BICHI INVESTMENT NIG. LTD v. SYBRON MEDICAL CENTRE LTD & ORS (2020)

BICHI INVESTMENT NIG. LTD v. SYBRON MEDICAL CENTRE LTD & ORS

(2020)LCN/14070(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, March 20, 2020

CA/A/649/2017

Before Our Lordships:

Abdu Aboki Justice of the Court of Appeal

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

BICHI INVESTMENT NIGERIA LIMITED APPELLANT(S)

And

1. SYBRON MEDICAL CENTRE LIMITED 2. HON. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 3. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

FACT ALREADY ADMITTED NEED NOT BE PROVED

“It is trite that a crucial fact which is admitted needs no further proof and same would be taken as established. See: Agbanelo v. U.B.N. Ltd (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 666) 534 at 549; Edokpolo & Co. Ltd. v. Ohenhen (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 358) 511 at 519.” Per Fabiyi. J.S.C. (Pp. 24 – 25, paras. G – A). PER IDRIS, J.C.A

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: LITERAL RULE

A curious look at Section 28(7) of the Land Use Act which provides inter alia:
“the title holder of a right of occupancy shall extinguish on the receipt by him of a Notice given under subsection (5) of this section or on such later date as may be stated on the Notice” (Emphasis mine). The wordings of the Land Use Act as emphasized above, do not contemplate a date that has passed but instead, a date upon receipt of the said Notice of Revocation or on a future date.
It is trite that when words of statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their clear and ordinary meaning. See the case of UBN LTD VS. SAX (NIG.) LTD (1994) LPELR-3390(SC) wherein the Supreme Court per Adio, JSC (P. 18, paras A – D) reiterated as follows:
“When a document is clear, the operative words in it should be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning. Further, the general rule is that when the words of any instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves and when the circumstances of the case have not created any doubt or difficulty as to the proper application of the words to claimants under the instrument or the subject matter to which the instrument relates, such an instrument is always to be construed according to the strict, plain and common meaning of the words themselves.” PER IDRIS, J.C.A

DUTY OF THE COURT TO CONSIDER ALL DOCUMENTS BROUGHT BEFORE IT

A Court is entitled to consider all the documents placed before it in arriving at its decision. A consideration of documents placed before a Court for its perusal, cannot in my view amount to raising issue suo motu without giving counsel opportunity to address the Court on the issue, as argued by learned counsel for the Appellant. See the following cases: AKINOLA VS. V.C UNILORIN (2004) 11 NWLR (PT. 885) 616; BADEJO VS. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1996) 8 NWLR (PT. 464) 15.
Also, in the case of EHIRIM VS. IMO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2012) LPELR-9723(SC), the Supreme Court per Mukhtar, JSC reiterated thus:
”It is elementary law that Courts are bound by the materials before them, and they are not allowed to go beyond or outside what has been placed before them.”
I agree with the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent that it has always been the case of the 1st Respondent that it submitted an application for land for the sole purpose of developing a hospital and that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents considered the said application and allocated the disputed land to the 1st Respondent.
From the afore-said therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the reason given by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the rejection of the initial building plan submitted by the 1st Respondent is unjustifiable was not raised suo motu but was upon consideration of the evidence and materials placed before the Court. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

THE INTERPRETATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

It is the duty of the Court in its interpretative jurisdiction to interpret any document placed before it. The Supreme Court per Iguh, JSC at P.37, Paras. A – C reiterated in the case of UBN LTD & ANOR VS. NWAOKOLO (1995) LPELR-3385(SC) thus:
“It is trite that in the construction of documents, the cardinal principle is that the parties are presumed to intend what they have in fact said or written down. Accordingly, the words employed by them will be so construed and should be given their ordinary and plain meaning unless, of course, circumstance, such as trade usage or the like, dictate that a particular construction ought to be applied in order to give, effect to the particular intention envisaged by the parties.”
Just as I have stated earlier on, the trial Court is at liberty to consider any document that is before it and in doing so the Court can exercise its duty of interpretation of such documents before it to arrive at a just determination. PER IDRIS, J.C.A

REVOCATION OF RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

In exercising the power of revocation, there must be due compliance with the provisions of the Act, particularly with regard to giving of adequate Notice of Revocation to the holder of a right of occupancy.
Also, failure to comply with the procedure required in the issuance of a Notice of Revocation will invalidate the process of a Right of Occupancy and a subsequent Certificate of Occupancy issued on the same property will be invalid. See the decision of this Court in the case of BARAYA VS. ABDULLAHI (2017) LPELR-43371(CA), wherein this Court reiterated as follows:
“Without valid notice of revocation, the original owner cannot be divested of his interest in the land. His interest still subsists.”
In other words, the grant of a right of occupancy over an existing right of occupancy will not amount to a revocation. PER IDRIS, J.C.A

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By an Amended Writ of Summons dated and filed on the 20th November, 2014, the 1st Respondent as Plaintiff at the trial Court instituted an action against the 2nd Respondent, 3rd Respondent and Appellant who were the Defendants at the trial Court respectively and sought for the following reliefs against the Defendants jointly and severally:
1. A DECLARATION OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT that the Notice of Revocation dated 15th day of June 2006 issued by the 1st and 2nd Defendants in respect of the Plaintiff’s right of occupancy over Plot 90 in sector Centre B (B16), Jabi, Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, is invalid, null and void, same not having been issued and served in accordance with the Land Use Act and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
2. AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT compelling the 1st and 2nd Defendants to approve forthwith the Plaintiff’s building plan for the said parcel of land submitted by the Plaintiff to the Defendants for the development of the said land, all amendments having been made thereto as requested by the

1st and 2nd Defendants.
3. AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT declaring null, void and of no legal effect any transfer, re-allocation of the Plaintiff’s subsisting right of occupancy over Plot 90 in sector Centre B (B16), Jabi, Abuja to any person(s) whatsoever including the 3rd Defendant.
4. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants by themselves, their servants, agents or privies from interfering with the Plaintiff’s use, possession, development and occupation of the said parcel of land, or re-allocating same to any third party including the 3rd Defendant.

On the other hand, the 3rd Defendant (now Appellant) who was joined as a party to the suit by a Motion on Notice-M/1990/07 dated the 19th of April, 2007 and filed by the 1st Respondent in this Appeal, counter claimed against the Plaintiff (1st Respondent) as follows:
(a) A DECLARATION that by virtue of the offer of Statutory Right of Occupancy dated 25th day of March, 2009 which was granted by the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant, the 3rd Defendant is now the lawful grantee or holder of the statutory right of occupancy over the parcel of land

known as Plot no. 90 in cadastral zone B16 of SECTOR CENTRE B, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja having an area of approximately 9134.12 Square Metre.
(b) A DECLARATION that the 3rd Defendant is the person exclusively entitled to the use and possession of the parcel of land
(c) A PERPETUAL ORDER of Injunction restraining the Plaintiff, her agents, servants, officers and successors- in- title from further interfering with the 3rd Defendant’s use and possession of the said parcel of land.

Before going into the appeal, below is a summary of the facts involved in this Appeal.

The 1st Respondent as Plaintiff at the trial Court, instituted this action claiming that in 2003, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents issued to it a Right of Occupancy and fees No. FCT/ABU/MISC over a parcel of land described as Plot 90 in sector B (B16), Jabi, Abuja, Plot HEA 1B within Sector Centre B District.

The Right of Occupancy was slated to expire in the year 2100. The said Right of Occupancy was issued by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents pursuant to the 1st Respondent’s application for a plot of land for hospital development.

The 1st Respondent claimed

that it paid all the relevant fees as required by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the Right of Occupancy Fees and Rents including the payment of One Million Eight Hundred Naira (N1,800,000) being part payment for the issuance of certificate of occupancy in respect of the said land and also applied for re-certification of the Right of occupancy as well as for building plan approval.

The 1st Respondent prepared the building plan for the project on the land and submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents on the 3rd of May 2003. However, sometime in August 2004, after the 1st Respondent orally demanded for the approval of its building plan, the 1st Respondent was shown a letter refusing the approval of its building plan and purported to have been in a file in the office of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents since June 2003.

The said refusal to approve the building plan of the 1st Respondent was on the ground that the purpose clause for the plot is commercial and that the 1st Respondent could only put up offices and shops which was clearly at variance with the purpose for which the 1st Respondent applied for the land which purpose was for building a hospital and

for which the land was granted by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents upon its application for same.

In view of this, the 1st Respondent claimed it resubmitted a new comprehensive design to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as requested by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. The 1st Respondent also claimed that in 2005, when the 2nd and 3rd Respondents began the process of recertification of Right of Occupancy, the 1st Respondent submitted its Right of Occupancy issued by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to AGIS recertification office, Abuja and a copy of the acknowledgement for recertification and reissuance of certificate of occupancy dated 28th February, 2005 was issued to the 1st respondent by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in favour of the 1st Respondent.

While waiting for the approval of the new comprehensive design plan, absence of which the 1st Respondent would not be able to build on the land, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents by a letter titled “NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF UNDEVELOPED PLOTS WITHIN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY” dated 15th June, 2006 revoked the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy over the described plot of land on the ground of continued

contravention of the terms of development of the Right of Occupancy.

The said Notice of Revocation was said to commence from the 29th day of September, 2005. The 1st Respondent further claimed that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents never gave it any grace period before its right of occupancy was revoked and that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not properly serve the said Notice of revocation terminating its right of occupancy neither was there any proof of service of the said Notice of Revocation.

Despite several appeals by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents upon the service of the Notice of Revocation on the 1st Respondent, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents refused to reinstate the 1st Respondent with the plot but instead, on the 25th of March, 2009, reallocated the said plot in dispute to the Appellant during the pendency of this suit.

The 1st Respondent at the trial Court opened its case on the 20th April, 2020 calling one witness who testified and tendered 12 Documents admitted and, marked as Exhibits PW1A – PW1M.

The 1st Respondent closed its case on the 9th March, 2016 and the matter was adjourned to 28th April, 2016 for

the defence to open its case.

The 2nd and 3rd Respondents opened their defence on the 31st May, 2016 and called one witness who testified and tendered one document, admitted and marked as Exhibit DW1A which was a Certified True Copy of a Newspaper Publication dated 1st January, 2005. The 1st and 2nd Respondents closed their case on 6th October, 2016.

The Appellant opened its defence on the 7th November, 2016, calling one witness; DW2 who testified and tendered 7 documents, admitted and marked exhibits.

The Appellant then closed its case on the 7th December, 2016 and the matter was adjourned to 21st February, 2017 for adoption of final written addresses, parties then filed and adopted their respective addresses on the 8th May, 2017.

After considering the evidence led by parties, the Learned Trial Judge, Honourable Justice A.O. Otaluka delivered judgment in the Suit No.FCT/HC/CV/666/2007 on the 6th July, 2017 wherein the trial judge granted judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated 3rd October, 2017 comprising of twelve grounds of appeal.

Only the Appellant and the 1st Respondent as parties in the appeal before this Court filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument.

In the Appellant’s brief of argument as settled by his counsel Sunny O. Ake, Esq. and dated 15th March, 2018 and filed 15th March, 2018, the following issues for determination were distilled from the grounds of appeal as follows:
1. Whether the finding of the lower Court, to the effect that the notice of revocation (Exhibit PW1K) which was issued by the 2nd Respondent, was not served on the 1st Respondent as required by law, is legally correct or justifiable, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding the express acknowledgment of receipt of the said Notice of Revocation by PW1 on behalf of the 1st Respondent? (Ground 9).
2. Whether the finding by the lower Court to the effect that the reason given by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the rejection of the initial building plan submitted to them for approval by the 1st Respondent, is not justifiable, is based or founded, on the facts that were pleaded and proved by parties before the Court? (Ground 1).

Whether the finding by the lower Court, to the effect that, the purpose clause described as “commercial” on the exhibit PW1H (offer of terms of Grant/ Conveyance of Approval dated 17th May 2001) also include a hospital was based on an issue that was joined by the parties in their respective pleadings to that effect before the Court? (Ground 2 and 3).
4. Whether it is right in law for the lower Court to have resorted to speculation and hypothesis, in holding that, hospital services come within the purpose clause of commercial activities as described in exhibit PW1H (Offer of terms of Grant/ Conveyance of Approval dated 17th May 2001) when such an issue was neither raised nor canvassed by the parties in their respective pleadings before the Court? (Ground 4).
5. Whether the learned trial judge was right to have held that he accepted the evidence of the 1st Respondent, to the effect that, the 1st Respondent actually submitted an amended version of the building plan for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ approval, when there is no iota of evidence adduced by the 1st respondent to that effect? (Ground 5).
6. Whether it is proper in law for the lower

Court to have willfully failed and or refused to make any pronouncement on the issue that was raised and canvassed before it by the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, to the effect that it was the willful failure of the 1st Respondent to discharge her financial obligations to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in respect of the offer of Right of occupancy granted to her by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was one of the reasons that led to the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s right of occupancy by the 2nd Respondent(Ground 6).
7. Whether the lower Court was right when it held that it was the unjustifiable refusal of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the 1st Respondent’s building plan that led to the non-development of the disputed plot of land when there is no evidence before the Court to show that the 1st Respondent ever challenged the rejection of her initial building plan by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents (Ground 7).
8. Whether the lower Court acted rightly when it ordered the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve forthwith the 1st Respondent’s “building plan with the amendments” when there is no scintilla of evidence

before the Court to show that such a building plan actually exists in the office of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents? (Ground 8).
9. Whether the finding of the lower Court, to the effect that, the 1st Respondent was not given any period of grace before the 1st Respondent’s right of occupancy over the disputed land was revoked by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents is justifiable, in view of the facts that were pleaded and proved by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents before the Court? (Ground 10).
10. Whether the unsigned judgment of the lower Court in respect of the 1st Respondent’s claims before it, is authentic, valid and enforceable? (Ground 11).
11. Whether the judgment of the lower Court in respect of the Appellant’s claim before it is justifiable or supportable, having regard to the facts that were pleaded and proved by the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents before the Court to that effect(Ground 12).

On issue one, the Appellant’s counsel submitted that in view of the express acknowledgment receipt of the said Notice of

Revocation by the PWI, who is the medical director and Chief Executive Director of the 1st Respondent, the finding of the Trial Court, to the effect that the said Notice of Revocation was not served on the 1st Respondent as required by law, cannot be justifiable or sustained.

In making his submission, the Appellant’s Counsel in paragraph 4.05 of the Appellant’s brief of argument submitted that from the evidence on record, the fact that the 1st Respondent duly received the Notice of revocation (PW1K) is not in doubt because according to PW1, the 1st Respondent, promptly wrote Exhibits PW1F and PW1G to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in reaction thereto and for a “reconsideration of the revocation”.

Therefore, since the 1st Respondent had expressly admitted receiving Exhibit PW1K from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, the duty of proving whether the said exhibits were actually received by the 1st Respondent, no longer lies on the shoulders of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. The Appellant’s Counsel cited Section 123 of the Evidence Act and the cases of; ADEKOYA JOMU & ANOR VS. IKORODU LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 394)

245 AT 269 PARA H.

The Learned Appellant Counsel also submitted that if the 1st Respondent had not expressly admitted in its pleadings, that it had actually or duly received the said Exhibit PW1K or if the 1st Respondent had denied receiving or seeing the said Exhibit PW1K, it is only then, that, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents would have had the evidential burden of proving that the said Exhibit PW1K was actually or duly received by the 1st Respondent but since the 1st Respondent had expressly admitted receiving the said Exhibit PWIK and had also promptly reacted thereto by writing Exhibits PW1F and PW1G to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are deemed to have discharged that evidential burden placed on them by law.

The Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the only complain of the 1st Respondent is that same was not properly and duly served and that since it is the 1st respondent that is alleging that Exhibit PW1K was not properly and duly served, the onus of proving the assertion squarely lies on the 1st Respondent as it is the party who pleads or asserts a fact that has the burden of proving it, except where the party

concerned can invoke any available presumption of the law in proof of alleged fact without the necessity for further proof thereof. Counsel cited Section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

The Appellant’s Counsel also submitted that it is the general rule that the burden of proof is not static; it shifts from one party to another and so on and so forth as the case may be, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, the burden of proving that Exhibit PW1K was not properly and duly served, lies on the 1st Respondent especially as it was the 1st respondent that received the said exhibit.

On Issues two and three which were argued together, the Appellant’s counsel submitted that there is nowhere in the statement of claim filed by the 1st Respondent where it stated that the reason given for the rejection of the approval of the building plan is unjustifiable and that the Court raised the issue of the rejection of the building plan submitted by the 1st Defendant suo motu and pronounced on it without giving parties the opportunity to address the Court.

The Appellant’s Counsel also submitted that the issue of whether the purpose

clause described as “commercial” on Exhibit PW1H (Offer of terms of grant/conveyance of approval dated 17th May, 2001) includes a hospital was also raised suo motu and pronounced on by the trial Court without giving opportunity to the parties to address the Court. Therefore, the Court has no power to violate the pleadings of parties and make a case for them contrary to their pleadings. Counsel cited the case of BALIOL NIG. LTD VS. NAVCON NIG. LTD (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 532) 1672 AT 1684 PARAS A – B.

In view of the foregoing, the Appellant’s counsel urged the Court to set aside the findings of the Court to the effect that the purpose clause described as “commercial” on Exhibit PW1H also include a hospital, was not based on an issue that was joined by parties in their respective pleadings.

On Issue four, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the trial Court delved into the realm of speculation and hypothesis, in reaching the conclusion and finding of the Court that hospital services falls within the purpose clause described as “commercial” in Exhibit PW1H.

The Appellant argued that the facts

pleaded and evidence adduced before the Court by the 1st Respondent before the trial Court is to the effect that upon the rejection of the initial building plan by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, the 1st Respondent then allegedly prepared and resubmitted a new set of building plan to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for approval and that the 1st Respondent did not insist that her initial building plan must be approved for her by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, nor did the 1st Respondent ever contended or stated in her pleadings before the Court, that hospital services falls within the purpose clause described as commercial.

The Appellant’s Counsel further argued that there is an unchallenged evidence of DW1 before the trial Court that an applicant or an allottee when allocated a plot of land which purpose clause is different from the one which the applicant applied for, can either reject the allocation or apply for change of the purpose clause. The Appellant’s Counsel therefore, submitted that the Court acted wrongly when it resorted to speculation and hypothesis in arriving at its finding. On this point, the Appellant’s counsel cited the case of

ODUBEKO VS. FOWLER (1993) 9SCNJ (PT. 11) 185 AT 196.

On issue five, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the trial Court shifted the burden of proving the fact that the 1st Respondent actually submitted an amended building plan for the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s approval, to the 2nd and 3rd Respondent instead of the 1st Respondent that owes the evidential burden of proving that particular fact. The Appellant’s counsel also argued that the PW1 under cross- examination stated that he does not have any letter or document to show to the Court that he actually submitted the purported amended version of the building plan to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for approval.

Therefore, it is the 1st Respondent that has the evidential burden of proving the actual submission of the purported amended version of the building plan to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for approval since an issue had been joined between the 1st Respondent and the 2nd and 3rd Respondent in this regard.

The Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the trial Court acted on speculation or on the unproved assertion of PW1 to arrive at its conclusion and finding of fact in this

regard and therefore, the decision of the trial Court is perverse and has occasioned miscarriage of justice. As there is no coherent or credible evidence placed before the Court to the effect that the 1st Respondent submitted an amended building plan for the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s approval.

On issue six, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that there is abundant evidence that was placed before the trial Court that the 1st Respondent failed to discharge her financial obligations to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents which is a valid and acceptable ground for the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy over the said plot of land and that the trial Court did not make any finding of fact on the alleged failure of the 1st Respondent to discharge its financial obligations towards the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as contained in Exhibit PW1H which issue was raised and canvassed by the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents before the trial Court. It is therefore clearly reprehensible for the trial Court to assist the 1st Respondent to ultimately enjoy the benefits of the contract which the 1st Respondent has unilaterally violated its terms

and conditions.

The Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents has the constitutional right to have every material aspect of the case which he has brought to be considered by the Court. The Appellant’s counsel referred the Court to the case of ONIFADE VS. OLAYIWOLA (1990) 11 – 12 S.C. 1 AT 20.

The Appellant’s Counsel further submitted that the judgment of the trial Court is defective for its failure or neglect to resolve this vital issue placed before the Court for determination by the parties and therefore, this Court is entitled to intervene and set aside the said Judgment. The Appellant’s Counsel cited the case of ATANDA VS. AJANI (1989) 6 SC (PT. 11) 87 AT 110 LINES 22 – 35.

On Issue 7, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that it is not on record that the 1st Respondent challenged the reason for the rejection of her building plan by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. Therefore, the trial Court took into consideration, extraneous matters in arriving at its conclusion and findings that it was the unjustifiable refusal of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the building

plan of the 1st Respondent without which the 1st Respondent cannot commence any development on the plot, that led to the non-development of the plot. So, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents cannot turn around to revoke the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy for its failure to develop the plot.

The Appellant’s Counsel cited the case of UNOKAN ENT. LTD & ANOR VS. CHIEF P.O OMUVWIE & ANOR (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 262) 501 AT 518 PARAS C – D and further urged this Court to set aside the conclusion and findings of the trial Court as same is not founded on any pleading or relief sought by the 1st Respondent.

On issue eight, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the trial Court did not specify which of the building plans is to be approved by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as it is on record that the initial building plan that was submitted by the 1st Respondent to the 2nd and 3rd Respondent for approval was rejected for violating the purpose clause in respect of which the plot was granted to the 1st Respondent and subsequently the 1st Respondent allegedly re-submitted new comprehensive designs to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as requested.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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The Appellant’s Counsel therefore submitted, that the order of the trial Court is incapable of being obeyed or enforced as there is nothing like building plan with amendments as referred to in the judgment of the trial Court as the Court cannot make an order in vain and where a Court order is nebulous or vague, the appellate Court is entitled to set it aside.

On Issue Nine, the Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent did not deny paragraph 21 of the statement of defence filed by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents yet the trial Court could come up with the conclusion that the 1st Respondent was entitled to a prior notice stating the reason for which its Right of Occupancy was revoked before the eventual revocation if the breach complained of was not remedied. The Appellant’s Counsel further argued that it was very wrong for the trial Court to draw wrong inference from established facts to apply wrong principles to such established facts and that when such occurs, the Appellate Court is entitled to interfere to right the wrong done by the trial Court by setting aside such wrong inferences or conclusions that are not based on

pleaded facts before the Court. On this point, the Appellant’s Counsel cited the case of SPASCO VEHICLE AND PLANT HIRE CO LTD VS. ALRAINE NIG LIMITED (1995) 8NWLR (PT. 416) 655 AT 299.

The Appellant’s counsel argued that despite the presence of Exhibit DW1A before the trial Court which is a certified Newspaper publication of the Notice of revocation of undeveloped plots dated 1st day of January, 2005, which was tendered by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to establish the period of grace given to the 1st Respondent and other defaulters, the trial Court still held that there is no evidence before the Court to establish the fact that a period of grace alluded to in Exhibit PW1K was given to the 1st Respondent which shows that the Court did not accord any evidential value to the said Exhibit DW1A.

On issue ten, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the trial Court failed to sign and date its judgment in respect of the 1st Respondent’s claim but only signed and dated the Judgment in respect of the Appellant’s counter-claim before it. The Appellant’s Counsel further argued that the judgment in respect of the 1st Respondent’s claim and the

Appellant’s counter claim are two distinct judgments and should be signed and dated separately as required by law and that the law is that every judgment should be signed and dated by a Judge who delivers it if not, any such unsigned Judgment cannot be said to be authentic. The Appellant’s Counsel referred the Court to the case of AREGBESOLA VS. OYINLOLA (2011) 9 NWLR (PT. 1253) 458 AT 536 PARAS D – G.

On issue eleven, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the Appellant’s Counter claim was not considered on its merit but the trial Court proceeded on the premise that the right of occupancy that was granted to the 1st Respondent by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents over the disputed land still subsists following the alleged irregularities in the issuance and service of the Revocation Notice that was issued by the 2nd Respondent and served on the 1st Respondent.

The Appellant’s Counsel further argued that the trial Court only chose the aspect of the 1st Respondent’s defence against the Appellant’s counter-claim and cleverly glossed over all the facts that were pleaded by both the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents

in support of the Appellant’s counter-claim. In order words, the failure of the trial Court to consider the facts and evidence that was adduced by the Appellant in support of her counter-claim is tantamount to a denial of the right of the Appellant to fair hearing in relation to her counter-claim which would result in the nullification of the Court’s Judgment. The Appellant’s Counsel referred the Court to the case of ONIFADE VS. OLAYIWOLA (1990) 11 – 12 S.C. 1 AT 20 and urged the Court to set aside the Judgment of the trial Court in respect of the Appellant’s Counter-Claim.

On the other hand, the 1st Respondent filed its brief of argument dated 16th July, 2018 and filed on 18th July, 2018 settled by its Counsel, Nwachukwu, Esq. and raised Nine(9) issues for determination. They are:
1. Whether the trial Court was right in holding that Exhibit PW1K (Notice of revocation) was not served on the 1st Respondent as required by law? (Distilled from ground 9).
2. Whether the trial Court was right in holding that the reason given by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in rejecting the 1st Respondent’s building plan

approval is not justifiable, is based on the facts that were pleaded and proved by the parties before Court. (Distilled from ground 1)
3. Whether the trial Court was right in interpreting hospital services to come under “commercial” purposes for the purpose of arriving at its final decision? (Distilled from Grounds 2, 3 and 4).
4. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that he accepted the evidence of the 1st Respondent, to the effect that the 1st Respondent actually submitted an amended version of the building plan for the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s approval? (Ground 5).
5. Whether the trial Court had in its findings willfully failed and refused to make any pronouncements on the issue raised by the 2nd and 3rd Respondent with respect to its reason for revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy? (Distilled from Ground 6).
6. Whether the lower Court was right when it held that it was the unjustifiable refusal of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the 1st Respondent’s building plan that led to the non-development of the disputed plot of land. (Distilled from Ground 7).

Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the 1st Respondent was not given any period of grace by the 2nd and 3rd respondent before its Right of Occupancy was revoked? (Distilled from Ground 10).
8. Whether the Judgment of the Trial Court is valid and enforceable? (Distilled from Ground 11).
9. Whether the judgment of the lower Court in respect of the Appellant’s counter-claim before it, is justifiable or supportable? (Ground 12).

On issue one, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued in response to the argument of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the issue whether the revocation Notice was valid, duly served and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Use Act formed the basis in the overall determination of this case. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued that the mode of service of the revocation notice on the 1st Respondent is unknown to law and in clear violation of Section 44(d) of the Land Use Act and that such notice is required by the law to be served by a prescribed means on an incorporated Company of which category the 1st Respondent belongs and that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not present any

evidence to show that any revocation notice was served on the 1st Respondent in accordance with the provision of the Land Use Act.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel also argued citing the case of OSHO VS. FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (1991) 4 NWLR (PT. 184) 157 that it is a laid down principle that any revocation notice not served in accordance with the procedures laid down by law will be rendered invalid and therefore null and void.

It was further argued that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not adduce any other evidence as to service to show that they had complied with the provisions of the law. Also, the case of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was made worse when on the face of the Notice of Revocation, it was clearly stated to have retroactive effect from the 29th day of September, 2005 while it was received and dated 15th Day of June, 2006, Eight months before it was issued.

The 1st Respondent’s counsel also argued that Section 28(7) of the Land Use Act never contemplated such retroactive effect. Therefore, the trial Court was right in holding that Exhibit PW1K was not served properly as required by law after a careful perusal of the said

Notice of Revocation, facts and evidence presented before the trial Court.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued issues two and three together. In arguing the said issues, Counsel submitted in response to the argument of the Appellant’s Counsel, that it has always been the case of the 1st Respondent ab initio that it submitted an application for land (Exhibit PW1M) for the sole purpose of developing a hospital and that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents considered the 1st Respondent’s application for land to build a hospital and thereafter allotted plot 90 in sector Centre B (B16) under the purpose clause “commercial”.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel further argued that the trial Court in considering whether the said Notice of Revocation was issued in compliance with the law looked into the reason which the 1st Respondent proffered for its delay in development of the said plot, the sole reason adduced for which the 2nd and 3rd Respondents revoked the 1st Respondent’s right of occupancy. The reason for the delay being that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not approve its initial building plan since it didn’t comply

with the “commercial” purpose for which it was granted.

It was also argued that it is only logical that since the 1st Respondent’s application for Land was stated to be for the building of a hospital, when it was offered a plot, it assumed that hospital services came under “commercial” purposes and that was why it quickly drew up a building plan for a hospital and in considering the justification of the reason given by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, the trial Court further defined the meaning of commercial which simply means a public place where service is rendered for consideration, which obviously includes a hospital.

On Issue Four, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that by virtue of Section 137 of the Evidence Act, the 1st burden of proof in civil cases is on a party who asserts a fact to prove same and that the standard of proof required is on a preponderance of evidence and balance of probabilities. The 1st Respondent’s counsel also argued that when DW1 was confronted with whether the 2nd and 3rd Respondents actually received another building plan from the 1st Respondent, he stated that he would not

know since it is another department that handles building plan approvals, this leaves the evidence of the 1st Respondent unchallenged.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel also submitted that the evidence of DW1 under cross examination was that he wouldn’t know whether the 1st Respondent actually submitted a building plan to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents which is at variance with the averment in the statement of defence of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents where they denied receiving same. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel cited the case of EMEGOKWUE VS. OKADIGBO (1973) 8 NSCC 220 AT PAGE 222.

On Issue Five, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued in response to the Appellant’s argument, that from the evidence before the trial Court, the only reason stated on the Notice of Revocation is the non-development of the plot. The Respondent’s Counsel further argued that Exhibit PW1K is very clear on this, therefore gives no room for speculation or imputation of any other reason(s) as rightly held by the trial Court.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted citing the case of GOVERNOR OF OGUN STATE VS. MR. ADEGBOYEGA ADEBOLA COKER (2008)

ALL FWLR (406) that where a document is clear, the operative words in it are to be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning. One is not to read into the document, what is not there. A document duly pleaded and tendered once admitted is the best evidence of its content and therefore speaks for itself.

It is also argued by the 1st Respondent’s Counsel that the PW1K clearly shows that the sole reason for the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy was for non-development of the plot which is in contradiction with the contention of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents that the 1st Respondent failed to pay the requisite fees to them which reason is not tenable, as the reason for the 1st Respondent’s delay in developing the plot was as a result of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents refusal to approve its building plan application.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel further argued that there is nowhere in the Statutory Right of occupancy bill where it was stated that failure to pay the required fees will result in revocation of its right rather, it was clearly stated that the certificate of occupancy in respect of the right of

occupancy will not be issued until the amount due to government is paid. The 1st Respondent’s counsel cited the case of C.S.S. BOOKSHOPS LTD VS. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN RIVERS STATE & 3 ORS (2006) 11 NWLR (PT.992) P. 577 – 578 PARA A – B.

On Issue Six, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued that it was the case of the 1st Respondent that the delay in commencing the building on the allocated plots was wholly caused by the deliberate delay by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the building plans of the 1st respondent and by virtue of Section 7(1) of the Federal Capital Development Act 1976 cap F6 Vol. 6 Law of the Federation 2004, the 1st Respondent cannot commence any development of the plot without the approval of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

It is also argued by the 1st Respondent Counsel that the DW1 under cross-examination confirmed that in the letter of rejection of the 1st Respondent’s initial building plan, the 2nd and 3rd respondents advised the 1st Respondent to resubmit another building plan with amendments for their approval.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel further argued in

response to the submission of the Appellant’s Counsel that the trial Court did not take into consideration the effect of the willful failure of the 1st Respondent to discharge her financial obligation as a reason for the non-approval of the 1st Respondent’s building plan and submitted that the argument of the Appellant’s Counsel is misconceived and baseless as there is nowhere in the 2nd and 3rd Respondents pleading or in evidence orally or documentary placed before the trial Court, where the 1st Respondent contended the failure of payment of any amount as ground for refusing to approve the 1st Respondent’s initial building plan as such to warrant the consideration of the trial Court. More so, the only reason stated on the letter of rejection was that the purpose clause for the plot was commercial. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel cited the case of EMEGOKWUE VS.OKADIGBO (1973) 4SC 113.

On Issue Seven, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued that there was no evidence that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents gave any period of grace as the only purported period of grace they claimed to have given was the notice in the newspaper

publication which has no basis in law. The 1st Respondent cited the case of JEGEDE VS. CITICOM NIG. LTD (2001) 3 W.R.N. P.1

Also citing the case of OSHO VS. FOREIGN FINANCE CORPORATION (1991) 4 NWLR (PT.184) P.157, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that there is no place for service of a Revocation Notice as enshrined in Section 14 of the Land Use Act by publication in a newspaper. Therefore, the service of the Notice of Revocation by way of Exhibit DW1K1 is not in compliance with the law.

On Issue Eight, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued that it is rather mischievous for the Appellant to argue that the judgment of the lower Court is unsigned, invalid and therefore unenforceable. That the Appellant filed a Motion for stay of execution of the judgment at the trial Court and a Notice of Appeal challenging the decision of the learned trial judge and has now turned around to urge this Honourable Court to declare the said judgment invalid and unenforceable on the grounds that the learned trial Judge signed at the foot of the judgment of the counter claim which formed part of the judgment of the lower Court in the 1st Respondent’s

suit.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the Appellant is only setting a booby trap for your lordships as the Appellant in one breathe is appealing the decision of the trial Court and in another breathe arguing that the same judgment it appealed against is unenforceable therefore speaking from two sides of its mouth. The 1st Respondent’s Counsel further submitted that the Appellant’s Counsel who procured the judgment did not notify the registrars of the Court even after compiling the records of appeal and apply for a supplementary record to be filed after regularizing the document.

On issue nine, the 1st Respondent’s Counsel argued that the case of the counter-claimant at the trial Court was for declaration of title in respect of the same plot 90 in Sector Centre B(B16) Jabi, the subject matter of the 1st Respondent’s case and the trial Court carefully considered all the facts, issues and evidences placed before it by parties before arriving at its decision on both the 1st Respondent’s case and the counter-claim of the Appellant.

The 1st Respondent’s Counsel also submitted that in the evidence

under cross-examination, the Appellant’s witness admitted having knowledge of the pendency of this suit before the purported allocation of the land to the Appellant. The Appellant’s sole witness further stated that the land was allocated to the Appellant in 2009 and the Appellant commenced payment in 2011 and that building approval was issued to the Appellant long before the Appellant commenced payment of bills on the plot. He also confirmed that the Certificate of Occupancy was yet to be issued to the Appellant.

It was also submitted that the trial Court after painstakingly considering the facts, evidences and issues raised, it found that the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy over Plot 90 in Sector Centre B(B16). Jabi, Abuja was not executed in accordance with the provisions of the Land Use Act and subsequently held that the purported revocation is null and void, the resultant effect being that the 1st Respondent’s right and interest over the said plot 90 in Sector Centre B(B16) Jabi, Abuja remains unrevoked and is still subsisting.

Citing the case of NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY VS. PANALPINA WORLD TRANSPORT (NIG) LTD

(1973)1 ALL NLR (PT.1), the 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the phrase “illegal, null, void and of no effect is a compendious legal jargon by which acts done or steps taken by a party wrongly are characterized and apart from the claim of illegality which implies that the act or step was done or taken contrary to the relevant law, the other words collectively connote a state of actual nullity and a state of legal no-existence.

The 1st Respondent’s counsel in conclusion cited the case of HOLMAN VS. JOHNSON (175)7 COWP. 341: 98 E.R. 1120 and submitted that it is the general principle which is founded on public policy that any transaction that is tainted by illegality in which both parties are equally involved is beyond the face of the law as no person can claim any right or remedy whatsoever under an illegal transaction in which he has participated and no Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.

Having summarized the arguments of counsel, I wish to adopt the issues raised by the Appellant herein, and will address the issues thereon.

ISSUE ONE
Whether the finding of the lower Court, to the effect that, the Notice of Revocation (Exhibit PW1K) which was issued by the 2nd Respondent, was not served on the 1st Respondent as required by law, is legally correct or justifiable, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding the express acknowledgment of receipt of the said Notice of Revocation by PW1 on behalf of the 1st Respondent? (Ground 9).

There are two legs to this issue. The first is whether the Notice of Revocation issued by the 2nd Respondent was actually served and received by the 1st Respondent. The second is whether the said Notice of Revocation dated 15th June, 2006 was issued in line with the provisions of the law having being stated to take effect from 29th September, 2005.

In addressing the first leg, one question comes to mind: What is the purpose of service of a Notice of Revocation?

The purpose of giving a Notice of Revocation of Right of Occupancy is to duly inform the holder thereof of the steps being taken to extinguish his right of occupancy. In the absence of a Notice of Revocation of Right of Occupancy, it follows that any purported revocation of the right of

occupancy is ineffectual.

What is to be established first of all is whether there was service of the said Notice of Revocation on the 1st Respondent by the 2nd Respondent and 3rd Respondent.
In addressing the question, reference would be made to the pleadings of the parties, evidence before the trial Court and the briefs of Argument filed by parties before this Court and bearing in mind that this question has to do with whether the 1st Respondent actually received the Notice of Revocation issued by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents and not as to the form of the said Notice of Revocation.
In Paragraph 12 of the statement of claim filed by the 1st Respondent at the trial Court, it stated inter alia:
“… the 1st and 2nd Defendants turned around by means of a letter titled “NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF UNDEVELOPED PLOTS WITHIN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY” dated 15th day of June 2006 to purport to revoke the Plaintiff’s Right of Occupancy over the said plot of land…”
The 1st Respondent also pleaded the said document which was tendered through the 1st Respondent’s witness, admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit PW1K.

Also, in paragraph 4.5 of the 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument, it is clear that the 1st Respondent does not deny knowledge of the Notice of Revocation of its Right of Occupancy by the 2nd Respondent but contests the mode of service of the said Notice of Revocation.
The 1st Respondent in paragraph 14 of its Statement on Oath stated thus:
“The Plaintiff upon receiving the said Notice (which was not properly and duly served), wrote an appeal to the Defendants for a reconsideration of the revocation ….”
The aforementioned averment clearly shows that the 1st Respondent did not only receive the said Notice of Revocation, it also started acting on the information therein to appeal to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for a reconsideration of the revocation.
It is also worthy of note to consider the evidence of PW1 at pages 274 and 274 of the Record of Appeal wherein he stated during cross-examination thus:
“…What date did you receive the notice of revocation?
PW1: I was not served any notice until I heard of it and I went to Mr. Mainasara and he now gave me a copy of the letter I heard about the

revocation of my plot in the premises of Development control. It was news among the people talking.
“…What day did you hear this?
PW1: That was around 15th June, 2006, and that was the day I received a copy of Exh PW1K.” (Emphasis mine).
It is very clear from the afore-stated response of the PW1 that he received the Notice of Revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy from the 2nd Respondent.
The Supreme Court in the case of NLEWEDIM VS. UDUMA (1995) 6 NWLR (PT. 402) 383, 394 held that where it is alleged that a document was delivered to a person who denies receiving such document, proof of delivery to such person can be established by:- (a) dispatch book indicating receipt; or (b) evidence of dispatch by registered post; or (c) evidence of witness, credible enough that the person was served with the document.” (emphasis mine)
In as much as I agree with the submission of the 1st Respondent’s Counsel that it is the provision of the law by virtue of Section 44(d) of the Land Use Act which prescribes for the mode of service of Notice of Revocation of Right of Occupancy on a company of which category

the 1st Respondent belongs thus:
“Any notice required by this Act to be served on any person shall be effectively served on him…
d) In case of an incorporated company or body, by delivering it to the secretary or clerk of the company or body at its registered or principal office or sending it in a prepaid registered letter addressed to the secretary or clerk of the company or body at that office.”
It is also important to state that the application of our laws cannot continue to thrive on technicalities. The heydays of technicalities are gone forever. The Court is now more interested in doing substantial justice than relying on technicalities which can only lead to injustice. The judicial process malfunctions and is discredited when it is bogged down by technicality and is manipulated to go from technicality to technicality and thrives on technicality. That is why at all times, the tendency towards technicality should be eschewed and the determination to do substantial justice should remain the preferred option and hallmark of the judicial system.
In this case, the resultant effect of the 1st Respondent’s contention that

the Notice of Revocation of its grant of Right of Occupancy over the disputed land was not served in the actual sense of it receiving the said Notice, if followed to its logical conclusion, would amount to a technical justice or a knock out, rather than the modern trend in the Courts of ensuring that substantial justice is done to all comers to the Courts.
The 1st Respondent has admitted in both its pleadings, evidence and brief of argument before this Court that it received the said Notice of Revocation from the 2nd Respondent. I therefore agree with the argument of the Appellant’s counsel in paragraph 4.05 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument that any fact pleaded need no further proof:
“It is trite that a crucial fact which is admitted needs no further proof and same would be taken as established. See: Agbanelo v. U.B.N. Ltd (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 666) 534 at 549; Edokpolo & Co. Ltd. v. Ohenhen (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 358) 511 at 519.” Per Fabiyi. J.S.C. (Pp. 24 – 25, paras. G – A)
It would therefore, amount to injustice if this Court should find in favour of the 1st Respondent that the Notice of Revocation was not duly and

properly served and received as is the case of the 1st Respondent. I am disappointed to say the least that the 1st Respondent’s Counsel can argue in his brief that the Notice of Revocation was not properly and duly received by the 1st Respondent. As Counsel, it is expected to always act rightly as minister in the temple of justice and advance the course of justice. The 1st Respondent received the said Notice of Revocation and went ahead to write two letters dated 16th of June 2006 and 18th September, 2006 marked as Exhibit PW1F and Exhibit PW1G appealing to the 2nd Respondent for reconsideration against the revocation of the disputed plot which fact amounts to an acknowledgment of the receipt of the said Notice of Revocation from the 2nd Respondent. Will it then not amount to blowing hot and cold, for the 1st Respondent to argue that it did not receive the said Notice of Revocation but responded to same vide the two letters dated 16th June, 2006 and 18th September, 2006? I would have understood if the 1st Respondent refused to receive the said Notice of Revocation from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ office when it was given to him and also did not go

ahead to respond to same.
The 1st Respondent cannot receive the said Notice of Revocation and then turn to say it was not duly and properly served by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
I agree with the submission of the Appellant’s Counsel in Paragraph 4.05 of its Brief of Argument that the fact that the 1st Respondent actually received the Notice of Revocation from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents is not in doubt as from the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the 1st Respondent actually received the Notice of Revocation from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
It is my strong and unshaken view therefore, that the 1st Respondent was served the said Notice of Revocation and it was received by it. Therefore, the learned trial Judge was wrong when it held in page 25 of its Judgment at page 329 of the Record of Appeal that there is no evidence before the Court that Exhibit PW1K (Which was also tendered through the 1st Respondent’s witness and admitted in evidence) or any Revocation Notice was served on the 1st Respondent in the manner stated in Section 44(d) of the Land Use Act.

This Issue is hereby resolved in favour of the

Appellant.

The Second leg is on whether the said Notice of Revocation dated 15th June, 2006 was issued in line with the provisions of the law having being stated to take effect from 29th September, 2005.
Let me examine the argument of the 1st Respondent’s Counsel on this point. The 1st Respondent argued in paragraph 4.12 that the case of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was made worse when on the face of the Notice of Revocation it was clearly stated to have retroactive effect from 29th day of September, 2005 while it was received and dated the 15th day of June, 2006, 8 months before it was issued.
This further draws my attention to examine Exhibit PW1B which is the said Notice of Revocation. Looking clearly at the document, it is dated 15th June, 2006 and the second paragraph reads thus:
“…Please note also that the revocation took effect from the 29th September, 2005.”
From the wordings above, it is clear that the Revocation of the grant of certificate of occupancy had even taken place before the date it was issued by the 2nd Respondent and received by the 1st Respondent. I agree with the 1st Respondent’s Counsel

that the Land Use Act never contemplated such retroactive effect.
A curious look at Section 28(7) of the Land Use Act which provides inter alia:
“the title holder of a right of occupancy shall extinguish on the receipt by him of a Notice given under subsection (5) of this section or on such later date as may be stated on the Notice” (Emphasis mine).
The wordings of the Land Use Act as emphasized above, do not contemplate a date that has passed but instead, a date upon receipt of the said Notice of Revocation or on a future date.
It is trite that when words of statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their clear and ordinary meaning. See the case of UBN LTD VS. SAX (NIG.) LTD (1994) LPELR-3390(SC) wherein the Supreme Court per Adio, JSC (P. 18, paras A – D) reiterated as follows:
“When a document is clear, the operative words in it should be given their simple and ordinary grammatical meaning. Further, the general rule is that when the words of any instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves and when the circumstances of the case have not created any doubt or difficulty as to the proper

application of the words to claimants under the instrument or the subject matter to which the instrument relates, such an instrument is always to be construed according to the strict, plain and common meaning of the words themselves.”
It is therefore my considered view and I agree with the Judgment of the learned trial Judge in page 330 of the Record of Appeal that the Land Use Act did not contemplate retroactive effect of a Notice of Revocation of a grant of Right of Occupancy. Therefore, the said Notice of Revocation is not in line with the requirement as stipulated in Section 28(7) of the Land Use Act.

The issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

ISSUES TWO, THREE AND FOUR
Whether the finding by the lower Court, to the effect that the reason given by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the rejection of the initial building plan submitted to them for approval by the 1st Respondent, is not justifiable, is based or founded, on facts that were pleaded and proved by the parties before the Court (Ground 1)
AND
Whether the finding by the lower Court, to the effect that the purpose clause described as

“commercial” on Exhibit PW1H (Offer of terms/Grant Conveyance of Approval dated 17th May 2001) also include a hospital, was based on an issue that was joined by the parties in their respective pleadings to that effect before the Court? (Grounds 2 and 3).
AND
Whether it is right in law, for the lower Court to have resorted to speculation and hypothesis, in holding that, hospital services come within the purpose clause of commercial activities as described in exhibit PW1H (Offer of terms of Grant/ Conveyance of Approval dated 17th May 2001) when such an issue was neither raised nor canvassed by the parties in their respective pleadings before the Court? (Ground 4).

I will address issues two, three and four together as it is my view that they flow from each other.
Before I address this issue, it is important to define the meaning of “Evidence”. According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, evidence is “any species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the trial of issue, by an act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, concrete objects etc for the purpose

of inducing belief in the minds of the Court or jury as to their contention.
This definition therefore means that the evidence the Court considers in arriving at its judgment in a matter includes pleadings exchanged between parties, evidence during cross examination of witnesses and documents before the Court etc.

The Appellant in paragraph 4.16 of its brief of argument argued that there was nowhere in the writ of summons and the pleadings filed by the 1st Respondent before the trial Court, where it expressly prayed or asked the Court to declare the reason for the rejection of the 1st Respondent’s initial building plan as unjustifiable and therefore the trial Court raised the said issue suo motu.

The 1st Respondent in paragraph 4 of its Amended Statement of claim averred that:
“The Plaintiff, desirous to move its hospital operations from Lagos to Abuja in response to then persistent national calls for movement to Abuja, had in 2000 applied for allocation of land in Abuja for the development of a hospital complex. A copy of the payment receipt for the land application form issued by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to the Plaintiff is

hereby pleaded and a copy annexed to this statement of claim.” (emphasis mine).

The payment for the said application form was also tendered, admitted through the Plaintiff’s witness and marked as Exhibit PW1A.

During the cross-examination of the DW1 at pages 280 of the Record of Appeal, the said DW1 confirmed that the 1st Respondent submitted an application for the land in dispute and the purpose for which the application was made was for the building of hospital….
“…Have you seen the application letter of the Plaintiff for the land in question?
DW1: Yes, I saw the application in my office.
Uche (SAN): Have a look at PW1M and confirm.
DW1: Yes, it is.
Uche (SAN): In column 8, what is the purpose stated there?
PW1: Hospital
Uche (SAN): The minister granted the land based on the application form PW1M.
DW1: Yes, the application was approved and granted as at that time.” (emphasis Mine)

Also, Exhibit PW1M which is also before the Court clearly shows that the application for the disputed land was for the building of a hospital by the 1st Respondent. It is also clearly

shown that the disputed land was offered to the 1st Respondent through Exhibit PW1H.

It is trite law that documents speak for itself, and one cannot read into the text what is not contained therein” See the case of AHMED VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2013) 11 NWLR (PT. 1365) 352 AT 374 PARAGRAPHS A – C.

Also, an admission against interest is admissible and needs no further proof. See AYOKE VS. BELLO (1992) 10 NWLR (PT.218) 380.

It is therefore clear that from the evidence before the Court by virtue of Exhibit PW1M and Exhibit PW1H, and the evidence of DW1 during cross-examination, the 1st Respondent applied for a land to build a hospital and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents further allocated a plot of land for the said purpose.

I therefore wonder how the same 2nd and 3rd Respondents who allocated the disputed land to the 1st Respondent would then turn around to reject the building plan submitted by the 1st Respondent on the ground that the purpose clause for the allocation of the said land to the 1st Respondent is “commercial”.

A Court is entitled to consider all the documents placed before it in arriving at its decision.

A consideration of documents placed before a Court for its perusal, cannot in my view amount to raising issue suo motu without giving counsel opportunity to address the Court on the issue, as argued by learned counsel for the Appellant. See the following cases: AKINOLA VS. V.C UNILORIN (2004) 11 NWLR (PT. 885) 616; BADEJO VS. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (1996) 8 NWLR (PT. 464) 15.
Also, in the case of EHIRIM VS. IMO STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2012) LPELR-9723(SC), the Supreme Court per Mukhtar, JSC reiterated thus:
”It is elementary law that Courts are bound by the materials before them, and they are not allowed to go beyond or outside what has been placed before them.”
I agree with the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent that it has always been the case of the 1st Respondent that it submitted an application for land for the sole purpose of developing a hospital and that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents considered the said application and allocated the disputed land to the 1st Respondent.
From the afore-said therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the reason given by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for the

rejection of the initial building plan submitted by the 1st Respondent is unjustifiable was not raised suo motu but was upon consideration of the evidence and materials placed before the Court. This Issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

I do not wish to dwell so much on Issue four, whether the issue as to whether the finding of the trial Court that the purpose clause described as “Commercial” also include a hospital was based on issue joined by parties in their respective pleadings as I do not agree with the submission of the Appellant’s Counsel that the findings of the trial Court in this regard was not based on issues joined by the parties.

construed and should be given their ordinary and plain meaning unless, of course, circumstance, such as trade usage or the like, dictate that a particular construction ought to be applied in order to give, effect to the particular intention envisaged by the parties.”
Just as I have stated earlier on, the trial Court is at liberty to consider any document that is before it and in doing so the Court can exercise its duty of interpretation of such documents before it to arrive at a just determination.

I agree with the Learned Trial Judge that the operation of a hospital has to do with the rendering of medical services for profit and it is only logical and evident that the operation of a hospital comes within the ambit of commercial activity except however the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had another reason for rejecting the initial building plan submitted by the 1st Respondent which is clearly not so. This issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

I also do not wish to over flog the Issue four as same has been considered under issues two and three, this issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.
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ISSUES FIVE AND SEVEN
Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right to have held that he accepted the evidence of the 1st Respondent to the effect that the 1st Respondent actually submitted an amended version of a building plan for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ approval, when there is no iota of evidence adduced by the 1st Respondent to that effect? (Ground 5).
AND
Whether the lower Court was right when it held that it was the unjustifiable refusal of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the 1st Respondent’s building plan that led to the the non-development of the disputed plot of land when there is no evidence before the Court to show that the 1st Respondent ever challenged the rejection of her initial building plan by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents (Ground 7).

I would address issues five and seven together as I have examined both issues and it is my considered view that the determination of issue five will rub off on the consideration of issue seven.

In addressing issue five, it would be important to look at both the pleadings of parties and the evidence adduced.

In Paragraph 10 of the Amended Statement of claim, the 1st Respondent stated that

it submitted new Comprehensive designs to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as requested after they rejected the initial building plan submitted by the 1st Respondent thus:
“Nevertheless, after weeks of consultations and meetings, the 1st and 2nd Defendants asked the Plaintiff to submit a comprehensive plan for 60% development of the plot upon which approval would be granted. The Plaintiff promptly re-submitted new comprehensive designs to the 1st and 2nd Defendants as requested. The 2nd Defendant’s officers of the Development control unit began work on the plans and said they needed time to effect some adjustments.” (Emphasis Mine)

The 2nd and 3rd Respondents on the other hand, denied in their statement of defence contained in page 82 of the Record of Appeal at Paragraph 12 of its Statement of defence thus:
“…the Plaintiff never re-submitted a proper and recommended plan for reconsideration by the 1st and 2nd Defendants Development Control office.”

These statements when examined, shows that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not deny the fact that they requested the 1st Respondent to resubmit a building plan

for reconsideration but the issue here is that the 1st Respondent never resubmitted another building plan for their recommendation.

During the cross-examination of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ witness at page 271 of the Record of Appeal, the said witness did not dispute the fact that after the initial building plan of the 1st Respondent was rejected, the 1st Respondent was advised by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to redesign the building plan but he would not know if the 1st Respondent re-designed the building plan and submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents thus:
“…By the letter, the Plaintiff was advised to redesign the building Plan to now build offices or shops, or both instead of a hospital.
DW1: I believe so.
…I put it to you that the Plaintiff took the advice and redesigned the plan and submitted to FCDA
DW1: I would not know because it is a different department that handles building plan. (Emphasis Mine).

Even though the 1st Respondent in his pleadings stated that it promptly re-submitted new comprehensive designs to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as requested, and maintained the same position during

cross-examination of the PW1 by both the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, there is no document before the Court to prove that the said new-redesign building plan was submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. It is also important to reproduce the evidence of the PW1 in pages 274 and 276 of the Record of Appeal. On page 274, PW1 during cross-examination was asked “when your building plan was rejected you submitted a new one” to which he answered “Yes I did”. While on page 276 when he was asked “do you have any document acknowledging the receipt of these fresh designs?” he answered “I do not have”. (Emphasis Mine)

It is my strong view that pleadings not supported by evidence goes to no issue. The Supreme Court in the case of MOHAMMED VS. KLARGESTER NIGERIA LTD (2002) LPELR-1897(SC) per Iguh, JSC (P. 23, paras. B – C) reiterated thus:
“Facts pleaded but not supported by evidence go to no issue and must similarly be discountenanced.”

In the same vein, I agree with the argument of the Appellant’s Counsel that it is the 1st Respondent that had the evidential burden of proving the

actual submission of the purported amended version of the building Plan to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents for approval. It is trite that he who asserts must prove. Section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011 also provides that whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. Because of the nature of the instant assertion that it submitted a new re-designed building plan, the 1st Respondent is obliged to prove its assertion by good and substantial evidence.

From the afore-mentioned therefore, I do not agree with the Learned trial Judge in his judgment at page 334 of the Record of Appeal wherein it accepted the evidence of the 1st Respondent that he submitted an amended version of the building plan for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ approval as the 1st Respondent did not only fail to provide evidence in support of the fact that it actually submitted the new re-designed building plan, it also failed vehemently to discharge the evidential burden placed on it. I would like to say that the Court is not a magician to conjure in the air and provide evidence

which the 1st Respondent did not himself provide. This issue is thus resolved in favour of the Appellant.

On issue seven, having held that there is no evidence before this Honourable Court to show that the 1st Respondent submitted a new redesigned building plan, I do not agree with the judgment of the trial Court on page 333 that it was the failure of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the building plan of the 1st Respondent that led to the non-development of the plot. The 1st Respondent in his evidence agreed that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents requested that he submits a new building plan which the 1st Respondent never showed any evidence before the trial Court that it submitted same. This issue is therefore resolved in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE SIX
Whether it is proper in law for the lower Court to have willfully failed and or refused to make pronouncement on the issue that was raised and canvassed before it by the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, to the effect that it was the willful failure of the 1st Respondent to discharge her financial obligations to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in respect of the offer of Right of

Occupancy granted to her by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was one of the reasons that led to the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy by the 2nd Respondent.(Ground 6).

I have read the judgment of the trial Court in pages 331 – 332 of the Record of Appeal and I do not agree with the submission of the Appellant’s Counsel that the trial Court failed to make pronouncement on the issue that the failure of the 1st Respondent to discharge her financial obligations to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was one of the reasons that led to the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy.

It is clear from pages 331 – 332 of the judgment of the Court that the trial Court did not fail to consider the only reason for the Revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy which was clearly stated on the Notice of Revocation dated 15th June, 2006. As I have said already and I would still say, the Court is bound to consider materials placed before it which is in this case, the said Notice of Revocation and the Court is further bound to consider the said document to impute the reason for the Revocation of the

1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy as same must be stated therein and not elsewhere.
The reason for revoking a person’s Right of Occupancy must be stated in the Notice of Revocation notwithstanding that the Act did not expressly state that the specific ground of the revocation must be stated in the Notice. See ADUKWU VS. COMMISSIONER FOR WORKS, LANDS AND TRANSPORT, ENUGU STATE (1997) 2 NWLR (PT. 489) 588 and NIGERIA ENGINEERING WORKS LTD v. DENAP LIMITED & ANOR (1997) 10 NWLR (PT. 525) 481.

In considering whether the reason for the Revocation of the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy was stated in the Notice of Revocation issued by the 2nd Respondent, it is important to reproduce the content of the Notice of Revocation just like the 1st Respondent did in paragraph 7.5 of its Brief of Argument, thus:
“NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF UNDEVELOPED PLOTS WITHIN FEDERAL CAPITAL CITY
Following the expiration of grace period granted by the Minister to effect and complete development of your plot within the Federal Capital City, I have been directed to inform you that the Minister of Federal Capital Territory has in the exercise powers conferred by him under

Section 28(5)(a) & (b) of the Land Use Act, 1978 revoked your rights and interest over plot 90 within SECTOR CENTRE B(B16) for your continued contravention of the terms of development of the Right of Occupancy.
Please note also that the revocation took effect from 29th September, 2005. (Emphasis mine)

The Appellant’s counsel argued that it is on record that the 1st Respondent willfully failed or refused and or neglected to pay the requisite fees including the ground rent for the disputed land for many years prior to the revocation of the 1st Respondent’s right of Occupancy and that it was one of the issues that was joined by the parties before the trial Court but the trial Court glossed over the same in its judgment.

One question I would love to ask the Appellant is, when the 2nd Respondent issued the said Notice of Revocation, what reason was stated on the said notice? Was the alleged non-payment of the requisite fee by the 1st Respondent a reason stated in the said Notice of Revocation?

I will help him answer this question. From the clear wordings of the said Notice of Revocation as reproduced above, beginning from the title, then to the

body, it is clear that the reason for the issuance of the Notice of Revocation is due to the failure of the 1st Respondent to develop the disputed land. Even the last line of the first paragraph of the said Notice of Revocation stated thus:
“…for your continued contravention of the terms of development of the Right of Occupancy.”

The Court is not allowed to impute in a document what is not there and that was exactly what the trial Court did in page 28 of its judgment at page 332 of the Record of Appeal. Therefore, I agree with the trial Court when it discountenanced the argument of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents on the ground that the only reason for the purported revocation of the Right of Occupancy of the 1st Respondent is the non-development of the disputed land. This issue is therefore resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

ISSUE EIGHT
Whether the lower Court acted rightly when it ordered the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve forthwith the 1st Respondent’s “building plan with the amendments” when there is no scintilla of evidence before the Court, to show that, such a building plan actually exists in the

office of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents? (Ground 8)

I do not agree with the judgment of the trial Court at page 31 of the Judgment in page 335 of the Record of Appeal that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents should approve the 1st Respondent’s building plan for the disputed land submitted by the 1st Respondent with the amendment requested by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as there is no evidence before the Court to show that the said building plan with the amendments was submitted to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as is the consideration under issues five and seven. Therefore, since there is no such evidence before the Court, it is my strong view and I also agree with the learned Counsel to the Appellant that the learned trial judge acted wrongly when it ordered the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to approve the 1st Respondent’s building plan with the amendments. The said order is hereby set aside. This issue is thus resolved in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE NINE
Whether the finding of the lower Court to the effect that the 1st Respondent was not given any period of grace before the 1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy over the disputed land was

revoked by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents is justifiable, in view of the facts that were pleaded and proved by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents before the Court (Ground 10).

It is the argument of the Appellant’s Counsel that before the Right of Occupancy of the 1st Respondent was revoked via the Notice of Revocation issued by the 2nd Respondent, a grace period was communicated to the 1st Respondent and other allottees through a Newspaper publication notice to the general public by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.
My question now would be, is such grace period via the said Newspaper publication according to the law?
A very careful reading of Sections 28 and 44 of the Land Use Act would disclose that publication in Gazette and local newspapers are not mode or manner of service contemplated under the Land Use Act. The omission of publication in the gazette or newspaper is to further emphasize to the acquiring authorities, that the legislature has in mind personal service only as it left the acquiring authority with no option. See the case of MILITARY GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE VS. OLATUNJI (1995) 5 NWLR (PT. 397).
On the provisions of

Section 44 of the Land Use Act, for a notice to be valid, it has to be served in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The combined effect is that failure to comply with the procedure will invalidate the process of revocation of a Right of Occupancy and a subsequent certificate of occupancy issued on the same property will be invalid.
In C.S.S. BOOKSHOP LIMITED VS. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN RIVERS STATE & ORS (2006) 11 NWLR (PT. 992) 530, per Mohammed JSC, it was held that publication in a gazette was not one of the methods of notification provided under the Land Use Act and therefore such notification is invalid.
The decision of the Court is worthy of reproduction as follows:
“From the above it is clear that the notice of revocation published in the said Rivers State Government Notice No.235 dated 27th April, 1985 and published in Volume 17, No. 27 of the official Gazette was not a valid mode of service in accordance with the Land Use Act. This is because the mode fell short of the requirement of the Act. There was no personal service or in this case which is a registered company, there was no service on the secretary or clerk

of the company as provided for. The mode of service is therefore null and void and of no effect.”
Also, revocation must comply strictly with the provisions of the Land Use Act. Any non-compliance will result in the revocation being a nullity. See the case of NIGERIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED VS. CHIEF OGUNBIYI (1992) 11 NWLR (PT. 992) 530 SC.
I entirely agree with the finding of the trial Court to the effect that the 1st Respondent was not given any period of grace before its right of occupancy over the disputed land was revoked by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. It is my very strong and unshaken view that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents ought to have given notice personally to the 1st Respondent as Notice to the whole world or to allottees via the Newspaper publication is not contemplated by the Land Use Act as the 1st Respondent is entitled personal to a grace period before the Revocation of his Right of Occupancy which would give it an opportunity to right any wrong. The effect of the failure of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to serve adequate notice on the 1st Respondent as required by the Land Use Act prior to the revocation of the Right of Occupancy

means the power of revocation was not exercised in compliance with the provisions of the Land Use Act. This issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

ISSUE TEN
Whether the unsigned judgment of the lower Court in respect of the 1st Respondent’s claims before it, is authentic, valid and enforceable? (Ground 11)

I agree with the 1st Respondent’s counsel that the Appellant’s attempt to flaw the judgment of the trial Court is quite deplorable to say the least.

I have looked at page 33 of the Judgment of the trial Court at page 337 of the Record of Appeal and I can see clearly the signature of the Learned trial Judge and it is my very strong view that there is no law which states that a Judge must sign on every page of his judgment. What the learned trial Judge did was to sign the judgment after delivering the judgment on both the substantive claim and the counter claim which I strongly believe is regular. The argument of the Appellant’s Counsel is very flimsy and is meant to distract this Court and frustrate the judgment of the trial Court by all means possible. The argument of the

Appellant’s Counsel on this issue is hereby discountenanced and this issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

ISSUE ELEVEN
Whether the judgment of the lower Court in respect of the Appellant’s counter-claim before it, is justifiable or supportable, having regard to the facts that were pleaded and proved by the Appellant and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents before the Court to that effect (GROUND 12).

It is now very clear that the Appellant’s Counsel is trying every possible means to frustrate the judgment of the trial Court. Far be it, that this Court will indulge him in his baseless argument.

If the Appellant’s Counsel read the judgment of the trial Court very well as he ought to in the normal circumstances to have done, he would have seen that the learned trial Court took its time to address the counter claim of the Appellant in pages 335 – 337 of the Record of Appeal. I agree totally with the judgment of the trial Court in respect of the counter claim of the Appellant and wish to uphold same having found on issues 6, 7 and 9 that the issuance and service of the Notice of Revocation of the

1st Respondent’s Right of Occupancy was not in accordance to the requirement as provided for under the Land Use Act.

Also, the DW2 under cross- examination at pages 296 – 297 of the Record of Appeal confirmed that it was during the pendency of the suit before the trial Court that the Appellant was allocated

the land which allocation was done whilst the Right of Occupancy of the 1st Respondent still subsists. See the case of OLORI MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED VS. UBN PLC (2006) LPELR-2589(SC) wherein the Supreme Court Per OGUNTADE, JSC (P. 38 paras. D – G) reiterated as follows:
“What makes the doctrine of lis pendens applicable is not whether or not the immediate parties to the dispute had notice of the appeal; lis pendens applies by the operation of the law and operates independent of the will of the parties. Even a person who is not a party to the case but who bought the property in dispute is bound by the doctrine. The practice in England is to have the judgment raising lis pendens registered so that anyone intending to deal in the property may be put on notice. This is in accordance with Sections 4 and 7 of 2 and 3 Viet. C. 11, which provide for registration of lis pendens.”

I uphold the judgment of the learned trial judge in respect of the Appellant’s counter-claim and hold that the counter-claim stands dismissed. This issue is thus resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent.

In the final result, the appeal is allowed in part in

respect of the issues resolved in favour of the Appellant. The 1st Respondent’s reliefs 1, 3 and 4 contained in the amended statement of claim before the trial Court succeeds. I accordingly grant them as follows:
1. It is declared that the Notice of Revocation dated 15th day of June, 2006 and back dated to 29th September, 2005 issued by the 1st and 2nd Defendants in respect of the Plaintiff’s Right of Occupancy over Plot 90 in sector centre B (B16), Jabi, Abuja within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, is invalid, null and void, same not having been issued and served in accordance with the Land Use Act, 1978.
2. The transfer or reallocation of the Plaintiff’s subsisting Right of Occupancy over Plot 90 in sector Centre B(B16), Jabi, Abuja to the 3rd Defendant or any person(s), is declared null, void and of no legal effect.
3. The Defendants are by order of injunction restrained by themselves, their agents or privies from interfering with the Plaintiff’s use, possession, development and occupation of the said parcel of land, or re-allocating same to a third party EXCEPT in accordance with the due process of law.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>
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I also uphold the cost of N50,000.00 granted by the trial Court in respect of the counter claim against the Appellant in favour of the 1st Respondent. I make no further orders as to cost.

ABDU ABOKI, P.J.C.A.: The lead judgment of my learned brother, MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JCA, was made available to me and I agree with the conclusion reached at, that the appeal is allowed in part in respect of the issues resolved in favour of the Appellant.

I also abide by the consequential order(s) as contained in the lead judgment.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.

Appearances:

UBOJU ESQ., with him, S. AFE For Appellant(s)

NWACHUKWU ESQ., with him, B. ELEM ESQ. – for 1st Respondent
R. J. ABDULLAHI – for 2nd and 3rd Respondents For Respondent(s)