CHIEF FESTUS YESUFU VS CO-OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED
(1988) LCN/2398(SC)
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Friday, June 9, 1989
Case Number: SC. 152/1988
JUSTICES:
NNAMANI JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
KARIBI-WHYTE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
KAWU JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
OPUTA JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
WALI JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
BETWEEN
APPELLANTS
CHIEF FESTUS YESUFU
AND
RESPONDENTS
CO-OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED
RATIO
APPEAL ON GROUNDS NOT RELIED ON BY COURT AND WHETHER OR NOT AN APPELLANT CAN INTRODUCE NEW ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
… under Order 8 Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985. Sub-rules 2 and 3 of Rule 3 of Order 8 provide that –
“2. A respondent who desires to contend on the appeal that the decision of the court below should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by that court must give notice to that effect specifying the grounds of that contention.
3. Except with the leave of the court, a respondent shall not be entitled on the hearing of the appeal to contend that the decision of the court below should be varied upon grounds not specified in a notice given under this rule, to apply for any relief not so specified or to support the decision of the court below upon any grounds not relied upon by that court or specified in such a notice.”
A party can only introduce new arguments on appeal if he has strictly complied with and satisfied the conditions prescribed in Order 8 Rule 3 (supra). See Daniel Dilibe & Ors. v. Chukwuemeka Nwakozor (1986) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.41) 315 and Osinupebi v. Saibu & Ors (1982) 7 S.C. 104. PER WALI, JSC.
THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING AN APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL
The principle governing the application for enlargement of time in which to appeal has been settled, stated and re-stated in several decisions emanating from this Court. See Bowaje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 S.C. 143, Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 5-7 S.C. 42; Lamai v.Orbih (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28; Osinupebi v. Saibu (1982) 7 S.C. 104 and Shittu & Anor. v. Osibanjo & Anor. (1988) 1 S.C.N.J. (Pt.1) 37; (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 83) 483.
Order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 has stipulated the conditions to be satisfied before the court can exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant and these are –
1. Good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period; and
2. grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. PER WALI, J.S.C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LENGTH OF DELAY IN BRINGING AN APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE AN APPEAL IS MATERIAL
The length of delay in bringing the application is immaterial so long as good and substantial reason justifying it is proffered. See Alagbe v. Abimbola & Ors. (1978) 2 S.C. 39. PER WALI, J.S.C.
WHETHER IT IS THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO GRANT OR REFUSE AN APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE AN APEAL AND WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE EXCERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION WHEN EXCERCISED
It is trite that to grant or refuse an application for enlargement of time within which to appeal is an exercise of judicial discretion by the Court and that an appellate court is always slow to interfere with the exercise of such discretion when it is so exercised. See University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1) 156. But where the discretion is found to have been wrongly exercised an appellate court has a duty to interfere and correct the mistake. See Niger Construction Ltd. v. Okugbemi (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.67) 787, particularly where Bello, J.S.C. (as he was then) said-
“…an appeal court may interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion if it is shown that there has been a wrongful exercise of the discretion such as where the tribunal acted under misconception of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or it omitted to take into account matters that are relevant or where it exercised or failed to exercise the discretion on wrong or inadequate materials and in all other cases where it is in the interest of justice to interfere…..”. PER WALI, J.S.C.
APPLICATION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE AN APPEAL AS PROVIDED UNDER ORDER 3 RULE 4(2) OF THE COURT OF APPEAL RULES 1981 AND FACTORS TO BE PROVED BY THE APPLICANT TO SUCCEED UNDER THE RULE
The application was made by the appellant to the Court of Appeal under Order 3 r.4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 which reads as follows:-
“Every application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period, and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. When time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”
It is plain that for an applicant to succeed under the Rule, he must satisfy the court that there are good and substantial reasons for his failure to appeal within the prescribed period and also that his proposed grounds of appeal prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard – Yinusa Shittu & Anor. VS. Mrs. Bisi Osibanja & anor. (1988) S.C.N.J. 37 (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 83) 483. PER KAWU, J.S.C.
WALI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): On 20th March, 1989, having read the record of proceedings and the briefs filed and after learned Counsel’s oral submissions in elucidation of their respective briefs, I allowed the appeal and reserved stating my reasons for doing so to today which I now do.
In the High Court of Justice, Bendel State of Nigeria, Benin Judicial Division, the plaintiff, as per his amended Statement of Claim asked for the following reliefs against the defendant-
“(a) A declaration that the plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant in respect of his accounts with the defendant a banker at Ibadan Oyo State of Nigeria and Benin City, Bendel State of Nigeria.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiffs accounts with the defendant at Ibadan and Benin City are in a credit of N2,211,956.35k made up as follows:-
(i) Ibadan Branch N677,264.15k
(ii) Benin Branch N1,534,692.20k
Total N2,211,956.35k
(c) interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of issuance of the writ (22/10/85) until payment.
(d) an Order for payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of N2,211,956.35k or any sum due and payable from the defendant to the plaintiff on the plaintiffs account with the defendant at Ibadan and Benin City.”
The case was tried by Akenzua, J., at the end of which he granted the plaintiff the reliefs prayed for in (a) and (b) but refused him (c) and (d) (supra), stating his reason for doing so as follows:-
“Just as the statement of defence has failed to answer all the material facts in the Amended Statement of Claim so the evidence led by the defence had failed to answer the case made out by the plaintiff. As claimed this is a declaration and so by reason of the evidence and under the principles already mentioned above I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established and proved the declaration he seeks in the second relief in paragraph 31 of the Amended Statement of Claim. As to the third and fourth reliefs this Court cannot grant them since there is no evidence that a demand was made on the defendant for the sum of money and the defendant refused to pay. I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff and I declare as follows:-
That the plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant in respect of his accounts with the defendant, a Banker at Ibadan Oyo State of Nigeria and in Benin City Bendel State of Nigeria.
2. That the plaintiffs account with the defendant at Ibadan Branch and in Benin City Branch are as follows:-
1. Ibadan Branch …………..N677,264.15
2. Benin Branch …………..N1,758,288.00”
By a Notice of Appeal dated 15th July, 1987, barely six days after the delivery of judgment, the defendant appealed against it to the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff was also not satisfied with that part of the judgment refusing him the reliefs he asked for in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 31 of the Amended Statement of Claim; he therefore instructed his counsel at the Court of trial Dr. Onaghise to cross-appeal. As a result of dispute that developed between the plaintiff and his counsel, the plaintiff changed counsel and instructed the Chambers of T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko & Co. to prosecute his case. It was when T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko came to write the plaintiff’s brief in respect of the appeal filed by the defendant that it was discovered that the plaintiff’s instruction to cross-appeal was not carried out by his former counsel. Then on 9th February 1988, the plaintiffs new Counsel filed an application dated 25th January 1988 in the Court of Appeal with the following prayers:-
“(1) Extension of time within which to appeal against that part of the judgment of Akenzua, J., dated 9th July, 1987 as set out in the proposed Notice of Appeal.
(2) Deeming as properly filed and served the proposed Notice of Appeal annexed to the affidavit in support of this motion and marked as ‘YCA’.
(3) Permitting the records of appeal and the respondent’s brief of argument filed in this case to be used for the purpose of the cross-appeal.”
As required by law the application was supported by the proposed Notice and Grounds of Appeal and the affidavit giving reasons for failure to appeal within time. The defendant filed counter-affidavit in opposition to the plaintiffs application.
The application was taken by the Court of Appeal on 22nd February 1988. After recording appearances of learned Counsel for the parties, the learned presiding Justice Ogundare, J .C.A., as shown by the printed record proceeded:-
(1) “Mr. Uwhubetine moves the court for extension of time to appeal against that part of the judgment of Akenzua, J., dated 9th July, 1987as set out in the proposed Notice of Appeal. He relies on the affidavit in support particularly paragraphs 3, 6-10. Urges the prayer sought.”
Immediately after that, came the Ruling of the Court. It reads:-
(2) “Court: We do not intend to call on him (Eghobamien) to reply.
It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this court in granting the prayer sought in his motion. The counter-affidavit shows that the applicant has not been forthright enough with the court as to the instruction he allegedly gave to Dr. Onaghise to appeal. There is no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why this instruction was not earned out, if at all given. Consequently this application lacks merit and it is dismissed with N40.00 costs to the respondent.
SGD.
MICHAEL EKUNDAYO OGUNDARE
JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
22/2/88.”
Both Mustapher and Ndoma-Egba, JJ .C.A. agreed with Ogundare, J .C.A. On 3rd March, 1988, the plaintiff filed an application dated 1st March 1988 in the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against its Ruling of 22nd February, 1988. Due to effluxion of time, the plaintiff applied to the Court of Appeal to withdraw his application and this was granted and same was struck out, as the Court of Appeal would no longer have jurisdiction to entertain it, in any case.
The plaintiff brought another application in the Supreme Court praying
(i) for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court;
(ii) granting applicant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Nigeria against the ruling of the Court of Appeal delivered in this case on the 22nd day of February, 1988refusing applicant an extension of time within which to cross-appeal against part of the judgment of Akenzua, J., in suit No. B/219/86.”
The application was heard in Chambers on Wednesday, 1st June 1988 and the prayers were granted. Hence this appeal.
For the purpose of this appeal, the plaintiff will henceforth be referred to as the appellant while the defendant will be referred to as the respondent.
Two Grounds of Appeal were filed in this appeal and they read:-
“1. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held:
“‘It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this Court in granting the prayers sought in this Motion.”
PARTICULARS
(a) Failure on the part of applicant’s Counsel to file an appeal which he had instructions to file is a good and substantial reason why applicant should not be refused leave to appeal in this case where defendant has already appealed.
(b) Refusal of leave to appeal in this case is highly bound to lead to a miscarriage of justice in this case where the unsuccessful defendant has appealed against the entire judgment.
2. The learned justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held:
‘”The Counter Affidavit shows that the applicant has not been forthright enough with the Court as to the instruction he allegedly gave to Dr. Onaghise to appeal. There is no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why the instruction was not carried out.”‘
PARTICULARS
(a) Applicant’s instruction to his Counsel is not a matter upon which a counter affidavit could have any relevance in the circumstances of this case.
(b) For reasons set out in the affidavit in support of the motion for leave, Dr. Onaghise could not reasonably be expected to swear to an affidavit in support of applicant’s motion.”
Briefs of arguments were filed and exchanged, and in elaboration thereof oral submissions were made by learned Counsel for the respective parties.
In the brief filed by T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko, S.A.N., for the appellant the following issues were formulated for determination:-
“WERE THE LEARNED JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL RIGHT IN REFUSING THE APPELLANT EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO CROSS-APPEAL AGAINST PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THIS CASE WHERE THE UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY APPEALED AGAINST THE WHOLE JUDGMENT or put in another way,
WAS THE REFUSAL BY THE LEARNED JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL TO GRANT APPELLANT EXTENSION OF TIME TO CROSS APPEAL IN THIS CASE A JUDICIOUS EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT”
Mr. A.O. Eghobamien for the respondent formulated the following four (4) issues in his brief:-
“1. Was Dr. Onaghise the counsel to the appellant in this appeal
2. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal
3. Has the appellant come to court with clean hands in view of the fact that he deleted the counter affidavit sworn on 11/3/88
4. Since A. O. Aburime, Esq., was counsel to the appellant from 20/7/87and there is no evidence that A.O. Aburime was given instruction to cross-appeal, is the appellant not estopped from cross-appealing after the statutory period of appealing had expired”
It is pertinent at this stage to deal with the issues formulated by learned Counsel for the respondent. With due respect to learned Counsel none of the issues formulated in his brief is related to any of the two Grounds of Appeal filed by the appellant. He neither cross-appealed nor filed a Notice under Order 8 Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules 1985. Sub-rules 2 and 3 of Rule 3 of Order 8 provide that –
“2. A respondent who desires to contend on the appeal that the decision of the court below should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by that court must give notice to that effect specifying the grounds of that contention.
3. Except with the leave of the court, a respondent shall not be entitled on the hearing of the appeal to contend that the decision of the court below should be varied upon grounds not specified in a notice given under this rule, to apply for any relief not so specified or to support the decision of the court below upon any grounds not relied upon by that court or specified in such a notice.”
A party can only introduce new arguments on appeal if he has strictly complied with and satisfied the conditions prescribed in Order 8 Rule 3 (supra). See Daniel Dilibe & Ors. v. Chukwuemeka Nwakozor (1986) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.41) 315 and Osinupebi v. Saibu & Ors (1982) 7 S.C. 104.
In his submissions, both written and oral, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that the reasons deposed to in the affidavit have substantially explained his client’s failure to appeal within the time statutorily provided, and that the proposed ground of appeal upon which he intends to prosecute his appeal prima facie shows good cause why he should be heard, and therefore the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal misdirected themselves when they refused to consider and grant his application for extension of time to appeal without really evaluating the affidavit evidence. He also submitted that paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 of the affidavit in support of the application were admitted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the counter affidavit. Learned Senior Advocate contended that the averment in paragraph 9 of the affidavit is a matter exclusively between the appellant and his former solicitor Dr. Onaghise and therefore not a matter that could be traversed by counter affidavit as the respondent was purported to have done in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit. He said the delay in filing the cross appeal was caused by the appellant’s former Counsel who was debriefed long after he was instructed to cross appeal; it was therefore unrealistic to expect a Counsel who was disengaged as a result of a disagreement with his client, (in this case, the appellant) to swear to an affidavit supporting the client’s application for extension of time to appeal. In support of the preceding submissions, the following decided cases were cited – Odusote v. Odusote (1971) 1 All N.L.R. 219, Ahmadu v. Salawu (1974) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt.2) 318; Ojora v. Bakare (1976) 1 All N.L.R. 22; Solanke v. Ajibola (1968) 1 All N.L.R. 46; Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 5-7 S.C. 42 and Awani v. Erejuwa (1976) 11 S.C. 307.
The application was brought pursuant to the provisions of Order 3 Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981, particularly sub-rules 1 and 2 thereof which provide that-
“4. – (1) The Court may enlarge the time provided by these Rules for the doing of anything to which these Rules apply.
(2) Every application for an enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period, and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. When time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”
The proposed ground of appeal upon which the appellant intends to prosecute his cross-appeal reads as follows:-
“1. The learned trial Judge having found that plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant and that the plaintiff had money in his account with the defendant, misdirected himself in law when he held:
‘”As to the third and fourth reliefs this court cannot grant them since there is no evidence that a demand was made on the defendant for the sum of money and the defendant refused to pay'”
PARTICULARS
“‘The filing of a writ of summons by a Bank’s customer in respect of his current account is a sufficient demand in law for the payment of the money in the account.'”
The principle governing the application for enlargement of time in which to appeal has been settled, stated and re-stated in several decisions emanating from this Court. See Bowaje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 S.C. 143, Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 5-7 S.C. 42; Lamai v.Orbih (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28; Osinupebi v. Saibu (1982) 7 S.C. 104 and Shittu & Anor. v. Osibanjo & Anor. (1988) 1 S.C.N.J. (Pt.1) 37; (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 83) 483.
Order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 has stipulated the conditions to be satisfied before the court can exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant and these are –
1. Good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period; and
2. grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.
To satisfy condition (1) supra, the appellant in support of the motion, swore to an affidavit paragraphs 3 to 10 of which I consider to be pertinent in deciding this appeal and which are reproduced hereunder:-
“3. In the judgment of the learned trial Judge, I succeeded in the two claims for declaration, but in respect of my claims number three and four, the learned trial Judge said:
”’As for the 3rd and 4th reliefs, this court cannot grant them since there is no evidence that a demand was made on the defendant for the sum of money and the defendant refused to pay.'”
4. I was dissatisfied with this aspect of the judgment of the learned trial Judge and as a result, I instructed my counsel at that time, Dr. Onaghise, to cross-appeal against this aspect of the judgment.
5. The defendant in this case has appealed against the whole judgment of the learned trial Judge and I desire to cross-appeal against the aspect of the judgment refusing my relief number four.
6. Upon the service of the appellant’s brief on me, I handed the same over to Messrs. T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko & Co. whom I have retained for the conduct of the appeal.
7. Upon perusal of the Records of Appeal and the appellant’s brief, my leading counsel, T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko, Esq. (S.A.N.) advised me that it is necessary to cross-appeal against the part of the judgment refusing to grant my fourth relief.
8. When I started this action at the High Court, my counsel were J.E. Agbetor, Esq. and E.E. Ayomanor, Esq. Later, Dr. Onaghise joined them as my counsel.
9. After the judgment in the case, I instructed Dr. Onaghise to cross-appeal against the part of the judgment I have complained of but, owing to a misunderstanding between my counsel and I, the cross-appeal was not filed.
10. I did not know of the fact that the cross-appeal was not filed until this was brought up by T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko, Esq. (S.A.N.) in the course of preparing my respondent’s Brief in this appeal. By this time, the time to appeal had expired.”
The circumstances that led to this appeal have been amply stated in both the affidavit and the brief of arguments of the appellant. His case is that having obtained a declaration in terms of his claims contained in paragraph 31(a) and (b) of his amended Statement of Claim the trial court was wrong to refuse him prayers (c) and (d) of the same paragraph. In (c) and (d) the appellant asked for an order that the amount declared in his favour plus interest at the rate of 10% be paid to him. The learned trial Judge refused to grant prayers (c) and (d) because as he put it there was no evidence that a demand was made on the respondent for the said sum to be paid and which the latter refused to honour.
As deposed to the affidavit, the appellant instructed his then counsel, Dr. Onaghise to cross-appeal (see paragraph 9 of the affidavit) but due to disagreement that later developed between the appellant and Dr. Onaghise, the former disengaged the latter and the cross-appeal was not filed. This fact was only discovered when his new counsel Okpoko, Esq. (S.A.N.), was preparing the appellant/respondent’s brief in the main appeal filed by the respondent. See paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the appellant’s affidavit. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the respondent’s counter affidavit explained what happened in court. They are –
“5. That when the motion for stay of execution came before the High Court on the 23rd July 1987, Dr. Onaghise announced himself as counsel for the applicant and A.O. Aburime, Esq. also announced himself as counsel to the applicant.
6. That the learned trial Judge asked the applicant who was his counsel as between Dr. Onaghise and A. O. Aburime, Esq.”
A perusal of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the counter affidavit shows that they do not specifically refute the appellant’s deposition that he had instructed Dr. Onaghise to cross appeal, which the latter failed to do. In my view, the counter affidavit is not an answer to the appellant’s affidavit, particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof.
A careful consideration of the affidavit filed in support of the application reveals that good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within time have been shown. The failure to lodge the cross appeal is the fault of the appellant’s former counsel Dr. Onaghise and for which the appellant should not be blamed. See Doherty v. Doherty (1971) 1 All N.L.R. 162; Lamai v. Orbih (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28. Had the Court of Appeal fully considered the affidavit, counter affidavit and the other materials before it, it would not have come to the conclusion that –
“It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this court in granting the prayer sought in the motion.”
The length of delay in bringing the application is immaterial so long as good and substantial reason justifying it is proffered. See Alagbe v. Abimbola & Ors. (1978) 2 S.C. 39. And as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Advocate in his brief, it is unrealistic for the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal in the given circumstance, to expect Dr. Onaghise to swear to an affidavit in support of the appellant’s application for enlargement of time to cross appeal.
The second condition to be fulfilled is that the ground or grounds of appeal must prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.
The substratum of the appellant’s case, as I have shown earlier, was a claim for a declaratory judgment that he was not indebted to the respondent in his accounts at the latter’s branches in Ibadan and Benin City. He was granted the declaration to that effect and also to the effect that he had substantial sums in the said accounts in his favour. His request for an order that the said amount be paid to him was refused on the pre that he did not demand payment of the same which was turned down by the respondent. From the Ruling of the Court of Appeal in which it dismissed the appellant’s application, there is nothing to show that the ground of appeal was ever adverted to. If that was done the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal would have realised that there is a serious issue of law to be decided, to wit – whether by filing the Writ of claim, the appellant was deemed to have made a demand for the payment of the specific amount for which he obtained declaratory judgment. At that stage, it was immaterial to consider whether or not the appellant as the applicant would succeed in his appeal as the condition stipulated is only that the ground must raise substantial issue of law, mixed law and fact or fact for the consideration of the Court. In Holman Brother (Nig.) Ltd. v. Kigo (Nig.) and Anor. (1980) 8-11 S.C. 43, Sir Udo Udoma, J.S.C., while considering the governing principle in application for enlargement of time and leave to appeal said at pages 62 and 63-
“In principle when dealing with an application for leave to appeal, an applicant is not required to show that the appeal would succeed if leave is granted. It is sufficient to show that there is an arguable appeal. Or to put it in another way, it is enough to show prima facie case that the court from whose decision leave to appeal is sought committed an error of law or has failed to exercise its discretion judicially, or has based the exercise of such on wrong principles.”
It is trite that to grant or refuse an application for enlargement of time within which to appeal is an exercise of judicial discretion by the Court and that an appellate court is always slow to interfere with the exercise of such discretion when it is so exercised. See University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1) 156. But where the discretion is found to have been wrongly exercised an appellate court has a duty to interfere and correct the mistake. See Niger Construction Ltd. v. Okugbemi (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.67) 787, particularly where Bello, J.S.C. (as he was then) said-
“…an appeal court may interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion if it is shown that there has been a wrongful exercise of the discretion such as where the tribunal acted under misconception of fact in that it either gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or it omitted to take into account matters that are relevant or where it exercised or failed to exercise the discretion on wrong or inadequate materials and in all other cases where it is in the interest of justice to interfere…..”
With the reasons given explaining the delay in not appealing within time coupled with the proposed ground of appeal raising a substantial and arguable point of law, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal misdirected themselves in law in dismissing the appellant’s application with a wave of hand and without giving it the due consideration it deserved.
It was for these reasons that I allowed the appeal on the 20th day of March, 1989.
NNAMANI, J.S.C.: On 20th March, 1989, this appeal came before this Court. Having read the record of proceedings, and after hearing learned counsel for both parties, I allowed it. I indicated that I would give my reasons for that judgment today. I now do so.
This appeal more directly arose from an application dated 25th January, 1988and filed at the Court of Appeal, Benin City on 9th February, 1988 by the appellant herein. In the application, there were prayers for the following reliefs:
“1. Extension of time within which to appeal against that part of the judgment of Akenzua, J., dated 9th July, 1987 as set out in the proposed Notice of Appeal.
2. Deeming as properly filed and served the proposed Notice of Appeal annexed to the affidavit in support of this motion.
3. Permitting the records of appeal and the respondent’s brief of argument filed in this case to be used for the cross-appeal”
The necessary affidavit in support of the application was sworn.
On 22nd February, 1988the Court of Appeal (coram: Ogundare, Musdapher and Ndoma Egba, JJ .C.A.) dismissed the application. In his lead ruling, Ogundare, J.C.A., said,
“We do not intend to call his (sic) Eghobamien, to reply. It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this Court in granting the prayer sought in his (sic) motion. The counter-affidavit shows that the applicant has not been for their right (sic) enough with the court as to the instruction he allegedly gave to Dr. Onaghise to appeal. There is no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why this instruction was not carried out, if at all given. Consequently this application lacks merit and it is dismissed with N40.00 costs to the respondent.”
The appeal was indeed decided on a very narrow compass. The application was made under Order 3 Rule 4(1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 which is in pari materia with Order 7, Rule 4 of the Supreme Court, Rules 1977. There have been several decisions on them. See Ibodo v Enarofia (1980) 5-7 S.C.42; Lamai v Orbih (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28; Olaniyan v University of Lagos (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.9) 599.
It is well settled that the Rules require an applicant to satisfy two conditions; substantial reasons for the delay in bringing the application and arguable grounds of appeal. From all the papers attached to this application, it is difficult to see the justification for the decision of the Court of Appeal that substantial reasons have not been given. If it is on the issue of delay, the applicant’s case was that he had instructed his former counsel, Dr. Onaghise, to appeal and he only knew that no appeal was filed when his new counsel, T.J. Okpoko, S.A.N., so informed him. In oral argument before us, Mr. Eghobamien, learned counsel was suggesting that the applicant’s case was handled in the High Court by three lawyers of which Dr. Onaghise was one. He pointed out that Mr. Aburime of counsel appeared for the applicant in subsequent applications in this matter. I suppose the point being made was that the applicant could not have asked counsel to file the appeal as he claimed. Indeed, in its ruling, the Court of Appeal said that there was no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why this instruction was not carried out. It is indeed strange, to say the least, that Dr. Onaghise could be expected to swear to an affidavit in support of an application by a client with whom he had disagreed. In effect there was nothing to controvert the averments of the applicant that he gave instructions to his former counsel which were not carried out.
The more serious error manifest in the Court of Appeal’s ruling is that it did not appear that that Court adverted at all to the proposed ‘grounds of appeal so as to decide whether they raised arguable issues. This is indeed an error, for a Court considering an application under Order 3, Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 must take account of the two arms to which I earlier make reference. See the decision of this Court in Yinusa Shittu and Anor. v Mrs. Bisi Osibanjo and Anor (1988) 7 S.C.N.J 37; (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.83) 483
It was for these reasons, and the more detailed reasons in the lead reasons for judgment by my learned brother, Wali, J.S.C. a draft of which I saw before now, that I allowed this appeal.
KARIBI.WHYTE, J.S.C.: On the 20th March, 1989, after reading the briefs of argument and hearing oral arguments of counsel, I summarily allowed the appeal of the appellant against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Benin City delivered on the 22nd February, 1988. I reserved my reasons for so doing to today. This I now proceed to do.
I have read the judgment of my brother Wali, J .S.C., in this appeal and I agree with it.
The appellant/as plaintiff had brought an action in the High Court Benin City against the respondent/as defendant for a declaration that
(a) Plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant in respect of his accounts with the defendant as a Banker at Ibadan Oyo State of Nigeria and Benin City, Bendel State of Nigeria.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiffs accounts with the defendant at Ibadan and Benin City are in a Credit of N2,211,956.35k made up as follows –
(i) Ibadan Branch N677,264.15k
(ii) Benin Branch N1,534,692.20k
Total N2,211,956.35k
(c) Interest at the rate 10% per annum from the date of issuance of the writ (22/10/85) until payment.
(d) An order for payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of N2,211.956.35k.” Or any sum due and payable from the defendant to the plaintiff or any sum due and payable.
The learned trial Judge gave judgment on the 9th July, 1987 for the appellant only on the first and 2nd claims. He dismissed the 3rd and 4th claims on the ground that there was no evidence of a demand for the sum of money and a refusal by the defendant to pay.
The defendant/respondent appealed against the judgment to the Court below. Counsel to both parties filed briefs of argument in the appeal. On a motion on notice dated 25th January, 1988, appellant now appreciating the necessity of a cross-appeal sought extension of time from the court below to appeal against that part of the judgment of the trial court dismissing the 3rd and 4th reliefs of his claim as stated above. There was also a notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit in support of the motion which applicant sought to be deemed as properly filed and served. Appellant/applicant also sought leave for the records of appeal and respondent’s brief of argument filed in this case to be used for the purpose of the cross-appeal.
There was only one ground of appeal in the cross-appeal. The application for extension of time to file the cross-appeal was necessary because the judgment appealed against was delivered on the 9th July, 1987. The notice of appeal which was four months out of time was given seven months after the delivery of the judgment. In his affidavit in support of the application for enlargement of time, to give notice of the cross-appeal, appellant averred in paragraphs 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, as follows-
“3. In the judgment of the learned trial Judge, I succeeded in the two claims for declaration, but in respect of my claims number three and four, the learned trial Judge said:
“As for the 3rd and 4th reliefs, this court cannot grant them since there is no evidence that a demand was made on the defendant for the sum of money and the defendant refused to pay.”
I was dissatisfied with this aspect of the judgment of the learned trial Judge and as a result, I instructed my counsel at that time, Dr. Onaghise to cross-appeal against this aspect of the judgment.
6. Upon the service of the appellant’s brief on me, I handed the same over to Messrs. T.J. ONOMIGBO OKPOKO & CO. whom I have retained for the conduct of the appeal.
7. Upon perusal of the Records of Appeal and the appellant’s brief, my leading counsel, T.J. Onomigbo Okpoko, Esq. (S.A.N.) advised me that it is necessary to cross-appeal against the part of the judgment refusing to grant my fourth relief.
8. When I started this action at the High Court, my counsel were J.E. Agbetor, Esq., and E.E. Ayomanor, Esq. Later, Dr. Onaghise joined them as my counsel.
9. After the judgment in the case, I instructed Dr. Onaghise to cross appeal against the part of the judgment I have complained of but, owing to a misunderstanding between my counsel and I, the cross-appeal was not filed.
10. I did not know of the fact that the cross-appeal was not filed until this was brought up by T.J. OnomigboOkpoko, Esq. (S.A.N.) in the course of preparing my respondent’s brief in this appeal. By this time, the time to appeal had expired.”
In the affidavit of the defendant/respondent, it was averred in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8-14, 15, 16, 17 that appellant’s counsel at the trial and in respect of all subsequent applications was A.O. Aburime, Esqr.; and that the averments in paragraph 3, 6, 7 of the applicant’s supporting affidavit that Dr. Onaghise was instructed to enter an appeal in favour of the appellant, and that applicant was not aware that the notice of appeal was not filed, was not correct. It is curious to observe that paragraph 17of the counter affidavit which states that
“the respondent was not in a position to admit or deny paragraphs 6 and 7 of the applicant’s affidavit, and put him to the strictest proof thereof,”
that applicant instructed his present counsel T.J. Onomigbo, Okpoko, Esqr., S.A.N., in this appeal on receiving the brief of argument of appellants in the main appeal; and that it was counsel who told him that the cross-appeal had not been filed. There is no way these averments can be contradicted other than by showing that the facts averred could not have happened.
When the application came up for hearing counsel to the applicants relied on the affidavit in support of the application, particularly paragraphs 3, 6-10 and urged the court to grant the application. The Court considered it unnecessary to call upon counsel to the defendant/appellant/respondent to reply and summarily dismissed the application.
In a very short ruling which for ease of reference I reproduce hereunder, the Court of Appeal held,
… It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this Court in granting the prayer sought in his motion. The counter-affidavit shows that the applicant has not been for their right (forthright) enough with the court as to the instruction he allegedly gave to Dr. Onaghise to appeal. There is no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why this instruction was not carried out; if at all given. Consequently this application lacks merit and it is dismissed with N40.00 costs to the respondent.”
In effect the rejection by the Court below of the reasons for the delay in giving notice of appeal was because applicant was not believed that he instructed Dr. Onaghise to give notice of the cross-appeal. The Court seems to have been convinced that there was no such instruction since as the court said, Dr. Onaghise had not sworn to an affidavit giving reasons why if he was so instructed he did not carry out the instruction.
Appellant’s application for leave to appeal against the above ruling from the Court below was therefore refused on the ground that it was lacking in merits. Appellant thereafter sought and was granted leave of this Court to appeal against the ruling. The ruling reproduced above is the subject matter of appeal before this Court. Appellant has filed two grounds of appeal against the ruling of the Court below. The grounds of appeal are as follows-
“1. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held:
“It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this Court in granting the prayers sought in this Motion.”
PARTICULARS
(a) Failure on the part of Applicant’s Counsel to file an appeal which he had instructions to file is a good and substantial reason why applicant should not be refused leave to appeal in this case where defendant has already appealed.
(b) Refusal of leave to appeal in this case is highly bound to lead to a miscarriage of justice in this case where the unsuccessful defendant has appealed against the entire judgment.
“2. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held:
“The Counter Affidavit shows that the applicant has not been forthright enough with the Court as to the instruction he allegedly gave to Dr. Onaghise to appeal. There is no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why the instruction was not carried out.”
PARTICULARS
(a) Applicant’s instruction to his Counsel is not a matter upon which a counter affidavit could have any relevance in the circumstances of this case.
(b) For reasons set out in the affidavit in support of the motion for leave, Dr. Onaghise could not reasonably be expected to swear to an affidavit in support of applicant’s motion.”
Counsel have filed their briefs of argument on which they relied in their oral argument before us. The issue for determination in this appeal is as formulated in the brief of appellant’s counsel. Respondent’s Counsel would appear to have relied on a different formulation of the issues for determination, which with respect to him are clearly irrelevant to the substance of the grounds of appeal in this case. They read as follows-
“1. Was Dr. Onaghise the counsel to the appellant in this appeal
2. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal
3. Has the appellant come to court with clean hands in view of the fact that he deleted the counter affidavit sworn on 11/3/88
4. Since A. O. Aburime, Esq., was counsel to the appellant from 20/7/87 and there is no evidence that A. O. Aburime was given instruction to cross appeal, is the appellant not estopped from cross appealing after the statutory period for appealing had expired
None of the questions above relates or refers to the exercise of discretion by the Court of Appeal to grant the extension of time to file notice of cross-appeal. I therefore accept and will adopt the formulation by appellant’s counsel. It reads as follows –
“Were the learned justices of the Court of Appeal right in refusing the appellant extension of time within which to cross-appeal against part of the judgment of the trial Judge in this case where the unsuccessful defendant has already appealed against the whole judgment or put in another way
“Was the refusal by the learned justices of the Court of Appeal to grant appellant extension of time to cross-appeal in this case a judicious exercise of the discretion of the Court”
I prefer the alternate formulation the issue for determination. I think what was intended therein in the use of the word “judicious” is the word “judicial.” I should not be taken as saying that the word “judicious” could not be used. It is better to speak of the exercise of discretion by a Judge in this circumstance as judicial or not judicial; but not judicious. The exercise of discretion on established principles is what is meant here.
The application subject matter of the ruling of the Court below was for an extension of time within which to give notice of a cross-appeal. The application was made under Order 3 r.4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981. T.J. Onomigbo-Okpoko, Esqr., S.A.N., for the appellant in his brief of argument and orally before us submitted that the Court of Appeal in refusing appellants’ application for enlargement of time did not have consideration for the provisions of Order 3 r.4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 which has prescribed the conditions under which the application could be granted. The Court also did not consider the decided cases on the matter. Counsel cited and relied on Odusote v. Odusote (1971) 1 All N.L.R 219, at p.223, Ojora v. Bakare (1976) 1 All N.L.R. 22 at p.27, Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 5-7 S.C.42, 52-53, Awani v. Erejuwa (1976) 11 S.C.307.
Mr. Eghobamien for the respondent would appear to have been misled by his formulation of the issues for determination and concentrated on the view that appellant having slept over his right was estopped from bringing the cross-appeal. Counsel also relied on the observation of the Court of Appeal that applicant was not ‘forthright’ in the reasons he gave for not filing his notice of appeal within time. Counsel to the respondent neither referred to nor did he consider the application of Order 3 r .4(2) Rules of the Court of Appeal, 1981, which governs applications of this nature.
I shall now consider the ruling of the Court below in the light of the grounds of appeal filed and the issues for determination formulated. There is no doubt and it is well settled that where a party has failed to comply with the provisions of the enabling rules of court, and is seeking the exercise of the court’s discretion to enlarge the time within which to comply, he is invoking the exercise of the judicial discretion of the court – See order 3 r.4(1). To enable the Court to exercise its discretion to grant the application to enlarge the time provided by the Rules for doing anything to which the rules apply, Order 3 r.4(2) provides as follows-
“Every application for an enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period, and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. When time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”
The act in this case is the cross-appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment delivered on the 9th July, 1987.The decision appealed against is a final judgment in a civil matter. Accordingly notice of appeal must be given within three months from the delivery of the judgment – See s.25(2)(a) Court of Appeal Act, 1976. The application which was made on the 9th February, 1988 was four months out of time. It is obvious that appellant at the time of the application had not complied with section 25(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976.
In order to move the Court to exercise its discretion to enlarge the time within which to appeal where applicant has not complied with the requirements of section 25(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976, the applicant is required to support the application with
(a) An affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the period prescribed.
(b) grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.
The affidavit in support of the application deposed in paragraphs 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 already reproduced in this judgment, that plaintiff informed his counsel at the time to appeal against the dismissal of the 3rd & 4th reliefs by the trial Judge and that he only became aware of the default when his new counsel informed him that no such cross-appeal had been filed. As I have already pointed out the respondent has not contradicted these averments in the counter-affidavit filed. The averment in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit requiring the applicant for strict proof of the instructions is not a contradiction of the averments – See Lewis & Peat (NRI) Ltd. v. Akhimien (1976) 7 S.C. 157,168. This is a half-hearted attempt to question the correctness of the averment without actually doing so. It actually raised no issue.
It seems to me that the Court below relied on the counter-affidavit in rejecting the reasons given for the delay in giving the notice to appeal. This is because in the ruling it was held that “The Counter-affidavit shows that the applicant has not been for their right (sic) (forthright), enough with the court as to the instruction he allegedly gave to Dr. Onaghise to appeal. There is no affidavit from Dr. Onaghise why this instruction was not carried out if at all given Consequently this application lacks merit and it is dismissed with N40.00 costs to the respondent.”
It follows therefore that the Court did not believe applicant that he gave any instructions to Dr. Onaghise to file a cross-appeal, and were of the view that an affidavit from Dr. Onaghise could have resolved the conflicts in the affidavits. This is clearly not how to resolve conflicts, if any, in an affidavit. I have already observed that stricto sensu, the averments in respondent’s affidavit did not contradict the applicant’s averment of his instructions to Dr. Onaghise, his counsel. No issues were joined on the matter and there was nothing to resolve.
It is important to appreciate the fact that the dominant consideration in an application for enlargement of time to appeal is that there is a good cause why the appeal must be heard – See Khawan Pools Ltd. v. Awoboye (1973) 3 W.S.C.A. 1. The subsidiary but relevant reasons why the delay in bringing the appeal should be condoned, is cured by setting forth in the affidavit good and substantial reasons for the delay.
It seems to me important that the exercise of discretion involves consideration of the two requirements of good cause why the appeal should be heard, and good and substantial reasons for the delay in bringing the application. Thus, the discretion will be exercised where applicant shows good cause that the appeal ought to be heard, the length of delay in such a circumstance will be immaterial – See Alagbe v. Abimbola & Ors. (1978) 2 S.C. 39. The judgment of the abolished Court of Appeal of the Western Region in Abraham Popoola v. Ojo (1973) 3 W.S.C.A. 265, that even where good grounds why the appeal should be heard had been established, an unexplained delay in bringing the notice of appeal will not be sufficient is inconsistent with the spirit of the provision. Justifying a delay in bringing the application without satisfying the Court that on the grounds of appeal exhibited, the appeal ought to be heard, will not be sufficient for the exercise of discretion.
The ruling of the Court of Appeal in this appeal discloses that they did not look at the grounds of appeal annexed to the affidavit to enable them in the exercise of their discretion take into account whether there is good cause why the appeal should be heard. They were merely satisfied from their reading of the affidavit and counter-affidavit in holding that the application lacked merits. Thus, the court only considered the reasons for the delay in bring the application for enlargement of time. The court has therefore not exercised its discretion in accordance with the provisions of Order 3 rule 4(2) as they are required to do. It could therefore not have been “so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this Court in granting the prayer sought in his motion.”
A careful reading of the applicant/appellant’s affidavit discloses that there are good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within time. The default in the filing of the appeal within the period prescribed was due to the failure of his former Counsel, Dr. Onaghise after being so instructed to do so. Appellant should not suffer for such default – See Lamai v. Orbih (1980) 5-7 S.C. 28, Doherty v. Doherty (1971) 1 All N.L.R. 162.
The Court of Appeal having not exercised its discretion in this application in accordance with the provisions of Order 3 r.4(2) Court of Appeal Rules, 1981, has not exercised its discretion judicially. The ruling therefore must be set aside, -See Nwadike v. Nwadike (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 65) p.394.
It is however necessary to consider whether the application before the Court below satisfied the requirements of Order 3 r .4(2) and if so this Court is in as much a position as the Court below to grant the application in the exercise of that discretion. I have already held that the Court below was in error to have held that applicant/appellant had not shown good and substantial reasons why there was a failure to give notice of appeal within the time prescribed under section 25(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976. I have accordingly held that the averments in the affidavit contain good and substantial reasons.
The second requirement is that the ground of appeal relied upon should prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.
The appellant in this case was the plaintiff in the Court of first instance. He was given judgment in respect of part of his claim and is now appealing against that part refused by the trial Judge. Thus, though a respondent to the appeal by the defendant against whom judgment was given in the Court of first instance, respondent is for all purposes in respect of the 3rd and 4th reliefs of his claim which were dismissed, an appellant. He has not come by way of respondent’s notice under Order 3 1.14(1)(2) seeking to affirm the judgment on other grounds. He is an appellant seeking to set aside that part of the judgment which was decided against him. He is for all purposes of these claims an appellant.
It seems to me that the provisions of Order 3 r.14(1)(2), similar to Order 8 r.3(1)(2) Rules of the Supreme Court 1985 which provide for the respondent to contend that judgment should be varied or affirmed on other grounds will cover this situation which seeks the reversal of part of the judgment. But although there is nothing preventing a respondent from filing a notice of appeal as has been done in this case, it is preferable, since the effect of setting aside the part of the judgment will amount to varying the judgment, to come by way of respondent’s notice. And this is so even where the grounds for varying the judgment tantamount to a reversal of that part of the judgment.
The provisions of Order 3 r.4(2) (Order 2 r.3(RSC.1985) only require the applicant to file grounds of appeal which show prima facie case that the appeal should be heard. In the Court below the ground of appeal annexed to the affidavit in support of the application for enlargement of time states as follows-
“1. The learned trial Judge having found the plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant and that the plaintiff had money in his account with the defendant, misdirected himself in law when he held:
“As to the third and fourth reliefs this court cannot grant them since there is no evidence that a demand was made on the defendant for the sum of money and the defendant refused to pay.”
Particulars
The filing of a writ of summons by a bank’s customer in respect of his current account is a sufficient demand in law for the payment of the money in the account.”
It is clear from the claim before the court, that appellant’s action was founded on a declaration that
(a) he was not indebted to the defendant in respect of his account with the defendant as a banker at Ibadan, Oyo State and at Benin City in Bendel State, all in this country. He also asked for
(b) a declaration that his accounts with the defendant Bank is in credit in both branches. He asked for an order for payment by defendant to him of the sum of N2,211,956.35k due and payable from the defendant Bank to him in both named branches of the defendant Bank.
The trial Judge granted the declarations (a) and (b) but refused to grant (c) interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of issuance of the writ on (22/10/85) until payment, and (d) payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of N2,211,956.35k or any sum due and payable from the defendant to the plaintiff on the plaintiffs account with the defendant at Ibadan and Benin City.
It seems to me clear from the ground of appeal filed that appellant has shown prima facie good case for why the appeal against that part of the judgment of the learned trial Judge refusing the third and fourth reliefs of appellant’s claim should be heard. There is no doubt in my mind that the ground of appeal is substantial and deserving to be heard by the appellate court. This Court will be slow in disturbing and will not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by the court below where such exercise of discretion is in accordance with established principles – See University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1) 156, Jammal Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Misr (Nigeria) Ltd. (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt.1) 322. But where the court below has failed to exercise its discretion where there is material before it to do so, or where it has acted under a mistake of law, in disregard of principle or under a misapprehension of the facts as in the case before us, this Court is entitled to interfere and exercise the discretion which the court below in the circumstances ought to have exercised – See Niger Construction Ltd. v. Okugbemi (1987) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.67) 787; Bank of Baroda v. Mercantile Bank (Nig.) Ltd. (1987) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.60) 233. In the instant case there has been a wrongful exercise of discretion. The reasons given for the delay in giving notice of the cross-appeal, and the ground of appeal filed against the judgment of the trial Judge satisfy the conditions prescribed in Order 3 r.4(2) for the grant of application for enlargement of time to appeal.
The above are my reasons for allowing the appeal of the appellant on the 20th day of March, 1989.
KAWU, J.S.C.: This appeal came up for hearing on the 20th March, 1989. After reading the briefs of arguments filed by both counsel and hearing their oral arguments, I allowed the appellant’s appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 22nd day of February, 1988 and reserved my reasons for so doing to today.
I have had the advantage of reading, in draft, the lead ‘Reasons for Judgment’ just delivered by my learned brother, WALI, J.S.C. I agree entirely with him and will respectfully adopt those reasons as mine.
The main point for determination in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeal was right in its refusal to grant the appellant’s application for extension of time within which to cross-appeal against the judgment of the High Court which was delivered on the 9th day of July, 1987. The application was made by the appellant to the Court of Appeal under Order 3 r.4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981 which reads as follows:-
“Every application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period, and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. When time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”
It is plain that for an applicant to succeed under the Rule, he must satisfy the court that there are good and substantial reasons for his failure to appeal within the prescribed period and also that his proposed grounds of appeal prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard – Yinusa Shittu & Anor. VS. Mrs. Bisi Osibanja & anor. (1988) S.C.N.J. 37 (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 83) 483. It is clear that in its Ruling of 22nd February, 1988, the Court of Appeal completely omitted to give consideration to the appellant’s proposed ground of his cross-appeal. It is, in my view, a fatal omission. It was for this reason and for the fuller reasons in the lead ‘Reasons for Judgment’ that I allowed this appeal on the 20th day of March, 1989.
OPUTA, J.S.C.: This appeal was heard on the 20th day of March, 1989. After reading the Briefs filed by the parties and after listening to learned counsel on either side elaborate in oral submission, the salient points made in those Briefs, the Court unanimously allowed the appeal and granted the appellant the extension of time he sought unsuccessfully from the Court below. Reasons for this judgment were then adjourned to today, the 9th day of June, 1989. Hereunder are my reasons.
The appellant who was the plaintiff before Akenzua, J., of the Bendel State High Court claimed in paragraph 31 of his Amended Statement of Claim as follows:-
“(a) A declaration that the plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant in respect of his accounts with the defendant a banker at Ibadan Oyo State of Nigeria and Benin City, Bendel State of Nigeria.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiffs accounts with the defendant at Ibadan and Benin City are in credit of N2,211,956.35k made up as follows:-
(i) Ibadan Branch ……. N677,264.15k
(ii) Benin Branch…….N1,534,692.20k
Total N2,211,956.35k
(c) Interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of issuance of the writ (22/10/85) until payment.
(d) An Order for payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of N2,211,956.35k or any sum due and payable from the defendant to the plaintiff on the plaintiffs account with the defendant at Ibadan and Benin City.”
Pleadings were filed and exchanged. After due hearing, Akenzua, J., granted the appellant the two declarations he claimed but refused to grant what in substance was the bone of contention -the payment over to him of the amount and interest on that amount found due to him in the declaratory orders made by the learned trial Judge. In other words, the plaintiff/appellant won in part and lost in part. The plaintiff was obviously not happy with a judgment which merely declared his rights but refused to make the orders that will enable him reap the fruits of his declaratory victories.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal Benin Division. In the meantime, the plaintiff had cause to brief new counsel Dr. Onomigbo Okpoko. In preparing the plaintiff/respondent’s Brief, Dr. Okpoko observed that there was nothing to show that the plaintiff cross-appealed against the refusal of the trial Court to grant items (c) and (d) of paragraph 31 of his Amended Statement of Claim. Dr. Okpoko then applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time within which to bring a cross-appeal against the judgment of Akenzua, J., dated 9th July 1987. This application was made on the 9th of February 1988 (seven months after the delivery of the judgment). The application was brought under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981as amended which stipulates:-
“Every application for an enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period, and by grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard ….”
The above rule prescribed two conditions i.e.:
1. Reasonable explanation of failure to appeal within the prescribed period.
2. Grounds which prima facie show that there is an arguable point.
On the 28th February 1988, the Court of Appeal Benin Division heard the plaintiff/appellant’s motion and without as much as calling on learned counsel for the respondent to the application dismissed the plaintiffs application as lacking in merit.
The plaintiff/applicant to the motion dissatisfied and aggrieved has now appealed to this Court against the Court of Appeal’s refusal to grant his motion for an extension of time. As I observed at the beginning, this Court allowed his appeal and reserved Reasons for Judgment to 9th June, 1989. I have in the interval had the advantage of a preview in draft of the lead Reasons for Judgment just delivered by my noble and learned brother, Wali, J.S.C. His lead Reasons agree with mine and I adopt them as mine.
Order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules of 1981 imposed on the applicant the onus to file an affidavit showing good and substantial reasons for his failure to appeal within time and to file grounds which prima facie show that it will be in the interest of justice to hear the appeal or put in another way that there is an arguable point or issue. The self same Order 3 Rule 4(2) imposed a duty on the Court of Appeal to carefully consider the affidavit in the prevailing circumstances of this particular case and decide whether the reason or reasons for failure to appeal within time are “good and substantial.” The Court had another duty – to look at the proposed ground or grounds of appeal annexed to the affidavit and satisfy itself whether those grounds do or do not contain any point of substance, any arguable point. Did the Court below look at the affidavit and the proposed ground of appeal The answer seems to be in the negative.
Ogundare, J.C.A. in his Ruling in which Musdapher and Ndoma-Egba, JJ.C.A. concurred merely said:-
“Court: We do not intend to call on Mr. Eghobamien to reply. It is so patent on the affidavit in support of the application that good and substantial reasons have not been shown to warrant this Court in granting the prayer sought in this motion. The Counter-affidavit shows that the applicant has not been forthright enough with the Court as to the instruction he allegedly gave Dr. Onaghise why this instruction was not carried out, if at all given. Consequently this application lacks merit and it is dismissed with N40.00 costs to the respondent.”
The above reasons for refusing the prayer for an order for extension of time is faulty on two grounds. Even if allegations made in the plaintiff/applicant’s affidavit is countered by the defendant/respondent’s counter-affidavit, how can the Court below decide on the printed affidavits which one to accept; how can it decide which was true and which was false without the benefit of hearing oral evidence from the deponents themselves It is also obvious from its Ruling that the Court of Appeal did not consider whether the proposed grounds of Appeal annexed to the applicant’s affidavit “prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.” This is a fatal omission. In a recent case, Yinusa Shittu & anor. v. Mrs. Bisi Osibanja & Anor. (1988) 7 S.C.N.1. p.37; (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 83) 483 S.C., Nnamani, J.S.C., at p.46 clearly stated the view on his Court in applications for extension of time within which to appeal thus:-
“In all the cases in which the Rule – Order 3 Rule 4(2) or Order 7 Rule 4(2) of the 1977 Supreme Court Rules (now Order 2, Rules 31(2) 1985 Rules) has been considered, it has always been assumed that the two arms of the rule are to be considered i.e. good and substantial reasons for not appealing within the prescribed period and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard …. It does seem to me that in an application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, it is of the essence that the proposed grounds of appeal are worth while. It is this that would determine whether it is just that the application be granted. If the proposed grounds of appeal are substantial, they are bound to weigh on the mind of the Court in deciding its attitude to such delay as there may be in bringing the application. After all what is involved is the exercise of the discretion of the Court. If the grounds of appeal are substantial, the Court may be inclined to look with more favour on the reasons for delay. To do otherwise would inevitably lead to injustice for, in my view, as much as is possible an appellant with an arguable appeal ought not to be shut out from an appeal.”
The above stricture of allowing an injustice to be perpetrated will attach to the Court below in this case unless it is shown that the proposed ground of appeal accompanying the motion for leave to appeal is completely unmeritorious.
The ground is at p.41 of the record and it is as follows:-
“1. The learned trial Judge having found that the plaintiff is not indebted to the defendant and that the plaintiff had money in his account with the defendant, misdirected himself in law when he held:-
“As to the third and fourth reliefs this Court cannot grant them since there is no evidence that a demand was made on the defendant for the money and the defendant refused to pay.”
Particulars
The filing of a Writ of Summons by a bank’s customer in respect of his current account is sufficient demand in law for the payment of the money in the account.”
No one can seriously say that the above ground does not raise an arguable point. In fact the trial Court is both a Court of law and of equity. Under its equitable jurisdiction, an equitable right to specific performance appearing incidentally in the course of an action but not claimed by counter-claim was given effect to in Williams v. Snowden (1880) W.N. 124. Also in Borrows v. Delaney L. R. Ir 24 Ex Div 503, a lease was rectified although there was no counter-claim to rectify it.
In this case, the trial Judge having granted the two declarations sought in paragraph 31(a) and (b) of the plaintiffs Amended Statement of Claim, one should have thought that the grant of the subsidiary reliefs sought in (c) and (d) of the self same paragraph 31 became automatic. In any event, the refusal to grant them because there was no formal demand is a moot point. It is an arguable point whether the filing of the Writ of Summons in this case is sufficient demand. The Court below, with respect, was in serious error when it failed to take into account, at all, the second condition precedent to granting or refusing an applicant leave to appeal out of time under Order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981 namely whether or not the proposed ground or grounds of appeal “prima facie showed good cause why the appeal should be heard.” I concede that the grant or refusal of leave to appeal is discretionary but it is a discretion to be exercised by the Court of Appeal in strict compliance with its own Rule – Order 3 Rule 4(2) – which set out the law governing its proper exercise. All that was required of the plaintiff/applicant in the Court of Appeal was that his proposed ground of appeal disclosed an arguable issue. Whether during the hearing, that issue will succeed or not is immaterial: – Holman Brother (Nig) Ltd. v. Kigo (Nig) & anor (1980) 8-11 S.C.43 at pp.62163 per Sir Udo Udoma, J.S.C.
It is clear that the Court below was in error when it refused the appellant to this Court leave to appeal out of time: University of Lagos & anor. v. M.I. Aigoro (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1) 143. Also as this Court held in Shittu v. Osibanjo supra, the main consideration is not really failure to give adequate reason for the delay in filing the appeal – that is important but not crucial rather the Court ought to concern itself with the dictates of justice. Here the proposed grounds of appeal will weigh more in the balance and thus turn the scales in favour of a grant. It is here that the Court below, with the greatest respect, erred seriously in not considering the proposed ground of appeal.
The above, as well as the reasons in the lead Reasons for Judgment were the reasons why I allowed this appeal on the 20th day of March, 1989.
Appeal allowed.
Appearances
- J. Onumigbo Okpoko, SAN (with him, C.A. Ajuyah) For Appellant
AND
A.O. Eghobamien For Respondent



