YISA ABDULRAHMAN v. THE STATE
(2018) LCN/4730(SC)
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 14th day of December, 2018
SC.319/2015
RATIO
POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE DEFENCE OF ALIBI
In decisions too many to count, this Court has held that in criminal proceedings the plea of alibi as a defence succeeds where it is raised unequivocally and timeously during investigation. The time, place and the people with whom the accused person was at the time material to the commission of the offence must be proffered. The plea will invariably be discountenanced if the particulars of the place, time as well as the name(s) of the person(s) who can testify that the accused was not at the scene of crime at the material time were not given. Though it is incumbent for the prosecution to investigate an accused person’s plea of alibi, this becomes impossible in the absence of the particulars of the plea being timeously supplied by the accused. Indeed, this Court has severally held that the prosecution is not expected, in the absence of the particulars necessary for such investigation, to go on a wild goose chase to investigate such an outrightly defective and unavailing plea. See Ikemson V. State (1989)3 NWLR (Pt. 110) at 466; Mohammed V. State (2014) LPELR- 22916 (SC) 22 – 23 and Afor Lucky V. The State (2016) 5 – 6 SC 144. Again, it is equally trite that where the evidence on record pins down the accused to the scene and at the time of the crime the prosecution’s failure to investigate the defence may not be fatal. See Ndukwe V. The State (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 43 and Kareem Olatinwo V. The State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 126 at 151 – 152. PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
WHETHER RETRACTION OF AN ACCUSED PERSON’S CONFESSION WILL RENDER THE CONFESSION INADMISSIBLE
The law indeed remains that retraction of an accused person’s confession does not by itself render the confession inadmissible and a retracted confession is not to be treated differently from any confession that is otherwise. True, an accused’s denial of his confession made at the earliest opportunity may lend weight to the denial. However, the issue of what probative value to ascribe to the retracted confession remains within the primary jurisdiction of the trial Court. See R V Sapele & Anor (1952) 2 FSC 74 R.V John Agangan Itule (1961) ALL NLR 462 and Demo Oseni V. The State (2012) LPELR. PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
POSITION OF THE LAW AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION THAT WILL BE RESOLVED IN THE ACCUSED’S FAVOUR
It has long been settled on a long line of authorities that only material contradictions to the facts in issue in the charge and which raise doubt that are resolved in an appellant’s favour. See Ibrahim V. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 399 at 415 and Oduneye V. State (2001) LPELR-2245 (SC). PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
JUSTICES
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
PAUL ADAMU GALUMJE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
YISA ABDULRAHMAN Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal sitting at Akure, hereinafter referred to as the lower Court, upholding the conviction of the appellant by the Ondo State High Court, hereinafter referred to as the trial Court, for the offence of armed robbery contrary to and punishable under Section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act CAP RI vol. 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The lower Court’s judgment being appealed against was delivered on the 12th day of May, 2015 and the trial Court’s decision it upholds was delivered on 24th July, 2013.
The appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge he had been arraigned for. To prove its case, the prosecution called three witnesses: PWI is Kolawole Ogunleye the victim of the crime; PW2, the painter to whom the appellant took the vehicle he robbed PWI for same to be differently painted and PW3 the police officer who investigated the case against the appellant. Four Exhibits, B, C, E and F were tendered by the prosecution.
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The appellant, DW1, testified in person with his father, DW2, further testifying for him. He tendered three Exhibits A, D1 and D2.
The case of the prosecution is that on the 23rd October, 2009 the appellant, by the Fiwasaye Girls Grammar School Area, Akure, engaged the services of PWl, a taxi driver, to convey him and his eggs from lju/lta-ogbolu to Alagbaka Akure for three thousand naira. Off the main road and towards the spot where the eggs were stored, the appellant instructed PWI to stop the vehicle and hand over the key of the vehicle to him. Following PWI’s resistance, the appellant brought out a cutlass from his black nylon bag and macheted the former on the head at which point in time someone emerged from the bush and assisted the appellant to drive away the vehicle. Not long after PWI had reported the incident at the lju/tta Ogbolu police station, the appellant was arrested. Appellant’s confession led to the recovery of PWI’s taxi cab from a painter’s workshop in Okene, Kogi State. PWI identified the appellant at the Iju/Ita Ogbolu police station as the person who robbed him of his taxi cab on the 23rd October 2009.
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Appellants case at trial is a flat denial of the armed robbery. Even though in Exhibit B, his extra judicial statement, he confessed to the robbery and furnished information leading to the recovery of PWI’s taxi cab from a painter’s workshop in Okene, he insisted at trial that on the 23rd October, 2009 he was away in Okene to attend to his health challenges.
At the close of trial, including final addresses of counsel, the learned trial judge, in a considered judgment delivered on 24th July, 2013, found the appellant guilty and sentenced him as charged. Dissatisfied, he appealed to the lower Court vide a Notice of Appeal containing two grounds filed on 2nd August, 2013. Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the lower Court.
Still aggrieved, he has further appealed to this Court by his Notice filed on the 18th May, 2015 containing three grounds. The lone issue distilled from the three grounds of appeal, see paragraph 3.0, page 4 of the appellant’s brief of argument which was adopted and relied upon by F. Omotosho Esq., of counsel at the hearing of the appeal, reads: –
“Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the findings of the trial Court that the defence of alibi was not established by the appellant and that
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the contradiction and discrepancies in the extra judicial statement of PWI and his evidence are not material to cast doubt to the case of the prosecution.”
(Underlining supplied for emphasis).
At paragraph 3.1 of the respondent’s brief of argument adopted and relied upon by Akintola Makinde, learned respondent counsel, as their argument for the appeal, a lone issue has been raised as calling for determination in the appeal thus:-
“Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the decision of the trial High Court which found the appellant guilty of the offence of armed robbery. (Grounds 1, 2 and 3).”
Arguing the lone issue, learned appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant had at the earliest opportunity set up an alibi in Exhibit D, his extra judicial statement made following his arrest 25/10/2009 at Iju police station reaffirming same on 26/10/2009 when Exhibit D1 was recorded. Appellant’s father, the other witness who testified for him, restated the alibi put forward by the appellant in Exhibits D and DI. The trial Court’s finding at page 128 of the record that the appellant’s alibi is at large which the lower Court affirmed
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at page 200 – 201 of the record, learned appellant’s counsel contends, is not supported by the evidence on record. The evidence on record, it is submitted, rather establishes the prosecution’s failure to investigate the defence so raised which is fatal to the prosecution’s case. Appellant’s defence of alibi as contained in the evidence of DWI and DW2, it is emphasized, is neither challenged nor controverted. The concurrent finding of the two Courts insisting that the appellant furnishes more details of his absence from the scene of crime, it is argued, casts on the appellant the burden of proving his innocence. Citing the decision in Ukwunnenyi V. State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 113, it is contended that the burden of establishing appellant’s guilt remains throughout on the prosecution and does not shift.
Further relying on John V. State (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 607) 643 at 656, Aliyu V. State (2013) 6-7 (Pt IV) SC and Chabasaya V.Anwasi ALL FWLR (Pt. 528) 837 at 857, learned counsel urges that the perverse concurrent findings of the two Courts be set aside.
The prosecution’s case, it is further argued, is riddled with contradictions.
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In Exhibit A, PWI’s statement to the police for example, submits learned appellant’s counsel, it is alleged that the appellant and one other person robbed PWI of his taxi. Under cross examination however, it is further submitted, the same PW1 told the Court that only the appellant dispossessed him of the vehicle. The trial Court’s finding at page 124 of the record ignoring this clear contradiction, it is contended, is wrongly affirmed by the lower Court at page 204 of the record of appeal. These findings failed to take into consideration the identity of the appellant as an essential and necessary element of the offence of robbery. Where identity of an accused remains in doubt, it is argued, the commission of the offence by him equally remains in doubt. The doubt, submits learned appellant’s counsel, enures to the appellant in this case. Learned counsel cites Abiodun V. State (2013) 3-4 SC (Pt 11) 126 at 143, Osuagwu V. State (2013) 12 SC (Pt.1) 37 at 64 and Opeyemi V. State and insists that the appellant be given the benefit of the alibi he raised but was ignored by the two Courts. This Court, learned counsel urges, intervenes to disallow reliance on incredible evidence led by the
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prosecution that is full of discrepancies. He prays that the appeal be allowed.
On the lone issue, learned respondent’s counsel argues that it is not enough for the appellant to assert he was not at the scene at the time of the armed robbery. The law requires, it is submitted, that he provides particulars of his whereabout to enable investigation by the prosecution to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the alibi he raises. Having not furnished details of his whereabout and those he was with at the time of the crime both Courts, learned counsel contends, are right to have ignored appellant’s unsubstantiated defence. The decisions in Ikemson V. The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 466, Mohammed V. State (2014) LPELR – 22916 (SC) 22 at 23 and Afor Lucky V. The State (2016) 5-6 inter-alia requires particulars of the appellant’s alibi soonest on being arrested. Where these particulars are not proffered, it is further submitted, an appellant’s defence of alibi being without merit must be discountenanced. The decision in Ukwunnenyi V. State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt 114) 113 wherein the appellant timeously provided details of his alibi does not avail the appellant.
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Further relying on Kareem Olatinwo V. The State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 126 at 151 – 152 and Ayiere Godsgift V. The State (2016) 5 – 6 SC 97 at 105 – 106, learned counsel submits that the prosecution was right to have declined embarking on a wild goose chase in investigating appellant’s alibi that is at large. In any event, it is further submitted, the evidence led by the prosecution pins the appellant to the scene at the time of the crime making investigation into the defence unnecessary.
In further response, learned counsel contends that appellant’s argument in paragraphs 4.18 4.45 at page 8 -13 of his briefs that the inherent contradictions in the evidence the prosecution has created so much doubt in its case to warrant appellant’s acquittal is unavailing. Whatever contradiction in the prosecution’s evidence, it is argued, does not go to the root of its case thereby affecting the cogency of the case made out against the appellant. Insisting that the contradictions are insignificant, learned counsel submits that the concurrent decisions of the two Courts founded on such evidence be allowed to persist.
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Reliance is placed on Akpan V. The State (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 420) 644 at 660 – 661, Effiong V. State (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 362 at 372 and Jerry Ikuepenikan V. The State (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1229) 449.
On the whole, learned counsel urges that the unmeritorious appeal be dismissed.
My Lords, both sides agree and rightly too that for the appellant to succeed he must demonstrate that the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts leading to his conviction and sentence for armed robbery under Section 1 (2) (a) of Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act CAP R1 Vol.14 of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 are perverse.
A perverse finding is one which is merely speculative and does not evolve from any evidence. It is a finding that is unreasonable and unacceptable having been arrived at completely outside the evidence or on the basis of wrong application of the law to the evidence before the Court. See Atolagbe V. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 260 and Sande V. The State (1982) 4 SC 41.
Appellants contention under the lone issue for the determination of his appeal is that his conviction and sentence by both Courts in the absence of legally admitted evidence led by
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the prosecution in proof of its case being perverse, the law entitles this Court to interfere by making correct findings in the circumstance and setting aside the wrong concurrent findings that occasioned miscarriage of justice. One cannot agree more with learned appellant’s counsel in this regard. However, learned respondent’s counsel is on a very firm terrain in his insistence that appellant’s failure to show that the concurrent findings being appealed against do not draw from the evidence on record and/or that the evidence is tarnished by contradictions accounts for the failure of his appeal. See The State V. Aibangbee (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt 84) 548; James Afolabi V. The State (2016) LPELR-40300 (SC). I entirely agree with learned respondent’s counsel.
In decisions too many to count, this Court has held that in criminal proceedings the plea of alibi as a defence succeeds where it is raised unequivocally and timeously during investigation. The time, place and the people with whom the accused person was at the time material to the commission of the offence must be proffered. The plea will invariably be discountenanced if the particulars of the place, time as
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well as the name(s) of the person(s) who can testify that the accused was not at the scene of crime at the material time were not given. Though it is incumbent for the prosecution to investigate an accused person’s plea of alibi, this becomes impossible in the absence of the particulars of the plea being timeously supplied by the accused. Indeed, this Court has severally held that the prosecution is not expected, in the absence of the particulars necessary for such investigation, to go on a wild goose chase to investigate such an outrightly defective and unavailing plea. See Ikemson V. State (1989)3 NWLR (Pt. 110) at 466; Mohammed V. State (2014) LPELR- 22916 (SC) 22 – 23 and Afor Lucky V. The State (2016) 5 – 6 SC 144.
Again, it is equally trite that where the evidence on record pins down the accused to the scene and at the time of the crime the prosecution’s failure to investigate the defence may not be fatal. See Ndukwe V. The State (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 43 and Kareem Olatinwo V. The State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 126 at 151 – 152.
Now, at pages 128 – 129 of the record of appeal is the finding of the trial Court on the plea
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of alibi raised by the appellant in defence of the charge against him. Its inter-alia reads: –
The problem with the alleged alibi claimed is that it is at large. The accused said that he was in Okene Local Government of Kogi State at the time relevant to the charge. There is no specific address or location given which can be investigated. He did not mention the names and addresses of those who can confirm that he was at Okene area on 23rd October 2009. Okene Local Government is certainly a large area and the police cannot be required to go on such a wide goose chase when no lead is provided. The accused is required to give particulars of his whereabouts when a claim of alibi is made.”
At page 129 of the record of appeal, the trial Court proceeded as follows: –
. In this case, PWI gave positive evidence that the accused was the person who chartered his taxi cab and later robbed him of the vehicle. He gave evidence that he identified the accused at the police station at lju/iltaogbolu shortly after the incident. PW2 gave evidence that it was the accused that brought the robbed vehicle to his workshop at
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Okene a day after the vehicle was robbed. PW3 said the accused confessed and that he gave information that the vehicle was at Okene. The police went to Okene and recovered the vehicle through the information given by the accused. With these evidences which I found credible, the alibi raised by the accused cannot be but a mirage. It cannot stand. The conclusion I have reached is that on the 23rd October 2009, the accused lured PWI into a bush road after Iju in Akure North Local Government and he snatched the taxi cab which PWI was driving for commercial purpose. The accused then drove the vehicle to Okene where he deposited it with PW2 for the purpose of changing its colour.”
In affirming the foregoing, the lower Court at page 202 of the record of appeal held thus:-
“It is clear that the prosecution vides PWI, PW2 and PW3 evidence emphatically fixed the appellant to the scene of the crime and as such physically demolished the plea of alibi set up by the appellant. Even if Exhibit B, the extra judicial statement of the appellant is successfully retracted by the appellant, a consideration of his evidence before the Court vis–vis the
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evidence of PWI, PW2 and PW3 would have demolished the appellant’s case
The foregoing are the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts learned appellant’s counsel contends are perverse. I disagree. It is manifest from these findings that learned counsel’s contention is misconceived.
The law indeed remains that retraction of an accused person’s confession does not by itself render the confession inadmissible and a retracted confession is not to be treated differently from any confession that is otherwise.
True, an accused’s denial of his confession made at the earliest opportunity may lend weight to the denial. However, the issue of what probative value to ascribe to the retracted confession remains within the primary jurisdiction of the trial Court. See R V Sapele & Anor (1952) 2 FSC 74 R.V John Agangan Itule (1961) ALL NLR 462 and Demo Oseni V. The State (2012) LPELR.
In the case at hand, appellant did not succeed in retracting Exhibit B admitted in evidence after a trial within a trial had been conducted. Having been lawfully admitted, Exhibit B alone which unequivocally pins down the appellant to the
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scene and time of the offence for which he is convicted lawfully sustains the lower Court’s affirmation of his conviction by the trial Court. The two Courts, however, rightfully in keeping with correct principles, looked further than his clear, direct and positive extra judicial confession to hold the appellant responsible for his criminal conduct. No one is left in any doubt as to why the concurrent decisions of the two Courts must prevail.
Appellants alibi made neither timeously nor with the necessary particulars to warrant being investigated is untenable. In addition to Exhibit B, the evidence of PWI and PW2 inexonarably puts the appellant at the scene, and time of the offence thereby establishing the fact of his being the person who robbed PWI of his taxi cab.
Appellant’s collateral argument that the evidence led by the respondent being riddled with contradictions is unreliable for any Tribunal to base its conviction of the appellant is indeed unhelpful. A scrutiny of the printed record of the appeal does not justify this off-the-mark allegation. It was the appellant who in Exhibit B provided the information that the taxi cab he robbed PWI was with PW2.
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He had taken the taxi cab there for it to be differently painted. It was the appellant who also took the investigating police team led by PW3 to PW2, who following reports, had deposited the taxi at the police station in Okene from where it was retrieved. In the event, whatever contradictions the appellant asserts in the prosecution’s case have ceased to be material and potent enough to discredit the case made out against the appellant.
It has long been settled on a long line of authorities that only material contradictions to the facts in issue in the charge and which raise doubt that are resolved in an appellant’s favour. See Ibrahim V. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 399 at 415 and Oduneye V. State (2001) LPELR-2245 (SC).
Appellants failure to sustain his contention that the concurrent findings he appeals against are perverse certainly disentitles him to any reprieve. His lone issue is resolved against him, the unmeritorious appeal, dismissed and the concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts accordingly further affirmed.
KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, J.S.C.: My learned brother, Muhammad JSC obliged me before now
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with the judgement just delivered. I agree that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
The appellant is contending that the alibi he set up that he was not at the scene of crime was not investigated; consequently he is entitled to be acquitted of the charge for which he was found guilty. It is not enough for an accused to state that he was not present at the scene of crime if he wants to set up the defence of alibi. He is required in addition to give details of the location he was and the person he was together with at the material time. If he gives these particulars and the police fail to investigate to ascertain if the claim was true or not, he would have succeeded in setting up the alibi. See: Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 466; Ukwunnenyi v. State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 113; Olatinwo v. State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 126.
Where the evidence adduced by the prosecution fixes the accused with the commission of the offence, the failure to investigate an alibi set up by the accused will not be fatal to his conviction provided there is no doubt about his identity. Pw1, the victim of the robbery identified the appellant as the
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person who robbed him of his taxi. Pw2 testified that it was the appellant who took the taxi to him and asked him to paint with a different colour and pw3 stated that when the appellant was arrested, he confessed to robbing pw1 of the taxi and he then took the police to okene where he had given the taxi for repainting, even though he later resiled from the statement. The alibi he set up was demolished.
It is for this and the more detailed reasons contained in the leading judgement of my learned brother, Muhammad JSC that I came to the conclusion that the appeal is lacking in merit and deserves to be dismissed and I accordingly dismiss it.
I affirm the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts. Appeal dismissed.
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the lead Judgment delivered by my learned brother, Muhammad, JSC, and I agree with him that the Appeal lacks merit.
The Appellant not only confessed that he committed the offence, he took the Police Investigators to the Painter’s Workshop at Okene, where he took the taxi cab, after he robbed PW1, Kolawole Ogunleye.
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However, at the trial, he denied that he committed the offence, and insisted that on the day in question, he was elsewhere in Okene, attending to his health. In other words, he raised the defence of alibi, which is Latin for “elsewhere”. The defence of alibi is based on the physical impossibility of an Accused Person being guilty of the offence by placing him in another location at the time the crime was committed.
Once the defence of alibi is properly raised during investigations, then it is the duty of the Police to investigate it and for the Prosecution to disprove it. It is also settled that a defence of alibi must be precise and specific in terms of the place that the Accused was and the person or persons he was with and possibly what he was doing there at the material time – see Shehu V. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 112 SC, and Ochemaje V. The State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1109) 57 SC.
On the other hand, investigation is not a necessity where evidence points unequivocally to the guilt of the Accused, either in the evidence of Witnesses or under cross-examination of the Accused or his Witness – see Ochemaje V. State (supra).
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Thus, it is not in all cases that the failure to investigate an alibi will be fatal to the Prosecution’s case – see Olaiya v. State (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 423, and Hemyo Ntam V. The State (1968) NMLR 86, wherein this Court held as follows –
There are occasions in which failure to check an alibi may cast doubt on the reliability of the case for the Prosecution, but in a case such as this where Appellants were identified by three eye witnesses there was a straight issue of credibility and we are not able to say that the Judge’s findings off acts were unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. If the alibi had been true it would have been open to the Appellants to call witnesses in support on them and neither of them did so.
And Hausa V. The State (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 281 SC, as follows:
Once the Prosecution through its witnesses establish that they (the witnesses) saw the Appellant committing the offence charged, a defence of alibi by the Appellant raises the straight issues of credibility to wit; whether the evidence of the witnesses is believable and if believed, the alibi is logically demolished or fizzles into thin air and so doomed.
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In this case, PW1 identified Appellant as the person, who robbed him, and even more damning to his defence, PW2, the Painter, testified that it was the Appellant that brought the taxi cab to him at the Workshop, and asked him, PW2, to paint PW1’s taxi cab with a different colour. PW3, the Police Officer, who investigated the case, also testified that when the Appellant was arrested, he confessed that he robbed PW1 and took them to PW2’s Workshop, where they recovered the taxi cab.
Obviously, the evidence against the Appellant leaves no room for any doubt as to his guilt, and in such circumstances, his defence of alibi, is logically demolished and therefore doomed. So, it cannot avail him.
It is for this and the more exhaustive reasons in the lead Judgment that I dismiss the Appeal and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal.
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.: I read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC and I completely agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
The Appellant in his extra judicial statement confessed to the commission of the crime for which he was
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charged and disclosed that the taxi cap which he robbed was at a car colour sprayer workshop at Okene Kogi State. He took the police investigators to the workshop of PW2 where he had taken the car to and PW2 identified the Appellant as the person that brought the taxi cap to his workshop. PW2 suspected the taxi cap to have been stolen, as the Appellant did not produce the particulars of the vehicle, he wanted the colour to be changed as he disappeared and did not return. PW2 reported to the police about the presence of the vehicle in his workshop and followed that report by taking the vehicle to the police station. When the Appellant conducted the investigating police officers to his workshop, PW2 took them to the police station where the vehicle was recovered.
The chain of evidence in this case leaves no gap for any doubt as to the guilt of the Appellant. Where an accused person confesses to theft and leads the police to the recovery of the subject matter of theft, issues of alibi and identification parade are no longer live issues. See Ntam v State (1968) NMLR 86; Gachi v State (1965) NMLR (Pt. 830)142.
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Learned Counsel for the appellant complained of contradictions in the prosecution’s case. Those contradictions highlighted by the Learned Counsel are not material considering the avalanche of evidence that pinned the Appellant to the commission of the offence for which he was charged tried and convicted.
Before I end this short contribution, I must commend PW2, the car paint sprayer who promptly reported the presence of the stolen car in his workshop. He is a true reflection of an honest Nigerian who deserves to be encouraged by the Law enforcement agencies. He definitely deserves an award in order to encourage others to expose criminals. It is when such people are recognized and rewarded that the fight against crime will find a new and extra momentum.
With these few words and the more elaborate reasoning in the Lead judgment. I find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby dismissed by me as well.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC, just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add.
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The appeal is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. The concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts are hereby affirmed.
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Appearances:
- OmotoshoFor Appellant(s)
Akintola Makinde with him, Bertilla AliyuFor Respondent(s)
Appearances
- OmotoshoFor Appellant
AND
Akintola Makinde with him, Bertilla AliyuFor Respondent
