CHIEF DENIS C. OSADEBAY v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 25th day of January, 1991
SC.53/1989
RATIO
JURISDICTION: POWERS OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS RAISED UNDER SECTION 6(6)(D) OF THE 1979 CONSTITUTION
From the outset, it needs to be emphasized that the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the courts of law under the 1979 Constitution to determine any question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 had been well settled by this Court in Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.58) 539 and Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (supra). In clear terms, this court decided that the jurisdiction of the courts of law to determine any such question has been excluded by Section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution as follows:
“(6) The judicial powers vested.”.. (in the courts) –
“(d) shall not, as from the date when this section comes into force, extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any such law.” (Bracket mine)
I may as well reiterate my observation in the Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552 at 596-597 thus:
‘Now, it needs to be emphasized that as from 1st October, 1979, all the courts in the Federation derive their jurisdiction from the 1979 Constitution. Where the Constitution expressly and in clear and unambiguous terms ousts the jurisdiction of any court of law from determining a particular issue or question, then the court is duty bound to give effect to the ouster. In Uwaifo v. Attorney of Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124 [1983] 4 NCLR 1, this court laid down in unequivocal ratio decidendi that by virtue of the provisions of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution, a court of law has no jurisdiction to determine the competence of a Military Governor to make any Edict or the competence of the Federal Military Government to promulgate any Decree that had been made between 15th January, 1966 and 1st October, 1979. The portion at page 309 of the Report in judgment of Uwais, J .S.C., is apt where he stated:-
“The effect of the provisions of section 6 subsection (6)(d) is clearly to retain the fetter previously placed on the courts by the successive Military Regimes which ruled this country from 15th January, 1966 to 30th September, 1979 not to question the efficacy of the laws which they promulgated. I am of the opinion that no court can in view of the provisions of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution have any jurisdiction to declare that the appropriate authority that promulgated a Decree or Edict had no power to do so.”
Also, see Joseph Mangtup Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.87) 147 at p. 171.
Like the Edict in Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (supra), the Edict and Order in the case on appeal are entitled to the protection accorded to “existing law” by section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution. The Edict and Order were made on 24th March, 1976 and 11th May, 1976 respectively. Both are existing laws as defined by section 274(4)(b) of the Constitution:
“existing law” means any law and includes any rule of law or any enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date when this section comes into force or which having been passed or made before that date comes into force after that date.” PER BELLO, C.J.N.
INTERPRETATION: EFFECT OF REPEAL OF AN ENACTMENT
Now, Section 6 of the Interpretation Act, 1964 provides:
“6. (1) The repeal of an enactment shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the enactment;
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment; may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed. PER BELLO, C.J.N.
JURISDICTION: IMPLICATION OF FAILURE A COURT TO EXERCISE JUDICIAL POWERS
If a court cannot exercise judicial powers, it cannot exercise jurisdiction. In other words, if it has no judicial powers, whatever jurisdiction the Constitution or law vests in it cannot be exercised. This is because the jurisdiction conferred, is an area mapped out by the Constitution or law for the exercise of judicial powers. PER OBASEKI, J.S.C.
INTERPRETATION: FUNDAMENTAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
It is an elementary but fundamental rule of the interpretation of statutes, that although there is a presumption against retrospectivity and in favour of prospectivity, where the words of the statute are dear and unambiguous in respect of retrospectivity retrospective effect must be given to them. This is the intention of the law maker-See Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 6 S.C.362; (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.60) 259; Atuyeye v. Ashamu (1987) 1 S.C.333; (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 267. PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C
LEGISLATION: DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF A LAW
It is well settled that the date of commencement of any law is the date of its publication, except where otherwise stated. – See Ebirikwu v. Onanyerenwa (1959) 4 F.S.C. 212; (1959) SCNLR 540. Where a retrospective date is provided, it is undoubtedly stating that that is the date of commencement. The rationale for an enabling or parent legislation is to give validity to the subsidiary legislation. The general principle of retrospectivity is to enable the legislation take into account matters which had happened before it came into existence and with which it is intended to deal. Hence, where the language of the enactment is not ambiguous and the dominant intention so demand, the retrospective effect must be given to them. See Habib v. Principal Immigration Officer (1958) 3 F.S.C.75; [1958] SCNLR 219. I subscribe to the opinion in Carson v. Carson (1964) 1 WLR 511 per Scarman, J., at p.517, that
“the rule against the retrospective effect of statutes is not a rigid or inflexible rule but is one to be applied always in the light of the language of the statute and the subject-matter with-which the statute is dealing.” PER KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C
JUSTICES
MOHAMMED BELLO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ANDREWS OTUTU OBASEKI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ADOLPHUS GODWIN KARIBI-WHYTE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
PHILLIP NNAEMEKA-AGU Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
ABUBAKAR BASHIR WALI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
EPHRAIM OMOROSE IBUKUN AKPATA Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
CHIEF DENIS C. OSADEBAY Appellant(s)
AND
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE Respondent(s)
- BELLO, C.J.N. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The plaintiff is a renowned public officer and from 1964 to 1966 was the Premier of the then Mid-Western Nigeria, now Bendel State. In January, 1966 the Military overthrew the Federal and Regional Governments and established a Military Regime in which a Military Governor was appointed to administer the Mid-Western Nigeria and to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Region in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1966.
In June 1966, the National Military Government enacted the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree, 1966 which inter alia under section 5 empowered the Military Governor of a Region to appoint a tribunal of inquiry to enquire whether or not specified public officers had corruptly or improperly enriched themselves or any person by virtue of their offices or by abuse of their offices. The Decree further empowered the Military Governor to forfeit to the State where the tribunal found a public officer had acquired assets for himself or in the name of any other person in the manner aforestated.
In exercise of the powers under the Decree, the Military Governor of Mid-Western Nigeria enacted Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No. 6 of 1967 as amended by the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry)(Amendment) Edict No. 7 of 1968 and the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) (Amendment) (No.2) Edict No.12 of 1968 wherein the Tribunal of Enquiry, known as Justice Begho Tribunal, was established to investigate the assets of the persons named therein, including the Plaintiff and to ascertain the extent to which such persons had corruptly enriched themselves or any other persons.
The Tribunal held the inquiry and submitted its Report dated 5th February, 1968 to the Military Governor. In respect of the plaintiff, the Tribunal found that:
(1) from his bank accounts, he had corruptly or improperly enriched himself by virtue of and in abuse of his office in the sum of 72,198 pounds; and
(2) he had an unbanked illgotten gain of 32,000.00 pounds
which the Tribunal recommended that he be made to disgorge the two amounts. The trial court found that the total amount the Tribunal had recommended the plaintiff should refund was 104,198 pounds, which he had corruptly acquired. After having considered the Report, the Mid-Western
Government accepted the Tribunal’s recommendations and each public officer was given the choice to refund his ill-gotten gains within a reasonable time or to accept the forfeiture of specified real properties belonging to him or to face the ignominy of being declared a public debtor.
It is pertinent to refer to the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No. 37 of 1968 promulgated on 29th July 1968. In section 14 and the Schedule 2 to it, the Decree repealed aforesaid Decree No. 51 of 1966. Edict No. 6 of 1967, No. 7 of 1968 and No. 37 of 1968 and declared in section 14(2) as follows:
“(2) It is hereby declared that-
(a) the repeal of any enactment or law by this Decree shall not affect any order, notice or other document made or thing whatsoever done under the provisions of any enactment or law hereby repealed, and every such order, notice or other document or thing so far as it is subsisting or in force at the time of the repeal shall continue or have effect by virtue of this Decree;
(b) any tribunal of inquiry established under any enactment or law repealed by this Decree and in being immediately before the making of this Decree shall on its promulgation by any means thereafter, continue as if constituted by or under and for the purposes of this Decree, and matters uncompleted before any such tribunal or pursuant to any enactment or law hereby repealed, prepared and intended for presentation thereto shall, where necessary be continued or completed, either by the same or any other tribunal accordingly by virtue of this Decree.
(c) the repeal of any enactment or law by this Decree shall not in any way affect the appointment, power or function of any person appointed or exercising any power or function by or under any such repealed enactment or law, and the appointment of such person and the exercise of such power or function shall continue and be deemed accordingly to have been made or, as the case may be, to be exercisable by virtue of this Decree, and subject to the foregoing paragraphs, the Interpretation Act 1964 shall have effect.”
The Decree further provided in section 8(3) that in making an order for forfeiture of assets corruptly or improperly acquired whether under the Decree or any other enactment or law or under any proceedings whatsoever, the Military Governor:
“May make an order for the forfeiture of any assets of any public officer or other person, no matter howsoever or whensoever acquired, if the assets whereby such public officer or other person has corruptly or improperly enriched himself or another person, or whereby he has been so enriched, are no longer subsisting either at all or in such form that they could have been made the subject of an order of forfeiture.”
It appears that the plaintiff did not refund the sum of 104,198 which the Tribunal had found he had corruptly acquired. Consequently, in exercise of the power conferred on the Military Governor by section 8 of the said Decree 37 of 1968, the Military Governor made the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968, M.S.L.N. 33 of 196 MidWestern Nigeria the Plot of land and the building thereon situate at 29 Femi Pearse Street, Lagos and some shares in specified companies belonging to the plaintiff.
In parenthesis, it may be pointed out that the plaintiff had lawfully acquired the property in question, 29 Femi Pearse Street, from Lagos Federal Territory in 1962 and negotiated with Cappa (Nig.) Ltd., a construction company, which developed the land on contractor-finance basis. Cappa built a block of flats on the land and then leased the building to Gulf Oil Company in 1966 for ten years for 90,000 pounds rents. The property was forfeited when it was under the care and management of Cappa.
The plaintiff had been out of the country and was living in England since August 1967 when the Biafran Army over-ran the Mid-Western State. He did not know his property had been forfeited until Cappa informed him by its letter dated 24th August, 1972. Thereafter, he wrote several petitions to several Government’s functionaries demanding the return to him of his property. On 21st January, 1982, he secured a Resolution of the Bendel State House of Assembly which resolved that the landed property in question should be reverted to him. After he had failed to secure the return to him of the property by extra-judicial means, on 23rd June, 1982, the plaintiff instituted the suit in this appeal in the High Court of Bendel State, claiming from the defendant, the Attorney-General of Bendel State:
“1. A declaration that by virtue of the public officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No. 6 of 1967, the order of forfeiture of the plaintiff’s Assets made by the Military Governor of Bendel State on 18th September, 1968 (that is to say MSLN 33 of 1968) took effect as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and was therefore enforceable by the High Court of Bendel State under the Sheriffs and Civil Process law (Cap. 116) – (now Cap. 151).
2. A declaration that every act and thing done by the Government of Mid-West State (now Bendel State) following the findings of the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry and the orders made thereon by the Military Governor of Mid-West State (which findings and orders are not put in issue in this suit), by seizure, forfeiture or otherwise, of the said house property and shares, is null and void, not being done under and by virtue of the Sheriffs and Civil process law of Bendel State Cap. 116 (now Cap. 151)
3. A Declaration that the property known as 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island, is the leasehold property of the plaintiff in as much as the purported execution was nor carried out under, or in accordance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law, Cap. 116-(now Cap. 151) of the Laws of Bendel State or at all.
4. An Order directing the defendant to pay over to the plaintiff the sum of N433,818.70 (Four hundred and thirty-three thousand, eight houndred and eighteen naira and seventy kobo) being money which the defendant appropriated in excess of money due to it as a result of executing the Order of forteiture, by the defendant collecting the rents and other moneys due to the plaintiff from the property known as 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island, which the plaintiff holds under a lease made by the Minister of Lagos Affairs in favour of the plaintiff and which is registered as No. 48 at page 48 in volume 1208 of the Land Registry in the office at Lagos. (The defendant has been collecting the sum of N85,000.00 a year, being rent paid on the said premises from February 1976 to February, 1982 by the tenants now occupying the premises and threaten to continue the irregular and unauthorized collection of the rents.)
5. An order restraining the defendant from henceforth collecting or claiming to be entitled to collect rents due from the said property, the order of the Tribunal of Inquiry having been fully satisfied and discharged.
6. An order directing the defendant to return to the plaintiff the plaintiffs documents of title in respect of the said house property and the plaintiff’s shares in the hands of the Government of Bendel State.
7. IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO CLAIM 4 hereof, the plaintiff claims from the defendant the sum of N641,214.70k (six hundred and forty-one thousand, two hundred and fourteen Naira, seventy kobo) being the sum of money unlawfully collected by the defendant from the plaintiffs said house property from 1976 to date.”
It follows from the foregoing that the Justice Begho inquiry and the forfeitures made there under were deemed to have been made under and by virtue of the said Decree No. 37 of 1968.
Having considered the evidence and the submission of counsel, the learned trial Judge held that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. She reasoned that if the plaintiff had instituted the suit during the Military Regime, before the 1st October, 1979 when the 1979 Constitution came into force, he would have been confronted with the provision of section 12 of the aforestated Decree No. 37 of 1968 under which the Order forfeiting his property was deemed to have been made, which ousted the jurisdiction of the court in these terms:
“12. The validity of any direction, notice or order given or made, or of any other thing whatsoever done, as the case may be, under this Decree or under any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree, or the circumstance under which such direction, notice or order has been given or made or other thing whatsoever done, shall not be inquired into in any court of law, and accordingly nothing in the provisions of chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Federation shall apply in relation to any matter arising out of this Decree or out of any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree.”
The learned Judge further considered the provisions of section 6 of the Interpretation Act, 1964 and concluded that the fact that the said Decree No.37 of 1968 was repealed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Certain Consequential Repeal, etc.) Decree No.105 of 1979 did not restore the jurisdiction of the court. She held that the repeal of the Decree has not affected the operation of the Order forfeiting the plaintiff’s property and the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter after the 1979 Constitution had come into force.
The plaintiff was not satisfied with the decision of the trial Judge and he appealed to the Court of Appeal. The issue of jurisdiction was also the main ground of appeal canvassed in the Court of Appeal. Chief Chukwura, S.A.N., for the plaintiff, had contended in that court that the MSLN 33 of 1968, hereinafter referred to as the Forfeiture Order, was void as the Edict No. 6 of 1967, as amended by Edict No. 7 of 1968, under which the forfeiture order was made was inconsistent with the Decree No. 5 of 1966. The inconsistency being that while the Decree only permitted the forfeiture of assets corruptly or improperly acquired, the Edict and the Forfeiture Order forfeited the plaintiffs property which had been lawfully obtained. Learned counsel further contended that although the Forfeiture Order was purported to have been made under Decree No.37 of 1968, which permitted the forfeiture of corruptly as well as lawfully acquired assets, the Forfeiture Order had taken effect before the Decree came into force.
In his lead judgment concurred by Musdapher and Ndoma-Egba. JJ.C.A.; Ogundare, J.C.A. set out comprehensively the relevant provisions of all the legislations involved, to wit Decree No. 51 of 1966. Edicts No.6 of 1967 and No.7 of 1968. Decree No.37 of 1968and the Forfeiture Order and concluded that the trial Judge was right that section 12 of the Decree No. 37 of 1968 effectively precluded the court from entertaining of suit questioning the validity of any direction, notices or order given or made or of any other thing whatsoever done under the Decree or under any of the enactments repealed by the Decree.
As I have shown earlier, the bedrock of the plaintiffs claim in the trial court was the alleged incompetence of the Military Governor to make the Forfeiture order forfeiting the plaintiffs property. Learned counsel for the plaintiff emphasized the same incompetence in his submission in the Court of Appeal. In the same vein, all the three grounds of appeal filed in this court reiterated directly or indirectly that the Military Governor was not competent to make the Forfeiture Order. Because this appeal will also be resolved on the only issue whether the court has jurisdiction to determine the competence of the Military Governor to make the Forfeiture Order, it is germane to the issue to reproduce fully the three grounds of this appeal:
“(1) The Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that MSLN 33 of 1968: Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968was made under Decree 37 of 1968- Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree when – the relevant enabling legislation is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51.
PARTICULARS
(a) M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 purportedly made under Decree No.37 of 1968 took effect on 15th March, 1968 when Decree No.37 of 1968had not been promulgated, did not exist and had not come into force.
(b) The relevant enabling and existing legislation at that time was Decree No.51 of 1966.
(c) Decree No.37 of 1968 was promulgated and came into force on 29th July, 1968 about four months after MSLN 33 of 1968 took effect.
(d) (i) If MSLN 33 of 1968 was made under Decree No. 37 of 1968, it was still born;
(ii) and if made under No.51 of 1966, it was void for inconsistency.
(2) The Court of Appeal erred in law in not holding that the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) No.1) Order 1968 MSLN 33, as amended, (the relevant enabling legislation of which was the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51) is void for inconsistency in that it purported to forfeit assets not corruptly or improperly acquired, contrary to clear enactments of Decree 51 of 1966.PARTICULARS
(a) The Court had properly held that the amendment effected to section 11(3) of the Public Officers (Tribunals of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967(as amended) “is void as being inconsistent with Decree No.51 of 1966…”
(b) The Court had also properly relied on section 6 of the Interpretation Act, 1964 No.1 to the effect that the repeal of an enactment shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of such right privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment.
(c) The repeal of an enactment did not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal took effect.
(d) When the forfeiture order (MSLN 33 of 1968) took effect, Decree No.37 of 1968 was not in existence and the relevant enabling enactment was NO.51 of 1966 – the order could therefore not take effect under Decree No. 37 of 1968.
(3) The Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law when it held as follows:-
“On issue (2), I need only point out that there is a misconception of the provisions of Section 9 of Decree No. 37 of 1968.
The Section does not apply to the appellant who on his own showing had sufficient assets which could, at the time be made and was indeed made, the subject of an order of forfeiture…the appropriate authority had a choice of proceeding under Section 9 or 10 which related to tracing of assets into the hands of their persons.”
PARTICULARS
(a) The assets of the Appellant could not have been (and were not) forfeited under Decree No. 37 of 1968. Further and in the alternative: If Decree No.37 of 1968 (or No.51 of 1966) applied –
(b) There was no evidence whatsoever to support the Court of Appeal finding that the appellant had sufficient assets which could be made the subject of forfeiture.
(c) Sections 9 and 10 of Decree No.37 of 1968 are alternative procedures and do not allow for proceeding simultaneously with both methods as was done in this case i.e. demand and receipt of part-payment of the sum of money adjudged can not be pursued pari-pasu with forfeiture, without further demand and failure to pay any balance outstanding.”
Grounds 1 and 2 clearly stated that the Forfeiture Order was null and void in that the Military Governor had no power to make it. In effect Ground 3 also challenged the competence of the Military Governor in making the Forfeiture Order by asserting that the Military Governor should have recovered the money corruptly acquired by means of execution in a court of law. It is transparently clear that all the three grounds required this Court to determine the competence of the Military Governor to make the Forfeiture Order.
Learned counsel for the parties had put a lot of industry and research in the preparation of their Briefs in this Court. Chief Chukwura, S.A.N., referred to a plethora of over thirty cases concerning the exercise and judicial powers of the courts of law in relation to the Decrees and Edicts of Military Regimes to buttress his submissions.
In his submission, referring to Wilson v. the Attorney-General of Bendel State (1985) 2 S.C. 191; [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572, Chief Chukwura contended that at the time the Forfeiture Order was made there was no enabling legislation authorising the Military Governor to make it and, that being the case, the Forfeiture Order was null and void. The learned Senior Advocate further contended that since the Decree 37 of 1968 had provided that the corruptly acquired asset might be recovered by judicial process under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law of Bendel State, that provision was tantamount to the restoration of the jurisdiction of the court of law over the subject-
matter of the claim. Consequently, argued the learned Senior Advocate, the court of law has jurisdiction to pronounce on the claim.
The learned Director of Public Prosecution for the respondent predicated her contention on a very narrow but effective issue that the court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Forfeiture Order because it has been precluded from doing so by Section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution. The learned Director of Public Prosecution relied on the decisions of this Court based on the said subsection. Her area of coverage of the cases was comprehensive. It ranged from Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124; [1983] 4 NCLR 1 to Udoh v. O.H.M.B. (1990) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 142) 52.
From the outset, it needs to be emphasized that the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the courts of law under the 1979 Constitution to determine any question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 had been well settled by this Court in Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.58) 539 and Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (supra). In clear terms, this court decided that the jurisdiction of the courts of law to determine any such question has been excluded by Section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution as follows:
“(6) The judicial powers vested.”.. (in the courts) –
“(d) shall not, as from the date when this section comes into force, extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any such law.” (Bracket mine)
I may as well reiterate my observation in the Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552 at 596-597 thus:
‘Now, it needs to be emphasized that as from 1st October, 1979, all the courts in the Federation derive their jurisdiction from the 1979 Constitution. Where the Constitution expressly and in clear and unambiguous terms ousts the jurisdiction of any court of law from determining a particular issue or question, then the court is duty bound to give effect to the ouster. In Uwaifo v. Attorney of Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124 [1983] 4 NCLR 1, this court laid down in unequivocal ratio decidendi that by virtue of the provisions of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution, a court of law has no jurisdiction to determine the competence of a Military Governor to make any Edict or the competence of the Federal Military Government to promulgate any Decree that had been made between 15th January, 1966 and 1st October, 1979. The portion at page 309 of the Report in judgment of Uwais, J .S.C., is apt where he stated:-
“The effect of the provisions of section 6 subsection (6)(d) is clearly to retain the fetter previously placed on the courts by the successive Military Regimes which ruled this country from 15th January, 1966 to 30th September, 1979 not to question the efficacy of the laws which they promulgated. I am of the opinion that no court can in view of the provisions of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution have any jurisdiction to declare that the appropriate authority that promulgated a Decree or Edict had no power to do so.”
Also, see Joseph Mangtup Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.87) 147 at p. 171.
Like the Edict in Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (supra), the Edict and Order in the case on appeal are entitled to the protection accorded to “existing law” by section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution. The Edict and Order were made on 24th March, 1976 and 11th May, 1976 respectively. Both are existing laws as defined by section 274(4)(b) of the Constitution:
“existing law” means any law and includes any rule of law or any enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date when this section comes into force or which having been passed or made before that date comes into force after that date.”
I have earlier shown that the enactments under which the Forfeiture Order had been made or deemed to have been made were repealed by Decree No.105 of 1979 with effect from 30th September, 1979.The Forfeiture Order itself has not been repealed.
Now, Section 6 of the Interpretation Act, 1964 provides:
“6. (1) The repeal of an enactment shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the enactment;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the enactment;
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment; may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been repealed.
Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order had the force of law on 1st October, 1979 when the 1979 Constitution came into force and is an “existing law” within the meaning of Section 274(4)(b) of the Constitution. That being the case, by virtue of Section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution, the courts have no power to determine the competence of the Military Governor of Bendel State to make the Forfeiture Order.
I have also shown that the main issue for determination in the Plaintiff’s claim revolves on the competence of the Military Governor to make the Forfeiture Order. The Constitution in its Section 6(6)(b) prevented the courts of law from entertaining such issue. Consequently, the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the decision of the trial court that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeal is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. N500 costs shall be awarded to the defendant.A. O. OBASEKI, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Bello, C.J.N., and I agree with him that the appeal must fail.
The central issue raised in the appeal revolves round the interpretation and application of the provision of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decrees of the Federal Military Government.
The appellant was the Administrator of Mid-Western Region of Nigeria on its creation on the 9th day of August, 1963. After the election to the House of Assembly of the Region in 1964 February, he became the Premier and held the office till January 15th 1966 when the military took over the administration of Nigeria in a bloody coup. A Military Governor was then appointed for the Mid-western Region by the Federal Military Government. For a few months, the Federal Military Government was changed in nomenclature to the National Military Government (May 1966 to October, 1966) but subsequently reverted to its former title “the Federal Military Government.”
One of the declared aim of the Federal Military Government was the investigation of the assets of former public officers and the forfeiture of ascertained unlawful enrichment. Towards this end, it promulgated enabling legislations including Decree No.51 of 1966 titled “The Public (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966″ which made provision in section 5 for the appointment of and establishment of a tribunal of inquiry by the Military Governor to enquire whether or not specified public officers had corruptly or improperly enriched themselves or any person by virtue of their offices or by abuse of their offices. The Decree further empowered the Military Governor to forfeit to the State assets adjudged as constituting unlawful enrichment. Subsequently, Decree No.37 of 1968” titled “Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968 was promulgated. It, among others, repealed Decree No.51 of 1966 and re-enacted most of its provisions.
The assets of the appellant were investigated by the tribunal appointed and set up by the Military Governor the Mid-western Region and it was adjudged that he had unlawfully enriched himself to the tune of N104,198:00 Section 8(3) of Decree No.37 of 1968 is very relevant as it empowered the Military Governor to forfeit the assets of the guilty public officer to cover the unlawful enrichment. More specifically, the section provides that-
“The Military Governor may make an order for the forfeiture of any assets of any public officer or other person no mailer howsoever or whensoever acquired; if the assets whereby such public officer or other person has corruptly or improperly enriched himself or another person, or whereby he has been so enriched are no longer subsisting either at all or in such form that they could have been made the subject of an order of forfeiture.”
Pursuant to this section 8(3), the Military Governor made the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968, MSLN .33 of 1968 on the 18th September, 1968 forfeiting to the Government of Mid-western Nigeria the plot of land and the building thereon situate at 29 Femi Pearce Street, Lagos and some shares in specified companies belonging to the appellant. No. 29 Femi Pearce Street, Victoria Island was a leasehold property acquired by the appellant from Lagos State Government and was developed under a contract financing agreement with G, Cappa (Nig.) Ltd.
The provisions of section 8(3) of Decree No.37 of 1968 have been couched in terms wide enough to bring the above property, i.e. 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island, Lagos within the class of property liable to forfeiture by the State Military Governor for the unlawful enrichment of the appellant. The appellant paid part of the amount Sterling (23,607.7 pounds or in Naira N47,214.70k) following the decision of government to give each public officer found guilty of unlawful enrichment the choice to refund his ill-gotten gains within a reasonable time or to accept forfeiture of specified real properties to him or face the ignominy of being declared a public debtor.
On the appellant’s failure to refund the full amount, government by Notice MSLN.33 of 1968 made an order dated 18th September, 1968 (taking effect from 15th March, 1968) to the effect that the assets of the appellant referred to above.
“are hereby forfeited to the Government of Mid-Western State of Nigeria and shall without further assurance vest in the (Military Governor) and be held by me on behalf and in trust for the Government of Mid-Western State of Nigeria.”
The appellant’s counsel, Chief Olisa Chukura, S.A.N., has argued that the order was null and void as the enabling Decree was not in effect on 15th March, 1968.He conceded that at the date the order was made, the enabling Decree No. 37 of 1968 had come into force. Learned counsel in his brief formulated two issues each consisting of three sub-issues for determination in this appeal. Sub-issues 1(a) and (b) are very relevant in this appeal and read:
“1(a) Was the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 (MSLN. 33 of 1968) made under the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968 No.37 as to oust the jurisdiction of the court;
(b) Is it possible that the relevant enabling Legislation under which MSLN. 33 of 1968 could be made is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51. In this case MSLN. 33 of 1968 is void for inconsistency in purporting to forfeit assets not unjustly or improperly acquired and was therefore incapable of ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court;
(c) If the enabling Decree for the promulgation of MSLN. 33 of 1968 is Decree No. 51 of 1966 was the jurisdiction of the Court ousted
Having regard to the three declaratory orders, the other orders and the sum of N641,214.70 claimed by the appellant the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the respondent and in my view, it assumed the primacy of importance. Indeed, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd declaratory orders claimed involve the question of jurisdiction in terms they read:
“The plaintiffs claims against the defendant are
1. A declaration that by virtue of the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967, the Order of forfeiture of the plaintiffs assets made by the Military Governor of Bendel State on 19th September, 1968 (that is to say MSLN.33 of 1968) took effect as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and was therefore enforceable by the High Court of Bendel State under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law (Cap. 1l6) – (now Cap. 151);
2. A declaration that every act or thing done by the government of Mid- West State (now Bendel State) following the findings of the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry and the Orders made thereon by the Military Governor of Midwest State (which findings and Orders are not put in issue in this suit) by seizure, forfeiture or otherwise, of the said house and property and shares is null and void not being done by virtue of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law of Bendel State.
3. A declaration that the property known as 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island is the leasehold property of the plaintiff in as much as the purported execution was not carried out under or in accordance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law Cap.116 (now Cap. 151) of the Laws of Bendel State or at all.
(b) Is it possible that the relevant enabling Legislation under which MSLN.33 of 1968 could be made is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51. In this case MSLN.33 of 1968 is void for inconsistency in purporting to forfeit assets not unjustly or improperly acquired and was therefore incapable of ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court;
(c) If the enabling Decree for the promulgation of MSLN.33 of 1968 is Decree No.S1 of 1966 was the jurisdiction of the court ousted Having regard to the three declaratory orders, the other orders and the sum of N641,214.70 claimed by the appellant the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the respondent as in my view, it assumed the primacy of importance. Indeed, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd declaratory orders claimed involve the question of jurisdiction in terms they read:
“The plaintiff’s claims against the defendant are
1. A declaration that by virtue of the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967, the Order of forfeiture of the plaintiff’s assets made by the Military Governor of Bendel State on 19th September, 1968 (that is to say MSLN.33 of 1968) took effect as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and was therefore enforceable by the High Court of Bendel State under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law (Cap.116) – (now Cap. 151);
2. A declaration that every act or thing done by the government of Mid-West State (now Bendel State) following the findings of the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry and the Orders made thereon by the Military Governor of Mid-West State (which findings and Orders are not put in issue in this suit) by seizure, forfeiture or otherwise, of the said house and property and shares is null and void
not being done by virtue of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law of Bendel State.
3. A declaration that the property known as 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island is the leasehold property of the plaintiff in as much as the purported execution was not carried out under or in accordance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law Cap. 116 (now Cap. 151) of the Laws of Bendel State or at all.
The contention raised in these claims is that the Military Governor is incompetent to make the order the terms of which are precise, clear and unambiguous. The statement that the order is not put in issue is not borne out by the terms of the claim and is a ploy to lead the High Court to exercise the judicial powers expressly withdrawn from it by the constitution.
The question, therefore, is whether the High Court of Bendel State can entertain the claim or, in other words, whether the High Court is vested with judicial powers to adjudicate on the claim. The judicial powers vested in the courts by section 6(1) and (2) is limited by paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection 6 of section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1979. It is paragraph (d) of subsection (6) of section 6 of the Constitution that is of relevance in the instant appeal. It reads:
“The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provision shall not, as from the date when this section comes into force, extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any such law.”
If a court cannot exercise judicial powers, it cannot exercise jurisdiction. In other words, if it has no judicial powers, whatever jurisdiction the Constitution or law vests in it cannot be exercised. This is because the jurisdiction conferred, is an area mapped out by the Constitution or law for the exercise of judicial powers.
A claim for a declaration that the property No.29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island which was taken over by the Bendel, State Government following an order of forfeiture made by the Military Governor, is the property of the plaintiff/appellant is a challenge to the validity of the order and a challenge to the competence of the Military Governor to make the order, the statement that the order is not put in issue not withstanding.
A claim that the act of forfeiture and seizure pursuant to the order of the Military Governor is null and void is also a challenge to the validity of the order and the competence of the Military Governor to make it.
The constitutional limitation imposed on the exercise of judicial powers by the courts must not be breached deliberately and consciously or by the use of clever arguments if the Rule of Law is to reign in our society. Section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution was first examined and construed by this court in the celebrated case of Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State. (1982) 7 S.C. 124; [1983] 4 NCLR 1 the facts of which are almost similar to the facts in the instant appeal. The decision in that case has since been followed in many cases coming before us. These cases include:
Attorney-General of Imo State v. Attorney-General of Rivers State (1983) 2 SCNLR 108 at 120;
Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.58) 539 at 552-553 at 651
Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) 147; and
Dosunmu v. Attorney-General of Lagos State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 87) 552.
If sympathy is to dominate our judicial task, we will falter and be unable to discharge our paramount duty of preserving the Rule of Law. The constitutional bar on the exercise of judicial power precludes the court from examining the merit of the case being put forward. It is not an indictment of the plaintiff/appellant.
In view of the constitutional bar on the exercise of the judicial powers vested in the court in respect of the claims filed by the plaintiff/appellant, the High Court was justified in dismissing the claim for want of jurisdiction and the Court of Appeal equally justified in dismissing the appeal from that judgment.
I, too, will dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judicial powers vested in the court does not extend to adjudication and determination of the claims instituted by the plaintiff/appellant. Accordingly, I hereby dismiss the appeal with costs to the respondent fixed at N500.00.A. G. KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C.: I have had the opportunity to read the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of Nigeria, the Hon. Justice Mohammed Bello, C.J.N., in this appeal. I agree with his reasoning and his conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. I also will, and hereby dismiss the appeal. I wish however to make some comments of my own on the questions of interpretation which fell for determination in this appeal.
The learned Chief Justice in his judgment stated the facts of the case lucidly and in considerable detail. I do not think I can improve on that. I therefore adopt them in their entirety. I will in this judgment also deal with the issue, which calls for determination of the competence of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in respect of matters done by the Military Government between January 15, 1966 and September 30, 1979.
It is however important to my consideration of these issues to set out the reliefs sought by the Appellant at the Court of trial. They are as follows-
“1. A declaration that by virtue of the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967, the Order of forfeiture of the plaintiffs assets made by the Military Governor of Bendel State on 19th September, 1968 (that is to say MSLN.33 of 1968) took effect as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and was therefore enforceable by the High Court of Bendel State under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law (Cap.116) – (now Cap.151);
2. A declaration that every act or thing done by the Government of Mid-West State (now Bendel State) following the findings of the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry and the Orders made thereon by the Military Governor of Mid-West State (which findings and Orders are not put in issue in this suit) by seizure, forfeiture or otherwise, of the said house, property and shares is null and void not being done under and by virtue of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law of Bendel State Cap. 116 (now Cap.151).
3. A declaration that the property known as 29 Femi Pearce Street, Victoria Island is the leasehold property of the plaintiff in as much as the purported execution was not carried out under, or in accordance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law, Cap.116-(now Cap. 151) of the Laws of Bendel State or at all.
4. An Order directing the defendant to pay over to the plaintiff the sum of N432,817.82 (Four hundred and thirty-two thousand, Eight hundred and Seventeen Naira, Eighty- two kobo) being money which the defendant appropriated in excess of money due to it as a result of executing the Order of forfeiture, by the defendant collecting the rents and other moneys due to the plaintiff from the property known as 29 Femi Pearce Street, Victoria Island which the plaintiff holds under a lease made by the Minister of Lagos Affairs in favour of the plaintiff and which is registered as No. 48 at page 48 in Volume 1208of the Land Registry in the Office of Lagos. (The defendant has been collecting the sum of N85,000.00 a year, being rent paid on the said premises from February 1976 to February, 1982 by the tenants now occupying the premises and threatens to continue the irregular and unathorised collection of the rents).
5. An Order restraining the Defendant from henceforth collecting or claiming to be entitled to collect rents due from the said premises or in any way laying any claim whatsoever to the said property, the order of the Tribunal of Inquiry having been fully satisfied and discharged.
6. An Order directing the defendant to return to the plaintiff the plaintiffs documents of title in respect of the said house property and the plaintiffs shares in the hands of the Government of Bendel State.
7. IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO CLAIM 4 hereof, the plaintiff claims from the defendant the sum of N641,214.70k (Six hundred and forty one thousand, two hundred and fourteen Naira, Seventy Kobo) being the sum of money unlawfully collected by the defendant from plaintiffs said house property from 1976 to date.”
It seems to me clear from the reliefs claimed that appellant was both in the writ of summons and statement of claim challenging the competence of the Military Governor of Mid-West State (now Bendel State) to seize his assets, subject-matter of complaint before the court. It seems to me that appellant is in one breath (see reliefs 1 & 2) not disputing the validity of the Tribunal of Inquiry under which the order of forfeiture of the assets was made, but is on the other hand contending the validity of the Order made sequel to the findings of the Tribunal and forfeiting the assets (see 2 & 3 reliefs).
Appellant has, through the proceedings maintained this stand. This is exemplified by the grounds of appeal (excluding particulars) filed in this court, which are as follows –
“(1) The Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that MSLN 33 of 1968; Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 was made under Decree 37 of 1968 -Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree when- the relevant enabling legislation is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1968 No. 51.
(2) The Court of Appeal erred in law in not holding that the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 MSLN 33, as amended, (the relevant enabling legislation of which was the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51) is void for inconsistency in that it purported to forfeit assets not corruptly or improperly acquired, contrary to clear enactments of Decree 51 of 1966.
(3) The Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law when it held as follows:-
“On Issue (2), I need only point out that there is a misconception of the provisions of Section 9 of Decree No.37 of 1968. The Section docs not apply to the appellant who on his own showing had sufficient assets which could, at the subject of an order of forfeiture the appropriate authority had a choice of proceeding under Section 9 or 10 which related to tracing of assets into the hands of third persons.
(4) RELIEF SOUGHT from the Supreme Court of Nigeria:- An Order allowing the Appellant’s appeal and setting aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal (and with it that of the High Court) and in its place an Order granting the Appellant’s claims as appear on the Writ and Statement of Claim.”
In effect the complaint of appellant is essentially on the crucial issue of the competence of the Military Governor to make the forfeiture Order. This, in my view, is the kernel of the dispute.
It is not in dispute that the transaction resulting in the making of the forfeiture Order, took place between January 15, 1966 and Sept. 30, 1979. It is however not accepted that the forfeiture order MSLN.33 of 1968was made by virtue of powers under The Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No.37 of 1968. The contention of the appellant before us is that the forfeiture Order MSLN.33 of 1968 made on 18/9/68, could not validly be made to come into force on 15/3/68before the commencement of its enabling Decree, No.37 of 1968 on the 29/7/68. That is whether it could be made retrospective to a period before the Decree came into force Learned counsel would accept Decree No.51 of 1966 as the enabling Decree.
Learned counsel’s argument is that the forfeiture Order cannot be made retrospective to have come into force before the enactment of its enabling Decree. Accordingly having been so made, there was no legal foundation to sustain the forfeiture Order, which learned counsel described as “still-born” and therefore a nullity.
The second argument was that the Order for forfeiture (MSLN 33of 1968) is inconsistent with sections 4(1)(a) and (b), 8(1) and 8(3) of Decree No.37 of 1968 in that it ordered the forfeiture of assets not tainted with corruption or impropriety. Learned counsel cited and relied on Adamolekun v. University of Ibadan (1967) 1 All NLR 213; Adejumo v. Johnson (1972) 1 All NLR. (Pt. 1) 159; Peenock Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 S.C. 1; (1983) 4 NCLR 122; Ereku v. Military Governor of MidWest State (1974) 1 All NLR. (Pt.2) 163. The Order of forfeiture was in respect of shares in Companies and 29 Femi Pearse Street, which were not found to be corruptly or improperly acquired. It was submitted that the sums of 32,000, and 72,000 to be refunded by the appellant were in fact moneys of the Political Party known as the NCNC which was still subsisting, and were not paid to the Appellant for his personal use.
Learned counsel submitted that the precondition for the operation of the Ouster clause is that the notice or order must be made or given under the Decree.
Further on this issue, learned counsel to the appellant argued the forfeiture Order and other statutes referred to being deprivative enactments must be construed against the law maker. Learned counsel cited Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Ashiru & 3 Ors. (1978) 6 & 7 S.C. 99; Bello v. Diocesan Synod of Lagos (1973) ECSLR (Pt.1) 330, Peen ok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 S.C. 1; (1983) 4 NCLR 122; Mrs. Lily Uyanne v. Ofor Asika (1975) 4 S.C.233 at p.238. Finally it was contended that even if on the authority of Falobi v. Falobi (1976) 9 & 10 S.C. 1, the MSLN.33 of 1968 was saved by Decree No.51 of 1966 which was in force at the time it was made, it was void as being inconsistent with Decree No.51 of 1966, as not being properly corruptly or improperly acquired. It was also argued that since appellant acquired rights provided by Decree No.51 of 1966, a subsequent repeal of the Decree did not affect the rights so acquired – See Johnson v. The State (1981) 2 S.C.29 at p.37. Accordingly the promulgation of Decree No. 37 of 1968 cannot retroactively affect such rights – see Afolabi v. Governor of Oyo State (1985)2 NWLR (Pt.9) 734. The resolution of this issue, as the second, depends on the construction of the provisions enabling the forfeiture of appellant property consequent upon the recommendations of the Begho Tribunal, and its acceptance by the Military Governor of the State. The Tribunal which recommended the forfeiture of appellant’s property was set up by the Military Governor of Mid-Western State under Edict No.6 of 1967 as amended by Edict No. 7 of 1968. Edict No.6 of 1967 was made under and by virtue of powers under S.5(1) Decree No.51 of 1966. Section 3(1) of Decree No.51 of 1966 empowered the Military Governor to appoint a Tribunal of Inquiry consisting of not more than three persons, as he deems fit, for the purpose of inquiry.
(a) whether or not the public officer has corruptly or improperly enriched himself or any person by virtue of his office or by any means in abuse of his office or otherwise howsoever, whilst a public officer:
and
(b) as to the extent of such enrichment.
Section 4(1) of the same Decree which enables forfeiture provides that
“(a) where an inquiry under this Decree (or any other enactment or under any proceedings whatsoever) discloses that a public officer has acquired assets for himself or in the name of any other person in the manner aforesaid; and
(b) if be is of the opinion that reparation ought to be made, make an order forfeiting to the State all the assets or any parts thereof acquired in the manner described in section 3, of this Decree, whether or not such assets are in his name.”
Although the investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No.37 of 1968 repealed, Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No. 51 of 1966 Edict No.6 of 1967, Public Officers (Tribunals of Inquiry) Edict No.7 of 1968 Public Officers (Tribunals of Inquiry (Amdt.) Section 8(1)(2)(3), thereof is a re-enactment of sections 3 and 4 of Decree No.51 of 1966.The significant difference in the reenactment is the provision that no order for forfeiture can be made by the Military Governor except with the consent of the Head of the Federal Military Government. Section 14 of the Decree No.37 of 1968 saved Orders, etc. made under Decree No.51 of 1966. It is patent from the Decrees and Edicts that they were concerned with the recovery of property corruptly or improperly acquired, and property acquired by virtue of abuse of office. In other words, the Government was interested in the recovery of ill-gotten gains.
Learned counsel to the appellant has argued that since the Decree No.37 of 1968 came into force on the 29th July, 1968, and the forfeiture Order which was made on the 18th September, 1968, the forfeiture Order could not be made retrospective to a date before the coming into force of the enabling Decree.
Learned counsel to the respondent has submitted to us, and I entirely agree that the fact that the commencement of the forfeiture Order antedates its parent and enabling Decree did not affect its validity. The words of the forfeiture Order are clear and unambiguous and should he construed accordingly.
It is an elementary but fundamental rule of the interpretation of statutes, that although there is a presumption against retrospectivity and in favour of prospectivity, where the words of the statute are dear and unambiguous in respect of retrospectivity retrospective effect must be given to them. This is the intention of the law maker-See Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 6 S.C.362; (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.60) 259; Atuyeye v. Ashamu (1987) 1 S.C.333; (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 267. It is a misconception to contend that the forfeiture Order can only be made retrospective to the date of commencement of the enabling legislation.
It is well settled that the date of commencement of any law is the date of its publication, except where otherwise stated. – See Ebirikwu v. Onanyerenwa (1959) 4 F.S.C. 212; (1959) SCNLR 540. Where a retrospective date is provided, it is undoubtedly stating that that is the date of commencement. The rationale for an enabling or parent legislation is to give validity to the subsidiary legislation. The general principle of retrospectivity is to enable the legislation take into account matters which had happened before it came into existence and with which it is intended to deal. Hence, where the language of the enactment is not ambiguous and the dominant intention so demand, the retrospective effect must be given to them. See Habib v. Principal Immigration Officer (1958) 3 F.S.C.75; [1958] SCNLR 219. I subscribe to the opinion in Carson v. Carson (1964) 1 WLR 511 per Scarman, J., at p.517, that
“the rule against the retrospective effect of statutes is not a rigid or inflexible rule but is one to be applied always in the light of the language of the statute and the subject-matter with-which the statute is dealing.”The assets, subject-matter of forfeiture, as has been said, are those of the Appellant. The Order of forfeiture was made on the 18th September, 1968, under and by virtue of section 8(3) of Decree No.37 of 1968, which came into force on the 29th July, 1968. The forfeiture Order has been made
retrospective to the 15th March, 1968.
The contention that the Order made retrospective cannot antedate its enabling Decree is founded on the assumption that the property of Appellant was forfeited under the Decree. This is not so. The Order under which the property was forfeited was different and came into force on 1819/68 after the promulgation on the 29/7/68 of the Decree No. 37 of 1968. It is a subsidiary legislation, dependent only for its validity on the enabling Decree.
Accordingly where its words are clear and unambiguous as to the scope of its operation it will not be limited by the date of the commencement of the enabling Decree. The Forfeiture Order came into force on 18/9/68, but was made retrospective to 15/3/68 to cover its subject-matter. The principle of retrospectivity is that the operation of the law relates back to a period before its commencement. So it is in this case:
The intention of the legislation which was to include the period of the subject-matter of the forfeiture, was so clearly expressed as to avoid any doubts whatsoever of the intention to provide for the operation of the forfeiture Order, as from the 15th March, 1968.
I have not found any of the many cases cited by learned counsel to the appellant to support any of the propositions contended for by him. The words of the forfeiture Order construed are not ambiguous, and therefore not open to more than one interpretations. There is no doubt therefore that the forfeiture Order M.S.L.N. No.33 of 1968is not void because it was made retrospective to a date before its enabling Decree No.38 of 1968 came into force. Learned counsel to the appellant can hardly be right in his submission that Decree No.51 of 1966 is the enabling law of the forfeiture Order MSLN. 38 of 1968, and that the Order is inconsistent with the terms of the Decree and accordingly void.
Learned counsel to the appellant in all the grounds of appeal 1, 2, and 3, filed and the issues as formulated is questioning the validity of the forfeiture Order M.S.L.N.33 of 1968. Ground 3 questions the competence of the Military Governor to make the Order. It was his contention that it is void and non-existent both on the ground that it is stated to have come into existence before its enabling Decree, and that the provisions are inconsistent with those of Decree No. 51 of 1966.
This submission would seem to have completely ignored the express and unambiguous provisions of section 12 of Decree No. 37 of 1968 which excludes the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of any action questioning the “validity of any discretion, notice, or order given or made, or of any other thing whatsoever done, as the case may be, under this Decree, or under any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree, or circumstances under which such direction, notice or order has been given or made or other thing whatsoever done…”
Thus section 12 is clear and unambiguous and excludes the jurisdiction of the Court, not only in respect of matters done under the Decree, but also under any enactment or other law repealed by this law. This exclusion relates to acts done under Decree No.51 of 1966 repealed by section 14: Furthermore section 12 excludes the application of the provisions of fundamental human rights to matters arising out of this Decree or out of any enactment or other law repealed by the Decree. Accordingly whether the act complained of is done under Decree No.51 of 1966, Decree No. 37 of 1968, or under any other law or enactment, the jurisdiction of the Court to inquire into the validity of such acts is excluded.
Section 14(1) which repealed Decree No.51 of 1966, Edict No.6 of 1967 and No.7 of 1968, preserved any order, notice, or other document made under the provisions of any repealed enactment. Such notice, order or other document in force at the time of the repeal, shall continue to have effect by virtue of this Decree.
I now refer to the submission of learned counsel to the Appellant on the question of the Competence of the Military Governor to make the order for forfeiture MSLN 33 of 1968. His contention was that there was no enabling legislation since the MSLN 33 of 1968 was made to come into force before the enactment of the enabling Decree No.37 of 1968. I have already held that that view is erroneous. The MSLN. 33 of 1968 came into being after the enactment of Decree No. 37 1968.
I think the learned Director of Public Prosecution who argued that section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution 1979 precludes the court from exercising jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Order for forfeiture was on much firmer legal grounds. Learned counsel relied on Uwaifo v. Attorney-General for Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124; (1983) 4 NCLR 1; Udoh v. O.H.M.B. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.142) 52.
The exercise of the judicial powers of the Constitution is by the Constitution vested in the courts named in section 6(5). Section 6(6) goes further to prescribe the circumstances of the exercise of these powers and in respect of and on behalf of whom the powers could be exercised -See S.6(6)(b), Section 6(6)(c)(d) prescribe the circumstances when the exercise of the judicial power of the Constitution cannot be invoked and is excluded. These are
(c) x x x (not relevant)
“(d) shall not, as from the date when this section comes into force, extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966, for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any authority or person to make any such law.”
This provision of sub-section (6) of the Constitution, 1979 has been construed and well settled in many decisions of this court. The most recent being Attorney-General of Lagos State v. Dosumu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552; Din v. A.G. of the Federation (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) 147.
The provision seems to me a policy legislation designed to insulate and render immune, the actions of the outgoing Military Administration from any possible illegality or errors resulting from the period of its administration. This policy was referred to by my learned brother, Uwais, J.S.C. in Uwaifo v. A.-G. of Bendel State (supra) when he observed
“The effect of the provisions of section 6 sub-section 6(d) is clearly to retain the feller previously placed on the courts by the successive Military Regimes which ruled this country from 15th January, 1966 to 30th September, 1979 not to question the efficacy of the laws which they promulgated…”
The Courts can only exercise the judicial powers vested in them by the Constitution. Where the Constitution has expressly and without ambiguity excluded the exercise of its judicial powers, the exercise of such powers by the courts will be unconstitutional. In Uwaifo v. Attorney-General, Bendel State (supra) this court has laid it down and this principle has always been followed, that by virtue of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution 1979, a court of law has no jurisdiction to determine the competence of a Military Governor to promulgate any Edict or the competence of the Federal Military Government to promulgate any Decree made between 15/1/66 and 1/10/79.
The Edict and Order in this case like the Edict in Uwaifo’s case were made by the Military Governor. They accordingly are entitled to the protection of the provision of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution, 1979. The Edict was made on the 24th March, 1976, and the Order on the 11th May, 1976. Both are made within the period prescribed in S.6 (6)(d) of the Constitution, 1979. Both are existing laws as defined by section 274(4)(b) of the Constitution, 1979.
It is pertinent to observe that although Decree No.37 of 1968 under which the Order was made was repealed by Decree No.105 of 1979 with effect from September 30, 1979, not so the Order. Hence the M.S.L.N. No.33 of 1968, the Forfeiture Order survived as an existing law, within the meaning of S.274(4)(b) and had the force of law on the 1st October, 1979 when the Constitution, 1979 came into force. This being the case, and by virtue of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution, 1979, being any question as to the competence of any person or authority to make any such law between 15/1/66 and 30/9/79, the judicial powers of the Constitution are not vested in the courts in such matters. The courts cannot therefore exercise jurisdiction to determine the competence of the authority in respect of such acts. The Court of Appeal was therefore right in upholding the decision of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on the issue.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. The appeal of the appellant is accordingly dismissed.
Appellant shall pay N500 as costs to the respondents.S. M. A. BELGORE, J.S.C.: The main plank of this appeal is the question of jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the appellant whilst relying on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 as his authority to bring the suit before the Court after 1979, he failed to explain why he never went to Court before 1979. The fact seems to be the awareness that no Court had jurisdiction to try or hear the matter. The tenacity of reliance on Interpretation Act, S.6(1)(a) thereof, is anomalous when considered in the light of the submission of the appellant: does the right that never existed before 1979 by virtue of Decree No.37 of 1968 resurrect by mere fact that such a right would exist under 1979 Constitution What 1979 Constitution did was to breath life into existing laws and rights and no more. The right to challenge Decree No.37 of 1968 did not exist and 1979 Constitution did not breath life to a dead right.
Any Decree ousting the jurisdiction of the Court does so effectively, because a Decree is a special creature of the Military to shield their own peculiar method of governance; it is for this reason they make their Decrees superior even to the Constitution. S.12 of Decree No.34 of 1968 is clear and it should not be beclouded by Court-induced ambiguity. When there is no jurisdiction the Court will act ultra vires should it venture to assume one; for a Court embarking on the hearing of a matter not within its jurisdiction is exercising in moot, a function not that of Court [Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 6 S. C.175]. The peculiar circumstance of a military regime is a point in issue, much as the military exercise governance and do so effectively, their protective laws must be obeyed; and once the Decrees are clear and unambiguous as to ouster of Courts’ jurisdiction in certain subject-matters the Courts indeed have no jurisdiction. [Attorney General Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552; Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124].
The provisions in Decree No.37 of 1968, S.12, and in similar vein in Decree No. 10 of 1976 in 6(3) are absolute in their ouster of courts’ jurisdiction and the forfeiture of assets ordered by their virtue cannot be challenged in any Court of law. It is to avoid any doubt as to ouster of jurisdiction by virtue of such Decrees that the 1979 Constitution in S.6(6)(d) thereof precludes Courts looking back on them; without this provision the Courts would start arrogating to themselves powers they never had before 1st October, 1979 [Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539, 541; Uwaifor v. Attorney-General Bendel State (supra); Okumagba v. Egbe (1965) 1 All NLR 62].
At the time this action was brought the appellant could not have succeeded because his position vis-a-vis the forfeiture order was not ameliorated by 1979Constitution because S.6(6)(d) thereof permits no looking back into the executive act giving rise to the forfeiture before 1st October, 1979 [Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.87) 147; Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550; Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (supra) ].
It must be pointed out that Courts are creatures of statute based on the Constitution. Their jurisdictions are based on statutes and no Court assumes jurisdiction without enabling statute. Jurisdiction cannot be implied where there is no statute to back it up [Ariyo v. Ogele (1968) 1 All NLR 1; Timitimi v. Amaoebe (1953) XIV WACA 374]. When there is no jurisdiction it is futile exercise for a Court to embark on the hearing of a matter [Attorney-General of the Federation v. Sode (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 500, 503, 504, 505]
It is for the foregoing reasons and for the fuller reasons in the judgment of Bello, C.J.N., which I entirely agree with, that I find no merit in this appeal and I hereby dismiss it with N500.00 cost to the respondent.A. B. WALI, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance, a copy of the lead judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed Bello, C.J.N. I entirely agree with his reasoning and the conclusion which I hereby adopt as mine.
The crux of the matter involved in this appeal is the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction, that is the High Court of Bendel State, to entertain the complaint filed before it by the plaintiff/appellant. Based on the pleadings filed and exchanged by the parties, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff/appellant and the addresses by the learned Counsel at the conclusion of the appellant’s evidence, the learned, trial Judge considered and construed the following statutes –
(a) Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No.5 of 1966;
(b) Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967 (Mid-West State);
(c) Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) [Amendment] Edict No.7 of 1968 (Mid-West State);
(d) Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No. 37 of 1968 and
(e) Public Officers and other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 [M.S.L.N. of 1968]
and came to the following conclusion –
“With regard to the plaintiff’s right to bring this action at all, learned Senior Advocate conceded in his address that the plaintiff had no right to bring the suit until after the coming into effect of the 1979 Constitution on the 1st of October of that year when Decree No.37 of 1968 was repealed, and also the cause of action cannot arise until there is a person who can sue and one who can be sued. Section 6(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act will also apply to the plaintiff’s right to sue in as much as that right which did not exist under the repealed law was not born when the repeal came into force. The effect of the Interpretation Law on repealed enactments containing ouster clauses was discussed at length in [Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State and 4 Ors. (1982) 7 S.C.124 and at page 289, Nnamani, J.S.C., stated:-
“The clauses ousting the jurisdiction of the court were a shield operating to the benefit of the respondents and were, in effect, a right of immunity from suit. Even though the Acts were implicably repealed, that right is an accrued right which survives. On the other hand, the forfeiture of the appellant’s property is a liability incurred under the repealed enactment. Sub-section (e) of Section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act clearly also applies against the appellants.’
The immunity from suit given to the defendants in this case by the provisions of Section 12 of Edict No.37 of 1968, being an accrued right at the time of the repeal of the Edict, continues, unaffected by the repeal, as a shield for the defendants. It follows, therefore, that even if the plaintiff had the right to bring this action, the defendant, being in effect, the Bendel State Government, is clothed with immunity from suit so the plaintiff would have no defendant that he could sue. In addition, as the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain such an action it would be a pointless exercise filing it.”
The action filed by the plaintiff was dismissed.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal and in a well considered judgment of the Court of Appeal, Benm, delivered by Ogundare, J.C.A., with which both Musdapher and Ndoma-Egba, JJ.C.A. agreed, the learned Justice concluded on the issue of jurisdiction.-
“that the learned trial Judge was right in the conclusion reached by her that she had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claims. S.12 of Decree No.37 of 1968 effectively precluded her from entertaining any suit questioning the validity of any direction notice, or order given or made or of any other thing whatsoever done under the Decree or under any of the enactments repealed by the Decree.”
The Court of Appeal then dismissed the plaintiff/appellant’s claim and affirmed the judgment and orders of the trial court.
It was as a result of the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal that the plaintiff/appellant has now appealed to this Court.
The present action was filed in the High Court on 23rd June, 1982, more than two and a half years after the 1979 Constitution has come into force. The appellant’s assets were forfeited as a result of probe into the assets of the appellant by the Tribunal of Inquiry headed by Hon. Justice M. A. Begho and under the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967 by the then Mid-West State now renamed Bendel State Government. The Government Promulgated the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 and published as M.S.L.N.33 of 1968, forfeiting to the State Government the following assets of the appellant-
“1. The plot of land and the building thereon situate at 29 Femi Pearse Street, Lagos.
2. Shares in Anyansi and Brienton Ltd., the value of which is 32,000 pounds.
3. Shares in Phoenix Insurance Co. Ltd., the value of which is 32,500 pounds
4. Shares in Agricultural Investment Co. Ltd., the value of which is 32,000 pounds.
5. Shares in Mid-West Voice (Newspaper) the value of which is 33.000 pounds.
By the provision of section 12 of Decree No.37 of 1968, the Courts were precluded from entertaining actions relating to forfeiture of assets following results of probes of public officers held under the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No.5 of 1966, Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967 (Mid-West State), (Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree No.37 of 1968 and Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) (Amendment) Edict No.7 of 1968.
Decree No.37 of 1968 repealed Decree No.51 of 1966 but re-enacted almost in pari materia certain provisions of that Decree which are relevant to the decision of this case. By 1976, the Federal Military Government promulgated Decree No. 10 of 1976.
Under Decree No.5 of 1966 section 7(2), and Decree No.37 of 1968 section 12, the jurisdiction of any court to entertain complaints against forfeiture of any assets under these Decrees or any other law was ousted. These ouster clauses were repealed in section 6 of Decree No. 10 of 1976 and Sections 1(2) and 3(2) of Decree No.18 of 1977.
Section 1(1) of Decree No.18 of 1977 validated any inquiry conducted by the appropriate authority on or after the commencement of the Decree (but before 30th September, 1977). Also by the provision of section-6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution all actions done under those Decrees and Edicts are accorded privilege and immunity of being questioned in any court of law, as a mailer of law. See F.S. Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124; Mangtup Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.87) 147 and [Attorney-General Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 552]
Where a statutory provision is clear (as in the ouster clauses referred to supra and section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution), it cannot be construed and stretched beyond its con. If its language and legislative intent are apparent, a Judge is not en clothed with authority to distort its meaning in order to make it conform with his own views of sound social justice.
I shall also dismiss this appeal as lacking in merit. The decision and orders of the trial court as confirmed by the Court of Appeal are hereby affirmed. I abide by the order as to costs made in the lead judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed Bello, C.J.N.E. O. I. AKPATA, J.S.C.: I have been privileged to have a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Bello, C.J.N. I agree with him. As the appeal touches on vital constitutional issues, I consider it necessary to express my views on it even at the risk of restating ad nauseam some points contained in the judgment of my learned brother.
The facts of this case are simple, straight-forward and not in dispute. The plaintiff was a national figure of great repute who received the accolade of Grand Commander of the Order of Nigeria (GCON). He held a number of exalted positions in the Federal set-up before he became the first Premier of the Mid-Western Region now Bendel State. His tenure as Premier was abruptly terminated when the Military took over the reins of the Federal and State Governments on 15th January, 1966.
In pursuit of its declared set objective of cleansing the augean stable, the National Military Government, as the Federal Government was then known, promulgated the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No.51 of 1966, 28th June, 1966 being the commencement date, to enable it recover ill-gotten gains from a number of public officers.
It should be noted that all Decrees and Edicts enacted before October 1st, 1979 are now known as Acts and Laws respectively. I intend however to refer to the relevant statutes as Decrees and Edicts for purposes of this judgment.
By virtue of section 5 of Decree No.51, the Military Governor of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria enacted the Public Officers Tribunal of Inquiry Edict No.6 of 1967, pursuant to which a Tribunal of Inquiry, headed by Hon. Justice Begho as Chairman, was set-up to investigate the assets of certain named public officers, including the plaintiff, and determine whether or not they had unjustly or corruptly enriched themselves or any other person.
In its report the Tribunal found that the plaintiff had unjustly enriched himself and the N.C.N.C., the political party to which he belonged, to the tune of 104,198 pounds (N208,396.00). It was also the finding of the Tribunal that the plaintiffs landed property situate at No.29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island, Lagos and shares in some companies were acquired legitimately.
By section 4 of the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) (Amendment) Edict 1968 No.7, the principal Edict was amended to enable the Military Governor to give directions by order for the forfeiture to the State of the assets of any public officer no matter howsoever or whensoever acquired, if the assets corruptly acquired are no longer subsisting.
In passing it is relevant to state that going by Decree No.51 of 1966, by virtue of which Edict No.71 of 1968 was purportedly enacted. only assets corruptly or improperly obtained were to be forfeited. The common feature in both the Federal Government Decree No.51 of 1966 and the State’s Edict No.6 of 1967as amended was that the court’s jurisdiction to determine the propriety of any order made under them was ousted.
Then followed the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other persons) Decree No.37 of 1968 promulgated by the Federal Military Government on 29th July, 1968 which repealed Decree No.51 of 1968, the original principal legislation, Edicts No.6 of 1967 and No.7 of 1968. Section 14(2)(a) of Decree No. 37 reads:
“It is hereby declared that:
(a) The repeal of any enactment or law by this Decree shall not affect any order, notice or other document made or thing whatsoever done under the provision of any enactment or law hereby repealed, and every such order, notice or other document or thing so far as it is subsisting or in force at the time of the repeal, shall continue to have effect by virtue of this Decree.”
Section 8(3) of the Decree re-enacted what Edict No.7 of 1968 sought to do by providing that:
“The proper authority may make an order for the forfeiture of the assets of any public officer or other person, no matter howsoever or whensoever acquired, if the assets whereby such public officers or other person has corruptly or improperly enriched himself or another person, or whereby he has been so enriched, are no longer subsisting…”
Section 12 states that the validity of any order made under the Decree or other law repealed by the Decree shall not be inquired into by any court of law.
Following Decree No.37 of 1968 was the Mid-Western State Legal Notice (MSLN) No.33 of 1968 of 28th September, 1968, the date of commencement of which was back-dated to 15th March, 1968, promulgating the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) No.1 Order 1968 by which the Military Governor of the State, said to be acting pursuant to section 9 of Decree No.37 of 1968, forfeited the plaintiffs plot of land and the building thereon situate at No.29 Femi Pearse Street, Lagos and shares in four companies.
It was not until 23rd June, 1982 that the plaintiff instituted his action, the subject-matter of this appeal, claiming amongst other reliefs:
“a declaration that the property known as No.29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria 1sland, is the leasehold property of the plaintiff in as much as the purported execution (of the forfeiture order) was not carried out under or in accordance with the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law Cap.116 (now Cap.151) of the Laws of Bendel State or at all.”
The plaintiff and two witnesses testified in support of his claim. The defendant adduced no evidence. After hearing the submissions of counsel for the parties, Aiwerioghene, J. in a well considered reserved judgment held that:
“The immunity from suit given to the defendants in this case by the provisions of Section 12 of Edict No.37 of 1968, being an accrued right at the time of the repeal of the Edict, continues, unaffected by the repeal, as a shield for the defendants. It follows, therefore, that even if the plaintiff had the right to bring this action, the defendant, being in effect, the Bendel State Government, is clothed with immunity from suit so the plaintiff would have no defendant that he could sue. In addition, as the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain such an action it would be a pointless exercise filing it.”
The learned trial Judge was also of the view that by section 9 of Decree No.37 of 1968 “a condition precedent to the filing of an order in the High Court for enforcement as a judgment of that court is that the public officer concerned has insufficient assets to satisfy the reparation required. This situation did not arise in the case of Chief Osadebay as there was no shortage of assets and in fact an order of forfeiture was made.”
The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. Aggrieved by this decision, he appealed to the Court of Appeal raising the following issues:
“(a) Where an Edict or Order made by virtue of an enabling Decree or Edict is inconsistent with the enactments in the enabling Decree or other Decree, is the jurisdiction of the High Court ousted by the fact that the enabling Decree or the Edict declares that anything done under the Decree/Edict shall not be called in question in any court of law, so as to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to decide the issue of inconsistency and matters arising therefrom
(b) Where in one section of a Decree or Edict the jurisdiction of the Court is taken away, and another section of the same Decree or Edict enacts that orders made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Decree/Edict should be filed in Court and when so filed “shall take effect as a judgment of the Court”, does this latter provision not restore the jurisdiction of the Court purportedly taken away by the ouster section
(c) Is the order of forfeiture in this case (MSLN 33 of 1968) not null and void by reason of:
(i) its inconsistency with the purported enabling and other relevant Decrees
(ii) its being fixed with other inherent and incurable statutory irregularity
The respondent however identified the issues for determination as:
1. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff/appellant’s action; and that
2. Whether the respondent was not obliged to file the “Order” of the Military Governor in the High Court.
After a thorough review of the relevant Federal and State enactments, Ogundare, J.C.A., in his judgment (concurred in by Musdapher and Ndoma-Egba, JJ.C.A.) came to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge was right in holding that she had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim and that section 12 of Decree No.37 of 1968 effectively precluded her from entertaining any suit questioning the validity of any direction, notice or order given or made or anything whatsoever done under the Decree or under any of the enactments repealed.
The Court of Appeal also agreed with the learned trial Judge that there was a misconception by the appellant of the provision of section 9 of Decree No.37 of 1968. The Court observed that the section only applied to a public officer who was found to have unjustly or improperly enriched himself or someone else, but who no longer possessed assets that could be forfeited in reparation for the unjust or improper enrichment, and not to the appellant who had sufficient assets which could be made the subject of an order of forfeiture.
The appellant has now brought his grievance to this Court in the form of three grounds of appeal in respect of which two broad issues were formulated in his brief of argument. They read:
“1(a) Was the Public Officer and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 (M.S.L.N 33 of 1968) made under the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968 No.37 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the High court in this suit
(b) Is it possible that the relevant enabling legislation under which M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 could be made is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51 In this case M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 is void for inconsistence in purporting to forfeit assets not unjustly or improperly acquired and was therefore incapable of ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court.
(c) If the enabling decree for the promulgation of M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 is Decree No.51 of 1966 was the jurisdiction of the Court ousted
2(a) If the assets of the Appellant were infact forfeited by virtue of Decree No.37 of 1968 was the respondent not obliged to proceed under section 9 thereof and have the order filed in the High Court for the purpose of execution
(b) Did the requirement in the enabling Decree that proceedings for the enforcement of any order made, (in this case M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968) should be in accordance with the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law and that such order should have effect as a judgment of the High Court not restore the jurisdiction purportedly taken away to the Court
(c) Was the appropriate authority empowered to proceed under both Section 9 and section 10 of Decree No.37 of 1968 contemporaneously (assuming that Decree No.37 of 1968 is the enabling Decree) ”
The first question which arises therefore is whether the forfeiture order, M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968, was made by virtue of Decree No.37 of 1968 and whether the courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s action in view of the fact that the commencement date of the said forfeiture order was to have effect retroactively from 15th of March, 1968, a time when the principal Decree No.37 of 1968, had not been promulgated.
It is the contention of Chief Chukwura, S.A.N. before us and in the Court of Appeal that since M.S.L.N.33 which was enacted on the 18th September, 1968 was made to take effect from 15th March, 1968, long before Decree No.37 of 1968 was promulgated, the “paternity”, if I may use his word, of the forfeiture order is obscure and not traceable to Decree No. 37. On the other hand, he submitted, if the forfeiture order can be said to be made by virtue of Decree No.51 of 1966, then the order would be void as that Decree did not allow for the forfeiture of any property not corruptly or improperly acquired.
It is instructive however to note that it was specifically stated by the Military Governor in the forfeiture order dated 18th September, 1968 that the order was being made by him “in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Investigation of assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968 and by virtue of all powers enabling me in that behalf.” It is therefore wrong in my view for one to entertain the notion that the order could have been made pursuant to Decree No.51 of 1966 which had been repealed as at 18th September, 1966 when the order was made.
It is important to note that there is a world of difference between the date a legislation is made or enacted and the date of its commencement. A statute or legislation is “born” on the date it is signed into law and not the date of its commencement. It is because of the artificiality of retrospective legislation that the presumption has been formulated by the courts that a statute does not retrospectively abrogate vested rights because it had not been in existence. Oputa, J.S.C., made the distinction between the time a statute is made and its commencement date in the case of Attorney-General Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 552 at page 579 when he said that:
“It is here important to note that there is a distinction between the date an Edict was made (was signed into law) and its commencement date. That is the reason why I underlined the word ‘made’ used in section 2(1)(a) of Decree No. 17 of 1977.”
In the instant case section 12 of Decree No.37 of 1966 states:
“12. The validity of any direction, notice or order given or made, or any other thing whatsoever done, as the case may be, under this Decree, or under any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree, or the circumstances under which such direction, notice or order has been given or made or other thing whatsoever done, shall not be inquired into in any court of law, and accordingly nothing in the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution of the Federation shall apply in relation to any matter arising out of this Decree or out of any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree.” (italics supplied for emphasis)
The operative word is the word “made.” M.S.L.N. No.33 was obviously made on 18th of September, 1968. It was not made on 15th March, 1968, the commencement date given to it. If it was the other way round, that is, if the forfeiture order had been made or signed into law on 15th March, 1968 with commencement date put at 18th September, 1968, it would not have fallen within the protection of Decree No.37 of 1968. In effect whether or not an instrument or order is protected by the principal Decree in this case can only be ascertained from the date of the enactment and not from its commencement date.
From the undisputed facts pleaded and the evidence adduced by the appellant and his witnesses which was unchallenged the appellant, no doubt must have drawn to himself enormous goodwill and sympathy. This is evident from the subsequent reaction of the Bendel State House of Assembly to the forfeiture order. The truth is that the court has no discretion no power indeed, no jurisdiction to amend any statute that appears to it unconscionable, to fall in line with moral values and sense of justice. The discretion, the power and the jurisdiction so to do lie with the Legislature and, to some extent, the Executive. It is in this sense Obaseki, J.S.C., observed in the case of Victor Ezeugo v. Nelson Ohaneyere (1978) 6-7 S.C. 171 at page 184 that “sentiments command no place in judicial deliberations for if it did, our task would be infinitely more difficult and less beneficial to the society.”
That there is an irregularity on the face of a forfeiture order or that the authority making the order exceeded the powers vested in him by the principal Decree in certain aspects of the order would not obviate the fact that the order was made under the Decree.
I must state that the fact that the forfeiture order was made to be retroactive from 15th March, 1968 at first gave me some anxious moments in that it is inconsistent with the principal Decree in that respect. Before the 1979 Constitution came into effect, a long line of pronouncements by this Court made it clear that the Court is competent to declare an Edict void to the extent of its inconsistency with a Decree. Apart from the decisions of this Court to that effect, a number of Decrees also made it plain that the Court could pronounce on the validity of any Edict which is inconsistent with a Decree. For instance in the preamble to the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) No.28 of 1970, it is stated thus: “And whereas by section 6 of the said Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1966, no question as to the validity of any Decree or any Edict (in so far as by section 3(4) thereof the provisions of the Edict are not inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree) shall be entertained by any Court in Nigeria.”
Whether or not 1 am competent to declare the forfeiture-order void to the extent of its inconsistency with Decree No.37 will be adverted to later in this judgment.
As already pointed out the plaintiff did not institute his action until 23rd of June, 1982, that is after the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 had come into effect. Section 6(6)(d) of the said 1979 Constitution provides that the judicial powers vested in the court “shall not extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of the authority or person to make any such law.”
Section 274(4)(b) defines existing law as meaning:
“any law and includes any rule of law or any enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date when this section into force or which have been passed or made
before this section comes into force after that date.”
The question that arises therefore is whether MSLN 33 is an existing law within the con of section 6(6)(d) and section 274(4)(b) of the 1979 Constitution.
From the definition of existing law, the forfeiture order, MSLN No.33 of 1968, being an instrument will be regarded as an existing law if it can be said to be in force immediately before the 1st of October, 1979.
By Section 6(1)(b) of the Interpretation Law of 1964, the repeal of an enactment shall not affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything done or suffered under the enactment MSLN No. 33 being an instrument duly done or made which survived the repealed Decree No.37 of 1968
and was therefore in force immediately before 1st of October, 1979, is an existing law as defined by section 274(4)(b) of the 1979 Constitution, and therefore, the competence of the Military Governor of Bendel State to make the forfeiture order cannot be questioned by the court.
There is however sub-section (3) of section 274 which states that:
“(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as affecting the power of a court of law or any tribunal established by law to declare invalid any provision of an existing law on the ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other law.”
What this boils down to is that while the courts cannot determine the competence of any authority to make an existing law they are competent to make pronouncements as to the validity of any existing law on ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other existing law.
In Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR. (Pt. 53) 678 at page 705, this Court, per Obaseki, J.S.C., held that “the provision of section 274(1) of the Constitution imposes an exercise on the courts in its interpretative jurisdiction in order that effect shall be given to an existing law without prejudice to their powers to declare invalid any provision of an existing law on the ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other law.”
The position therefore is that any provision of the forfeiture order which has been shown to be an existing law can be declared invalid if it is found to be inconsistent with any other law. “Any other law” is defined by sub-section (3)(a)-(d) of section 274 as:
“(a) any other existing law;
(b) a Law of a House of Assembly; or
(c) an Act of the National Assembly; or
(d) any provision of this Constitution.”
It follows therefore that it is only if Decree No.37 of 1968is an existing law that any provision of the forfeiture order (MSLN No.33) which is inconsistent with it can be declared invalid.
Decree No.37 of the 1968 was one of the Decrees repealed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Certain Consequential Repeals etc.) Decree, 1979 with effect from 30th September, 1968. In the case of Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124, it was the contention of the appellant in that case that Decrees Nos. 10 and 18 were not existing Laws because they had been repealed by implication by the 1979 Constitution on the basis that where two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant, the latter will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier. This Court however held that Decrees No.10 of 1976 and No.18 of 1977 were existing laws since they had not been repealed and were existing when the 1979 Constitution came into effect.
In Uwaifo’s case, Idigbe, J.S.C., in holding that Decrees No. 10 of 1976 Hand No.18 of 1977were existing laws observed at page 208 thus:
“To my mind, a law is in “force” within the con of section 274(4)(b) aforesaid – if it is in existence (i.e. it is recorded as an unrepealed enactment in one’s statute books) and has been brought into operation; and for this purpose it is immaterial that the law in question has not been used for some time or even, for may years…”
(italics mine for emphasis)
At page 209 he went further to observe:
“The way I read section 274(1) is this: an existing law (i.e. an unrepealed enactment still on record in our statute books) cannot have effect as, or deemed to be, a law of the National Assembly or a House of Assembly…”
(italics mine for emphasis)
It is obvious from the observation of the then learned Justice of this Court, that a repealed enactment cannot be an “existing law.” At page 239 of the same case, Obaseki, J.S.C., posed this question:
“The next question I ask is this: Is Decree No.18 of 1977 an existing law Is Edict No. 10 of 1977 of Bendel State and existing law It is my view that being laws not repealed before the 1979 Constitution came into force on the 1st day of October, 1979, both laws are existing laws within the definition set out in section 274(4) of the 1979 Constitution.”
(italics mine)
At page 307, Uwais, J.S.C., after referring to the definition of the expression “existing law” as defined under section 274(4)(b) observed:
“The 1977 Act was in force on 1st October, 1979 when the Constitution including section 274 thereof came into force. It is therefore an existing law. If it had been repealed or became non-existent by 1st October, 1979 it would have been otiose to declare it inconsistent with section 4 sub-section of the Constitution.
(italic supplied)
Since Decree No.37 of 1968 had been repealed before the 1979 Constitution came into effect, it is certainly not an existing law. Section 274(3) which enables a court to declare invalid any provision of an existing law on the ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other existing law is inapplicable to this case since the forfeiture order MSLN No.33 is not inconsistent with any existing law. It is only inconsistent with a non-existing law.
It seems to me therefore that it is too late in the day to declare any provision of the forfeiture order invalid vis-a-vis Decree No.37 of 1968; not even its commencement date.
Even granted that the Court was in a position to declare the forfeiture order invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with Decree No.37 of 1968, the best it could do would be to declare the commencement date which was retro-active invalid and regard the date of enactment that is 18th September, 1968 as the date of commencement. The forfeiture order as a whole could not have been declared void.
By section, 6(6)(d) the court is precluded from determining any question as to the competence of the Military Governor of Mid-Western State of Nigeria (now Bendel State) to make the forfeiture order issued as MSLN No. 33 of 1968. Where the validity of any law is questioned it is implied that the authority or person who purported to make the law was not competent to make it in the form the law stands or that he had no jurisdiction to make the law in respect of the subject-matter covered by it. Section, 6(6)(d) and section, 274(3), to some extent, constitute a constitutional barrier designed to shield Decrees and Edicts enacted before October 1st, 1979, which qualify as existing laws, from annulment by Courts in the exercise of the judicial powers vested in them by the Constitution.
I have also examined section 4(5) which states that:
“If any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.”
It is obvious that this section relates to laws passed by the House of Assembly vis-a-vis those enacted by the National Assembly after the 1979 Constitution had come into effect. The section certainly does not relate to Edicts enacted by State Military Governors and Decrees promulgated by the Federal Military Government before 1st October, 1979. It does not therefore vest jurisdiction in the High Court to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of the forfeiture order MSLN No.33 of 1968.
As I have earlier pointed out, in the case of Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (supra) Idigbe, J.S.C., made it plain at page 209 that even a Decree or an Edict which can be regarded as an existing law “cannot have effect as, or be deemed to be, a law of the National Assembly or a House of Assembly unless it can be modified in such a way ‘as to bring it into conformity’ with the 1979 Constitution.”
It therefore seems to me most inappropriate to seek in aid section 4(5) of the 1979 Constitution to justify giving the Courts a semblance of jurisdiction in a matter of this nature. This is so because section 274(2) of the Constitution provides that “the appropriate authority may at any time by order make such changes in the of any existing law as the appropriate authority considers necessary or expedient to bring the law into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution.” Neither Decree No.37,which has been repealed, nor MSLN No. 33 has been modified to pass for a law validly made by the National Assembly or enacted by the House of Assembly.
I do not consider it necessary to dwell on the question whether the order of forfeiture ought to have been registered in the High Court for enforcement as a judgment of that court, save to say that it is crystal clear that such filing would only be necessary if the appellant had had no asset to satisfy the reparation required.
The High Court was therefore right to have declined jurisdiction. The decision of the Court of Appeal upholding the judgment of the High Court is accordingly affirmed. The appeal fails and it is dismissed. I adopt the order as to costs made in the judgment of my learned brother, the Chief Justice of Nigeria.P. NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C. (Dissenting): With greatest respects, I am unable to agree with the lead judgment of the Honourable Chief Justice of Nigeria, for reasons I shall now give.
In 1982, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant-representing the Bendel State Government claiming the following reliefs:
“1. A declaration that by virtue of the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiry) Edict No.6 of 1967, the Order of forfeiture of the plaintiffs assets made by the Military Governor of Bendel State on 18th September, 1968 (that is to say MSLN 33 of 1968) took effect as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and was therefore enforceable by the High Court of Bendel State under the Sheriffs and Civil process Law (Cap. 116)- (now Cap.151).
2. A declaration that every act and thing done by the Government of Mid-West State (now Bendel State) following the findings of the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry and the orders made thereon by the Military Governor of Mid-West State (which findings and orders are not put in issue in this suit), by seizure, forfeiture or otherwise, of the said house property and shares, is null and void, not being done under and by virtue of the Sheriffs and Civil process law of Bendel State Cap.116 (now Cap.151).
3. A declaration that the property known as 29, Femi Pearce Street, Victoria Island, is the leasehold property of the plaintiff in as much as the purported execution was not carried out under, or in accordance with the Sheriffs and Civil process Law, Cap. 166- (now Cap.151) of the Laws of Bendel State or at all.
4. An order directing the defendant to pay over to the plaintiff the sum of N432,817.82 (four hundred and thirty-two thousand, eight hundred and seventeen Naira, eighty-two kobo) being money which the defendant appropriated in excess of money due to it as a result of executing the order of forfeiture, by the defendant collecting the rents and other moneys due to the plaintiff from the property known as 29 Femi Pearce Street, Victoria Island which the plaintiff holds under a lease made by the Minister of Lagos Affairs in favour of the plaintiff and which is registered as No.48 at page 48 in volume 1208 of the Land Registry in the office at Lagos. (The defendant has been collecting the sum of N85,000.00 a year, being rent paid on the said premises from February, 1976 to February, 1982 by the tenants now occupying the premises and threatens to continue the irregular and unauthorized collection of the rents).
5. An order restraining the defendant from henceforth collecting or claiming to be entitled to collect rents due from the said premises or in any way laying any claim whatsoever to the said property, the order of the Tribunal of Inquiry having been fully satisfied and discharged.
6. An order directing the defendant to return to the plaintiff the plaintiffs documents of title in respect of the said house property and the plaintiffs shares in the hands of the Government of Bendel State.
7. IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO CLAIM thereof, the plaintiff claims from the defendant the sum of N641,214.70k (six hundred and forty-one thousand, two hundred and fourteen Naira, seventy kobo) being the sum of money unlawfully collected by the defendant from the plaintiff’s said house property from 1976 to date”.
After pleadings, the matter went to trial. As the learned trial Judge himself noted in his judgment, the facts are not in dispute as the defendant did not call evidence at the trial. In sum, the facts are as follows. The plaintiff had held a number of important political posts in Nigeria in general and Mid-B Western State (now Bendel State) in particular. He was sometime the acting Governor-General for Nigeria, the leader of the Mid-West State Movement, the Administrator of the Mid-West State, and the elected Premier of the Mid-West State. At the time he instituted this action, he was Pro-Chancellor of the University of Lagos.
About 1964 he negotiated with a Construction Company, G. Cappa Nigeria Ltd. to develop for him on a contractor finance basis, a piece or parcel of land being and situate at No.29, Femi Pearce Street, Victoria Island. Lagos, which had been granted to him on lease by the Government on lease in 1962. G. Cappa Nigeria Limited (hereinafter referred to as contractors) built a block of flats on the plot and then subleased it to the Gulf Oil Company in 1966 for a term of 10 years for which the Oil Company paid 90,000.00 pounds (N180,000.00).
By a number of Decrees, including Decree No.51 of 1966, the Federal Military Government, which had wrested powers from the civilians in 1966, sought to forfeit ill-gotten property of erstwhile civilian, public and political, office holders. Invariably the actual Act of forfeiture was done by Edicts passed by various State Governments but which derived their force and authority from the enabling decrees.
In 1967 the Military Government of the then Mid-Western State of Nigeria, pursuant to Decree No.51 of 1966, promulgated the Public Officers (Tribunal of Inquiries) Edict No.6 of 1967. By the Edict they set up a Tribunal of Inquiry with Begho, J., as Chairman to investigate the assets of certain named officers including the plaintiff under the defunct civilian Government, to determine whether or not they had unjustly or corruptly enriched themselves by virtue of their offices, and to make whatever recommendations they considered necessary. The plaintiff attended the proceedings of the Tribunal and testified. However, before his counsel addressed the Tribunal it broke up in August, 1967 as a result of the events of the civil war. The chairman escaped to Lagos and the plaintiff to London where he lived till 1973. During the period, he suffered a serious nervous break-down as a result of which he became very ill and was hospitalized on two occasions. When he found that he was running out of funds he wrote a letter, tendered at the trial as Exh. C. to the contractors. In the letter, he asked them to pay to him the sum of N25,000.00 which he calculated was the balance from the rents after the contractors had deducted the whole of the money they spent for the construction of the building.
According to the plaintiff, he did not know that the Tribunal had reconvened and completed its proceedings in his absence. It issued its report on the 5th of February, 1968. Vol.2 of the report was tendered at the trial as Exh. H. It is noteworthy that part of Exh. H reads as follows:-
(a) “During the period Cappa Limited built a block of flats at the value of 50,000.00 pounds on his plot at No. 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island, Lagos on CONTRACTOR FINANCE BASIS. We have already decided that this is a legitimate business and nothing sinister about it” (Italics supplied).
(b) “Out of a total amount of 92, 176: I 1:6 that passed through the four known banks during the relevant period (i.e. 12th August, 1963 to 17th January, 1966) we have found 72,198.00 pounds to be over and above his personal emoluments and legitimate income from all known sources. This represents the amount (as far as known banked ill-gotten gains are concerned) by which the public officer corruptly or improperly enriched himself by virtue of and in abuse of his office. It is recommended that he be made to disgorge the amount”.
(c) “… We have found from the evidence before us that there was an unbanked illgotten gain of 32,00.00 pounds. We recommend that the public officer be made to disgorge it”
(d) “It has been shown that the 297,823:6:6 pounds credited to the MidWest NCNC consolidated Account in the Bank of West Africa, Benin’ City on 17’978’9764 was originally 3000,000.00 pounds sent by Conthinho Caro through CIFICO Bank Zurich as part of ‘loaded on the Contract price of the three projects…”
From the evidence, the sums of ‘a332,000:0:0 and ‘a372,198:0:0 adjudged by the tribunal to be refunded by the appellant were in fact sums of money belonging to a political party known as NCNC. Appellant’s case was that the said sums were paid to the political party as he was a mere conduit pipe for the receipt of the money. It was his contention that the money was not paid to him personally, and as, in any event, the Military had forfeited all the funds and assets of the political party, he ought not to have been made to pay. It was his further submission that the government had fully deducted all the sums due to it from the rents of the building. However, inspite these findings by the Tribunal the Mid’ West Government (now Bendel State Government) in a purported implementation of the findings and recommendations of the Tribunal promulgated the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No. I) Order, 1968, which was published as MSLN/33 of 1968. By the Order, the following assets of the plaintiff were declared forfeited:
1. the plot of land and building thereon situate at No. 29 Femi Pearse Street, Victoria Island Lagos;
2. shares in Anyansi and Brenton Ltd. valued at 200:0 pounds
3. shares in Phoenix Insurance Co. Ltd. valued 2,500:0:0 pounds
4. sharer. in Agricultural Investment Co. Ltd. valued 2,000:0:0 pounds
5. shares in Mid-West Voice (Newspaper) valued 3,000:0:0 pounds
It turned out that the forfeiture of the plaintiffs said building was notified to the contractors by a letter dated 11th April, 1969 tendered as Exh. K. The letter emanated from the Military Governor’s Office, Bendel State. However, after considering all the relevant Decrees and Edicts and such cases as F.S. Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124 and Attorney-General of Bendel State v. A.N. Wilson: suit No.FCA/B/115/82 (unreported) The learned Judge, Aiwerioghene, J., held that his jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter had been ousted, and dismissed the plaintiffs action.
In the Court of Appeal, it was held:
(i) that the facts are not in dispute;
(ii) that on the doctrine of covering the field, section 11(3) of Edict
No.6 of 1967 (as amended) is void as being inconsistent with Decree No.51 of 1966; but that the plaintiff’s assets were not forfeited under Decree No.51 of 1966 and Edict No. 6 of 1967, but under M.S.L.N.33 of 1968;
(iii) that M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 was made under powers conferred by Decree No.37 of 1968 and not under Decree No. 51 of 1966;
(iv) that section 12 of Decree No.37 of 1968 completely ousted the jurisdiction of the courts;
(v) that the Tribunal of Inquiry (Validation etc.) Decree, No. 18 of 1977 and the case of Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1982) 7 S.C.124 decided thereunder did not apply to the instant case;
(vi) that section 9 of Decree No.37 of 1968, which stated that the order of forfeiture shall be filed and be enforceable in court as if it were a judgment of court, did not apply to the plaintiff who on
his own showing had sufficient assets that could be forfeited so that there was no question of restoring the jurisdiction of courts; and
(vii) that notwithstanding the repeal of Decree No.51 of 1966 by Decree No.37 of 1968 with effect from 29th July, 1968, by the effect of section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1964, and on the authority of decided cases, such as Ogamioba v. Oghene (1961) 1 All NLR 59, p.61, the repeal did not affect the inquiry already instituted under the repealed legislation.
The plaintiff (hereinafter called the appellant) has appealed further to this court. He filed the following grounds of appeal.
(1) The Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that MSLN 33 of 1968; Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 was made under Decree 37 of 1968-Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree when-the relevant enabling legislation is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1968 No. 51.
PARTICULARS
(a) M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 purportedly made under Decree No. 37 of 1968 took effect on 15th March, 1968 when Decree No.37 of 1968 had not been promulgated, did not exist and had not come into force.
(b) The relevant enabling and existing legislation at that time was Decree No.51 of 1966.
(c) Decree No.37 of 1968was promulgated and came into force on 29th July, 1968 about four months after MSLN 33 of 1968 took effect.
(d) (i) If MSLN 33 of 1968 was made under Decree No.37 of 1968, it was still-born;
(ii) and if made under No.51 of 1966, it was void for inconsistency.
(2) The Court of Appeal erred in law in not holding that the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No. 1) Order 1968 MSLN 33, as amended, (the relevant enabling legislation of which was the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1968 No. 51) is void for inconsistency in that it purported to forfeit assets not corruptly or improperly acquired, contrary to clear enactments of Decree 51 of 1966.
PARTICULARS
(a) The court had properly held that the amendment effected to Section 11(3) of the Public Officers (Tribunals of Inquiry) Edict No. 6 of 1967 (as amended) “is void as being inconsistent with Decree No. 51 of 1966…”
(b) The court had also properly relied on Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1964 No. 1 to the effect that the repeal of an enactment shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of such right privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment.
(c) The repeal of an enactment did not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal took effect.
(d) When the forfeiture order (MSLN 33 of 1968) took effect, Decree No.37 1968 was not in existence and the relevant order(3)could therefore not take effect under Decree No.37 of 1968.
(3) The Court of Appeal misdirected itself in law when it held as follows
“On issue (2), I need only point out that there is a misconception of the provisions of Section 9 of Decree No. 37 of 1968. The Section does not apply to the appellant who on his own showing had sufficient assets which could, at the time be made and was indeed made, the subject of an order of forfeiture… the appropriate authority had a choice of proceeding under Section 9 or 10 which related to tracing of assets into the hands of third persons.”
PARTICULARS
(a) The assets of the appellant could not have been (and were not) forfeited under Decree No. 37 of 1968. Further and in the alternative: If Decree No. 37 of 1968 (or No. 51 of 1966 applied –
(b) There was no evidence whatsoever to support the court of Appeal finding that the appellant had sufficient assets which could be made the subject of forfeiture.
(c) Section 9 and 10 of Decree No. 37 of 1968 are alternative procedures and do not allow for proceeding simultaneously with both methods as was done in this case i.e. demand and receipt of part-payment of the sum of money adjudged can not be pursued pari-pasu with forfeilure, without further demand and failure to pay any balance outstanding.”
One point which has assumed a decisive role in this appeal is the question whether or not the appellant is, in this appeal, challenging competence of any authority or person (in this case the Military Governor of Bendel State) to make “the law in question, that is M.S.L.N. No.33 of 1968 (to be hereinafter referred to as “the order.” No doubt, whether or not the appellant challenges the competence of the Military Governor to make the law will be discernible from his claim as amplified or amended by his pleading.
What then is the meaning of the word “competence” Although as I shall show annon, the case of Uwaifo v. Attorney-General, Bendel State (1983) 4 NCLR 1 is, on one vital point, distinguishable from the instant case, I have derived a lot of benefit from the interpretation placed by this court on that word in that case in the con of section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution. Idigbe, J.S.C., with whose opinion most other eminent Justices agreed, stated:
“Now the dictionary meaning of “competence” has been given as
(1) “adequate fitness or ability” (2) “in law”, “legal capacity”, “power”, “jurisdiction”., “capacity” has the meaning of “legal qualification”, “legal power or right”; and “valid” has the meaning of having legal force, properly executed and binding in law, while “validity” has the meaning of “the state of being valid”. See Websters’ 20th Century Dictionary Unabridged, 2nd Edition 1972
……………………..
……………………..
……………………..
It seems to me that while the Constitution empowers the courts to inquire into the validity of any existing law, it clearly intends that the courts should not inquire into proceedings which seek to determine issues or questions as to the competence of any authority or person (i.e. the legal capacity, power, legal qualification or jurisdiction of any authority or person) to make any existing law promulgated between 15th January, 1966, and 1st October, 1979; in other words the courts are precluded from inquiring into the validity of such laws.”
Then he later continued with one observation, important and relevant in this case. He stated:
“Clearly by virtue of section 6(6)(a), 6(6)(b) and 4(8) of the constitution aforesaid, the courts have jurisdiction to determine issues or questions as to whether any law, including those unrepealed laws which were made between 15th January, 1966 and 1st October, 1979 (or the provisions thereof) is consistent with the provisions of the 1979 Constitution for the purpose of giving effect to it under the existing Constitution; for this purpose but to this extent only, the courts can declare such law or portions thereof invalid.”
See also Obaseki, J.S.C., at pp.42-43 where he emphasized that competence relates to the legal capacity and power to make such a law. Eso and Uwais, JJ.S.C. adopted Idigbe’s views and Nnamani, J.S.C. at p.57 emphasized that competence entails capacity and power to make such a law.
From the above statements of the law, the following principles clearly emerge, in my view, namely:
i. That what the provision bars the courts from entertaining is challenge to the competence of an authority or a person to make the law.
This means a challenge to the capacity and power to make the law.
ii. Apart from challenge to competence, there is nothing under the provision in that paragraph, i.e. S.6 (6)(d) of the Constitution to preclude a person from challenging the validity or applicability of
any law made between January, 16, 1966 and 1st October, 1979.
111. The courts can declare any Law invalid on the ground that it conflicts with any of the unsuspended provision of the 1979 Constitution or a Decree or a Federal Act.
A close look at the appellant’s claim and grounds of appeal set out above, shows that, in sum, the following are his contentions:
(i) That because Decree No.37 of 1968 became effective from 29th July, 1968, it could not have been the enabling Decree to the Order M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 which became effective from 15th March, 1968, when the said Decree was not in existence. This, to my mind, is directed to the effect and validity of the law, not a challenge to the competence, i.e. the capacity and power of the Military Governor of Bendel State to make the Order.
(ii) That in so far as Decree No.37 of 1968 is regarded as the enabling Decree for the Order, the Order, made to take effect before the Decree came into effect was invalid.
(iii) That if the Order was deemed to have been made under the earlier Decree, No.51 of 1966, which was subsisting until it was repealed with effect from the 29th of July, 1968, by Decree No.37 of 1968, then the Order was inconsistent with Decree No.51 and therefore void.
(iv) That the appellant’s assets were not forfeited under Decree No. 37 of 1968.
(v) That there is no evidence in support of the finding that the appellant had sufficient other assets which could have been made the subject of forfeiture.
(vi) That sections 9 and 10 of Decree No.37 of 1968 are alternative procedures and do not allow for both reparation and forfeiture.
The learned counsel for the respondent formulated the issues rather succinctly as follows:
“2.1. Whether the Forfeiture Order MSLN 33 of 1968 was made under Decree No.51 of 1966 and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether MSLN 33 of 1968is void for inconsistency with the parent Decree in purporting to forfeit assets not unjustly or improperly acquired.
2.2 Whether the Forfeiture order, MSLN 33 of 1968 was made under Decree No.37 of 1968.
2.2(a) If the answer to (2) is in the affirmative whether the Order was validly made as to oust the jurisdiction of the court since its date of commencement precedes the date of commencement of its parent Decree.
2.3. Whether the respondent was bound to file the Order of Forfeiture in the High Court for the purpose of the execution under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law.”
It was from these points and on the basis of the above grounds of appeal that the appellant framed the following issues for determination:
“1 (a) Was the Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) (No.1) Order 1968 (M.S.L.N.33 of 1968) made under the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968 No.37 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in this suit
(b) Is it possible that the relevant enabling legislation under which M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 could be made is the Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree 1966 No.51 In this case M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 is void for inconsistency in purporting to forfeit assets not unjustly or improperly acquired and was therefore incapable of ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court.
(c) If the enabling Decree for the promulgation of M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 is Decree No.51 of 1966 was the jurisdiction of the court ousted
(a) If the assets of the appellant were in fact forfeited by virtue of Decree No.37 of 1968 was the respondent not obliged to proceed under section 9 thereof and have the Order filed in the High Court for the purpose of execution
(b) Did the requirement in the enabling Decree that proceedings for the enforcement of any order made, (in this case M.S.L.N.33 of 1968) should be in accordance with the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law and that such order should have effect as a judgment of the High Court not restore the jurisdiction purportedly taken away to the court
(c) Was the appropriate authority empowered to proceed under both section 9 and section 10 Decree No. 37 of 1968 contemporaneously (assuming that Decree No.37 of 1968 is the enabling Decree)
It can be seen from the above claims, grounds of appeal, my analysis of same, and the above formulations of the issues for determination by counsel that no question of incompetence as discussed above arises in the appeal. The only other question is that of inconsistency between the Order, a State law, and a Decree. As I shall show later, the courts have the power and jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether a State law is inconsistent with a Decree, an unsuspended section of the Constitution or a federal enactment. In particular, it is not a challenge to either the power or the capacity to make the law for one to contend that a particular legislation did not take effect from the date it purports to have commenced; or to argue that on proper application of established principles of law a subsidiary legislation draws its potency from a particular paramount legislation rather than the one it purports to have derived its authority. Indeed the argument that a particular law had not the effect of forfeiting a person’s property assumes the competence and validity of the particular legislation but advances permissible forensic argument to show that it had not the effect it purported to have. The argument on paragraphs (v) and (vi) above could only have arisen because the appellant conceded it that Decree No.37 of 1968 was competently made. The conclusion I have reached, therefore, is that in all the claims as well as the grounds of appeal and issues formulated thereon, there was no challenge to competence of the law-maker. There was a case of inconsistency between the Order, a State law, and the enabling Decree but, as I shall show further such a contention on ground of inconsistency is permissible. I shall return to this later.
Learned counsel for the appellant, Chief Chukurah, submitted that M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 did not in fact forfeit the appellant’s property which it purported to forfeit. The main thrust of his argum.nt in this respect was manifold. First, it was submitted that it was in conflict with Decree No.37 of 1968 from which it purported to derive authority in that on the 15th of March, 1968, when it purported to have taken effect the Decree was not in existence, as the latter was made on the 29th of July, 1968 and took effect the same day. There was therefore no legal foundation for the forfeiture order. It was in conflict with Ss.4(1)(a) and (b) and 8(1) and (3) of the Decree in that it ordered forfeiture of assets not tainted with corruption or impropriety. There was no evidence or finding that the improperly acquired assets, if any, or that the N.C.N.C. funds in question – which were in the hands of the Federal Government – was no longer available. Conflict of M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 with the enabling Decree rendered it void and the ouster provision inapplicable, he submitted. The better view he submitted, is that it was Decree No.51 of 1966which was in existence at the time M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 came into effect that governs the situation: Edwin Johnson, alias Sofa Boy v. State (1981) 2 S.C.29, p.37. Even if Decree No.51 of 1966 was applied by virtue of the provision of section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1964 because the Tribunal had been appointed and was functioning before the repeal of the Decree (No.51) then M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 was still invalid because its provisions are in conflict with the provisions of Decree No.51. In support of his submissions, he cited the following decided cases, namely:
Ugwuh v. Attorney-General, East-Central State & Anor. (1975) 6 S.C.13.
Adamolekun v. University of Ibadan (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 213.
Adejumo v. Mobolaji Johnson (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt. 1) 159.
Peenok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 S.C. 1, at pp. 136 and 138; (1983) 4 NCLR 122.
Ereku v. Military Governor of Mid-West (1974) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt. 2) 2 S.C.163.
A.I. Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel State & Ors. (1985) 2 S.C.191 (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.4) 572.
In his further submission, he contended that, as M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 was a deprivative legislation, it must be construed against the law maker. He cited-
Barclays Bank of Nig. Ltd. v. Ashiru & 3 Ors. (1978) 6 & 7 S.C.99, p.114;
Bello v. Diocesan Synod of Lagos (1975) E.C.S.L.R. (Pt. 1) 330;
Mrs. Lily Uyanne v. Ofor Asika (1975) 4 S.C.233, p.238.
Next he submitted that what the Decrees and Edicts demanded was reparation, not reparation in money and forfeiture. They enabled the respondents to either recover the money or forfeit the property, not both, he submitted. So, as the respondent had fully recovered the money, he could not proceed to forfeit the property, he submitted.
Finally he submitted that even if the jurisdiction of court could be said to have been ousted by the Decrees and Edicts which he did not admit, then as it is provided by the same laws that the forfeiture order would be registered in the High Court and enforced as a judgment, that restored the jurisdiction of court. In any event, as the statute had expressly prescribed a special procedure for enforcement of the order, the respondent was bound thereby. He urged the court to allow the appeal.
Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 was, in view of the recital, made under Decree No.37 of 1968, the fact that its effective date ante-dated the enabling Decree notwithstanding. The words of the order are clear and ought to be so construed: Attorney-General Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.118) 646. She therefore considered it unnecessary to consider whether the order is inconsistent with Decree No.51 of 1966. It was the further submission of learned counsel that in so far as the appellant’s assets had been investigated and it was found that he, being a public officer, was guilty of corrupt or unjust enrichment within the meaning of the law, any of his assets could be forfeited There is nothing in Decree No. 37 of 1968 to prevent the respondent from making a forfeiture order retrospectively, she submitted. As M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 was made expressly under the Decree (No.37 of 1968) it is not competent for anybody to impugn its validity, she submitted. She submitted that the fact that the Decree No.37 of 1968 was made to empower forfeiture of assets of such officers “howsoever acquired” shows that it was intended to have a wider application than Decree No.51 of 1966 which it repealed. It is the duty of courts to interpret it in such a way as to implement rather than to G defeat the legislative intention: Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940) A.C.1014, p.1022. Moreover, she pointed out, section 14(1) of Decree No.37 of 1968saves any subsisting order already made at the time of repeal of Decree No.51 of 1966 and Edict made thereunder. It was further submitted that even if M.S.L.N .33 of 1968 lacks paternity because its commencement date antedates the parent Decree, the paternity of the Order cannot be questioned in any court in view of the provisions of section 12 of Decree No.37 of 1968.The case is an ingenious way of challenging the competence of the Military Governor to make laws. This will be contrary to section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution. She cited the following cases. Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 N.W.L R. (Pt.58); 539 at pp. 552-553 & 561
A.G., Imo State v. Attorney-General of Rivers State (1983) 2 SCNLR 108 at p. 120.
Inoma-Biriya v. Omoni (1989) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.119) 60
On the question of double remedies, counsel submitted that reparation was never made by the appellant: the respondent made an order of forfeiture of the property and all the sums paid to him were rents on the forfeited property.
Finally, she submitted that the provisions of section 9 of the Decree are inapplicable since the appellant by his own showing had sufficient assets for forfeiture. Section 9(1) only applies when the assets are insufficient, she submitted. The question of restoration of the jurisdiction of court by the provisions of section 9 does not, therefore, arise. She urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
Before I proceed to consider the various contentions of counsel in this appeal, I believe it is helpful to state why I consider it improper to apply the decision in Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (supra) hook line and sinker in this case. It is necessary for this purpose to bear in mind the fact that cases of challenge to jurisdiction since the inception of the first Military Administration in this country in 1966, fall into three categories, namely:
(i) Cases in which attempts have been made to challenge Decrees the Constitution, and other federal enactments;
(ii) Cases in which attempts have been made to challenge State legislations on the ground that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Decrees, unsuspended sections of the Constitution; and
(iii) Cases in which attempts have been made to challenge State legislations validated by Decrees.
I wish to discuss some of these in not much detail for the simple reason that they are not directly in issue here. It is, however, important to advert to them for a just decision in this case, if only to see the irrelevance of some of the numerous cases cited by counsel.
To deal with the first class of cases, I should recall that the first attempt was the case of Lakanmi & Anor. v. The Attorney-General (West & Two Others (1974) 4 E.C.S.L.R. 713. It was a case initially under the same Decree No.51 of 1966. While an appeal was pending against the refusal of the High Court to quash a forfeiture order made by Edict No. 5 of 1967 on the ground that it covered the same field as the Decree, the Federal Military Government passed Decree No.37 of 1968 which repealed both Decree No.51 of 1966 and Edict No.5 of 1967. Then they again passed Forfeiture of Assets, etc. (Validation) Decree No.45 of 1968. It not only ousted the jurisdiction of courts generally but also in the Schedule forfeited the assets of the appellants. This court held that it was a legislative judgment, not contemplated by the Constitution and, therefore, void. It ought to be emphasized that the kernel of the case was a straight issue of pronouncing a Decree void. The judgment was delivered on April, 24, 1970. The Federal Military Government’s reply was the Decree No. 28, 1970. The Government effectively nullified the Lakanmi decision, proclaimed the supremacy of Decrees, and subject only to inconsistency between an Edict and a Decree, Edicts. The jurisdiction of court was, subject as I have stated, completely ousted. Subsequently the courts have held that it has no jurisdiction to exercise its powers when the issue is a straight challenge of the competence of the Federal Military Government to promulgate a Decree, See: Joseph Magtup Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) 147.
The court’s approach to the second class of cases, that is where a State Edict or other legislation is being challenged on the ground that it is inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree, the Constitution or other federal enactment is clearly different. I shall deal with this in some detail.
One clear trend which runs through all organic Decrees of all military administrations in Nigeria which seek to oust or limit the jurisdictions of courts is that even where they seek to emphasize the unchallenged ability of Decrees, they have always conceded it that an Edict which is inconsistent with a Decree, the Constitution or Federal Enactment can be challenged. It is enough to refer to some of them.
1. Section 3(4)(b) of Decree No. 1 of 1966 provides as follows:
“(4) If any law –
(a) ………………………………………………..
(b) made after that date (i.e. 16th January, 1966) by the Military Governor of a Region is inconsistent with any law-
(i) validly made by Parliament before that date, or having effect as if so made, or
(ii) made by the Federal Military Government on or after that date, the law made as mentioned in
paragraph (i) or (ii) above shall prevail and the Regional law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
There can of course be no question that whenever there is such a provision, the courts have jurisdiction and power to pronounce the Regional or State Legislation inconsistent and void.
2. Even Decree No.28 of 1970 – the so-called Supremacy Decree makes a similar concession in the¢ preamble to the Decree.
3. Again Decree No.13 of 1984 which re-enacts Decree No. 28 of 1970 makes the same concession.
From all these and more, it can be said that the military administrations in Nigeria never intended or set out by all their enactments to create a sort of deus ex machina – impregnable walls of no-go areas to which the interpretative and adjudicative jurisdictions of courts must never reach. Rather, it is the intendment of those enactments that the courts can always go into them to find out whether their jurisdictions have been ousted; and, when they are satisfied that what is at issue is whether or not a State enactment is inconsistent with a Decree or a Federal enactment, military or civilian, the court can, and ought to go into them and pronounce them void.
In The Military Governor of Ondo State & Anor. v. Victor Adegoke Adewunmi (1988) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.82) 280, the full court of this court made it abundantly clear that a Military Governor of a State has no power to make any law inconsistent with a Decree, an unsuspended section of the Constitution or a Federal enactment and that any law made during the period in question which is inconsistent as aforesaid, is void to the extent of the inconsistency. It also stated that courts always have jurisdiction to entertain an action which seeks to show that a law of a State is inconsistent with such an enactment. This has been the attitude of this court. See Onyiuke v. Eastern States Interim Assets & Liabilities Agency (1974) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt.2) 151; The Council of the University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 213 at pp.233- 234; and Adejumo v. Johnson (1972) 3 S.C. 45. In short, if this case were to be decided on the law as it was in 1968, when Order No.33 of 1968 in question was promulgated, there would have been no question as to whether this court, or any High Court for that matter, has jurisdiction to examine whether it is inconsistent with Decrees No. 37 of 1968 or 51 of 1966, if relevant.
The third group of cases is where, what is being challenged is a State legislation, but the law and the act in question have been validated by a Decree. Since the Supremacy Decree, No.28 of 1970, the consistent altitude of our courts has been to regard the case as one challenging the validating Decree, for which the courts have no jurisdiction. Such was the case in Uwaifo v. Attorney-General Bendel State (supra). The case arose from the forfeiture of the appellant’s landed properties in Benin under the Bendel State Public Officers and Other Persons (Forfeiture of Assets) No.2 Edict of 1977 i.e. Edict No.10 of 1977 made pursuant to the recommendations of a panel of inquiry set up under the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree No. 10 of 1976. But the case had the singular feature that the institution, constitution findings, and recommendations of the Panel of Inquiry were validated by Decree, i.e. Tribunals of Inquiry (Validation. etc) Decree No. 18 of 1977. The Decree also completely ousted the jurisdiction of all courts from inquiring into whether any Law, Edict or subsidiary instrument under which the tribunal of inquiry was instituted had been validly made or any order of forfeiture was properly made. It further provided that if any action or other proceeding was pending in relation thereto, it “shall” forthwith abate and become void. This court held that the jurisdiction of the court had been ousted completely, but emphasized that but for the Validation Decree, it could have otherwise pronounced on the inconsistency of the Edict with the enabling Decree. The important point of distinction between this case and Uwaifo’s case (supra) is, therefore; this: that whereas in Uwaifo’s case the Edict had the advantage of validation by a Validation Decree (No.18 of 1977); in this case, the Order No.33 of 1968, coming as it does outside the period (29th July, 1975 and 8th March, 1977) covered by the Validation Decree does not enjoy its protection. This distinction between that case and this, in my view, is crucial for a just decision of this case. See also Attorney General, Lagos v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 111) 552.
On the thrust of the arguments in this appeal, I feel bound to deal with one preliminary question. What should be my approach to the interpretation of legislations passed or sponsored by a military regime Do I approach them differently from those passed by civilian governments
It is noteworthy in this respect, I believe, that each Military Administration has always started their now endemic administrations in this country by declaring their power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever (see, for an example section 3(1) of Decree No. 1of 1966). They have also usually legislated on their powers (see section 4 of same). Also they have usually declared the continuation, subject to any Decree which modifies or suspends any law, of “any court of law, authority or office which was established,” made, or done before the take over (see section 13 of each of Decrees No. 1 of 1966 and No.1 of 1984, for examples). None of them has opted to rule by martial law. What IS more, they have usually declared the applicability of the interpretation Act of 1964 (except section 2 thereof) in relation to the interpretation of any Decree (see section 16 of No.1 of 1966 for an example). Significantly, apart from the adoption of the Interpretation Act, and the express ouster and limitation of jurisdiction of courts in some cases, there has never been a legislation by any Military administration in Nigeria to impose upon the courts any special form of interpretation of laws passed or sponsored by the Military in Nigeria. From this state of affairs, the conclusion I have reached is that it is intended by even the Military legislators in Nigeria, that our laws will be subject to the same norms, principles and canons of construction whether they were passed by a military or civilian administration. In other words, while a Decree or an Edict may enjoy special, and often truncated, modes of being brought into being, and may be made known to the public by means of sound or television broadcast or by publication in writing or by any other manner, once published and it comes under the searchlight of the interpretative jurisdiction of the courts, it is not intended to enjoy any construction different from any other laws. So, the law speaks in the same language whether made by the military or the civilian.
I may observe further that this court has laid down clear principles to guide courts faced with the problems of ouster of their jurisdiction. In the case of Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 1 All N.L.R. (Pt.1) 409, this court, per Fatayi Williams, J.S.C. (as he then was) stated at page 421:
“In considering whether or not a court has jurisdiction to entertain any claim, it is our view that while a person’s right of access to the courts may be taken away or restricted by statute, the language of any such statute will be watched by the courts and will not be extended beyond its least onerous meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension (See Halsburys Law of England 4th Edition, Vol. 10 para.720). That is why it is now well established that a provision in a statute ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly. This means that if such a provision is reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the court. (See Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 A.C. (H.L.) 147 at p.170). Moreover, there is a clear distinction between stating that the court has no jurisdiction to hear a case, and stating that that court has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Thus, a court may, by statute, lack jurisdiction to deal with a particular matter, but it has jurisdiction to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction to deal with such matter. (See Wilkinson v. Barking Corporation (1948) 1 K.B.721 (A.C.) at p.725)”.
Guided by the above principles, I shall now proceed to deal with the important questions that have arisen in this case. For reasons of clarity, I shall reduce them to different point headings.
From which of the two Decrees, No.51 of 1966 or No.37 of 1968 did Order No. M.S. L.N.33 of
1968 draw its authority and binding force
Now, Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree No.51 of 1966 came into force on the 28th of June, 1966. It, of course, continued in force until it was repealed by The Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968, on the 29th of July, 1968. So, it was in force on the date when Order was made to take effect. The Order, published as MSLN No.33 of 1968, came into force on the 15th of March, 1968, more than four months before Decree No.37 of 1968 came into force. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that although the said Order recites Decree No.37 of 1968 as its enabling Decree, this could not be, for the simple reason that its operative date antedated that of the enabling Decree, that is: Decree No.37 of 1968. In my opinion, there is force in this contention. For it is the law that where a legislation derives its force of authority from a paramount enactment, the subordinate legislation, in appropriate metaphor, draws its life-blood from the paramount enactment and cannot have a wider binding force than the latter. See on this Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1988) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 87) 147 at p.187. See also: Mac-fisheries (Wholesale & Retails) Ltd. v. Coventry Corporation & Anor. (1987) 3 All E.R. 302; also Kaycee (Nig.) Ltd. v. Prompt Shipping Corp. & Anor. (1986) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 15) 180. As it is so, it follows that Order No. MSLN 33 of 1968 which was made with effect from 15th March, 1968 could not have had Decree No.37 of 1968 which commenced more than four months later as its enabling Decree. But as the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry was originally set up under Decree No.51 of 1966 the legislation was subsisting on the 15th of March, 1968 when the appellant’s assets were forfeited by the Order, it appears to me that there is force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the expropriatory Order was made under the Decree No. 51 of 1966, and not under Decree No.37 of 1968 which by 15th March, 1968 was still to be promulgated. There is nothing in Decree No.37 of 1968 to show that it was intended to confer validity to State laws which were made before it came into effect. Rather Decree No.37 of 1968 makes it clear that Decree No.51 of 1966 and Edict No.6 of 1967 under which the Begho Tribunal of Inquiry was originally set up remained in force until 29th July, 1968. It is, of course, a legitimate principle of interpretation of statutes that if the choice is between two interpretations, one of which will achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, the court should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and accept the bolder construction based on the view that the legislator would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. See: Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940) A.C. 1014 at p.1022; also Shannon Realties Ltd. v. Ville de St. Michel (1924) A.C.185 at pp.192 and 193. This principle of interpretation is often expressed by the Latin maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. The choice before the court in this case is either to hold that the Order was made under Decree No.37 of 1968which it recites and strike it down on the ground that at the date it became effective, it lacked paternity and, therefore, was invalid OR to hold that it was deemed to have been made under Decree No.51 of 1966 which was subsisting on the date the Order came into effect and under which Begho Tribunal of Inquiry the result of which was sought to be implemented by the Order was set up. The scheme of exercise of legislative powers in this country is very much like in all other federations. It is based on legislative lists. Some items on the list are reserved for the exclusive legislative competence of the Federal Government and others for State Governments. A State Government or Authority can only legislate over a matter on the Federal exclusive legislative list if it is expressly empowered so to do by the competent federal authority. In the instant case, what is in issue is deprivation of the appellant of the right over his properties, a right which was at the material time secured and guaranteed by the Constitution, (See section 31 of the 1963 Constitution). It goes without saying, from the principles I have referred to, that the legislative authority in the State had no power to pass a law on a subject outside the legislative competence of the State by making an order which could have the effect of depriving a person of his property, movable or immovable, without paying adequate compensation therefore as provided for by the Constitution unless it is squarely authorized by the Federal Government. So, quite apart from the general principle of law that a dependent or subordinate legislation can have no wider binding or effective force than the paramount law which gives it force, to hold that Order No.33 of 1968 could be effective and binding four months before its purported enabling legislation, i.e. Decree No.37 of 1968, took effect has serious constitutional implications. I do not so hold. Also, ordinary commonsense dictates that a child can never be older than his father. Learned counsel for the appellant was, therefore, right in saying that although the Order recites Decree No.37 of 1968 as its enabling Decree, in fact, it was Decree No. 51 of 1966 which gave paternity to the order. I would therefore resolve this issue in favour of the appellant and deem that the Order (M.S.L.N.33 of 1968) was made under Decree No.51 of 1966.
The effect of the Enabling Decree on The Order
Having decided that the order was deemed to have been made under Decree No.51 of 1966 and not under Decree No.37 of 1968, it becomes, perhaps, unnecessary to go in detail into what would have been the effect of application of Decree No.3 It is sufficient to repeat that if the enabling Decree were No.37 of 1968, I would have felt bound to hold that the Order was invalid. This is because, as I have stated, the Order cannot have a wider application than the enabling Decree. The commencement date of a legislation is part of that legislation: Tomlinson v. Bullock (1879) 4 Q.B.D.230. A subsidiary legislation which derives its authority from a paramount legislation must, when in conflict with the latter, by construction, be cut down so as not to conflict with it: see Re Simpkin Marshall Ltd. (1959) Ch. 229; also Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. v. Bryers (1958) A.C.485 (H.L.) at pp. 499-501. I would even go further to state that the part of the subsidiary legislation which seeks to extend the content and application of the paramount enactment is a nullity, and that, inspite of any ouster provision, a court of law has jurisdiction and power to say so. I am reinforced in this by the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission & Anor. (1969) 2 A.C.147, where Lord Reid, while considering the application of an ouster provision to a proceeding which is a nullity stated at p.170:
“Statutory provisions which seek to limit the ordinary jurisdiction of the court have a long history. No case has been cited in which any other form of words limiting the jurisdiction of the court has been held to protect a nullity. If the draftsman or Parliament had intended to introduce a new kind of ouster clause so as to prevent any inquiry even as to whether the document relied on was a forgery, I would have expected to find something much more specific than the bald statement that a determination shall not be called in question in any court of law. Undoubtedly such a provision protects every determination which is not a nullity. But I do not think that it is necessary or even reasonable to construe the word “determination” as including everything which purports to be a determination but which is in fact no determination at all. And there are no degrees of nullity”.
Then he concluded:
“I have come without hesitation to the conclusion that in this case we are not prevented from inquiring whether the order of the commission was a nullity,”
I agree with him that an ouster provision does not extend to a proceeding which is a nullity. I think its relevance in this case is that it strengthens my view that the fact that that portion of the Order is void is an additional reason why it should be held void as against the enabling Decree.
What I am saying is not that the Military governor of Bendel State had not the competence to make an order, if duly authorized by a Federal Decree so to do, to have deprived the appellant of his property. What I am saying is that, because the order made in this case purports to be effective four months before the Decree from which it derived authority came into being, it could not be presumed to have been authorized by the Decree which only could have given it its lifeblood. This is not a challenge to the competence of the law maker. Retroactive application of any law is not one which is favoured by the courts. And when, as in this case, it relates to the potency of a dependent legislation which cannot stand on its own, I feel entitled to say that the retroactive provision is a nullity.
Reliance has been placed on the provision of section 12 of Decree No. 37 of 1968 as ousting the jurisdiction of the court from even pronouncing on the ineptitude of the Order. That section provides:
“The validity of any direction, notice or order given or made, or of any other thing whatsoever done, as the case may be, under this Decree, or under any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree, or the circumstances under which such direction, notice or order has been given or made or other thing whatsoever done, shall not be inquired into in any court of law, and accordingly nothing in the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution of the Federation shall apply in relation to any matter arising out of this Decree or out of any enactment or other law repealed by this Decree.”
In my opinion this provision does not protect the Order, for a number of reasons. First: An Order which purports to have been effective four months before the Decree was made could not have been made “under the Decree”
Even though the Order avers it was made under the Decree, it tells a lie about itself. Secondly, unlike in several cases such as in Attorney-General, Lagos State v. Hon. Justice L. J. Dosunmu (1989) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 111) 552 and Uwaifo v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (supra) in which a validation Decree (No.18 of 1977) was promulgated by the Federal Military Government to validate the otherwise invalid Edict and everything done under it and to protect the Governor and everybody who took part in the forfeiture, the Order in question in this case has no Validation Decree to back it up. Decree No.37 of 1968, read as a whole, does not purport to be a Validation Decree. Thirdly; the Order No. 33 of 1968 was not repealed by Decree No.37 of 1968 and so cannot be stated to be one of the “other law repealed by” the Decree. So, the order No.33 of 1968 does not come within the contemplation of section 12 and the whole Decree No.37 of 1968 is irrelevant in this case.
DECREE NO.51 OF 1966
The next point for consideration in this case is the position of Order No. M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 as against the provisions of Decree No.51 of 1966 Public Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree of 1966. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the Order is inconsistent with the Decree because whereas sections 3 and 4 of the Decree contemplate forfeiture of assets which have been found to have been improperly or corruptly acquired, the Order has forfeited assets which have been found by the Tribunal to have been acquired as a genuine business venture in a contract finance business. I have already dealt with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that Decree No.51 of 1966 does not apply at all and held that it does.
Now sections 3(1) and 4(1) of Decree No.51 of 1966 provided as follows:
“3-(1) The appropriate authority may by an instrument, after considering the report and if he is of the opinion that it is appropriate for him to do so, appoint a tribunal of inquiry consisting of such number of persons, not being less than of whom the chairman shall be Judge or former Judge of a High Court or a person qualified to practice as a legal practitioner for not less than ten years) as he deems fit, for the purpose of inquiry –
(a) whether or not the public officer has corruptly or improperly enriched himself or any person by virtue of his office or by any means in abuse of his office or otherwise howsoever whilst a public officer; and
(b) as to the extent of such enrichment, and the provisions of the Tribunal of Inquiry Decree 1966, or so much of it as the appropriate authority may by the instrument appointing the tribunal specify, shall apply in Section 3(4) of Decree No. 1 of 1966 and it becomes a dead letter. We feel that Dr. Ajayi’s reference to section 6 of the Decree is inept and the flaw in Section 6 in isolation. Reading the Decree as a whole we are not in doubt that section 6 does not preclude the courts from enquiring into any inconsistency that may arise, but merely bars the courts from questioning the validity of the making of a Decree or an Edict on the ground that there is no valid legislative authority to make one.”
I adopt these words in this appeal.
I may pause here to observe that the provisions in sections 3(1) and 4(1) in Decree No.51 of 1966 have been substantially re-enacted in sections 4(1) and 8(1) of Decree No.37 of 1968. The substantial additions are sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 8. Sub-section (3) enables the Military Governor to make a forfeiture order against the property of any person who has been improperly enriched by the public officer. This is not relevant here. Sub-section (3) runs thus:
“(3) The appropriate authority may make an order for forfeiture of any assets of any public officer or other person, no mailer howsoever or whensoever acquired, if the assets whereby such public officer or other person has corruptly or improperly enriched himself or another person, or whereby he has been so enriched, are no longer subsisting either at all or in such form that they could have made the subject of an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2) of this section.”
It is clear that this section empowers the forfeiture of assets howsoever or whensoever acquired i.e. outside those found to have been corruptly acquired only when it has been shown that the property whereby the public officer has corruptly and improperly enriched himself or another person is no longer available or is no longer in a form in which it could be forfeited under the section. The uncontradicted evidence before the court is that the assets of the political party which was corruptly enriched had already been seized by the respondent and that the appellant had sufficient assets to be forfeited, if need be. In any event the Order (No.33) does not show that it was made because any of these two circumstances existed. This also shows that the Order is also in conflict with even Decree No.37 of 1968. In the circumstances, there was therefore no basis for the forfeiture order. Part of the argument of the appellant is that for the respondent to forfeit the assets of the political party and later forfeit the assets of the appellant for the same reason was a clear case of double jeopardy. I agree. From all these it follows that even if Decree No.37 was applicable, it would still not have protected the act of forfeiture of the appellant’s assets.
THE POSITION UNDER THE 1979 CONSTITUTION
This would have been sufficient to dispose of this appeal in appellant’s favour; but then the learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that, in any event, the appellant’s cause of action, if he had any, had been barred from adjudication by the provisions of section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution by the time the appellant went to court in 1982. The learned senior advocate for the appellant submitted that appellant’s case is not within the purview of the provision.
Now, section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution provides as follows:
“(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section (which invests the courts with judicial powers)
xxxxxxxxxxx
(d) shall not, as from the date when this section comes into force, extend to any action or proceedings relating to any existing law made on or after 15th January, 1966 for determining any issue or question as to the competence of any such law.” (Italics and parenthesis mine).
There can be no doubt that what was aimed at was any existing law, in this case Order M.S.L.N.33 of 1968, as both Decree No.51 of 1966 and Edict No.6 of 1967 had been repealed by Decree NO.37 of 1968, which has also been repealed by Decree No. 105 of 1979. But even so, I have to bear in mind that when a subsidiary legislation is continued in force after the paramount enactment from which it derived its authority has been repealed, the rule is that the scope and construction of the subordinate legislation are determined according to the repealed enactment under which it was made; see Miller’s Cash Stores v. Westham Corporation (1955) 1 W.L.R. 1121; Re Fletcher, ex p. Fletcher v. Official Receiver (1956) Ch. 28. See also Maxwell: On Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pp.18-19. Indeed section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1964 expressly preserves, inter alia, all the accrued rights, privilege, obligation or liability under such a repealed enactment. I shall apply this principle in this case. Section 6(6)(d) is also aimed at actions and proceedings relating to existing laws made during the period in question and which challenge the competence of any person or authority to make the laws.
I have tried to examine the meaning of this expression in the con of decided cases. As I have stated, most of appellant’s claims do not challenge the competence of any person or authority to make the laws, taking into account the definition of the expression in Uwaifo’s case (supra) and other cases. It does not amount to a challenge within the meaning of the provision to try to draw any inference from an application of the law in question to a set of facts. An examination of the appellant’s claims set out above shows that:
(i) The first claim assumes the validity of Edict No.6 of 1967 and Order M.S.L.N.33 of 1968 but contends that by reason of some provisions of the enabling Decree they took effect as the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.
(ii) The second and third heads of claim maintain that the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law apply to the Acts done and forfeiture made pursuant to the Edict and the Order.
(iii) The fourth head of claim assumes the validity of the Order but maintains that on a correct interpretation and application thereof the appellant is entitled to be paid the sum of N432,817.82.
(iv) The 5th and 6th heads of claim assume the validity of the Edict and Order but maintain that, based on them the appellant is entitled to certain reliefs.
(v) The last head of claim is a claim of a bulk sum as an alternative to 5th and 6th heads of claim.
It is thus clear that the appellant by the formulation of his claim remained true to his stated objective as set out in paragraph 24 of his statement of claim where he averred:
“24. The plaintiff is not in these proceedings calling into question the proceedings of the Tribunal or the recommendation or other Order made by the Tribunal or any orders or directions on the issue made by the Military Governor but avers that the execution of the said orders and directives which took effect as judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction and which were enforceable by the High Court Mid-Western State of Nigeria under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law. Cap. 116 were not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the said Law (now Cap.151).”
Throughout the statement of claim which spans twelve pages of the typed record, he exhibited the same caution and care not to challenge the competence in terms of capacity or power to make the laws relating to the forfeiture of his assets. The only exception is, perhaps, in paragraph 31 where he sought in his pleading to show that the orders made were in conflict with the enabling law. This, however, did not result in the amendment of the reliefs claimed and is, as I have shown, permissible from the analysis of the cases I have made earlier. I am therefore, of the respectful opinion that unless this Court now decides to enlarge the meaning of the expression “competence of any authority or person to make any such law” as adumbrated in Uwaifo’s Case (supra) and applied in a large number of cases, including I.A. Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel State & Ors. (1985) 2 S.C.191; [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572 there is nothing in the appellant’s claim that comes within the purview of section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution.
It becomes pertinent to ask: is it the intendment of section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution that all acts or matter done by the Military Administration pursuant to any law, Federal or State, from January, 16, 1966 to October 1, 1979, constitutes a completely closed chapter in the sense that no suit whatsoever can be entertained on them on any ground whatsoever after the promulgation of the 1979 Constitution I cannot answer this question correctly without adverting to the state of the law before the Constitution came into effect as well as some provisions of the Constitution itself. In saying so I shall bear in mind what Lindley, M. R. said in Re Mayfair Properly Co. (1898) 2 Ch.28 at p.35:
“In order to properly interprete any statute (including a Constitution) it is necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon’s Case (3 Co. Rep. 7a) to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief”.
See also Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptroller General of Patents (1898) A.C.S71. In A.I. Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel State & Ors. (1985) 2 S.C.191; [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt.4) 572, this Court at p.205, per Bello, J.S.C. (as he then was) reaffirmed this principle. Bearing this principle in mind, I should note that prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution on October 1, 1979, successive Military Administrations conceded it, as I have shown, that the courts had jurisdiction to inquire into cases of conflict between a State law and a Decree, the Constitution or a Federal enactment. I should also proceed to take a calm look at the provisions of the Constitution itself.
Significantly there are some provisions of the Constitution itself which tend to show that inspite of the provisions of section 6(6)(d) the courts can always exercise their powers once the issue is that of conflict between a State law and a Decree, the Constitution or other Federal enactment. It is enough to refer to only two of them. Dealing with State legislative powers, the Constitution provides in section 4(5) as follows:
“(5) if any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
Also as if to put the preservation of judicial powers over such inconsistent State Legislation beyond peradventure, it is provided in section 274(3) of the same Constitution thus:
“(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as affecting the power of a court of Law or any tribunal established by law to declare invalid any provision of an existing law on the ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other law, that is to say-
(a) any other existing law;
(b) a Law of a House of Assembly;
(c) an Act of the National Assembly; or
(d) any provision of this Constitution.”
An Edict has, of course, the same status with a Law of a House of Assembly and is an “existing law” under paragraph (a).
One of the basic principle of interpretation of all constitutions and statutes is, of course, that the law maker will not be presumed to have given a right in one section and taken it away in another. See: Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane) Limited (1949) A.C.530 at p. 546. In the instant case, it cannot be right to assume that the Constitution by sections 4(5) and 274(3) gave the courts the power to pronounce on any inconsistency between a State legislation on the one hand and a Federal enactment or the Constitution on the other and yet by section 6(6)(d) absolutely barred them from adjudicating in such matters. The only meaningful interpretation of section 6(6)(d), therefore, is that which preserves the potency of that paragraph without disturbing the application of sections 4(5) and 274(3). In other words that the bar to the exercise of judicial powers intended by section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution does not extend to a case like this where one of the facts relied upon but not directly claimed is that of a conflict between the Edict and Order, which are State Laws, on one hand and the enabling Decree, on the other. In my respectful opinion, therefore, ouster of courts’ exercise of their power by section 6(6)(d) of the Constitution does not extend to the instant case. In short, section 6(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution is merely declaratory of the law before the Constitution came into force. Reading it together with other provisions of the Constitution, it will be seen that the Constitution retains the old distinction between those legislations passed between January 16, 1966 and October 1,1979 which could be challenged and those which could not.
I shall deal with one final point. It has been suggested that the order itself is not void but its retroactivity is invalid. So, its retroactive effect can be removed while the Order itself is upheld with effect from the 18th of September, 1968 when it was signed into law.
I believe that this approach will ignore a number of fundamental principles of interpretation of statutes. In the first place, as the Order was an expropriatory legislation, it ought, on the authority of several decided cases, be construed contra preferentes. Secondly, it is basic that where a legislation is expressed to commence on a particular day, it is to be construed as coming into effect at the first moment of that day: see Maxwell: On Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) p.14. As it is so, although it is sometimes possible to excise the retroactive provision of a statute and apply it as taking effect from the date when the statute was made, such an approach will not be adopted in an expropriatory statute when it will do violence to the language of the enactment. In this case, the question, I believe will be; was the forfeiture Order intended to take effect on a particular day If the answer is yes, then that date falls down with the retroactive provision. If on the other hand it was a continuous exercise, then it will be possible to excise the retroactive provision and save the Order. Looking at the Order as a whole, it appears to me that the forfeiture was intended to take place on the commencement date of the order, that is on the 15th of March, 1968. As I have held that the Military Governor’s Order of that date was invalid for the reasons I have given, it follows that the Order was ineffective. It will not be right to plant it on another day not intended by the Order. I should mention, however, that if the Decree applied, I would have agreed with the learned counsel for the respondent that it is only where there is evidence that the public officer had not sufficient assets to be forfeited that the question of execution and registration of the Order as a judgment of the High Court would arise. There is no such evidence in this case and there is nothing to show that registration of an Order of forfeiture under the section was compulsory in all cases. It is only where the competent authority has decided to register the Order that the question of revival of the jurisdiction of court where it would have been ousted could rise.
But, for other reasons I have given above, I have come to the conclusion that, as against Decree No.51 of 1966 which was the only relevant enabling Decree in force on the date it purported to have become effective, the Order No. M.S.L.N. 33 of 1968 is invalid. But assuming, but not agreeing that Decree No. 37 of 1968 is applied, the expropriatory Order effective on the 15th of March, 1968, four months before the enabling Decree was made, is invalid. I, therefore agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that it did not have the effect of forfeiting the assets of the appellant. As the evidence went one way, the appellant is entitled to judgment. So, I allow the appeal and set aside the order forfeiting the appellant’s assets and order that they be returned to him.
I award costs of N500.00 in favour of the appellant in this Court, N350.00 in the Court of Appeal and N300.00 in the High Court.Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
Chief Otisa Chukura, S.A.N. (with him, C. O. Chukura) For Appellant
AND
- Akomolafe Wilson, Director of Public Prosecutions, Bendel State Ministry of Justice For Respondent



