OGBA v. STATE (2020)

OGBA v. STATE

(2020)LCN/15228(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, March 11, 2020

CA/B/313C/2016

Before Our Lordships:

Samuel Chukwudumebi Oseji Justice of the Court of Appeal

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DAVID OGBA APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

MEANING OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Now, a confessional statement is one in which a person charged with the commission of a crime admits by stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. That is to say, for a statement to qualify as being confessional, the maker must therein admit to the ingredients of the offence with which he is charged or suggesting the inference that he committed the ingredients of the offence. See Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also NWACHUKWU VS. THE STATE (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 390) 1380; BATURE VS. THE STATE (1994) 1 NWLR (PT. 320) 267; MOHAMMED VS THE STATE (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 383) 46.
Once an accused person makes a statement under caution, stating or admitting the charge or creating the impression that he committed the offence charged, the statements becomes confessional and admissible in evidence. See ISONG VS THE STATE (2016) 14 NWLR (PT. 1531) 96; NWOBE VS. STATE (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 678) 271; DAWA VS. STATE (1980) 12 NSCC 334 at 336 and OSENI VS. THE STATE (2012) 5 NWLR (PT. 1218) 35. PER OSEJI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO RAISE DUST ON THE INVOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS WHEN IT IS ABOUT TO BE TENDERED IN EVIDENCE

GUIDELINE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

The Supreme Court in the case of OGUDO VS. STATE (2011) 12 SC (PT. 1) 71 provided a guideline on the admissibility of a confessional statement or where there is a retraction after being admitted in evidence as follows:
“On the vexed issues of admissibility of confessional statement and when such statement is retracted after its admission, it is my view that the law on it is trite and clear as follows:-
(a) where a statement by an accused person is tendered in evidence and objection made to it on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, the Judge should first hear evidence on the point from both parties and make a ruling on the admissibility or otherwise of the document before receiving or rejecting it in evidence. See R V. ONABANJO (1936) WACA 23; R Vs Kessi (1936) 5 WACA 154; Nwangbogu v. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 745 and Ikpesan Vs. The State (1981) 9 SC 17.
(b) Hearing the parties on the objection that the investigation or inquiry which the Judge or Magistrate makes in order to determine the admissibility of the document is called trial within trial.
(c) If the question is whether the accused person made the statement or not, the Judge may receive in evidence when properly tendered and decide at the end of the case whether the accused in fact made the statement. See R V. Igwe (1960) 5 FSC 55; Ehot vs. The State (1993) 5 SCNJ 65.
(d) When a statement had been admitted as a confessional statement and the accused later retracted it in his evidence, the Court when considering the weight to be attached to it must consider the following:- (i) Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true or real? (ii) Is it corroborated? (iii) Are the relevant statement made in it of facts, true as far as they can be tested? (iv) Was the prisoner who had the opportunity of committing the offence? (v) Is his confession possible? (vi) Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved?
My Lords, if the confessional statement passes these tests so to speak, satisfactorily, a conviction founded on it would be upheld. See Kanu Vs. King (1952) 14 WACA 30; DAWA Vs. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 236.”PER OSEJI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A VOLUNTARY CONFESSION IS A SUSTAINABLE GROUND FOR CONVICTION FOR AN OFFENCE

In law, a voluntary confession of guilt if consistent and probable and is coupled with clear proof that a crime has been committed by the accused person, is usually accepted as satisfactory evidence on which the Court can convict. Put differently, a confessional statement is admissible and will sustain a ground for conviction for an offence, if it is direct and positive and relates to the act, knowledge and intention of an accused person. Stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the offence charged. See KANU VS. R (1952) 14 WACA 30; AKPAN VS. STATE (1992) 7 SCNJ 22; OBASI VS. STATE (1965) NMLR 129; OGOALA VS. THE STATE (1991) 3SCNJ 61; In AKPAN VS. STATE (2007) 2 NWLR (PT. 1019) 500, the Apex Court held per Niki Tobi JSC (now of blessed memory) that:
“Confession in criminal procedure, like admission in civil procedure is the strongest evidence of guilt on the part of an accused person. It is stronger than the evidence of an eye witness because the evidence, borrowing the daily axion, comes from the mouth of the Horse who is the accused person. What better evidence than that/he knows or knew what he did and he says or said it in Court. Is there need for further proof? I think not.” See also MILLA VS. STATE (1985) 3 NWLR (PT. 11) 190; BATURE VS. STATE (1994) 1 NWLR (PT. 320) 267; DELE VS. STATE (2011) 2 NWLR (PT. 1229) 508.” PER OSEJI, J.C.A.

DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE BEFORE IT

In considering the conclusions and findings reached by the Court below, I am aware that it is the prerogative of a trial Court which sees and hears the witnesses to choose which to believe and to ascribe probative value to such evidence, either oral or documentary. Thus, a trial Court being the master of the facts, must base his inferences, evaluation or assessment and findings on the available evidence adduced before it and therefore, if its findings must stand it must not be premised on extraneous facts or matters or conjectures outside the evidence given at the trial. See Emeka V. The State (2014) LPELR 23020 (SC); Afolalu V. The State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 584; Ejeka V. The State (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 819) 408; Isibor V. The State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 758) 241; Iko V. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 221; Buba V. The State (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 355) 195; The State V. Musa Danjuma (1997) 3216 (SC) 1; Arehia V. The State (1982) NSCC 85. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Edo State, sitting in Benin and delivered on the 3rd day of February, 2014 wherein the Appellant was convicted on a two count charge for the offence of kidnapping contrary to Section 2 (1) and punishable under Section 3 (2) of Kidnapping (Prohibition) Law of Edo State 2009.
The Appellant herein was charged by the Respondent on a two count of kidnapping. The Appellant pleaded not guilty to the two counts and at the trial, the Respondent called four witnesses to prove its case. The Appellant testified in his defence and called no other witness. At the conclusion of trial, counsel for the parties filed and subsequently adopted their written addresses. In a judgment delivered on the 3rd day of February, 2014, the Court found the Appellant guilty of the offence charged and convicted him accordingly.

The Appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment filed a notice of appeal with three grounds on the 05/8/2016. The Appellant brief of argument settled by J.N. Okongwu Esq, was subsequently filed on the 29/8/2016.

The Respondent’s brief of argument settled by C.A. Ebosele Esq, was filed on the 4/11/2016 but was deemed properly filed on 7/03/2019.
The parties adopted and relied on their respective brief of argument at the hearing of appeal on the 17/02/2020.

From the three grounds in the notice of appeal, the Appellant in his brief of argument formulated two issues for determination as follows:
“1. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the confessional statement is admissible against the Appellant.”

The Respondent herein adopted the issues for determination as raised in the Appellant’s brief of argument. I will also adopt the two issues as distilled by the parties in the consideration of this appeal.

ISSUE ONE
Herein, learned counsel to the Appellant while relying on the case of MORKA VS. THE STATE (1998) 2 NWLR (PT 537) page 292 at 301, submitted that in kidnapping offences which carries life imprisonment, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. He added that it is pertinent at this stage to an observer that the Appellant was not arrested by the police or the PW4 who testified before the Court but instead by the leaders of the Ikpeteye village.

He further submitted that the Appellant was arrested by the leaders of Ikpeteye village simply because they regarded the Appellant as a bad person who involves himself in criminal activities. He also referred to the evidence of PW3, to contend that PW3 did not testify that the Appellant was one of the kidnappers that kidnapped the PWI and PW2.

On issue two, learned counsel submitted that before a confessional statement can be admissible against an accused person certain conditions must be fulfilled and a confession is a statement made by any person charged with a crime at anytime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the offence.

It was further conceded that a conviction for any crime may be based on a single confession if voluntarily made. As held in the case of GIRA VS THE STATE (1996) 4 SCNJ 94.

While pointing out the fundamental ingredients of a confession, it was posited that a confession must be voluntary otherwise it is deem to be irrelevant and inadmissible and for a confession to be admitted it must be direct, positive and unequivocal. On this he cited RE EDAMINE VS THE STATE (1996) 3 SCNJ 12.

He added that confession is admissible only if it is voluntary and the onus of proving affirmatively beyond reasonable doubt that a confession is voluntary rests on the prosecution and in order to render a confession admissible, it must be perfectly voluntary and there is no doubt that any inducement in the nature of a promise or of a threat held out by a person in authority vitiates a confession. He placed reliance on the case of GBADAMOSI & ANOR. VS. THE STATE (1992) 11-12 SCNJ 269.
It was therefore urged on this Court to allow the Appeal, and set aside the conviction of the Appellant.

Replying on issue 1, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the prosecution discharged the burden placed on it to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He added that the Appellant was charged for the offence of kidnapping and in pursuit of this, the Respondent as prosecution called four witnesses to establish the case against the Appellant.

It was further submitted that the evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses were not in any way rebutted by the Appellant after their respective testimonies had gone through the process of cross-examination.

Learned counsel also contended that PW1 and PW2 both victims of the kidnapping stated in their testimonies in Court that they identified the Appellant amongst about four men paraded at the SSS office weeks after their release from the den of the kidnappers.

On issue 2, learned counsel while referring to Exhibit ‘A’, submitted that the statement of the Appellant made to the SSS which was duly attested to and admitted as evidence was indeed a confessional statement. He added that Exhibit ‘A’ was properly tendered and admitted by the trial Court.

It was further submitted that Exhibit A was tendered without any objection from the Counsel to the accused and this clearly shows an admission on the part of the accused that the said confessional statement (Exhibit A) was true and consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and established before the Court.

It was also argued that where a confessional statement has been proved to have been voluntarily made and it is positive, unequivocal, and amounts to an admission of guilt, it is enough to sustain a finding of guilt, regardless of the fact that the maker resiled from it or retracted it all together at the trial. He added that such a retraction does not in itself make the previous confession inadmissible. He relied on the case of NWOCHA V. THE STATE (2012) LPELR 9223.
He therefore urged this Court to uphold the decision of the lower court.

I have duly perused the record of appeal as well as the submission of counsel for the parties as contained in their briefs of argument and I find it expedient to first address issue two. That is whether the confessional statement is admissible against the appellant.

In the instant case, the Appellant’s complaint is that his confessional statement Exhibit ‘A’ was not voluntary because he was tortured and severely beaten and forced to sign the statement and as such it was wrong for the trial Judge to have admitted same in evidence.

However a perusal of the proceedings leading to the admission of the statement in evidence show that the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant was tendered through the PW4 and upon being shown to the Appellant through his counsel, no objection was raised to its admissibility and same was admitted as Exhibit ‘A’ while the Attestation form endorsed by a superior officer was also tendered and admitted as Exhibit ‘B’.

For clarity purposes, the portion of the evidence of the PW4 leading to the admission of the said confessional statement as detailed in page 14 of the record of appeal is hereinbelow set out.
“When the Accused Person volunteered to make a statement, I supervised the recording of this statement. The Accused Person told me that he cannot write and requested that the statement be recorded on his behalf. The Accused Person was charged in English language with the offence of kidnapping. He made the statement in English language under caution. The statement was read over to him in English language. The Accused Person accepted the correctness of the statement and signed it in my presence. The statement was recorded by one Alh. Bello. He has resigned from the job presently. He later took the Accused Person and the statement before a Superior Officer in the person of Mohammed Kaumi the “PSO” ops now serving in JTF Maiduguri, Borno State. The Accused Person signed an attestation after he had confirmed that he made the statement voluntarily. The PSO and Alh. Bello also signed the form. I can identify both the statement and its attestation. These are the statement and the attestation.
Prosecutor: We seek to tender it.
Learned Defence Counsel: No objection.
Court: Statement and its attestation are admitted and marked Exhibits A and B respectively.”

From the above set out proceedings in the trial Court, it is clear that the confessional statement of the Appellant as well as attestation form were tendered and admitted in evidence without any objection by learned counsel for the Appellant.

The law is settled by a long line of authorities that the appropriate time to raise dust as per the involuntariness of a confessional statement is when it is about to be tendered in evidence, more particularly where, as in this case, the Appellant was represented by counsel and it is assumed that he ought to know what to do at every stage of the proceedings. In this regard, the Appellant who did not object to the admissibility of Exhibit ‘A’ the confessional statement cannot thereafter, validly complain that same was made under duress or that he was tortured and made to sign a statement he did not make. See OKAROH VS. STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 81) 214; OBIDIOZO VS. STATE (1987) 4 NWLR (PT. 67) 748; EFFIONG VS STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (PT. 562) 362. Where the confessional statement of an accused person is tendered by the prosecution and it is admitted in evidence by the Court without an objection (especially where the accused person is represented by counsel), it is too late in the day and infact an afterthought for the accused person to raise the issue of the voluntariness or authorship of such confessional statement in his testimony on oath. See NWACHUKWU VS. THE STATE (2004) All FWLR (PT. 206) 525. The Supreme Court in the case of OGUDO VS. STATE (2011) 12 SC (PT. 1) 71 provided a guideline on the admissibility of a confessional statement or where there is a retraction after being admitted in evidence as follows:
“On the vexed issues of admissibility of confessional statement and when such statement is retracted after its admission, it is my view that the law on it is trite and clear as follows:-
(a) where a statement by an accused person is tendered in evidence and objection made to it on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, the Judge should first hear evidence on the point from both parties and make a ruling on the admissibility or otherwise of the document before receiving or rejecting it in evidence. See R V. ONABANJO (1936) WACA 23; R Vs Kessi (1936) 5 WACA 154; Nwangbogu v. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 745 and Ikpesan Vs. The State (1981) 9 SC 17.
(b) Hearing the parties on the objection that the investigation or inquiry which the Judge or Magistrate makes in order to determine the admissibility of the document is called trial within trial.
(c) If the question is whether the accused person made the statement or not, the Judge may receive in evidence when properly tendered and decide at the end of the case whether the accused in fact made the statement. See R V. Igwe (1960) 5 FSC 55; Ehot vs. The State (1993) 5 SCNJ 65.
(d) When a statement had been admitted as a confessional statement and the accused later retracted it in his evidence, the Court when considering the weight to be attached to it must consider the following:- (i) Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true or real? (ii) Is it corroborated? (iii) Are the relevant statement made in it of facts, true as far as they can be tested? (iv) Was the prisoner who had the opportunity of committing the offence? (v) Is his confession possible? (vi) Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved?
My Lords, if the confessional statement passes these tests so to speak, satisfactorily, a conviction founded on it would be upheld. See Kanu Vs. King (1952) 14 WACA 30; DAWA Vs. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 236.”
In the instance case, the learned trial Judge relying on relevant authorities rightly held that a confessional statement must be direct, positive, true and unequivocal of facts that satisfy the ingredients of the offence the accused person confesses to have committed. He then proceeded to consider the guidelines as listed in OGUDO VS. THE STATE supra wherein he detailed his findings as follows at pages 41 to 42 of the record.
“In Exhibit A, the accused person confessed to the commission of the offences charged. The statement was attested by a Superior Police Officer. The statement and the attestation were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits A & B without objection by the Accused Person and his defence counsel. The confession was direct, positive, true and unequivocal of facts that satisfy the ingredients of the offence of kidnapping which the Accused Person confessed to have committed. I am most aware that it is, however desirable to have, outside a confession, some evidence of circumstances which makes it probable that the confession was true. See R V SYKES (1931) CAR 113, YESUFU V STATE (1976) 6 S.C. 167 and ONOCHIE V. REPUBLIC (1966) NMLR 307. There is ample evidence outside the confession to show that it is true. His positive identification by the PW1 and PW2 corroborated the story of the Accused Person in his statement. The Accused Person under cross-examination admitted that he was of Isoko stock, was born in Delta State but resides at Egbeteye Village in Ovia North East Local Government Area of Edo State and his year of birth. These are relevant facts which makes the facts stated in the statement true as they can be tested. The confession is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved such as the fact that the PW1, PW2 and Mr. Mike were kidnapped on 5/12/09 in an area close to Egbeteye Village where the Accused Person resides. There is no doubt that the offence charged was committed. The confessional statement of the Accused Person and his positive identification by the PW1 and PW2 leave no one in doubt that the Accused Person not only had the opportunity to have committed the offence charged but also that he was a Culprit.”
I endorse the above set out findings of the learned trial Judge having applied the right parameters for necessary reliance on a confessional statement in reaching the conclusion that the prosecution proved its case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

In the light of the above reason, the answer to the question whether the confessional statement is admissible against the Appellant is in the affirmative. The issue is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

On issue one, that is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The Appellant complaint is that the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses is not sufficient to pin him down to the offence of kidnapping and that the mode of his identification was flawed.

For the Respondent, the argument was that the prosecution led credible evidence through PW1, PW2 and PPW4 and which evidence were compelling, credible and uncontroverted by the Appellant whose guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Now, the law is trite that in any criminal trial, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt, vide Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011. Failure by the prosecution to discharge this burden placed on it by the law tilts the benefit of the doubt in favour of the accused person. See OKAFOR VS. THE STATE (2006) 4 NWLR (PT. 969) page 1; OCHE VS. STATE (2007) 5 NWLR (PT. 1027) 214; ONAH VS. STATE (1985) 3 NWLR (PT. 12) 236; ANI VS. STATE (2003) 11 NWLR (PT. 830) 142.

In the instant case, the Appellant was charged with a two count of kidnapping contrary to Section 2(1) and punishable under Section 3(2) of the Kidnapping (Prohibition) Law of Edo State 2009.
Section 15(a) of the said law provides thus:
“Kidnapping” or “abduction” includes the unlawful removal or exportation of a person from any place where he/she is to another vicinity where he/she is found or the unlawful confinement of a person in any place without his consent with any of the following intent or purposes:-
(1) To hold for ransom or reward.
(2) As a shield or hostage.
(3) To facilitate the commission of a felony.
(4) To inflict injury on or terrorize the victim or another to give ransom or anything of value.
(5) To interfere with the performance of any government or political functions.
(6) To interfere with the personal business or the business of another.
(7) To restrain or keep back.
(8) To falsely imprison for payment of ransom or doing an act by another.”

The summary of the evidence as adduced by the prosecution witnesses is that at close of work on 5/12/2009, the PW1 and PW2 who were both staff of Udo Rubber Estate were driving home in a jeep when they were stopped and attacked by 6 men armed with guns. They were driven in the jeep to a minor road where about forty five minutes later a third person named Mr. Mike (a contractor with their company) was also abducted from his camry car and made to join them in the jeep. They were driven to a point along the pipeline road where they met a river and they were ferried across the river to an Island where they held them for three nights until the sum of N1.5million was paid as ransom. They were subsequently set free. The matter was reported to the Benin office of the State Security Service (SSS) whose investigation led to the arrest of the Appellant. During an identification parade at the office of the SSS, the PW1 and PW2 identified the Appellant as one of the kidnappers. He was then arraigned before the trial Court on a two count charge of kidnapping.

In finding the Appellant guilty of the offence charged, the learned trial Judge relied on Exhibit ‘A’, the confessional statement of the Appellant as well as the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW4. He held in the judgment at page 42 of the record of appeal that:
“There is no doubt that the offence charged was committed. The confessional statement of the Accused Person and his positive identification by the PW1 and PW2 leave no one in doubt that the Accused Person not only had the opportunity to have committed the offence charged but also that he was a Culprit.
Taking Exhibit A together with other evidence led by the prosecution against the accused person, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved each of the two counts against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.”

I will have no justification to upstage the above set out findings of the learned trial Judge. Moreso, given the reasoning and conclusion earlier reached by this Court while considering issue two, that is with regard to the fact that the confessional statement of the Appellant was admissible in evidence and was rightly admitted and marked Exhibit ‘A’ by the trial Court.

This Court in USONGO VS. STATE (2013) LPELR 22747 CA in resolving the issue whether a Court can convict solely on the confessional statement of an accused person held at pages 22 to 23 of the report and relying on the Supreme Court case of IHUEBEKA VS. THE STATE (2000) 2 SCNQR 186 that:-
“Free and voluntary confession of guilt whether judicial or extra judicial, if it is direct and positive and properly established is sufficient proof of guilt and enough to sustain a conviction so long the Court is satisfied with the truth of the confession.”
See also ALARAPE VS. THE STATE (2011) 14 WRN page 1; IDOWU VS. THE STATE (2000) 7 SC. (PT. ii) 50; EFFIONG VS. STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (PT. 562) 362; YESUFU VS. THE STATE (1976) 6 SC 167 and AKINMOJU VS. THE STATE (2000) 2 SCNQR 90.
In ADIO VS. THE STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (PT. 24) 581 it was held that a free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused person, if it is direct, positive and satisfactorily proved occupies the highest place of authenticity when it comes to proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The said confessional statement of the Appellant Exhibit ‘A’ was tendered in evidence by the prosecution and it was admitted without any objection by counsel for the Appellant.

The learned trial Judge in his judgment examined the truthfulness of the said statement in the light of other credible evidence before the Court and found it flawless before relying on same to hold that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

I have no cause whatsoever to interfere with the findings of the trial Court, same not being smeared with the veneer of perverseness. It is now of common knowledge that the responsibility of evaluating evidence is that of the trial Court that saw and heard the witnesses and an appellate Court may not interfere or disturb a finding or conclusion in a judgment except in certain cases, including where such finding is found to be perverse. See ADEYEFA VS. BAMGBOYE (2014) 11 NWLR (PT. 1419) 520; OZIGBO VS. C.O.P. (1976) LPELR 2890 – (SC); WOLUCHEM VS. GUDI (1981) 5 SC 291.

In this regard, this issue is answered in the affirmative and accordingly resolved against the Appellant.
On the whole, this appeal is found to be lacking in merit and it is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of the High Court of Edo State, delivered on the 3rd day of February, 2014 in charge No. B/19C/2010 is hereby affirmed.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: Having had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Samuel Chukwudumebi Oseji, JCA; I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that this appeal lacks merit and it ought to be dismissed. I also dismiss it.

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.: I have been afforded the privilege of reading in advance a draft of the Judgment just delivered by my noble lord, Samuel Chukwudumebi Oseji JCA., affirming the conviction of the Appellant for the notorious offence of Kidnapping by the Court below on the proved evidence showing the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. I completely agree with both the reasons and the inescapable conclusions reached therein and I adopt it as mine, with just a little words of mine to add to the rich analysis contained therein.

My lords, in law an allegation of the commission of a crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution in order to secure the conviction of an Accused person so charged. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). See Godwin Igabele V. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 103. See also Lori V. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 81; Emeka V. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 666; Peter Igho V. The State (1978) 3 SC 87; Archibong V. The State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 349.
To succeed therefore, the Prosecution must lead credible evidence establishing the essential ingredients of the offence charged. In doing so the Prosecution need not call a horde of witnesses since in law the credible and cogent evidence of a sole witness will be sufficient to secure a conviction for an offence no matter the heinous nature of the offences charged in so far as corroboration is not required by law. Thus, once the essential ingredients of the offence charged is sufficiently established by the evidence put forward by the Prosecution, it is immaterial that a particular witness was not called or that a particular document was not tendered in evidence. See Alhaji Muadzu Ali V. The State (2015) 5 SCM 26. See also Odili V. The State (1977) 4 SC 1; Oguonzee V. The State (1998) 5 NWLR (pt. 551) 521; Alonne V. IGP. (1959) 4 FSC 203; Ibodo V. The State (1975) 9 – 11 SC (Reprint) 80; Abeke Onafowokan V. The State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 61) 538. See also Akpabio V. The State (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 359) 635; Idiok V. The State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 225 @ Pp. 250 ?? 251. See also Olayinka V. The State (2007) 4 SCNJ 53 @ p. 73; The State V. Ajie (2000) 3 NSCQR 53 @ p. 66;Adebayo Rasaki V. The State (2014) 10 NCC 1.
In law, the Prosecution has open to it three basic types of evidence with which to prove the commission of an offence charged against an Accused person beyond reasonable doubt, namely: a: Direct eye witness evidence; b: Confessional statement and c: Circumstantial evidence. See Godwin Igabele V. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 103. See also Lori V. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 81; Emeka V. The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 666; Peter Igho V. The State (1978) 3 SC 87; Archibong V. The State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 349.

The Appellant was charged, tried and convicted before the Court below for the offence of Kidnapping contrary to Section 2 (1) and punishable under Section 3(2) of the Kidnapping (Prohibition) Law of Edo State 2009.
Now, the very notorious offence of kidnapping occurs where any person unlawfully imprisons any person within Nigeria in such a manner as to prevent him from applying to a Court for his release or from discovering to any other person the place where he is imprisoned, or in such a manner as to prevent any person entitled to have access to him from discovering the place where he is imprisoned.
Thus, in a count alleging Kidnapping, the Respondent being the Prosecution must lead credible and cogent evidence establishing all the essential ingredients of the offence of Kidnapping, to wit
i. That the victim was forcefully seized and taken away by the accused.
ii. That the victim was taken away against his or her consent.
iii. That the victim was unlawfully detained or imprisoned. See Okashetu V. State (2016) LPELR – 40611 SC. See also the English case of R V Cort (2004) 4 All ER 137.
Flowing from the above essential elements of the offence of kidnapping is the fact that the gist of the offence of kidnapping lies in the taking or carrying away of one person by another with force, fraud or deception without the consent of the person so taken or carried away and without lawful excuse. The offence of kidnapping is therefore, complete when the victim is carried away against his or her wish.

The Respondent proved by credible evidence the guilt of the Appellant for the heinous offence of Kidnapping and by law a conviction founded on such proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be interfered with or disturbed by an appellate Court, which has no business doing so. It is only when the decision of a trial Court is wrong in that the evidence proffered by the Prosecution were insufficient and or inadequate to establish the guilt of the Accused person beyond reasonable doubt as required by law, but the Accused person was nevertheless convicted that this Court would be under a duty, dictated by the ends of justice, to intervene to set such an accused person wrongly convicted free. But, this is not the case in the instant appeal. The Appellant was properly convicted by the Court below on the ample evidence led by the Respondent against him proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.
It is in the light of the above and for the fuller reasons so adroitly marshaled out in the lead judgment, that I too hereby dismiss this appeal for lacking in merit. The judgment of the Court below convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the heinous crime of Kidnapping is hereby also affirmed by me.

Appearances:

Chief J.N. Okongwu For Appellant(s)

Mrs. C.A. Chris-Ebosele with him Mrs. E. Ikoghode For Respondent(s)