues for determination in an appeal must arise from or relate to the grounds of appeal. Any issue which does not relate to the grounds of appeal must be struck out. Any issue distilled from the particulars of a ground of appeal is grossly incompetent and should be struck out. See BISIRIYU AKINLAGUN & ORS V. TAIWO OSHOBOJA & ANOR. (2006) LPELR-348 (SC) AT 15 (C-D). ATUNRASE & ORS. V. S. C. O. PHILLIPS & ORS. (1996) LPELR-636(SC) AT 14 (A). CARLEN NIGERIA LTD. V. UNIVERSITY OF JOS & ANOR. (1994) LPELR-832 (SC) AT 17 (C-E). Since issues 1 and 3 raised by the appellant’s counsel and issue 2 raised by the respondent’s counsel do not arise from or relate to any ground of appeal, they are incompetent and are hereby struck out.

Based on the foregoing, the only competent issue for determination in this appeal is whether the trial Court was right in holding that there was nothing before the Court to show that there is a threat that the respondents would not comply with the law in dealing with the appellant. On this issue, counsel referred to paragraphs 5-18 of the affidavit in support of the application. He submitted that the appellant by the affidavit evidence discharged the burden placed on him by law to prove his entitlement to the enforcement of his fundamental right to fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36 of the Constitution (as amended) as there is a real likelihood of breach of his fundamental right. He referred to SPDC LTD V. OLANREWAJU (2009) VOLUME 171 LRCN 255 AT 258 (3). GARBA V. UNIV. OF MADUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR 550 AT 618.

He further submitted that the Court below erred in law when it held that there was nothing before him to show that there is a threat that the respondents would not comply with the law in dealing with the appellant when the depositions of the appellant were not controverted.

In response, the respondent’s counsel submitted that the appellate Courts have always abstained from interfering with the findings of the trial Courts except where such findings are perverse. He referred to OSENI V. BAJULU (2009) 40 NSCQR 280 AT 295 RATIO 17-20. JINADU V. ESUROMBI (2009) 38 (PT 2) NSCQR 1026 AT 1029 RATIO 1. OLALOMI IND. LTD V. NIDB (2009) 39 NSCQR 240 RATIO 6. He further submitted that the appellant’s allegation that his right to fair hearing has been, is being or is likely to be violated by the respondents cannot stand in the face of the appellant’s depositions in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the affidavit in support of the application which confirmed that the appellant was given an opportunity to respond to or state his own side in respect of the petition written against him. He argued that the respondents acted within the confines of the law when they set up the Governing Council Committee under Section 17(1) of the Federal Polytechnics Act, Cap. F17 LFN.

In his reply, the appellant’s counsel submitted that the respondents are playing deceit by refusing to respond to the depositions in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the appellant’s affidavit. He further submitted that the right to fair hearing does not abate because one was afforded the opportunity in the previous hearing that was terminated but revived before another reconstituted panel. He submitted that the grouse of the appellant is the failure of the reconstituted committee of 2011 to give him a hearing before taking a decision on the petition against him which the court below did not appreciate.

RESOLUTION
Section 46 (1) of the Constitution provides that any person who alleges that any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress. Section 36 (1) of the Constitution provides that:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.
(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this section, a law shall not be invalidated by reason only that it confers on any government or authority power to determine questions arisinadministration of a law that affects or may affect the civil rights and obligations of any person if such law –
(a) provides for an opportunity for the person whose rights and obligations may be affected to make representations to the administering authority before that authority makes the decision affecting that person; and
(b) Contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive.”

The appellant’s case at the Court below is that his right to fair hearing has been, is being or likely to be contravened by the respondents by reconstituting another panel to look into a petition against him pursuant to a white paper report issued in respect of the operations of the Local Government Councils in Abia State from 18th November, 1993 – 30th April, 1994 after the 1st panel suspended its proceedings and deliberations upon being informed that the white paper report was being challenged in Court. The full facts of the case as deposed to by the appellant in paragraphs 3-18 of the affidavit of facts in support of the application on pages 215- 216 of the record of appeal are as follows:
3.

“The 2nd respondent is an establishment of the Federal Government.
4. That I became a member of staff of the 2nd respondent consequent upon my appointment in 1996.
5. That sometimes in 2009, I took out a Writ of Summons Suit No. HU/221/2009 in the High Court of Justice, Umuahia, Abia State against the Hon. Attorney General of Abia State & Anor based on the outcome of the White Paper on the Operation of the Local Government Council in Abia State from 18th November, 1993- 30th April, 1994.
6. That the statement of claim on the said suit is hereby annexed and marked as exhibit VOA 1.
7. That the said suit is still pending before the High Court of Justice, Umuahia.
8. That on April, 21, 2008, the Registrar of the 2nd respondent sent me a Memorandum Ref. No. ALFPU/REG/SS/412/200 dated April, 21 2008 titled RE; CASE OF STEALING, FRAUD, EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT BY FRAUD AGAINST MR. JONATHAN A. OSIBE wherein the Management directed that I should comment on the petition attached to the Memorandum.
9. That the said Memorandum is hereby annexed and marked as exhibit VOA 2.
10.

That I sent in my response to the said Governing Council Committee through the Chairman of the said Committee dated 07/09/09 wherein I informed the said Committee amongst others that the matter concerning the Abia State Government and my humble self over the White Paper, the subject matter of the said petition is presently in Court and therefore subjudice.
11. That my response dated 07/09/09 is hereby annexed and marked as exhibit VOA 3.
12. That I have not been found guilty of any embezzlement by a court of competent jurisdiction.
13. That based on my said response, the Governing Council Committee decided to stop further deliberation on the said petition until the determination of the said Suit No. HU/221/2009.
14. That I was however stupefied to learn from the Secretary of the Council Committee one Mrs. Ola Imaga who informed me at the Federal Polytechnic Unwana, Afikpo and I verily believed her that the said Governing Council Committee reconstituted another Committee to look into the said petition against me.
15. That the said Mrs. Ola Imaga, the Secretary of the Committee further informed me at the Federal Polytechnic Unwana, Afikpo and I verily believed her that the reconstituted Committee has sat, deliberated on the said petition against me without hearing from me and shall present their report against me today to the Governing Council of the Polytechnic.
16. That I was denied the opportunity of hearing my own side of the petition by the reconstituted Committee looking into the said petition against me.
17. That unless this honourable court intervenes, my employment with the 2nd respondent shall be terminated based on the report and recommendations of the reconstituted Committee.
18. That there is no established criminal allegation whatsoever against me and there is no reasonable grounds to deny me fair hearing respecting the petition against me by the reconstituted committee in such a manner as carried out by the respondents.”

The counter affidavit filed by the respondents and the further affidavit filed in response thereto by the appellant were struck out by the Court along with the addresses filed with the processes for being filed outside the time prescribed by Order II Rules 6 and 7 and Order VI Rules 2 and 5 of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009.

There is no appeal against that decision. The decision of the Court below was therefore based solely on the facts presented by the appellants in his affidavit in support of the application. The Court at pages 214-215 of record held that:
“I am now left solely with the applicant’s deposition and argument in written address to consider his application.
The position of law is clear on what I am to do in this situation. The Court of Appeal held in AGBAKOBA V. THE DIRECTOR SSS (1994) 6 NWLR (PT.351) 475 that, the fact that the other party to an application for enforcement of fundamental rights refuse to file a counter affidavit or any evidence or appear to be heard on the application will not deprive the applicant of his entitlement to declaratory reliefs. Secondly, the Court will not declare a right to be infringed merely because the other party to the application has neither filed an affidavit nor come forward to be heard on the application if the affidavit and materials placed before the Court in support of the application show that the right claimed does not exist or if it exists, has not been infringed.
The Court of Appeal in this same case held that, a party seeking an injunction to restrict the doing of an act in future must show facts that there is a threat that in future such an act will be carried out.”

The law is trite that a declaratory relief is not granted as a matter of cause and not even on the admission of the defendant. A party seeking a declaratory relief has the burden to prove his entitlement to the relief sought by placing cogent and credible evidence and materials before the Court. In MOHAMMED V. WAMAKO & ORS (2017) LPELR-42667(SC) AT 21-22(A-B) the Supreme Court Per OGUNBIYI, J.S.C, held that:
“It is further settled and well established that declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission. The plaintiff who sought for such relief must prove and succeed on the strength of his case and not rely on the weakness of the defence. See the case of Emenike v. P.D.P (2012) 50 NSCQR 94 at 130 per Fabiyi, JSC where it was held that:- “the burden of proof on the plaintiff in establishing declaratory relief to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission bythe defendant where the plaintiff fails to establish his entitlement to the declaration by his own evidence.” The same principle was emphasized also in the case of C.P.C. V. INEC (2012) 1 NWLR (pt. 1280) 106 of 131 where this Court held and said:- “The Court does not make declarations of right either on admission as in default of defence without having evidence and being satisfied by such evidence to the plaintiff’s entitlement to such a right. The requirement of oral evidence arises from the fact that the Court has discretion to grant or refuse a declaratory relief and its success depends entirely on the strength of the plaintiff’s own case and not on the defence.”
See also EDOSA & ANOR. V. OGIEMWANRE (2018) LPELR-46341 (SC) AT 12-14(F-A) MTN V. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION INVESTMENT (2019) LPELR-47042 (SC) AT 39 (A-D). ASHAKACEM PLC V. ASHARATUL MUBASHSHURUN INVESTMENT LTD (2019) LPELR-46541(SC) AT 16 (D-F).

The appellant had the burden to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that another committee was reconstituted after the committee before which he made representation suspended its proceedings and deliberations, that the reconstituted committee met on 16th day of March, 2011 and deliberated on the petition written against him and that a decision was reached pursuant to the deliberations. The pronouncement of the Court below represents the correction position of the law.

The Court having considered the depositions in the affidavit of facts in support of the application held that:
“Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavits in support of the application which is the main basis of the application before the court offends S. 89 of the Evidence Act as to time, place and circumstances of the information received from Mrs. Imaga and the two paragraphs are hereby struck out.
The applicant is now left with the remaining paragraphs of affidavit in support and the exhibits attached. While exhibit VOA 1 is the Writ of Summons from High Court of Justice of Abia State sitting in Umuahia VOA 2 is the petition written against the applicant forwarded to him by the respondent for his comment. Exhibit VOA 3 attached was the paper presented to the Council Committee by the applicant as his representation on the matter. While the respondents are not party (sic) to the case before the High Court of

Umuahia, as for any party or person to be bound by a decision he ought to be made a party. Exhibit VOA 2 is within the ambit of the FREPER 2009 as the applicant was given the opportunity to be heard. This fair hearing has been endorsed by exhibit VOA 3. The applicant’s employment is guided by the Federal Polytechnic Act LFN 2004. There is nothing before me so far to show that the respondents have violated or are about to violate the Act that guides the employment of the applicant in this case. The applicant has failed to show that there is threat that the respondents would not comply with law in dealing with him. I hereby dismiss the case.”

I have considered the facts deposed to by the appellant. The appellant failed woefully to discharge the burden placed on him by law. The 2nd respondent is a Federal Government institution established by an Act of the National Assembly. It cannot be argued that the business of such an institution is conducted verbally. It cannot also be argued seriously that the setting up of a committee or a panel to investigate any petition or allegation against a staff of the institution is done verbally. There is absolutely nothing on record to support the assertion of the appellant that any committee was reconstituted and who the members of the reconstituted committee are. No record of the alleged meeting and deliberations of the said committee on 16th day of March, 2011 is presented to the Court. Even if paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavits in support of the application were not struck out for offending Section 89 of the Evidence Act, it is a notorious fact that the running or governance of an institution is not done verbally. Therefore, those depositions are not credible and reliable evidence upon which the Court could have come to a conclusion that the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing has been, is being or likely to be contravened. Apart from lack of documentary evidence, the depositions in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavit in support of the application are hearsay in so far as they seek to prove the truth of the reconstitution of the committee and that the committee met on 16th March, 2011 in respect of the petition against the appellant. Section 37 of the Evidence Act defines hearsay evidence as follows:
37. “Hearsay means a statement-
(a) oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding; or
(b) contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it.’’
By virtue of Section 38 of the Evidence Act, hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided under the Act. In FRN V. USMAN (2012) LPELR-7818(SC) AT 19-20 (F-C) the Supreme Court per RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C stated the meaning and nature of hearsay evidence as follows:
“The question to be answered is what constitutes hearsay evidence. A witness is expected to testify in Court on oath on what he knows personally. If the witness testifies on what he heard some other person say, his evidence is hearsay. Such evidence is to inform the Court of what he heard the other person say e.g. in cases of slander. If on the other hand his testimony is to establish the truth of an event in question or as in this case to establish the truth of the contents of the appellants’ statements, it is hearsay and inadmissible evidence. Hearsay evidence is secondary evidence of an oral statement best described as second-hand evidence. What a witness says he heard from another person is unreliable for many reasons. For example, he may not have understood the informant/interpreters, or he may say things that were never said. Such evidence remains hearsay evidence because it cannot be subject to cross- examination in the absence of the informant/interpreters.”
In OJO V. GHARORO & ORS (2006) LPELR-2383(SC) AT 16-17 (C-D) the Supreme Court per TOBI, J.S.C explained the nature of hearsay evidence as follows:
“When a third party relates a story to another as proof of contents of a statement such story is hearsay. Hearsay evidence is all evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person. See Judicial Service Committee v. Omo (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.157) 407. A piece of evidence is hearsay if it is evidence of the contents of a statement made by a witness who is himself not called to testify. See Utteh v. The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 223) 257. The word “hearsay” is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say. Sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. The Evidence Act, Cap. 112, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 does not specifically use the expression “hearsay evidence” But the totality of Section 77 of the Act, by interpretation of the Courts, provide for hearsay evidence. In most cases, hearsay evidence is to the following or like effect: “I was told by XYZ that; or XYZ told me that; or I heard that XYZ told ABC that; or I made inquiries and I was told that”. See generally Armel’s Transport Ltd. v. Madam Martins (1970) 1 All NLR 27; Adeka v. Vaatia (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 48) 134; Management Enterprises Ltd. v. Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.55) 179; Jolayemi v. Olaoye (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt.887) 322.”
See also KAKIH V.PDP (2014) LPELR-23277(SC) AT 46-47 (D-A) where the Supreme Court held that:
“Once it is found that a deposition is laced with hearsay, the Court cannot ascribe probative value to it. To do otherwise is like asking the Court to sieve the oral evidence (in form of written statement on oath) of witnesses to determine which part of it is hearsay or not so as to give probative value to the aspect of evidence that is not hearsay. Hearsay evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing a criminal liability. If such evidence was admitted unwittingly, it should not be acted upon by the trial Court; but if it did, an appellate Court can overturn the judgment based on the fact that the finding of the trial Court was based upon inadequate evidence: BUHARI & ANOR v. OBASANJO & ORS (2005) 9 SCN 1.”
Even if the depositions in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavits in support of the appellant’s application had not been struck out, the Court below could not have placed any probative value on those depositions as they are hearsay and inadmissible. The finding and conclusion of the Court below that the appellant failed to show that his fundamental right to fair hearing has been, is being or likely to be contravened is absolutely correct. No legally admissible and credible material or evidence was placed before the Court to justify a conclusion that the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing has been, is being or likely to be contravened.
In conclusion, the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. The ruling of the Federal High Court sitting at Abakaliki, Ebonyi State delivered in suit no. FHC/A/CS/14/2011 on 31/10/2011 by S. SAIDU, J is hereby affirmed. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the draft of the lead judgment just delivered herein by my learned brother MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, JCA and I totally endorse the reasoning and conclusion therein.

For the more detailed reasoning in the lead judgment, I equally find no merit in this appeal and I accordingly dismiss it.

ABUBAKAR SADIQ UMAR, J.C.A.: I the opportunity of reading in advance, the well-considered judgment of my learned brother, MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, JCA, just delivered. I am in total agreement with the decision reached and the reasoning behind the decision

​The Appellant in his application at the Court below alleged the infringement of his constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing. It has always been the stand in our jurisprudence that the fundamental rights of citizens must be guarded jealously by the Courts. see ONUCHE V. ONYEBUCHI & ORS (2016) LPELR — 42114 (CA). However, the Courts will not protect fundamental rights in a vacuum. A person who alleges that his right has been, is being or likely to be contravened, to be entitled to the relief(s) sought, must present to the Court cogent facts by way of admissible evidence. The Appellant in the instant appeal failed woefully to show how his fundamental right to fair hearing has been, is being or likely to be trampled upon. And by reason of his failure to do so, his claims are bound to fail as rightly held by the learned trial judge.

For the above reasons and of course the detailed ones adumbrated in the lead judgment, I too feel that the appeal lacks merit. Same is equally dismissed. I abide by the order to cost made in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

P. O. Ogwuche For Appellant(s)

…For Respondent(s)