YOHANNA & ORS v. GABRIEL & ORS (2020)

YOHANNA & ORS v. GABRIEL & ORS

(2020)LCN/15823(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(MAKURDI JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, June 10, 2020

CA/MK/181/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Ignatius Igwe Agube Justice of the Court of Appeal

Onyekachi Aja Otisi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Joseph Eyo Ekanem Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. JATAU TETE YOHANNA 2. ISIAKA MOHAMMED ISA (For Themselves And On Behalf Of Nigeria Union Of Teachers, Nasarawa State Wing) 3. NIGERIA UNION OF TEACHERS (NUT) 4. MUSA ADAMU 5. USMAN AGYE APPELANT(S)

And

AGBASHI GABRIEL 2. BELLO KWARA (For And On Behalf Of Conference Of Secondary School Tutors (COSST), Nasarawa State Chapter Otherwise Known As Academic Staff Union Secondary Schools (ASUSS), Nasarawa State) 3. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, NASARAWA STATE 4. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, NASARAWA STATE 5. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NASARAWA STATE 6. ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL, NASARAWA STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

WHAT IS A MISNOMER?

A misnomer simply means “a mistake in naming a person, place or thing, esp. in a legal instrument” – see Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition at page 1090. ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

WHAT IS A MISNOMER?

A misnomer occurs when the correct person sues or is sued under a wrong name; Mespo J. Continental Limited v. Corona S-R Mbh & Company (The Owners Of “M.V. Concordia”) (2006) LPELR-1129(SC). Expressing opinion in APGA v. Ubah & Ors (2019) LPELR-48132(SC) on whether suing the “All Progressive Party” instead of “All Progressive Grand Alliance” amounted to a suit against a non-juristic person, thereby impinges on the jurisdiction of the Court, Abba Aji, JSC said, at page 19:
“Misnomer in this sense means, simply, a wrong use of a name. If the entity intended to be sued exists but a wrong name is used to describe it that, in my judgment, is a misnomer. See Per AYOOLA, JSC in MAERSK LINE & ANOR V. ADDIDE INVESTMENTS LTD & ANOR (2002) LPELR-1811(SC). ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

WHAT IS A MISNOMER?

It is a mistake in name, i.e., giving incorrect name to a person in the writ of summons. It occurs when a mistake is made as to the name of a person who sued or was sued or when an action is brought by or against the wrong name of a person. When both parties are quite familiar with the entity envisaged in a Writ of Summons and could not have been misled or have any real doubt or misgiving as to the identity of the person suing or being sued, then there can be no problem of mistaken identity to justify a striking out of the action. A misnomer that will vitiate the proceedings would be such that will cause reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending to sue or be sued. See Per OKORO, JSC in REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS OF NIG V. NAMA (2014) LPELR- 22372 (SC).” ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

POSITION OF LAW WHERE A CORRECT PERSON IS TAKEN TO COURT UNDER A WRONG NAME OR AN INCORRECT NAME IS GIVEN TO A PARTY

The important point to note is that it is the correct person who sued or has been sued (as in “All Progressive Party” instead of “All Progressive Grand Alliance”) but a mistake was made in stating the name, and none of the parties to the suit was misled by the mistake. That is to say, the error is as to the wrong name of the party; Registered Trustees of the Airline Operators of Nig. v. NAMA (2014) LPELR- 22372 (SC); A. B. Manu & Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. Costain (W.A.) Ltd (1994) LPELR-14550(CA). It is therefore well settled that where the correct person is taken to Court under a wrong name or an incorrect name is given to a party, an amendment may be sought to correct the mistake, and the Court is obliged to allow the amendment, in the interest of justice; Agbule v. Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2012) LPELR-20625 (SC); Maersk Line & Anor v. Addide Investments Ltd & Anor (2002) LPELR-1811(SC); Njoku v. United African Company Foods (1999) LPELR-13014(CA); Karmame & Anor v. Dan’azumi & Ors (2011) LPELR-9192(CA); Arab Contractors (O.A.O.) (Nig.) Ltd v. El-Raphaal Hospital and Maternity Home Investment Co. Ltd & Anor (2009) LPELR-8735(CA). ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

PERSON(S) RECOGNIZED BY LAW TO SUE OR BE SUED

It is well settled that only natural persons or a body of persons whom statutes have either expressly or by implication clothed with the garment of legal personality could prosecute or defend law suits by that name; Dairo & Ors v. The Registered Trustees of the Anglican Diocese of Lagos (2017) LPELR-42573(SC); Ataguba And Company v. Gura Nigeria Limited (2005) LPELR-584(SC); AG Federation v. ANPP & Ors (2003) LPELR-630(SC); Fawehinmi v. NBA & Ors (No 2) (1989) LPELR-1259(SC). I further place reliance on Reptico S. A. Geneva v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2013) LPELR-20662 (SC) wherein the Apex Court, per the Noble Lord, Ariwola, JSC, said:
“Generally, the law recognizes two categories of and be sued in Court. They are natural persons, with life, mind, brain and physical body and other artificial persons or institutions having juristic personality. See; Attorney General of Federation v. All Nigeria Peoples Party & Ors (2003) 12 SCM 1 at 12; (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.851) 182; (2003) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 146. In Mailafia Trading & Transport Company Ltd. v. Veritas Insurance Company Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.38) 802, the Court held that a party who should commence action in Court must be a person known to law, that is, a legal Person. In other words, no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or body of persons, unless such a party has been given by statute, expressly or impliedly either (a) a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or (b) a right to sue or be sued by that name. See; Knight and Searle v. Dove (1964) 2 All ER 307, Admin Estate of Gen. Sanni Abacha v. Eke-Spiff & Ors (2009) 3 SCM 1; (2009) NWLR (Pt.1139) 92.” ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

WHETHER JUDGMENT OF COURT CAN BE ENFORCED ON A NECESSARY PARTY TO AN ACTION BUT NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION IN COURT.
It is trite that no order of Court can be binding or enforceable on a non-party to the action, in this case, COSST. Therefore, COSST was a necessary party to the action; Green v Green (1987) LPELR-1338(SC). The proper parties to whom rights and obligations arising from the cause of action attach must be before the Court; Ehidimhen v. Musa & Anor (2000) LPELR-1051(SC). Where the proper parties are not before the Court then the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit; Cotecna Intl Ltd v. Churchgate Nig Ltd & Anor (2010) LPELR-897(SC); Williams v. Williams & Anor (2018) LPELR-44901(SC); CBN v. Interstella Communications Limited & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940(SC). ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

IMPROPER USE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

In Saraki v Kotoye (1992) LPELR-3016(SC), the erudite Law Lord, Karibi Whyte, JSC (of blessed memory) explained, page 33:
“The concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. It’s one common feature is the improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice.”
There is abuse of process of Court where the process of the Court has not been used bona fide and properly. Circumstances in which abuse of Court process can arise has been said to include the following: –
(a) Instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues or multiplicity of action on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to begin that action.
(b) Instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different Courts even though on different grounds.
(c) Where two similar processes are used in respect of the exercise of the same right; for example a cross-appeal and a respondent’s notice.
(d) Where an application for adjournment is sought by a party to an action to bring an application to Court for leave to raise issues of fact already decided by Courts below.
(e) Where there is no iota of law supporting a Court process or where it is premised on frivolity or recklessness. It is not the existence of the right to institute these actions that is protested against, rather, it is the manner of exercise of this right and the purpose of doing same that is abhorred; Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil and Allied Products Ltd & Ors (2007) LPELR-55(SC); Ogboru & Anor v. Uduaghan & Ors (2013) LPELR-20805(SC); Ladoja v. Ajimobi & Ors (2016) LPELR-40658(SC). ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

PLEAD OF ESTOPPEL PER REM JUDICATAM

As has been established in a plethora of judicial pronouncements, to successfully plead estoppel per rem judicatam, the party must establish the following requirements or pre-conditions: –
(a) That the parties or their privies are the same in both the previous and the present proceeding.
(b) That the claim or issues in dispute in both actions are the same.
(c) That the res or the subject matter of litigation in the two cases is the same.
(d) That the decision relied upon to support the plea of estoppel per rem judicatam is valid, subsisting and final.
(e) That the Court that gave the previous decision relied upon to sustain the plea is a Court of competent jurisdiction.
See: Ogbolosingha & Anor v. Bayelsa State IEC & Ors (2015) LPELR-24353(SC); Adeyemi-Bero v. Lagos State Development Property Corporation & Anor (2012) LPELR-20615 (SC); Odutola v. Oderinde & Ors (2004) LPELR-2258(SC). ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

GROUND OF APPEAL

Issue for determination must flow from the grounds of appeal; Onyesoh v. Nnebedun & Ors (1992) LPELR-2742(SC); Lau v. PDP & Ors (2017) LPELR-42800(SC). ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.

PRINCIPLE OF LAW ON THE JURISDICTION OF COURT

Their Lordships of the Apex Court also re-stated the fundamental nature of jurisdiction in the adjudicatory process where they posited that jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law without the jurisdiction, the action being like an animal drained of its blood, ceases to be alive. Bereft of any blood in it and indeed without life, any effort at resuscitating it remains a futile exercise. See Utih vs. Onoyivwe (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 166) 166; Usman vs. Umaru (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.254) 377 and the recent Supreme Court cases of Emejuru vs. Abraham (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1663) 541 at page 560 paragraphs B-C; page 567 paragraphs A-B, page 568 paragraph B, per Galumje, Peter-Odili, and Sanusi, JSC. IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.

PRINCIPLE OF LAW ON RES JUDICATA

The issue Res Judicata as have been raised in Issue 3 of the Appellants Brief of Argument is also fundamental for the hearing and determination any before the Court on the merit. In Gbishe & Ors. vs. Zangue (1973) 5 SC 293 at 305, the Supreme Court held that “when a fact has been decided in a Court of competent jurisdiction, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call in question and have it tried over again at any later date thereafter so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed”.
In Madukolu & Ors. vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 581 at 588 the Court also held that “where a competent Court has determined an issue and entered judgment thereon, neither party to the proceedings may re-litigate that issue by formulating a fresh claim since the matter is res judicata.” Res judicata operates not only against the party whom it affects but also against the jurisdiction of the Court.” See Ukaegbu vs. Ugoji (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.190) page 127 at 146 and Yoye vs. Olubode (1974) 1 All NLR 18 and in Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. vs. UIO Exportchleb (1965) 2 All ER. 4 at 8 per Lord Denning. IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.

MEANING OF MISNOMER

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal was lodged against the interlocutory ruling and final decision of the National Industrial Court, sitting at Makurdi (the lower Court) delivered on 5/12/2014 and 26/2/2015 respectively in Suit No: NICN/LAF/01/2014. The lower Court had declined jurisdiction to entertain the case of the Appellants on the ground, inter alia, that the proper parties had not been sued and that the case of the Appellants was an abuse of Court process on the basis of res judicata.

The Appellants as claimants had commenced Suit No: NICN/LAF/01/2014 by Originating Summons, with an affidavit in support, in which they sought these reliefs:
1. A DECLARATION that Conference of Secondary School Tutors (COSST) of Academic Staff Union of Secondary Schools (ASUSS) Nasarawa State Chapter as represented by the 1st and 2nd Defendants is not a registered Trade Union under the Trade Union (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 2005.
2. A DECLARATION that COSST or ASUSS not being a registered Trade Union is not legible to enjoy the privileges of recognition by the Nasarawa State Government and the enjoyment of the check-off-dues from Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State and other benefits and privileges of registration and recognition granted by the Trade Union Act.
3. A Declaration that only the Nigeria Union of Teachers as a registered Trade Union with Secondary School Tutors as statutory members is entitled under the law to check-off-dues from Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State.
4. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 3rd – 6th defendants from according COSST or ASUSS as represented by the 1st and 2nd Defendants any form of recognition or privileges of a registered trade union.
5. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION mandating the 3rd – 6th Defendants to deduct check-off dues from the salaries of Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State for remittance to the NUT as provided by law.
6. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining COSST or ASUSS by itself or through its agents, servants, representatives and privies from parading itself as a trade union and, a fortiori, from meddling with trade union activities in Nasarawa State.
7. AND FOR SUCH other order{s} as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.

Prior to filing their counter affidavits, the 3rd – 6th Respondents and the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed Preliminary Objections challenging the competence of the action and the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the suit, pages 42 – 88 and pages 111 – 159 of the Record of Appeal. The Appellants filed a counter affidavit in opposition to both Preliminary Objections, pages 181 – 184. On 5/12/2014, the lower Court heard arguments on whether the issue of jurisdiction should be taken alongside the originating summons. The learned trial Judge, noting the fact that the parties had earlier agreed that the preliminary objections be taken before the substantive matter and had filed their processes on this accord, as well as the fundamental nature of jurisdiction, ruled that the said preliminary objections be taken before the Originating Summons. The lower Court proceeded to hear arguments on the Preliminary Objections. In a considered ruling delivered on 26/2/2015, the trial Court upheld the arguments of the 3rd – 6th Respondents and the 1st and 2nd Respondents and declined jurisdiction to hear the Suit. The Appellants’ suit was thereupon struck out.

Dissatisfied with the decisions of the lower Court, the Appellants lodged this appeal by Notice of Appeal filed on 2/5/2018 with 10 grounds of appeal challenging the ruling and decision of the Lower Court.

Parties filed Briefs of Argument. The Appellants’ Brief was filed on 3/9/2018. The 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Brief was filed on 25/10/2018 but deemed properly filed and served on 16/5/2019. The 3rd – 6th Respondents’ Brief was filed on 22/10/2018 but deemed properly filed and served on 25/10/2018. The Appellants filed a Reply Brief on 8/11/2018 but deemed properly filed and served on 16/5/2019. At the hearing of the appeal on 20/3/2020, the Appellants’ Counsel, Dr. M.E. Ediru, who was served with Hearing Notice electronically on 15/3/2020, was absent. The Appellants were also absent. Being satisfied that the Appellants through Counsel, had been notified of the hearing of the appeal, the Court proceeded to deem the Appellants’ Brief and Reply Brief to be duly argued pursuant to Order 19 Rule 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016. Olayinka Afolabi, Esq. with Esther Uloho, Esq., adopted the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Brief, while A. H. Akuson, Esq., Principal State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Nasarawa State adopted the 3rd – 6th Respondents’ Brief.

The Appellants formulated five issues for determination from the grounds of appeal:
1. Whether having regard to the contents of the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection and the finding of the trial Court that the Registered Trustees of COSST is the legal person of the COSST sued as 1st and 2nd defendants/respondents the issue of the competence or otherwise of the 1st and 2nd defendants/respondents borders on juristic personality or a misnomer (Grounds 1 & 2)
2. Whether having regard to the circumstances of this case the trial Court was not wrong in holding that COSST as the 1st and 2nd defendants/respondents are not proper parties and therefore the suit is incompetent against them. (Grounds 3, 4 & 10).
3. Whether the trial Court was not wrong when it declined jurisdiction to entertain the claimants’ originating summons for being an abuse of Court process on the basis of res judicata. (Grounds 5, 6 & 7).

4. Whether the trial Court was not wrong when it held itself bound by the decision in the case of Nigerian Union of Teachers v Kogi State Teaching Service Commission & Anor, Suit No. NICN/34/2007 delivered on 20th day of May, 2008, which is a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. (Ground 8).
5. Whether the failure of the trial Court to determine the legal status and rights of the respondents to practice trade unionism under Sections 3, 5 and 17 of the Trade Union (Amended) Act, 2005, its 3rd Schedule and Section 5(3) of the Labour (Amendment) Act, 1986, before declining jurisdiction in this matter deprived the appellants of the exercise of their rights under the said laws. (Ground 9).

For the 1st and 2nd Respondents, Issue 1 was reframed thus:
Having regard to the position of law as regards proper parties to a suit and having regard to the processes filed by the appellants at the trial Court, whether the trial Court was right to have raised the issue of proper parties from Grounds No. 1 and 2.

The 3rd – 6th Respondents reframed the Issues in this manner:
1. Whether the finding of the trial Court that the Registered Trustees of COSST is the legal person of the COSST and not the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Respondents, and as such, suing the 1st and 2nd Respondents for and on behalf of the COSST/ASUSS Nasarawa State is a mere misnomer or of suing the wrong person, (ground 1 and 2)
2. Whether having regard to the circumstances of this case, the trial Court was wrong in holding that the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Respondents are not the proper parties and therefore the suit is incompetent against them. (Grounds 3, 4 & 10)
3. Whether the trial Court was wrong when it decline jurisdiction to entertain the claimants’ originating summons for being an abuse of Court process or whether if the trial Court had granted the prayers of the claimant, it would have effects on the decision of the High Court of Justice of Nasarawa State (ground 5, 6 & 7)
4. Whether considering the facts of this case, the trial Court was wrong when it held itself bound by the decision in the case of Conference of Secondary School Tutors (COSST) Nasarawa State Chapter & 7 ors Vs. Nigeria Union of Teachers Nasarawa State Chapter & 2 ors delivered on 27th day of November, 2003, (ground 8)

5. Whether the decline of jurisdiction by the trial Court to determine the legal status and rights of the Respondents to practice trade unionism under Sections 3, 5 and 17 of the Trade Union (Amended) Act 2005 and Section 5(3) of the Labour (Amended) Act, 1986, deprived the Appellants of the exercise of their right under the said laws. (ground 9).

I shall adopt the Issues as formulated by the Appellants, taking into consideration the modifications postulated by the Respondents. Issues 1 and 2 shall be resolved together.

Issues 1 and 2
The 1st and 2nd Respondents were sued for and on behalf of Conference of Secondary school Tutors (COSST), Nasarawa State Chapter otherwise known as Academic Staff Union Secondary Schools (ASUSS), Nasarawa State). On whether these parties were the proper parties to be sued, the learned trial Judge held, page 266 – 267 of the Record of Appeal:
“On whether the defendants/applicants (1st & 2nd) are proper parties in this suit, not been(sic) sued in its registered name. It is settled law that in the absence of a competent party, the subject matter that calls for determination in the action becomes undeterminable and rather otiose. See Lemna Energy Resources Ltd vs. Engr. Mukaila Musa (2013) LPELR – 20367 (CA)…
I find from the processes filed as I do also agree with defendants’ counsel here that the reliefs of claimants’ in this suit bothers (sic) on the Conference of Secondary School Tutors (COSST) who are not party to the suit as registered trustees. The poser here is: can the 1st & 2nd defendants stand on their own in the absence of the Registered Trustees of Secondary School Tutors? There is therefore no order of Court made that can be binding or enforceable on a non-party, where that parent body registered as COSST, which ought to have been joined in this suit was left out.
Furthermore, the averment of the claimants in paragraph 19 of its supporting affidavit is of concern here, the respondents having admitted that the 1st & 2nd defendants is a registered body cannot renege on his earlier submission, this would amount to blowing hot and cold at the same. The referred paragraph is thus reproduced below.
“That I know as a fact that COSST or ASUSS Bauchi State and COSST or ASSUSS Nassarawa State owns their existence to one parent body registered as COSST or ASUSS”.
It is therefore my holding in view of the above reasoning and the authorities cited that the 1st & 2nd defendants/applicants are not proper parties sued and this in effect renders the suit against them incompetent, and I do so hold.”

The contention of the Appellants is that this was a case of a mere misnomer where a party has been sued using a wrong name or insufficient description and that the Court can correct the error in name even suo motu. Authorities cited included: Engr. Emmanuel Chukwuemeka Okeke v Nnamdi Azikiwe University Teaching Hospital (2018) LPELR (43781) CA; Maersk Line v Addide Ltd (2002) 29 WRN 1 at pp. 57-59; Agbule v W.R. & P.CO. Ltd (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 318 at 341. It was argued that the 1st and 2nd Respondents who were sued as representing COSST, confirmed their membership of COSST in the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection. They were not incompetent parties. The Court was urged to invoke its powers under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act to correct the names of the 1st and 2nd Respondents or to hold that COSST sued as the 1st and 2nd Respondents was a juristic person in which case the issue of competence of the parties would not arise.

For the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the issue of misnomer was not argued in the lower Court. The Appellants on their own showing admitted there is a registered body to which the 1st and 2nd Respondents belong. The importance of suing the proper defendant for a suit to be competent was emphasized. This Court cannot exercise its powers under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act in this matter as the lower Court on its own had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Authorities relied on include Akindele v Abiodun (2009) 11 NWLR (PT 1152) 356 at 363; Santa Fe Drilling Nig. Ltd v Awala {1991} 6 NWLR {PT 609} 623 at 625.

For the 3rd – 6th Respondents, it was argued that this was not a case of misnomer in which an amendment would be permitted but a case where the wrong person had been sued. On what would constitute a misnomer, reliance was placed on The Registered Trustees of the Airline Operators of Nigeria v. NAMA (2014) LPELR-22372(SC), inter alia. The right and proper party to be sued was the Registered Trustees of COSST and not the member of COSST. Where there are no proper parties the Court would have no jurisdiction to hear the matter; citing authorities such as: Mozie v Mbamalu (2006) 15 NWLR (FT 1003) 466; Christaben Group Ltd v. Oni (2008) 11 NWLR (1097) 84; Awoniyi v Reg. Trustees of Amorc (2000) 10 NWLR (FT 676) 522 at 533. The only legal personality of COSST are its Registered Trustees. The Court was urged to hold that the action was incompetent as constituted.

Resolution
A misnomer simply means “a mistake in naming a person, place or thing, esp. in a legal instrument” – see Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition at page 1090. A misnomer occurs when the correct person sues or is sued under a wrong name; Mespo J. Continental Limited v. Corona S-R Mbh & Company (The Owners Of “M.V. Concordia”) (2006) LPELR-1129(SC). Expressing opinion in APGA v. Ubah & Ors (2019) LPELR-48132(SC) on whether suing the “All Progressive Party” instead of “All Progressive Grand Alliance” amounted to a suit against a non-juristic person, thereby impinges on the jurisdiction of the Court, Abba Aji, JSC said, at page 19:
“Misnomer in this sense means, simply, a wrong use of a name. If the entity intended to be sued exists but a wrong name is used to describe it that, in my judgment, is a misnomer. See Per AYOOLA, JSC in MAERSK LINE & ANOR V. ADDIDE INVESTMENTS LTD & ANOR (2002) LPELR-1811(SC). It is a mistake in name, i.e. giving incorrect name to a person in the writ of summons. It occurs when a mistake is made as to the name of a person who sued or was sued or when an action is brought by or against the wrong name of a person. When both parties are quite familiar with the entity envisaged in a Writ of Summons and could not have been misled or have any real doubt or misgiving as to the identity of the person suing or being sued, then there can be no problem of mistaken identity to justify a striking out of the action. A misnomer that will vitiate the proceedings would be such that will cause reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending to sue or be sued. See Per OKORO, JSC in REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS OF NIG V. NAMA (2014) LPELR- 22372 (SC).”
The important point to note is that it is the correct person who sued or has been sued (as in “All Progressive Party” instead of “All Progressive Grand Alliance”) but a mistake was made in stating the name, and none of the parties to the suit was misled by the mistake. That is to say, the error is as to the wrong name of the party; Registered Trustees of the Airline Operators of Nig. v. NAMA (2014) LPELR- 22372 (SC); A. B. Manu & Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. Costain (W.A.) Ltd (1994) LPELR-14550(CA). It is therefore well settled that where the correct person is taken to Court under a wrong name or an incorrect name is given to a party, an amendment may be sought to correct the mistake, and the Court is obliged to allow the amendment, in the interest of justice; Agbule v. Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2012) LPELR-20625 (SC); Maersk Line & Anor v. Addide Investments Ltd & Anor (2002) LPELR-1811(SC); Njoku v. United African Company Foods (1999) LPELR-13014(CA); Karmame & Anor v. Dan’azumi & Ors (2011) LPELR-9192(CA); Arab Contractors (O.A.O.) (Nig.) Ltd v. El-Raphaal Hospital and Maternity Home Investment Co. Ltd & Anor (2009) LPELR-8735(CA).

In the instant case, however, the scenario was in the opposite direction. The 1st and 2nd Respondents were sued for and on behalf of COSST, Nasarawa State Chapter. I am not unmindful of the fact that the 1st applicant in an earlier suit between the parties in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 was COSST, Nasarawa State Chapter. What can however be deduced from the depositions of the Appellants is that the correct party that the Appellants meant to sue was COSST. The Appellants deposed in paragraphs 19 – 21 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, pages 5 – 8 of the Record of Appeal:
19. That I know as a fact that COSST or ASUSS Bauchi State and COSST or ASUSS Nasarawa State owns(sic) their existence to one parent body registered as COSST or ASUSS.
20. That I know as a fact that both COSST in Bauchi State and in Nasarawa State are mere branches of the registered COSST or ASUSS.
21. That I know as a fact that neither COSST or ASUSS Bauchi State nor COSST or ASUSS Nasarawa State is independently registered as an Association. In other words, COSST or ASUSS is the registered body and not the respective State Branches. The 1st and 2nd Respondents were described in paragraph 6 of the said affidavit as the chairman and secretary of COSST, Nasarawa State Chapter. By these averments, as at the time the Appellants filed the action, they knew COSST or ASUSS was a registered body while the 1st and 2nd Respondents were only chairman and secretary of the Nasarawa State Chapter of the parent body.
It is well settled that only natural persons or a body of persons whom statutes have either expressly or by implication clothed with the garment of legal personality could prosecute or defend law suits by that name; Dairo & Ors v. The Registered Trustees of the Anglican Diocese of Lagos (2017) LPELR-42573(SC); Ataguba And Company v. Gura Nigeria Limited (2005) LPELR-584(SC); AG Federation v. ANPP & Ors (2003) LPELR-630(SC); Fawehinmi v. NBA & Ors (No 2) (1989) LPELR-1259(SC). I further place reliance on Reptico S. A. Geneva v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2013) LPELR-20662 (SC) wherein the Apex Court, per the Noble Lord, Ariwola, JSC, said:
“Generally, the law recognizes two categories of and be sued in Court. They are natural persons, with life, mind, brain and physical body and other artificial persons or institutions having juristic personality. See; Attorney General of Federation v. All Nigeria Peoples Party & Ors (2003) 12 SCM 1 at 12; (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.851) 182; (2003) 12 SC (Pt. 11) 146. In Mailafia Trading & Transport Company Ltd. v. Veritas Insurance Company Ltd. (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.38) 802, the Court held that a party who should commence action in Court must be a person known to law, that is, a legal Person. In other words, no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or body of persons, unless such a party has been given by statute, expressly or impliedly either (a) a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or (b) a right to sue or be sued by that name. See; Knight and Searle v. Dove (1964) 2 All ER 307, Admin Estate of Gen. Sanni Abacha v. Eke-Spiff & Ors (2009) 3 SCM 1; (2009) NWLR (Pt.1139) 92.”
A body registered under the Company and Allied Matters Act (Part C) acquires legal personality or becomes a juristic or artificial person. As settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncements, including those already cited and relied on, no legal action can be brought by or against any party in a Court of law other natural person or an artificial person who is a legal persona.
Annexed as Exhibit E to the Preliminary Objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, at page 159 of the Record of Appeal, is the Certificate of Registration of the Incorporated Trustees of COSST, dated 9/3/2001. By that Certificate, the Trustees of COSST became registered as a corporate body under the Company and Allied Matters Act (Part C). By virtue of the said Exhibit E, an action can be maintained against or defended by COSST though its Incorporated Trustees. A member of COSST, albeit an executive member of a State Branch of COSST, cannot sue or be sued for and on behalf of COSST. The 1st and 2nd Respondents, for this reason, lacked the competence to be sued for and on behalf of COSST. Their names therefore ought to be struck out of the suit. The contention of the Appellants’ Counsel, Dr. Ediru to the effect that the names of the 1st and 2nd Respondents was a misnomer cannot successfully fly. The point has earlier been made that a misnomer implies that the correct person was sued with the wrong name. But, in the instant case, the wrong person was sued. 1st and 2nd Respondents were not Registered Trustees of COSST. Therefore, it was not a mere case of misnomer. The names of the 1st and 2nd Respondents are accordingly hereby struck out. It is now to see if the action could have been successfully maintained against the 3rd – 6th Respondents.

The Appellants described the 3rd – 6th Respondents, and rightfully so, as agents of the Nasarawa State Government. See paragraph 7 of the affidavit in support, page 6 of the Record of Appeal. The only relief sought against the 3rd – 6th Respondents in the Originating Summons was Relief 5:
AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION mandating the 3rd – 6th Defendants to deduct check-off dues from the salaries of Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State for remittance to the NUT as provided by law.

This relief can only be granted upon a resolution of the Issues in controversy in favour of the Appellants. Unless COSST is a party to the action, these issues cannot be properly settled. There can be no judicial and judicious resolution of the issues in controversy. Further, it is trite that no order of Court can be binding or enforceable on a non-party to the action, in this case, COSST. Therefore, COSST was a necessary party to the action; Green v Green (1987) LPELR-1338(SC). The proper parties to whom rights and obligations arising from the cause of action attach must be before the Court; Ehidimhen v. Musa & Anor (2000) LPELR-1051(SC). Where the proper parties are not before the Court then the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit; Cotecna Intl Ltd v. Churchgate Nig Ltd & Anor (2010) LPELR-897(SC); Williams v. Williams & Anor (2018) LPELR-44901(SC); CBN v. Interstella Communications Limited & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940(SC). In the absence of the proper party, COSST, the learned trial Judge rightly declined jurisdiction and struck out the matter. Issues 1 and 2 are thus resolved against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondents.

Issue 3.
The affidavit evidence in support of the Preliminary Objections of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, and the 3rd – 6th Respondents, reveal the following facts:
The 1st and 2nd Appellants as Nigerian Union of Teachers, Nasarawa State Wing and the 3rd and 4th Respondents herein had been sued in 2002 by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, among others, before the Nasarawa State High Court in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002. The said trial Court in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 in its judgment, delivered on 27/11/2003, pages 125 to 154 of the Records of Appeal, held, inter alia:
“On the whole, I have not seen and have not been shown how and why the applicants can be restrained from exercising their Fundamental Right as enshrined in Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, consequently the applicants’ application succeeds. I grant same and accordingly make the following declarations and consequential orders:
(1). A declaration that the Applicants have a fundamental right to form themselves into an association for the protection of their rights and interests.
(2). A declaration that the Respondents have no right to compel the Applicants to belong to the Nigeria Union of Teachers.
(3). A perpetual injunction restraining the Respondents from treating the Applicant as members of the NUT and in particular restraint the 1st Respondent from demanding or in any way deducting the salaries of the Applicants as membership dues.”

The Nigeria Union of Teachers, Nasarawa State Wing lodged an appeal against the said judgment at the Jos Division of this Court. But the appeal was dismissed on 7/2/2006, upon failure to fail the appellant’s brief therein, a copy of the Order of this Court was attached as Exhibit C to their affidavit by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, page 150 of the Record of Appeal. That is to say, the judgment of 27/11/2003 is still subsisting.

The suit leading to this appeal was filed in 2014, eight years after the appeal filed by the Nigerian Union of Teachers Nasarawa State Wing was dismissed. Upon a consideration of the affidavit and annexed documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge held, page 267 of the Record of Appeal:
“Furthermore, I have studied the exhibits in support of the defendant/applicants’ preliminary objection, particularly the judgement of the Nassarawa State High Court Lafia. See Exhibit “A” delivered the 27th day of November, 2003, Exhibit ‘B’ of the same Court and Exhibit ‘C’ of the Court of Appeal in suit no. NSD/LF9m/2002 in Appeal No CA/J/148m2004, delivered the 7th day of February 2006. These are all decision of Courts arrived at after trial and also having heard the parties in the suit, for the claimants to submit that the decisions are not binding on a Court of coordinate jurisdiction, I find quite absurd. In any event, the decisions are binding and subsisting until appealed. Still on the same point, I find also that the subject matter and the issues raised at the Nassarawa State High Court are not distinct from the issues found in the claimants’ processes filed before this Court; the claimants may have in their own wisdom included or excluded some other parties to give this suit a different colouration from the previous suits notwithstanding, the subject matter still remains the same.” (Emphasis mine)

The trial Court continued, page 268 of the Record of appeal:
“Flowing therefore from my reasoning and totality of the authorities cited above, it is thus clear that the claimants’ suit filed before this Court is incompetent as I had earlier on held in this ruling. Furthermore, the principle of Res Judicata is applicable in this circumstance where this Court has found that the claimant’s suit is an abuse of the process of Court having filed a fresh suit before this Court, for which same issues and subject matter had been determined by the High Court of Nassarawa State Lafia.

On a calm consideration of the affidavit evidence as well as the Exhibits annexed thereto, I see no reason to disturb the conclusion of the learned trial Judge. In Saraki v Kotoye (1992) LPELR-3016(SC), the erudite Law Lord, Karibi Whyte, JSC (of blessed memory) explained, page 33:
“The concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. It’s one common feature is the improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice.”
There is abuse of process of Court where the process of the Court has not been used bona fide and properly. Circumstances in which abuse of Court process can arise has been said to include the following: –
(a) Instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues or multiplicity of action on the same matter between the same parties even where there exists a right to begin that action.
(b) Instituting different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different Courts even though on different grounds.
(c) Where two similar processes are used in respect of the exercise of the same right; for example a cross-appeal and a respondent’s notice.
(d) Where an application for adjournment is sought by a party to an action to bring an application to Court for leave to raise issues of fact already decided by Courts below.
(e) Where there is no iota of law supporting a Court process or where it is premised on frivolity or recklessness. It is not the existence of the right to institute these actions that is protested against, rather, it is the manner of exercise of this right and the purpose of doing same that is abhorred; Abubakar v. Bebeji Oil and Allied Products Ltd & Ors (2007) LPELR-55(SC); Ogboru & Anor v. Uduaghan & Ors (2013) LPELR-20805(SC); Ladoja v. Ajimobi & Ors (2016) LPELR-40658(SC).
The trial Court found and held that the Appellants’ suit was an abuse of Court process on the basis of res judicata. The rule of res judicata simply means that a plaintiff cannot, by formulating a fresh claim, re-litigate the same cause. As has been established in a plethora of judicial pronouncements, to successfully plead estoppel per rem judicatam, the party must establish the following requirements or pre-conditions: –
(a) That the parties or their privies are the same in both the previous and the present proceeding.
(b) That the claim or issues in dispute in both actions are the same.
(c) That the res or the subject matter of litigation in the two cases is the same.
(d) That the decision relied upon to support the plea of estoppel per rem judicatam is valid, subsisting and final.
(e) That the Court that gave the previous decision relied upon to sustain the plea is a Court of competent jurisdiction.
See: Ogbolosingha & Anor v. Bayelsa State IEC & Ors (2015) LPELR-24353(SC); Adeyemi-Bero v. Lagos State Development Property Corporation & Anor (2012) LPELR-20615 (SC); Odutola v. Oderinde & Ors (2004) LPELR-2258(SC).
The major parties in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 delivered on 27/11/2003, which went on appeal in Appeal No: CA/J/148m/2004 delivered on 7/2/2006, were COSST, Nasarawa State Chapter and NUT, Nasarawa State Chapter. The 1st and 2nd Respondents herein were sued for and on behalf of COSST, Nasarawa State Chapter, and that the 1st applicant in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 was COSST, Nasarawa State Chapter.
The subsisting orders in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 were:
(1). A declaration that the Applicants have a fundamental right to form themselves into an association for the protection of their rights and interests.
(2). A declaration that the Respondents have no right to compel the Applicants to belong to the Nigeria Union of Teachers.
(3). A perpetual injunction restraining the Respondents from treating the Applicant as members of the NUT and in particular restraint the 1st Respondent from demanding or in any way deducting the salaries of the Applicants as membership dues. (Emphasis mine).
The reliefs sought in the Appellants’ Originating Summons were:
1. A DECLARATION that Conference of Secondary School Tutors (COSST) of Academic Staff Union of Secondary Schools {ASUSS} Nasarawa State Chapter as represented by the 1st and 2nd Defendants is not a registered Trade Union under the Trade Union {Amendment} Act No. 17 of 2005.
2. A DECLARATION that COSST or ASUSS not being a registered Trade Union is not legible to enjoy the privileges of recognition by the Nasarawa State Government and the enjoyment of the check-off-dues from Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State and other benefits and privileges of registration and recognition granted by the Trade Union Act.
3. A Declaration that only the Nigeria Union of Teachers as a registered Trade Union with Secondary School Tutors as statutory members is entitled under the law to check-off-dues from Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State.
4. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 3rd – 6th defendants from according COSST or ASUSS as represented by the 1st and 2nd Defendants any form of recognition or privileges of a registered trade union.
5. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION mandating the 3rd – 6th Defendants to deduct check-off dues from the salaries of Secondary School Tutors in Nasarawa State for remittance to the NUT as provided by law.
6. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining COSST or ASUSS by itself or through its agents, servants, representatives and privies from parading itself as a trade union and, a fortiori, from meddling with trade union activities in Nasarawa State.

7. AND FOR SUCH other order{s} as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. (Emphasis mine).
An examination of the reliefs filed by the 1st and 2nd Appellants, for themselves and on behalf of the same NUT, Nasarawa State Wing, the NUT and others will show some overlap and similarity to the subsisting orders already made in the judgment of 27/11/2003 in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002, the appeal against it in Appeal No: CA/J/148m/2004 having been dismissed on 7/2/2006 by this Court, per Akaahs, JCA (as he then was). Even if one were to seek to disparage the judgment in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 by raising the argument that the 1st applicant in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 was not a juristic person, that argument may not have wings to successfully fly. In the first place, aside from the 1st applicant in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002, there were seven other applicants whose competence is not in doubt. Secondly, the said judgment abides until it is set aside on appeal, which has not happened.
I agree completely with Mr. Akuson for the 3rd – 6th Respondents that the lower Court in the instant case would be unable to grant the prayers of the Appellants as sought in the Originating Summons, without upsetting in some detail, the subsisting judgment in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002, bearing in mind that the major actors in the two cases remain COSST, Nasarawa State Wing and NUT, Nasarawa State Wing, as well as COSST (parent body) and NUT.
Res judicata operates not only against the parties but also against the Court itself as it robs the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the same cause of action on the same issues previously determined between the same parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction; Oleksandr & Ors v. Lonestar Drilling Company Limited & Anor (2015) LPELR-24614(SC); Ogbolosingha & Anor v. Bayelsa State IEC & Ors (supra). The learned trial Judge therefore rightly declined jurisdiction to entertain the Appellants’ suit as it was an abuse of Court process on the basis of res judicata. Issue No 3 is resolved against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondents.

Issue 4
I agree with Mr. Akuson for the 3rd – 6th Respondents that, fundamentally, the manner in which the Issue was couched by the Appellants’ Counsel is misleading. Ground 8 shorn of its particulars reads:
The trial Court erred in law when in its judgment it held as follows:
“…These are all decisions of Court arrived at after trial and also having heard the parties in the suit for the claimants to submit that the decisions are not binding on a Court of coordinate jurisdiction, I find quite absurd. In any event the decisions are binding and subsisting until appealed”.

The “decisions” referred to by the learned trial Judge as subsisting and binding on the trial Court, at page 267 of the Record of Appeal, and cited in ground 8 of the grounds of appeal, were the decisions in Suit No NSD/LF9m/2002 delivered on 27/11/2003, and in Appeal No CA/J/148m/2004 delivered on 7/2/2006. The further reference to Nigerian Union of Teachers v Kogi State Teaching Service Commission & Anor, Suit No. NICN/34/2007 by the trial Court was to a decision of another division of the lower Court which the trial Court found relevant to the issues before it.

I therefore also agree with Mr. Afolabi for the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the arguments of Dr. Ediru for the Appellants on this issue do not flow from ground 8 of the grounds of appeal. It is completely extraneous thereto. Issue for determination must flow from the grounds of appeal; Onyesoh v. Nnebedun & Ors (1992) LPELR-2742(SC); Lau v. PDP & Ors (2017) LPELR-42800(SC). I therefore resolve Issue 4 against the Appellants.

Issue 5
Once more, I agree with Mr. Afolabi for the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the arguments of the Appellants adumbrated from this issue do not arise from the ruling of the learned trial Judge in which the preliminary objection of the Respondents was upheld.

The transcribed record, at page 273, reveals that on 5/12/2014, the trial Court heard arguments from Counsel for the parties on whether the challenge to the jurisdiction of the trial Court should be first heard and determined before the substantive matter, or whether the issue of jurisdiction should be taken alongside the Originating Summons and determined together. The trial Court ruled that the issue of jurisdiction be taken first. The substantive issues arising from the Originating Summons were not considered. In any event, at the material time, none of the Respondents had filed their Counter affidavits to the Originating Summons, following the understanding that preliminary issues would first be resolved. The issues relating to the legal status and rights of the Respondents to practice trade unionism under Sections 3, 5 and 17 of the Trade Union (Amended) Act, 2005 and Section 5(3) of the Labour (Amended) Act, 1986, therefore did not arise from the Ruling on appeal. Issue 5 is therefore resolved against the Appellants.

All issues arising for determination of this appeal have thus been resolved against the Appellants. The appeal is without merit. It fails and is hereby dismissed.
The Appellants are liable in costs which is assessed in favour of the 1st and 2nd Respondents at N100,000.00.

IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother, HON. JUSTICE O.A. OTISI, JCA; and I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion.

The issue of jurisdiction of any matter before a Court of law is fundamental to the adjudicatory process. In the case of Zakari vs. Nigerian Army (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1487) 77 at page 97 paragraphs A-E per Peter-Odili, JSC whose lead Judgment was re-echoed by M.D. Muhammad, JSC at pages 111-112 and C.C. Nweze, JSC at page 112-113 paragraphs H-E re-emphasized the trite position of the law as was laid down in the celebrated case of Madukolu & Ors. vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR 587; per Bairamian F.J. that before a Court is competent to adjudicate on a matter the following conditions must be made namely
“(1) It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(2) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
(3) the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Any defect in competence is fatal, for the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided; the defect is extrinsic to the adjudication.”
Their Lordships of the Apex Court also re-stated the fundamental nature of jurisdiction in the adjudicatory process where they posited that jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a Court of law without the jurisdiction, the action being like an animal drained of its blood, ceases to be alive. Bereft of any blood in it and indeed without life, any effort at resuscitating it remains a futile exercise. See Utih vs. Onoyivwe (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 166) 166; Usman vs. Umaru (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.254) 377 and the recent Supreme Court cases of Emejuru vs. Abraham (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1663) 541 at page 560 paragraphs B-C; page 567 paragraphs A-B, page 568 paragraph B, per Galumje, Peter-Odili, and Sanusi, JSC

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A.: I read in advance a copy of the lead judgment of my learned brother, Otisi, JCA. which has just been delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein that the appeal lacks merit.

A misnomer is a mistake in name, that is giving Incorrect name to a person in the writ of summons. It occurs when a mistake is made as to the name of a person who sued or was sued or when an action is brought by or against the wrong name of a person. In other words, a misnomer occurs when the correct person is brought to Court in a wrong name. See The Registered Trustees of the Airline Operators of Nigeria V. Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1408) 1 and All Progressives Grand Alliance V. Ubah (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt 1694) 25. The matter under consideration is not a case of misnomer as the appellants knowingly (and not mistakenly) sued the 1st and 2nd respondents. They therefore dragged the wrong persons in their correct names to the court. Since the Conference of Secondary School Tutors (COSST) has been registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the trustees have become a corporate body invested with the power to sue and be sued in the corporate name. See The Registered Trustees, Pentecostal Assemblies of the World Inc V. The Registered Trustees of African Apostolic Christ Church (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt. 790) 427.

The appellants should not have sued the 1st and 2nd appellants but rather should have sued The Incorporated Trustees of COSST. I therefore agree with my lord that they ought to be struck out of the suit. The suit as it is now constituted Is improperly constituted and the trial Court was right in declining jurisdiction and striking out the suit.
It is for the foregoing and the more insightful reasons marshaled in the lead judgment that I too dismiss the appeal.
I abide by the order as to costs made in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

The Appellants’ Counsel, Dr. M.E. Ediru, who was served electronically on 15/3/2020 with a Hearing Notice, was absent. The Appellants were not represented For Appellant(s)

Olayiwola Afolabi, Esq., with him, Esther Uloho, Esq. – for 1st and 2nd Respondents.

A. H. Akuson, Esq., Principal State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Nasarawa State – for 3rd – 6th Respondents For Respondent(s)