THE STATE V. SAMSON GALI
(1974) LCN/1927(SC)
In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Thursday, May 23, 1974
Case Number: SC. 118/1974
RATIO
DUTY OF COURT: APPELLATE COURT AND INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT
The questions which call for determination in this appeal are twofold. The first is whether this court, in the circumstances of this case, has the power to examine the manner in which the discretion which the learned trial Judge undoubtedly has as to whether to grant the applicant/appellant leave or not, has been exercised; the other is whether or not we could decide whether the discretion has been judiciously or properly exercised. It is well settled that a court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a Judge in the Court below unless he has erred in principle or there is no material on which he could properly have arrived at his decision (see R. v. Cook (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 138 as per Devlin, J., at p. 147). Referring to the above principle in a later decision in the case of R. v. Flynn (1961) 45 Cr. App. R. 268 which was heard by a full court of five judges, Slade, J., delivering the judgment of the court, observed at p. 277 as follows: “This court is mindful of the remarks which I have already read of Devlin, J., as he then was, in delivering the judgment of five judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of Cook and, indeed, it is a truism to say that any appellate court is slow to interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a Judge unless they feel satisfied either that he exercised it on wrong principles or that he failed to give weight to matters which he should have had in mind when exercising the discretion.” PER FATAYI-WILLIAMS, JSC.
JUSTICES:
GEORGE B. A. COKER, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
FATAYI-WILLIAMS, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
AYO GABRIEL IRIKEFE, JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT
APPELLANTS
THE STATE
RESPONDENTS
SAMSON GALI
FATAYI-WILLIAMS, JSC. (Delivering the Judgment by the Court)
This is an appeal by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, (Benue-Plateau State), as applicant, against the order of Belgore, J., made in the Jos High Court on 19th February, 1974, in which he refused the application, made by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State for leave to prefer two criminal charges against the respondent. The application, made ex parte, was made under the provisions of Section 185 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Northern States and the two charges in respect of which the leave was sought are as follows:- “1st Head of Charge: That you, Samson Gali, on or about the 9th day of May, 1968 at Jos in the Benue – Plateau State Judicial Division dishonestly misappropriated the sum of eighty pounds (N160.00) property of Lawrence Nwagbo and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 309 of the Penal Code. 2nd Head of Charge: That on or about the 9th day of May, 1968 at Jos in the Benue – Plateau State Judicial Division, you, Samson Gali being an officer of the Federal Government of Nigeria wilfully and with intent to defraud made a false entry in a book belonging to your employer – to wit: you wrote in a register that you sold a vehicle registered PL. 2836 for the sum of seventy pounds instead of the actual amount of one hundred and fifty pounds realised from the sale and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 371 of the Penal Code.” The reasons for the application, stated in the form of a preamble to the application, are as follows:- “WHEREAS the above – named respondent is accused of criminal misappropriation and falsification of accounts; AND WHEREAS applications have been previously made under the Criminal Procedure (Application for leave to prefer a charge in the High Court) Rules and refused for failure to comply with the Rules but no proceedings have been taken under Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code; AND WHEREAS the alleged offences were committed in May, 1968, over five years ago and it is expedient in the interest of justice to dispose of the case speedily by summary trial in the High Court without first holding a preliminary inquiry under Chapter XVII of the Criminal Procedure Code; AND WHERAS the accused is an Inspector of Police and it is needful for him to be prosecuted by Counsel rather than a Police Officer in the High Court where issues can be properly tried; AND WHERAS the evidence shown in the proofs of evidence attached hereto will be evidence which will be available at the trial, and the case disclosed by proofs is to the best of my knowledge, information and belief a true case;” The proofs of evidence referred to in the last preamble were duly attached to the application. Although the application for such leave could be made ex-parte, the learned trial Judge at the hearing on 9th November, 1973, and without assigning any reason, directed that the respondent should be put on notice and then adjourned it for hearing on 19th February, 1974.
At the resumed hearing, the learned trial Judge, after hearing both parties, refused the application after referring to the provisions of Section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code and observing as follows:- “The relevant subsection is subsection (b) above. The Law is very clear indeed and all the arguments before me seem to beat about the bush. This application can be made only if the charge on which the State would like to prosecute before the High Court is triable only by the High Court and what a lower court (Magistrate Court) could do on it would be the holding of a preliminary inquiry. That is to say, the High Court is being prayed by the State to dispense with the absence of a preliminary inquiry which the law requires to be performed under Chapter XVII of the C.P.C. and have a direct trial. In this case, the two offences on which the State would wish to prosecute the accused are triable in the Magistrate Court – one by a Magistrate of the third grade and the other by a Chief Magistrate. The Chief Magistrate could hear the two charges jointly and decide upon them. They are charges to be tried within the competent jurisdiction of the Chief Magistrate and the High Court could come in only by way of hearing appeal against the decision of the Chief Magistrate. This is not a proper matter to be brought to the High Court by way of application under Section 185 (b) C.P.C.
In passing, the Criminal Procedure (Applications for leave to prefer a charge in the High Court) Rules, 1970 has enumerated the conditions in rule 2 on which an application could be made to prefer a charge without P.I. Rule 3 is mainly procedural and the provisions of rule 3(2) do not contradict Section 185 (b) C.P.C. as it is necessary that the charge sought to be brought must be for offences on which P.I. is necessary. It is the view of this court that an application of this nature should not be made by way of trial and error. Once it has been rejected by a High Court, it should not normally be brought before another Judge. It would seem and will hardly connote another presumption, that one High Court is being asked to reverse the decision of another in the same subject matter affecting the same person. Finally, a police officer in law, is not different from another citizen when it comes to right to be tried. If a person elects to be tried summarily he should not constitutionally be deprived of that right.” At the hearing of the appeal against this ruling the learned State Counsel who appeared for the applicant/appellant made a number of submissions which can be summarised as follows.
The implication of the ruling is that certain categories of cases cannot be tried by the High Court although this could not be so in view of the provisions of Section 12 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Learned counsel further argued that the interpretation given to the provisions of section 185 of the Code by the learned trial Judge is erroneous in that it purports to restrict the High Court itself from trying certain categories of cases. Learned counsel then submitted that the learned trial Judge was also in error in stating that the application can be made only if the charge on which the State could like to prosecute before the High Court is triable only by the High Court. Counsel also argued that the learned trial Judge erred in his interpretation of the provisions of rules 2 and 3 of the Criminal Procedure (Application for leave to prefer a charge in the High Court) Rules, 1970. In the face of all these errors, learned counsel finally submitted, the discretion which the learned trial Judge undoubtedly has under Section 185 (b) of the Code when deciding whether to grant leave or not has not been judiciously exercised. PAGE| 4 In reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the interpretation placed on Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code by learned counsel for the applicant/appellant could not be correct if the section is read together with Section 185 (b) of the said Code. It was further submitted that the discretion was properly exercised and that the reasons given by the learned trial Judge for refusing to grant the leave asked for were amply supported by the law. It is common ground that the learned trial Judge has a discretion in the exercise of his power under Section 185(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the C.P.C.). However, as it will be necessary to refer to the section later, we reproduce its provisions hereunder:- “185. No person shall be tried by the High Court unless – (a) he has been committed for trial to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII; or (b) a charge is preferred against him without the holding of a preliminary inquiry by leave of a judge of the High Court; (c) a charge of contempt is preferred against him in accordance with the provisions of Section 314 or Section 315.”
The questions which call for determination in this appeal are twofold. The first is whether this court, in the circumstances of this case, has the power to examine the manner in which the discretion which the learned trial Judge undoubtedly has as to whether to grant the applicant/appellant leave or not, has been exercised; the other is whether or not we could decide whether the discretion has been judiciously or properly exercised. It is well settled that a court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a Judge in the Court below unless he has erred in principle or there is no material on which he could properly have arrived at his decision (see R. v. Cook (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 138 as per Devlin, J., at p. 147). Referring to the above principle in a later decision in the case of R. v. Flynn (1961) 45 Cr. App. R. 268 which was heard by a full court of five judges, Slade, J., delivering the judgment of the court, observed at p. 277 as follows: “This court is mindful of the remarks which I have already read of Devlin, J., as he then was, in delivering the judgment of five judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of Cook and, indeed, it is a truism to say that any appellate court is slow to interfere with the exercise of a discretion by a Judge unless they feel satisfied either that he exercised it on wrong principles or that he failed to give weight to matters which he should have had in mind when exercising the discretion.” In the present case, the learned trial Judge has given reasons for refusing to grant leave to the applicant/appellant to prefer the two charges. In view of this settled principle of law to which we have referred, there is no doubt that this court has the power, and indeed the duty, to look at these reasons and to examine the manner in which the learned trial Judge has exercised his discretion by refusing to grant leave to the applicant/ap



