SCC (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. JOSEPH & ANOR (2020)

SCC (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. JOSEPH & ANOR

(2020)LCN/15188(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, March 18, 2020

CA/A/223/2016

Before Our Lordships:

Abdu Aboki Justice of the Court of Appeal

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. SCC (NIGERIA) LIMITED 2. ABEL OLOKOR APPELANT(S)

And

1. MR. FIDELIS JOSEPH 2. THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ON THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT, HIGH COURT OF A STATE, AND HIGH COURT OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY TO HEAR AND DETERMINE APPLICATIONS FOR REDRESS FOR ANY VIOLATION OF A PERSON’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

It is clear that S.46(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution vests concurrent original jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, High Court of a State and High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to hear and determine applications for redress for any violation of a person’s fundamental right created in Chapter IV of the same Constitution. The exact text of that provision reads thusly-
“(1)- Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court for redress.
(2) – subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.”
S.251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution provides that-
“(1) – Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters.
(r) – any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any its agencies.“ PER AGIM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS DETERMINED BY THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM BEFORE IT

In Roe Limited v. UNN, the Supreme Court held thusly- “The law is very well settled beyond any argument that the jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the nature of claim before it. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 17) 517. The Federal High Court is a special Court with exclusive jurisdiction limited to those items specified under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and any other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly. A Court must not while interpreting the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution, and any other statute whose wordings are very clear and unambiguous import into them something which is not contained in them. Section 251, has clearly made provisions for actions against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in any other Courts in the proviso after subparagraph (sic) which reads thus:
“Provided that noting in the provisions of paragraphs (p) (q) and (r) of this section shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.”PER AGIM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A REPORT MADE TO THE POLICE AMOUNTS TO INSTIGATING THE POLICE IN ANY WAY

As held by this Court in Atakpa v Ebetor (2015) 3 NWLR (1447) 572 at 574 “The law supports a person who had good reasons to make a report to the police about an offence so long as he leaves them to use their own discretion in taking further steps. It is for the police to investigate the complaint and upon the result of their investigation, to take appropriate action. A report made to the police does not, without more, amount to instigating the police in any way. In the instant case, the 1st respondent acted within his rights in taking his compliant to the police, which was not shown to be frivolous or without foundation (Owomero v. Flour Mills (Nig) Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 622) …… In consequence, he went to report his case to the police, who asked him to company the police team in order to identify the attackers.
No malice has been shown on the part of the 1st respondent. There is no evidence that the 1st respondent did any more than lay his complain before the police. He has not been shown to have interfered with or otherwise directed the police investigation. A report made to the police does not, without more, amount to instigating the police in any way. The 1st respondent was certainly acting within his own rights in laying a complaint before the police; and he cannot be faulted on this score.”PER AGIM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO THE WRIT OF SUMMONS AND STATEMENT OF CLAIM

The jurisdiction of a Court is determined by reference to the writ of Summons and Statement of Claim. In a case commenced by an originating motion or application, as in this instance, the Court is to consider the motion or application and the affidavit in support, to see if the claim of the Applicant comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the Constitution and the relevant legislation. Where the claim falls within that jurisdiction, the Court must assume jurisdiction. Where it does not, the Court must decline jurisdiction. See
ONWUDIWE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2006) 10 NWLR (988) 382,428, AHMED V. AHMED(2013) 15 NWLR (1377) 274, 331 – 332; ANNP v. BSIEC(2006) 11 NWLR (992) 585,619. PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal No. CA/A/223/2016 was commenced on 29/3/2016 when the appellants herein filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Abuja delivered on 24/3/2016 in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/2646/2015, by A.S. Adepoju J. The notice of appeal contains 15 grounds of appeal.

The appellant and 1st respondent have filed, exchanged and adopted their respective briefs as follows- appellant’s brief, 1st respondent’s brief and appellant’s reply brief.

The appellant’s brief raised the following issues for determination –
1. Whether or not the Lower Court had the jurisdiction to entertain this action having regard to the settled position of the law that only the Federal High Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain an action of this nature against the 2nd Respondent; without whom the matter would not be properly constituted. (Grounds 4 & 5)
2. Whether or not the originating application by which the 1st Respondent commenced this suit was incompetent having regard to the fact that it contained no relief. (Ground 3)

Whether or not the Lower Court had the jurisdiction to entertain this matter having regard to the settled position of the law that the National Industrial Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to entertain enforcement of fundamental right matters between employees and employers. (Grounds 1 & 2)
4. Whether or not the Lower Court ought to have dismissed the 1st Respondent’s case on the merit having regard to the law, facts and evidence before the Court. (Grounds 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15)

The 1st respondent’s brief raised the following issues for determination-
1. Whether a State High Court or High Court of the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction to entertain a fundamental rights action wherein the Nigeria Police is joined as a party? (Ground 10)
2. Whether the 1st Respondent substantially complied with Order II Rule 3 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, in commencing his action at the Lower Court (Grounds 3 and 12)
3. Whether Section 254 C (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) clothes the National Industrial Court with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain actions for unlawful arrest and detention arising from allegation of commission of crime (Grounds 1, 2 and 11).
4. Whether the Court below has right to enter judgment for the 1st Respondent having regards to the facts and evidence adduced before it.
5. Whether the Lower Court was perverse in disbelieving the contradictory and hearsay evidence of the Appellants and believing the case of the 1st Respondent.

I will determine this appeal on the basis of the issues raised for determination in the appellant’s brief.

Let me start with issue No. 1 which asks “Whether or not the Lower Court had the jurisdiction to entertain this action having regard to the settled position of the law that only the Federal High Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain an action of this nature against the 2nd Respondent; without whom the matter would not be properly constituted.”

I have carefully read and considered the arguments in the respective briefs on this issue.

Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit that challenges the validity of the executive and administrative decision and action of the Nigerian Police Force, an agency of the Federal Government, by its arrest and detention of the 1st respondent at Bwari Police station from 1st to 3rd December, 2014, that the jurisdiction to entertain and try such a suit is exclusively vested in the Federal High Court by S.251(1)(r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (the 1999 Constitution). For these submissions, he relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in CBN & Ors v. Okojie (2015) 5 – 6 SC (Pt. 11) 173 at 202 and Adetona v. I.G. Ent. Ltd (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 535 at 564, 567 – 568 and the decisions of this court in Unical v. Ugochukwu (No.1) (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt 1063) 225 at 247 and Mil. Admin. Taraba State v. Jen (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 694) 416 at 431.

Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent argued in reply that the fact that the 2nd respondent is an agency of the Federal Government does not rob the trial Court or a State High Court the jurisdiction to entertain an action challenging the breach of the fundamental rights of the appellant by his arrest and detention by the 1st respondent, that it is only where the subject matter in respect of which the appellant’s right is breached is one of the subject matters over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction under S.251(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, that the Trial Court or a State High Court would be robbed of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit challenging the breach of a person’s fundamental right by the Federal Government or any of its agency, that there is no feature in the 1st respondent’s case that lent it to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, that unlawful arrest and detention and breaches of fundamental rights do not fall within the subject matters in S.251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, that the special jurisdiction to entertain actions for the enforcement of fundamental rights is vested concurrently on all High Courts in Nigeria by S.46(1) of the 1999 Constitution, that so the 1st respondent’s suit can be brought in the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, where the breach occurred or the Federal High Court, that CBN v. Okojie cannot apply here as the facts are different from that of this case as CBN v. Okojie was an action for malicious prosecution and this one is for enforcement of fundamental right. For these submissions, he relied on the judicial decisions in Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208, Nigeria Navy v. Garrick (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt 969) 69, Roe Limited v. University of Nigeria LER (2018) SC 421 2017, Adetona v. I.G Ent. Ltd (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 535 at 564 (SC), Gabriel V. Ukpabio (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1073) 21 at 31 – 32 (CA), NDLEA V. Omidina (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 589 at 606, Jaja v. COP (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1231) 375 and Ekanem v. IGP (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1079) 97.

Let me now determine the merits of the arguments of both sides on this issue.
It is clear that S.46(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution vests concurrent original jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, High Court of a State and High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to hear and determine applications for redress for any violation of a person’s fundamental right created in Chapter IV of the same Constitution. The exact text of that provision reads thusly-
“(1)- Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court for redress.
(2) – subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of this section and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under this Chapter.”
S.251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution provides that-
“(1) – Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters.
(r) – any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any its agencies.“
It is clear from the litera legis of S.46(2) of the 1999 Constitution, that it subjects itself to the other provisions of the 1999 Constitution including S.251(1) of the 1999 Constitution that overrides any other provision of the Constitution except the supremacy clause.
The coexistence of these two provisions and the subjection of S.46 to S.251(1) of the 1999 Constitution is the cause of the recurring disputes on whether the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction to entertain and try actions or applications against the 2nd respondent as an agency of the Federal Government for redress for its executive and administrative actions and decisions that violate a person’s fundamental right created in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution.
It is clear from the judicial decisions cited in the respective briefs in this appeal and other decisions not referred to here that judicial opinions on the point are divergent. As a penultimate Court that must follow the decisions of our respected Supreme Court in line with the principle of stare decisis that guides and determines the application of law and administration of justice in our Courts, we are caught here between the Supreme Court decisions in CBN V. Okojie and in Adetona V. IG Ent. Ltd that hold that only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an action for redress for unlawful arrest and detention of a person by an agency of the Federal Government and the Supreme Court decision in Jack V. University of Agriculture Makurdi (supra) that the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State and the High Court of Federal Capital Territory have concurrent jurisdiction over actions for redress for violations of a person’s fundamental rights by an agency of the Federal Government.
The Supreme Court in Adetona’s case (supra) at P. 564 added that where the subject matter of the breach of fundamental right is not within the matters prescribed by S.251(1) of the 1999 Constitution to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, then the High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction over it.
In Roe Ltd V. University of Nig. (supra), the Supreme Court introduced another dimension to the matter by holding that the proviso to S.251(1) has clearly made provisions for actions against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in any other Courts.
The exact texts of the said decisions of the Supreme Court are reproduced here to bring out clearly this divergence.
In CBN V. Okojie, the Supreme Court held that-
“Malicious Prosecution, unlawful arrest and wrongful detention of the respondent by the appellants are all wrong executive or administrative decisions of the Nigeria Police, an agency of the Federal Government. A right of action accrued to the Respondent to seek redress and the proper forum to hear this action is the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 230(s) of the 1979 Constitution, now Section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution. The judgment of the Federal High Court affirmed by the Court of Appeal is not a nullity since the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to hear the Respondents action.”
In Adetona’s case at P. 247, the Supreme Court held thusly –
“Equally, a High Court of a State shall lack the jurisdiction to entertain matters of fundamental rights, although brought pursuant to Section 46(2) of the Constitution where the alleged breach of such matters arose from a transaction or subject matter which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided by Section 251 of the constitution… Thus, looking at the above provisions, and in a nutshell it is the Federal High Court alone that has jurisdiction on Matters relating to the Federal Government and its agencies. Thus, where public officers, institutions of the government are sued in their official capacities, the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal high Court.”
In Roe Limited v. UNN, the Supreme Court held thusly-
“The law is very well settled beyond any argument that the jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the nature of claim before it. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 17) 517. The Federal High Court is a special Court with exclusive jurisdiction limited to those items specified under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and any other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly. A Court must not while interpreting the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution, and any other statute whose wordings are very clear and unambiguous import into them something which is not contained in them. Section 251, has clearly made provisions for actions against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in any other Courts in the proviso after subparagraph (sic) which reads thus:
“Provided that noting in the provisions of paragraphs (p) (q) and (r) of this section shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.”
In Adetona’s case, it also held at P. 564 thusly –
“Although, unlike the 1979 Constitution, Section 318(1) of the present Constitution does not define “High Court”, there is no doubt that the term carries the same meaning as given by Section 277 (1) of the 1979 Constitution to mean Federal High Court or the High Court of a State. Therefore, it is my understanding that where a person’s fundamental right is breached, being breached or about to be breached, that person may apply under Section 46 (1) to the judicial division of the Federal High Court in the State or the High Court of the State or the Federal Capital Territory in which the breach occurred or is occurring or about to occur. This is irrespective of whether the right involved comes within the legislative competence of the Federation or State or the Federal Capital Territory. See the case of Minister of Internal Affairs v. Shugaba (1982) 3 NCLR 915. It has to however be noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Federal High Court is where the fundamental right threatened or breached falls within the enumerated matters on which that Court has jurisdiction. Thus, fundamental rights arising from matters outside its jurisdiction cannot be enforced by the Federal high Court.“
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Roe Limited v. UNN and the alternative view in Adetona V. I G Ent. Ltd appear to conflict with its decision in CBN V. Okojie. Since the decision in Roe was made in 2018, later in time than that in CBN V. Okojie made in 2015, this Court is bound to follow the 2018 decision of the Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court held in Osakwe V FCE (Technical) Asaba & Ors (2010) 5 SCM 185 at 203(SC) where two or more conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court exist on an issue, this Court is bound to follow the later decision of the Supreme Court.
I agree with the submission of Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent that the claim for damages for the unlawful arrest and detention of the 1st respondent by the appellant falls within the proviso to S.251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. So by virtue of the Supreme Court decision in Roe Ltd v. UNN on the implication of the proviso to S.251(1), the High Court of a State and the High Court of Federal Capital Territory can also entertain and hear claims for damages for the breach of the fundamental rights of a person by agencies of the Federal Government. Therefore, the Trial Court validly exercised jurisdiction to entertain and determine the 1st respondent’s suit.

It is clear from paragraphs 18 to 24 of the affidavit in support of the originating application and reliefs A, B, D and E sought for by the 1st respondent, that the cause for the action by the 1st respondent is not only his detention by officials of the 2nd respondent at Bwari Police Station from 1st to 3rd December, 2014, but also the appellants falsely accusing him of theft or attempted theft of 1st appellant’s properties, arresting him from his office, taking him to Bwari Police Station where he and others were detained by the appellants in their car until they were handed over to the police officers at Bwari Police Station, where the officers of the 2nd respondent continued detaining him and others for 3 days before releasing them on bail.

As it is, the 1st respondent’s suit can competently lie against the appellants for their arrest and detention of the 1st respondent until they handed him to the officers of the 2nd respondent at Bwari Police Station and for their seizure of his phone and other personal effects in the office and for intimidating, humiliating and embarrassing him. So that even if the 2nd respondent was not joined as a defendant in the suit, it would not affect the competence of the suit against the appellants for arresting and detaining him, seizing his properties and humiliating him before handing him over to the police officers.

In the light of the foregoing, issue No. 1 is resolved in favour of the 1st respondent.

Let me now consider issue No. 2 which asks “Whether or not the originating application by which the 1st Respondent commenced this suit was incompetent having regard to the fact that it contained no relief. “

The part of the judgment of the Trial Court complained against under this issue reads thusly- “The second leg of the objection that the originating motion did not contain any prayers of the applicant also does not hold water. The objection is premised on technicality. It is a notorious fact that our Courts have moved away from the era of technical justice to that of substantial justice.
In any case, the reliefs are contained in the accompanying statement of fact in strict compliance with provisions of Order 2, Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. And the Court is bound to consider all the processes filed before it. The applicant I hold have substantially complied with the Provision of Order 2, Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 in commencing the action. Also, on this point, I wish to stress that the nature of action for enforcing of fundamental rights abhors technicality in the mode of commencement of the proceedings. In the case of EKANEM V. ASSISTANT I.G.P 2008 CHR 172 @ IG 182 Omage JCA state; “The civil rights contained in the Constitution against the unjust arrest and detention of a citizen which is protected by the enforcement of the fundamental right provisions should not be restricted in any way by technicalities where none is justified by the Constitution… See ADESANYA V. PRESIDENT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS (1981) 5 SC 113.” The objection of the learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents is as to form and not the substance of the claim.

The defect is also cured by the Provision of Order 9 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 which stipulates that such non-compliance as to form be treated as an irregularity which is precisely what I am going to do in this instance. I hold that the omission by the applicant to state on the face of the originating motion, the reliefs sought is an irregularity, having explicitly stated it on the accompanying statement of facts; this objection must also fail for lacking in merit.”

I have carefully read and considered the arguments of both sides on this issue.
This issue and the arguments in support of it proceed from the assumption that the originating application that commenced this case at the Trial Court did not state or contain the reliefs sought for by the 1st Respondent. The part of the judgment reproduced above also proceeds from this assumption. It is glaring from the face of the originating application that this assumption is wrong. The exact text of the body of the originating application on its face states thusly –
“TAKE NOTICE that this Honourable Court shall be coved on…… day of… 2015 at the Hour of 9 O’clock in the forenoon or so soon thereafter as the business of Court may allow as the Counsel on behalf of Applicant may be heard praying the Honourable Court for orders in terms of the reliefs set out in the Statement accompanying this application.
AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that at the hearing of this application the Appellant shall rely on the Statement, Affidavit and Exhibits filed along with this application. “
It states that the applicant prays “for orders in terms of the reliefs set out in the statement accompanying this application.”
The originating application or motion clearly states the reliefs prayed for on its face through incorporation by reference to the reliefs sought for in the statement that accompanied the originating application. The reference in the originating application or motion to the reliefs in the statement of reliefs sought for accompanying the said application as the reliefs prayed for, makes those reliefs part of the motion or application. Therefore, the submission of Learned Counsel for the appellant that the originating motion does not contain or state the reliefs sought for is wrong.
The legal doctrine that the contents of a document includes the terms it incorporates by reference to the contents of other documents which is more commonly applied to contractual documents, also applies in determining the contents of Court processes. See Ekpemupolo & Ors v. Edremoda & Ors (2009) 8 NWLR in which the Supreme Court applied the doctrine to hold that a statement of claim contained the reliefs it incorporated by reference to the relief stated in the writ of summons. The exact text of the said decision of the Supreme Court reads thusly- “The question posed there is whether the plaintiffs/respondents pleaded any relief in their Statement of Claim. The writ of summons issued on the 2nd December, 1970 contained four reliefs. In paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim dated 2/2/1973 and filed on the 3/2/1993. The Respondents claimed as follows: ’19 whereof the Plaintiffs claim as per their writ of summons’ have considered the arguments very ably agitated by counsel for the parties with the authorities cited. On this issue OKOMU OIL PALM CO. LTD v. ISERHIENHEN (2001) 6 NWLR (part 710) 660 at 681 is quite apposite. There this Court, Per Uwaifo J.S.C. while restating the principle had this to say: ‘…I think reference in a statement of claim to the writ for the reliefs claimed in the writ of summons makes the statement of claim complete as it incorporates the writ. It is accepted that the synonym of the word ‘incorporate’ includes roll into one, merge, link with, join together, fuse, assimilate: se Barlett’s Rogef’s Thesaurus 1st Edition paragraph 753.15 at page 663 and paragraph 757.9 at page 668. I am satisfied that Ubaezonu, JCA was right in his observation in OWENA BANK case (supra) at pp. 714 -715 that “where the Statement of claim states that the Plaintiff claims ‘as per writ of summons’, the claim in the writ of summons is incorporated in the statement of claim and becomes part of it. Once there is such incorporation, the statement of claim is taken to contain the relief stated in the writ which statement of claim would otherwise have been defective and contrary to the requirements of Ord. 13 Rule 7…. ‘I adopt the above opinion in its entirety. The invitation to dismiss the claim on the ground that in the Statement of claim the Plaintiffs/Respondent merely claimed ‘as per their writ of summons’ is an invitation to give credence to technical justice. The Courts have been advised to avoid technicalities in the administration of justice. See BELLO v. A.G. OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (Part 45) 828 at 885-886; NNEJI v. CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR (Part 81) 186 at 188. The skill of formulating pleadings is a highly technical one that can only be properly handled by lawyers with the appropriate skills. If we accede to the request of learned counsel for the appellants to dismiss the claim, then the Plaintiffs/Respondents would be punished for the mistakes or inadvertence of their counsel and inflict injustice. This we should avoid. SeeIBODO v. ENAROFIA (1980) 5 SC 42; NNEJI v. CHUKWU (supra), ADEPOJU v. ADEPOJU (1968) 2 ALL NLR 141. For the foregoing considerations, this issue is resolved against the Appellants.”
In the light of the foregoing, I hold that issue No. 2 and the arguments that proceed from the assumption that the originating application did not state or contain the reliefs are invalid.
The Trial Court was right to have relied on the fact that the statement of facts accompanying the originating motion contains the reliefs sought for by him in upholding the validity of the said originating application. The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 which prescribe the procedure for applying for enforcement of one’s fundamental right, provides in Order II Rule 3 that the reliefs sought for and the grounds for seeking such reliefs should inter alia be stated in a statement that must accompany the notice of application. The 1st respondent complied with this provision by accompanying his application with a statement setting out his name, and description, the reliefs sought for and the grounds for seeking the reliefs.
Issue No. 2 is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

Let me now consider issue No. 3 which asks “Whether or not the Lower Court had the jurisdiction to entertain this matter having regard to the settled position of the law that the National Industrial Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to entertain enforcement of fundamental right matters between employees and employers.”

The part of the judgment of the Trial Court complained against under this issue reads thusly- “I agree with the submissions of counsel to the applicant and wish to add that the applicant’s in the main is seeking for the enforcement of his fundamental right arising from the allegation of theft, his unlawful arrest and detention by the 1st – 3rd respondents. While it is true that the applicant is an employee of the 1st respondent, the applicant has not instituted this action either as a member of any union, or challenging a collective agreement between the 1st respondent and his workers. The action therefore is not a labour matter. In the same vein, the applicant have not told this Court that the 1st respondent have breached any contract of employment or condition of service entered into with him or any other person with respect to his dismissal by the 1st respondent. The action is therefore not employment related. It is trite principle of law that the claim of the plaintiff as endorsed on the writ of summons determines the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the claim. See the case of DR. TAIWO OLORUNTOBA OJU & 5 ORS V. PROF A. DOPAMU & 6 ORS 2008 LPELR 2595 (SC). Where the Court held that “it has now become legally customized through long practice to determine the issue of jurisdiction of Court on the reliefs sought by the claimant on the writ of summons and statement of claim.”
The words of Section 254(c)(1)(d) of the Constitution reads; “with the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to entertain an determine civil cases and matter relating to or connected with dispute over interpretation and application of the Provision of Chapter IV of the Constitution as it relates to employment, labour, industrial relation,…”
I am in agreement with applicant’s counsel that this Provision took away part of the jurisdiction of the High Court contained in Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution in relation to interpretation and application of Chapter IV of the Constitution and thus the High Court lost its jurisdiction to interpret and apply Chapter IV of the Constitution to matters relating to employment, labour, e.t.c. In my view the aggregate of facts contained in the applicant’s affidavit cannot be given a coloration of labour/employment in order to confer jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court. And neither can it be stretched to include or embrace all conceivable matters relating to or connected with employment as argued by Mr. Ogunwumiju because of the use of the phrase “connected with”, “Pertaining to” and “arising from”. To do so would mean that all manners of actions arising from employer/employee relationship would be dumped on the National Industrial Court. This would defeat the whole essence of special purpose for which the Court was created. See OLORUNTOBA OJO & 5 ORS Supra Per Oguntade JSC. Although this matter is not all fores with the case at hand, but the learned jurist opined thus; “Finally on this point, it seems to be that to give jurisdiction in all matters relating to dispute in employment matters to the National Industrial Court will clearly overburden a special purpose which National Industrial Court was designed to be.” I am therefore in agreement with the submissions of the counsel to the applicant that this Court has wide original jurisdiction to hear and determine application made pursuant to the Provision of Chapter IV of the Constitution and that the Jurisdiction to interpret and apply Chapter IV of the Constitution could only be ousted where the cause of action relates to employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, e.t.c. And since the cause of action in this case is not in any way related to any of the issues listed in Section 254(c)(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court is imbued with jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant’s claim. The 1st leg of the objection fails and it is hereby dismissed.”
I have carefully read and considered all the arguments in the respective briefs on this issue.

It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent’s fundamental right to his personal liberty was violated by the appellants while he was in their employment, during working hours and starting from his place of work to Bwari Police Station and the appellants also terminated his employment with them because they suspected he was among the persons that brought trucks to the premises of the company on the night of 30th November, 2014 and attempted to steal company properties. It is glaring from the reliefs sought for by the 1st respondent in his originating application that the suit did not challenge the termination of his employment by the appellants, that the suit did not seek any relief concerning his contract of employment with the 1st appellant, that the reliefs were for redress of only the violation of his fundamental right by the appellants.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the above facts notwithstanding, the Trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the application because S.254 C(1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution confers on the National Industrial Court the exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning violation of the fundamental right of an employee by his employer, that this exclusive jurisdiction is not given by the reliefs sought but by the existence of the employer/employee relationship at the time of the violations and that the phrases “pertaining to”, “arising from” and “connected with” in S.254C(1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution should be interpreted and applied expansively as was done by the Supreme Court in SBN V. De Lunch (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 341 at 355 and SPDC Nig Ltd v. Maxon (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 541 at 553 as embracing all possible and conceivable matters of fundamental rights between an employee and his or her employer.

Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent argued in reply that the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the National Industrial Court by S.254C(1) (d) is to hear and determine civil causes and matters relating to, connected with or arising from labour or employment matters, that therefore it is the cause for the action that would determine if a case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction given to the National Industrial Court by S.254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, that the cause for this action is related to, connected with or arose from the appellant’s suspicion that the 1st respondent attempted to steal their property, their arresting and detaining him and their criminal complaint against him that culminated in his arrest and detention for 3 days by the officers of the 2nd respondent, that the cause for the action is not connected to and did not arise from his contract of employment with the appellants.

Let me now determine the merits of the above arguments.
Even though the appellants’ violation of the 1st respondent’s fundamental right to his personal liberty and human dignity occurred during his employment with the appellant and in his office, during working hours, it is clear from the facts of the case, that the violations did not arise from any dispute as to the rights and obligations of both sides in their contract of employment and is not connected with the enforcement of any right or obligation under the employment contract. The appellants’ baseless suspicion that the 1st respondent attempted to steal their properties on the night of 30th November, 2014 made them violate his fundamental right to personal liberty and human dignity and initiated a criminal complaint against him that led to the officers of the 2nd respondent arresting and detaining him for 3 days. Their violations of his fundamental right did not arise from the appellants’ application or invocation of the terms of the employment agreement with the 1st respondent and rather arose from the initiation of a criminal process against him for the attempted theft or theft of the properties of the 1st appellant. The violations did not arise from the imposition of any disciplinary measures on the 1st respondent for his breach of his employment contract with the appellants. So the action brought by the 1st respondent to seek redress for the said violations through the reliefs sought for therein is not a cause relating to or connected with any dispute over the application of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution in relation to any employment, labour, industrial association or any other matter which the National Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine. The disputes concerning application of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution over which the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction is limited to those connected with a matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine by virtue of S.254 C-(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution which provides that-
“254C-(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters.
(d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine.
The National Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to try allegations of commission of crime. That is why allegations that an employee has stolen his or employer’s property are tried by Courts with the jurisdiction to try criminal offences such as Magistrates and High Courts. Such criminal cases are not tried by the National Industrial Court, even where the theft occurred at the work place and during the employment. Since it has no jurisdiction to try allegations of crime, it has no jurisdiction to entertain a civil cause relating to or connected with a dispute as to the application of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution arising from the appellants’ suspicion or allegation that an employee attempted to steal or stole properties belonging to the employer.
The supreme Court in Oju & Ors v. Dopamu & Ors (2008) LPELR 2595 (SC) held that S.254 C-(1)(d) did not confer jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court to adjudicate on all kinds of disputes between an employee and his or her employer. The exact text of this holding of the Supreme Court reads thusly – “I do not agree with Mr. Ogunwumiju and Mr. Babalola that the cause of action in this case is a conceivable matter arising from employment/labour. To hold otherwise would mean that all manner of actions arising from employer/employee relationship would be dumped on the National Industrial Court was created. Therefore, to construe the provision of Section 254 (c) (1) (d) of the Constitution as conferring jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court to adjudicate on all kinds of disputes between employer/employee would defeat the special purpose for which the National Industrial Court was created. See OLORUNTOBA OJO & 5 ORS (supra) per Oguntade JSC, although this case is not on all fours with the issue at hand, however, the learned jurist held while interpreting the provision of Section 47 Trade Dispute Act LFN viz a viz the provision of Section 251 (1) (q) (r) and (s) of the 1999 Constitution thus: “it seems that to construe the interpretation clause in Section 47 of Cap 432 1999 LFN as conferring on the National Industrial Court the jurisdiction to adjudicate on all manners of dispute concerning employment matters would do a great violence to the provision of Section 251(1) (q) (r) and (s) of the 1999 Constitution.“
The decisions in N.U.T., Niger State (2012) 10 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1307) 89, John v. Igbo-Etiti LGA (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 1 and Coca-Cola (Nig) Ltd. v. Akinsanya (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1386) 225, S.B.N. v. De Lluch (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 341 and Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Maxon (2001) 9 NWLR (719) 541 relied on by Learned Counsel for the appellant to support his submission that S.254 C-(1)(d) confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court to entertain all disputes between an employee and an employer, are not applicable here because the relevant facts of those cases are different from the relevant facts of this case. The cause of action in those cases did not involve any employer alleging that his or her employee has committed a crime or criminal complaint by an employer against an employee. The said precedent cases involved labour and employment matters.

In the light of the foregoing, I resolve issue No. 3 in favour of the 1st respondent.

Let me now consider issue No. 4 which asks “Whether or not the Lower Court ought to have dismissed the 1st Respondent’s case on the merit having regard to the law, facts and evidence before the Court.“

I have carefully read and considered the arguments in the respective briefs on this issue.

It is clear from the reliefs claimed for by the 1st respondent and the affidavit in support of the originating application, that the case of the 1st respondent is based on two separate violations of his fundamental rights. The first is the violation of his right to personal liberty and human dignity by the 1st and 2nd appellants before they laid their criminal complaint against him to the police on the 1st of December, 2014. The second is the violation by the Police officers at Bwari Police station when they detained him there for 3 days.

Nobody named the 1st respondent as one of the persons that attempted to steal the 1st appellant’s properties on the night of 30th November, 2014 and there was no reason to suspect him of being part of the group that attempted the theft of the appellants’ properties. The Trial Court held that the detention of the 1st respondent by officers of the 2nd respondent for 3 days before granting him bail is unjustified and unlawful and then held thusly- “The 1st and 2nd respondents set in motion the machinery for the unlawful detention of the applicant by handing over the applicant to the 3rd respondent without a just cause. Their acts went beyond mere reporting of the allegations to the 3rd respondent. I hold and declare that the arrest and detention of the applicant by the 1st – 3rd respondents is unlawful, unconstitutional and a gross violation of the Provision of Section 35(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. Therefore the claim of the applicant for declaration in A, C and D of the reliefs sought succeeds.”
As this Court held in Ezeigbo V Ikechukwu & Ors (CA/A/448/2017 of 26-4-2019) “A criminal complaint is a legitimate criminal process provided it is based upon a reasonable suspicion of commission of a crime. A criminal complaint against a person without any justification or reasonable basis for suspecting that person of committing any crime is a malicious criminal process. A person who employs such a malicious process clearly intends the consequences of such a malicious complaint.
A criminal complaint to the Police or other law enforcement agency that a person has committed a crime is usually intended to ignite the investigation of the allegation and often times results in the questioning of the suspect or his invitation to the Police station or the office of the law enforcement agency or his arrest and detention by the law enforcement agency. So when the appellant laid the criminal complaint against the 1st respondent, he clearly intended to expose the 1st respondent to the said criminal process.
If there was a reasonable basis for suspecting a person of committing a crime, the criminal complaint based on it would be legitimate irrespective of the fact that subsequent investigation or trial discloses that the suspect did not commit the alleged offence and the complainant may not be liable for any unlawful action carried out by the Police or other law enforcement agency in pursuance of that complaint, provided that he did nothing to aid or support the said unlawful action. The officers of the police or other law enforcement agency that carried out the unlawful act would be liable for the said unlawful act”. As held by this Court in Atakpa v Ebetor (2015) 3 NWLR (1447) 572 at 574 “The law supports a person who had good reasons to make a report to the police about an offence so long as he leaves them to use their own discretion in taking further steps. It is for the police to investigate the complaint and upon the result of their investigation, to take appropriate action. A report made to the police does not, without more, amount to instigating the police in any way. In the instant case, the 1st respondent acted within his rights in taking his compliant to the police, which was not shown to be frivolous or without foundation (Owomero v. Flour Mills (Nig) Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 622) …… In consequence, he went to report his case to the police, who asked him to company the police team in order to identify the attackers.
No malice has been shown on the part of the 1st respondent. There is no evidence that the 1st respondent did any more than lay his complain before the police. He has not been shown to have interfered with or otherwise directed the police investigation. A report made to the police does not, without more, amount to instigating the police in any way. The 1st respondent was certainly acting within his own rights in laying a complaint before the police; and he cannot be faulted on this score.”
Where as in this case, a person had no reasonable basis for suspecting that another person has committed an offence, but proceeds to lay a criminal complaint against that other person of committing a crime that he knew the person had not committed, such a complainant cannot validly contend that he merely exercised his right to make a criminal complaint to the police and did not instigate their arrest and detention of the person he complained against. Such a complainant by virtue of the malicious and false nature of his criminal complaint or lack of justification for the complaint, clearly intended to expose or subject the suspect to a malicious criminal process. He cannot absolve himself from liability for any actions carried out by the police or other officers in pursuance of his malicious compliant.
In Ajao v Ashiru (1973) 8 NSCC 525, the Supreme Court held that “The law of Nigeria is that those who set a ministerial rather than a judicial officer in motion in this way are as liable for the wrongful seizure of another’s property as if they had done it themselves. Police officers must therefore be wary of being invited into a situation in which they find themselves becoming partisan agents of wrong doers in the pursuit of private vendetta. This kind of show of power which is becoming too frequent in our society today must be discouraged by all those who set any store by civilized values.”
In Nkpa v Nkume (2001) 6 NWLR Pt. 710 at Pg. 543, this Honourable Court also held that a private individual who uses the Police to settle private scores would himself also be liable for the wrongful act of the Police.
In a very recent decision of this Honourable Court, delivered on the 10th day of May, 2016, in Skye Bank Plc v. Emerson Njoku & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40447 (CA), it was held per Mbaba, J.C.A, that we have depreciated, several times, the tendency of a creditor resorting to the police to force his debtor to settle simple debts or bank loan and the willingness of the police to accept to do so, using their coercive powers, wrongly, to violate the fundamental rights of the debtor, see the case of Gusau v. Umezurike (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 655) 291; (2012) LPELR 8000 (CA), OSIL Limited vs. Balogun & Ors (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 677) 653. In Ogbonna v. Ogbonna (2014) LPELR 22308 (CA); (2014) 23 WRN 48, it was held that …. a party that employs the police, or any law enforcement agency, to violate the fundamental rights of a citizen should be ready to face the consequences, either alone or with the misguided agency …… the police have no business helping parties to settle or recover we have also depreciated the resort by aggrieved creditors to the police to arrest their debtors using one guise of criminal wrong doing or another. See also the recent case of Anogwie & Ors IV. Odom & Ors (2016) LPELR-40214 (CA) where we restated the above legal position and added that: ‘maybe … the public officer or law enforcement agency that allows himself to be used by any member of the public to commit illegality that results in damages and liability to the agency or government should be made to pay such costs or damages personally either in part or in whole, if this can serve to warn such officer to act within the rules and scope of his office.
In another very recent decision of this Honourable Court, delivered on Thursday, the 24th day of March, 2016, this Court, in Bernard Anogwie & Ors v. Ebere Odom & Ors (2016) LPELR-40214 (CA) held that “…. The invitation of the police to intervene in a matter that is purely civil in nature cannot be justified under any circumstances. The duties of the Police as provided under Section 4 of the Police Act, Cap. 359, LFN, 1990 does not include the settlement of civil disputes or the collection of debts or enforcement of civil agreements between parties. The mere fact that the police are usually invited into just about every matter under the sun is no justification to get the police involved in the resolution of civil disputes. The police has recently held itself out as a responsible law enforcement organization and should be seen to live up to it so as to avoid embarrassments of matters of this nature. There are usually dire consequences at every turn of event, in the event of things of this nature happening. The position is and has always been that the private individual who uses the police to settle a private score would himself be liable for the wrongful act of the police…. We have stated, several times, that a party that employs the police or any law enforcement agency, to violate the fundamental rights of a citizen, should be ready to face the consequences, either alone or with the misguided agency. We have stated several times, that a party that employs the police or any law enforcement agency, to violate the fundamental rights of a citizen, should be ready to face the consequences, either alone or with the misguided agency. See the case of Nkpa vs. Nkume (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 543 and a host of other decided cases on the subject “. In Ogbonna v. Ogbonna (2014) LPELR-22308 (CA); (2014) 23 WRN 48, we held that: “…the police have no business helping parties to settle or recover debts. We also deprecated the resort by aggrieved creditors, to the police to arrest their debtors using one guise of criminal wrong doing or another. See Ibiyeye vs. Gold (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 659) 1074; OSIL Ltd vs. Balogun (2012) 7 WRN 143 at 173-174. Of course, a man who procures the police to do some illicit duties for him should be ready to face the legal consequences of that illegality, and the law is well settled on this.”
Both sides agree that the 1st respondent was on 4-9-2014 arrested and taken away from his shop at Dei-Dei Building materials market, by a team of police detectives from the Police Special Fraud Unit (FSFU), Police Force Headquarters, Area 10 Garki, Abuja, that the appellant who accompanied the said police officers pointed the 1st respondent out to the officers, that the officers took the 1st respondent to the Police Force Headquarters, where he was detained for some hours and released on bail to his brother, Mr. Obi Godson Obianwuna at about 7pm same day.
Since there was no reasonable basis for the suspicion of the 1st respondent of committing fraud and criminal conversion of the said 4 Million Naira, his arrest and detention by the police officers upon the basis of the appellant’s complaint on the basis of that suspicion, violates his fundamental right to his personal liberty guaranteed him by S.35(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (the 1999 Constitution) which provides thusly-
“(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law….
(c) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.”
The Police should have first investigated the appellant’s complaint to find out if there is reasonable basis or justification for it, before proceeding to arrest the 1st respondent. If they had done so, they would have realised from the facts of the dispute, that there was no basis for the appellant’s allegation that the 1st respondent has defrauded him of 4 million naira or criminally converted same and would have avoided being led by the appellant to go and effect the arrest of the 1st respondent on 4-9-2014.
This Court also held in EFCC V REINL (CA/A/392/2016 delivered on 26-1-2018) “the law places the primary burden on the investigating, arresting and detaining authority to show that there is reasonable basis for suspecting the person arrested as having committed an offence by virtue of S.35(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution. It is not the duty of the arrested person to show that there is no reason for his arrest and detention”. This Court in Yakassi v Tela & Ors (CA/A/42/2014, Judgment delivered on 21-6-2018) held that by virtue of S.35(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the appellant’s petition can justify the 2nd respondent’s initial arrest, further arrest and continuous investigation of the 1st respondent, only if it contains facts that show a reasonable basis for its suspicion and allegation that the 1st respondent committed the crimes alleged therein. The said S.35(1)(c) provides thusly-
“(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law….
(c) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.”
Since there is no reasonable basis for the criminal complaint in the petition against the 1st respondent, there was no basis for the 2nd and 3rd respondent’s continuation of the criminal process against the 1st respondent. The powers vested on the 2nd respondent by Ss. 6 and 7 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act does not include the use of the criminal process to resolve or influence the resolution of contractual and other forms of civil disputes under the guise of investigating alleged criminal features in such disputes.

In the light of the foregoing, issue No. 4 is resolved in favour of the 1st respondent.
On the whole, this appeal fails as it lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
The appellants shall pay cost of N400,000.00 to the 1st respondent.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I have read before now, a draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my Learned Brother EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JCA. I agree that the appeal is unmeritorious and should be dismissed.

My Learned Brother has dealt exhaustively with all the issues raised in this appeal and I adopt his judgment as mine. However, and just for the purpose of emphasis, I will put in one or two words of mine in answer to the question of whether or not the Trial Court validly exercised jurisdiction to entertain and determine the 1st Respondent’s suit.

A perusal of the originating application/motion and paragraphs 18 – 24 of the affidavit in support, as well as Reliefs A, B, D and E sought by the 1st Respondent leaves me in no doubt that the claim of the 1st Respondent at the Trial Court, is not only his detention by the officials of the 2nd Respondent at the Bwari Police Station, from the 1st to the 3rd of December 2014, but also that the Appellants falsely accused him of theft of the 1st Appellant’s properties, arresting him from his office, taking him to Bwari Police Station where he and others were detained by the Appellants in their car until they were handed over to the Police Officers at the Bwari Police Station, where the officers of the 2nd Respondent continued detaining him and others for about three days.

This Court, in considering the concurrent jurisdiction of the Federal and State High Court, to entertain matters relating to enforcement of fundamental rights, held as follows, in the case of AJAYI v. SEC (2007) LPELR 4553(CA):
“It is true that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of the enforcement of a persons fundamental rights. An application may therefore be made either to the judicial division of the Federal High Court in the State or the High Court of the State in which a breach of fundamental right occurred, is occurring or about to occur.”
However, the Apex Court, in ADETONA v. I.G. ENT LTD (2011) LPELR 159 (SC), expatiated on the above decision of this Court, and held inter alia, as follows:
“It has to however be noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Federal High Court is where the fundamental right threatened or breached falls within the enumerated matters on which that Court has jurisdiction.
Thus, fundamental rights arising from matters outside its jurisdiction cannot be enforced by the Federal High Court.”
Flowing from the above decisions, and by virtue of the proviso to Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), I hold the view that in a claim for damages for unlawful arrest and detention, as in the instant appeal, the High Court of a State and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, can hear and determine claims for damages for the breach of fundamental rights of a person by agencies of the Federal Government.

It is for this reason and the more detailed reasons given by my Learned Brother EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JCA that I also find that this appeal is unmeritorious and ought to be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed by me.
I also abide by the consequential order contained in the lead judgment.

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JCA, just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. I abide by all the orders made therein.

Appearances:

Ademola Abimbola, Esq. with Olamide Adekunle, Esq., For Appellant(s)

Stephen Enyinnaya Ekeh Esq. for 1st Respondent For Respondent(s)